Carlson, J. v. Graziano, M.

J-S22034-25

NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT O.P. 65.37

JUSTIN CARLSON AND REBECCA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF

LOMBARD : PENNSYLVANIA

:

Appellant :

:

:

v. :

:

: No. 1675 MDA 2024

MICHELLE GRAZIANO, CHILDREN :

HOSPITAL OF PHILADELPHIA, :

SUSQUEHANNA COUNTY CHILDREN :

AND YOUTH SERVICES, UNKNOWN :

CHOP ADMINISTRATOR, AND :

UNKNOWN CHOP SOCIAL WORKER :

Appeal from the Order Dated October 16, 2024

In the Court of Common Pleas of Susquehanna County Civil Division at

No(s): 2024-0612-CP

BEFORE: LAZARUS, P.J., BOWES, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*

CONCURRING MEMORANDUM BY STEVENS, P.J.E.:

FILED FEBRUARY 06, 2026

Procedurally, this matter formally commenced with Susquehanna

County Children and Youth Services (“CYS”) making an oral application for

protective custody of Appellants’ child in the juvenile court division, and the

trial court orally granting the application on August 12, 2024. The next day,

on August 13, 2024, CYS filed a written shelter care application, and

Appellants filed a pro se emergency petition for special injunctive relief in the

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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.

J-S22034-25

civil division.1 The trial court sua sponte consolidated the shelter care

application and Appellants’ petition for special injunctive relief. The court

scheduled a hearing for August 14, 2024, to address both matters.

During the August 14, 2024, hearing, the witnesses’ testimony belied

the averments made in CYS’s shelter care application. Consequently, CYS

moved to withdraw its shelter care application. The trial court granted the

motion and vacated the emergency protective custody order. Based on the

testimony presented during the hearing, and the trial court’s ruling vacating

the emergency protective custody order, the trial court denied as moot

Appellants’ August 13, 2024, petition for special injunctive relief. Specifically,

by order entered on August 15, 2024, the trial court held that, because the

emergency protective custody order was vacated, the shelter care application

was withdrawn, and full custody of the child had been restored to Appellants,

Appellants’ petition for special injunctive relief was moot.

There is no dispute that Appellants did not file a notice of appeal within

thirty days from the August 15, 2024, order denying their petition for special

injunctive relief. Rather, within ten days, on August 23, 2024, Appellants filed

a pro se motion entitled “Motion for Reconsideration of Petitioners’ Injunction

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1 The shelter care application proceeded in the juvenile court division while

Appellants’ petitions were filed in the civil court division. The matters were

consolidated for hearings before the same lower court judge. Thus, for ease

of discussion, the juvenile court and the trial court are referred to as the “trial

court.”

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for Special Relief and Supporting Memorandum.” The Majority concludes that,

since the trial court did not expressly grant reconsideration within the thirty-

day appeal period, it did not toll the time for Appellants to file a notice of

appeal to this Court relative to the August 15, 2024, order. See Majority

Memorandum at *9. Consequently, the Majority concludes Appellants “missed

the appeal window” by waiting for the trial court to dispose of the

reconsideration motion on October 16, 2024. Majority Memorandum at *9.

While the Majority correctly holds that Appellants could have filed an

appeal immediately as of right from the August 15, 2024, order, which denied

as moot their petition for special injunctive relief, I respectfully disagree that

they were required to do so. See Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4); SBA Towers II LLC

v. Wireless Holdings, LLC, 231 A.3d 901 (Pa.Super. 2020) (en banc)

(discussing the interplay between Pa.R.C.P. 227.1 and Pa.R.A.P. 311(a)(4)).

Rather, since the trial court held a consolidated evidentiary hearing on August

14, 2024, and, based on the testimony presented, dismissed Appellants’

petition for special injunctive relief as moot at the conclusion of the hearing,

Appellants were not precluded from filing a timely post-trial motion. See

Wolk v. School District of Lower Merion, 649 Pa. 604, 197 A.3d 730

(2018) (discussing the filing of post-trial motions in cases involving petitions

for injunctive relief).

That is, after the trial court rendered its decision denying the injunction

and resolving all issues following a hearing, Appellants, the aggrieved litigants,

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were permitted to file timely post-trial motions. Id. Accordingly, Appellants’

“Motion for Reconsideration of Petitioners’ Injunction for Special Relief and

Supporting Memorandum” was a timely filed post-trial motion. See Pa.R.C.P.

227.1. Consequently, Appellants’ notice of appeal filed on November 12, 2024,

which was within thirty days of the trial court’s October 16, 2024, order

denying the “Motion for Reconsideration of Petitioners’ Injunction for Special

Relief and Supporting Memorandum,” was timely filed. See Pa.R.A.P. 903(a)

(setting forth time limits for taking an appeal).

Turning to the issues raised in Appellants’ brief, the pro se brief is not a

model of clarity. In any event, to the extent Appellants challenge CYS’s ability

to seize custody of the child based solely upon an oral application and oral

order, the issue is meritless.2

The Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure relevantly provide:

A. Application of order. The application for a court order of

protective custody may be orally made; however, the request

shall be reduced to writing within twenty-four hours. The request

shall set forth reasons for the need of protective custody.

B. Finding of court.

***

(3) The order may initially be oral, provided that it is reduced to

writing within twenty-four hours or the next court business day.

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2 As it relates to the application of the mootness doctrine, “an actual claim or

controversy must be present at all stages of the judicial process for the case

to be actionable or reviewable.” In re Duran, 769 A.2d 497, 502 (Pa.Super.

2001) (citations omitted). However, mootness would not prevent review in

this case because it meets at least one of the exceptions to the mootness

doctrine. See In re D.A., 801 A.2d 614, 617 (Pa.Super. 2002) (en banc)

(citations omitted).

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Pa.R.J.C.P. 1210(A), (B)(3) (bold in original).

Accordingly, contrary to Appellants’ assertion, there is authority for a

trial court to issue an oral emergency protective custody order provided that

it is reduced to writing within twenty-four hours, as occurred in the case sub

judice.

Moreover, in their brief, Appellants question the standard to be applied

by courts in ruling on oral emergency protective custody applications filed by

CYS, as well as whether the appropriate standard was satisfied in this case.

The Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure provide the following: “(1) A child may

be taken into protective custody by court order when the court determines

that removal of the child is necessary for the welfare and best interests of the

child.” Pa.R.J.C.P. 1210(B)(2).

Here, in its confirmation of oral order for emergency protective custody,

the trial court referenced the needs, welfare, and best interests of the child.

Based on the evidence provided to the trial court at that time, including the

allegation Appellants were interfering with life-saving medical care for child,

the trial court granted the oral application for emergency protective care under

the appropriate standard.

As the Majority notes, thereafter, during the August 14, 2024,

evidentiary hearing, it became apparent that the reports made to CYS, which

formed the basis for CYS’s oral application for protective custody of the child

and the written shelter care application, were not supported by the evidence.

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Thus, during the hearing, CYS moved to withdraw the shelter care application,

and the trial court properly granted the motion, as well as vacated the

emergency protective custody order. The Majority criticizes CYS’s efforts in

this case, concluding CYS’s oral application and subsequent written

applications were based on false or baseless information.

However, in my view, particularly with the exigency inherent in these

types of matters, CYS (and more importantly the trial court) followed the

mandates of the Child Protective Services Law (“CPSL”) and the Pennsylvania

Rules of Juvenile Court Procedure. See Interest of C.B., 264 A.3d 761

(Pa.Super. 2021) (en banc) (discussing the purpose of the CPSL is mainly to

work as a vehicle for reporting abuse and bringing quickly into play services,

including court hearings, available through county protective service facilities

for the care of the child). Certainly, there will be times when the evidence

offered during the hearing will reveal reports are “unfounded;” however, the

CPSL’s preference is for “over-investigating unfounded reports as opposed to

one of under-reporting founded allegations.” Commonwealth v. Coyne, ___

A.3d. ___, 2025 WL 2619297, at *12 (Pa.Super. 2025) (cleaned up).3

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3 I agree with the Majority that there is no merit to Appellants’ claim that,

since the original report of child abuse was “unfounded,” CYS must be enjoined

from conducting future investigations based on valid reports. Such a holding

would be contrary to the purpose of the CPSL, which has the primary purpose

of protecting children from abuse. See Coyne, 2025 WL 2619297, at *11-

12.

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I do not fault CYS in this case and instead commend CYS for their

concern about the health, safety, and best interests of a child. Once CYS was

given notification about possible parental interference in necessary medical

treatment of a child, CYS sought a hearing, an entirely appropriate course of

action, i.e., the purpose of the hearing was to determine the facts of the case.

As an appellate court, it is our responsibility to review the actions of the

trial court, and it is the trial court’s responsibility to analyze the actions of

CYS, which it did, and did correctly, in this case.

Finally, Appellants suggest they suffered “irreparable” harm from the

improper removal of the child from their custody for approximately forty-eight

hours. They specifically ask this Court to render an “advisory opinion”

clarifying the type of evidence suitable for the granting of an oral application

for protective custody, as well as whether the Pennsylvania Rules of Juvenile

Court Procedure, which permit oral applications and oral orders, are

“fundamentally flawed.” Appellants’ Brief at 58-59.

However, since it is impermissible for this Court to render advisory

opinions, I decline to do so. See Trust of John S. Middleton, 313 A.3d 1079

(Pa.Super. 2024) (holding it is impermissible for courts to render purely

advisory opinions). Accordingly, while I agree with the Majority’s affirming of

the trial court’s order, I disagree with portions of the Majority’s analysis.

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