SSR 00-1c: Sections 222(c) and 223(a), (d)(2)(a), and (e)(1) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 422(c) and 423(a), (d)(2)(A), and (e)(1)) Disability Insurance Benefits—Claims Filed Under Both the Social Security Act and the Americans with Disabilities Act

SSR 00-1c

EFFECTIVE/PUBLICATION DATE: 01/07/2000

20 CFR 404.1520(b)-(f), 404.1525, 404.1526, 404.1560(c), 404.1592, and

404.1592a

CAROLYN C. CLEVELAND v. POLICY MANAGEMENT SYSTEMS CORPORATION ET AL.,

____ U.S. ____, 119 S.Ct. 1597 (1999)

This Ruling concerns whether an individual's claim for, or receipt of,

disability insurance benefits filed under the Social Security Act (the

SSAct) would preclude the individual from pursuing relief under the

Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA).

The SSAct and the ADA both help individuals with disabilities but in

different ways. The SSAct provides monetary benefits to insured

individuals who are under a disability, as defined in the SSAct. The ADA

seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against any individual who

is considered a "qualified individual with a disability" as defined in the

ADA.

In January 1994, the claimant filed for Social Security disability

insurance benefits. By April 1994, her condition improved and she returned

to work. She reported this to the Social Security Administration (SSA)

which denied her claim. Her employer subsequently terminated her. She then

asked SSA to reconsider its denial of her claim. SSA again denied her

claim, but following a hearing, she was awarded benefits. However, before

her Social Security award, the claimant brought an ADA lawsuit contending

that her employer terminated her employment without reasonably

accommodating her disability.

The District Court did not evaluate her "reasonable accommodation" claim

on the merits, but granted summary judgment to the defendant because, in

the court's view, the plaintiff, by applying for and receiving Social

Security disability insurance benefits, had conceded that she was totally

disabled. This fact, the court concluded, estopped the plaintiff from

proving an essential element of her ADA claim, i.e., that she could

"perform the essential functions" of her job with "reasonable

accommodation."

to the defendant because, in

the court's view, the plaintiff, by applying for and receiving Social

Security disability insurance benefits, had conceded that she was totally

disabled. This fact, the court concluded, estopped the plaintiff from

proving an essential element of her ADA claim, i.e., that she could

"perform the essential functions" of her job with "reasonable

accommodation."

The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's grant of

summary judgment on the grounds that the plaintiff's statement on her

Social Security application that she was totally disabled and unable to

work was sufficient evidence to judically estop her later ADA claim. In

her ADA claim, the plaintiff contended that, for the time in question,

with reasonable accommodation, she could perform the essential functions

of her job. The Court of Appeals thought that her claims under both Acts

would incorporate two directly conflicting propositions; namely, "I am too

disabled to work" and "I am not too disabled to work." That court, in an

effort to prevent two conflicting claims under both Acts, used a special

judicial presumption that it believed would prevent the plaintiff from

successfully pursuing her ADA claim.

The Supreme Court (the Court) granted certiorari in light of the

disagreement among the circuits concerning the legal effect upon an ADA

claim of the application for, or receipt of, Social Security disability

insurance benefits. The Court held that, despite the appearance of

conflict between the two statutes, the two claims do not conflict to the

point where courts should apply a special negative presumption as in the

Court of Appeals' decision in this case. The Court believed that there are

too many situations in which a Social Security claim and an ADA claim can

comfortably exist side by side. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment

of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings

consistent with the Court's opinion.

ourts should apply a special negative presumption as in the

Court of Appeals' decision in this case. The Court believed that there are

too many situations in which a Social Security claim and an ADA claim can

comfortably exist side by side. The Court, therefore, vacated the judgment

of the Court of Appeals and remanded the case for further proceedings

consistent with the Court's opinion.

BREYER, Supreme Court Justice:

The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program provides benefits

to a person with a disability so severe that she is "unable to do [her]

previous work" and "cannot ... engage in any other kind of substantial

gainful work which exists in the national economy." § 223(a) of the Social

Security Act, as set forth in 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A). This case asks

whether the law erects a special presumption that would significantly

inhibit an SSDI recipient from simultaneously pursuing an action for

disability discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act of

1990 (ADA), claiming that "with ... reasonable accommodation" she could

"perform the essential functions" of her job. § 101, 104 Stat. 331, 42

U.S.C. § 12111(8).

We believe that, in context, these two seemingly divergent statutory

contentions are often consistent, each with the other. Thus pursuit, and

receipt, of SSDI benefits does not automatically estop the recipient from

pursuing an ADA claim. Nor does the law erect a strong presumption against

the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless, an ADA plaintiff

cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she was too disabled to

work. To survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, she must

explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she

could "perform the essential functions" of her previous job, at least with

"reasonable accommodation."

I

the recipient's success under the ADA. Nonetheless, an ADA plaintiff

cannot simply ignore her SSDI contention that she was too disabled to

work. To survive a defendant's motion for summary judgment, she must

explain why that SSDI contention is consistent with her ADA claim that she

could "perform the essential functions" of her previous job, at least with

"reasonable accommodation."

I

After suffering a disabling stroke and losing her job, Carolyn Cleveland

sought and obtained SSDI benefits from the Social Security Administration

(SSA). She has also brought this ADA suit in which she claims that her

former employer, Policy Management Systems Corporation, discriminated

against her on account of her disability. The two claims developed in the

following way:

August 1993 : Cleveland began work at Policy Management Systems. Her

job required her to perform background checks on prospective employees of

Policy Management System's clients.

January 7, 1994 : Cleveland suffered a stroke, which damaged her

concentration, memory, and language skills.

January 28, 1994 : Cleveland filed an SSDI application in which she

stated that she was "disabled" and "unable to work." App. 21.

April 11, 1994 : Cleveland's condition having improved, she returned

to work with Policy Management Systems. She reported that fact to the SSA

two weeks later.

July 11, 1994 : Noting that Cleveland had returned to work, the SSA

denied her SSDI application.

July 15, 1994 : Policy Management Systems fired Cleveland.

n which she

stated that she was "disabled" and "unable to work." App. 21.

April 11, 1994 : Cleveland's condition having improved, she returned

to work with Policy Management Systems. She reported that fact to the SSA

two weeks later.

July 11, 1994 : Noting that Cleveland had returned to work, the SSA

denied her SSDI application.

July 15, 1994 : Policy Management Systems fired Cleveland.

September 14, 1994 : Cleveland asked the SSA to reconsider its July

11th SSDI denial. In doing so, she said, "I was terminated [by Policy

Management Systems] due to my condition and I have not been able to work

since. I continue to be disabled." Id. , at 46. She later added that

she had "attempted to return to work in mid April," that she had "worked

for three months," and that Policy Management Systems terminated her

because she "could no longer do the job" in light of her "condition." Id. , at 47.

November 1994 : The SSA denied Cleveland's request for

reconsideration. Cleveland sought an SSA hearing, reiterating that "I am

unable to work due to my disability," and presenting new evidence about

the extent of her injuries. Id. , at 79.

September 29, 1995 : The SSA awarded Cleveland SSDI benefits

retroactive to the day of her stroke, January 7, 1994.

On September 22, 1995 , the week before her SSDI award, Cleveland

brought this ADA lawsuit. She contended that Policy Management Systems had

"terminat[ed]" her employment without reasonably "accommodat[ing] her

disability." Id. , at 7. She alleged that she requested, but was

denied, accommodations such as training and additional time to complete

her work. Id. , at 96. And she submitted a supporting affidavit from

her treating physician. Id. , at 101. The District Court did not

evaluate her reasonable accommodation claim on the merits, but granted

summary judgment to the defendant because, in that court's view,

Cleveland, by applying for and receiving SSDI benefits, had conceded that

she was totally disabled

al time to complete

her work. Id. , at 96. And she submitted a supporting affidavit from

her treating physician. Id. , at 101. The District Court did not

evaluate her reasonable accommodation claim on the merits, but granted

summary judgment to the defendant because, in that court's view,

Cleveland, by applying for and receiving SSDI benefits, had conceded that

she was totally disabled. And that fact, the court concluded, now estopped

Cleveland from proving an essential element of her ADA claim, namely that

she could "perform the essential functions" of her job, at least with

"reasonable accommodation." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8).

The Fifth Circuit affirmed the District Court's grant of summary judgment.

120 F.3d 513 (1997). The court wrote:

"[T]he application for or the receipt of social security disability

benefits creates a rebuttable presumption that the claimant or recipient

of such benefits is judicially estopped from asserting that he is a

'qualified individual with a disability.'" Id. , at 518.

The Circuit Court noted that it was "at least theoretically conceivable

that under some limited and highly unusual set of circumstances the two

claims would not necessarily be mutually exclusive." Id. , at 517.

But it concluded that, because

"Cleveland consistently represented to the SSA that she was totally

disabled, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact

rebutting the presumption that she is judicially estopped from now

asserting that for the time in question she was nevertheless a 'qualified

individual with a disability' for purposes of her ADA claim." Id. ,

at 518-519.

But it concluded that, because

"Cleveland consistently represented to the SSA that she was totally

disabled, she has failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact

rebutting the presumption that she is judicially estopped from now

asserting that for the time in question she was nevertheless a 'qualified

individual with a disability' for purposes of her ADA claim." Id. ,

at 518-519.

We granted certiorari in light of disagreement among the Circuits about

the legal effect upon an ADA suit of the application for, or receipt of,

disability benefits. Compare, e.g., Rascon v. U S West

Communications, Inc. , 143 F.3d 1324, 1332 (C.A.10 1998)

(application for, and receipt of, SSDI benefits is relevant to, but does

not estop plaintiff from bringing, an ADA claim); Griffith v.

Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. , 135 F.3d 376, 382 (C.A.6 1998) (same), cert.

pending, No. 97-1991; Swanks v. Washington Metropolitan Area Transit

Authority , 116 F.3d 582, 586 (C.A.D.C.1997) (same), with McNemar v. Disney Store, Inc. , 91 F.3d 610, 618-620 (C.A.3

1996) (applying judicial estoppel to bar plaintiff who applied for

disability benefits from bringing suit under the ADA), cert. denied, 519

U.S. 1115, 117 S.Ct. 958, 136 L.Ed.2d 845 (1997), and Kennedy v.

Applause, Inc. , 90 F.3d 1477, 1481-1482 (C.A.9 1996) (declining to

apply judicial estoppel but holding that claimant who declared total

disability in a benefits application failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a

disability).

II

The Social Security Act and the ADA both help individuals with

disabilities, but in different ways. The Social Security Act provides

monetary benefits to every insured individual who "is under a disability."

42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act defines "disability" as an

ation failed to raise a genuine issue of

material fact as to whether she was a qualified individual with a

disability).

II

The Social Security Act and the ADA both help individuals with

disabilities, but in different ways. The Social Security Act provides

monetary benefits to every insured individual who "is under a disability."

42 U.S.C. § 423(a)(1). The Act defines "disability" as an

"inability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any

... physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death

or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of

not less than 12 months." § 423(d)(1)(A).

The individual's impairment, as we have said, supra, at 1599, must be

"of such severity that [she] is not only unable to do [her] previous work

but cannot, considering [her] age, education, and work experience, engage

in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national

economy ...." § 423(d)(2)(A).

The ADA seeks to eliminate unwarranted discrimination against disabled

individuals in order both to guarantee those individuals equal opportunity

and to provide the Nation with the benefit of their consequently increased

productivity. See, e.g. , 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101(a)(8),(9). The Act

prohibits covered employers from discriminating "against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability of such

individual." § 12112(a). The Act defines a "qualified individual with a

disability" as a disabled person "who ... can perform the essential

functions" of her job, including those who can do so only "with ...

reasonable accommodation." § 12111(8).

. The Act

prohibits covered employers from discriminating "against a qualified

individual with a disability because of the disability of such

individual." § 12112(a). The Act defines a "qualified individual with a

disability" as a disabled person "who ... can perform the essential

functions" of her job, including those who can do so only "with ...

reasonable accommodation." § 12111(8).

We here consider but one of the many ways in which these two statutes

might interact. This case does not involve, for example, the

interaction of either of the statutes before us with other statutes, such

as the Federal Employers' Liability Act, 45 U.S.C. § 51 et

seq. Nor does it involve directly conflicting statements about

purely factual matters, such as "The light was red/green," or "I

can/cannot raise my arm above my head." An SSA representation of total

disability differs from a purely factual statement in that it often

implies a context-related legal conclusion, namely "I am disabled for

purposes of the Social Security Act." And our consideration of this latter

kind of statement consequently leaves the law related to the former,

purely factual, kind of conflict where we found it.

The case before us concerns an ADA plaintiff who both applied for, and

received, SSDI benefits. It requires us to review a Court of Appeals

decision upholding the grant of summary judgment on the ground that an ADA

plaintiff's "represent[ation] to the SSA that she was totally disabled"

created a "rebuttable presumption" sufficient to "judicially esto[p]" her

later representation that, "for the time in question," with reasonable

accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of her job. 120

F.3d, at 518-519

ppeals

decision upholding the grant of summary judgment on the ground that an ADA

plaintiff's "represent[ation] to the SSA that she was totally disabled"

created a "rebuttable presumption" sufficient to "judicially esto[p]" her

later representation that, "for the time in question," with reasonable

accommodation, she could perform the essential functions of her job. 120

F.3d, at 518-519. The Court of Appeals thought, in essence, that claims

under both Acts would incorporate two directly conflicting propositions,

namely "I am too disabled to work" and "I am not too disabled to work."

And in an effort to prevent two claims that would embody that kind of

factual conflict, the court used a special judicial presumption, which it

believed would ordinarily prevent a plaintiff like Cleveland from

successfully asserting an ADA claim.

In our view, however, despite the appearance of conflict that arises from

the language of the two statutes, the two claims do not inherently

conflict to the point where courts should apply a special negative

presumption like the one applied by the Court of Appeals here. That is

because there are too many situations in which an SSDI claim and an ADA

claim can comfortably exist side by side.

For one thing, as we have noted, the ADA defines a "qualified individual"

to include a disabled person "who ... can perform the essential functions"

of her job " with reasonable accommodation ." Reasonable

accommodations may include:

"job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to

a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,

appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training

materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,

and other similar accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).

." Reasonable

accommodations may include:

"job restructuring, part-time or modified work schedules, reassignment to

a vacant position, acquisition or modification of equipment or devices,

appropriate adjustment or modifications of examinations, training

materials or policies, the provision of qualified readers or interpreters,

and other similar accommodations." 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9)(B).

By way of contrast, when the SSA determines whether an individual is

disabled for SSDI purposes, it does not take the possibility of

"reasonable accommodation" into account, nor need an applicant refer to

the possibility of reasonable accommodation when she applies for SSDI. See

Memorandum from Daniel L. Skoler, Associate Comm'r for Hearings and

Appeals, SSA, to Administrative Appeals Judges, reprinted in 2 Social

Security Practice Guide, App. § 15C[9], pp. 15-401 to 15-402 (1998). The

omission reflects the facts that the SSA receives more than 2.5 million

claims for disability benefits each year; its administrative resources are

limited; the matter of "reasonable accommodation" may turn on highly

disputed workplace-specific matters; and an SSA misjudgment about that

detailed, and often fact-specific matter would deprive a seriously

disabled person of the critical financial support the statute seeks to

provide. See Brief for United States et al. as Amici Curiae 10-11,

and n. 2, 13. The result is that an ADA suit claiming that the plaintiff

can perform her job with reasonable accommodation may well prove

consistent with an SSDI claim that the plaintiff could not perform her own

job (or other jobs) without it.

For another thing, in order to process the large number of SSDI claims,

the SSA administers SSDI with the help of a five-step procedure that

embodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job availability, and

their interrelation. The SSA asks:

Step One : Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.)

See 20 CFR § 404.1520(b) (1998).

her own

job (or other jobs) without it.

For another thing, in order to process the large number of SSDI claims,

the SSA administers SSDI with the help of a five-step procedure that

embodies a set of presumptions about disabilities, job availability, and

their interrelation. The SSA asks:

Step One : Are you presently working? (If so, you are ineligible.)

See 20 CFR § 404.1520(b) (1998).

Step Two : Do you have a "severe impairment," i.e., one that

"significantly limits" your ability to do basic work activities? (If not,

you are ineligible.) See § 404.1520(c).

Step Three : Does your impairment "mee[t] or equa[l]" an impairment

on a specific (and fairly lengthy) SSA list? (If so, you are eligible without more. ) See §§ 404.1520(d), 404.1525, 404.1526.

Step Four : If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed

impairment, can you perform your "past relevant work?" (If so, you are

ineligible.) See § 404.1520(e).

Step Five : If your impairment does not meet or equal a listed

impairment and you cannot perform your "past relevant work," then can you

perform other jobs that exist in significant numbers in the national

economy? (If not, you are eligible.) See §§ 404.1520(f), 404.1560(c).

The presumptions embodied in these questions—particularly those

necessary to produce Step Three's list, which, the Government tells us,

accounts for approximately 60 percent of all awards, see Tr. of Oral Arg.

20—grow out of the need to administer a large benefits system

efficiently. But they inevitably simplify, eliminating consideration of

many differences potentially relevant to an individual's ability to

perform a particular job. Hence, an individual might qualify for SSDI

under the SSA's administrative rules and yet, due to special individual

circumstances, remain capable of "perform[ing] the essential functions" of

her job.

large benefits system

efficiently. But they inevitably simplify, eliminating consideration of

many differences potentially relevant to an individual's ability to

perform a particular job. Hence, an individual might qualify for SSDI

under the SSA's administrative rules and yet, due to special individual

circumstances, remain capable of "perform[ing] the essential functions" of

her job.

Further, the SSA sometimes grants SSDI benefits to individuals who not

only can work, but are working. For example, to facilitate a disabled

person's reentry into the workforce, the SSA authorizes a 9-month

trial-work period during which SSDI recipients may receive full benefits.

See 42 U.S.C. § 422(c), 423(e)(1); 20 CFR § 404.1592 (1998). See also §

404.1592a (benefits available for an additional

15-month [1] period depending

upon earnings). Improvement in a totally disabled person's physical

condition, while permitting that person to work, will not necessarily or

immediately lead the SSA to terminate SSDI benefits. And the nature of an

individual's disability may change over time, so that a statement about

that disability at the time of an individual's application for SSDI

benefits may not reflect an individual's capacities at the time of the

relevant employment decision.

Finally, if an individual has merely applied for, but has not been

awarded, SSDI benefits, any inconsistency in the theory of the claims is

of the sort normally tolerated by our legal system. Our ordinary rules

recognize that a person may not be sure in advance upon which legal theory

she will succeed, and so permit parties to "set forth two or more

statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically," and to

"state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of

consistency." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e)(2). We do not see why the law in

respect to the assertion of SSDI and ADA claims should differ

e sure in advance upon which legal theory

she will succeed, and so permit parties to "set forth two or more

statements of a claim or defense alternatively or hypothetically," and to

"state as many separate claims or defenses as the party has regardless of

consistency." Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 8(e)(2). We do not see why the law in

respect to the assertion of SSDI and ADA claims should differ. (And, as we

said, we leave the law in respect to purely factual contradictions where

we found it.)

In light of these examples, we would not apply a special legal presumption

permitting someone who has applied for, or received, SSDI benefits to

bring an ADA suit only in "some limited and highly unusual set of

circumstances." 120 F.3d, at 517.

Nonetheless, in some cases an earlier SSDI claim may turn out genuinely to

conflict with an ADA claim. Summary judgment for a defendant is

appropriate when the plaintiff "fails to make a showing sufficient to

establish the existence of an element essential to [her] case, and on

which [she] will bear the burden of proof at trial." Celotex Corp.

v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265

(1986). An ADA plaintiff bears the burden of proving that she is a

"qualified individual with a disability"—that is, a person "who,

with or without reasonable accommodation, can perform the essential

functions" of her job. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). And a plaintiff's sworn

assertion in an application for disability benefits that she is, for

example, "unable to work" will appear to negate an essential element of

her ADA case—at least if she does not offer a sufficient

explanation. For that reason, we hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply

ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI

total disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient

explanation.

for disability benefits that she is, for

example, "unable to work" will appear to negate an essential element of

her ADA case—at least if she does not offer a sufficient

explanation. For that reason, we hold that an ADA plaintiff cannot simply

ignore the apparent contradiction that arises out of the earlier SSDI

total disability claim. Rather, she must proffer a sufficient

explanation.

The lower courts, in somewhat comparable circumstances, have found a

similar need for explanation. They have held with virtual unanimity that a

party cannot create a genuine issue of fact sufficient to survive summary

judgment simply by contradicting his or her own previous sworn statement

(by, say, filing a later affidavit that flatly contradicts that party's

earlier sworn deposition) without explaining the contradiction or

attempting to resolve the disparity. See, e.g. , Colantuoni v.

Alfred Calcagni & Sons, Inc. , 44 F.3d 1, 5 (C.A.1 1994); Rule

v. Brine, Inc. , 85 F.3d 1002, 1011 (C.A.2 1996); Hackman v.

Valley Fair , 932 F.2d 239, 241 (C.A.3 1991); Barwick v.

Celotex Corp. , 736 F.2d 946, 960 (C.A.4 1984); Albertson v.

T.J. Stevenson & Co. , 749 F.2d 223, 228 (C.A.5 1984); Davidson & Jones Development Co. v. Elmore Development Co. ,

921 F.2d 1343, 1352 (C.A.6 1991); Slowiak v. Land O'Lakes,

Inc. , 987 F.2d 1293, 1297 (C.A.7 1993); Camfield Tires, Inc.

v. Michelin Tire Corp. , 719 F.2d 1361, 1365-1366 (C.A.8 1983); Kennedy v. Allied Mutual Ins. Co. , 952 F.2d 262, 266 (C.A.9

1991); Franks v. Nimmo , 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (C.A.10 1986); Tippens v. Celotex Corp. , 805 F.2d 949, 953-954 (C.A.11

1986); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc. , 924

F.2d 1114, 1123 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822, 112 S.Ct. 85, 116

L.Ed.2d 57 (1991); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc. ,

982 F.2d 494, 498 (C.A.Fed. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct.

2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 256 (1993)

, 796 F.2d 1230, 1237 (C.A.10 1986); Tippens v. Celotex Corp. , 805 F.2d 949, 953-954 (C.A.11

1986); Pyramid Securities Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc. , 924

F.2d 1114, 1123 (C.A.D.C.), cert. denied, 502 U.S. 822, 112 S.Ct. 85, 116

L.Ed.2d 57 (1991); Sinskey v. Pharmacia Ophthalmics, Inc. ,

982 F.2d 494, 498 (C.A.Fed. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 912, 113 S.Ct.

2346, 124 L.Ed.2d 256 (1993). Although these cases for the most part

involve purely factual contradictions (as to which we do not necessarily

endorse these cases, but leave the law as we found it), we believe that a

similar insistence upon explanation is warranted here, where the conflict

involves a legal conclusion. When faced with a plaintiff's previous sworn

statement asserting "total disability" or the like, the court should

require an explanation of any apparent inconsistency with the necessary

elements of an ADA claim. To defeat summary judgment, that explanation

must be sufficient to warrant a reasonable juror's concluding that,

assuming the truth of, or the plaintiff's good faith belief in, the

earlier statement, the plaintiff could nonetheless "perform the essential

functions" of her job, with or without "reasonable accommodation."

III

In her brief in this Court, Cleveland explains the discrepancy between her

SSDI statements that she was "totally disabled" and her ADA claim that she

could "perform the essential functions" of her job. The first statements,

she says, "were made in a forum which does not consider the effect that

reasonable workplace accommodations would have on the ability to work."

Brief for Petitioner 43. Moreover, she claims the SSDI statements were

"accurate statements" if examined "in the time period in which they were

made." Ibid. The parties should have the opportunity in the trial

court to present, or to contest, these explanations, in sworn form where

appropriate

sider the effect that

reasonable workplace accommodations would have on the ability to work."

Brief for Petitioner 43. Moreover, she claims the SSDI statements were

"accurate statements" if examined "in the time period in which they were

made." Ibid. The parties should have the opportunity in the trial

court to present, or to contest, these explanations, in sworn form where

appropriate. Accordingly, we vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals

and remand the case for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

It is so ordered.

Justice Breyer delivered the opinion for a unanimous Court.