Knowingly leaving scene of accident under certain circumstances; crime, sentencing.

1. A motor vehicle operator who knows he is involved in an accident and knowingly leaves the scene of that accident under circumstances that violate the provisions of R.S.39:4-129 shall be guilty of a crime of the second degree if the accident results in the death of another person. If the evidence so warrants, nothing in this section shall be deemed to preclude an indictment and conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4 , reckless vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 or strict liability vehicular homicide under the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3). Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:1-8 or any other provisions of law, a conviction arising under this section shall not merge with a conviction for aggravated manslaughter under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-4, reckless vehicular homicide under the provisions of N.J.S.2C:11-5 or strict liability vehicular homicide under the provisions of section 1 of P.L.2017, c.165 (C.2C:11-5.3) and a separate sentence shall be imposed upon each such conviction. Notwithstanding the provisions of N.J.S.2C:44-5 or any other provisions of law, when the court imposes multiple sentences of imprisonment for more than one offense, those sentences shall run consecutively. For the purposes of this section, neither knowledge of the death nor knowledge of the violation are elements of the offense and it shall not be a defense that the operator of the motor vehicle was unaware of the death or of the provisions of R.S.39:4-129. L.1997, c.111, s.1; amended 2003, c.55, s.2; 2007, c.83, s.1; 2017, c.165, s.4.