Burden of proof

(a) In any action for medical injury, when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving: (1) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant, the degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and used by members of the profession of the medical care provider in good standing, engaged in the same type of practice or specialty in the locality in which he or she practices or in a similar locality; (2) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant that the medical care provider failed to act in accordance with that standard; and (3) By means of expert testimony provided only by a qualified medical expert that as a proximate result thereof the injured person suffered injuries that would not otherwise have occurred. (b) (1) Without limiting the applicability of subsection (a) of this section, when the plaintiff claims that a medical care provider failed to supply adequate information to obtain the informed consent of the injured person, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the treatment, procedure, or surgery was performed in other than an emergency situation and that the medical care provider did not supply that type of information regarding the treatment, procedure, or surgery as would customarily have been given to a patient in the position of the injured person or other persons authorized to give consent for such a patient by other medical care providers with similar training and experience at the time of the treatment, procedure, or surgery in the locality in which the medical care provider practices or in a similar locality. (2) In determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the following matters shall also be considered as material issues: (A) Whether a person of ordinary intelligence and awareness in a position similar to that of the injured person or persons giving consent on his or her behalf could reasonably be expected to know of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery; (B) Whether the injured party or the person giving consent on his or her behalf knew of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery; (C) Whether the injured party would have undergone the treatment, procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or whether he or she did not wish to be informed thereof; and (D) Whether it was reasonable for the medical care provider to limit disclosure of information because such disclosure could be expected to adversely and substantially affect the injured person's condition. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2614; Acts 2003, No. 649, § 18.

t, procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or whether he or she did not wish to be informed thereof; and (D) Whether it was reasonable for the medical care provider to limit disclosure of information because such disclosure could be expected to adversely and substantially affect the injured person's condition. Acts 1979, No. 709, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2614; Acts 2003, No. 649, § 18.

(a) In any action for medical injury, when the asserted negligence does not lie within the jury's comprehension as a matter of common knowledge, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving: (1) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant, the degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and used by members of the profession of the medical care provider in good standing, engaged in the same type of practice or specialty in the locality in which he or she practices or in a similar locality; (2) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant that the medical care provider failed to act in accordance with that standard; and (3) By means of expert testimony provided only by a qualified medical expert that as a proximate result thereof the injured person suffered injuries that would not otherwise have occurred.

(1) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant, the degree of skill and learning ordinarily possessed and used by members of the profession of the medical care provider in good standing, engaged in the same type of practice or specialty in the locality in which he or she practices or in a similar locality;

(2) By means of expert testimony provided only by a medical care provider of the same specialty as the defendant that the medical care provider failed to act in accordance with that standard; and

(3) By means of expert testimony provided only by a qualified medical expert that as a proximate result thereof the injured person suffered injuries that would not otherwise have occurred.

(b) (1) Without limiting the applicability of subsection (a) of this section, when the plaintiff claims that a medical care provider failed to supply adequate information to obtain the informed consent of the injured person, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the treatment, procedure, or surgery was performed in other than an emergency situation and that the medical care provider did not supply that type of information regarding the treatment, procedure, or surgery as would customarily have been given to a patient in the position of the injured person or other persons authorized to give consent for such a patient by other medical care providers with similar training and experience at the time of the treatment, procedure, or surgery in the locality in which the medical care provider practices or in a similar locality. (2) In determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the following matters shall also be considered as material issues: (A) Whether a person of ordinary intelligence and awareness in a position similar to that of the injured person or persons giving consent on his or her behalf could reasonably be expected to know of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery; (B) Whether the injured party or the person giving consent on his or her behalf knew of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery; (C) Whether the injured party would have undergone the treatment, procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or whether he or she did not wish to be informed thereof; and (D) Whether it was reasonable for the medical care provider to limit disclosure of information because such disclosure could be expected to adversely and substantially affect the injured person's condition.

or surgery; (C) Whether the injured party would have undergone the treatment, procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or whether he or she did not wish to be informed thereof; and (D) Whether it was reasonable for the medical care provider to limit disclosure of information because such disclosure could be expected to adversely and substantially affect the injured person's condition.

(1) Without limiting the applicability of subsection (a) of this section, when the plaintiff claims that a medical care provider failed to supply adequate information to obtain the informed consent of the injured person, the plaintiff shall have the burden of proving that the treatment, procedure, or surgery was performed in other than an emergency situation and that the medical care provider did not supply that type of information regarding the treatment, procedure, or surgery as would customarily have been given to a patient in the position of the injured person or other persons authorized to give consent for such a patient by other medical care providers with similar training and experience at the time of the treatment, procedure, or surgery in the locality in which the medical care provider practices or in a similar locality.

(2) In determining whether the plaintiff has satisfied the requirements of subdivision (b)(1) of this section, the following matters shall also be considered as material issues: (A) Whether a person of ordinary intelligence and awareness in a position similar to that of the injured person or persons giving consent on his or her behalf could reasonably be expected to know of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery; (B) Whether the injured party or the person giving consent on his or her behalf knew of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery; (C) Whether the injured party would have undergone the treatment, procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or whether he or she did not wish to be informed thereof; and (D) Whether it was reasonable for the medical care provider to limit disclosure of information because such disclosure could be expected to adversely and substantially affect the injured person's condition.

(A) Whether a person of ordinary intelligence and awareness in a position similar to that of the injured person or persons giving consent on his or her behalf could reasonably be expected to know of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery;

(B) Whether the injured party or the person giving consent on his or her behalf knew of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery;

(C) Whether the injured party would have undergone the treatment, procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or whether he or she did not wish to be informed thereof; and

(D) Whether it was reasonable for the medical care provider to limit disclosure of information because such disclosure could be expected to adversely and substantially affect the injured person's condition.

Acts 1979, No. 709, § 2; A.S.A. 1947, § 34-2614; Acts 2003, No. 649, § 18.