SSR 05-1c: The SociaL Security Act, Sections 223(d)(2)(A) and 1614(a)(3)(B), as Amended (42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B)) — Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental Security Income — Whether Past Relevant Work Must Exist in Significant Numbers in the National Economy

Effective/Publication Date: 02/15/2005

20 CFR 404.1520 , 404.1560(B) , 416.920 , and 416.960(b)

This Ruling concerns the Social Security Administration's (SSA)

interpretation of sections 223(d)(2)(A) and 1614(a)(3)(B) of the

Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 423(d)(2)(A) and 1382(a)(3)(B)) that a

claimant who remains physically and mentally able to perform his or her

past relevant work will be found not disabled (see 20 CFR 404.1520 and 416.920 ), regardless of

whether that previous work exists in the national economy.

In June 1996, the claimant applied for Social Security disability

insurance benefits and for Supplemental Security Income, alleging

disability due to heart disease and cervical and lumbar radiculopathy. She

had worked as an elevator operator for 6 years until her job was

eliminated in August 1995. The SSA denied her claim at the initial and

reconsideration levels of adjudication and she requested a hearing before

an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that she was not under a

disability because her impairments did not prevent her from performing her

past work as an elevator operator. The ALJ rejected the claimant's

argument that she was not able to do her past work because it no longer

existed in significant numbers in the national economy. The SSA's Appeals

Council denied the claimant's request for review. The United States

District Court for the District of New Jersey affirmed the ALJ's findings,

concluding that whether the old job exists is irrelevant under SSA's

regulations. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and

remanded, holding that the statute unambiguously provides that the ability

to perform prior work disqualifies a claimant from benefits only if the

work is “substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy.”

y affirmed the ALJ's findings,

concluding that whether the old job exists is irrelevant under SSA's

regulations. The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit reversed and

remanded, holding that the statute unambiguously provides that the ability

to perform prior work disqualifies a claimant from benefits only if the

work is “substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy.”

The Supreme Court of the United States (the Court) held that 42 U.S.C.

423(d)(2)(A) and 1382c(a)(3)(B) do not require a different interpretation

and that, because SSA's regulations

( 20 CFR 404.1520 , 404.1560(b) , 416.920 , and 416.960(b) ) are a reasonable

interpretation of the text of the Act, they must be deferred to and given

effect.

Cite as: 540 U. S. 20 (2003)

Opinion of the Court

Supreme Court of the United States

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No. 02-763

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JO ANNE B. BARNHART, COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, PETITIONER v.

PAULLINE THOMAS

ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD

CIRCUIT

[November 12, 2003]

JUSTICE SCALIA delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under the Social Security Act, the Social Security Administration (SSA) is

authorized to pay disability insurance benefits and Supplemental Security

Income to persons who have a “disability.” A person qualifies

as disabled, and thereby eligible for such benefits, “only if his

physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he

is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his

age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42

U.S.C. §§423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The issue we must decide

is whether the SSA may determine that a claimant is not disabled because

she remains physically and mentally able to do her previous work, without

investigating whether that previous work exists in significant numbers in

the national economy.

I

her kind of

substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy.” 42

U.S.C. §§423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). The issue we must decide

is whether the SSA may determine that a claimant is not disabled because

she remains physically and mentally able to do her previous work, without

investigating whether that previous work exists in significant numbers in

the national economy.

I

Pauline Thomas worked as an elevator operator for six years until her job

was eliminated in August 1995. In June 1996, at age 53, Thomas applied for

disability insurance benefits under Title II and Supplemental Security

Income under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. See 49 Stat. 622, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. §401 et seq. (Title II); as added, 86 Stat.

1465, and as amended, §1381 et seq. (Title XVI). She claimed

that she suffered from, and was disabled by, heart disease and cervical

and lumbar radiculopathy.

After the SSA denied Thomas's application initially and on

reconsideration, she requested a hearing before an Administrative Law

Judge (ALJ). The ALJ found that Thomas had “hypertension, cardiac

arrhythmia, [and] cervical and lumbar strain/sprain.” Decision of

ALJ 5, Record 15. He concluded, however, that Thomas was not under a

“disability” because her “impairments do not prevent

[her] from performing her past relevant work as an elevator

operator.” Id. , at 6, Record 16. He rejected Thomas's

argument that she is unable to do her previous work because that work no

longer exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The SSA's

Appeals Council denied Thomas's request for review.

Thomas was not under a

“disability” because her “impairments do not prevent

[her] from performing her past relevant work as an elevator

operator.” Id. , at 6, Record 16. He rejected Thomas's

argument that she is unable to do her previous work because that work no

longer exists in significant numbers in the national economy. The SSA's

Appeals Council denied Thomas's request for review.

Thomas then challenged the ALJ's ruling in the United States District

Court for the District of New Jersey, renewing her argument that she is

unable to do her previous work due to its scarcity. The District Court

affirmed the ALJ, concluding that whether Thomas's old job exists is

irrelevant under the SSA's regulations. Thomas v. Apfel , Civ. No.

99-2234 (Aug. 17, 2000). The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit,

sitting en banc, reversed and remanded. Over the dissent of three of its

members, it held that the statute unambiguously provides that the ability

to perform prior work disqualifies from benefits only if it is

“substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy.” 294 F. 3d 568, 572 (2002). That holding conflicts with the

decisions of four other Courts of Appeals. See Quang Van Han v.

Bowen , 882 F. 2d 1453, 1457 (CA9 1989); Garcia v. Secretary of

Health and Human Services , 46 F. 3d 552, 558 (CA6 1995); Pass v.

Chater , 65 F. 3d 1200, 1206-1207 (CA4 1995); Rater v. Chater ,

73 F. 3d 796, 799 (CA8 1996). We granted the SSA's petition for

certiorari. 537 U.S. 1187 (2003).

II

As relevant to the present case, Title II of the Act defines

“disability” as the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). That definition

is qualified, however, as follows:

le II of the Act defines

“disability” as the “inability to engage in any

substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable

physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or

which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not

less than 12 months.” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(1)(A). That definition

is qualified, however, as follows:

“An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if

his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any

other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy.... ” §423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added).

“[W]ork which exists in the national economy” is defined to

mean “work which exists in significant numbers either in the region

where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.”

Ibid. Title XVI of the Act, which governs Supplemental Security Income

benefits for disabled indigent persons, employs the same definition of

“disability” used in Title II, including a qualification that

is verbatim the same as §423(d)(2)(A). See 42 U.S.C.

§1382c(a)(3)(B). For simplicity's sake, we will refer only to the

Title II provisions, but our analysis applies equally to Title XVI.

Section 423(d)(2)(A) establishes two requirements for disability. First,

an individual's physical or mental impairment must render him

“unable to do his previous work.” Second, the impairment must

also preclude him from “engag[ing] in any other kind of substantial

gainful work.” The parties agree that the latter requirement

is qualified by the clause that immediately follows it—“which

exists in the national economy.” The issue in this case is whether

that clause also qualifies “previous work.”

pairment must render him

“unable to do his previous work.” Second, the impairment must

also preclude him from “engag[ing] in any other kind of substantial

gainful work.” The parties agree that the latter requirement

is qualified by the clause that immediately follows it—“which

exists in the national economy.” The issue in this case is whether

that clause also qualifies “previous work.”

The SSA has answered this question in the negative. Acting pursuant to its

statutory rulemaking authority, 42 U.S.C. §§405(a) (Title II),

1383(d)(1) (Title XVI), the agency has promulgated regulations

establishing a five-step sequential evaluation process to determine

disability. See 20 CFR

§404.1520 (2003) (governing claims for disability insurance

benefits); §416.920 (parallel regulation governing claims for

Supplemental Security Income). If at any step a finding of disability or

non-disability can be made, the SSA will not review the claim further. At

the first step, the agency will find non-disability unless the claimant

shows that he is not working at a “substantial gainful

activity.” §§404.1520(b), 416.920(b). At step two, the SSA

will find non-disability unless the claimant shows that he has a

“severe impairment,” defined as “any impairment or

combination of impairments which significantly limits [the claimant's]

physical or mental ability to do basic work activities.”

§§404.1520(c), 416.920(c). At step three, the agency determines

whether the impairment which enabled the claimant to survive step two is

on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled;

if so, the claimant qualifies. §§404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the

claimant's impairment is not on the list, the inquiry proceeds to step

four, at which the SSA assesses whether the claimant can do his previous

work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is determined not to be

disabled

claimant to survive step two is

on the list of impairments presumed severe enough to render one disabled;

if so, the claimant qualifies. §§404.1520(d), 416.920(d). If the

claimant's impairment is not on the list, the inquiry proceeds to step

four, at which the SSA assesses whether the claimant can do his previous

work; unless he shows that he cannot, he is determined not to be

disabled. [1] If the claimant

survives the fourth stage, the fifth, and final, step requires the SSA to

consider so-called “vocational factors” (the claimant's age,

education, and past work experience), and to determine whether the

claimant is capable of performing other jobs existing in significant

numbers in the national economy. §§404.1520(f), 404.1560(c),

416.920(f), 416.960(c). [2]

As the above description shows, step four can result in a determination of

no disability without inquiry into whether the claimant's previous work

exists in the national economy; the regulations explicitly reserve inquiry

into the national economy for step five. Thus, the SSA has made it

perfectly clear that it does not interpret the clause “which exists

in the national economy” in §423(d)(2)(A) as applying to

“previous work.” [3] The issue presented is whether this agency interpretation must be accorded

deference.

As we held in Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council,

Inc. , 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984), when a statute speaks clearly to the

issue at hand we “must give effect to the unambiguously expressed

intent of Congress,” but when the statute “is silent or

ambiguous” we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency

charged with its implementation. The Third Circuit held that, by referring

first to “previous work” and then to “ any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy,” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added), the statute

unambiguously indicates that the former is a species of the latter

nt or

ambiguous” we must defer to a reasonable construction by the agency

charged with its implementation. The Third Circuit held that, by referring

first to “previous work” and then to “ any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy,” 42 U.S.C. §423(d)(2)(A) (emphasis added), the statute

unambiguously indicates that the former is a species of the latter.

“When,” it said, “a sentence sets out one or more

specific items followed by 'any other' and a description, the specific

items must fall within the description.” 294 F. 3d, at 572. We

disagree. For the reasons discussed below the interpretation adopted by

SSA is at least a reasonable construction of the text and must therefore

be given effect.

The Third Circuit's reading disregards—indeed, is precisely contrary

to—the grammatical “rule of the last antecedent,”

according to which a limiting clause or phrase (here, the relative clause

“which exists in the national economy”) should ordinarily be

read as modifying only the noun or phrase that it immediately follows

(here, “any other kind of substantial gainful work”). See 2A

N. Singer, Sutherland on Statutory Construction §47.33, p. 369 (6th

rev. ed. 2000) (“Referential and qualifying words and phrases, where

no contrary intention appears, refer solely to the last

antecedent”). While this rule is not an absolute and can assuredly

be overcome by other indicia of meaning, we have said that construing a

statute in accord with the rule is “quite sensible as a matter of

grammar.” Nobelman v. American Savings Bank , 508 U.S. 324,

330 (1993). In FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc. , 359 U.S. 385 (1959),

this Court employed the rule to interpret a statute strikingly similar in

structure to §423(d)(2)(A)—a provision of the Fur Products

Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §69, which defined “'invoice'” as

“'a written account, memorandum, list, or catalog . .

as a matter of

grammar.” Nobelman v. American Savings Bank , 508 U.S. 324,

330 (1993). In FTC v. Mandel Brothers, Inc. , 359 U.S. 385 (1959),

this Court employed the rule to interpret a statute strikingly similar in

structure to §423(d)(2)(A)—a provision of the Fur Products

Labeling Act, 15 U.S.C. §69, which defined “'invoice'” as

“'a written account, memorandum, list, or catalog . . . transported

or delivered to a purchaser, consignee, factor, bailee, correspondent, or

agent, or any other person who is engaged in dealing commercially in

fur products or furs '” 359 U.S., at 386 (quoting 15 U.S.C.

§69(f)) (emphasis added). Like the Third Circuit here, the Court of

Appeals in Mandel Brothers had interpreted the phrase “'any

other'” as rendering the relative clause (“'who is engaged in

dealing commercially'”) applicable to all the specifically listed

categories. 359 U.S., at 389. This Court unanimously reversed, concluding

that the “limiting clause is to be applied only to the last

antecedent.” Id. , at 389, and n. 4 (citing 2 J. Sutherland,

Statutory Construction §4921 (3d ed. 1943)).

An example will illustrate the error of the Third Circuit's perception

that the specifically enumerated “previous work”

“must” be treated the same as the more general reference to

“any other kind of substantial gainful work.” 294 F. 3d, at

572. Consider, for example, the case of parents who, before leaving their

teenage son alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, “You will

be punished if you throw a party or engage in any other activity that

damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a party and is

caught, he should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the

house was not damaged. The parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any

other activity that damages the house

ir

teenage son alone in the house for the weekend, warn him, “You will

be punished if you throw a party or engage in any other activity that

damages the house.” If the son nevertheless throws a party and is

caught, he should hardly be able to avoid punishment by arguing that the

house was not damaged. The parents proscribed (1) a party, and (2) any

other activity that damages the house. As far as appears from what they

said, their reasons for prohibiting the home-alone party may have had

nothing to do with damage to the house—for instance, the risk that

underage drinking or sexual activity would occur. And even if their only

concern was to prevent damage, it does not follow from the fact that the

same interest underlay both the specific and the general prohibition that

proof of impairment of that interest is required for both. The parents,

foreseeing that assessment of whether an activity had in fact

“damaged” the house could be disputed by their son, might have

wished to preclude all argument by specifying and categorically

prohibiting the one activity—hosting a party— that was most

likely to cause damage and most likely to occur.

The Third Circuit suggested that interpreting the statute as does the SSA

would lead to “absurd results.” Ibid. See also Kolman v. Sullivan , 925 F. 2d 212, 213 (CA7 1991) (the fact that a

claimant could perform a past job that no longer exists would not be

“a rational ground for denying benefits”. The court could

conceive of “no plausible reason why Congress might have wanted to

deny benefits to an otherwise qualified person simply because that person,

although unable to perform any job that actually exists in the national

economy, could perform a previous job that no longer exists.” 294 F.

3d, at 572-573

at no longer exists would not be

“a rational ground for denying benefits”. The court could

conceive of “no plausible reason why Congress might have wanted to

deny benefits to an otherwise qualified person simply because that person,

although unable to perform any job that actually exists in the national

economy, could perform a previous job that no longer exists.” 294 F.

3d, at 572-573. But on the very next page the Third Circuit conceived of just such a plausible reason, namely, that “in the vast

majority of cases, a claimant who is found to have the capacity to perform

her past work also will have the capacity to perform other types of

work.” Id. , at 574, n. 5. The conclusion which follows is

that Congress could have determined that an analysis of a claimant's

physical and mental capacity to do his previous work would “in the

vast majority of cases” serve as an effective and efficient

administrative proxy for the claimant's ability to do some work

that does exist in the national economy. Such a proxy is useful because

the step-five inquiry into whether the claimant's cumulative impairments

preclude him from finding “other” work is very difficult,

requiring consideration of “each of th[e] [vocational] factors and .

. . an individual assessment of each claimant's abilities and

limitations,” Heckler v. Campbell , 461 U.S. 458, 460-461, n.

1 (1983) (citing 20 CFR

§§404.1545 - 1404.1565 (1982)). There is

good reason to use a workable proxy that avoids the more expansive and

individualized step-five analysis. As we have observed, “[t]he

Social Security hearing system is 'probably the largest adjudicative

agency in the western world.'. . . The need for efficiency is

self-evident.“ 461 U.S., at 461, n. 2 (citation omitted).

1 (1983) (citing 20 CFR

§§404.1545 - 1404.1565 (1982)). There is

good reason to use a workable proxy that avoids the more expansive and

individualized step-five analysis. As we have observed, “[t]he

Social Security hearing system is 'probably the largest adjudicative

agency in the western world.'. . . The need for efficiency is

self-evident.“ 461 U.S., at 461, n. 2 (citation omitted).

The Third Circuit rejected this proxy rationale because it would produce

results that “may not always be true, and . . . may not be true in

this case.” 294 F. 3d, at 576. That logic would invalidate a vast

number of the procedures employed by the administrative state. To

generalize is to be imprecise. Virtually every legal (or other) rule has

imperfect applications in particular circumstances. Cf. Bowen v.

Yuckert , 482 U.S. 137, 157 (1987) (O.CONNOR, J., concurring)

(“To be sure the Secretary faces an administrative task of

staggering proportions in applying the disability benefits provisions of

the Social Security Act. Perfection in processing millions of such claims

annually is impossible”). It is true that, under the SSA's

interpretation, a worker with severely limited capacity who has managed to

find easy work in a declining industry could be penalized for his troubles

if the job later disappears. It is also true, however, that under the

Third Circuit's interpretation, impaired workers in declining or marginal

industries who cannot do “other” work could simply refuse to

return to their jobs—even though the jobs remain open and

available—and nonetheless draw disability benefits. The proper Chevron inquiry is not whether the agency construction can give

rise to undesirable results in some instances (as here both constructions can), but rather whether, in light of the alternatives, the

agency construction is reasonable. In the present case, the SSA's

authoritative interpretation certainly satisfies that test.

n and

available—and nonetheless draw disability benefits. The proper Chevron inquiry is not whether the agency construction can give

rise to undesirable results in some instances (as here both constructions can), but rather whether, in light of the alternatives, the

agency construction is reasonable. In the present case, the SSA's

authoritative interpretation certainly satisfies that test.

We have considered respondent's other arguments and find them to be

without merit.

* * * *

We need not decide today whether §423(d)(2)(A) compels the

interpretation given it by the SSA. It suffices to conclude, as we do,

that §423(d)(2)(A) does not unambiguously require a different

interpretation, and that the SSA's regulation is an entirely reasonable

interpretation of the text. The judgment of the Court of Appeals is

reversed.

It is so ordered.

Justice Scalia delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.

[1] The four-step instructions

to the claimant read as follows: “If we cannot make a decision based

on your current work activity or on medical facts alone, and you have a

severe impairment(s), we then review your residual functional capacity and

the physical and mental demands of the work you have done in the past. If

you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not

disabled.” 20 CFR

§§404.1520(e) , 416.920(e) (2003).

[2] In regulations that became

effective on September 25, 2003, the SSA amended certain aspects of the

five-step process in ways not material to this opinion. The provisions

referred to as subsections (e) and (f) in this opinion are now subsections

e in the past. If

you can still do this kind of work, we will find that you are not

disabled.” 20 CFR

§§404.1520(e) , 416.920(e) (2003).

[2] In regulations that became

effective on September 25, 2003, the SSA amended certain aspects of the

five-step process in ways not material to this opinion. The provisions

referred to as subsections (e) and (f) in this opinion are now subsections

(f) and (g).

[3] This interpretation was

embodied in the regulations that first established the five-step process

in 1978, see 43 FR 55349 (codified, as amended, at 20 CFR §§404.1520 and 416.920 (1982)). Even

before enactment of §423(d)(2)(A) in 1967, the SSA disallowed

disability benefits when the inability to work was caused by

“technological changes in the industry in which [the claimant] has

worked.” 20 CFR

§404.1502(b) (1961).