Rule 2. A Judge Shall Avoid Impropriety and the Appearance of Impropriety in All the Judge’s Activities

A.  In all activities, a judge shall exhibit respect for the

rule of law, comply with the law,* avoid impropriety and the

appearance of impropriety, and act in a manner that promotes

public confidence in the integrity and the impartiality of the

judiciary.

Commentary.—Public confidence in the judiciary is eroded by

irresponsible or improper conduct by judges. A judge must

avoid all impropriety and appearance of impropriety. A judge

must expect to be the subject of constant public scrutiny. A

judge must therefore accept restrictions on the judge’s conduct

that might be viewed as burdensome by the ordinary citizen

and should do so freely and willingly.

The prohibition against behaving with impropriety or the

appearance of impropriety applies to both the professional and

personal conduct of a judge. Because it is not practicable to

list all prohibited acts, the proscription is necessarily cast in

general terms that extend to conduct by judges that is harmful

although not specifically mentioned in the Code. Actual

improprieties under this standard include violations of law,

court rules, and other specific provisions of this Code. The test

for appearance of impropriety is whether the conduct would

create in reasonable minds a perception that the judge’s

ability to carry out judicial responsibilities with integrity,

impartiality, and competence is impaired.

See also Commentary to Section 2C.

B.  A judge shall not allow family, social, political, or

other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or

judgment. A judge shall not use or lend the prestige of judicial

office to advance the private interests of the judge or others. A

judge shall not knowingly* convey or permit others to convey

the impression that anyone is in a special position to influence

the judge

C.

B.  A judge shall not allow family, social, political, or

other relationships to influence the judge’s judicial conduct or

judgment. A judge shall not use or lend the prestige of judicial

office to advance the private interests of the judge or others. A

judge shall not knowingly* convey or permit others to convey

the impression that anyone is in a special position to influence

the judge. A judge shall not testify voluntarily as a character

witness, except that a judge may testify as a character witness

in a criminal proceeding if the judge or a member of the

judge’s family* is a victim of the offense or if the defendant is

a member of the judge’s family.

Commentary.—Maintaining the prestige of judicial office is

essential to a system of government in which the judiciary

functions independently of the executive and legislative

branches. Respect for the judicial office facilitates the orderly

conduct of legitimate judicial functions. Judges should

distinguish between proper and improper use of the prestige of

office in all of their activities. For example, it would be

improper for a judge to allude to his or her judgeship to gain a

personal advantage such as differential treatment when

stopped by a police officer for a traffic offense. Similarly,

judicial letterhead must not be used for conducting a judge’s

personal business.

A judge must avoid lending the prestige of judicial office for

advancement of the private interests of others. For example, a

judge must not use the judge’s judicial position to gain

advantage in a civil suit involving a member of the judge’s

family. In contracts for publication of a judge’s writings, a

judge should retain control over the advertising to avoid

exploitation of the judge’s office. As to the acceptance of

awards, see Section 4D(5)(a) and Commentary

nt of the private interests of others. For example, a

judge must not use the judge’s judicial position to gain

advantage in a civil suit involving a member of the judge’s

family. In contracts for publication of a judge’s writings, a

judge should retain control over the advertising to avoid

exploitation of the judge’s office. As to the acceptance of

awards, see Section 4D(5)(a) and Commentary.

Although a judge should be sensitive to possible abuse of the

prestige of office, a judge may, based on the judge’s personal

knowledge, serve as a reference or provide a letter of

recommendation.

However,

except

in

very

limited

circumstances, a judge must not initiate the communication of

information to a sentencing judge or a probation or

corrections officer. A judge may provide to such persons

information for the record in response to a formal request. A

judge may also initiate the communication of information for

the record if the judge or a member of the judge’s family was a

victim of the offense or the defendant is a member of the

judge’s family.

Judges may participate in the process of judicial selection by

cooperating with appointing authorities and screening

committees seeking names for consideration, and by

responding to official inquiries concerning a person being

considered for a judgeship. See also Canon 5 regarding use of

a judge’s name in political activities.

A judge must not testify voluntarily as a character witness

because to do so may lend the prestige of the judicial office in

support of the party for whom the judge testifies. Moreover,

when a judge testifies as a witness, a lawyer who regularly

appears before the judge may be placed in the awkward

position of cross-examining the judge. A judge may, however,

testify when properly summoned and in the special

circumstances described in the last sentence of this Section.

C

lend the prestige of the judicial office in

support of the party for whom the judge testifies. Moreover,

when a judge testifies as a witness, a lawyer who regularly

appears before the judge may be placed in the awkward

position of cross-examining the judge. A judge may, however,

testify when properly summoned and in the special

circumstances described in the last sentence of this Section.

C. A judge shall not hold membership in any organization

that the judge knows* practices invidious discrimination on the

basis of race, sex, religion or national origin, nor shall a judge

regularly use the facilities of such an organization. A judge

shall not arrange to use the facilities of an organization that the

judge knows* practices invidious discrimination on the basis

of race, sex, religion, or national origin unless there are no

alternative facilities in the community and use of the facilities

would not give rise to an appearance of endorsing the

discriminatory practices of the organization.

Commentary.—This Section prohibits a judge from holding

membership in any organization that the judge knows engages

in invidious discrimination on the basis of race, sex, religion

or national origin. The membership of a judge in an

organization that practices such discrimination gives rise to

perceptions among the public that a judge is insensitive to

minorities,

women,

and

others

protected

against

discrimination.

The common judicial definition of invidious discrimination “is

a classification which is arbitrary, irrational and not

reasonably related to a legitimate purpose.” McLaughlin v.

Florida; 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Whether an organization

practices invidious discrimination is often a complex question

which requires careful consideration by the judge

and

others

protected

against

discrimination.

The common judicial definition of invidious discrimination “is

a classification which is arbitrary, irrational and not

reasonably related to a legitimate purpose.” McLaughlin v.

Florida; 379 U.S. 184 (1964). Whether an organization

practices invidious discrimination is often a complex question

which requires careful consideration by the judge. The answer

cannot be determined from a mere examination of an

organization’s current membership rolls but rather depends on

how the organization selects members and other relevant

factors, such as that the organization is dedicated to the

preservation of religious, ethnic or cultural values of

legitimate common interest to its members, or that it is in fact

and effect an intimate, purely private organization whose

membership

limitations

could

not

be

constitutionally

prohibited. Absent such factors, an organization is generally

said to discriminate invidiously if it arbitrarily excludes from

membership on the basis of race, religion, sex or national

origin persons who would otherwise be admitted to

membership. See New York State Club Ass’n v. City of New

York, 108 S. Ct. 2225, 101 L. Ed. 2d 1 (1988); Board of Dirs.

of Rotary Int’l v. Rotary Club of Duarte, 481 U.S. 537, 107 S.

Ct. 1940, 95 L. Ed. 2d 474 (1987); Roberts v. United States

Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 104 S. Ct. 3244, 82 L. Ed. 2d 462

(1984).

Judges in Alaska must be particularly sensitive to this inquiry.

Alaska’s Human Rights Act has been narrowly construed as it

applies to membership discrimination. Compare United States

Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983) with

Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Consequently,

discriminatory practices which would not be illegal in Alaska

may nevertheless be arbitrary, irrational, and unrelated to a

legitimate organizational purpose, and thus covered by the

prohibition in Section 2C

onstrued as it

applies to membership discrimination. Compare United States

Jaycees v. Richardet, 666 P.2d 1008 (Alaska 1983) with

Roberts v. Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984). Consequently,

discriminatory practices which would not be illegal in Alaska

may nevertheless be arbitrary, irrational, and unrelated to a

legitimate organizational purpose, and thus covered by the

prohibition in Section 2C. Nonetheless, some discrimination is

viewed as innocuous when measured by contemporary

standards and therefore not invidious.

Section 2C prohibits regular use by a judge of the facilities of

an organization which invidiously discriminates. It does not

prohibit incidental use of such facilities, for example, attending

a wedding reception in such a facility.

When a person who is a judge on the date this Code becomes

effective learns that an organization to which the judge

belongs engages in invidious discrimination that would

preclude membership under Section 2C, the judge is permitted,

in lieu of resigning, to make immediate efforts to have the

organization

discontinue

its

invidiously

discriminatory

practices, but is required to suspend participation in any other

activities of the organization. If the organization fails to

discontinue its invidiously discriminatory practices as

promptly as possible (and in all events within a year of the

judge’s first learning of the practices), the judge is required to

resign immediately from the organization.

Nothing in Section 2C should be interpreted to diminish a

judge’s right to the free exercise of religion.