Rule 213. Written Interrogatories to Parties

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Rule 213. Written Interrogatories to Parties

(a) Directing Interrogatories. A party may direct written interrogatories to any other party.

A copy of the interrogatories shall be served on all other parties entitled to notice.

(b) Duty of Attorney. It is the duty of an attorney directing interrogatories to restrict them to

the subject matter of the particular case, to avoid undue detail, and to avoid the imposition of any

unnecessary burden or expense on the answering party.

(c) Number of Interrogatories. Except as provided in subparagraph (j), a party shall not serve

more than 30 interrogatories, including sub-parts, on any other party except upon agreement of the

parties or leave of court granted upon a showing of good cause. A motion for leave of court to

serve more than 30 interrogatories must be in writing and shall set forth the proposed

interrogatories and the reasons establishing good cause for their use.

(d) Answers and Objections. Within 28 days after service of the interrogatories upon the party

to whom they are directed, the party shall serve a sworn answer or an objection to each

interrogatory, with proof of service upon all other parties entitled to notice. Any objection to an

answer or to the refusal to answer an interrogatory shall be heard by the court upon prompt notice

and motion of the party propounding the interrogatory. The answering party shall set forth in full

each interrogatory being answered immediately preceding the answer. Sworn answers to

interrogatories directed to a public or private corporation, or a partnership or association shall be

made by an officer, partner, or agent, who shall furnish such information as is available to the

party.

mpt notice

and motion of the party propounding the interrogatory. The answering party shall set forth in full

each interrogatory being answered immediately preceding the answer. Sworn answers to

interrogatories directed to a public or private corporation, or a partnership or association shall be

made by an officer, partner, or agent, who shall furnish such information as is available to the

party.

(e) Option to Produce Documents. When the answer to an interrogatory may be obtained

from documents in the possession or control of the party on whom the interrogatory was served, it

shall be a sufficient answer to the interrogatory to produce those documents responsive to the

interrogatory. When a party elects to answer an interrogatory by the production of documents, that

production shall comply with the requirements of Rule 214.

(f) Identity and Testimony of Witnesses. Upon written interrogatory, a party must furnish

the identities and addresses of witnesses who will testify at trial and must provide the following

information:

(1) Lay Witnesses. A “lay witness” is a person giving only fact or lay opinion testimony.

For each lay witness, the party must identify the subjects on which the witness will testify. An

answer is sufficient if it gives reasonable notice of the testimony, taking into account the

limitations on the party’s knowledge of the facts known by and opinions held by the witness.

(2) Independent Expert Witnesses. An “independent expert witness” is a person giving

expert testimony who is not the party, the party’s current employee, or the party’s retained

expert. For each independent expert witness, the party must identify the subjects on which the

witness will testify and the opinions the party expects to elicit. An answer is sufficient if it

gives reasonable notice of the testimony, taking into account the limitations on the party’s

knowledge of the facts known by and opinions held by the witness.

party’s current employee, or the party’s retained

expert. For each independent expert witness, the party must identify the subjects on which the

witness will testify and the opinions the party expects to elicit. An answer is sufficient if it

gives reasonable notice of the testimony, taking into account the limitations on the party’s

knowledge of the facts known by and opinions held by the witness.

(3) Controlled Expert Witnesses. A “controlled expert witness” is a person giving expert

testimony who is the party, the party’s current employee, or the party’s retained expert. For

each controlled expert witness, the party must identify: (i) the subject matter on which the

witness will testify; (ii) the conclusions and opinions of the witness and the bases therefor; (iii)

the qualifications of the witness; and (iv) any reports prepared by the witness about the case.

(g) Limitation on Testimony and Freedom to Cross-Examine. The information disclosed

in answer to a Rule 213(f) interrogatory, or in a discovery deposition, limits the testimony that can

be given by a witness on direct examination at trial. Information disclosed in a discovery deposition

need not be later specifically identified in a Rule 213(f) answer, but, upon objection at trial, the

burden is on the proponent of the witness to prove the information was provided in a Rule 213(f)

answer or in the discovery deposition. Except upon a showing of good cause, information in an

evidence deposition not previously disclosed in a Rule 213(f) interrogatory answer or in a

discovery deposition shall not be admissible upon objection at trial.

Without making disclosure under this rule, however, a cross-examining party can elicit

information, including opinions, from the witness. This freedom to cross-examine is subject to a

restriction that applies in actions that involve multiple parties and multiple representation

closed in a Rule 213(f) interrogatory answer or in a

discovery deposition shall not be admissible upon objection at trial.

Without making disclosure under this rule, however, a cross-examining party can elicit

information, including opinions, from the witness. This freedom to cross-examine is subject to a

restriction that applies in actions that involve multiple parties and multiple representation. In such

actions, the cross-examining party may not elicit undisclosed information, including opinions,

from the witness on an issue on which its position is aligned with that of the party doing the direct

examination.

(h) Use of Answers to Interrogatories. Answers to interrogatories may be used in evidence

to the same extent as a discovery deposition.

(i) Duty to Supplement. A party has a duty to seasonably supplement or amend any prior

answer or response whenever new or additional information subsequently becomes known to that

party.

(j) The Supreme Court, by administrative order, may approve standard forms of interrogatories

for different classes of cases.

(k) Liberal Construction. This rule is to be liberally construed to do substantial justice

between or among the parties.

Amended July 1, 1985, effective August 1, 1985; amended June 1, 1995, effective January 1, 1996;

amended April 3, 1997, effective May 1, 1997; amended March 28, 2002, effective July 1, 2002;

amended December 6, 2006, effective January 1, 2007; amended Dec. 29, 2017, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.

SEE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 27, 2002

Committee Comments

(March 28, 2002)

Paragraph (f)

The purpose of this paragraph is to prevent unfair surprise at trial, without creating an undue

burden on the parties before trial. The paragraph divides witnesses into three categories, with

separate disclosure requirements for each category.

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1, 2007; amended Dec. 29, 2017, eff. Jan. 1, 2018.

SEE ADMINISTRATIVE ORDER ENTERED NOVEMBER 27, 2002

Committee Comments

(March 28, 2002)

Paragraph (f)

The purpose of this paragraph is to prevent unfair surprise at trial, without creating an undue

burden on the parties before trial. The paragraph divides witnesses into three categories, with

separate disclosure requirements for each category.

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“Lay witnesses” include persons such as an eyewitness to a car accident. For witnesses in this

category, the party must identify the “subjects” of testimony—meaning the topics, rather than a

summary. An answer must describe the subjects sufficiently to give “reasonable notice” of the

testimony, enabling the opposing attorney to decide whether to depose the witness, and on what

topics. In the above example, a proper answer might state that the witness will testify about: “(1)

the path of travel and speed of the vehicles before impact, (2) a description of the impact, and (3)

the lighting and weather conditions at the time of the accident.” The answer would not be proper

if it said only that the witness will testify about: “the accident.” Requiring disclosure of only the

subjects of lay witness testimony represents a change in the former rule, which required detailed

disclosures regarding the subject matter, conclusions, opinions, bases and qualifications of any

witness giving any opinion testimony, including lay opinion testimony. Experience has shown that

applying this detailed-disclosure requirement to lay witnesses creates a serious burden without

corresponding benefit to the opposing party.

“Independent expert witnesses” include persons such as a police officer who gives expert

testimony based on the officer’s investigation of a car accident, or a doctor who gives expert

testimony based on the doctor’s treatment of the plaintiff’s injuries. For witnesses in this category,

the party must identify the “subjects” (meaning topics) on which the witness will testify and the

“opinions” the party expects to elicit

nesses” include persons such as a police officer who gives expert

testimony based on the officer’s investigation of a car accident, or a doctor who gives expert

testimony based on the doctor’s treatment of the plaintiff’s injuries. For witnesses in this category,

the party must identify the “subjects” (meaning topics) on which the witness will testify and the

“opinions” the party expects to elicit. The limitations on the party’s knowledge of the facts known

by and opinions held by the witness often will be important in applying the “reasonable notice”

standard. For example, a treating doctor might refuse to speak with the plaintiff’s attorney, and the

doctor cannot be contacted by the defendant’s attorney, so the opinions set forth in the medical

records about diagnosis, prognosis, and cause of injury might be all that the two attorneys know

about the doctor’s opinions. In these circumstances, the party intending to call the doctor need set

forth only a brief statement of the opinions it expects to elicit. On the other hand, a party might

know that a treating doctor will testify about another doctor’s compliance with the standard of

care, or that a police officer will testify to an opinion based on work done outside the scope of the

officer’s initial investigation. In these examples, the opinions go beyond those that would be

reasonably expected based on the witness’ apparent involvement in the case. To prevent unfair

surprise in circumstances like these, an answer must set forth a more detailed statement of the

opinions the party expects to elicit. Requiring disclosure of only the “subjects” of testimony and

the “opinions” the party expects to elicit represents a change in the former rule, which required

detailed disclosures about the subject matter, conclusions, opinions, bases, and qualifications of

all witnesses giving opinion testimony, including expert witnesses over whom the party has no

control

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opinions the party expects to elicit. Requiring disclosure of only the “subjects” of testimony and

the “opinions” the party expects to elicit represents a change in the former rule, which required

detailed disclosures about the subject matter, conclusions, opinions, bases, and qualifications of

all witnesses giving opinion testimony, including expert witnesses over whom the party has no

control. Experience has shown that the detailed-disclosure requirement is too demanding for

independent expert witnesses.

“Controlled expert witnesses” include persons such as retained experts. The party can count

on full cooperation from the witnesses in this category, so the amended rule requires the party to

provide all of the details required by the former rule. In particular, the requirement that the party

identify the “subject matter” of the testimony means that the party must set forth the gist of the

testimony on each topic the witness will address, as opposed to setting forth the topics alone.

A party may meet its disclosure obligation in part by incorporating prior statements or reports

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of the witness. The answer to the Rule 213(f) interrogatories served on behalf of a party may be

sworn to by the party or the party’s attorney.

Paragraph (g)

Parties are to be allowed a full and complete cross-examination of any witness and may elicit

additional undisclosed opinions in the course of cross-examination. This freedom to cross-examine

is subject to a restriction that, for example, prevents a party from eliciting previously undisclosed

contributory negligence opinions from a coparty’s expert.

Note that the exception to disclosure described in this paragraph is limited to the cross-

examining party. It does not excuse the party calling the witness from the duty to supplement

described in paragraph (i).

Paragraph (i)

The material deleted from this paragraph now appears in modified form in paragraph (g).

Paragraph (k)

The application of this rule is intended to do substantial justice between the parties

xception to disclosure described in this paragraph is limited to the cross-

examining party. It does not excuse the party calling the witness from the duty to supplement

described in paragraph (i).

Paragraph (i)

The material deleted from this paragraph now appears in modified form in paragraph (g).

Paragraph (k)

The application of this rule is intended to do substantial justice between the parties. This rule

is intended to be a shield to prevent unfair surprise but not a sword to prevent the admission of

relevant evidence on the basis of technicalities. The purpose of the rule is to allow for a trial to be

decided on the merits. The trial court should take this purpose into account when a violation occurs

and it is ordering appropriate relief under Rule 219(c).

The rule does not apply to demonstrative evidence that is intended to explain or convey to the

trier of fact the theories expressed in accordance with this rule.

Committee Comments

(Revised June 1, 1995)

Paragraph (a)

The provision of former Rule 19-11(1) as to who is to answer interrogatories served on

corporations, partnerships, and associations appears in paragraph (d) of this rule. The provisions

of former Rule 19-11(1) stating that both interrogatories and depositions could be employed and

that the court may issue protective orders were deleted because these matters are covered in Rules

201(a) and (c). A prior requirement that the written interrogatories be spaced so as to permit the

answering party to answer upon the interrogatory served upon him has been amended to eliminate

the spacing requirement, primarily because of the practical and customary way in which

interrogatories are answered.

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t may issue protective orders were deleted because these matters are covered in Rules

201(a) and (c). A prior requirement that the written interrogatories be spaced so as to permit the

answering party to answer upon the interrogatory served upon him has been amended to eliminate

the spacing requirement, primarily because of the practical and customary way in which

interrogatories are answered.

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Paragraph (b)

Like paragraph (a) of Rule 201, which cautions against duplication, this provision states the

general policy of the rules for the guidance for the court when it is called upon to frame protective

orders or dispose of objections to interrogatories as provided in paragraph (d) of Rule 213.

Paragraph (c)

Paragraph (c) is new. Because of widespread complaints that some attorneys engage in the

practice of submitting needless, repetitious, and burdensome interrogatories, paragraph (c) limits

the number of all interrogatories, regardless of when propounded, to 30 (including subparts),

unless “good cause” requires a greater number.

Paragraph (d)

Paragraph (d) is derived from former Rules 19-11(2) and (3). This paragraph embodies a

number of changes in the present practice. The time for answering interrogatories is fixed at 28

days instead of 30 (as in former Rule 19-11(2)), consistent with the committee’s general policy of

establishing time periods that are multiples of seven days. Under former Rule 19-11(3), the time

for making objections is 15 days. Paragraph (d) increases this to 28 days, making the time limit

for answering and objecting the same. The other change in Illinois practice effected by paragraph

xed at 28

days instead of 30 (as in former Rule 19-11(2)), consistent with the committee’s general policy of

establishing time periods that are multiples of seven days. Under former Rule 19-11(3), the time

for making objections is 15 days. Paragraph (d) increases this to 28 days, making the time limit

for answering and objecting the same. The other change in Illinois practice effected by paragraph

(d) is the requirement that motions to hear objections to interrogatories must be noticed by the

party seeking to have the interrogatories answered. Under former Rule 19-11(3) the objection must

be noticed by the party making it. This change was made because the committee believes the party

seeking the information should have the burden of seeking a disposition of the objection, and that

this will tend to reduce the number of rulings that are necessary by automatically suspending

interrogatories which a party is not seriously interested in pursuing. The last phrase provides that

the person answering must furnish such information as is available to the party. This phrase was

added, as was the same provision to Federal Rule 33 in 1946, to make certain that a corporation,

partnership, or association may not avoid answering an interrogatory by disclaiming personal

knowledge of the matter on the part of the answering official.

Paragraph (e)

Paragraph (e) has been amended to require a party who elects to answer an interrogatory by

referring to documents, to produce the responsive documents as part of the party’s answer. When

a party elects to respond to an interrogatory by the production of documents, that production must

comply with the requirements of Rule 214.

Paragraph (f)

Paragraph (f) now requires a party to serve the identity and location of witnesses who will

testify at trial, together with the subject of their testimony. This is a departure from the previously

recognized law. This paragraph, as well as others contained in these rules, imposes a “seasonable”

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production of documents, that production must

comply with the requirements of Rule 214.

Paragraph (f)

Paragraph (f) now requires a party to serve the identity and location of witnesses who will

testify at trial, together with the subject of their testimony. This is a departure from the previously

recognized law. This paragraph, as well as others contained in these rules, imposes a “seasonable”

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duty to supplement.

Paragraph (g)

In light of the elimination of former Supreme Court Rule 220, the definition of an opinion

witness is now a person who will offer “any” opinion testimony. It is the Committee’s belief that

in order to avoid surprise, the subject matter of all opinions must be disclosed pursuant to this rule

and Supreme Court Rule 218, and that no new or additional opinions will be allowed unless the

interests of justice require otherwise. For purposes of this paragraph, there is no longer a distinction

between retained and nonretained experts. Further, upon written interrogatories, a party must state

the subject matter to be testified to, the conclusions, opinions and qualifications of opinion

witnesses, and provide all reports of opinion witnesses.

Paragraph (h)

Paragraph (h) is derived from former Rule 19-11(4), which provided that answers to

interrogatories could be used to the same extent as the deposition of an adverse party. Under former

Rule 19-11(1), interrogatories can be directed only to adverse parties; hence the provision in

former Rule 19-11(4) to the effect that the answers could be used as could a deposition of an

adverse party. Paragraph (a) of the new rule provides that interrogatories can be directed to any

party. Accordingly, paragraph (h) of the new rule provides that the answers can be used to the

same extent as a discovery deposition. Former Rule 19-11(4) also contained a statement on the

scope of interrogatories, equating the permissible scope of inquiry to that permitted in the taking

of a deposition

verse party. Paragraph (a) of the new rule provides that interrogatories can be directed to any

party. Accordingly, paragraph (h) of the new rule provides that the answers can be used to the

same extent as a discovery deposition. Former Rule 19-11(4) also contained a statement on the

scope of interrogatories, equating the permissible scope of inquiry to that permitted in the taking

of a deposition. This provision was deleted as unnecessary in view of the provisions of Rule

201(b)(1).

Paragraph (i)

With regard to paragraph (i), the new rule imposes a “seasonable” duty to supplement or amend

prior answers when new or additional information becomes known to that party. This is a change

from previous discovery requirements and thus eliminates the need for supplemental

interrogatories unless different information is sought. The Committee believes that the definition

of “seasonable” varies by the facts of each case and by the type of case, but in no event should it

allow a party or an attorney to fail to comply with the spirit of this rule by either negligent or wilful

noncompliance.

Paragraph (j)

In an effort to avoid discovery disputes, the practitioner is encouraged to utilize interrogatories

approved by the Supreme Court pursuant to paragraph (j) whenever possible.

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Administrative Order

(Nov. 27, 2002)

In re Discovery Rules

The order entered March 28, 2002, amending various rules and effective July 1, 2002, shall

apply to all cases filed after such effective date as well as all cases pending on such effective

date, provided that any discovery order entered in any such case prior to July 1, 2002, shall

remain in effect unless and until amended by the trial court.

Order entered November 27, 2002, effective immediately.

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Rule 213. Written Interrogatories to Parties · IL. R. Ct. 213 | Frix