SSR 82-46c: SECTIONS 223(d) and 1614(a)(3) (42 U.S.C. 423(d) and 1382c(a)(3)) DISABILITY -- AGE CRITERION OF THE VOCATIONAL FACTORS REGULATIONS -- USE OF CHRONOLOGICAL AGE -- CONSTITUTIONALITY
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20 CFR 404.1560-404.1569 and 416.960-416.969
SSR 82-46c
Fogg v. Schweiker , 1st Circuit, Civ. No. 81-1232 (10/13/81)
BREYER, Circuit Judge:
This case is an appeal from a decision of the United States District
Court for the District of Maine affirming the decision of the Secretary of
Health and Human Services that the appellant, William H. Fogg, was not
disabled within the meaning of 42 U.S.C. §§423(d)(1)(A) and 1382c(a)(3).
Specifically, appellant claims that the Secretary improperly applied the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines (the "guidelines") which have been adopted
by the Social Security Administration in order to aid in the determination
of disability in that he (1) failed to take into consideration limitations
on the appellant's ability to perform sedentary work, and (2) failed to
apply the age criterion in the guidelines in a flexible manner. Because we
find that the Secretary properly considered appellant's nonexertional
limitations, correctly applied the age criterion, and is supported by
substantial evidence in his determinations of fact, we affirm the decision
below.
I
William H. Fogg, a forty-six year-old resident of West Rockport, Maine,
originally applied for Disability Insurance Benefits and Supplemental
Social Security Income on November 15, 1976. He alleged that he had become
unable to work in June, 1975, because of pains in his legs and chest and
breathing problems. These claims were denied on June 18, 1977, and were
not appealed. Mr. Fogg again filed applications on December 27, 1977,
alleging the same onset date. These applications were denied initially and
on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Appellant, his
attorney, and a vocational expert appeared before an Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") who considered the claim de novo. On March 28, 1979,
the ALJ found that the appellant was not disabled. The Appeals Council
denied appellant's request for review on August 17, 1979
date. These applications were denied initially and
on reconsideration by the Social Security Administration. Appellant, his
attorney, and a vocational expert appeared before an Administrative Law
Judge ("ALJ") who considered the claim de novo. On March 28, 1979,
the ALJ found that the appellant was not disabled. The Appeals Council
denied appellant's request for review on August 17, 1979. Upon
consideration of additional medical evidence submitted by appellant, on
November 9, 1979, the Appeals Council found no basis for vacating its
previous denial, thereby rendering the ALJ's decision the final decision
of the Secretary of Health and Human Services, subject to judicial
review.
Appellant filed suit in the United States District Court for the District
of Maine seeking review. Both parties moved for summary judgment and oral
argument was waived. The court, upon review of the administrative record
and consideration of the briefs filed by the parties, held that the
Secretary's decision was supported by substantial evidence and granted the
Secretary's motion for summary judgment. Appellant appeals from this
decision.
The Secretary's determination of no disability, the finding in dispute in
this appeal, was derived by use of the Medical-Vocational Guidelines found
at Appendix II to Subpart P of Part 404 of Title 20 of the Code of Federal
Regulations (for Disability Insurance Benefits) and Appendix II to Subpart
I of Part 416 of Title 20 of the Code of Federal Regulations (for
Supplemental Security Income), enacted pursuant to the Social Security Act
§205, 42 U.S.C. §405(a). [1] These guidelines consist of a series of rules, organized into a grid,
which direct a conclusion of "disability" or "no disability" based upon
the claimant's residual ability to perform, age, education, and previous
work experience. Medical evidence of any impairment suffered by a claimant
is considered at two stages in the determination
he Social Security Act
§205, 42 U.S.C. §405(a). [1] These guidelines consist of a series of rules, organized into a grid,
which direct a conclusion of "disability" or "no disability" based upon
the claimant's residual ability to perform, age, education, and previous
work experience. Medical evidence of any impairment suffered by a claimant
is considered at two stages in the determination. If the claimant has an
exertional impairment, i.e., a strength limitation, that evidence
is considered in determining whether he had the residual work capacity to
do sedentary, light, medium, heavy, or very heavy work. If a claimant has
nonexertional limitations, either alone or in addition to his exertional
impairments, the Secretary is directed to turn first to the grid to
determine whether there can be a finding of "disability" based on
exertional limitations alone. If not, the rules reflecting the
individual's maximum residual strength capabilities, age, education, and
work experience are to provide a framework for consideration of how much
the individual's work capability is further diminished by those
nonexertional limitations. In considering the effect of nonexertional
limitations all of the relevant facts of the case are to be considered.
Appendix II, §200(e)(2).
In applying these guidelines, the ALJ made the following findings of
facts:
This appeal is limited to a challenge to the ALJ's application of the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines in that it is contended that (1) the ALJ
failed to take into consideration limitations on the appellant's ability
to perform sedentary work, and (2) the ALJ failed to apply the age
criterion of the grid in a flexible manner.
II
se guidelines, the ALJ made the following findings of
facts:
This appeal is limited to a challenge to the ALJ's application of the
Medical-Vocational Guidelines in that it is contended that (1) the ALJ
failed to take into consideration limitations on the appellant's ability
to perform sedentary work, and (2) the ALJ failed to apply the age
criterion of the grid in a flexible manner.
II
Appellant claims that his urinary problems, evidence of which was
introduced at the hearing, constituted a nonexertional impairment which
required the ALJ to consider the effects of those problems upon his
ability to perform sedentary work. Appellant further argues that in the
presence of such nonexertional limitations use of the grid alone
constituted a failure to carry the burden of establishing that alternate
jobs existed which appellant could perform.
The short answer to this objection is that the ALJ did consider the
appellant's evidence of urinary problems and concluded that "[t]here is no
established urinary tract or bladder disease," Finding No. 4, and further
that '[t]he claimant's impairment is solely exertional . . .," Finding No.
15. After reviewing the record, we believe that these conclusions were
supported by substantial evidence.
The limited role of this court in reviewing these finds of fact is set
out by the Social Security Act §205(a), 42 U.S.C. §405(a), which provides,
in part, that "[t]he findings of the Secretary as to any fact, if
supported by substantial evidence shall be conclusive . . . ." Thus the
Secretary, as trier of fact, is charged with duty to weigh the evidence,
to resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to determine the case
accordingly. The findings of the Secretary are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
e
Secretary, as trier of fact, is charged with duty to weigh the evidence,
to resolve material conflicts in the testimony, and to determine the case
accordingly. The findings of the Secretary are conclusive if supported by
substantial evidence, i.e., such relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson v.
Perales, 402 U.S. 389 (1971).
The evidence adduced at the hearing with regard to the claimed urinary
problems was as follows. The appellant testified that he had urinary
problems involving both voiding frequency and bladder incontinence. He
offered evidence that in October of 1966 he had bloody urine and pain in
the abdomen associated with urination. At that time he was admitted to
Camden Community Hospital, Camden, Maine, where all tests including
cystoscopy and bilateral retrograde pyelography indicated that the
appellant's urinary tract was well within normal functioning limits. The
final diagnosis was a recently passed left uretal stone.
Appellant next complained of voiding frequency in November, 1976, when he
was examined by Dr. P.A. Millington. Dr. Millington did not conduct any
tests of the urinary system, but diagnosed urinary frequency as secondary
to a severe accident in 1973 which resulted in broken legs, broken pelvis,
and urinary bladder involvement.
In January of 1978 appellant was examined by Jack McCue, M.D., who
determined from X-rays that the appellant had a normal upper urinary
tract, but opined that the urinary frequency and hesitancy where
suggestive of prostatism. Dr. McCue urged further examination of the
urinary problems by a specialist in this field.
esulted in broken legs, broken pelvis,
and urinary bladder involvement.
In January of 1978 appellant was examined by Jack McCue, M.D., who
determined from X-rays that the appellant had a normal upper urinary
tract, but opined that the urinary frequency and hesitancy where
suggestive of prostatism. Dr. McCue urged further examination of the
urinary problems by a specialist in this field.
Appellant then saw such a specialist, Dr. William E. Nuesse, a board
certified urologist, in July, 1978. Dr. Nuesse found absolutely normally
functioning kidneys, normally draining uterers, and a bladder which
functioned normally. Because there was no evidence of any abnormalities in
his urinary tract, Dr. Nuesse felt that he was dealing with a basically
healthy urinary tract. Dr. Nuesse further stated that frequent urination
does not necessarily indicate a disease, but can result from psychological
problems. Finally, Dr. Nuesse noted that the appellant had had no medical
treatment whatsoever for his urinary problems and that many drugs which
would help patients decrease their voiding frequency were available for
reasonable medical treatment. Dr. Nuesse recommended against the granting
of any disability prior to at least such medical treatment.
The appellant himself testified that he had significant urinary frequency
problems for over six months and dating back to a year, with somewhat less
frequency in the beginning, requiring him to urinate 20 to 30 times a day
and five times a night. He indicated that for the prior two weeks, since
his examination with Dr. Nuesse, such frequency was not necessary at all.
Although the appellant testified that there was some seepage during that
period, he said that his urinary frequency was approaching normal; indeed
claimant did not show any necessity for urination until one hour and
forty-five minutes into the hearing.
times a night. He indicated that for the prior two weeks, since
his examination with Dr. Nuesse, such frequency was not necessary at all.
Although the appellant testified that there was some seepage during that
period, he said that his urinary frequency was approaching normal; indeed
claimant did not show any necessity for urination until one hour and
forty-five minutes into the hearing.
On the basis of this evidence the ALJ concluded that there was no
impairment resulting from urinary disorders. We think that he was
supported by substantial evidence in this decision. The ALJ was entitled
to rely on the evaluation and opinion of Dr. Nuesse, the only urologist
who examined appellant and only physician who performed tests on his
urinary system. The ALJ was also entitled to consider both his own
observations of the appellant's voiding frequency and the appellant's
statements that after his visit to Dr. Nuesse his urinary frequency was
approaching normal. In light of this evidence and the fact that "[i]t is
for the Secretary, not a reviewing court, to determine what weight to give
to particular items of evidence, "Miranda v. Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, 514 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1975), we cannot
say that the Secretary's determination that there was no nonexertional
impairment resulting from urinary tract disease was not supported by
substantial evidence. Thus, the ALJ did not misapply the guidelines when
he failed to consider a nonexistent nonexertional impairment.
III
vidence, "Miranda v. Secretary of Health,
Education, and Welfare, 514 F.2d 996, 998 (1st Cir. 1975), we cannot
say that the Secretary's determination that there was no nonexertional
impairment resulting from urinary tract disease was not supported by
substantial evidence. Thus, the ALJ did not misapply the guidelines when
he failed to consider a nonexistent nonexertional impairment.
III
The appellant also claims that the ALJ erred in his failure to apply the
age criterion of the grid in a flexible manner. The appellant contends
that the "age" criterion of the grid is meant to refer to "physiological
age" rather than "chronological age." Appellant bases this contention on
the argument that physiological age is more relevant to the determination
of disability than is chronological age, and further argues that if
chronological age alone is considered, then the use of the age requirement
creates an unconstitutional irrebuttable presumption. We believe that the
ALJ correctly applied the age criterion when he considered chronological
age only and that the application was constitutionally sound.
In 1975, when the appellant first applied for Disability Insurance
Benefits and Supplemental Security Income, his chronological age was 43.
He was chronologically 45 on Sept. 30, 1977, when his insured status for
the purpose of disability benefits expired, and chronologically 46 at the
time of the hearing. [2] According to the classifications established in the guidelines appellant
was at all relevant times a "younger individual" in either the 18-44 or
the 45-49 age bracket. For a person of appellant's residual work capacity,
education, and previous work experience in either of those age brackets a
finding of "not disabled" is directed by the grid
nologically 46 at the
time of the hearing. [2] According to the classifications established in the guidelines appellant
was at all relevant times a "younger individual" in either the 18-44 or
the 45-49 age bracket. For a person of appellant's residual work capacity,
education, and previous work experience in either of those age brackets a
finding of "not disabled" is directed by the grid. Appellant claims,
however, that his physical age was much in advance of his chronological
age and that he should have classified as an individual "closely
approaching advanced age." Were he so classified, the grid would direct a
finding of "disabled."
The appellant points to evidence of his premature aging in the record
consisting of general statements to the effect that at various times he
looked older than his stated age, two made by doctors and one made by a
Social Security Administration official. Each of these statements reflects
a visual impression of the appellant's appearance and is neither based on
specific testing results nor is linked to any particular claims of
resulting impairment. No reference to physiological age as such was
offered at the hearing, and in his brief the appellant offers no
indication of what his precise physiological age is, but merely suggests
that it ought to be at lease four years older than his chronological
age. [3] He claims that the ALJ
erred in ignoring this evidence of early aging.
inked to any particular claims of
resulting impairment. No reference to physiological age as such was
offered at the hearing, and in his brief the appellant offers no
indication of what his precise physiological age is, but merely suggests
that it ought to be at lease four years older than his chronological
age. [3] He claims that the ALJ
erred in ignoring this evidence of early aging.
It is our opinion, however, that the age criterion in the guidelines was
meant to incorporate chronological age only and not to refer to
physiological age. There is no evidence whatsoever that the regulations
were intended to encompass "physiological age" rather than the common,
well-known concept of chronological age. Physiological age is not a
standard measure supported by any established scientific guidelines. It is
not capable of precise or accurate determination; indeed, the appellant
cannot say what his precise physiological age is, but merely contends that
it must be at least fifty. Although it may be that there is such a thing
as physiological age which can be roughly calculated, we believe that the
use of exact years in the guidelines implies reference to a measure that
is exactly determinable in years, not the inherently imprecise concept of
physiological age. We are further bolstered in this conclusion by the
guidelines reference to "age" in the context of a borderline situation. A
"borderline situation" exists when there would be a shift in results
caused by "the passage of a few days or months." 43 Fed.Reg.
55359. [4] This definition
clearly contemplates a determination of age that is tied to some specific
calendar date, as is chronological age. In contrast, physiological age
could not be so accurately determined as to make this definition of a
borderline situation meaningful
uation" exists when there would be a shift in results
caused by "the passage of a few days or months." 43 Fed.Reg.
55359. [4] This definition
clearly contemplates a determination of age that is tied to some specific
calendar date, as is chronological age. In contrast, physiological age
could not be so accurately determined as to make this definition of a
borderline situation meaningful. In short, we are unwilling to believe
that the Social Security Agency would introduce such an imprecise and
unusual concept as physiological age into their guidelines without clearly
indicating the departure from chronological
age. [5]
The appellant goes on to argue that if "age" is meant to be
"chronological age" then the guidelines establish an irrebuttable
presumption which prevents a claimant from introducing relevant evidence, i.e., his physiological age, as to the ultimate issue, which is
disability. Because such an irrebuttable presumption so limits him, the
appellant argues that it unconstitutionally deprives him of due process of
law. In support of this contention the appellant cites Vlandis v.
Kline, 412 U.S. 441 (1973), in which the Supreme Court held that an
irrebuttable presumption of nonresidency for students who began school as
nonresidents was unconstitutional.
The Vlandis analysis has, however, been limited by the Court's
subsequent decision in Weinberger v. Salfi, 422 U.S. 749 (1975). In
that case the Court upheld a duration of marriage requirement for the
receipt of surviving widow's and children's benefits, establishing that in
the case of a Social Security classification "'the Due Process clause can
be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently
arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification,'" 422
U.S. at 768, quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611
ion of marriage requirement for the
receipt of surviving widow's and children's benefits, establishing that in
the case of a Social Security classification "'the Due Process clause can
be thought to interpose a bar only if the statute manifests a patently
arbitrary classification, utterly lacking in rational justification,'" 422
U.S. at 768, quoting Fleming v. Nestor, 363 U.S. 603, 611
(1960).
It is our opinion that the use of chronological age is not so utterly
lacking in rational justification as to run afoul of the Due Process
clause. In taking account of age, the Secretary has recognized "the
increasing physiological deterioration in the senses, joints, eye-hand
coordination, reflexes, thinking processes, etc., which diminish a
severely impaired person's aptitude for learning and adaptation to a new
job." 43 Fed.Reg. 55359. "[W]ork capacity does decline as age increases
beyond a certain age; this is a logical and reasonable factor to be taken
into account." Stallings v. Harris, 493 F.Supp. 956, 960 (W.D.
Tenn. 1980)
Moreover, the specific use of chronological rather than physiological age
is a constitutional means of classification. Weinberger makes it
clear that the validity of a classification depends not upon whether the
classifying regulation fits the purpose of the classification precisely,
correctly identifying all members of the class, but rather upon the
existence of a rational relation which links the classification to a
reasonable end coupled with inherent difficulties in making individual
determinations. 422 U.S. at 777. In this case chronological age is
rationally related to those bodily changes which occur with approaching
old age, albeit sooner for some people than for others. Given the inherent
difficulties in defining, much less proving, physiological age on an
individual basis, we think that classification by chronological age is
appropriate
s in making individual
determinations. 422 U.S. at 777. In this case chronological age is
rationally related to those bodily changes which occur with approaching
old age, albeit sooner for some people than for others. Given the inherent
difficulties in defining, much less proving, physiological age on an
individual basis, we think that classification by chronological age is
appropriate. Such a classification does no more than impute to each member
of an age bracket the average effects of aging for persons within that age
bracket. That imputation may underestimate the effects of aging on some
and overestimate those effects for others, yet the classification is
defensible in light of the morass into which attempts to determine the
physiological age of claimants would lead.
Finally, we note that contrary to the appellant's fears, this decision
will not prevent a claimant from introducing evidence of his disability. A
claimant is free to show any discernible exertional or nonexertional
impairment. If the effects of premature aging for an individual should
rise to the level of a demonstrable or measurable exertional or
nonexertional impairment, there is no bar to the introduction and
consideration of evidence related to that impairment. The use of
chronological age in the age criterion portion of the guidelines merely
eliminates speculation about intangible, subtle, unmeasurable changes in
the aging process. There is no cognizable prejudice to the appellant or to
other claimants in the elimination of such speculation.
Affirmed
there is no bar to the introduction and
consideration of evidence related to that impairment. The use of
chronological age in the age criterion portion of the guidelines merely
eliminates speculation about intangible, subtle, unmeasurable changes in
the aging process. There is no cognizable prejudice to the appellant or to
other claimants in the elimination of such speculation.
Affirmed
[1] "The Secretary shall have
full power and authority to make rules and regulations and to establish
procedures, not inconsistent with the provisions of this title, which are
necessary or appropriate to carry out such provisions, and shall adopt
reasonable and proper rules and regulations to regulate and provide for
the nature and extent of the proofs and evidence and the method of taking
and furnishing the same in order to establish the right to benefits
hereunder."
[2] Appellant's insured status
for the purposes of Disability Insurance Benefits expired on September 30,
1977, and therefore he needed to be found disqualified as of or prior to
that date to be eligible for disability benefits. There is no insured
status requirement, however, under the Supplemental Security Income
program.
[3] Appellant would have to have
been even further in advance of his chronological age than is suggested in
his brief in order to be found an individual "closely approaching advanced
age" at the other relevant dates of June, 1975, when he first applied for
benefits, and September 30, 1977, when his insured status for disability
benefits expired.
e Supplemental Security Income
program.
[3] Appellant would have to have
been even further in advance of his chronological age than is suggested in
his brief in order to be found an individual "closely approaching advanced
age" at the other relevant dates of June, 1975, when he first applied for
benefits, and September 30, 1977, when his insured status for disability
benefits expired.
[4] In the case of a borderline
situation, the Secretary is directed to apply the guidelines flexibly to
avoid dramatic shifts in results. Appellant also claims that his
physiological age made him a borderline case and that the ALJ should thus
have adopted a flexible approach to the grid. It is clear however that the
appellant is not a borderline case within the intended meaning of the
regulations as it requires a passage of at least four years, rather than
"a few days or months" to place him into the higher age classification.
[5] Nor are we convinced that
Congress, in referring to "age" as a factor to be considered in
determining disability, meant to refer to anything other than
chronological age. Had Congress purposely intended to refer to
physiological age, it, too, would have signalled this departure from the
expected by clearer language. Instead Congress simply noted that age was a
relevant factor and accorded the Secretary broad powers to issue
regulations which would take age into account as a part of disability. 42
U.S.C. §423(d)(2). We cannot find that the Secretary exceeded his powers
by contravening Congressional intent.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.