SSR 82-46c: SECTIONS 223(d) and 1614(a)(3) (42 U.S.C. 423(d) and 1382c(a)(3)) DISABILITY -- AGE CRITERION OF THE VOCATIONAL FACTORS REGULATIONS -- USE OF CHRONOLOGICAL AGE -- CONSTITUTIONALITY

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20 CFR 404.1560-404.1569 and 416.960-416.969

SSR 82-46c

Fogg v. Schweiker , 1st Circuit, Civ. No. 81-1232 (10/13/81)

BREYER, Circuit Judge:

This case is an appeal from a decision of the United States District

Court for the District of Maine affirming the decision of the Secretary of

Health and Human Services that the appellant, William H. Fogg, was not

disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3).

Specifically, appellant claims that the Secretary improperly applied the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "guidelines") which have been adopted

by the Social Security Administration in order to aid in the determination

of disability in that he (1) failed to take into consideration limitations

on the appellant's ability to perform sedentary work, and (2) failed to

apply the age criterion in the guidelines in a flexible manner. Because we

find that the Secretary properly considered appellant's nonexertional

limitations, correctly applied the age criterion, and is supported by

substantial evidence in his determinations of fact, we affirm the decision

below.

I

William H. Fogg, a forty-six year-old resident of West Rockport, Maine,

originally applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental

Social Security Income on November 15, 1976. He alleged that he had become

unable to work in June, 1975, because of pains in his legs and chest and

breathing problems. These claims were denied on June 18, 1977, and were

not appealed. Mr. Fogg again filed applications on December 27, 1977,

alleging the same onset date. These applications were denied initially and

on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Appellant, his

attorney, and a vocational expert appeared before an Administrative Law

Judge ("ALJ") who considered the claim de novo. On March 28, 1979,

the ALJ found that the appellant was not disabled. The Appeals Council

denied appellant's request for review on August 17, 1979

date. These applications were denied initially and

on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Appellant, his

attorney, and a vocational expert appeared before an Administrative Law

Judge ("ALJ") who considered the claim de novo. On March 28, 1979,

the ALJ found that the appellant was not disabled. The Appeals Council

denied appellant's request for review on August 17, 1979. Upon

consideration of additional medical evidence submitted by appellant, on

November 9, 1979, the Appeals Council found no basis for vacating its

previous denial, thereby rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision

of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, subject to judicial

review.

Appellant filed suit in the United States District Court for the District

of Maine seeking review. Both parties moved for summary judgment and oral

argument was waived. The court, upon review of the administrative record

and consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, held that the

Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence and granted the

Secretary's motion for summary judgment. Appellant appeals from this

decision.

The Secretary's determination of no disability, the finding in dispute in

this appeal, was derived by use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines found

at Appendix II to Subpart P of Part 404 of Title 20 of the Code of Federal

Regulations (for Disability Insurance Benefits) and Appendix II to Subpart

I of Part 416 of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations (for

Supplemental Security Income), enacted pursuant to the Social Security Act

§205, 42 U.S.C. §405(a). [1] These guidelines consist of a series of rules, organized into a grid,

which direct a conclusion of "disability" or "no disability" based upon

the claimant's residual ability to perform, age, education, and previous

work experience. Medical evidence of any impairment suffered by a claimant

is considered at two stages in the determination

he Social Security Act

§205, 42 U.S.C. §405(a). [1] These guidelines consist of a series of rules, organized into a grid,

which direct a conclusion of "disability" or "no disability" based upon

the claimant's residual ability to perform, age, education, and previous

work experience. Medical evidence of any impairment suffered by a claimant

is considered at two stages in the determination. If the claimant has an

exertional impairment, i.e., a strength limitation, that evidence

is considered in determining whether he had the residual work capacity to

do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work. If a claimant has

nonexertional limitations, either alone or in addition to his exertional

impairments, the Secretary is directed to turn first to the grid to

determine whether there can be a finding of "disability" based on

exertional limitations alone. If not, the rules reflecting the

individual's maximum residual strength capabilities, age, education, and

work experience are to provide a framework for consideration of how much

the individual's work capability is further diminished by those

nonexertional limitations. In considering the effect of nonexertional

limitations all of the relevant facts of the case are to be considered.

Appendix II, §200(e)(2).

In applying these guidelines, the ALJ made the following findings of

facts:

This appeal is limited to a challenge to the ALJ's application of the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines in that it is contended that (1) the ALJ

failed to take into consideration limitations on the appellant's ability

to perform sedentary work, and (2) the ALJ failed to apply the age

criterion of the grid in a flexible manner.

II

se guidelines, the ALJ made the following findings of

facts:

This appeal is limited to a challenge to the ALJ's application of the

Medical-Vocational Guidelines in that it is contended that (1) the ALJ

failed to take into consideration limitations on the appellant's ability

to perform sedentary work, and (2) the ALJ failed to apply the age

criterion of the grid in a flexible manner.

II

Appellant claims that his urinary problems, evidence of which was

introduced at the hearing, constituted a nonexertional impairment which

required the ALJ to consider the effects of those problems upon his

ability to perform sedentary work. Appellant further argues that in the

presence of such nonexertional limitations use of the grid alone

constituted a failure to carry the burden of establishing that alternate

jobs existed which appellant could perform.

The short answer to this objection is that the ALJ did consider the

appellant's evidence of urinary problems and concluded that "[t]here is no

established urinary tract or bladder disease," Finding No. 4, and further

that '[t]he claimant's impairment is solely exertional . . .," Finding No.

15. After reviewing the record, we believe that these conclusions were

supported by substantial evidence.

The limited role of this court in reviewing these finds of fact is set

out by the Social Security Act §205(a), 42 U.S.C. §405(a), which provides,

in part, that "[t]he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if

supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive . . . ." Thus the

Secretary, as trier of fact, is charged with duty to weigh the evidence,

to resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to determine the case

accordingly. The findings of the Secretary are conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).

e

Secretary, as trier of fact, is charged with duty to weigh the evidence,

to resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to determine the case

accordingly. The findings of the Secretary are conclusive if supported by

substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable

mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.

Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).

The evidence adduced at the hearing with regard to the claimed urinary

problems was as follows. The appellant testified that he had urinary

problems involving both voiding frequency and bladder incontinence. He

offered evidence that in October of 1966 he had bloody urine and pain in

the abdomen associated with urination. At that time he was admitted to

Camden Community Hospital, Camden, Maine, where all tests including

cystoscopy and bilateral retrograde pyelography indicated that the

appellant's urinary tract was well within normal functioning limits. The

final diagnosis was a recently passed left uretal stone.

Appellant next complained of voiding frequency in November, 1976, when he

was examined by Dr. P.A. Millington. Dr. Millington did not conduct any

tests of the urinary system, but diagnosed urinary frequency as secondary

to a severe accident in 1973 which resulted in broken legs, broken pelvis,

and urinary bladder involvement.

In January of 1978 appellant was examined by Jack McCue, M.D., who

determined from X-rays that the appellant had a normal upper urinary

tract, but opined that the urinary frequency and hesitancy where

suggestive of prostatism. Dr. McCue urged further examination of the

urinary problems by a specialist in this field.

esulted in broken legs, broken pelvis,

and urinary bladder involvement.

In January of 1978 appellant was examined by Jack McCue, M.D., who

determined from X-rays that the appellant had a normal upper urinary

tract, but opined that the urinary frequency and hesitancy where

suggestive of prostatism. Dr. McCue urged further examination of the

urinary problems by a specialist in this field.

Appellant then saw such a specialist, Dr. William E. Nuesse, a board

certified urologist, in July, 1978. Dr. Nuesse found absolutely normally

functioning kidneys, normally draining uterers, and a bladder which

functioned normally. Because there was no evidence of any abnormalities in

his urinary tract, Dr. Nuesse felt that he was dealing with a basically

healthy urinary tract. Dr. Nuesse further stated that frequent urination

does not necessarily indicate a disease, but can result from psychological

problems. Finally, Dr. Nuesse noted that the appellant had had no medical

treatment whatsoever for his urinary problems and that many drugs which

would help patients decrease their voiding frequency were available for

reasonable medical treatment. Dr. Nuesse recommended against the granting

of any disability prior to at least such medical treatment.

The appellant himself testified that he had significant urinary frequency

problems for over six months and dating back to a year, with somewhat less

frequency in the beginning, requiring him to urinate 20 to 30 times a day

and five times a night. He indicated that for the prior two weeks, since

his examination with Dr. Nuesse, such frequency was not necessary at all.

Although the appellant testified that there was some seepage during that

period, he said that his urinary frequency was approaching normal; indeed

claimant did not show any necessity for urination until one hour and

forty-five minutes into the hearing.

times a night. He indicated that for the prior two weeks, since

his examination with Dr. Nuesse, such frequency was not necessary at all.

Although the appellant testified that there was some seepage during that

period, he said that his urinary frequency was approaching normal; indeed

claimant did not show any necessity for urination until one hour and

forty-five minutes into the hearing.

On the basis of this evidence the ALJ concluded that there was no

impairment resulting from urinary disorders. We think that he was

supported by substantial evidence in this decision. The ALJ was entitled

to rely on the evaluation and opinion of Dr. Nuesse, the only urologist

who examined appellant and only physician who performed tests on his

urinary system. The ALJ was also entitled to consider both his own

observations of the appellant's voiding frequency and the appellant's

statements that after his visit to Dr. Nuesse his urinary frequency was

approaching normal. In light of this evidence and the fact that "[i]t is

for the Secretary, not a reviewing court, to determine what weight to give

to particular items of evidence, "Miranda v. Secretary of Health,

Education, and Welfare, 514 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1975), we cannot

say that the Secretary's determination that there was no nonexertional

impairment resulting from urinary tract disease was not supported by

substantial evidence. Thus, the ALJ did not misapply the guidelines when

he failed to consider a nonexistent nonexertional impairment.

III

vidence, "Miranda v. Secretary of Health,

Education, and Welfare, 514 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1975), we cannot

say that the Secretary's determination that there was no nonexertional

impairment resulting from urinary tract disease was not supported by

substantial evidence. Thus, the ALJ did not misapply the guidelines when

he failed to consider a nonexistent nonexertional impairment.

III

The appellant also claims that the ALJ erred in his failure to apply the

age criterion of the grid in a flexible manner. The appellant contends

that the "age" criterion of the grid is meant to refer to "physiological

age" rather than "chronological age." Appellant bases this contention on

the argument that physiological age is more relevant to the determination

of disability than is chronological age, and further argues that if

chronological age alone is considered, then the use of the age requirement

creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption. We believe that the

ALJ correctly applied the age criterion when he considered chronological

age only and that the application was constitutionally sound.

In 1975, when the appellant first applied for Disability Insurance

Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, his chronological age was 43.

He was chronologically 45 on Sept. 30, 1977, when his insured status for

the purpose of disability benefits expired, and chronologically 46 at the

time of the hearing. [2] According to the classifications established in the guidelines appellant

was at all relevant times a "younger individual" in either the 18-44 or

the 45-49 age bracket. For a person of appellant's residual work capacity,

education, and previous work experience in either of those age brackets a

finding of "not disabled" is directed by the grid

nologically 46 at the

time of the hearing. [2] According to the classifications established in the guidelines appellant

was at all relevant times a "younger individual" in either the 18-44 or

the 45-49 age bracket. For a person of appellant's residual work capacity,

education, and previous work experience in either of those age brackets a

finding of "not disabled" is directed by the grid. Appellant claims,

however, that his physical age was much in advance of his chronological

age and that he should have classified as an individual "closely

approaching advanced age." Were he so classified, the grid would direct a

finding of "disabled."

The appellant points to evidence of his premature aging in the record

consisting of general statements to the effect that at various times he

looked older than his stated age, two made by doctors and one made by a

Social Security Administration official. Each of these statements reflects

a visual impression of the appellant's appearance and is neither based on

specific testing results nor is linked to any particular claims of

resulting impairment. No reference to physiological age as such was

offered at the hearing, and in his brief the appellant offers no

indication of what his precise physiological age is, but merely suggests

that it ought to be at lease four years older than his chronological

age. [3] He claims that the ALJ

erred in ignoring this evidence of early aging.

inked to any particular claims of

resulting impairment. No reference to physiological age as such was

offered at the hearing, and in his brief the appellant offers no

indication of what his precise physiological age is, but merely suggests

that it ought to be at lease four years older than his chronological

age. [3] He claims that the ALJ

erred in ignoring this evidence of early aging.

It is our opinion, however, that the age criterion in the guidelines was

meant to incorporate chronological age only and not to refer to

physiological age. There is no evidence whatsoever that the regulations

were intended to encompass "physiological age" rather than the common,

well-known concept of chronological age. Physiological age is not a

standard measure supported by any established scientific guidelines. It is

not capable of precise or accurate determination; indeed, the appellant

cannot say what his precise physiological age is, but merely contends that

it must be at least fifty. Although it may be that there is such a thing

as physiological age which can be roughly calculated, we believe that the

use of exact years in the guidelines implies reference to a measure that

is exactly determinable in years, not the inherently imprecise concept of

physiological age. We are further bolstered in this conclusion by the

guidelines reference to "age" in the context of a borderline situation. A

"borderline situation" exists when there would be a shift in results

caused by "the passage of a few days or months." 43 Fed.Reg.

55359. [4] This definition

clearly contemplates a determination of age that is tied to some specific

calendar date, as is chronological age. In contrast, physiological age

could not be so accurately determined as to make this definition of a

borderline situation meaningful

uation" exists when there would be a shift in results

caused by "the passage of a few days or months." 43 Fed.Reg.

55359. [4] This definition

clearly contemplates a determination of age that is tied to some specific

calendar date, as is chronological age. In contrast, physiological age

could not be so accurately determined as to make this definition of a

borderline situation meaningful. In short, we are unwilling to believe

that the Social Security Agency would introduce such an imprecise and

unusual concept as physiological age into their guidelines without clearly

indicating the departure from chronological

age. [5]

The appellant goes on to argue that if "age" is meant to be

"chronological age" then the guidelines establish an irrebuttable

presumption which prevents a claimant from introducing relevant evidence, i.e., his physiological age, as to the ultimate issue, which is

disability. Because such an irrebuttable presumption so limits him, the

appellant argues that it unconstitutionally deprives him of due process of

law. In support of this contention the appellant cites Vlandis v.

Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that an

irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for students who began school as

nonresidents was unconstitutional.

The Vlandis analysis has, however, been limited by the Court's

subsequent decision in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). In

that case the Court upheld a duration of marriage requirement for the

receipt of surviving widow's and children's benefits, establishing that in

the case of a Social Security classification "'the Due Process clause can

be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently

arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification,'" 422

U.S. at 768, quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611

ion of marriage requirement for the

receipt of surviving widow's and children's benefits, establishing that in

the case of a Social Security classification "'the Due Process clause can

be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently

arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification,'" 422

U.S. at 768, quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611

(1960).

It is our opinion that the use of chronological age is not so utterly

lacking in rational justification as to run afoul of the Due Process

clause. In taking account of age, the Secretary has recognized "the

increasing physiological deterioration in the senses, joints, eye-hand

coordination, reflexes, thinking processes, etc., which diminish a

severely impaired person's aptitude for learning and adaptation to a new

job." 43 Fed.Reg. 55359. "[W]ork capacity does decline as age increases

beyond a certain age; this is a logical and reasonable factor to be taken

into account." Stallings v. Harris, 493 F.Supp. 956, 960 (W.D.

Tenn. 1980)

Moreover, the specific use of chronological rather than physiological age

is a constitutional means of classification. Weinberger makes it

clear that the validity of a classification depends not upon whether the

classifying regulation fits the purpose of the classification precisely,

correctly identifying all members of the class, but rather upon the

existence of a rational relation which links the classification to a

reasonable end coupled with inherent difficulties in making individual

determinations. 422 U.S. at 777. In this case chronological age is

rationally related to those bodily changes which occur with approaching

old age, albeit sooner for some people than for others. Given the inherent

difficulties in defining, much less proving, physiological age on an

individual basis, we think that classification by chronological age is

appropriate

s in making individual

determinations. 422 U.S. at 777. In this case chronological age is

rationally related to those bodily changes which occur with approaching

old age, albeit sooner for some people than for others. Given the inherent

difficulties in defining, much less proving, physiological age on an

individual basis, we think that classification by chronological age is

appropriate. Such a classification does no more than impute to each member

of an age bracket the average effects of aging for persons within that age

bracket. That imputation may underestimate the effects of aging on some

and overestimate those effects for others, yet the classification is

defensible in light of the morass into which attempts to determine the

physiological age of claimants would lead.

Finally, we note that contrary to the appellant's fears, this decision

will not prevent a claimant from introducing evidence of his disability. A

claimant is free to show any discernible exertional or nonexertional

impairment. If the effects of premature aging for an individual should

rise to the level of a demonstrable or measurable exertional or

nonexertional impairment, there is no bar to the introduction and

consideration of evidence related to that impairment. The use of

chronological age in the age criterion portion of the guidelines merely

eliminates speculation about intangible, subtle, unmeasurable changes in

the aging process. There is no cognizable prejudice to the appellant or to

other claimants in the elimination of such speculation.

Affirmed

there is no bar to the introduction and

consideration of evidence related to that impairment. The use of

chronological age in the age criterion portion of the guidelines merely

eliminates speculation about intangible, subtle, unmeasurable changes in

the aging process. There is no cognizable prejudice to the appellant or to

other claimants in the elimination of such speculation.

Affirmed

[1] "The Secretary shall have

full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish

procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this title, which are

necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall adopt

reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for

the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking

and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits

hereunder."

[2] Appellant's insured status

for the purposes of Disability Insurance Benefits expired on September 30,

1977, and therefore he needed to be found disqualified as of or prior to

that date to be eligible for disability benefits. There is no insured

status requirement, however, under the Supplemental Security Income

program.

[3] Appellant would have to have

been even further in advance of his chronological age than is suggested in

his brief in order to be found an individual "closely approaching advanced

age" at the other relevant dates of June, 1975, when he first applied for

benefits, and September 30, 1977, when his insured status for disability

benefits expired.

e Supplemental Security Income

program.

[3] Appellant would have to have

been even further in advance of his chronological age than is suggested in

his brief in order to be found an individual "closely approaching advanced

age" at the other relevant dates of June, 1975, when he first applied for

benefits, and September 30, 1977, when his insured status for disability

benefits expired.

[4] In the case of a borderline

situation, the Secretary is directed to apply the guidelines flexibly to

avoid dramatic shifts in results. Appellant also claims that his

physiological age made him a borderline case and that the ALJ should thus

have adopted a flexible approach to the grid. It is clear however that the

appellant is not a borderline case within the intended meaning of the

regulations as it requires a passage of at least four years, rather than

"a few days or months" to place him into the higher age classification.

[5] Nor are we convinced that

Congress, in referring to "age" as a factor to be considered in

determining disability, meant to refer to anything other than

chronological age. Had Congress purposely intended to refer to

physiological age, it, too, would have signalled this departure from the

expected by clearer language. Instead Congress simply noted that age was a

relevant factor and accorded the Secretary broad powers to issue

regulations which would take age into account as a part of disability. 42

U.S.C. §423(d)(2). We cannot find that the Secretary exceeded his powers

by contravening Congressional intent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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