SSR 76-3c: SECTIONS 210(a)(6)(A), 216(i)(3), and 223(c)(1) (42 U.S.C. 410(a)(6)(A), 416(i)(3), and 423(c)(1)) -- DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS -- INSURED STATUS -- FEDERAL CIVILIAN EMPLOYMENT -- COVERAGE OF OVERTIME PAYMENTS
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Social Security Rulings › OASI › Definition of Employment/Employee › SSR 76-3c
Text
20 CFR 404.116 and 404.1013
SSR 76-3c
Kaplan v. Richardson, 1A Unempl. Ins. Rep. Par. 14,303 (E.D. N.Y.
7/19/73), affirmed 489 F.2d 752 (2d Cir. 1974).
NEAHER, District Judge:
Plaintiff commenced this action seeking review under § 205(g) of the
Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g), of a final decision of the
defendant Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare ("the Secretary")
denying his application for establishment of a period of disability under
§ 216, 42 U.S.C. § 416, and for disability insurance benefits under § 223,
42 U.S.C. § 423. Defendant has moved for judgment on the pleadings,
pursuant to Rule 12(c), F.R.Civ.P.
Plaintiff, George E. Kaplan, a retired federal civil service employee,
filed an application for disability insurance benefits on May 24, 1971.
The application was denied on June 24, 1971; the denial was affirmed upon
reconsideration by the Bureau of Disability Insurance of the Social
Security Administration on September 1, 1971. Pursuant to Kaplan's request
a de novo hearing was held before a hearing examiner on April 18, 1972,
where his application was again denied. The Appeals Council of the Social
Security Administration denied review on July 28, 1972. Thus, the hearing
examiner's decision became the final decision of the Secretary, 42 U.S.C.
§ 405(g).
Plaintiff alleged that the onset date of his disability was August 15,
1970 (Exhibit 1). He previously worked for the Social Security
Administration as a claims authorizer for nearly 10 years ending in 1968.
The hearing examiner found that plaintiff was not under a disability as
defined in the Act for any period through September 30, 1963, when he last
met the earnings requirement of the Act. The examiner also found that
plaintiff did not receive quarters of coverage from overtime wages earned
by him as a Civil Service employee in the Social Security Administration
because those wages were excluded from covered wages under § 210(a)(6)(A)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C
he Act for any period through September 30, 1963, when he last
met the earnings requirement of the Act. The examiner also found that
plaintiff did not receive quarters of coverage from overtime wages earned
by him as a Civil Service employee in the Social Security Administration
because those wages were excluded from covered wages under § 210(a)(6)(A)
of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 410(a)(6)(A).
The basic issue that plaintiff has raised throughout the administrative
process and the sole issue raised here is the contention that overtime
wages of federal employees should be used in calculating quarters of
coverage.
Section 210(a)(6)(A) clearly excludes from the coverage of the Social
Security Act those in the employ of the United States or its
instrumentalities who are covered by a federal retirement system. Quarters
of coverage are derived from wages earned through employment or
self-employment income covered by the Social Security Act. The term wages,
as defined in § 209, 42 U.S.C. § 409, means remuneration for employment,
"including the cash value of all remuneration paid in any medium other
than cash." The term employment, as defined in § 210(a), 42 U.S.C. §
410(a), specifically does not include service performed in the employ of
the United States or one of its instrumentalities, if the service is
"covered by a retirement system established by a law of the United States.
. . . A retirement system for employees of the Social Security
Administration is established under the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5
U.S.C. § 8301, et. seq. ("Retirement Act"). Thus, under the Act Kaplan is
not entitled to quarters of coverage on the basis of wages received from
the Social Security Administration, since he is covered and presently
receives benefits under the Retirement Act.
A retirement system for employees of the Social Security
Administration is established under the Civil Service Retirement Act, 5
U.S.C. § 8301, et. seq. ("Retirement Act"). Thus, under the Act Kaplan is
not entitled to quarters of coverage on the basis of wages received from
the Social Security Administration, since he is covered and presently
receives benefits under the Retirement Act.
Nevertheless Kaplan argues that the overtime wages received from the
Social Security Administration should be counted as wages under the Social
Security Act, because overtime wages are excluded under the Retirement Act
for purposes of computing benefits under the latter Act. This contention
is clearly frivolous.
Overtime wages cannot be viewed separately from basic wages, at least
where both are paid by the same agency for the same type of services.
Wages, as already noted, include "the cash value of all remuneration" received. As to whether an employment is included within the
Social Security Act's coverage, the crucial question is not whether the
form of remuneration is covered by a retirement system, but whether the
service is covered by a retirement system. Plaintiff was clearly
performing the same service at all times. Cf. Thaxton v. Finch , 301
F.Supp. 1155 (D. Tex. 1971).
Moreover, § 210(b) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 410(b), and
implementing regulations provide that if services performed during more
than one-half of any pay period do not constitute employment under the Act
then none of the services during that pay period shall be considered
employment. Plaintiff has never alleged that his overtime work constituted
more than one-half of his services or time spent in any pay period
(Hearing Examiner's Decision, at 6). Therefore, assuming that his overtime
work is a separable service constituting employment, since all services by
him are to be treated alike either as all included or excluded, all of his
services must be held to be excluded.
aintiff has never alleged that his overtime work constituted
more than one-half of his services or time spent in any pay period
(Hearing Examiner's Decision, at 6). Therefore, assuming that his overtime
work is a separable service constituting employment, since all services by
him are to be treated alike either as all included or excluded, all of his
services must be held to be excluded.
Plaintiff further alleges that if overtime wages are not covered under
the Social Security Act, the Act unconstitutionally discriminates against
federal employees.
The provision of the Social Security Act excluding earnings received by
federal employees covered by the Retirement Act is not arbitrary. Cf. Steward Machine Co. v. Davis 301 U.S. 548 (1937). The Retirement
Act became law on May 22, 1920, fifteen years before the advent of social
security. The drafters of the Social Security Act felt that federal
employees already had adequate retirement provisions. Congress also felt
that the purposes of the two systems were somewhat different and that it
would not be advantageous to disturb the existing viable federal
retirement system.
Similarly, the exclusion of overtime pay for purposes of computing
benefits under the Retirement Act is also not arbitrary. Congress felt
that
Thus, it can be seen that this classification serves the reasonable
purpose of standardizing payroll deductions and computations, by excluding
sporadic and irregular overtime pay.
In sum, while the interplay of the two statutes may result in a
difference in treatment between federal employees and those who are not,
this difference is not discrimination; it is at most an anomaly. The
provisions in controversy are rationally based and free from invidious
discrimination. Cf. Florio v. Richardson , 469 F.2d 803, 808 (2 Cir.
1972).
Accordingly, defendant's motion for judgment on the pleadings is
granted.
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