SSR 83-46c: SECTIONS 216(i) AND 223(d) (42 U.S.C. 416(i) AND 423 (d)) DISABILITY INSURANCE BENEFITS -- INABILITY TO PERFORM PREVIOUS WORK -- ADMINISTRATIVE NOTICE UNDER THE MEDICAL- VOCATIONAL GUIDELINES OF THE EXISTENCE OF OTHER WORK

20 CFR 404.1560-404.1569

SSR 83-46c

(This ruling supersedes SSR 82-33c)

Heckler v. Campbell, ____ U.S. ____, 103 S.Ct. 1952 (1983)

POWELL, Supreme Court Justice:

The issue is whether the Secretary of Health and Human Services may rely

on published medical-vocational guidelines to determine a claimant's right

to Social Security disability benefits.

I

The Social Security Act defines "disability" in terms of the effect a

physical or mental impairment has on a person's ability to function in the

work place. It provides disability benefits only to persons who are unable

"to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically

determinable physical and mental impairment." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(10(A).

And it specifies that a person must "not only [be] unable to do his

previous work but [must be unable], considering his age, education, and

work experience, [to] engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work

which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work

exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job

vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for

work." 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A).

In 1978, the Secretary of Health and Human Services promulgated

regulations implementing this definition. See 43 Fed. Reg. 55349 (1978)

(codified as amended at 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P (1982)). The regulations

recognize that certain impairments are so severe that they prevent a

person from pursuing any gainful work. See 20 CFR § 404.1520(d) (1982)

(referring to impairments listed at 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1). A

claimant who establishes that he suffers from one of these impairments

will be considered disabled without further inquiry. Ibid. If a

claimant suffers from a less severe impairment, the Secretary must

determine whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either his

former work or some less demanding employment

ferring to impairments listed at 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 1). A

claimant who establishes that he suffers from one of these impairments

will be considered disabled without further inquiry. Ibid. If a

claimant suffers from a less severe impairment, the Secretary must

determine whether the claimant retains the ability to perform either his

former work or some less demanding employment. If a claimant can pursue

his former occupation, he is not entitled to disability benefits. See §

404,1520(e). If he cannot, the Secretary must determine whether the

claimant retains the capacity to pursue less demanding work. See §

404.1520(f)(1).

The regulations divide this last inquiry into two stages. First, the

Secretary must assess each claimant's present job qualifications. The

regulations direct the Secretary to consider the factors Congress has

identified as relevant; physical ability, age, education and work

experience. [1] See 42 U.S.C. §

423(d)(2)(A); 20 CFR § 404.1520(f). Second, she must consider whether jobs

exist in the national economy that a person having the claimant's

qualifications could perform. 20 CFR § 404.120(f); §§

404.1566-404.1569.

Prior to 1978, the Secretary relied on vocational experts to establish

the existence of suitable jobs in the national economy. After a claimant's

limitation and abilities had been determined at a hearing, a vocational

expert ordinarily would testify whether work existed that the claimant

could perform. Although this testimony often was based on standardized

guides, see 43 Fed. Reg. 9286 (1978), vocational experts frequently were

criticized for their inconsistent treatment of similarly situated

claimants. See Santise v. Schweiker , 676 F.2d 925, 930 (CA3 1982);

J. Mashaw et. al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals 78-79 (1978). To

improve both the uniformity and

efficiency [2] of this

determination, the Secretary promulgated medical-vocational guidelines as

part of the 1978 regulations. See 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt

ticized for their inconsistent treatment of similarly situated

claimants. See Santise v. Schweiker , 676 F.2d 925, 930 (CA3 1982);

J. Mashaw et. al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals 78-79 (1978). To

improve both the uniformity and

efficiency [2] of this

determination, the Secretary promulgated medical-vocational guidelines as

part of the 1978 regulations. See 20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2

(1982).

These guidelines relieve the Secretary of the need to rely on vocational

experts by establishing through rulemaking the types and numbers of jobs

that exist in the national economy. They consist of a matrix of the four

factors identified by Congress -- physical ability, age, education, and

work experience [3] and set forth

rules that identify whether jobs requiring specific combinations of these

factors exist in significant numbers in the national

economy. [4] Where a claimant's

qualification correspond to the job requirements identified by a

rule, [5] the guidelines direct a

conclusion as to whether work exists that the claimant could perform. If

such work exists, the claimant is not considered disabled.

II

In 1979, Carmen Campbell applied for disability benefits because a back

condition and hypertension prevented her from continuing her work as a

hotel maid. After her application was denied, she requested a hearing de novo before an Administrative Law

Judge. [6] He determined that her

back problem was not severe enough to find her disabled without further

inquiry, and accordingly considered whether she retained the ability to

perform either her past work or some less strenuous jobs. App. to Pet. for

Cert. 28a. He concluded that even though Campbell's back condition

prevented her from returning to her work as a maid, she retained the

physical capacity to do light work. Ibid. In accordance with the

regulations, he found that Campbell was 52 years old, that her previous

employment consisted of unskilled jobs and that she had a limited

education

e less strenuous jobs. App. to Pet. for

Cert. 28a. He concluded that even though Campbell's back condition

prevented her from returning to her work as a maid, she retained the

physical capacity to do light work. Ibid. In accordance with the

regulations, he found that Campbell was 52 years old, that her previous

employment consisted of unskilled jobs and that she had a limited

education. Id., at 28a-29a. He noted that Campbell, who had been

born in Panama, experienced difficulty in speaking and writing English.

She was able, however, to understand and read English fairly well. App.

42. Relying on the medical-vocational guidelines, the Administrative Law

Judge found that a significant number of jobs existed that a person of

Campbell's qualifications could perform. Accordingly, he concluded that

she was not disabled. [7] App. to

Pet. for Cert. 29a.

This determination was upheld by both the Social Security Appeals

Council, id., at 16a, and the District Court for the Eastern

District of New York, id., at 15a. The Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit reversed. Campbell v. Secretary of HHS, 665 F.2d 48

(1982). It accepted the Administrative Law Judge's determination that

Campbell retained the ability to do light work. And it did not suggest

that he had classified Campbell's age, education, or work experience

incorrectly. The court noted, however, that it

The court found that the medical-vocational guidelines did not provide

the specific evidence that it previously had required. It explained that

in the absence of such a showing, "the claimant is deprived of any real

chance to present evidence showing that she cannot in fact perform the

types of jobs that are administratively noticed by the guidelines." Ibid. The court concluded that because the Secretary had failed to

introduce evidence that specific alternative jobs existed, the

determination that Campbell was not disabled was not supported by

substantial evidence. Id., at 54.

deprived of any real

chance to present evidence showing that she cannot in fact perform the

types of jobs that are administratively noticed by the guidelines." Ibid. The court concluded that because the Secretary had failed to

introduce evidence that specific alternative jobs existed, the

determination that Campbell was not disabled was not supported by

substantial evidence. Id., at 54.

We granted certiorari to resolve a conflict among the Courts of

Appeals [8] Schweiker v.

Campbell, _____ U.S. _____ (1982). We now reverse.

III

The Secretary argues that the Court of Appeals' holding effectively

prevents the use of the medical-vocational guidelines. By requiring her to

identify specific alternative jobs in every disability hearing, the court

has rendered the guidelines useless. An examination of both the language

of the Social Security Act and its legislative history clearly

demonstrates that the Secretary may proceed by regulation to determine

whether substantial gainful work exists in the national economy. Campbell

argues in response that the Secretary has misperceived the Court of

Appeals' holding. Campbell reads the decision as requiring only that the

Secretary give disability claimants concrete examples of the kinds of

factual determinations that the Administrative Law Judge will be making.

This requirement does not defeat the guideline's purpose; it ensures that

they will be applied only where appropriate. Accordingly, respondent

argues that we need not address the guidelines' validity.

A

ads the decision as requiring only that the

Secretary give disability claimants concrete examples of the kinds of

factual determinations that the Administrative Law Judge will be making.

This requirement does not defeat the guideline's purpose; it ensures that

they will be applied only where appropriate. Accordingly, respondent

argues that we need not address the guidelines' validity.

A

The Court of Appeals held that "[i]n failing to show suitable available

alternative jobs for Ms. Campbell, the Secretary's finding of 'not

disabled' is not supported by substantial evidence." 665 F.2d at 54. It

thus rejected the proposition that "the guidelines provide adequate

evidence of a claimant's ability to perform a specific alternative

occupation." id., at 53, and remanded for the Secretary to put into

evidence "particular types of jobs suitable to the capabilities of Ms.

Campbell," id., at 54. The court's requirement that additional

evidence be introduced be introduced on this issue prevents the Secretary

from putting the guidelines to their intended use and implicitly calls

their validity into question. [9] Accordingly, we think the decision below requires us to consider whether

the Secretary may rely on medical- vocational guidelines in appropriate

cases.

The Social Security Act directs the Secretary to "adopt reasonable and

proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for the nature and

extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing

the same" in disability cases. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a). As we previously have

recognized, Congress has "conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad

authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the

[Social Security] Act." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43

and provide for the nature and

extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking and furnishing

the same" in disability cases. 42 U.S.C. § 405(a). As we previously have

recognized, Congress has "conferred on the Secretary exceptionally broad

authority to prescribe standards for applying certain sections of the

[Social Security] Act." Schweiker v. Gray Panthers, 453 U.S. 34, 43

(1981); see Batterton v. Francis , 432 U.S. 416, 425 (1977). Where

as here, the statute expressly entrusts the Secretary with the

responsibility for implementing a provision by

regulation, [10] our review is

limited to determinating whether the regulations promulgated exceeded the

Secretary's statutory authority and whether they are arbitrary and

capricious. Herweg v. Ray, 455 U.S. 265, 275 (1982); Schweiker

v. Gray Panthers. supra, at 44.

We do not think that the Secretary's reliance on medical-vocational

guidelines is inconsistent with the Social Security Act. It is true that

the statutory scheme contemplates that disability hearings will be

individualized determinations based on evidence adduced at a hearing. See

42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A) (specifying consideration of each individual's

condition); 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (disability

determination to be based on evidence adduced at hearing). But this does

not bar the Secretary from relying on rulemaking to resolve certain

classes of issues. The Court has recognized that even where an agency's

enabling statute expressly requires it to hold a hearing, the agency may

rely on its rulemaking authority to determine issues that do not require

case-by-case consideration. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33,

41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.

192, 205 (1956). A contrary holding would require the agency continually

to relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a

single rulemaking proceeding. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc. , supra, at

44.

y to determine issues that do not require

case-by-case consideration. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc., 377 U.S. 33,

41-44 (1964); United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S.

192, 205 (1956). A contrary holding would require the agency continually

to relitigate issues that may be established fairly and efficiently in a

single rulemaking proceeding. See FPC v. Texaco, Inc. , supra, at

44.

The Secretary's decision to rely on medical-vocational guidelines is

consistent with Texaco v. Storer. As noted above, in determining

whether a claimant can perform less strenuous work, the Secretary must

make two determinations. She must assess each claimant's individual

abilities and then determine whether jobs exist that a person having the

claimant's qualifications could perform. The first inquiry involves a

determination of historic facts, and the regulations properly require the

Secretary to make these findings on the basis of evidence adduced at a

hearing. We note that the regulations afford claimants ample opportunity

both to present evidence relating to their own abilities and to offer

evidence that the guidelines do not apply to

them. [11] The second inquiry

requires the Secretary to determine an issue that is not unique to each

claimant -- the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national

economy. This type of general factual issue may be resolved as fairly

through rulemaking as by introducing the testimony of vocational experts

at each disability hearing. See American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 310, 319, 359, F.2d 624, 633 (1966), en

banc).

to determine an issue that is not unique to each

claimant -- the types and numbers of jobs that exist in the national

economy. This type of general factual issue may be resolved as fairly

through rulemaking as by introducing the testimony of vocational experts

at each disability hearing. See American Airlines, Inc. v. CAB, 123 U.S. App. D.C. 310, 319, 359, F.2d 624, 633 (1966), en

banc).

As the Secretary has argued, the use of published guidelines brings with

it a uniformity that previously had been perceived as lacking. To require

the Secretary to relitigate the existence of jobs in the national economy

at each hearing would hinder needlessly an already overburdened agency. We

conclude that the Secretary's use of medical-vocational guidelines does

not conflict with the statute, nor can we say on the record before us that

they are arbitrary and capricious.

B

We now consider Campbell's argument that the Court of Appeals properly

require the Secretary to specify alternative available jobs. Campbell

contends that such a showing informs claimants of the type of issues to be

established at the hearing and is required by both the Secretary's

regulation, 20 CFR § 404.944 (1980), and the Due Process Clause.

By referring to notice and an opportunity to respond, see 665 F.2d, at

53-54, the decision below invites the interpretation given it by

respondent. But we do not think that the decision fairly can be said to

present the issues she

raises. [12] The Court of

Appeals did not find that the Secretary failed to five sufficient notice

in violation of the Due Process Clause or any statutory provision designed

to implement it. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (requiring

that disability claimants be given "reasonable notice and an opportunity

for a hearing"). Nor did it find that the Secretary violated any duty

imposed by regulation. See 20 CFR § 404.944 (1982) (requiring the

Administrative Law Judge to "loo[k] fully into the issues")

Process Clause or any statutory provision designed

to implement it. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V) (requiring

that disability claimants be given "reasonable notice and an opportunity

for a hearing"). Nor did it find that the Secretary violated any duty

imposed by regulation. See 20 CFR § 404.944 (1982) (requiring the

Administrative Law Judge to "loo[k] fully into the issues"). Rather the

court's reference to notice and an opportunity to respond appears to be

based on a principle of administrative law -- that when an agency takes

official or administrative notice of facts, a litigant must be given an

adequate opportunity to

respond. [13] See 5 U.S.C. §

556(e); McDaniel v. Celebrezze, 331 F.2d 426 (CA4 1964).

The principle is inapplicable, however, when the agency has promulgated

valid regulations. Its purpose is to provide a procedural safeguard; to

ensure the accuracy of the facts of which an agency takes notice. But when

the accuracy of those facts already has been tested fairly during

rulemaking proceeding itself provides sufficient procedural

protection. [14] See, e.g., Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 1144, 1156 (CA5 1982); Broz v.

Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1362 (CA11 1982); Torres v. Secretary of

HHS, 677 F.2d 167, 169 (CA1 1982).

IV

The Court of Appeals' decision would require the Secretary to introduce

evidence of specific available jobs that respondent could perform. It

would limit severely her ability to rely on the medical-vocational

guidelines. We think the Secretary reasonably could choose to rely on

these guidelines in appropriate cases rather than on the testimony of a

vocational expert in each case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals is

Reversed.

Justice Powell was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Burger and

Justices White, Blackmum, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice

Brennan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall filed an opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

te cases rather than on the testimony of a

vocational expert in each case. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of

Appeals is

Reversed.

Justice Powell was joined in this opinion by Chief Justice Burger and

Justices White, Blackmum, Rehnquist, Stevens, and O'Connor. Justice

Brennan filed a concurring opinion. Justice Marshall filed an opinion

concurring in part and dissenting in part.

[1] The regulations state that

the Secretary will inquire each of these factors and make an individual

assessment of each claimant's abilities and limitations. See 20 CFR §§

404.1545- 404.1565 (1982); cf. 20 CFR § 404.944. In determining a person's

physical ability, she will consider, for example, the extent to which his

capacity for performing tasks such as lifting objects or his ability to

stand for long periods of time has been impaired. See § 404.1545.

[2] The Social Security hearing

system is "probably the largest adjudicative agency in the western world."

J. Mashaw et al., Social Security Hearings and Appeals, p.xi (1978).

Approximately 2.3 million claims for disability benefits were filed in

fiscal year 1981. Department of Health and Human Services, Social Security

Annual Report to the Congress for Fiscal Year 1981, pp. 32, 35 (1982).

More than a quarter of a million of these claims require a hearing before

an Administrative Law Judge. Id., at 38. The need for efficiency is

self-evident.

[3] Each of these four factors

is divided into defined categories. A person's ability to perform physical

tasks, for example, is categorized according to the physical exertion

requirements necessary to perform varying classes of jobs -- i.e., whether a claimant can perform sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very

heavy work. 20 CFR § 404.1567. Each of these work categories is defined in

terms of the physical demands it places on a worker, such as the weight of

objects he must lift and whether extensive movement or use of arm and leg

controls is required. Ibid.

requirements necessary to perform varying classes of jobs -- i.e., whether a claimant can perform sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very

heavy work. 20 CFR § 404.1567. Each of these work categories is defined in

terms of the physical demands it places on a worker, such as the weight of

objects he must lift and whether extensive movement or use of arm and leg

controls is required. Ibid.

[4] For example, rule 202.10

provides that a significant number of a jobs exist for a person who can

perform light work, is closely approaching advanced age, has a limited

education but who is literate and can communicate in English, and whose

previous work has been unskilled.

[5] The regulations recognize

that the rules only describe "major functional and vocational patterns."

20 CFR pt. 404, subpt. P, app, 2 § 200.00(a). If an individual's

capabilities are not described accurately by a rule, the regulations make

clear that the individual's particular limitations must be considered. See

app. 2, §§ 200.00(a), (d). Additionally, the regulations declare that the

Administrative Law Judge will not apply the age categories "mechanically

in a borderline situation," 20 CFR § 404.1563(a), and recognize that some

claimants may possess limitations that are not factored into guidelines,

see app. 2, § 200.00(e). Thus, the regulations provide that the rules will

be applied only when they describe a claimant's abilities and limitations

accurately.

[6] The Social Security Act

provides each claimant with a right to a de novo hearing. 45 U.S.C.

§ 405(b) (1976 ed., Supp. V); § 421(d). The regulations specify when a

claimant may exercise this right. See 20 CFR §§ 404.929-404.930.

[7] The Administrative Law Judge

did not accept Campbell's claim that her hypertension constituted an

impairment. He found that this claim was not documented by the record and

noted that her current medication appeared sufficient to keep her blood

pressure under control. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a.

tions specify when a

claimant may exercise this right. See 20 CFR §§ 404.929-404.930.

[7] The Administrative Law Judge

did not accept Campbell's claim that her hypertension constituted an

impairment. He found that this claim was not documented by the record and

noted that her current medication appeared sufficient to keep her blood

pressure under control. See App. to Pet. for Cert. 27a.

Campbell later reapplied for disability benefits and was found disabled

as of January 1, 1981. See Brief for Petitioner 8, n. 7. the Secretary's

subsequent decision does not moot this case since Campbell is claiming

entitlement to benefits prior to January 1, 1981.

[8] Every other Court of Appeals

addressing the question has upheld the Secretary's use of guidelines. See Rivers v. Schweiker, 684 F.2d 1144, 1157-1158 (CA5 1982); McCoy v. Schweiker, 683 F.2d 1138, 1144-1146 (CA8 1982); Torres

v. Secretary of HHS, 677 F.2d 167, 169 (CA1) 1982); Santise v.

Schweiker, 676 F.2d 925, 934-936 (CA3 1982); Cummins v.

Schweiker , 670 F.2d 81, 82-83 (CA7 1982); Kirk v. Secretary of

HHS, 667 F.2d 524, 529-535 (CA6 1981); Frady v. Harris , 646

F.2d 143, 145 (CA4 1981). One Court of Appeals has agreed that the

Secretary may use medical-vocational guidelines but has found that with

respect to age the guidelines are arbitrary. See Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1359-1361 (CAii 1982, cert. pending, NO. 82-816. The

instant case does not present the issue addressed in Broz .

[9] The Courts of Appeals have

read the decision below as implicitly invalidating the guidelines. See

McCoy v. Schweiker 683 F.2d, at 1145; Torres v. Secretary of

HHS, 677 F.2d, at 169; Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d, at 937,

and n. 25.

. See Broz v. Schweiker, 677 F.2d 1351, 1359-1361 (CAii 1982, cert. pending, NO. 82-816. The

instant case does not present the issue addressed in Broz .

[9] The Courts of Appeals have

read the decision below as implicitly invalidating the guidelines. See

McCoy v. Schweiker 683 F.2d, at 1145; Torres v. Secretary of

HHS, 677 F.2d, at 169; Santise v. Schweiker, 676 F.2d, at 937,

and n. 25.

[10] Since Congress amended

the Social Security Act in 1954 to provide for disability benefits, Pub.

L. 761, § 106, Stat. 1079, it repeatedly has suggested that the Secretary

promulgate regulations defining the criteria for evaluating disability.

See, e.g., Subcommittee on the Administration of the Social

Security Laws of the House Committee on Ways and Means, 86th Cong., 2d

Sess., Administration of Social Security Disability Insurance Program:

Preliminary Report 17-18 (Comm. Print 1960) (requesting Secretary to

develop "specific criteria for the weight to be given non-medical factors

in the evaluation of disability"); House Committee on Way and Means, 93d

Cong., 2d Sess., Committee Staff Report on the Disability Insurance

Program 6 (1974) (recommending that the Secretary promulgate regulations

defining disability to ease accelerating case load)" Hearings on H.R. 8076

before the Subcommittee on Social Security of the House Committee on Ways

and Means, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (Comm. Print 1977) (comments of Rep.

Burke) (noting with approval that the Secretary had promised to promulgate

medical-vocational guidelines to define disability). While these sources

do not establish the original congressional intent, they indicate that

later Congresses perceived that regulations such as the guidelines would

be consistent with the statute.

eans, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (Comm. Print 1977) (comments of Rep.

Burke) (noting with approval that the Secretary had promised to promulgate

medical-vocational guidelines to define disability). While these sources

do not establish the original congressional intent, they indicate that

later Congresses perceived that regulations such as the guidelines would

be consistent with the statute.

[11] Both FPC v. Texaco,

Inc., 377 U.S. 33, 40 (1964), and United States v. Storer

Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192, 205 (1956), were careful to note that

the statutory scheme at issue allowed an individual applicant to show that

the rule promulgated should not be applied to him. The regulations here

provide a claimant with equal or greater protection since they state that

an Administrative Law Judge will not apply the rules contained in the

guidelines when they fail to describe a claimant's particular limitations.

See n. 5, supra.

[12] Respondent did not raise

either her due process or her regulatory argument below. See Brief for

Appellant in Campbell v. Schweiker, No. 81-6908 (CA2); Tr. of Oral

Arg. 30. Nor has respondent filed a cross-petition. As she prevailed

below, we could consider grounds supporting her judgment different from

those on which the Court of Appeals rested its decision. See Dandridge

v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475-476, n. 6 (1970). But where the ground

presented here has not been raised below we exercise this authority "only

in exceptional cases." McGoldrick v. Compagnia Generale

Transatlantique, 309, U.S. 430, 434 (1940). We do not think this is

such a case.

pporting her judgment different from

those on which the Court of Appeals rested its decision. See Dandridge

v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 475-476, n. 6 (1970). But where the ground

presented here has not been raised below we exercise this authority "only

in exceptional cases." McGoldrick v. Compagnia Generale

Transatlantique, 309, U.S. 430, 434 (1940). We do not think this is

such a case.

Alternatively, respondent suggests that if the Administrative Law Judge

had inquired conscientiously and fully into the relevant facts, as

required by 20 CFR § 404.944 (1980), he would have concluded that she was

not capable of performing light work. The Secretary concedes that §

404.944 requires such an inquiry, see Brief for Petitioner 42, but argues

that the inquiry undertaken by the Administration Law Judge satisfied any

regulatory duty. Again respondent appears not to have presented her §

404.944 argument to the Court of Appeals, and we decline to reach it here.

[13] The Court of Appeals did

not identify any basis for imposing this requirement other than its

earlier decision in Decker v. Harris, 647 F/2d 291 (CA2 1981). Decker, however, identified the source of this requirement more

clearly. It stated: "This requirement of specificity...assures the

claimant of adequate notice of the grounds on which his claim may be

denied, providing him with an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.

See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.18, at 198-206

(2d ed, 1980)." Id., at 298.

291 (CA2 1981). Decker, however, identified the source of this requirement more

clearly. It stated: "This requirement of specificity...assures the

claimant of adequate notice of the grounds on which his claim may be

denied, providing him with an opportunity to present rebuttal evidence.

See generally 3 K. Davis, Administrative Law Treatise § 15.18, at 198-206

(2d ed, 1980)." Id., at 298.

In § 15.18 of his treatise, Professor Davis addresses the question of

administrative or official notice of material facts in disability cases

and the need for an adequate opportunity to respond. He states that an

Administrative Law Judge may take administrative notice of jobs in the

national economy. He emphasizes, however, that "[a] quick remark by an ALJ

that he takes official notice of availability of jobs in the national

economy that would be suitable for the claimant could be unfair for lack

of sufficient specificity. The job s should be identified, their

characteristics should be stated ...." § 15.18, at 204 (emphasis

added). Decker's reference to this treatise makes clear that the

requirement of specificity derives from a principle of administrative law.

[14] Respondent does not

challenge the rulemaking itself, and, as noted above, respondent was

accorded a de novo hearing to introduce evidence on issues, such as

physical and mental limitations, that require individualized

consideration. See supra, at 4-5.