SSR 84-14c: SECTION 202(c) (42 U.S.C. 402(c)) AS AMENDED BY SECTION 334 OF PUBLIC LAW 95-216 -- HUSBAND'S INSURANCE BENEFITS -- GOVERNMENT PENSION OFFSET -- CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE EXCEPTION PROVISION

20 CFR 404.408a

SSR 84-14c

Heckler v. Mathews et al., _____ U.S. _____, 104 S. Ct. 1387 (1984)

BRENNAN , Supreme Court Justice:

Califano v. Goldfarb , 430 U.S. 199 (1977), held that a

gender-based classification in the spousal-benefit provisions of the

Social Security Act violated the right to the equal protection of the laws

guaranteed by the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment. In this case,

the United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama held

that amendments to the Act, adopted in 1977 partly in response to our

decision, unjustifiably revive the gender-based classification that was

invalidated in Goldfarb and therefore also violate the Fifth

Amendment. J.S. App. 1a-9a. The Government appealed directly to this

Court. We noted probable jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1252, _____ U.S.

_____, and now reverse.

I

A

The Social Security Act (Act) provides spousal benefits for the wives,

husbands, widows, and widowers of retired and disabled wage earners. 42

U.S.C. § 402. Prior to December 1977, benefits were payable only to those

husbands or widowers who could demonstrate dependency on their

wage-earning wives for one-half of their support. Wives and widows, on the

other hand, were entitled to spousal benefits without any such showing of

dependency on their husbands. See former 42 U.S.C. § 402(b), (c)(1)(C) and

(f)(1)(D) (1976). In March 1977, Califano v. Goldfarb, supra ,

affirmed the judgment of a three-judge District Court which held that the

gender-based dependency requirement for widowers violated the equal

protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. [1] Subsequently, the

Court summarily affirmed two District Court decisions invalidating the

dependency requirement for husbands' benefits. Califano v.

Silbowitz , 430 U.S. 924 (1977); Califano v. Jablon , 430 U.S.

924 (1977).

which held that the

gender-based dependency requirement for widowers violated the equal

protection component of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth

Amendment. [1] Subsequently, the

Court summarily affirmed two District Court decisions invalidating the

dependency requirement for husbands' benefits. Califano v.

Silbowitz , 430 U.S. 924 (1977); Califano v. Jablon , 430 U.S.

924 (1977).

Following these decisions, as part of a general reform of the Social

Security system, Congress repealed the dependency requirement for widowers

and husbands. Social Security Amendments of 1977 (1977 Amendments), §

334(b)(1), (d)(1), Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1509, 42 U.S.C. §

402(c)(1), (f)(1) (Supp. V). See S. Rep. No. 95-572, pp. 88, 93

(1977). [2] It concluded,

however, that elimination of the dependency test, by increasing the number

of individuals entitled to spousal benefits, could create a serious fiscal

problem for the Social Security trust fund. See S. Rep. No. 95-572, supra , at 27-28. This problem was particularly acute with respect

to the large number of retired federal and state employees who would not

become eligible for spousal benefits. Unlike most applicants, who must

offset any dual Social Security benefits against each other, 42 U.S.C. §

402(k)(3)(A), retired civil servants could, at the time of the 1977

Amendments, receive the full amount of both the spousal benefits and the

government pensions to which they were entitled. Congress estimated that

payment of unreduced spousal benefits to such individuals could cost the

system an estimated $190 million in 1979. S. Rep. No. 95-572, supra , at 27-28.

To avoid this fiscal drain, Congress included as part of the 1977

Amendments a "pension offset" provision that generally requires the

reduction of spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal or state

government pensions received by the Social Security applicant. 1977

Amendments, § 334(a)(2) and (b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(4)(A) and

ion in 1979. S. Rep. No. 95-572, supra , at 27-28.

To avoid this fiscal drain, Congress included as part of the 1977

Amendments a "pension offset" provision that generally requires the

reduction of spousal benefits by the amount of certain federal or state

government pensions received by the Social Security applicant. 1977

Amendments, § 334(a)(2) and (b)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 402(b)(4)(A) and

(c)(2)(A). Congress estimated that 90 per cent of the savings that would

be achieved by the pension offset provision as proposed by the Senate

would be attributable to a reduction in payments to nondependent husbands

and widowers who had not been entitled to any spousal benefits prior to

the decision in Goldfarb . See S. Rep. No. 95-572, supra , at

81. The remaining portion of the savings, however, would come from a

reduction in benefits to individuals, mostly women but also dependent men,

who had retired or were about to retire and who had planned their

retirements in reliance on their entitlement, under pre-1977 law, to

spousal benefits unreduced by government pension benefits. See ibid ; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-837, p. 72 (1977); S. Conf. Rep. No.

95-612, p. 72 (1977). In order to protect the reliance interests of this

group, see infra , at _____, Congress exempted from the pension

offset requirement as ultimately enacted those spouses who were eligible

to receive pension benefits prior to December 1982 and who would have

qualified for unreduced spousal benefits under the Act "as it was in

effect and being administered in January 1977." 1977 Amendments,

334(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 402

note. [3]

In the same subsection in which it established this five-year grace

period for individuals who qualified for spousal benefits in January 1977,

Congress also included a severability clause, which provides:

would have

qualified for unreduced spousal benefits under the Act "as it was in

effect and being administered in January 1977." 1977 Amendments,

334(g)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 402

note. [3]

In the same subsection in which it established this five-year grace

period for individuals who qualified for spousal benefits in January 1977,

Congress also included a severability clause, which provides:

The Conference Committee explained that the severability clause was

enacted "so that if [the exception to the pension offset provision] is

found invalid the pension-offset . . . would not be affected, and the

application of the exception clause would not be broadened to include

persons or circumstances that are not included within it." H.R. Conf. Rep.

No. 95-837, pp. 71-72 (1977); S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-612, pp. 71-72

(1977).

B

Appellee Mathews retired from his job with the United States Postal

Service on October 18, 1977. His wife, who had retired from her job a few

months earlier, was fully insured under the Social Security Act. In

December 1977, Mathews applied for husband's benefits on his wife's

account. On review of the application, the Social Security Administration

(SSA) informed Mathews that he was entitled to spousal benefits of $153.30

per month but that, because, as appellee acknowledged, he was not

dependent upon his wife for one-half of his support, this amount would be

entirely offset by his $573 per month Postal Service pension in accordance

with § 334(b)(2) of the 1977 Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(2). J.S. App.

2a. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the SSA's

initial decision. J.S. App. 16a-22a. The ALJ's decision was in turn

affirmed by the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human

Services and thereby became the final decision of the Secretary. J.S. App.

13a-14a.

sion in accordance

with § 334(b)(2) of the 1977 Amendments, 42 U.S.C. § 402(c)(2). J.S. App.

2a. After a hearing, an administrative law judge (ALJ) affirmed the SSA's

initial decision. J.S. App. 16a-22a. The ALJ's decision was in turn

affirmed by the Appeals Council of the Department of Health and Human

Services and thereby became the final decision of the Secretary. J.S. App.

13a-14a.

Mathews then brought this class action against the Secretary in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of Alabama under §

205(g) of the Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(g). The complaint alleged that

application of the pension offset provision of the 1977 Amendments to

Mathews and other nondependent men but not to similarly situated

nondependent women violated the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment

and sought a declaratory judgment to that effect. Appellee also contended

that the severability clause of the 1977 Amendments was unconstitutional.

The District Court certified a nationwide class composed of "all

applicants for husband's insurance benefits . . . whose applications . . .

have been denied [beginning 60 days before the filing of the complaint]

solely because of the statutory requirement that husbands must have

received more than one-half of their support from their wives in order to

be entitled to benefits." J.S. App. 10a.

Shortly thereafter, the District Court filed an opinion, J.S. App. 1a-9a,

and order, J.S. App. 26a-27a, holding both the pension offset exception of

§ 334(g)(1)(B) and the severability clause of § 334(g)(3)

unconstitutional. The court noted that, in essence, the exception to the

pension offset "provides a five-year grace period for all women who retire

within five years of the enactment, and for men who retire within five

years of the enactment and who are economically dependent upon their

wives." J.S. App. 3a

n offset exception of

§ 334(g)(1)(B) and the severability clause of § 334(g)(3)

unconstitutional. The court noted that, in essence, the exception to the

pension offset "provides a five-year grace period for all women who retire

within five years of the enactment, and for men who retire within five

years of the enactment and who are economically dependent upon their

wives." J.S. App. 3a. In light of this gender-based classification, the

court noted that the offset exception could be upheld only if it "serve[s]

important governmental objectives and [is] substantially related to

achievement of those objectives." Id ., quoting Craig v.

Boren , 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The court decided that the exception

could not be justified as protecting the reliance interests of individuals

who had planned their retirements prior to the 1977 Amendments in

expectation of undiminished benefits because, by requiring men to prove

dependency notwithstanding the decision in Goldfarb , the offset

exception presumes "that women would have relied upon the practices of the

Social Security Administration, yet men would not have relied upon a

decision of the Supreme Court." J.S. App. 5a. Accordingly, the court held

that the portion of the exception to the pension offset provision that

requires a male applicant to prove that he received one-half of his

economic support from his wife violates the equal protection guarantees of

the due process clause of the fifth amendment." J.S. App. 6a-7a (footnote

omitted).

ve relied upon a

decision of the Supreme Court." J.S. App. 5a. Accordingly, the court held

that the portion of the exception to the pension offset provision that

requires a male applicant to prove that he received one-half of his

economic support from his wife violates the equal protection guarantees of

the due process clause of the fifth amendment." J.S. App. 6a-7a (footnote

omitted).

Having invalidated the exception to the offset provision, the District

Court considered the severability clause of § 334(g)(3). The court noted

that, in the event appellee obtained a judgment that the offset exception

unconstitutionally discriminates against him, the clause, if valid, would

require nullification of the exception as to all persons, rather than

extension of the exception to persons like appellee. Consequently, all

government retirees, without regard to gender or dependency, would have

their spousal benefits offset by the amount of their government pensions.

The court characterized this effect of the severability clause as an

effort by Congress "to mandate the outcome of any challenge to the

validity of the [pension offset] exception by making such a challenge

fruitless. Even if a plaintiff achieved success in having the gender-based

classification stricken, he would derive no personal benefit from the

decision, because the pension offset would be applied to all applicants

without exception." J.S. App. 8a. Because of its view that Congress could

not have meant to defeat the reliance interests of government retirees in

that way, the court concluded "that the severability clause is not an

expression of the true Congressional intent, but instead is an adroit

attempt to discourage the bringing of an action by destroying standing." Id

applied to all applicants

without exception." J.S. App. 8a. Because of its view that Congress could

not have meant to defeat the reliance interests of government retirees in

that way, the court concluded "that the severability clause is not an

expression of the true Congressional intent, but instead is an adroit

attempt to discourage the bringing of an action by destroying standing." Id . Accordingly, the court held the severability provision

unconstitutional and ordered the Secretary to pay Mathews and the rest of

the plaintiff class full spousal benefits without regard to dependency and

without offsetting the amount of their government pensions. J.S. App.

9a.

II

Because it may affect our jurisdiction, see Linda R.S. v. Richard

D. , 410 U.S. 614, 616 (1973), we consider first the District Court's

conclusion that the severability provision of the 1977 Amendments would,

if valid, deprive appellee of standing to bring this action by preventing

him from receiving any more spousal benefits if he prevails than he is now

allowed. Appellee agrees with the District Court's analysis and, for that

reason, contends that the severability clause amounts to an

unconstitutional attempt by Congress to thwart the jurisdiction and

remedial power of the federal courts. We agree with the Secretary,

however, that because the right asserted by appellee is the right to

receive "benefits . . . distributed according to classifications which do

not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered

[applicants] solely on the basis of sex," Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld ,

420 U.S. 636, 647 (1975), and not a substantive right to any particular

amount of benefits, appellee's standing does not depend on his ability to

obtain increased Social Security payments.

e "benefits . . . distributed according to classifications which do

not without sufficient justification differentiate among covered

[applicants] solely on the basis of sex," Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld ,

420 U.S. 636, 647 (1975), and not a substantive right to any particular

amount of benefits, appellee's standing does not depend on his ability to

obtain increased Social Security payments.

In order to establish standing for purposes of the constitutional "case

or controversy" requirement, a plaintiff "must show that he personally has

suffered some actual or threatened injury as a result of the putatively

illegal conduct of the defendant," Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of

Bellwood , 441 U.S. 91, 99 (1979), and that the injury "is likely to be

redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare

Rights Organization , 426 U.S. 26, 38 (1976). In this case, appellee

claims a type of personal injury we have long recognized as judicially

cognizable. [4] He alleges that

the pension offset exception subjects him to unequal treatment in the

provision of his Social Security benefits solely because of his gender,

specifically, as a nondependent man, he receives fewer benefits than he

would if he were a similarly situated woman. J.A. 6.

Although the severability clause would prevent a court from redressing

this inequality by increasing the benefits payable to appellee, we have

never suggested that the injuries caused by a constitutionally

underinclusive scheme can be remedied only by extending the program's

benefits to the excluded class. To the contrary, we have noted that a

court sustaining such a claim faces "two remedial alternatives: [it] may

either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not

extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may

extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by

the exclusion." Welsh v. United States , 398 U.S

xcluded class. To the contrary, we have noted that a

court sustaining such a claim faces "two remedial alternatives: [it] may

either declare [the statute] a nullity and order that its benefits not

extend to the class that the legislature intended to benefit, or it may

extend the coverage of the statute to include those who are aggrieved by

the exclusion." Welsh v. United States , 398 U.S. 333, 361 (1970)

(Harlan, J., concurring in the result). See Califano v. Westcott ,

443 U.S. 76, 89-91 (1979). [5] For that reason, we have frequently entertained attacks on discriminatory

statutes or practices even when the government could deprive a successful

plaintiff of any monetary relief by withdrawing the statute's benefits

from both the favored and the excluded

class. [6]

These decisions demonstrate that, like the right to procedural due

process, see Carey v. Piphus , 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978), the right

to equal treatment guaranteed by the Constitution is not co-extensive with

any substantive rights to the benefits denied the party discriminated

against. Rather, as we have repeatedly emphasized, discrimination itself,

by perpetuating "archaic and stereotypic notions" or by stigmatizing

members of the disfavored group as "innately inferior" and therefore as

less worthy participants in the political community, Mississippi

University for Women v. Hogan , 458 U.S. 718, 725 (1982), can cause

serious non-economic injuries to those persons who are personally denied

equal treatment solely because of their membership in a disfavored

group. [7] Accordingly, as

Justice Brandeis explained, when the "right invoked is that of equal

treatment," the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment,

a result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the

favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett , 284 U.S. 239, 247

rship in a disfavored

group. [7] Accordingly, as

Justice Brandeis explained, when the "right invoked is that of equal

treatment," the appropriate remedy is a mandate of equal treatment,

a result that can be accomplished by withdrawal of benefits from the

favored class as well as by extension of benefits to the excluded class. Iowa-Des Moines National Bank v. Bennett , 284 U.S. 239, 247

(1931). [8] Because the

severability clause would forbid only the latter and not the former kind

of relief in this case, the injury caused by the unequal treatment

allegedly suffered by appellee may "be redressed by a favorable decision," Simon v. Eastern Kentucky Welfare Rights Organization, supra , 426

U.S., at 38, and he therefore has standing to prosecute this

action. [9]

III

Although appellee prevailed in the District Court on his constitutional

claim, he urges as an alternative ground for affirmance that we construe

the pension offset exception so that it does not incorporate a

gender-based classification of the kind invalidated in Califano v.

Goldfarb, supra , but instead exempts from the offset requirement both

men and women, without regard to dependency. Relying on "the maxim that

statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions," United

States v. Batchelder , 442 U.S. 114, 122 (1979), he contends that

Congress, in reviving the qualifying criteria in effect before the

decision in Goldfarb , must be presumed to have done so without

reenacting the gender-based dependency test which this Court had held

unconstitutional.

ncy. Relying on "the maxim that

statutes should be construed to avoid constitutional questions," United

States v. Batchelder , 442 U.S. 114, 122 (1979), he contends that

Congress, in reviving the qualifying criteria in effect before the

decision in Goldfarb , must be presumed to have done so without

reenacting the gender-based dependency test which this Court had held

unconstitutional.

The canon favoring constructions of statutes to avoid constitutional

questions does not, however, license a court to usurp the policy-making

and legislative functions of duly-elected representatives. Yu Cong Eng

v. Trinidad , 271 U.S. 500, 518 (1926). See NLRB v. Catholic Bishop

of Chicago , 440 U.S. 490, 499-501 (1979); id ., at 508-511

(BRENNAN, J., dissenting); United States v. Sullivan , 332 U.S. 689,

693 (1948). "'[A]lthough this Court will often strain to construe

legislation so as to save it against constitutional attack, it must not

and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a

statute' . . . or judicially rewriting it." Aptheker v. Secretary of

State , 378 U.S. 500, 515 (1964), quoting Scales v. United

States , 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961). In this case, the language and

history of the offset exception plainly demonstrate that Congress meant to

resurrect, for a five-year grace period, the gender-based dependency test

of pre- Goldfarb law.

As we have noted, supra , at _____, Congress adopted the pension

offset requirement to prevent the serious fiscal drain that it concluded

would result from payment of unreduced benefits to the new class of

recipients made eligible by the decision in Goldfarb . Nevertheless,

in an effort to protect the reliance interests of individuals who had

planned their retirement before the March 1977 Goldfarb decision

and the resulting amendments to the Act, see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-837,

p. 72 (1977); S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-612, p

d

would result from payment of unreduced benefits to the new class of

recipients made eligible by the decision in Goldfarb . Nevertheless,

in an effort to protect the reliance interests of individuals who had

planned their retirement before the March 1977 Goldfarb decision

and the resulting amendments to the Act, see H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-837,

p. 72 (1977); S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-612, p. 72 (1977), Congress exempted

from the offset requirement those individuals eligible for spousal

benefits under the Act "as it was in effect and being administered in

January 1977." There can be no dispute that in January 1977 men were

eligible for benefits only upon a showing of dependency whereas women were

subject to no such requirement. See former 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(c) and (f)

(1976); Califano v. Goldfarb, supra , 430 U.S., at 201-202 and nn.

1-2. [10] And Congress further

indicated its intent to revive those eligibility criteria by including an

unusual severability clause that would, in the event the classification

were held invalid, sacrifice the exception's protection of reliance

interests to the goal served by the offset provision itself -- preventing

an undue financial burden on the system. See supra , at _____, and

n. 5; H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-837, supra , at 72; S. Conf. Rep. No.

95-612, supra , at 72.

Consistent with the plain import of these provisions, Senator Long,

Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and principal manager of the bill

in the Senate, explained that the exception clause was meant "to afford .

. . protection to those who anticipated receiving their spouses benefits

prior to March 1977 without providing it also to those [who] would

qualify only as a result of [the Goldfarb] decision." Id ., at 39134

hese provisions, Senator Long,

Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee and principal manager of the bill

in the Senate, explained that the exception clause was meant "to afford .

. . protection to those who anticipated receiving their spouses benefits

prior to March 1977 without providing it also to those [who] would

qualify only as a result of [the Goldfarb] decision." Id ., at 39134

(1977) (emphasis added). See also 123 Cong. Rec. 39008 (1977) (remarks of

Rep. Ullman). Appellee's proposed interpretation of the exception

provision would defeat this clearly expressed intention and, by rendering

the offset requirement applicable to very few

applicants, [11] frustrate the

congressional aim of preventing a major fiscal drain on the Social

Security trust fund. Accordingly, we reject appellee's construction of the

Act and conclude that the exception to the offset provision applies to

otherwise eligible men only when they can show dependency on their wives

for one-half of their support. We turn therefore to consider the

constitutionality of that gender-based classification.

IV

We recently reviewed the "firmly-established principles" by which to

evaluate a claim of gender discrimination like that made by appellee:

We therefore consider in turn whether the Secretary has carried her

burden of (A) showing a legitimate and "exceedingly persuasive

justification" for the gender-based classification of the pension offset

provision and (B) demonstrating "the requisite direct, substantial

relationship" between the classification and the important governmental

objectives it purports to serve.

A

appellee:

We therefore consider in turn whether the Secretary has carried her

burden of (A) showing a legitimate and "exceedingly persuasive

justification" for the gender-based classification of the pension offset

provision and (B) demonstrating "the requisite direct, substantial

relationship" between the classification and the important governmental

objectives it purports to serve.

A

Although the offset exception temporarily revives the gender-based

eligibility requirements invalidated in Goldfarb , Congress's

purpose in adopting the exception bears no relationship to the concerns

that animated the original enactment of those criteria. The Court

concluded in Goldfarb that the original gender-based standards,

which were premised on an assumption that females would normally be

dependent on the earnings of their spouses but males would not,

constituted an "accidental byproduct of a traditional way of thinking

about females," 430 U.S., at 228 (STEVENS, J., concurring in the

judgment), that reflected "'old notions' 'archaic and overbroad'

generalizations" about the roles and relative abilities of men and women,

430 U.S., at 211, 217 (plurality opinion). Accordingly, the statute's

"objective itself [was] illegitimate." Mississippi University for Women

v. Hogan, supra , at

725. [12]

The provision at issue here, in contrast, reflects no such illegitimate

government purposes. As detailed above, supra , at _____, _____,

Congress adopted the offset exception in order to protect the expectations

of persons, both men and women, who had planned their retirements based on

pre-January 1977 law, under which they could receive spousal benefits

unreduced by the amount of any government pensions to which they were also

entitled

o such illegitimate

government purposes. As detailed above, supra , at _____, _____,

Congress adopted the offset exception in order to protect the expectations

of persons, both men and women, who had planned their retirements based on

pre-January 1977 law, under which they could receive spousal benefits

unreduced by the amount of any government pensions to which they were also

entitled. Congress accomplished its aim by incorporating the eligibility

criteria as they existed in January 1977; its choice of this approach

rather than an explicit adoption of new gender-based standards confirms

that its purpose was to protect reliance on prior law, not to reassert the

sexist assumptions rejected in Goldfarb .

Nor is that purpose rendered illegitimate by the fact that it is achieved

through a temporary revival of an invalidated classification. We have

recognized, in a number of contexts, the legitimacy of protecting

reasonable reliance on prior law even when that requires allowing an

unconstitutional statute to remain in effect for a limited period of time.

See, e.g. , Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe

Line Co ., 458 U.S. 50, 87-89 (1982) (plurality opinion); Buckley v.

Valeo , 424 U.S. 1, 142-143 (1976) (per curiam); Chevron Oil Co. v.

Huson , 404 U.S. 97, 106-107 (1971). See also Los Angeles Dept. of

Water & Power v. Manhart , 435 U.S. 702, 718-723 (1978). Although

an unconstitutional scheme could not be retained for an unduly prolonged

period in the name of protecting reliance interests, or even for a brief

period if the expectations sought to be protected were themselves

unreasonable or illegitimate, there is no indication that the offset

exception suffers from either of these flaws

ater & Power v. Manhart , 435 U.S. 702, 718-723 (1978). Although

an unconstitutional scheme could not be retained for an unduly prolonged

period in the name of protecting reliance interests, or even for a brief

period if the expectations sought to be protected were themselves

unreasonable or illegitimate, there is no indication that the offset

exception suffers from either of these flaws. The duration of the

exception is closely related to its goal of protecting only individuals

who had planned their retirements in reliance on prior law, see infra , at _____, and appellee does not suggest that the

expectations of those individuals, who hardly could have anticipated the

adoption of the offset requirement, were unreasonable or illegitimate.

The protection of reasonable reliance interests is not only a legitimate

governmental objective: it provides "an exceedingly persuasive

justification" for the statute at issue here. See Kirchberg v.

Feenstra , 450 U.S. 455, 461 (1981); Personnel Administrator of

Mass. v. Feeney , 442 U.S. 256, 273 (1979). Appellee does not, and

cannot, contest the Secretary's statement that "it is a significant and

salutary goal to secure the retirement plans of our Nation's workers who

in good faith had long and reasonably relied on the provisions of the

Social Security Act." Brief for Appellant 33. Instead, appellee contends

that the only people who could justifiably have relied on an expectation

of unreduced benefits are those who actually retired before the effective

date of the offset provision and those individuals will not be required to

offset their benefits. Brief for Appellee 28-29, and n. 21, 31-32.

Congress determined, however, that many individuals adjusted their

spending and savings habits prior to their retirements in expectation of

receiving full spousal benefits as well as a government

pension, [13] and we have no

reason to doubt that conclusion. One commentator has explained:

ividuals will not be required to

offset their benefits. Brief for Appellee 28-29, and n. 21, 31-32.

Congress determined, however, that many individuals adjusted their

spending and savings habits prior to their retirements in expectation of

receiving full spousal benefits as well as a government

pension, [13] and we have no

reason to doubt that conclusion. One commentator has explained:

In short, particularly in the years immediately preceding retirement,

individuals make spending, savings, and investment decisions based on

assumptions regarding the amount of income they expect to receive after

they stop working. For such individuals reliance on the law in effect

during those years may be critically

important. [14] In recognition

of this fact, the offset exception, in the words of the Conference Report,

protects "people who are already retired, or close to retirement, from

public employment and who cannot be expected to readjust their retirement

plans to take account of the 'offset' provision that will apply in the

future." H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-837, supra , at 72; S. Conf. Rep.

No. 95-612, supra , at 72. That purpose, consistent with the

principle that "'[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their

word,'" Astrup v. INS , 402 U.S. 509, 514, n . 4 (1971), quoting FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation , 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,

dissenting), provides an exceedingly persuasive justification for the

gender-based classification incorporated in the offset exception.

B

2, supra , at 72. That purpose, consistent with the

principle that "'[g]reat nations, like great men, should keep their

word,'" Astrup v. INS , 402 U.S. 509, 514, n . 4 (1971), quoting FPC v. Tuscarora Indian Nation , 362 U.S. 99, 142 (1960) (Black, J.,

dissenting), provides an exceedingly persuasive justification for the

gender-based classification incorporated in the offset exception.

B

Having identified the legitimate and important governmental purpose of

the offset exception, we have little trouble concluding that the means

employed by the statute is "substantially related to the achievement of

[that] objectiv[e]." Wengler v. Druggists Mutual Insurance Co ., 446

U.S. 142, 150 (1980). By reviving for a five-year period the eligibility

criteria in effect in January 1977, the exception is narrowly tailored to

protect only those individuals who made retirement plans prior to the

changes in the law that occurred after that date. Individuals who were

eligible for spousal benefits before the law changed and who retire within

five years of the statute's enactment may reasonably be assumed to have

begun planning for their retirement prior to the adoption of the offset

provision. See supra , at _____. Such persons, men as well as women,

may receive spousal benefits unreduced by their government pensions, while

those persons, men as well as women, who first became eligible for

benefits after January 1977 may

not. [15]

rs of the statute's enactment may reasonably be assumed to have

begun planning for their retirement prior to the adoption of the offset

provision. See supra , at _____. Such persons, men as well as women,

may receive spousal benefits unreduced by their government pensions, while

those persons, men as well as women, who first became eligible for

benefits after January 1977 may

not. [15]

Moreover, the offset exception was plainly adopted " through reasoned

analysis rather than through the mechanical application of traditional,

often inaccurate, assumptions about the proper roles of men and women." Mississippi University for Women v. Hogan, supra , 458 U.S., at 726

(footnote omitted). As the legislative history set out above demonstrates,

Congress considered carefully and at length both the financial problems

that led to the offset provision and the reliance interests that might be

frustrated by that requirement. The solution finally adopted, after

rejection of more expensive or impractical

alternatives, [16] distinguishes Social Security applicants, not according to archaic

generalizations about the roles and abilities of men and women, but rather

according to whether they planned their retirements with the expectation,

created by the law in effect in January 1977, that they would receive both

full spousal benefits and a government pension.

V

The exception to the pension offset requirement set out in § 334(g)(1) of

the 1977 Amendments to the Social Security Act, while temporarily reviving

the gender-based classification invalidated in Califano v.

Goldfarb , is directly and substantially related to the important

governmental interest of protecting individuals who planned their

retirements in reasonable reliance on the law in effect prior to that

decision. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is

Reversed .

[1] There was no majority

opinion in Goldfarb . See 430 U.S., at 201 (plurality opinion); id. , at 217 (STEVENS,J., concurring in the judgment).

ubstantially related to the important

governmental interest of protecting individuals who planned their

retirements in reasonable reliance on the law in effect prior to that

decision. Accordingly, the judgment of the District Court is

Reversed .

[1] There was no majority

opinion in Goldfarb . See 430 U.S., at 201 (plurality opinion); id. , at 217 (STEVENS,J., concurring in the judgment).

[2] At the same time, Congress

directed the Department of Health, Education, and Welfare to include "the

entire question of such gender based distinctions . . . in [a] 6-month

study of proposals to eliminate dependency and sex discrimination. . . ."

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 95-837, p. 73 (1977). Thereafter, other gender-based

distinctions were eliminated from the Act by the Social Security

Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. No. 98-21, §§ 301-308, 97 Stat. 109-115; see

H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 98-47, p. 140 (1983).

[3] Section 334(g) of the 1977

Amendments, Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1546, 42 U.S.C. § 402 note,

provides in full:

"(1) The amendments made by the preceding provisions of this section

[section 334] shall not apply with respect to any monthly insurance

benefit payable, under subsection (b), (c), (e), (f), or (g) (as the case

may be) of section 202 of the Social Security Act, to an individual --

"(A) to whom there is payable for any month within the 60-month period

beginning with the month in which this Act is enacted (or who is eligible

in any such month for) a monthly periodic benefit (within the meaning of

such provisions) based upon such individual's earnings while in the

service of the Federal Government or any State or political subdivision

thereof, as defined in Section 218(b)(2) of the Social Security Act);

and

"(B) who at time of application for or initial entitlement to such

monthly insurance benefit under such subsection (b), (c), (e), (f), or (g)

meets the requirements of that subsection as it was in effect and being

administered in January 1977.

service of the Federal Government or any State or political subdivision

thereof, as defined in Section 218(b)(2) of the Social Security Act);

and

"(B) who at time of application for or initial entitlement to such

monthly insurance benefit under such subsection (b), (c), (e), (f), or (g)

meets the requirements of that subsection as it was in effect and being

administered in January 1977.

"(2) For purposes of paragraph (1)(A), an individual is eligible for

monthly periodic benefit for any month if such benefit would be payable to

such individual for that month if such individual were not employed during

that month and had made proper application for such benefit.

"(3) If any provision of this subsection, or the application thereof to

any person or circumstance, is held invalid, the remainder of this section

shall not be affected thereby, but the application of this subsection to

any other persons or circumstances shall also be considered invalid."

On January 12, 1983, Congress created an exception from the pension

offset provision for any person eligible for a pension prior to July 1983

who satisfies a half-support dependency test. Pub. L. No. 97-455, § 7, 96

Stat. 2501. On April 20, 1983, Congress revised the pension offset

provision, which is now applicable to all persons, without exception, who

become eligible to retire in or after July 1983 and which requires the

offsetting of only two-thirds of the public pension. Pub. L. No. 98-21, §

337, 97 Stat. 131. The exception to the offset provision at issue in this

case still applies to nondependent women eligible for pensions prior to

December 1982 but not to such nondependent men as the named plaintiff in

this action. Accordingly, the recent amendments to the Act do not moot

this case.

requires the

offsetting of only two-thirds of the public pension. Pub. L. No. 98-21, §

337, 97 Stat. 131. The exception to the offset provision at issue in this

case still applies to nondependent women eligible for pensions prior to

December 1982 but not to such nondependent men as the named plaintiff in

this action. Accordingly, the recent amendments to the Act do not moot

this case.

[4] E.g ., Wengler v.

Druggists Mutual Insurance Co ., 446 U.S. 142, 147-149 (1980); Califano v. Goldfarb, supra , 430 U.S., at 212 (plurality opinion).

See Baker v. Carr , 369 U.S. 186, 207 (1962) (finding standing in

case in which "[t]he injury which appellants assert is that this

classification disfavors the voters in the counties in which they reside,

placing them in a position of constitutionally unjustifiable inequality vis-a-vis voters in irrationally favored counties"). See also Linda R.S. v. Richard D ., 410 U.S. 614, 620-621 (1973) (WHITE, J.,

dissenting).

[5] Although the choice between

"extension" and "nullification" is within the "constitutional competence

of a federal district court," Califano v. Westcott , 443 U.S. 76, 91

(1979), and ordinarily "extension, rather than nullification, is the

proper course," id ., at 89, the court should not, of course, "use

its remedial powers to circumvent the intent of the legislature," id ., at 94 (opinion of POWELL, J.) and should therefore "measure

the intensity of commitment to the residual policy and consider the degree

of potential disruption of the statutory scheme that would occur by

extension as opposed to abrogation." Welsh v. United States, supra ,

at 365 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). See also Califano v.

Westcott, supra , at 90. In this case, Congress has, through the

severability clause, clearly expressed its preference for nullification,

rather than extension, of the pension offset exception in the event it is

found invalid

cheme that would occur by

extension as opposed to abrogation." Welsh v. United States, supra ,

at 365 (Harlan, J., concurring in the result). See also Califano v.

Westcott, supra , at 90. In this case, Congress has, through the

severability clause, clearly expressed its preference for nullification,

rather than extension, of the pension offset exception in the event it is

found invalid. Because we conclude that the severability clause does not

deprive appellee of standing to seek judicial redress for the alleged

discrimination of the offset exception, we need to consider his claim that

a legislative attempt to thwart a court's ability to remedy a

constitutional violation would itself violate the Constitution. See Brief

for Appellee 40-55.

[6] E.g ., Wengler v.

Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., supra , 446 U.S. at 152-153; Orr v.

Orr , 440 U.S. 268, 272 (1979); Califano v. Webster , 430 U.S.

313, 316 (1977); Kahn v. Shevin , 416 U.S. 351, 352 (1974); Stanton v. Stanton , 421 U.S. 7, 17-18 (1975).

[7] See, e.g ., Bob

Jones University v. United States , _____ U.S. _____, _____ __ _____

(1983); Havens Realty Corp. v. Coleman , 455 U.S. 363, 373-374

(1982); Gladstone, Realtors v. Village of Bellwood, supra , at

109-114; Norwood v. Harrison, supra , 413 U.S. at 465-466, 467; Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U.S. 677, 684-685 (1973) (plurality

opinion); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co ., 409 U.S. 205,

208 (1972); id ., at 212 (WHITE, J., concurring); Brown v. Board

of Education , 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Sierra Club v.

Morton , 405 U.S. 727, 734-735 (1972).

of Bellwood, supra , at

109-114; Norwood v. Harrison, supra , 413 U.S. at 465-466, 467; Frontiero v. Richardson , 411 U.S. 677, 684-685 (1973) (plurality

opinion); Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co ., 409 U.S. 205,

208 (1972); id ., at 212 (WHITE, J., concurring); Brown v. Board

of Education , 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954). See also Sierra Club v.

Morton , 405 U.S. 727, 734-735 (1972).

[8] Consistent with Justice

Brandeis's explanation of the appropriate relief for a denial of equal

treatment, we have often recognized that the victims of a discriminatory

government program may be remedied by an end to preferential treatment for

others. E.g ., Gilmore v. City of Montgomery , 417 U.S. 556,

566-567 (1974); Norwood v. Harrison , 413 U.S. 455, 470-471 (1973); Griffin v. County School Board of Prince Edward County , 377 U.S.

218, 232-234 (1964). See also Califano v. Westcott, supra , 443

U.S., at 93-94 (opinion of POWELL, J.) (finding federal aid program

violative of plaintiffs' right to equal protection but arguing that

appropriate remedy under statute was to enjoin further payment of benefits

to all applicants, including plaintiffs).

[9] The relationship between the

right asserted by appellee and the injury allegedly caused by the denial

of that right distinguishes this case from Simon v. Eastern Kentucky

Welfare Rights Organization , 426 U.S. 26 (1976). In that case, the

Court concluded that indigents, who contended that they were denied

medical treatment by tax-exempt hospitals, lacked standing to challenge

the government's allegedly unlawful administration of the tax code because

it was "purely speculative" whether their injury was caused by the

government's actions or was instead attributable to "decisions made by the

hospitals without regard to the tax implications." Id ., at 42-43

who contended that they were denied

medical treatment by tax-exempt hospitals, lacked standing to challenge

the government's allegedly unlawful administration of the tax code because

it was "purely speculative" whether their injury was caused by the

government's actions or was instead attributable to "decisions made by the

hospitals without regard to the tax implications." Id ., at 42-43.

Here, in contrast, there can be no doubt about the direct casual

relationship between the government's alleged deprivation of appellee's

right to equal protection and the personal injury appellee has suffered --

denial of Social Security benefits solely on the basis of his gender.

Similarly, because appellee personally has been denied benefits that

similarly situated women receive, his is not a generalized "claim of 'the

right possessed by every citizen, to require that the Government be

administered according to law. . . .'" Baker v. Carr, supra , 369

U.S., at 208, quoting Fairchild v. Hughes , 258 U.S. 126, 129

(1922).

[10] This conclusion is not,

contrary to appellee's suggestion, altered by the fact that in January

1977 the SSA was withholding disputed benefit claims pending this Court's

disposition of Goldfarb . The Social Security Claims Manual in

effect at the time notes that "[t]he current law requires that claimants

for (widower's) (husband's) benefits meet a one-half support requirement.

[While that requirement has been challenged in court], the law remains

unchanged and no payment can be made until a final decision has been

rendered on the constitutionality of the one-half support requirement."

Social Security Administration Claims Manual Transmittal No. 3844 (July

14, 1976). Thus, the Manual indicates that, as provided by the extent

provisions of the Act, the SSA did not in January 1977 pay benefits to

male claimants who failed to demonstrate dependency on their wives.

made until a final decision has been

rendered on the constitutionality of the one-half support requirement."

Social Security Administration Claims Manual Transmittal No. 3844 (July

14, 1976). Thus, the Manual indicates that, as provided by the extent

provisions of the Act, the SSA did not in January 1977 pay benefits to

male claimants who failed to demonstrate dependency on their wives.

[11] The only individuals

identified by appellee who would be subject to the offset requirement

under his interpretation of the Act are those who first became eligible

for spousal benefits after enactment of the statute in December 1977. See

Brief for Appellee 23-24; Reply Brief for Appellant 4 and n. 2. For

example, the 1977 Amendments shortened the number of years a divorced wife

must be married before being eligible for spousal benefits, effective

December 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-216, § 337, 91 Stat. 1548, 42 U.S.C. §§

402(b)(1)(G), 416(d), and a number of judicial decisions just prior and

subsequent to the Amendments extended eligibility for benefits to new

categories of individuals, see, e.g., Cooper v. Califano , 87 F.R.D.

107 (ED Pa. 1980) (young husbands); Mertz v. Harris , 497 F. Supp.

1134 (SD Tex. 1980) (remarried widowers); Yates v. Califano , 471 F.

Supp. 84 (WD Ky. 1979) (surviving divorced fathers); Oliver v.

Califano , [1977-1978 Transfer Binder] Unempl. Ins. Rep. (CCH), ¶ 15244

(ND Cal. June 24, 1977) (divorced husbands). These groups were not,

however, mentioned in the legislative history of the offset and exception

provisions and limiting the offset to such newly eligible beneficiaries

would frustrate Congress's express desire to prevent the financial burden

to the system of extending unreduced benefits to those nondependent men

first made eligible by the Goldfarb decision. See S. Rep. No.

95-572, pp. 27-28 (1977).

ere not,

however, mentioned in the legislative history of the offset and exception

provisions and limiting the offset to such newly eligible beneficiaries

would frustrate Congress's express desire to prevent the financial burden

to the system of extending unreduced benefits to those nondependent men

first made eligible by the Goldfarb decision. See S. Rep. No.

95-572, pp. 27-28 (1977).

[12] See also Wengler v.

Druggists Mutual Insurance Co., supra , 446 U.S., at 147-149; Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld , 420 U.S. 636, 643 (1975); Schlesinger

v. Ballard , 419 U.S. 498, 507 (1975); Frontiero v. Richardson,

supra , 411 U.S., at 688.

[13] See H.R. Conf. Rep. No.

95-837, supra , at 72 ("The managers are concerned that there may be

large numbers of women, especially widows in their late fifties, who are

already drawing pensions, or would be eligible to draw them within 5 years

of the date of enactment of this bill, based on their non-covered work and

whose retirement income was planned for on the assumption of the

availability of full wife's or widow's benefits under social security");

S. Conf. Rep. No. 95-612, supra , at 72 (same); Staff of Senate

Comm. on Finance, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., Summary of H. R. 9346, the

Social Security Amendments of 1977 as Passed by the Congress (P.L.

95-216) 7 (Comm. Print 1977) ("To assure that persons who have been

counting on these benefits for many years and who are now at or nearing

retirement age will not be adversely affected, H. R. 9346 includes a

transitional exception under which certain individuals will not have their

social security benefits as spouses reduced by the amount of their public

pension. This exception applies to those who . . . would qualify for

spouses benefits under social security under the law as in effect and as

administered in January 1977").

etirement age will not be adversely affected, H. R. 9346 includes a

transitional exception under which certain individuals will not have their

social security benefits as spouses reduced by the amount of their public

pension. This exception applies to those who . . . would qualify for

spouses benefits under social security under the law as in effect and as

administered in January 1977").

[14] Indeed, the Social

Security Act itself recognizes the critical importance of protecting an

individual's expectation of benefits even in circumstances where payment

is contrary to current law. The Act forbids recovery of such

overpayments when the recipient is not at fault and recapture "would be

against equity and good conscience." 42 U.S.C. § 404(b).

[15] The latter group includes

persons who first became entitled to spousal benefits under the 1977

Amendments themselves as well as those whose eligibility was first

established in judicial decisions issued from 1977 to the present. See n.

11, supra . Because the offset provision was enacted at the end of

1977, the only members of this group who, under the law in effect at any

given time, might have expected to receive spousal benefits unreduced by

their government pensions are those who became eligible during 1977 as a

result of Goldfarb and other decisions announced that year. The Act

protects the reliance interests of most such people, however, by providing

that the offset applies only to applicants who file their claims for

spousal benefits in or after December 1977, the month of enactment of the

Amendments. 1977 Amendments § 334(f), Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1546,

42 U.S.C. 402 note.

1977 as a

result of Goldfarb and other decisions announced that year. The Act

protects the reliance interests of most such people, however, by providing

that the offset applies only to applicants who file their claims for

spousal benefits in or after December 1977, the month of enactment of the

Amendments. 1977 Amendments § 334(f), Pub. L. No. 95-216, 91 Stat. 1546,

42 U.S.C. 402 note.

The reliance of appellee on the Goldfarb decision was frustrated

not by operation of the exception provision but rather by the unfortunate

timing of his retirement. After being informed that, as a result of the

March 1977 Goldfarb decision, he would receive spousal benefits

unreduced by his government pension, Brief for Appellee 2, Mr. Mathews

retired in October 1977 and filed his application for benefits on December

15. J.A. 4. If he had applied for benefits before December 1, he would

have been exempt from the offset provision which, as noted, took effect

that day. Alternatively, if he had not retired until after December 20,

the day the 1977 Amendments were enacted, he would have known that he

could not expect spousal benefits unreduced by his government pension and

might therefore have altered his plans. Although the bind thus imposed on

Mr. Mathews by the enactment and effective dates of the Amendments is

regrettable, the statute is not rendered fatally underinclusive because it

protects only expectations of substantially greater duration than his.

e would have known that he

could not expect spousal benefits unreduced by his government pension and

might therefore have altered his plans. Although the bind thus imposed on

Mr. Mathews by the enactment and effective dates of the Amendments is

regrettable, the statute is not rendered fatally underinclusive because it

protects only expectations of substantially greater duration than his.

[16] See, e.g ., Staff

of the House Comm. on Ways and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess., WMCP:

95-57 Summary of the Principal Provisions of H. R. 9346, The Social

Security Financing Amendments of 1977 As Passed By the House 4 (Comm.

Print 1977) (House version proposing six-month administration study of, inter alia , "various proposals to mitigate the cost impact of the

recent Goldfarb decision on the system"); S. Rep. No. 95-572, supra , at 28 (describing consideration and rejection on grounds of

potential abuse, inequity, invasion of privacy, and administrative

difficulty of requirement that each applicant for spousal benefits prove

dependency on spouse).