The opinion
J-S13010-24
2024 PA Super 114
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
JOHN LEONARD CORBIN :
:
Appellant : No. 1393 WDA 2023
Appeal from the Order Entered November 6, 2023
In the Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County Criminal Division at
No(s): CP-04-CR-0000327-2003
BEFORE: KUNSELMAN, J., BECK, J., and STEVENS, P.J.E.*
OPINION BY STEVENS, P.J.E.: FILED: JUNE 3, 2024
Appellant, John Leonard Corbin, appeals from the order entered in the
Court of Common Pleas of Beaver County denying his Petition for Judicial Relief
in which he sought declaratory relief stating that he had satisfied all court-
ordered restitution obligations, injunctive relief directing cessation of further
collections, and compensatory relief for alleged excessive restitution
payments made. After careful review, we affirm.
The trial court sets forth the pertinent procedural history, as follows:
This case arose out of the homicide of David Kyler, the husband
of Appellant’s mother, Mildred Corbin. At trial held in 2004, the
Commonwealth presented evidence to the jury that Appellant had
killed David Kyler by striking him in the head with a hammer
during a physical altercation between the two men while they were
alone in the home shared by Mr. Kyler and Ms. Corbin. Following
the homicide, Appellant rifled through a few dresser drawers and
a jewelry box in the home, and he broke open a piggy bank, taking
the money he found there.
____________________________________________
* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
J-S13010-24
Following the jury trial, on March 4, 2004, the jury returned a
verdict finding Appellant guilty of second-degree murder, third-
degree murder, aggravated assault, robbery, and theft by
unlawful taking. On April 7, 2004, President Judge McBride
sentenced Appellant to life imprisonment without the possibility of
parole. President Judge McBride further sentenced Appellant to
pay restitution to Mildred Corbin, Appellant’s mother and the wife
of the deceased victim,fn in the amount of $3,590.36. President
Judge McBride also sentenced Appellant to pay laboratory costs to
the Greensburg Regional Laboratory in the amount of $2,967.25.
In total, Appellant’s restitution [and costs] obligation amounted to
$7,102.81. (Entry of Judgment Notice – Restitution, Fees, Costs,
Fines, and Penalties, 7/8/2004).
FN. In Commonwealth v. Labarre, [961 A.2d 176
(Pa. Super. 2008)], the Superior Court held that “because
an estate stands in the shoes of the victim under the
restitution statute, it is the ‘victim’ within the meaning of
that statute.” [Id. at 181]. The [trial] court finds this case
noteworthy, as Judge McBride’s sentence order does not
specify the reasoning behind Appellant’s sentence to pay
restitution to Mildred Corbin, and the entire record of this
case is unavailable to the [trial court] due to its age.
On August 23, 2023, Appellant filed a Petition for Judicial Relief.
In his Petition, Appellant [sought] the following relief from the
Court: (1) declaratory relief stating that Appellant has satisfied
all restitution and other court-ordered obligations in the above-
captioned case; (2) injunctive relief directing the immediate
cessation of all Act 84 collections; (3) compensatory relief for the
moneys collected up to June 30, 2023, in the amount of $335.06,
which Appellant alleges is in excess of the amount ordered by
President Judge McBride; (4) compensatory relief for those
excessive moneys collected beyond June 30, 2023.
In support of these requests, Appellant cited 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9728(b)(5)(i) and § 9728(g.1). Appellant argued that because his
mother Mildred Corbin passed away in March 2019, any restitution
still owed to her was subject to annulment, and Appellant was
thereby entitled to be released of his monetary obligation to Ms.
Corbin.
-2-
J-S13010-24
Appellant also alleged that any restitution payments he made to
his mother after her death should be redirected toward the
payment of Appellant’s other court-ordered payments, fees, and
costs. Appellant attached the payment plan of his case as Exhibit
B1-7 to show that from July 27, 2004, to March 19, 2019, the
Pennsylvania Department of Corrections (“DOC”) collected a total
of $2,204.39 from his prison inmate account. Appellant also
stated that as of June 30, 2023, a grand total of $3,972.50 had
been collected from his inmate account for the costs and fees
President Judge McBride ordered him to pay.
The Commonwealth filed an Answer to Appellant’s Petition on
October 2, 2023. Appellant filed a Response to Commonwealth’s
Answer on October 20, 2023.
...
The [trial court] held a hearing on Appellant’s Petition on the
scheduled date, November 6, 2023. Appellant participated in the
hearing by video conference call. At the hearing, the Solicitor of
the Clerk of Courts . . . presented the testimony of . . . the Clerk
of Courts for Beaver County. The Clerk of Courts testified 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 9728(g.1) states that “no less than 50% of all money
collected by the county probation department . . . shall, until
satisfaction of the defendant’s restitution obligation, be used to
pay restitution to victims.” [The Clerk of Courts] indicated that it
is standard practice in Beaver County to use 100% of payments
to satisfy restitution payments until the restitution payment is
satisfied.
[The Clerk of Courts] indicated that she received restitution
amounts [from Appellant] pursuant to President Judge McBride’s
Sentence Order of April 7, 2004. The Clerk of Courts received a
total of $1,583.02 in payments from Appellant, which were
forwarded to the victim Mildred Corbin. [The Clerk of Courts]
indicated that after Mildred Corbin moved to Georgia on or about
June 21, 2018, the checks of Appellant’s restitution payments that
the Clerk of Courts sent to Ms. Corbin were returned uncashed.
In fact, according to an obituary presented by the Commonwealth,
Ms. Corbin passed away on March 16, 2019, in Columbia, Georgia.
[]. On February 13, 2023, the Clerk of Courts forwarded
Appellant’s [unremitted] payments of $2,007.34 to the
-3-
J-S13010-24
Department of Revenue’s Bureau of Unclaimed Property. [The
Clerk of Courts] also testified at the hearing that Appellant still
owes $1,905.99 to be paid to Greensburg Regional Laboratory.
Trial Court Opinion, 12/11/23, at 1-4.
Appellant presents the following question for this Court’s review:
Whether the [trial court] abused its discretion in denying the
Appellant’s Petition for Judicial Relief?
Brief for Appellant, at 7.
Pursuant to 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(c)(3), a defendant required to pay
restitution as part of their sentence may “at any time” file a petition in the
trial court to modify or amend the restitution order. Commonwealth v.
Gentry, 101 A.3d 813, 816 (Pa. Super. 2014). “Our case law in this
Commonwealth establishes that [this] statute creates an independent cause
of action for a defendant to seek a modification of an existing restitution
order.” Id.
The crux of Appellant’s argument, as stated in his appellate brief,
asserts,
Appellant is ultimately asking the court to apply the money
unclaimed by his mother due to her death and apply it to his fines,
costs, and fees. This could be done simply by amending the
amount of restitution to the amount [Mother] actually claimed and
directing the Clerk of Courts to seek remittance of the amount
forwarded to the Treasurer of Pennsylvania as unclaimed.
Brief for Appellant at 13.
There is no reasonable dispute to the trial court’s observation that
Appellant would have enjoyed a windfall in the form of a $2,007.34 reduction
to his restitution obligation if the trial court had applied the unremitted portion
-4-
J-S13010-24
of restitution owed to his widowed Mother to cover the outstanding balance of
the separate costs obligation he owes to the Greensburg Regional Laboratory.
Appellant responds, however, that although the intent underlying the trial
court’s order may be consistent with the rehabilitative purposes of restitution,
the unintended consequence of placing him in position to claim the unremitted
portion of his restitution payments under Section 3101(e) of the Probate,
Estates and Fiduciaries Code1 undermines such intent, as he contends he has
____________________________________________
1 Section 3101(e) provides,
(e) Unclaimed property.--
(1) In any case where property or funds owned by an
individual who has died a resident of this
Commonwealth have been reported to the
Commonwealth and are in the custody of the State
Treasurer as unclaimed or abandoned property, the
State Treasurer, at any time after the death of the
individual, shall be authorized under this section to
distribute the property or to pay the amount being
held in custody where all of the following conditions
are present:
(i) The amount of the funds or the value
of the property is $11,000 or less.
(ii) The person claiming the property or
the funds is the surviving spouse, child,
mother or father, or sister or brother of
the decedent, with preference given in
that order.
(iii) A personal representative of the
decedent has not been appointed or five
years have lapsed since the appointment
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-5-
J-S13010-24
____________________________________________
of a personal representative of the
decedent.
(2) Upon being presented with a claim for property
owned by a decedent, the State Treasurer shall
require the person claiming the property to provide all
of the following prior to distributing the property or
paying the amount held in custody:
(i) A certified death certificate of the
owner.
(ii) A sworn affidavit under the penalties
of 18 Pa.C.S. § 4904 (relating to unsworn
falsification to authorities) setting forth
the relationship of the claimant to the
decedent, the existence or nonexistence
of a duly appointed personal
representative of the decedent and any
other persons that may be entitled under
this section to make a claim to the
decedent's property.
(iii) Other information determined by the
State Treasurer to be necessary in order
to distribute property or pay funds under
this section to the proper person.
(3) If the State Treasurer determines the claimant to
be a person entitled to claim property of a decedent
owner, the State Treasurer shall pay or distribute such
property to the claimant and shall thereby be released
to the same extent as if payment or distribution had
been made to a duly appointed personal
representative of the decedent and shall not be
required to oversee the application of the payments
made. Any claimant to whom payment is made shall
be answerable therefore to anyone prejudiced by an
improper distribution or payment.
20 Pa.C.S.A. § 3101(e).
-6-
J-S13010-24
the right to access the funds under Section 3101(e) as his mother’s primary
heir.
Specifically, Appellant posits that by failing to amend the restitution
order as he requested, the trial court has left him no choice but to claim the
unremitted portion as a primary heir to Mother’s estate and, thus, frustrate
the purpose of his restitution sentence. He asks somewhat disingenuously,
“How does leaving the door open for the Appellant to claim the victim’s
unclaimed restitution impress upon him that his conduct caused the victim’s
loss? How does it follow the trial court’s stated rational [sic] of believing it
unjust to allow the Appellant to benefit (by analogy to the slayer’s act [see
infra]) from the victim’s death?” He answers his own question, “It does not .
. . .”, see Brief of Appellant at 16, as if he lacks the capacity to forgo pursuing
this claim in favor of simply fulfilling the restitution sentence and its
rehabilitative purpose that he claims to appreciate.
Initially, we reject Appellant’s position that the trial court’s refusal to
apply the unremitted restitution payments to the outstanding balance of his
laboratory fees is “manifestly unreasonable and inconsistent with the
Sentencing Code.” To the contrary, it is entirely reasonable and consistent
with the Sentencing Code for the trial court to recognize the undeserved
payout that would result by refunding unremitted restitution payments to
Appellant and applying them to still unpaid portions of his lab fees, thereby
effectively decreasing the amount of his aggregate sentence of restitution and
costs by over $2,000.00.
-7-
J-S13010-24
The primary purpose of restitution is not to compensate the victim but
to rehabilitate the offender. Commonwealth v. Brown, 956 A.2d 992, 996
(Pa. Super. 2008). On this point, we have explained,
“[R]estitution does not seek, by its essential nature, the
compensation of the victim[.]” Pleger, 934 A.2d at 720 (emphasis
added). Rather, the primary purpose of restitution is to
rehabilitate the offender by impressing on him the fact that his
actions damaged the victim. Id. “In the end, restitution is not
simply an award of damages, but, rather, a sentence.” Id. The
amount of restitution set by the court is related to the amount of
damage sustained by the victim, but restitution is not itself a civil
damage award. Id. “It is true that restitution helps the victim,
but this fact is secondary to the reality that restitution is an aspect
of sentencing imposed by the court on an offender in order to
facilitate the administration of criminal justice.” Id. Where the
defendant has caused personal injury or property damage to the
victim, restitution is mandatory. Id., citing 42 Pa.C.S.A. §
9721(c) and 18 Pa.C.S.A. § 1106(a).
Brown, supra (emphasis in original). Applying Brown to the present facts,
we concur with the trial court’s determination that effectively refunding
Appellant a portion of his unremitted restitution payments such that he
receives the benefit of compensation therefrom would negate the
rehabilitative purpose of the reasonable restitution payments2 that the trial
court’s order requires him to complete.
Furthermore, to the extent the remainder of Appellant’s argument
hinges on his apparent assumption that because his Mother’s husband is
deceased, he automatically supplants husband as the priority heir to Mother’s
____________________________________________
2 Notably, Appellant does not contest the reasonableness of the aggregate
restitution and costs of $7,102.81 imposed by the trial court.
-8-
J-S13010-24
intestate estate and thus stands as a “proper person” entitled under Section
3101(e) to claim his Mother’s unremitted restitution payments, he has failed
to offer a developed legal argument to this end. For this reason, we reject his
position that his acquisition of the unremitted restitution payments placed in
the custody of the State Treasurer as unclaimed or abandoned property would
be a self-evident matter of right under Section 3101(e).
Specifically, Appellant has not shown that he meets the criteria of
Section 3101(e) necessary to demand that the Pennsylvania State Treasurer
distribute his unremitted restitution payments back to him as a “proper
person” under that section, particularly in light of the trial court’s observations
that the requested refund through Section 3101(e) not only would flout the
punitive and rehabilitative purposes of restitution in this case but also would
offend equitable principles and notions of sound public policy, both generally
and as specifically applied in the Slayer Act, 20 Pa.C.S. § 8801 et seq.,3 which
____________________________________________
3 This Court has described the Slayer Act as follows:
Pennsylvania's Slayer Act[] (“the Slayer Act”) defines a “slayer” as
“any person who participates, either as a principal or as an
accessory before the fact, in the willful and unlawful killing of any
other person.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 8801. To prevent slayers from
acquiring property or benefits from the estates of those they
killed, the Slayer Act provides:
No slayer shall in any way acquire any property or
receive any benefit as the result of the death of the
decedent, but such property shall pass as provided in
the sections following.
(Footnote Continued Next Page)
-9-
J-S13010-24
the trial court appropriately invoked by analogy as additional reasonable
grounds to deny Appellant’s requested refund.4 The Slayer Act “seeks to
determine whether an individual acquired any property or benefit from a killing
and to prevent such person from profiting by his own wrongdoing.” Dinardo
v. Kohler, 304 A.3d 1187, 1197 (Pa. 2023). What constitutes a benefit under
____________________________________________
20 Pa.C.S. § 8802. To accomplish this goal, the Slayer Act deems
slayers,
to have predeceased the decedent as to property
which would have passed from the decedent or his
estate to the slayer under the statutes of descent and
distribution or have been acquired by dower, by
curtesy or by statutory right as surviving spouse.
20 Pa.C.S. § 8803. Further, the Slayer Act expressly
states that it shall “be construed broadly in order to
effect the policy of this State that no person shall be
allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever
committed.” 20 Pa.C.S. § 8815.
In addition to the Slayer Act, the Probate, Estates and Fiduciaries
Code expressly provides:
Slayer's share.—Any person who participates either
as a principal or as an accessory before the fact in the
wilful [sic] and unlawful killing of any person shall not
in any way acquire property or receive any benefits as
the result of such killing, but such property or benefits
shall be distributed as provided in Chapter 88 of this
code (relating to slayers).
20 Pa.C.S. § 2106(c).
In re Est. of McAndrew, 131 A.3d 988, 990 (Pa. Super. 2016)
4 The trial court appropriately acknowledges that it applies the Slayer Act by
analogy because the Act precludes a slayer from benefitting from the estate
of the decedent, who is defined by statute as the victim of the slayer’s conduct.
- 10 -
J-S13010-24
the Slayer's Act “has been broadly construed to include anything that works
to the advantage or gain of the recipient[.]” Id. (citing Drumheller v.
Marcello, 532 A.2d 807, 810 (1987) (observing Slayer Act has been applied
to bar recovery of any benefit of any kind.).5
We understand the trial court’s decision in this matter as one
appropriately recognizing the intersection between principles underlying the
Slayer Act, as applied to this case by analogy, and Section 3101(e)’s vesting
of power unto the Treasurer to acquire information needed to determine who
presents as a “proper person” to claim property. Presented with no
meaningful argument contesting this relationship, we conclude that it was
within the sound discretion of the trial court to enter its order directing
Appellant to continue payments required under his original sentence of
restitution. Accordingly, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
____________________________________________
5 See the Slayer Act’s section 8815, “Broad construction; policy of State”,
which provides, “This chapter shall not be considered penal in nature, but shall
be construed broadly in order to effect the policy of this State that no person
shall be allowed to profit by his own wrong, wherever committed.” 20
Pa.C.S.A. § 8815.
- 11 -
J-S13010-24
DATE: 6/3/2024
- 12 -