Representations to the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office

37 CFR 1.4  Nature of correspondence and signature requirements.

*****

(d)

*****

(4)

Certifications—

(i)

Certification as to the paper presented.

The

presentation to the Office (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or

later advocating) of any paper by a party, whether a practitioner or

non-practitioner, constitutes a certification under §

11.18(b)

of this subchapter. Violations of §

11.18(b)(2)

of this subchapter by a party,

whether a practitioner or non-practitioner, may result in the

imposition of sanctions under §

11.18(c)

of this

subchapter. Any practitioner violating §

11.18(b)

of this subchapter may also be subject

to disciplinary action. See §

11.18(d)

of this

subchapter.

(ii)

Certification as to the signature.

The person

inserting a signature under paragraph

(d)(2)

or

(d)(3)

of this section in a document submitted

to the Office certifies that the inserted signature appearing in the

document is his or her own signature. A person submitting a document

signed by another under paragraph

(d)(2)

or

(d)(3)

of this

section is obligated to have a reasonable basis to believe that the

person whose signature is present on the document was actually

inserted by that person, and should retain evidence of authenticity of

the signature. Violations of the certification as to the signature of

another or a person’s own signature as set forth in this paragraph may

result in the imposition of sanctions under §

11.18(c)

and

ection is obligated to have a reasonable basis to believe that the

person whose signature is present on the document was actually

inserted by that person, and should retain evidence of authenticity of

the signature. Violations of the certification as to the signature of

another or a person’s own signature as set forth in this paragraph may

result in the imposition of sanctions under §

11.18(c)

and

(d)

of this chapter.

(5)

Forms.

The Office provides forms for the public to use in

certain situations to assist in the filing of correspondence for a certain

purpose and to meet certain requirements for patent applications and

proceedings. Use of the forms for purposes for which they were not designed

is prohibited. No changes to certification statements on the Office forms

(e.g., oath or declaration forms, terminal disclaimer forms, petition forms,

and nonpublication request forms) may be made. The existing text of a form,

other than a certification statement, may be modified, deleted, or added to,

if all text identifying the form as an Office form is removed. The

presentation to the Office (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later

advocating) of any Office form with text identifying the form as an Office

form by a party, whether a practitioner or non-practitioner, constitutes a

certification under §

37 CFR 11.18(b)

of this

chapter that the existing text and any certification statements on the form

have not been altered other than permitted by EFS-Web customization.

(e) [Reserved]

*****

37 CFR 11.18  Signature and certificate for correspondence filed in the Office.

identifying the form as an Office

form by a party, whether a practitioner or non-practitioner, constitutes a

certification under §

37 CFR 11.18(b)

of this

chapter that the existing text and any certification statements on the form

have not been altered other than permitted by EFS-Web customization.

(e) [Reserved]

*****

37 CFR 11.18  Signature and certificate for correspondence filed in the Office.

(a) For all documents filed in the Office in patent, trademark, and

other non-patent matters, and all documents filed with a hearing officer in a

disciplinary proceeding, except for correspondence that is required to be signed

by the applicant or party, each piece of correspondence filed by a practitioner in

the Office must bear a signature, personally signed or inserted by such

practitioner, in compliance with §

1.4(d)

or § 2.193(a) of this

chapter.

(b) By presenting to the Office or hearing officer in a disciplinary

proceeding (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) any

paper, the party presenting such paper, whether a practitioner or

non-practitioner, is certifying that—

(1) All statements made therein of the party’s own knowledge are

true, all statements made therein on information and belief are believed to

be true, and all statements made therein are made with the knowledge that

whoever, in any matter within the jurisdiction of the Office, knowingly and

willfully falsifies, conceals, or covers up by any trick, scheme, or device

a material fact, or knowingly and willfully makes any false, fictitious, or

fraudulent statements or representations, or knowingly and willfully makes

or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,

fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be subject to the

penalties set forth under

18 U.S.C. 1001

and any

other applicable criminal statute, and violations of the provisions of this

section may jeopardize the probative value of the paper; and

ent statements or representations, or knowingly and willfully makes

or uses any false writing or document knowing the same to contain any false,

fictitious, or fraudulent statement or entry, shall be subject to the

penalties set forth under

18 U.S.C. 1001

and any

other applicable criminal statute, and violations of the provisions of this

section may jeopardize the probative value of the paper; and

(2) To the best of the party’s knowledge, information and

belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances,

(i) The paper is not being presented for any improper

purpose, such as to harass someone or to cause unnecessary delay or

needless increase in the cost of any proceeding before the Office;

(ii) The other legal contentions therein are warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the extension,

modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new

law;

(iii) The allegations and other factual contentions have

evidentiary support or, if specifically so identified, are likely to

have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for further

investigation or discovery; and

(iv) The denials of factual contentions are warranted on

the evidence, or if specifically so identified, are reasonably based

on a lack of information or belief.

(c) Violations of any of paragraphs (b)(2)(i) through (iv) of this

section are, after notice and reasonable opportunity to respond, subject to such

sanctions or actions as deemed appropriate by the USPTO Director, which may

include, but are not limited to, any combination of—

(1) Striking the offending paper;

(2) Referring a practitioner’s conduct to the Director of the

Office of Enrollment and Discipline for appropriate action;

(3) Precluding a party or practitioner from submitting a paper,

or presenting or contesting an issue;

(4) Affecting the weight given to the offending paper; or

(5) Terminating the proceedings in the Office.

e not limited to, any combination of—

(1) Striking the offending paper;

(2) Referring a practitioner’s conduct to the Director of the

Office of Enrollment and Discipline for appropriate action;

(3) Precluding a party or practitioner from submitting a paper,

or presenting or contesting an issue;

(4) Affecting the weight given to the offending paper; or

(5) Terminating the proceedings in the Office.

(d) Any practitioner violating the provisions of this section may also

be subject to disciplinary action.

37 CFR

1.4(d)(4)

and

(5)

provide that the presentation to

the Office (whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating) of any paper or

Office form by a party, whether a practitioner or non-practitioner, constitutes a

certification under

37

CFR 11.18(b)

, and that violations of

37 CFR 11.18(b)(2)

may subject the party to sanctions under

37 CFR 11.18(c)

. Thus, by presenting to

the Office a paper or Office form, the party is making the certifications set forth in

37 CFR

11.18(b)

, and is subject to sanctions under

37 CFR 11.18(c)

for

violations of

37 CFR

11.18(b)(2)

, regardless of whether the party is a practitioner or

non-practitioner. A practitioner violating

37 CFR 11.18(b)

may also be subject to

disciplinary action in lieu of or in addition to sanctions under

37 CFR 11.18(c)

for

violations of

37 CFR

11.18(b)

. See

37 CFR 11.18(d)

.

Additional certifications provided in

37 CFR

1.4(d)(4)

and

(5)

include that a person inserting a

signature into a document under

37 CFR 1.4(d)(2)

certifies that the

inserted signature appearing in the document is their own signature. Also, a person filing

a document signed by another under

37 CFR 1.4(d)(2)

is obligated to have a

reasonable basis to believe that the signature present on the document was actually

inserted by that person. The person filing the document should retain evidence of the

authenticity of the signature. See

37 CFR 1.4(h)

ifies that the

inserted signature appearing in the document is their own signature. Also, a person filing

a document signed by another under

37 CFR 1.4(d)(2)

is obligated to have a

reasonable basis to believe that the signature present on the document was actually

inserted by that person. The person filing the document should retain evidence of the

authenticity of the signature. See

37 CFR 1.4(h)

.

37 CFR

11.18(b)

provides that, by presenting any paper to the USPTO, the

party presenting such paper is making two certifications: (1) the first certification is

that the statements made therein are subject to the declaration clause of

37 CFR 1.68

; (2) the

second certification is the certification required for papers filed in a federal court

under Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.

37 CFR 1.4(d)(5)

makes clear that presenting a completed Office form to the USPTO constitutes a specific

certification under

37

CFR 11.18(b)

.

The first certification has permitted the USPTO to eliminate the separate

verification requirement previously contained in several rules for statements of facts by

persons who are not registered to practice before the USPTO. As statements submitted to the

USPTO by any person are now, by operation of

37 CFR 11.18(b)(1)

, verified

statements, a separate verification requirement is no longer necessary. The USPTO, however,

has retained the verification requirement for a statement to be submitted under oath or

declaration (

37 CFR

1.68

) in a number of sections (e.g.,

37 CFR 1.63

,

1.64

,

1.130

,

1.131

,

1.132

,

1.495(f)

, and

5.25

).

The second certification is based upon Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure (2007). This provision is promulgated pursuant to the Director’s authority

under

35 U.S.C.

2(b)(2)

to establish regulations for the conduct of proceedings in

the USPTO, and is intended to discourage the filing of frivolous papers by practitioners or

non-practitioners in the USPTO. Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:

Representations to Court

Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure (2007). This provision is promulgated pursuant to the Director’s authority

under

35 U.S.C.

2(b)(2)

to establish regulations for the conduct of proceedings in

the USPTO, and is intended to discourage the filing of frivolous papers by practitioners or

non-practitioners in the USPTO. Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

provides:

Representations to Court.

By presenting to the court a pleading, written

motion, or other paper—whether by signing, filing, submitting, or later advocating it—an

attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the person's knowledge,

information, and belief, formed after an inquiry reasonable under the circumstances:

(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to

harass, cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;

(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions are warranted by

existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying, or reversing

existing law or for establishing new law;

(3)the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically

so identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity for

further investigation or discovery; and

(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,

if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of

information.

Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)(2007).

37 CFR

11.18(b)(2)

includes the same substantive requirements as Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(b). The advisory committee notes to the 1993 revision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)

provide, in part, that:

[Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) and (c)] restate the provisions requiring

attorneys and

pro se

litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into

the law and facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other documents, and

prescribing sanctions for violations of these obligations

s Fed. R.

Civ. P. 11(b). The advisory committee notes to the 1993 revision of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b)

provide, in part, that:

[Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b) and (c)] restate the provisions requiring

attorneys and

pro se

litigants to conduct a reasonable inquiry into

the law and facts before signing pleadings, written motions, and other documents, and

prescribing sanctions for violations of these obligations. The [1993] revision in part

expands the responsibilities of litigants to the court, while providing greater

constraints and flexibility in dealing with infractions of the rule. The rule continues

to require litigants to “stop-and-think” before initially making legal or factual

contentions. It also, however, emphasizes the duty of candor by subjecting litigants to

potential sanctions for insisting upon a position after it is no longer tenable and by

generally providing protection against sanctions if they withdraw or correct contentions

after a potential violation is called to their attention.

The rule applies only to assertions contained in papers filed with or

submitted to the court. It does not cover matters arising for the first time during oral

presentations to the court, when counsel may make statements that would not have been

made if there had been more time for study and reflection. However, a litigant's

obligations with respect to the contents of these papers are not measured solely as of

the time they are filed with or submitted to the court, but include reaffirming to the

court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning

that they cease to have any merit. For example, an attorney who during a pretrial

conference insists on a claim or defense should be viewed as “presenting to the court”

that contention and would be subject to the obligations of [Rule 11(b)] measured as of

that time

ed to the court, but include reaffirming to the

court and advocating positions contained in those pleadings and motions after learning

that they cease to have any merit. For example, an attorney who during a pretrial

conference insists on a claim or defense should be viewed as “presenting to the court”

that contention and would be subject to the obligations of [Rule 11(b)] measured as of

that time. Similarly, if after a notice of removal is filed, a party urges in federal

court the allegations of a pleading filed in state court (whether as claims, defenses,

or in disputes regarding removal or remand), it would be viewed as “presenting”-- and

hence certifying to the district court under Rule 11--those allegations.

The certification with respect to allegations and other factual

contentions is revised in recognition that sometimes a litigant may have good reason to

believe that a fact is true or false but may need discovery, formal or informal, from

opposing parties or third persons to gather and confirm the evidentiary basis for the

allegation. Tolerance of factual contentions in initial pleadings by plaintiffs or

defendants when specifically identified as made on information and belief does not

relieve litigants from the obligation to conduct an appropriate investigation into the

facts that is reasonable under the circumstances; it is not a license to join parties,

make claims, or present defenses without any factual basis or justification. Moreover,

if evidentiary support is not obtained after a reasonable opportunity for further

investigation or discovery, the party has a duty under the rule not to persist with that

contention. [Rule 11(b)] does not require a formal amendment to pleadings for which

evidentiary support is not obtained, but rather calls upon a litigant not thereafter to

advocate such claims or defenses.

The certification is that there is (or likely will be) “evidentiary

support” for the allegation, not that the party will prevail with respect to its

contention regarding the fact

rsist with that

contention. [Rule 11(b)] does not require a formal amendment to pleadings for which

evidentiary support is not obtained, but rather calls upon a litigant not thereafter to

advocate such claims or defenses.

The certification is that there is (or likely will be) “evidentiary

support” for the allegation, not that the party will prevail with respect to its

contention regarding the fact. That summary judgment is rendered against a party does

not necessarily mean, for purposes of this certification, that it had no evidentiary

support for its position. On the other hand, if a party has evidence with respect to a

contention that would suffice to defeat a motion for summary judgment based thereon, it

would have sufficient “evidentiary support” for purposes of Rule 11.

Denials of factual contentions involve somewhat different

considerations. Often, of course, a denial is premised upon the existence of evidence

contradicting the alleged fact. At other times a denial is permissible because, after an

appropriate investigation, a party has no information concerning the matter or, indeed,

has a reasonable basis for doubting the credibility of the only evidence relevant to the

matter. A party should not deny an allegation it knows to be true; but it is not

required, simply because it lacks contradictory evidence, to admit an allegation that it

believes is not true.

The changes in [Rule 11(b)(3) and (4)] will serve to equalize the burden

of the rule upon plaintiffs and defendants, who under Rule 8(b) are in effect allowed to

deny allegations by stating that from their initial investigation they lack sufficient

information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation. If, after further

investigation or discovery, a denial is no longer warranted, the defendant should not

continue to insist on that denial. While sometimes helpful, formal amendment of the

pleadings to withdraw an allegation or denial is not required by [Rule 11(b)]

by stating that from their initial investigation they lack sufficient

information to form a belief as to the truth of the allegation. If, after further

investigation or discovery, a denial is no longer warranted, the defendant should not

continue to insist on that denial. While sometimes helpful, formal amendment of the

pleadings to withdraw an allegation or denial is not required by [Rule 11(b)].

Arguments for extensions, modifications, or reversals of existing law or

for creation of new law do not violate [Rule 11(b)(2)] provided they are “nonfrivolous.”

This establishes an objective standard, intended to eliminate any “empty-head

pure-heart” justification for patently frivolous arguments. However, to the extent to

which a litigant has researched the issues and found some support for its theories even

in minority opinions, in law review articles, or through consultation with other

attorneys should certainly be taken into account in determining whether [Rule 11(b)(2)]

has been violated. Although arguments for a change in law are not required to be

specifically so identified, a contention that is so identified should be viewed with

greater tolerance under [Rule 11].

Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

at 50-53 (1993). An

“inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” requirement of 37 CFR 10.18(b)(2) is identical

to that in Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b). The federal courts have stated in regard to the

“reasonable inquiry” requirement of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11:

In requiring reasonable inquiry before the filing of any pleading in a

civil case in federal district court, Rule 11 demands “an objective determination of

whether a sanctioned party's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.” In effect

it imposes a negligence standard, for negligence is a failure to use reasonable care.

The equation between negligence and failure to conduct a reasonable precomplaint inquiry

is . .

quiry before the filing of any pleading in a

civil case in federal district court, Rule 11 demands “an objective determination of

whether a sanctioned party's conduct was reasonable under the circumstances.” In effect

it imposes a negligence standard, for negligence is a failure to use reasonable care.

The equation between negligence and failure to conduct a reasonable precomplaint inquiry

is . . . that “the amount of investigation required by Rule 11 depends on both the time

available to investigate and on the probability that more investigation will turn up

important evidence; the Rule does not require steps that are not cost-justified.”

Hays v. Sony Corp. of Am.,

847 F.2d 412, 418, 7 USPQ2d 1043, 1048 (7th.

Cir. 1988) (citations omitted) (decided prior to the 1993 amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11,

but discussing a “reasonable under the circumstances” standard).

37 CFR

1.4(d)(4)

and

(5)

and

11.18

do not require

a practitioner to advise the client (or third party) providing information of this

certification effect (or the sanctions applicable to noncompliance), or question the client

(or third party) when such information or instructions are provided. When a practitioner is

submitting information (e.g., a statement of fact) from the applicant or a third party, or

relying upon information from the applicant or a third party in their arguments, the Office

will consider a practitioner's “inquiry reasonable under the circumstances” duty under

37 CFR

11.18

met so long as the practitioner has no knowledge of information

that is contrary to the information provided by the applicant or third party or would

otherwise indicate that the information provided by the applicant or third party was so

provided for the purpose of a violation of

37 CFR 11.18

(e.g., was submitted to

cause unnecessary delay).

Nevertheless, it is highly advisable for a practitioner to advise a client

or third party that any information so provided must be reliable and not misleading

ovided by the applicant or third party or would

otherwise indicate that the information provided by the applicant or third party was so

provided for the purpose of a violation of

37 CFR 11.18

(e.g., was submitted to

cause unnecessary delay).

Nevertheless, it is highly advisable for a practitioner to advise a client

or third party that any information so provided must be reliable and not misleading. The

submission by an applicant of misleading or inaccurate statements of facts during the

prosecution of applications for patent has resulted in the patents issuing on such

applications being held unenforceable. See

e.g., Refac Int'l Ltd. v. Lotus

Development Corp.,

81 F.3d 1576, 38 USPQ2d 1665 (Fed. Cir. 1996);

Paragon Podiatry Laboratory, Inc. v. KLM Laboratories, Inc.,

984 F.2d

1182, 25 USPQ2d 1561 (Fed. Cir 1993);

Rohm & Haas Co. v. Crystal Chem.

Co.,

722 F.2d 1556, 200 USPQ 289 (Fed. Cir. 1983),

cert.

denied,

469 U.S. 851 (1984);

Ott v. Goodpasture,

40 USPQ2d

1831 (D.N. Tex. 1996);

Herman v. William Brooks Shoe Co.,

39 USPQ2d

1773 (S.D.N.Y. 1996);

Golden Valley Microwave Food Inc. v. Weaver Popcorn

Co.,

837 F. Supp. 1444, 24 USPQ2d 1801 (N.D. Ind. 1992),

aff'd,

11 F.3d 1072 (Fed. Cir. 1993)(table),

cert.

denied,

511 U.S. 1128 (1994). Likewise, false statements by a practitioner in

a paper submitted to the Office during the prosecution of an application for patent have

resulted in the patent issuing on such application also being held unenforceable. See

General Electro Music Corp. v. Samick Music Corp.,

19 F.3d 1405, 30

USPQ2d 1149 (Fed. Cir. 1994)(false statement in a petition to make an application special

constitutes inequitable conduct, and renders the patent issuing on such application

unenforceable).

An applicant has no duty to conduct a prior art search as a prerequisite to

filing an application for patent. See

Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc.,

82 F.3d 394, 397, 38 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (Fed. Cir. 1996);

FMC Corp. v. Hennessy

Indus., Inc.,

836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6, 5 USPQ2d 1272, 1275-76 n.6 (Fed. Cir

stitutes inequitable conduct, and renders the patent issuing on such application

unenforceable).

An applicant has no duty to conduct a prior art search as a prerequisite to

filing an application for patent. See

Nordberg, Inc. v. Telsmith, Inc.,

82 F.3d 394, 397, 38 USPQ2d 1593, 1595-96 (Fed. Cir. 1996);

FMC Corp. v. Hennessy

Indus., Inc.,

836 F.2d 521, 526 n.6, 5 USPQ2d 1272, 1275-76 n.6 (Fed. Cir.

1987);

FMC Corp. v. Manitowoc Co.,

835 F.2d 1411, 1415, 5 USPQ2d 1112,

1115 (Fed. Cir. 1987);

American Hoist & Derrick Co. v. Sowa & Sons,

Inc.,

725 F.2d 1350, 1362, 220 USPQ 763, 772 (Fed. Cir.),

cert.

denied,

469 U.S. 821, 224 USPQ 520 (1984). Thus, the “inquiry reasonable under

the circumstances” requirement of

37 CFR 11.18

does not create any new

duty on the part of an applicant for patent to conduct a prior art search. See

MPEP §

609

; cf.

Judin v. United States,

110 F.3d

780, 42 USPQ2d 1300 (Fed. Cir 1997)(the failure to obtain and examine the accused

infringing device prior to bringing a civil action for infringement violates the 1983

version of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11). The “inquiry reasonable under the circumstances”

requirement of

37 CFR

11.18

, however, will require an inquiry into the underlying facts and

circumstances when a practitioner provides conclusive statements to the Office (e.g., a

statement that the entire delay in filing the required reply from the due date for the

reply until the filing of a grantable petition pursuant to

37 CFR 1.137(a)

was

unintentional).

37 CFR

11.18(c)

specifically provides that violations of

37 CFR 11.18(b)(1)

may jeopardize the validity of the application or document, or the validity or

enforceability of any patent, trademark registration, or certificate resulting therefrom,

and that violations of any of

37 CFR 11.18(b)(2)(i)

through

(iv)

are, after notice and reasonable opportunity to respond,

subject to such sanctions as deemed appropriate by the USPTO Director, which may include,

but are not limited to, any combination of:

(1) Striking the offending paper;

, or the validity or

enforceability of any patent, trademark registration, or certificate resulting therefrom,

and that violations of any of

37 CFR 11.18(b)(2)(i)

through

(iv)

are, after notice and reasonable opportunity to respond,

subject to such sanctions as deemed appropriate by the USPTO Director, which may include,

but are not limited to, any combination of:

(1) Striking the offending paper;

(2) Referring a practitioner’s conduct to the Director of the Office of

Enrollment and Discipline for appropriate action;

(3) Precluding a party or practitioner from submitting a paper, or

presenting or contesting an issue;

(4) Affecting the weight given to the offending paper; or

(5) Terminating the proceedings in the Office.

37 CFR 1.4(d)(4)

and

11.18

are intended to discourage the

filing of frivolous or clearly unwarranted correspondence in the Office; the Office does

not routinely review correspondence for compliance with

37 CFR 11.18(b)(2)

and impose sanctions

under

37 CFR

11.18(c)

.

Where the circumstances of an application or other proceeding warrant a

determination of whether there has been a violation of

37 CFR 11.18(b)

, the file or the

application or other proceeding may be forwarded to the Deputy Commissioner for Patents who

oversees the Office of Petitions for a determination of whether there has been a violation

of

37 CFR

11.18(b)

. See

MPEP § 714.25

. In the event that a

provision of

37 CFR

11.18(b)

has been violated, the USPTO Director will determine what

(if any) sanction(s) under

37 CFR 11.18(c)

is to be imposed in the

application or other proceeding.

Any practitioner violating the provisions of

37 CFR

11.18

may be subject to disciplinary action.

37 CFR 11.18(d)

(and

the corresponding provision of

37 CFR 1.4(d)(4)

) clarifies that a

practitioner may be subject to disciplinary action in lieu of, or in addition to, the

sanctions set forth in

37

CFR 11.8(c)

for violations of

37 CFR 11.18

c)

is to be imposed in the

application or other proceeding.

Any practitioner violating the provisions of

37 CFR

11.18

may be subject to disciplinary action.

37 CFR 11.18(d)

(and

the corresponding provision of

37 CFR 1.4(d)(4)

) clarifies that a

practitioner may be subject to disciplinary action in lieu of, or in addition to, the

sanctions set forth in

37

CFR 11.8(c)

for violations of

37 CFR 11.18

. If a provision of

37 CFR

11.18(b)

has been violated by a practitioner, the Office of

Enrollment and Discipline (OED) will determine whether such practitioner is to be subject

to disciplinary action (see

37 CFR 1.4(d)(4)

and

11.18(d)

).

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