AR 24-1(6): Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security , 893 F.3d 929 (6th Cir. 2018) (Interpreting Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security , 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997)): Effect of Prior Disability Findings on Adjudication of a Subsequent Disability Claim—Titles II and XVI of the Act.

Acquiescence Ruling 24-1(6) Effective Date: December 2, 2024 Federal Register,

Vol. 89, No. 227, page 92995

Issue

Whether, in making a disability determination or decision

on a subsequent disability claim with respect to an

unadjudicated period, the Social Security Administration

(SSA) must consider a finding of a claimant's residual

functional capacity (RFC) or other finding required under

the applicable sequential evaluation process for

determining disability, made in a final decision by an

administrative law judge (ALJ) or the Appeals Council (AC)

on a prior disability claim.

Statute/Regulation/Ruling Citation

Sections 205(a) and (h) and 702(a)(5) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 405(a) and (h) and 902(a)(5)), 20 CFR 404.900(a) , 404.957(c)(1) , 416.1400(a) , 416.1457(c)(1) , AR 98-3(6) (rescinded), AR 98-4(6) (rescinded).

Circuit

Sixth (Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio, Tennessee) Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security , 893 F.3d

929 (6th Cir. 2018) (Interpreting Drummond v.

Commissioner of Social Security , 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997))

Applicability of Ruling

This ruling applies to determinations and decisions at all

administrative levels (i.e., the initial, reconsideration,

ALJ hearing, and AC levels).

The decision of the Sixth Circuit in Earley was

based, in part, on the panel's interpretation of the Sixth

Circuit's prior decision in Drummond . Drummond , in turn, relied in part on the Sixth

Circuit's earlier decision in Dennard . The following

summaries of the two earlier cases are provided as

background material.

Dennard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 907

F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1990)

n of the Sixth Circuit in Earley was

based, in part, on the panel's interpretation of the Sixth

Circuit's prior decision in Drummond . Drummond , in turn, relied in part on the Sixth

Circuit's earlier decision in Dennard . The following

summaries of the two earlier cases are provided as

background material.

Dennard v. Secretary of Health & Human Services , 907

F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1990)

Mr. Dennard argued that because SSA found him unable to do

his past relevant work on his first application for

benefits, SSA was precluded from reconsidering this issue

and finding in a subsequent decision, involving an

unadjudicated period, that Mr. Dennard could perform the

same past relevant work. The Sixth Circuit observed that it

seemed clear that SSA had reconsidered the nature and

extent of Mr. Dennard's exertional level in his former job.

The court stated: “We are persuaded that under the

circumstances, we must remand this case to [SSA] . . . to

determine whether [Mr.] Dennard is disabled in light of the

prior determination that he could not return to his

previous employment.”

Drummond v. Commissioner of Social Security , 126

F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997)

Ms. Drummond argued that, absent evidence of improvement in

her condition, the ALJ's finding in a prior claim that she

was limited to sedentary work precluded SSA from finding in

a subsequent claim that she could perform medium work. The

Sixth Circuit stated that, “[a]bsent evidence of an

improvement in a claimant's condition, a subsequent ALJ is

bound by the findings of a previous ALJ.” The court

held that SSA could not reexamine issues previously

decided, in the absence of new and additional evidence or

changed circumstances. The court further stated that,

“[j]ust as a Social Security claimant is barred from

relitigating an issue that has been previously determined,

so is the Commissioner.” After finding that there was

not substantial evidence that Ms

revious ALJ.” The court

held that SSA could not reexamine issues previously

decided, in the absence of new and additional evidence or

changed circumstances. The court further stated that,

“[j]ust as a Social Security claimant is barred from

relitigating an issue that has been previously determined,

so is the Commissioner.” After finding that there was

not substantial evidence that Ms. Drummond's condition had

improved significantly in the time between the two ALJ

decisions, the court concluded that SSA was bound by its

previous finding that Ms. Drummond was limited to sedentary work.

Earley v. Commissioner of Social Security , 893 F.3d

929 (6th Cir. 2018)

Description of Case

In 2010, Ms. Earley applied for disability benefits,

claiming that she was disabled starting on June 25, 2010.

In 2012, an ALJ found that she remained capable of light

physical exertion and that she was not disabled for the

period from June 25, 2010, through May 15, 2012. Ms. Earley

applied again in July 2012, arguing that she became

disabled after the decision on her last claim. The same

ALJ, invoking Drummond and AR 98-4(6) , stated that

he was bound by his earlier findings, unless Ms. Earley

offered new and material evidence of a changed condition.

Because the ALJ found that Ms. Earley had failed to do

that, the ALJ again found her not disabled and denied her claim.

On review, the district court reversed. The district court

construed Drummond to apply only if it would lead to

a favorable outcome for the claimant. Since any preclusive

effect of the ALJ's prior findings would make it more

difficult for Ms. Earley to be found disabled, the court

found that Drummond did not apply.

to do

that, the ALJ again found her not disabled and denied her claim.

On review, the district court reversed. The district court

construed Drummond to apply only if it would lead to

a favorable outcome for the claimant. Since any preclusive

effect of the ALJ's prior findings would make it more

difficult for Ms. Earley to be found disabled, the court

found that Drummond did not apply.

On appeal, the Sixth Circuit examined and clarified Drummond . The court found that the key principles

protected by Drummond , consistency between

proceedings and finality with respect to prior adjudicated

claims, apply to both individuals and the government. At

the same time, these principles do not prevent the agency

from giving a fresh look to a new claim containing new

evidence or satisfying a new regulatory threshold that

covers a new period of alleged disability while being

mindful of past rulings and the record in prior proceedings.

The court rejected the argument that, “[i]n reviewing

a second application by the same individual . . . the

administrative law judge should completely ignore earlier

findings and applications.” The court explained that

“[f]resh review is not blind review” and that

“a later administrative law judge may consider what

an earlier judge did if for no other reason than to strive

for consistent decision making.” Further, the court

explained that “it is fair for an administrative law

judge to take the view that, absent new and additional

evidence, the first administrative law judge's findings are

a legitimate, albeit not binding, consideration in

reviewing a second application” and, at the same

time, that “an applicant remains free to bring a

second application that introduces no new evidence or very

little new evidence after a failed application.” The

court cautioned, however, that a claimant “should not

have high expectations about success if the second filing

mimics the first one and the individual has not reached any

new age (or othe

second application” and, at the same

time, that “an applicant remains free to bring a

second application that introduces no new evidence or very

little new evidence after a failed application.” The

court cautioned, however, that a claimant “should not

have high expectations about success if the second filing

mimics the first one and the individual has not reached any

new age (or other) threshold to obtain benefits.”

Holding

The Sixth Circuit stated that, “[w]hen an individual

seeks disability benefits for a distinct period of time,

each application is entitled to review.” The court

explained that if an individual files a subsequent

application for the same period and “offers no

cognizable explanation for revisiting the first decision,

res judicata would bar the second application.” The

court further explained that an ALJ honors res judicata

“principles by considering what an earlier judge

found with respect to a later application and by

considering the earlier record” and that,

accordingly, “it is fair for an administrative law

judge to take the view that, absent new and additional

evidence, the first administrative law judge's findings are

a legitimate, albeit not binding, consideration in

reviewing a second application.” Ms. Earley's new

claim involved a new period; therefore, the court held that

res judicata did not apply. Accordingly, the court remanded

the case for the ALJ to reconsider Ms. Earley's claim for

benefits under the correct standard.

Statement as to How Earley Differs From the Agency's

Policy

dings are

a legitimate, albeit not binding, consideration in

reviewing a second application.” Ms. Earley's new

claim involved a new period; therefore, the court held that

res judicata did not apply. Accordingly, the court remanded

the case for the ALJ to reconsider Ms. Earley's claim for

benefits under the correct standard.

Statement as to How Earley Differs From the Agency's

Policy

In a subsequent disability claim, SSA considers the

issue of disability with respect to a period that was not

adjudicated to be a new issue that requires an independent

evaluation. Thus, when adjudicating a subsequent disability

claim involving an unadjudicated period, SSA considers the

facts and issues de novo in determining or deciding

disability with respect to the unadjudicated period. SSA

does not consider prior findings made in the final

determination or decision on the prior claim as evidence in

adjudicating disability with respect to the unadjudicated

period in the subsequent claim.

In Earley , the Sixth Circuit agreed with SSA's

policy that res judicata does not apply with respect to an

unadjudicated period. Yet, the Sixth Circuit disagreed with

SSA's policy that prior disability findings are not to be

considered in the adjudication of disability for a

previously unadjudicated period in a subsequent claim.

Rather, Earley indicates that such prior findings

made at the ALJ hearing or AC level should be considered in

the adjudication of disability for an unadjudicated period

in a subsequent claim, stating that “it is fair for

an administrative law judge to take the view that, absent

new and additional evidence, the first administrative law

judge's findings are a legitimate, albeit not binding,

consideration in reviewing a second application.” Earley indicates that an adjudicator honors the

principles of res judicata “by considering what an

earlier judge found with respect to a later application and

by considering that earlier record.”

to take the view that, absent

new and additional evidence, the first administrative law

judge's findings are a legitimate, albeit not binding,

consideration in reviewing a second application.” Earley indicates that an adjudicator honors the

principles of res judicata “by considering what an

earlier judge found with respect to a later application and

by considering that earlier record.”

SSA interprets Earley to require that, where a final

decision after a hearing on a prior disability claim

contains a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding

required under the applicable sequential evaluation process

for determining disability, SSA must consider such

finding(s) as evidence when adjudicating a subsequent

disability claim, arising under the same or a different

title of the Act, involving an unadjudicated period.

Explanation of How We Will Apply the Earley Decision

Within the Circuit

This Ruling applies only to disability findings in cases

involving claimants who reside in Kentucky, Michigan, Ohio,

or Tennessee at the time of the determination or decision

on the subsequent claim at the initial, reconsideration,

ALJ hearing, or AC level. Additionally, it applies only to

a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding that is

required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for

adjudicating disability (provided under 20 CFR 404.1520 , 416.920 , or 416.924 ,

as appropriate), made in a final

decision (favorable or unfavorable) by an ALJ or the AC on

a prior disability claim. [1]

deration,

ALJ hearing, or AC level. Additionally, it applies only to

a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding that is

required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for

adjudicating disability (provided under 20 CFR 404.1520 , 416.920 , or 416.924 ,

as appropriate), made in a final

decision (favorable or unfavorable) by an ALJ or the AC on

a prior disability claim. [1]

When a claimant seeks disability benefits for a new period

in a subsequent claim, that subsequent claim is entitled to

review following the applicable sequential evaluation

process. However, such review does not exist in a vacuum.

When adjudicating a subsequent claim (arising under the

same or a different title of the Act as the prior claim),

an adjudicator deciding whether a claimant is disabled

during a previously unadjudicated period must consider

findings from the decision on the prior claim. As the Court

recognized in Earley , things change with the passage

of time, such as age and physical condition. As a result,

each claim covering a different period should be reviewed

as a new claim. However, when a finding of a claimant's RFC

or other finding required under the sequential evaluation

process for determining disability differs from that in the

prior decision, the adjudicator must make clear that they

considered the prior finding as evidence in light of all

relevant facts and circumstances. [2]

each claim covering a different period should be reviewed

as a new claim. However, when a finding of a claimant's RFC

or other finding required under the sequential evaluation

process for determining disability differs from that in the

prior decision, the adjudicator must make clear that they

considered the prior finding as evidence in light of all

relevant facts and circumstances. [2]

Where the prior finding was about a fact that is subject to

change with the passage of time, such as a claimant's RFC

or the severity of an impairment(s), the likelihood that

the fact has changed generally increases as the time

between the previously adjudicated period and the

subsequent period increases. An adjudicator generally

should pay particular attention to the lapse of time

between the earlier claim and the later claim and the

impact of the passage of time on the claim. In situations

where minimal time has passed, and no or very little new

evidence has been introduced, it is more likely that the

prior finding will remain the same. But the adjudicator

must consider all relevant facts and circumstances on a

case-by-case basis. Additionally, a change in the law,

regulations, or rulings affecting a relevant finding or the

method for arriving at the finding may be a reason why the

prior finding, considered as evidence, is properly departed

from in the current determination or decision.

[1] In making a finding of a claimant's RFC or other finding that is

required at a step in the sequential evaluation process for adjudicating

disability, an ALJ or the AC may have made certain subsidiary findings,

such as an assessment of the claimant's symptoms. A subsidiary finding

does not constitute a finding that is required at a step in the sequential

evaluation process for adjudicating disability, as provided under 20 CFR 404.1520 , 416.920 , or 416.924 .

equired at a step in the sequential evaluation process for adjudicating

disability, an ALJ or the AC may have made certain subsidiary findings,

such as an assessment of the claimant's symptoms. A subsidiary finding

does not constitute a finding that is required at a step in the sequential

evaluation process for adjudicating disability, as provided under 20 CFR 404.1520 , 416.920 , or 416.924 .

[2] For example, an adjudicator might consider such factors as: (1)

whether the fact on which the prior finding was based is subject to change

with the passage of time, such as a fact relating to the severity of

the claimant's medical condition; (2) the likelihood of such a change,

considering the amount of time between the period adjudicated in the

prior claim and the unadjudicated period in the subsequent claim; and

(3) the extent to which evidence that was not considered in the final

decision on the prior claim provides a basis for making a different

finding for the unadjudicated period in the subsequent claim. These are

only examples and not intended to create specific requirements as part

of the sequential evaluation.