Assessments Thresholds, Rate Schedules, and Adjustments

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Federal Register › Vol. 91 › 91 FR 39794

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the public comment file and will be considered as required under all applicable laws. All comments may be accessible under the Freedom of Information Act.

This proposal, all comments received, and a summary of not more than 100 words of the proposed rule pursuant to the Providing Accountability Through Transparency Act of 2023 are available at https://www.fdic.gov/federal-register- publications.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Division of Insurance and Research: Daniel Hoople, Associate Director, Financial Risk Management Branch, 202-898-3835, dhoople@fdic.gov; Division of Complex Institution Supervision and Resolution: Ryan Tetrick, Deputy Director, Resolution Readiness Branch, 202-898-7028, rtetrick@fdic.gov; Sean Healey, Acting Associate Director, Policy Analysis, Systemic Risk Branch, 202-898-7049, seahealey@fdic.gov; Patrick Bittner, Senior Policy Specialist, Policy Analysis, Systemic Risk Branch, 202-898-3550, pabittner@fdic.gov; Division of Resolutions and Receiverships: Shivali Nangia, Deputy Director, Receivership Operations, 972-761-2945, snangia@fdic.gov; Catherine Linhart, Assistant Director, Closing Operations and Data, 571-242-5368, clinhart@fdic.gov; Legal Division: Ryan McCarthy, Counsel, 202-898-7301, rymccarthy@fdic.gov; Jacques Schillaci, Counsel, 202-898-7298, jschillaci@fdic.gov; Dena Kessler, Counsel, 202-898-3833, dkessler@fdic.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Legal Framework

Pursuant to section 7 of the Federal Deposit Insurance (FDI) Act, 1 the FDIC has established a risk-based assessment system for calculating and charging all insured depository institutions (IDIs) 2 a quarterly assessment for deposit insurance. 3 The FDI Act defines a risk-based assessment system as a system for calculating a depository institution's assessment based on: (1) the probability that the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will incur a loss with respect to the institution; (2) the likely amount of any such loss; and (3) the revenue needs of the DIF

nsured depository institutions (IDIs) 2 a quarterly assessment for deposit insurance. 3 The FDI Act defines a risk-based assessment system as a system for calculating a depository institution's assessment based on: (1) the probability that the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) will incur a loss with respect to the institution; (2) the likely amount of any such loss; and (3) the revenue needs of the DIF. 4 The FDIC has established separate risk-based assessment systems 5 and calculates a bank's assessment rate using different methods for small, large, and highly-complex institutions. 6

1 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b).

2 As used in this notice of proposed rulemaking, the term “bank” is synonymous with the term “insured depository institution” as it is used in section 3(c)(2) of the FDI Act, 12 U.S.C. 1813(c)(2). As used in this notice, the term “small bank” is synonymous with the term “small institution,” as defined in 12 CFR 327.8(e), or using the proposed revised definition. Additionally, as used in this notice, the terms “large bank” and “highly complex institution” refer to an insured depository institution that meets the definition of a large institution or highly complex institution as defined in 12 CFR 327.8(f) and (g), or using the proposed revised definitions of those terms.

3 12 CFR part 327.

4 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)(C).

5 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)(D).

6 See 12 CFR 327.16(a) and (b).

Under the assessment regulations, the amount of an IDI's deposit insurance assessment is equal to its assessment base multiplied by its risk-based assessment rate. 7 Generally, an IDI's assessment base equals its average consolidated total assets minus its average tangible equity. 8 An IDI's risk-based assessment rate is determined each quarter based on supervisory ratings and information collected on the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) or the Report of Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks (FFIEC 002), as appropriate. 9

7 See 12 CFR 327.3(b)(1)

average consolidated total assets minus its average tangible equity. 8 An IDI's risk-based assessment rate is determined each quarter based on supervisory ratings and information collected on the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) or the Report of Assets and Liabilities of U.S. Branches and Agencies of Foreign Banks (FFIEC 002), as appropriate. 9

7 See 12 CFR 327.3(b)(1).

8 See 12 CFR 327.5(a).

9 See 12 CFR 327.16.

The assessment regulations generally define a small institution as an IDI with total assets of less than $10 billion, as reported on the Call Report. 10 Assessment rates for established small banks ( i.e., small banks that have been federally insured for at least five years) are calculated based on seven financial ratios and a weighted average of 11 components that are statistically significant in predicting the probability of an institution's failure over a three-year horizon. 12 The CAMELS composite rating is used to determine the minimum and maximum assessment rate for a small institution.

10 Banks that elect to use the community bank leverage ratio framework are also considered small institutions, even if those banks would otherwise meet the definition of a large institution. See 12 CFR 327.8(e)(3). An insured branch of a foreign bank is not considered a large institution. See 12 CFR 327.8(f).

A small institution is reclassified as a large institution beginning in the fourth consecutive quarter that it reports assets of $10 billion or more on the Call Report. Similarly, a large institution is reclassified as a small institution beginning in the fourth consecutive quarter that it reports assets of less than $10 billion on the Call Report.

11 Bank examiners review and evaluate an institution's condition using the Uniform Financial Institutions Rating System, also known as CAMELS (Capital, Asset quality, Management, Earnings, Liquidity, and Sensitivity to market risk). CAMELS ratings are scored on a scale of “1” (best) to “5” (worst)

institutions are subject to certain adjustments to their assessment rates for factors that can increase or reduce loss to the DIF in the event the bank fails. 16 For example, the unsecured debt adjustment is a downward adjustment intended to better account for certain liabilities that can reduce the loss to the DIF in the event of failure. 17 The brokered deposit adjustment is an upward adjustment. 18 In addition, the FDIC may adjust a large or highly complex institution's total score, which is used in the calculation of its assessment rate, to consider idiosyncratic or other relevant risk factors not reflected in the appropriate scorecard. 19

16 See 12 CFR 327.16(e).

17 Id. See also 74 FR 9525 (Mar. 4, 2009) and 76 FR 10672, 10680 (Feb. 25, 2011). The unsecured debt adjustment applies to all institutions except new institutions and insured branches of foreign banks.

18 See 12 CFR 327.16(e)(3).

19 See 12 CFR 327.16(b)(3); see also Assessment Rate Adjustment Guidelines for Large and Highly Complex Institutions, 76 FR 57992 (Sept. 19, 2011).

B. Overview of the Proposal and Policy Objectives

The FDIC, under its general rulemaking authority in section 9 of the FDI Act, and its specific authority under section 7 of the FDI Act to set assessments and establish a risk-based assessment system, 20 is proposing to make several revisions to the deposit insurance assessment regulations (the proposal), including to: (1) update the $10 billion asset threshold in the definitions of small and large institutions to $30 billion and adjust the threshold every four years to reflect inflation, pursuant to a pre-determined indexing methodology; (2) decrease initial base assessment rate schedules by 2 basis points for all small institutions, including new small institutions and insured branches of foreign banks, and by 1 basis point for large and highly complex institutions; and (3) provide a downward resolution readiness adjustment (RRA) to assessment rates for large and highly complex institutions electing to participate,

ctors. See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)(C).

The RRA would be applied to a bank's initial base assessment rate prior to application of any other applicable adjustments to initial base assessment rates. Under the current regulations, the minimum initial base assessment rate applied to large and highly complex institutions becomes progressively lower when the reserve ratio reaches 2 percent and 2.5 percent. Under the proposal, the minimum initial base assessment rates applied to large and highly complex institutions would still become progressively lower, but the decrease would be smaller in order to incorporate the RRA.

Under the revised schedules, a large or highly complex institution at the minimum initial base assessment rate that also earns the full 1 basis point RRA would be eligible to receive the same maximum unsecured debt adjustment as it would under the rate schedules applied in the current regulation after the reserve ratio reaches 2 percent. In addition, under the proposed rate schedules, the minimum assessment rate after application of all adjustments would be the same for large and highly complex institutions and for small banks, which is equal to the minimum assessment rates applied prior to the increase implemented in 2023. 25

25 See supra fn 23.

4. Technical Amendments To Remove Obsolete Content

The FDIC is also proposing technical amendments to its regulations governing deposit insurance assessments to remove obsolete provisions that are no longer applicable and have not been applicable to any IDI for at least three years.

II. Updating Definitions of Small and Large Institutions

A. Background

The FDIC is proposing to amend the definitions of small and large institutions in the assessment regulations. Under the assessment regulations, the definitions of small, large, and highly complex institutions determine which risk-based deposit insurance assessments methodology is applied when calculating an institution's deposit insurance assessment rate. 26

26 See 12 CFR 327.8(e), (f), and (g)

ion of a highly complex institution. 28 The $10 billion asset size threshold has been in place since the FDIC first established separate risk-based pricing methods for large and small banks in 2006. 29

27 Generally, an established institution is one that has been federally insured for at least five years. See 12 CFR 327.8(k).

28 See supra fn 10.

29 See 71 FR 69270, 69281 (Nov. 30, 2006).

C. Proposed Increase in the Asset Threshold in the Definitions of Small and Large Institutions

The FDIC is proposing to update the asset-based threshold in the assessment regulations used to define small and large institutions for deposit insurance assessments purposes and to determine whether assessment rates are calculated using the small bank pricing methodology or the large bank scorecard approach from $10 billion in total assets to $30 billion in total assets. In future years, the proposed assessment methodology threshold of $30 billion would be adjusted on a consistent basis as later described in section II.F. of this Supplementary Information.

An institution that is priced as a large institution immediately prior to the effective date of any final rule but that reports less than $30 billion in total assets would be classified as a small institution as of the effective date of any final rule. Such a bank would not need to report less than $30 billion in total assets for four consecutive quarters before being reclassified as small. Thereafter, a small institution would be reclassified as a large institution only if it reports total assets of $30 billion (or such threshold adjusted in the future for inflation) or more for four consecutive quarters. Similarly, a large institution would be reclassified as a small institution only if it reports total assets under $30 billion (or such threshold adjusted in the future for inflation) for four consecutive quarters

further vary over time and through banking and economic cycles. For example, a given bank likely would have paid a lower rate when priced as large in 2020 due to the influx of deposits in response to the pandemic and related relief efforts which improved liquidity and core deposits measures applicable to large banks, whereas the small bank pricing methodology directly prices for rapid asset growth.

Generally, possible impacts could include, but would not be limited to, banks with significant concentrations in higher-risk assets or elevated funding stress paying lower assessments, and banks with greater concentrations in core deposits or larger government guaranteed loan portfolios paying higher assessments under the small bank pricing methodology relative to the current large bank scorecard methodology. Institutions with higher leverage ratios could also pay lower assessments if shifted to the small bank pricing methodology. These potential effects arise because the small bank pricing methodology uses a different set of financial measures and weights based on how the measures corresponded with the probability of failure for small banks.

In aggregate and disregarding the other proposed changes to the assessment regulations in this proposal, the proposed increase in the assessment methodology threshold is estimated to result in an approximate net decrease of $129 million in annual assessments based on data as of December 31, 2025. 32 This component of the proposal, if adopted, is therefore expected to reduce the banking industry's aggregate assessment cost, with varied impacts on individual affected institutions depending on how their specific risk profiles at a specific point in time are priced under the small bank pricing methodology.

32 Analysis is based on data from the Call Report and FFIEC 002 for the reporting period that ended December 31, 2025, reported as of February 16, 2026

ted to reduce the banking industry's aggregate assessment cost, with varied impacts on individual affected institutions depending on how their specific risk profiles at a specific point in time are priced under the small bank pricing methodology.

32 Analysis is based on data from the Call Report and FFIEC 002 for the reporting period that ended December 31, 2025, reported as of February 16, 2026.

The FDIC analyzed the similarity between institutions with total assets between $1 billion and $10 billion and the 76 institutions with assets between $10 billion and $30 billion that would be reclassified as small institutions under the proposal. As reflected in Table 1, on average, both groups reported approximately similar shares of deposit and loan types and leverage ratios as of December 31, 2025. 33

33 The regulatory and reporting requirements for institutions with total assets under $1 billion generally differ from that of those with over $1 billion. See, e.g., 12 CFR 363.1(a).

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Institutions that would shift from the large bank scorecard methodology to the small bank pricing methodology would also benefit from a reduction in reporting burden, as large institutions must report granular data on higher-risk asset exposures and specific liability concentrations under the scorecard approach. These reporting burden reductions would be expected to create operational savings for the reclassified IDIs.

2. Alternatives Considered

In developing the proposal, the FDIC considered alternatives to the proposed $30 billion assessment methodology threshold, including maintaining the $10 billion threshold or increasing the assessment methodology threshold to $20 billion, $25 billion, or $50 billion.

n threshold or increasing the assessment methodology threshold to $20 billion, $25 billion, or $50 billion.

The FDIC believes that maintaining the current $10 billion assessment methodology threshold would not be appropriate because institutions between $10 billion and $30 billion in total assets are more appropriately priced using the small bank pricing methodology than the large bank scorecard. Increasing the asset-based threshold in the definitions of small and large banks in the assessments regulations to $30 billion would more closely align the share of industry assets held by banks priced using the scorecard methodology under the proposal with the share held by such institutions when the current large bank and highly complex scorecard methodology was first implemented in 2011. At that time, institutions priced as large or highly complex institutions made up 78.9 percent of industry assets. As of December 31, 2025, that share has increased to 85.0 percent. Under the proposed $30 billion assessment methodology threshold, large and highly complex institutions would make up 79.5 percent of industry assets based on data as of December 31, 2025.

Further, institutions that would shift from the large bank scorecard methodology to the small bank pricing methodology under the proposal demonstrate certain similarities with other small institutions. For example, and as described above, small institutions with total assets between $1 billion and $10 billion report approximately similar shares of foreign deposits, uninsured deposits, and real estate loans as those of the 76 institutions that would shift from the large bank pricing scorecard methodology to the small bank pricing methodology under the proposal.

The FDIC considered several alternative thresholds

as described above, small institutions with total assets between $1 billion and $10 billion report approximately similar shares of foreign deposits, uninsured deposits, and real estate loans as those of the 76 institutions that would shift from the large bank pricing scorecard methodology to the small bank pricing methodology under the proposal.

The FDIC considered several alternative thresholds. In general, relative to the alternatives considered, the FDIC believes that the proposed threshold of $30 billion best preserves its intended purpose as it most closely aligns with the shares of industry assets held by small and large institutions in 2011, when the current large bank pricing methodology was implemented, but seeks comments on alternatives.

Question 1: What are the advantages and disadvantages of updating the threshold for defining an institution as small or large for deposit insurance assessments purposes from $10 billion in total assets to $30 billion in total assets, as described above? Should the FDIC consider other asset thresholds for defining an institution as small or large for deposit assessment purposes? Are there any other factors the FDIC should consider?

Question 2: What are the potential unintended consequences, if any, of establishing a higher threshold for deposit insurance assessments purposes?

D. Removing the Option for a Small Institution To Request That the FDIC Determine Its Assessment Rates as a Large Institution

The FDIC's assessment regulations currently permit a small institution with assets between $5 billion and $10 34 Approved requests become effective within one year of the date of the request. If an institution whose request has been granted subsequently reports total assets of less than $5 billion in its Call Report for four consecutive quarters, the institution shall be deemed a small institution for assessment purposes

gulations currently permit a small institution with assets between $5 billion and $10 34 Approved requests become effective within one year of the date of the request. If an institution whose request has been granted subsequently reports total assets of less than $5 billion in its Call Report for four consecutive quarters, the institution shall be deemed a small institution for assessment purposes. If the FDIC approves an institution's request to be treated as a large institution, the institution is not eligible to request to be assessed as a small institution for a period of three years from the first quarter its approval became effective.

34 12 CFR 327.16(f)(1).

Small institutions that have exercised this option generally have paid lower assessments under the large bank scorecard approach relative to the small bank pricing methodology. However, several additional reasons for requesting this option have been cited, including anticipated growth above the $10 billion threshold and having an affiliated large bank with which the small bank shares the same reporting and risk framework.

The FDIC is proposing to remove this option to promote fairness, simplicity, and accuracy in risk-based deposit insurance assessments. Additionally, if the assessment methodology threshold is consistently adjusted in the future to reflect inflation, banks will be less likely to naturally grow above the threshold. The FDIC expects the impact of removing this provision to be minimal given that only nine requests were received in the last ten years.

Question 3: What are the advantages and disadvantages of eliminating the option for a small institution to request treatment as a large institution for purposes of the assessment regulations, as described above?

Question 4: What are the potential unintended consequences, if any, of eliminating this option?

ible for all or some of the RRA during the time period it is priced as a large institution?

F. Indexing of Threshold Used To Define Small and Large Institutions

Under the proposal, the dollar-based threshold included in the proposed definitions of a small and large institution would be updated and adjusted every four years to reflect inflation, pursuant to a pre-determined indexing methodology. Specifically, the proposed indexing methodology would adjust the threshold based on the consumer price index for urban wage earners and clerical workers (CPI-W) published by the U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics. 35 The use of CPI-W to index thresholds is consistent with the indexing methodology in other bank regulations. 36 Further, the indexing methodology included under the proposal would generally align with the methodology used to adjust certain 37

35 The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics publishes the CPI-W on a monthly basis. The CPI-W is used to annually adjust benefits paid to Social Security beneficiaries and Supplemental Security Income recipients. See U.S. Social Security Administration, CPI for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, available at: www.ssa.gov/oact/STATS/cpiw.html.

36 The use of CPI-W to index thresholds is consistent with other bank regulations, such as those relating to the Community Reinvestment Act and the March 2026 proposed updates to the regulatory capital rules. The indexing methodology would also generally align with the methodology used to adjust certain thresholds within FDIC regulations. See, e.g., Community Reinvestment Act Regulations Asset-Size Thresholds, 89 FR 106480, 106481 (Dec. 30, 2024); Regulatory Capital Rule: Category I and II Banking Organizations, Banking Organizations With Significant Trading Activity, and Optional Adoption for Other Banking Organizations, 91 FR 14952, 14960 (Mar. 27, 2026); and Regulatory Capital Rules: Regulatory Capital and Standardized Approach for Risk-Weighted Assets, 91 FR 15332, 15364 (Mar. 27, 2026). See also 12 CFR 229.11

, 2025).

The proposal would not lower the threshold in the event of deflation. 39 In contrast to the indexing methodology included in the March 2026 proposed updates to the regulatory capital rules, the threshold defining small and large institutions in the assessment regulations would not be adjusted during any intervening calendar year to address the possibility of periods of unusual inflation. The FDIC believes this difference is appropriate given the requirement that an institution must generally report dollar amounts above or below the asset threshold defining small and large institutions in the assessment regulations for four consecutive quarters in order to meet the criteria for applicability of the definitions and the regular cadence of threshold adjustments would instill consistency and transparency in quarterly assessment payments for IDIs.

39 Any periods of deflation would be reflected in future threshold increases, as threshold adjustments in the future would be based on the positive net cumulative change in CPI-W.

Additionally, the threshold adjusted under the proposed indexing methodology would be rounded based on the size of the threshold ( e.g., billions, millions, thousands), generally, to the nearest two significant digits, as appropriate. 40

40 For example, a threshold that would otherwise be calculated as $30.964 billion would be rounded to $31 billion.

To effectuate future threshold adjustments under the proposal, the FDIC would announce the thresholds adjusted in accordance with the indexing methodology by issuing a final rule in the Federal Register to announce the updated threshold without notice and comment. Although the FDIC would be required to publish a final rule in the Federal Register , the adjustment would occur even in the absence of publication in the Federal Register

not be invoiced and due until June. See 12 CFR 327.3(b)(2).

1. Alternatives Considered

In developing this proposal and in proposing and finalizing the first phase of adjustments to certain thresholds within FDIC regulations, 43 the FDIC considered other factors that could be used to adjust certain thresholds in the assessment regulations to preserve the threshold levels in real terms over time. 44 For example, the indexing methodology could rely on an alternative index or measure of inflation ( e.g., core versus non-core measures). Additionally, the FDIC considered using changes in economic growth, such as gross domestic product (GDP), or banking industry assets as well as alternative approaches using a less or more frequent cadence or a process that is less automated ( e.g., requiring Board approval or public notice and comment).

43 See supra fn 22.

44 See 90 FR 35449, 35458 (Jul. 28, 2025). See also 90 FR 55789, 55791 (Dec. 4, 2025).

Properly constructed, periodic adjustments can avoid unintended and undesirable outcomes. For example, frequent adjustments in the absence of meaningful change can result in inefficiencies, as institutions realign their reporting and balance sheet management practices to reflect adjusted thresholds. Conversely, infrequent adjustments increase the risk that the intended purpose of the threshold is not preserved consistently over time.

A threshold may be periodically updated through ad-hoc review or consistent adjustments. An ad-hoc approach that does not pre-determine future adjustments may better preserve the threshold's intended application by allowing consideration of relevant contextual factors at each future adjustment. Such an approach may also be less predictable and introduce inefficiencies. Conversely, periodic adjustments using a pre-determined indexing methodology based on one or more specified factors, such as inflation, would increase efficiency and predictability, but may limit flexibility in cases where the measure is less relevant to a future context

levant contextual factors at each future adjustment. Such an approach may also be less predictable and introduce inefficiencies. Conversely, periodic adjustments using a pre-determined indexing methodology based on one or more specified factors, such as inflation, would increase efficiency and predictability, but may limit flexibility in cases where the measure is less relevant to a future context.

Finally, the threshold used in the assessment regulations to define an institution as a small or large institution and determine which assessment methodology is applied can influence a bank's decision to grow, as a bank's deposit insurance assessment rate may increase or decrease depending on whether it is defined as a small, large, or highly complex institution. Moreover, while all banks are required to report certain items on the Call Report, as noted above, large and highly complex institutions have additional reporting requirements related to assessments.

In general, properly structured and appropriately sequenced threshold adjustments promote consistent application of regulatory requirements over time and contribute to a more durable regulatory framework that enhances the overall efficacy of the risk-based assessment system. In addition, such adjustments can enhance transparency and certainty and therefore allow for more enhanced balance sheet management practices for IDIs.

As noted in the FDIC's 2025 final rule on adjusting and indexing certain regulatory thresholds, many commenters supported the proposed indexing methodology and related process for automatic threshold adjustments. 45 The FDIC is proposing substantively the same indexing methodology as the 2025 final rule, with the exception of the four-year cadence and disallowing adjustments in intervening years for periods of unusual

45 See supra fn 22.

Comments on the 2025 final rule on adjusting and indexing certain regulatory thresholds were mixed as to whether to use CPI-W as the reference index under the proposed indexing methodology

nt regulations. The FDIC requests additional feedback on all alternative approaches discussed and any other alternative approaches that should be considered.

The FDIC continues to evaluate other dollar-based thresholds in the assessment regulations and may consider soliciting comment on updating and adjusting additional thresholds through a subsequent proposal to amend the assessment regulations.

Question 8: What are the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed approach for indexing the threshold used for defining large and small institutions for purposes of deposit insurance assessments? What alternatives should the FDIC consider and why?

Question 9: What are the advantages and disadvantages of using a different index for adjusting the threshold, such as banking industry assets, nominal GDP, or the GDP deflator, instead of CPI-W?

Question 10: Should the FDIC consider a shorter or longer interval than four years for automatic threshold adjustments, and if so, why?

Question 11: What are the advantages and disadvantages of discretionary off-year adjustments for periods of unusual inflation? Should the FDIC consider a framework for adjustment in off years, and if so, why?

III. Proposed Revisions to Assessment Rates

A. Background

1. Deposit Insurance Assessment Rates

Pursuant to section 7 of the FDI Act, the FDIC has established a risk-based assessment system through which it charges all IDIs an assessment amount for deposit insurance. 46 Under the FDIC's assessment regulations, an IDI's assessment amount is equal to its assessment base multiplied by its risk-based assessment rate. 47 The FDIC is authorized to set assessments for IDIs in such amounts as the FDIC may determine to be necessary or appropriate. 48 In setting assessment rates, the FDIC is required by statute to consider the following factors:

46 See supra fn 1.

47 See supra fn 7.

48 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(2)(A).

ult in total base assessment rates that are negative. See 12 CFR 327.10(f)(1).

2. Current Assessment Rate Schedules and the Reserve Ratio

Effective January 1, 2023, the FDIC adopted an increase in initial base deposit insurance assessment rate schedules of 2 basis points as part of the statutorily-required Restoration Plan. 52 Those rate schedules are currently in effect and are detailed below. 53 Progressively lower assessment rate schedules will take effect when the reserve ratio exceeds 2 percent and 2.5 percent, and the FDIC did not modify those schedules when increasing rates in 2023. 54

52 See 87 FR 39388 (Jul. 1, 2022) and 87 FR 64314 (Oct. 24, 2022). The FDI Act requires the Board to adopt a restoration plan when the DIF reserve ratio falls below the statutory minimum of 1.35 percent or is expected to within 6 months, to restore the DIF to at least 1.35 percent within eight years, absent extraordinary circumstances. See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(3)(B) and (E). The reserve ratio is calculated as the ratio of the net worth of the DIF to the value of the aggregate estimated insured deposits at the end of a given quarter. See 12 U.S.C. 1813(y)(3).

53 See 12 CFR 327.10(b).

54 See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d).

As of June 30, 2025, the reserve ratio increased to 1.36 percent, above the statutory minimum of 1.35 percent. Therefore, the FDIC is no longer operating under a Restoration Plan. The reserve ratio was 1.43 percent as of March 31, 2026, and has continued to progress toward the FDIC's long-term goal of a 2 percent designated reserve ratio (DRR). 55

55 The DRR is expressed as a percentage of estimated insured deposits. The FDI Act requires that the Board designate the DRR for the DIF and publish the DRR before the beginning of each calendar year

e assessment rate schedules applicable to banks that would meet the proposed definition of a small institution (generally, those under $30 billion in total assets) is estimated to result in a decline in annual assessments of approximately $917 million, or 7.5 percent of total annual assessments.

2. Proposed Updates to Assessment Rate Schedules Applied to Large and Highly Complex Institutions

a. Proposed Reduction in Initial Base Assessment Rates

The FDIC is also proposing to decrease initial base deposit insurance assessment rate schedules applicable to large and highly complex institutions by 1 basis point, beginning upon the effective date of any final rule.

b. Proposed Resolution Readiness Adjustment

The proposal would also establish a new downward assessment rate adjustment, the RRA, available to IDIs that meet the proposed definition of a large institution or that are highly complex institutions, and that elect to submit to testing of the institution's ability to populate a VDR with information that could be used to market a bank in the event of failure, and/or provide the FDIC prescribed data access, including access to an institution's service provider(s) and/or internal systems, to support readiness for the resolution of rapid failures.

In recognition of the expected reduction in losses to the DIF in the event of failure, 65 the FDIC is proposing to apply a downward adjustment of up to 1 basis point to assessment rates, available to large and highly complex institutions that elect to participate, including 0.5 basis points for passing the VDR testing exercise and 0.5 basis points for providing prescribed data access, as described in section IV. of this Supplementary Information. 66

65 The FDI Act requires the FDIC to establish a risk-based assessment system for calculating an IDI's assessment based on the probability that the DIF will incur a loss with respect to that IDI and the likely amount of any such loss, among other factors. See 12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)(C)

asis points for providing prescribed data access, as described in section IV. of this Supplementary Information. 66

66 If a large or highly complex institution is affiliated with other IDIs, only an affiliate that is itself a large or highly complex institution would be eligible to seek a resolution readiness assessment adjustment.

c. Proposed Revisions to Initial Base Assessment Rates When the Reserve Ratio Reaches 2 Percent and 2.5 Percent

Under the current regulation, progressively lower initial base assessment rate schedules applicable to large and highly complex institutions will come into effect when the reserve ratio reaches 2 percent and 2.5 percent, with minimum initial base assessment rates declining from 5 basis points to 2 basis points and 1 basis point, respectively. 67 Under the proposal, the minimum initial base assessment rates applied to large and highly complex institutions would still become progressively lower, declining from 4 basis points to 3 basis points and to 2 basis points when the reserve ratio reaches 2 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively, in order to incorporate the RRA into the assessment rate schedules.

67 See 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d).

This proposed revision to the initial base assessment rate schedules combined with the proposed allocation of adjustments described below have the result that a large or highly complex institution at the minimum initial base assessment rate could effectively achieve the maximum proposed RRA

ion's initial base assessment rate first, prior to the application of the other adjustments, and the unsecured debt adjustment would be limited to the lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent of a large or highly complex institution's initial base assessment rate less any applicable RRA. Under the proposal, the allocation of, and limitations on, a small bank's rate adjustments would remain unchanged.

The proposed allocation of adjustments—specifically, allowing for an institution's initial base assessment rate to be reduced by up to the maximum RRA of 1 basis point before applying the unsecured debt adjustment—would have the result that a large or highly complex institution that is assigned an assessment rate that is the least risky, or the minimum initial base assessment rate, would be able to apply an unsecured debt adjustment of up to 1.5 basis points when the reserve ratio is less than 2 percent, as shown in Table 7. This maximum unsecured debt adjustment of 1.5 basis points would be equal to the maximum unsecured debt adjustment that could apply to a small institution assigned the minimum initial base assessment rate, and would also be equal to the maximum unsecured debt adjustment available prior to the 2023 increase in the rate schedules applied while the reserve ratio is less than 2 percent.

Similarly, when the reserve ratio exceeds 2 percent, allocating the RRA before the unsecured debt adjustment would result in a large or highly complex institution that is assigned the minimum initial base assessment rate being able to apply up to a 1 basis point unsecured debt adjustment, also shown in Table 7, and on par with a small institution assigned the minimum initial base assessment rate.

basis point unsecured debt adjustment, also shown in Table 7, and on par with a small institution assigned the minimum initial base assessment rate.

When the reserve ratio exceeds 2.5 percent, the proposed allocation would result in a large or highly complex institution that is assigned the minimum initial base assessment rate being able to apply up to a 0.5 basis point unsecured debt adjustment. As proposed, the 1 basis point RRA is equal to or exceeds the maximum unsecured debt adjustments of 1 basis point and 0.5 basis points available to large and highly complex institutions with the minimum initial base assessment rate in

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In absence of these revisions, the maximum unsecured debt adjustment that a bank at the minimum initial base assessment rate could receive would decrease because the adjustment is limited to the lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent of the bank's initial base assessment rate (or, in the case of the proposal, 50 percent of the bank's initial base assessment rate less any applicable RRA). For example, when the reserve ratio is equal to or greater than 2 percent but less than 2.5 percent, the minimum initial base assessment rate for large and highly complex institutions is 2 basis points. Under the current assessments regulations, a bank receiving the minimum initial base assessment rate of 2 basis points would have a maximum unsecured debt adjustment of 1 basis point. If the same bank under the proposal also received the full RRA of 1 basis point, its maximum unsecured debt adjustment would decline to 0.5 basis points.

Recognizing the significant benefit that the issuance of unsecured debt may have on potential losses to the DIF in the event of a bank failure, the proposed rate schedules would result in no change to the maximum unsecured debt adjustment for banks receiving the minimum initial base assessment rate in the rate schedules applied when the reserve ratio exceeds 2 percent

t elect to participate. Under this proposal, the first 0.5 basis points of the RRA for providing the FDIC access to an institution's service provider(s) and/or internal systems to obtain detailed bank data needed to manage and market the bank in receivership would be applied at the beginning of the first full quarterly assessment period after the date on which the institution elects to participate. For instance, if an institution elected to participate on May 15, it would first be entitled to a 0.5 basis point adjustment for providing data access in the quarterly assessment period beginning on July 1, for which payment would be invoiced and due in December.

If an institution fails to follow through on providing prescribed data access or does not provide information or access to personnel that the FDIC needs to assess the data, documents, and other materials that must be provided, the FDIC would cease application of the 0.5 basis point adjustment beginning the following quarterly assessment period. If this occurs in the initial data access engagement, the institution would be liable to reimburse the FDIC for an amount equal to the total amount of the 0.5 basis point component of the adjustment for data access the institution already received.

g. Timing of the Component of the RRA for VDR Testing

If the institution satisfies the requirements of the rule with respect to the VDR test, the FDIC would generally apply the 0.5 basis point component of the RRA beginning in the first quarterly assessment period after the institution passes the VDR test. However, as described further below, the FDIC will not initially apply the downward adjustment until all banks have completed the initial round of testing, to ensure that institutions who are tested sooner do not unfairly benefit from the timing of the tests.

h. Retesting and Follow-Up Data Access Engagements

Participating institutions would be subject to periodic retesting and follow-up data access engagements, as described in section IV. of this

ially apply the downward adjustment until all banks have completed the initial round of testing, to ensure that institutions who are tested sooner do not unfairly benefit from the timing of the tests.

h. Retesting and Follow-Up Data Access Engagements

Participating institutions would be subject to periodic retesting and follow-up data access engagements, as described in section IV. of this

i. Analysis

While the reserve ratio is less than 2 percent, the minimum total base assessment rate for large and highly complex institutions that receive the maximum proposed RRA would be 1.5 basis points, the same minimum that would apply to small institutions. The proposed minimum total base assessment rate of 1.5 basis points is 1 basis point lower than in the current schedule and is the same as the minimum total base assessment rate that was applicable prior to the 2023 increase in the assessment rate schedule in place while the reserve ratio is less than 2 percent.

The minimum total base assessment rates when the reserve ratio is equal to or greater than 2 percent are the same for small, large, and highly complex institutions and are unchanged from the current schedules, which were not raised in 2023. The proposed revisions to the assessment rate schedules are illustrated in the tables below.

If all IDIs that meet the proposed definition of a large institution or that are highly complex institutions successfully participate in and pass the VDR exercise and provide the prescribed data access to achieve the maximum RRA of 1 basis point, the RRA combined with the proposed 1 basis point reduction in initial base assessment rates is generally estimated to result in a decline in annual assessments of approximately $3.4 billion, or approximately 27.8 percent of total annual assessments, based on data as of December 31, 2025

1. Proposed Assessment Rate Schedules for Established Small Institutions and Large and Highly Complex Institutions

Pursuant to the FDIC's authority to set assessments, the FDIC is proposing the following initial base assessment rates, adjustments, and total base assessment rates applicable to established small institutions and large and highly complex institutions set forth in Table 8 below.

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The proposed assessment rate schedules applicable to established small institutions and large and highly complex institutions in Table 8 above would remain in effect unless and until the reserve ratio meets or exceeds 2 percent. 69

69 In lieu of dividends, and pursuant to the FDIC's authority to set assessments, the progressively lower initial base and total base assessment rates set forth in 12 CFR 327.10(c) and (d) will come into effect without further action by the Board when the fund reserve ratio at the end of the prior assessment period reaches 2 percent and 2.5 percent, respectively.

The proposed initial base assessment rates, adjustments, and total base assessment rates in Table 9 below would be in effect if the reserve ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior assessment period is equal to or greater than 2 percent and less than 2.5 percent.

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The proposed initial base assessment rates, adjustments, and total base assessment rates in Table 10 below would be in effect if the reserve ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior assessment period is equal to or greater than 2.5 percent.

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2. Proposed Assessment Rates for New Small Institutions

Pursuant to the FDIC's authority to set assessments, the proposed initial and total base assessment rates applicable to new small institutions set forth in Table 11 below would take effect beginning upon the effective date of any final rule

t would interact with the RRA and the impact on the maximum unsecured debt adjustment applicable to large and highly complex institutions at the minimum initial base assessment rates and at higher rates. The unsecured debt adjustment was adopted in recognition that, all else equal, greater amounts of long-term unsecured debt can reduce the potential loss to the DIF in the event of an IDI's failure. The FDIC is proposing to adopt the RRA in recognition that a large or highly complex institution's ability to both populate a VDR with information that could be used to market the bank in the event of its failure and provide the FDIC access to detailed bank data needed to manage and market the bank in receivership can improve resolution efficiencies and result in a reduction in losses to the DIF in the event of the institution's failure. The FDIC recognizes that the proposed structure creates a potential asymmetry in which the unsecured debt adjustment can be significantly greater than the RRA for institutions with higher initial base assessment rates, while the RRA would be equal to or greater than the unsecured debt adjustment for institutions with the minimum initial base assessment rate when the reserve ratio exceeds 2 percent, and seeks comment on this proposed structure.

Question 12: The FDIC invites comment on the proposal to revise deposit insurance assessment rates, beginning with the effective date of any final rule. How does the approach in the proposed rule support or not support the objectives of the FDIC's comprehensive, long-range management plan for the DIF? What are the

Question 13:The FDIC invites comment on the proposed RRA. What are the advantages and disadvantages of implementing such an adjustment? Is the calibration appropriate, and if not, why?

Question 14: The FDIC additionally invites comment on the proposed allocation of the RRA and incorporation into the assessment rate schedules

s comprehensive, long-range management plan for the DIF? What are the

Question 13:The FDIC invites comment on the proposed RRA. What are the advantages and disadvantages of implementing such an adjustment? Is the calibration appropriate, and if not, why?

Question 14: The FDIC additionally invites comment on the proposed allocation of the RRA and incorporation into the assessment rate schedules. Are there alternative approaches for allocation or incorporation into the assessment rate schedules the FDIC should consider?

Question 15: Under the proposal, the unsecured debt adjustment would be limited to the lesser of 5 basis points or half of an institution's initial base assessment rate less any applicable RRA. As proposed, the 1 basis point RRA equals or exceeds the maximum unsecured debt adjustments of 1 basis point and 0.5 basis points available to large and highly complex institutions with the minimum initial base assessment rate in the schedules applied when the reserve ratio is between 2 percent and 2.5 percent, and 2.5 percent or greater. The FDIC invites comment on the relative allocation of these adjustments. Are there are alternative allocations or limitations the FDIC should consider?

IV. Resolution Readiness Adjustment

Under the proposed rule, the FDIC would apply a downward resolution readiness adjustment to the assessment rate of a large or highly complex institution that elects to (1) submit to testing of the institution's ability to populate a VDR (VDR test) with information that could be used to market the bank in the event of its failure (VDR component) and/or (2) provide the FDIC access to an institution's service provider(s) and/or internal systems if the institution maintains its own proprietary data systems, to obtain detailed bank data needed to manage and market the bank in receivership (data access component)

lity to populate a VDR (VDR test) with information that could be used to market the bank in the event of its failure (VDR component) and/or (2) provide the FDIC access to an institution's service provider(s) and/or internal systems if the institution maintains its own proprietary data systems, to obtain detailed bank data needed to manage and market the bank in receivership (data access component). 70 The proposed RRA would be comprised of a 0.5 basis point adjustment for successfully passing a VDR test (VDR adjustment) and a 0.5 basis point adjustment for completing the data access component (data access adjustment) in recognition of the expected reduction in losses to the DIF in the event of the failure of an institution that participates and completes both components.

70 If a large or highly complex institution is affiliated with other IDIs, only an affiliate that is itself a large or highly complex institution would be eligible to seek a resolution readiness assessment adjustment.

A. Background

A large or highly complex institution's ability to quickly populate a VDR with complete, timely, and accurate information can be key to ensuring that the FDIC receives high quality bids in the event of the institution's failure, which would reduce the likely amount of loss to the DIF. From a marketing standpoint, an institution's ability to quickly populate a VDR is critical to ensuring necessary information on unique business lines can be supplied in a timely manner for bidders to evaluate the institution's franchise. Better information for bidders when marketing a franchise increases bid quality which, in turn, increases the likelihood that a failed bank will be acquired over the course of the weekend immediately following its entry into receivership. This also decreases the likelihood of needing to operate the bank as a bridge depository institution, which can further erode franchise value and increase costs to the DIF

component, the institution's notice of election would provide the FDIC a complete list of all systems and applications maintained by itself and/or third-party vendor(s) that serve as core data processors for deposit and loan data and the institution's general ledger, and a list of key personnel (including personnel of third-party vendors) needed to support and operate such systems and applications. The institution would also authorize the FDIC to communicate with, and request data from, its third-party vendors and acknowledge that any costs required to obtain any necessary data would be borne by the institution. The institution would be able to opt in to one of or both components of the RRA as part of its election, whether it be one election submission or two.

An institution that is a large or highly complex institution as of the effective date of any final rule would submit a notice of election to the FDIC within 30 days of the effective date of the rule. Such an institution would be eligible to receive a data access adjustment beginning in the assessment period following the institution's election, and would be eligible to receive a VDR adjustment beginning in the assessment period one year after the effective date of the final rule if the institution passes the VDR test.

Following the end of this 30-day period, institutions would still be able to make an election at any time. However, the FDIC would not conduct a VDR test of such an institution until after all institutions who initially opted in completed VDR tests, and the institution's VDR adjustment would not be available until after completing the VDR test

r the institution passes the VDR test. Such an institution would not, however, receive the VDR adjustment

If an institution's notice of election for the data access component contains materially inaccurate information or the institution does not provide required information in its notice of election, the FDIC may notify the institution that it is no longer eligible for the data access adjustment. In that case, the data access adjustment would be removed beginning the next quarterly assessment period, and the institution would be liable to reimburse the FDIC for an amount equal to the amount of data access adjustment the institution received. The institution could seek to resume eligibility for the data access adjustment by submitting another notice of election.

C. VDR Test

In order to demonstrate its ability to adequately populate a VDR, a large or highly complex institution must be able to provide information under the below categories in a VDR set up by the FDIC within 48 hours of a request. 71 These categories of information reflect the data and information that potential bidders have identified as most useful for conducting due diligence, especially when there is a short runway to an institution's failure:

71 The FDIC would generally delete data shortly after concluding the test.

1. Key financial information, including balance sheets, income statements, general ledgers (both consolidated and unconsolidated), and other relevant financial information;

2. Deposit data and information, including deposit tapes and data dictionary, and a report regarding key depositors (including key depositors by name and business segment, the amount of each key depositor's deposits, and a list of other services provided to such key depositors), though existing management reports are acceptable;

termines that the information and data uploaded is sufficient for a potential bidder to conduct adequate due diligence to inform a potential bid, including that the financial information provided is consistent with the general ledger, and (3) the institution provides the FDIC such information and access to such personnel of the institution as the FDIC in its discretion determines is relevant to properly evaluate the documents and information uploaded to the VDR.

3. Results of VDR Test and Application of VDR Adjustment

The FDIC will notify the institution in writing concerning the results of its test. If the institution has satisfied the requirements of the rule with respect to the VDR test, it will be entitled to a VDR adjustment. The FDIC would retest an institution's capabilities with respect to the VDR test once every three years. In certain circumstances, such as when the FDIC determines that it can access certain important information in a timely manner in connection with data access engagement, the FDIC may waive aspects of future VDR tests. The FDIC would provide an institution with not less than four weeks' notice if it plans to retest an institution's VDR population capabilities. The FDIC may extend the timeline to more than three years at its discretion. The FDIC may do so if, for example, there is an increase in bank failures resulting in increased resources devoted to resolution activity. If an institution has experienced material changes with respect to its ability to populate a data room, such as undergoing a merger, the FDIC may conduct a retest in less than three years at its discretion. If the institution does not satisfy the requirements of the VDR test, the FDIC may offer the institution an opportunity to retake the test not less than one month after the initial test

terest;

e. Deposit account status;

f. Deposit account rate terms; and

g. Any other information about material characteristics of deposits;

3. Core data concerning the institution's loan portfolio, including:

a. Borrower, co-borrower, and guarantor information;

b. Loan balances, including charge offs;

c. Participation information;

d. Loan status;

e. Loan terms;

f. Loan type;

g. Collateral associated with each loan; and

h. Any other information about material characteristics of loans;

4. A list of key personnel (including those employed by third-party vendors) needed to support and operate each system and application used to produce data, information, and other materials listed above identified by name, title, employer, telephone number, and email address.

If an institution fails to follow through on providing prescribed data access or does not provide information or access to personnel that the FDIC needs to assess the data, documents, and other materials that must be provided, the FDIC would cease application of the adjustment beginning the following quarterly assessment period. If this occurs during the initial data access engagement, the institution would be liable to reimburse the FDIC for an amount equal to the amount of data access adjustment the institution received.

After the initial engagement, the institution must notify the FDIC within 30 days of any material changes to its internal data systems or data service providers that made the FDIC's prior engagement with respect to data access no longer relevant, such as when an institution engages a new data service provider with respect to the data that the FDIC would seek to collect in the event of the institution's failure. The FDIC anticipates that such notices would be rare. Failure to provide notice of material change may result in the data access adjustment being removed in the following assessment period and, potentially, liability for repayment if discovered after multiple assessment periods

service provider with respect to the data that the FDIC would seek to collect in the event of the institution's failure. The FDIC anticipates that such notices would be rare. Failure to provide notice of material change may result in the data access adjustment being removed in the following assessment period and, potentially, liability for repayment if discovered after multiple assessment periods.

The FDIC will conduct follow-up engagements every seven years, except that the FDIC may (1) extend the timeline at its discretion or (2) conduct a follow-up engagement sooner than seven years in the event of a material change to an internal data system or data service provider. The FDIC would provide an institution with not less than four weeks' notice if it chooses to conduct a new engagement concerning an institution's data access capabilities.

If the institution qualifies for the data access adjustment after the first engagement, and then declines to participate in subsequent engagement, the data access adjustment will be removed in the assessment period following receipt of notice that it declines to participate, and the institution would not be liable to reimburse the FDIC.

Question 16: Please describe and quantify the costs that large and highly complex institutions would expect to incur in seeking the RRA? If possible, please delineate costs by VDR test and data access engagement.

Question 17: Do commenters believe that the amount of the RRA is appropriately calibrated to recognize the potential reduction in losses to the DIF in the event of a large or highly complex institution's failure? If not, what would be a more appropriate calibration and why?

a more appropriate calibration and why?

Question 18: Do commenters believe that the proposed rule asks for large and highly complex institutions to provide the correct set of data for a VDR test? What, if any, alternative data and information would potential bidders want access to in connection with the marketing of a failed bank and why? What other information in the possession of a large or highly complex institution would help facilitate competitive, high-quality bids? Should any of the data or information items requested under the proposal for purposes of the VDR test be removed under any final rule and, if so, why? Would this set of data benefit from more or less prescription in the rule and why?

Question 19: What, if any, other data would be useful to potential bidders, help improve the marketing process for a failed institution, or be useful to operate the institution if the FDIC is unable to solicit adequate bids over resolution weekend? Would this set of data benefit from more or less prescription in the rule and why?

Question 20: Does the information that must be populated in a VDR and to which access would be provided under the proposed rule overlap with information that is otherwise provided by large and highly complex institutions to the FDIC or information that is otherwise publicly available?

Question 21: Is the information that would be required to be submitted with respect to the election notice appropriate and sufficient to provide the FDIC an understanding of the institution's information technology systems in order to aid the FDIC in conducting testing under the proposed rule? What, if any, other information should a large or highly complex institution provide when seeking an adjustment?

Question 22: Are the timelines for the initial VDR test and data access engagement appropriate and, if not, why? What alternative timeframe, if any, would be more appropriate to ensure sufficient time for the FDIC to conduct testing under the proposed rule?

Question 23: To what extent would an appe

tegories of information requested with respect to the VDR test are sufficiently clear? Do institutions have existing internal management reports that could be used to populate a VDR, even on a partial basis, without having to generate additional reports and, if so, which types of existing internal management reports could be leveraged by institutions?

V. Other Proposed Amendments to Part 327

A. Conforming Amendments to the Assessment Regulations

The FDIC also is proposing conforming amendments to sections 327.8, 327.10, and 327.16 of the assessment regulations to effectuate the modifications described above. These conforming amendments would ensure that the proposed updates to the definitions, thresholds, and assessment rate schedules are properly incorporated into the assessments regulation provisions governing the calculations of an IDI's quarterly deposit insurance assessment. The FDIC is proposing revisions to section 327.10 to reflect the assessment rate schedules that would be applicable before and after the effective date of any final rule.

The FDIC is also proposing to revise the uniform amounts for small banks and insured branches of foreign banks in sections 327.16(a) and (d), respectively, to reflect the proposed 2 basis point decrease in initial base assessment rate schedules applicable to these institutions.

B. Technical Amendments to the Assessment Regulations To Remove Obsolete Provisions

The FDIC is proposing other technical amendments to its regulations governing deposit insurance assessments to remove obsolete provisions. Removal of these provisions, described below, will neither affect deposit insurance assessments nor result in new requirements for IDIs.

pplicable to these institutions.

B. Technical Amendments to the Assessment Regulations To Remove Obsolete Provisions

1. Surcharges and Assessments Required To Raise the Reserve Ratio of the DIF to 1.35 Percent in Section 327.11

As a technical change, the FDIC is proposing to rescind in its entirety 12 CFR 327.11 which includes provisions relating to surcharges and assessments required to raise the reserve ratio of the DIF to 1.35 percent that are no longer applicable.

2. Prepayment of Quarterly Risk-Based Assessments in 12 CFR 327.12

As a technical change, the FDIC is rescinding in its entirety 12 CFR 327.12, which includes provisions relating to the prepayment of quarterly risk-based assessments that are no longer applicable.

3. Implementation of One-Time Assessment Credit in 12 CFR part 327 Subpart B

As a technical change, the FDIC is proposing to rescind in its entirety 12 CFR 327 Subpart B which implemented a one-time assessment credit required by section 7(e)(3) of the FDI Act. 73

73 See 12 U.S.C. 1817(e)(3). See also 71 FR 61374 (Oct. 18, 2006).

VI. Reporting

In December 2025, the FDIC, the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, and the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (the agencies), issued a Request for Information on Streamlining the Call Report. 74 The request offered the opportunity for interested stakeholders to identify ways that the agencies could streamline the Call Report forms and instructions while still meeting the purposes of the collection.

74 90 FR 55240 (Dec. 1, 2025).

The agencies received several comments in response to the request addressing the collection of data on Schedule RC-O—Other Data for Deposit Insurance Assessments

expenses and income of the DIF.

(iii) The projected effects of the payment of assessments on the capital and earnings of IDIs.

(iv) The risk factors and other factors taken into account pursuant to section 7(b)(1) of the FDI Act (12 U.S.C. 1817(b)(1)) under the risk-based assessment system, including the requirement under such section to maintain a risk-based system. 75

75 See supra fn 45.

(v) Other factors the FDIC has determined to be appropriate. 76

76 See supra fn 50.

For purposes of statutory considerations and expected effects, the FDIC based its analysis on data as of December 31, 2025, including data from the Call Report and FFIEC 002 for the reporting period that ended December 31, 2025, reported as of February 16, 2026.

B. Deposit Insurance Fund Expenses and Income

As of December 31, 2025, the DIF balance totaled $153.9 billion, an increase of $16.8 billion from the previous year. Since second quarter 2023, the DIF balance has steadily increased, primarily from assessments earned. Assessments earned totaled $13 billion for 2025. The weighted average assessment rate was approximately 5.6 basis points as of December 31, 2025, up 1.8 basis points from the weighted average assessment rate of 3.8 basis points for the assessment period ending June 30, 2022, just prior to the adoption of the 2022 final rule implementing a uniform increase in initial base deposit insurance assessment rate schedules of 2 basis points. 77 Net investment income

77 See supra fn 23.

Operating expenses partially offset increases in the DIF balance, ranging between $497 million and $666 million on a quarterly basis for the past three years. Full-year operating expenses were $2.4 billion for 2025, unchanged from 2024.

erly basis for the past three years. Full-year operating expenses were $2.4 billion for 2025, unchanged from 2024.

Losses from bank failures, or case resolution expenses, represent the largest potential expenses of the DIF. Except for 2023, the DIF has experienced low losses since 2016. Between 2016 and 2022, three banks per year failed, at an average annual cost to the DIF of about $177 million. In 2023, five banks failed with estimated losses to the DIF of $18.0 billion, excluding losses that are being recovered through the special assessment. 78 Since 2023, six institutions have failed as of May 2026, with an estimated cost to the DIF of $928 million. 79

78 Estimated losses do not include amounts associated with the special assessment to recover estimated losses attributable to protecting uninsured depositors pursuant to the systemic risk determination announced following the failures of Silicon Valley Bank and Signature Bank in March 2023. The FDIC is required by statute to recover such losses through a special assessment. See 12 U.S.C. 1823(c)(4)(G)(ii). See also 88 FR 83329 (Nov. 29, 2023) and 90 FR 59369 (Dec. 19, 2025).

79 Loss estimates for failures that occurred between 2023 through 2026 as of March 31, 2026. FDIC BankFind Suite: Bank Failures & Assistance Data, available at: https://banks.data.fdic.gov/bankfind-suite/failures. See also “Anchor Bank Assumes Insured Deposits of Community Bank and Trust—West Georgia, LeGrange, Georgia,” May 1, 2026, available at: https://www.fdic.gov/news/press-releases/2026/anchor-bank-assumes-insured-deposits-community-bank-and-trust-west-georgia.

The total number of institutions on the FDIC's Problem Bank List was 60 at the end of the fourth quarter of 2025, up by a net of three institutions from the previous quarter. 80 The number of problem banks represented 1.4 percent of total banks in the fourth quarter of 2025, which is in the normal range of 1 to 2 percent for non-crisis periods

to fourth quarter 2025, growth in the DIF balance outpaced growth in estimated insured deposits, resulting in continued growth in the reserve ratio—DIF balance as a percentage of estimated insured deposits. As previously noted, the reserve ratio further increased to 1.43 percent on March 31, 2026, up 15 basis points from the year-end 2024 and 28 basis points from year-end 2023.

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C. Projections for DIF Balance, Insured Deposits, and Reserve Ratio

In developing the proposal, the FDIC projected how changes to the threshold used to define small and large institutions and to rate schedules would affect assessment revenue and therefore growth in the DIF balance and reserve ratio, including when the reserve ratio would reach 2 percent. These projections assume the continuation of current trends, including low to moderate losses from bank failures, and do not contemplate a significant downturn in banking or economic conditions. Projections also assume no change in bank behavior. For example, changes to assessment rates and pricing methodologies because of the proposal may motivate banks to adjust their risk profiles or practices, including changes to borrowing rates, deposits rates, or service fees. Any potential adjustments to bank behavior are unknown and therefore not incorporated into projections.

The projections generally assume that changes to the definitions of small and large institutions and decreases to assessment rate schedules take effect at the beginning of 2027. Projections further assume that 75 percent of large and highly complex institutions elect to participate and receive assessment rate adjustments of 0.5 basis points for the data access component of the RRA and 0.5 basis points for the VDR testing component of the RRA beginning in 2027 and 2028, respectively. The FDIC believes these are reasonable assumptions given the expected cost of initial and continued participation in the proposed engagement relative to the proposed assessment benefit

rience an estimated increase in assessments totaling less than one percent of income.

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The FDIC also considered the effects of the proposal on equity capital. The proposed changes to the assessment regulations are expected to increase tier 1 capital of IDIs by an estimated 16.3 basis points, on average, resulting from the estimated net decrease in annual assessments of $4.0 billion. 85 No institutions are expected to fall below the minimum Tier 1 capital requirement as a result of the proposal.

85 Estimated effects on capital are calculated based on data reported as of December 31, 2025, on the Call Report.

VIII. Impact and Economic Analysis

This section evaluates the projected economic effect of the proposal relative to a baseline in which the proposal is not adopted. Specifically, the section discusses the expected material costs and benefits of the proposal to small institutions and large and highly complex institutions. 86 Relevant regulations and financial data as of December 31, 2025, are generally used to estimate outcomes under the proposal and the baseline.

86 For purposes of the economic analysis, unless specified otherwise, small institutions include newly insured small institutions and insured branches of foreign institutions. See sections III.C.2. and III.C.3. of this Supplementary Information for a discussion of assessment rates and schedules for these institutions.

The proposal would update and provide for future indexing of the asset-based threshold used in the definitions of small and large institutions, decrease initial base assessment rate schedules by 2 basis points for small institutions and by 1 basis point for large and highly complex institutions, and provide a downward adjustment to assessment rates, including 0.5 basis points for passing virtual data room testing and 0.5 basis points for providing prescribed data access to large and highly complex institutions electing to participate

ons, decrease initial base assessment rate schedules by 2 basis points for small institutions and by 1 basis point for large and highly complex institutions, and provide a downward adjustment to assessment rates, including 0.5 basis points for passing virtual data room testing and 0.5 basis points for providing prescribed data access to large and highly complex institutions electing to participate. 87

87 The proposal contains certain other technical amendments to the assessments regulations to remove obsolete provisions. The FDIC anticipates these amendments will have little to no effect on deposit insurance assessments for IDIs. As such, the effects on IDIs due to these amendments under the proposal are likely to be de minimis.

As of December 31, 2025, the FDIC insured 4,345 IDIs, including nine insured branches of foreign institutions. Table 16 breaks out these institutions by assessments pricing methodology as of December 31, 2025, under current regulations (baseline) and under the proposed changes to the definitions of small and large institutions. Excluding banks that may utilize the proposed one-time election for reclassified institutions to be temporarily priced using the large bank scorecard pricing methodology, 76 institutions would shift from the large bank pricing methodology to the small bank pricing methodology.

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A. Effects on all IDIs

Using data as of December 31, 2025, the FDIC estimates the proposal would result in an overall decrease in annual assessments of approximately $4.0 billion (1.1 percent of 2025 pre-tax income) when aggregated across the 4,345 IDIs. 88

88 See section VII.D., Capital and Earnings Analysis for more details on the estimated changes in annual assessments.

1. Distributional Effects on IDIs

Annualized assessments earned for all 4,345 IDIs based on data as of December 31, 2025, were $12.3 billion in aggregate

ames Ian and Zhou, Lily, “Do Big Banks Have Lower Operating Costs?” Federal Reserve Bank of New York, Economic Policy Review, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2014, https://www.newyorkfed.org/medialibrary/media/research/epr/2014/EPRvol20no2.pdf.

2. Effects Due to Reductions in Assessments

Institutions with reduced assessments under the proposal would have reduced noninterest expense commensurate with bank size. Affected IDIs could adjust their balance sheet in several ways. First, they could distribute more income to equity holders or retain additional earnings. Second, they could increase noninterest expenses by increasing salaries and employee benefits, expanding premises or fixed assets, or spending more on data processing or other expenses. Third, with reduced expenses related to holding deposits, banks could pay higher interest to depositors and thereby attract more deposits. Fourth, with reduced expenses related to holding deposits, banks could instead rebalance their asset portfolio, subject to their business models, and capital and other regulatory constraints. 90 The FDIC acknowledges that institutions could vary their responses and does not have the information necessary to quantify the range of responses.

90 Analysis of disparities in assessment rates from 1995 to 1996 found that banks with higher assessments shifted to longer maturity and higher yielding assets. See: Shoukry, George F., “Insurance Pricing, Distortions, and Moral Hazard: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from Deposit Insurance”, Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 2024; Vol. 59(2), pages 896-932, https://doi.org/10.1017/S0022109022001491.

Any difference in the rate of return between the DIF and how IDIs choose to employ any assessment reductions as a result of the proposal would produce a general welfare effect. As previously discussed, the FDIC does not have the information to forecast how IDIs will utilize the income resulting from the proposal and therefore cannot quantify any such effects.

i.org/10.1017/S0022109022001491.

B. Effects Specific to Small Institutions

As noted previously, under the proposal, the number of IDIs classified as small institutions, including newly insured small institutions and insured branches of foreign institutions, under 12 CFR 327 would increase by 76 IDIs to 4,271. The FDIC estimates that these 4,271 IDIs would experience a collective decrease in annual assessments of approximately $1.0 billion, under the proposal, relative to the baseline. 91

91 As discussed previously, institutions reclassified from large to small may experience a cliff effect after switching assessment pricing frameworks. Such institutions could mitigate any changes in assessment costs (and any costs associated with the loss of the option to request discretionary adjustments under the 2011 adjustment guidelines) using the proposal's one-time election to be priced temporarily using the large bank scorecard pricing methodology. See section II.E. for additional details.

1. Balance-Sheet Incentives Due to Reclassification

For the 76 reclassified institutions, differences between the large bank scorecard and the small bank pricing methodology would change their incentives to hold certain assets or liabilities under the proposal, which may result in changes in these institutions' balance sheet composition. As noted in section II.C. of this Supplementary Information, these differences arise because the small bank pricing methodology uses a different set of financial measures and weights based on how the measures corresponded with the probability of failure for small banks

exing, but only 20% surpassed the threshold with indexing.

C. Effects Specific to Large or Highly Complex Institutions That Would Elect To Participate in VDR Testing and Provide Prescribed Data Access

This subsection discusses the large or highly complex institutions that would elect to participate in VDR testing and provide the prescribed data access, and the benefits and costs of that choice. The FDIC does not have data to predict the number of large or highly complex institutions that would elect to participate in, and successfully pass, VDR testing and provide the prescribed data access. For simplicity, and to provide a quantitative discussion of benefits and costs under the proposal, the FDIC assumes that 75 percent of institutions would elect to participate under the proposal.

1. Benefits

As noted previously, under the proposal, the number of institutions classified as large and highly complex would decrease to 74. The FDIC estimates that the proposal would generally decrease annual assessments for these institutions by approximately 33 percent once all components of the proposal are implemented and assuming 75 percent of large and highly complex institutions elect to participate and receive the full RRA.

Institutions that elect to complete one or both resolution readiness components would directly benefit from a decrease in assessments, which if invested, could earn additional returns. Institutions that elect to complete one or both components would demonstrate readiness for rapid resolution which could pose benefits to the institution and to the FDIC, both before and during the resolution process. For example, the VDR testing and data access engagement could provide information to participating IDIs that may help optimize their business or identify ways to reduce their risk of loss. In the event of failure, the FDIC may need less time to set up a VDR

te readiness for rapid resolution which could pose benefits to the institution and to the FDIC, both before and during the resolution process. For example, the VDR testing and data access engagement could provide information to participating IDIs that may help optimize their business or identify ways to reduce their risk of loss. In the event of failure, the FDIC may need less time to set up a VDR. Providing access to more complete, timely, and accurate data during the bidding process could also preserve the franchise value of the institution, decrease administrative costs of the receivership, and in turn, reduce costs to the DIF in the event of a failure. 94

94 Academic research suggests that the higher the cost of due diligence and, more generally, the less relevant information available about a failing institution, the more difficult it becomes for potential acquirers to determine a profitable bidding strategy in the auction. See, e.g., Granja, João, “The Relation Between Bank Resolutions and Information Environment: Evidence from the Auctions for Failed Banks,” Journal of Accounting Research, 2013, Vol. 51 (5), https://doi.org/10.1111/1475-679X.12028 and references therein.

2. Reporting Burden

As discussed above, the FDIC assumes 75 percent of large and highly complex institutions would elect to participate in and complete both the VDR and data access components. The total estimated voluntary burden borne by these 56 institutions in the first three years under the proposal would be approximately 3,893 hours per year. 95 Using an estimated wage rate of $110.95 96 per hour, this would amount to total estimated reporting costs of approximately $431,928 annually for the participating institutions (constituting less than half a percent of their aggregate total noninterest expenses). 97

95 See section X.A for additional details. The estimated number of respondents for the data access component is 3/4 of 56, or 42 institutions, because of the four-year cycle for that component

tions and Effects

Institutions that elect to participate would likely incur some regulatory costs, in addition to the reporting costs presented above, to transition their internal systems and processes. The FDIC does not have access to information that would enable it to estimate such costs. However, the FDIC expects that such costs are likely to be small relative to the size of the institutions.

Under the proposal, when the designated reserve ratio is less than 2 percent, the application of the unsecured debt adjustment would start from a lower base assessment rate (after factoring in the downward adjustments) for a large or highly complex institution that elects to participate in and complete both the VDR and data access components. 98 As of December 2025, 45 large or highly complex institutions received an unsecured debt adjustment under the baseline. For such institutions, participation in the VDR and data access components may change their preferences for the funding mix.

98 For a large or highly complex institutions that receives the downward resolution readiness adjustment under the proposal, the unsecured debt adjustment is limited to the lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent of the bank's initial base assessment rate less any applicable RRA.

The proposal would revise the assessment rate schedules for large and highly complex institutions when the designated reserve ratio reaches its statutorily mandated level of 2 percent. The revised assessment rates would maintain the adjustments for institutions participating in the VDR and data access components and for

ticipating in the VDR and data access components and for

Finally, any additional costs that institutions incur after electing to complete both the resolution readiness components may not have significant adverse impacts on the provision of banking services such as originating and servicing loans, processing payments, or various financial market activities that the institutions may be involved in. This analysis illustrates that estimated reporting costs in future years would constitute less than half a percent of current noninterest expenses 99 for all large and highly complex institutions.

99 FDIC Call Report data as of March 31, 2025 through December 31, 2025, reported as of February 16, 2026.

Overall, the FDIC expects that institutions that elect to participate would likely not do so if they determine the costs to be significantly greater than the benefits.

D. Effects on the Deposit Insurance Fund and Safety and Soundness

While the estimated reductions in assessments under the proposal would result in a reduced DIF balance relative to the baseline, as described previously, the FDIC expects a reduction in the losses to the DIF in the event of the failure of a large or highly complex institution that would elect to participate and complete the resolution readiness components. The reclassification of some institutions under the proposal from large to small would focus the overall assessment framework on the most salient aspects of an institution's risk profile. This focus would promote institutions' safety and soundness while reducing assessment burden and enabling additional economic activity.

E. Conclusion

The proposal, if finalized, would provide meaningful economic relief to IDIs through lower assessment rates. The proposal would lower the assessment rate by 2 basis points for small institutions and 1 basis point for large and highly complex institutions

highly complex institution, which would mitigate the reduced DIF revenue growth. As described previously, participating institutions could experience voluntary reporting burdens (constituting less than half a percent of their aggregate total noninterest expenses). Such institutions could also incur regulatory burdens to transition their internal systems and processes, which are likely to be small. The FDIC expects that institutions that elect to participate would likely not do so if they determine the costs to be greater than the benefits.

Proposed technical changes to 12 CFR 327 and removal of unnecessary or obsolete provisions would also provide benefits to the banking industry and the public through increased clarity and improved ease of references.

Given the effects described above, the FDIC expects the benefits of the proposal to justify its costs. The FDIC invites comments on this analysis. The FDIC is particularly interested in comments on any material economic effects that the agency has not identified.

IX. Request for Comment

In addition to its request for comment on specific parts of the proposal, the FDIC seeks comment on all aspects of this proposed rulemaking.

Elements of the proposal, including the proposed reduction in initial base assessment rate schedules and the update to the $10 billion asset threshold in the definitions of small and large institutions to $30 billion, would address comments received from the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA) public notices. 100

wth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996 (EGRPRA) public notices. 100

100 The EGRPRA requires that regulations prescribed by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System be reviewed by the agencies not less frequently than once every 10 years. The purpose of the EGRPRA review is to identify outdated or unnecessary regulations and consider how to reduce regulatory burden on insured depository institutions while, at the same time, ensuring their safety and soundness and the safety and soundness of the financial system. Public Law 104-208, Div. A, Title II, section 2222, 110 Stat. 3009-414 (1996) (codified at 12 U.S.C. 3311). See also Regulatory Publication and Review Under the Economic Growth and Regulatory Paperwork Reduction Act of 1996, 90 FR 35241 (Jul. 25, 2025).

X. Regulatory Analysis

A. Paperwork Reduction Act

This notice of proposed rulemaking has been reviewed for compliance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA) (44 U.S.C. 3501 et seq. ). In accordance with the PRA, the FDIC may not conduct or sponsor, and an organization is not required to respond to, an information collection unless the information collection displays a currently valid Office of Management and Budget (OMB) control number. The FDIC has reviewed the notice of proposed rulemaking and determined that it would introduce new information collection requirements pursuant to the PRA and necessitate clarification of the instructions to reporting for depository institutions.

The FDIC is seeking a new control number for these information collection requirements and will submit them to OMB for review and approval.

Proposed Information Collection

Title: Resolution Readiness Adjustments.

OMB Control No.: 3064-NEW.

Type of Review: Regular.

Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit

clarification of the instructions to reporting for depository institutions.

The FDIC is seeking a new control number for these information collection requirements and will submit them to OMB for review and approval.

Proposed Information Collection

Title: Resolution Readiness Adjustments.

OMB Control No.: 3064-NEW.

Type of Review: Regular.

Affected Public: Businesses or other for-profit.

Description: Among other things, the proposal would provide a downward resolution readiness adjustment to assessment rates for large and highly complex institutions, including 0.5 basis points for passing virtual data room testing and 0.5 basis points for providing the prescribed data access. The information collection requirements in the proposed rule are as follows:

Section 327.18(d) would allow a large or highly complex financial institution to submit to the FDIC a notice of election to participate in the resolution readiness adjustment.

Section 327.18(e) would allow a large or highly complex financial institution

Section 327.18(f) would allow a large or highly complex financial institution to submit to the FDIC information relating to the data access capabilities test.

Section 327.18(f)(3)(i) would allow a large or highly complex financial institution to submit to the FDIC information relating to a material change notice.

BILLING CODE 6714-01-P EP30JN26.079

EP30JN26.080

BILLING CODE 6714-01-C This final rule will also necessitate clarifications of the instructions to reporting for depository institutions. The FDIC will coordinate with the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency and Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, under the auspices of the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC), to separately address such clarifications to the instructions to the Consolidated Reports of Condition and Income (Call Report) (FFIEC 031, FFIEC 041, and FFIEC 051; OMB Nos. 1557-0081; 3064 0052, and 7100-0036).

Comments are invited on:

Section 722 of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act 108 requires the Federal banking agencies to use plain language in all proposed and final rulemakings published in the Federal Register after January 1, 2000. The FDIC invites your comments on how to make this proposed rule easier to understand, including the following:

108 Public Law 106-102, section 722, 113 Stat. 1338, 1471 (1999), 12 U.S.C. 4809.

• Has the FDIC organized the material to suit your needs? If not, how could the proposed rule be more clearly stated?

• Are the requirements in the proposed rule clearly stated? If not, how could the proposed rule be more clearly stated?

• Does the proposed rule contain language or jargon that is not clear? If so, which language requires clarification?

• Would a different format (grouping and order of sections, use of headings, paragraphing) make the proposed rule easier to understand? If so, what changes to the format would make the proposed rule easier to understand?

• What else could the FDIC do to make the proposed rule easier to understand?

E. Executive Orders 12866, 13563, and 14192

Executive Order 12866 directs agencies to assess the costs and benefits of available regulatory alternatives and, if regulation is necessary, to select regulatory approaches that maximize net benefits. This proposed rule was drafted and reviewed in accordance with Executive Order 12866. Within OMB, the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA) has determined that this rulemaking is a “significant regulatory action” under section 3(f)(1) of Executive Order 12866. Accordingly, the draft rule was submitted to OIRA for review. As noted in other sections of the SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION of this document, the FDIC has assessed the costs and benefits of this rulemaking and has made a reasoned determination that the benefits of this rulemaking justify its costs. Executive Order 14192, titled “Unleashing Prosperity Through Deregulation,” was issued on January 31, 2025

2) Transition from small to large institution. If an institution classified as small under paragraph (e) of this section reports total assets of $30 billion or more in its quarterly reports of condition for four consecutive quarters after [effective date of final rule], excluding assets as described in § 327.17(e), the FDIC will reclassify the institution as large beginning the following quarter.

(g) Highly complex institution.

(1) * * *

(2) Control has the same meaning as in section 3(w)(5) of the FDI Act. A U.S. parent holding company is a parent holding company incorporated or organized under the laws of the United States or any State, as the term “State” is defined in section 3(a)(3) of the FDI Act. If, after December 31, 2010, an institution classified as highly complex under paragraph (g)(1)(i) of this section falls below $50 billion in total assets in its quarterly reports of condition for four consecutive quarters, or its parent holding company or companies fall below $500 billion in total assets for four consecutive quarters, the FDIC will reclassify the institution beginning the following quarter. If, after December 31, 2010, an institution classified as highly complex under paragraph (g)(1)(ii) of this section falls below $10 billion in total assets for four consecutive quarters, the FDIC will reclassify the institution beginning the following quarter.

4. Amend § 327.10 by revising paragraphs (a) through (e) to read as follows:

§ 327.10 Assessment rate schedules. (a) Assessment rate schedules for established small institutions and large and highly complex institutions applicable in the first assessment period after December 31, 2022, and in all subsequent assessment periods through the assessment period ending [the quarter prior to the quarter during which a final rule becomes effective], where the reserve ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior assessment period is less than 2 percent.

ercent, the total base assessment rates after adjustments for established small institutions and large and highly complex institutions, except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, shall be as prescribed in the schedule in the following table:

Table 2 to Paragraph ( a )(2) Introductory Text—Total Base Assessment Rate Schedule (After Adjustments) 1 Beginning the First Assessment Period After December 31, 2022, and for All Subsequent Assessment Periods Through the Assessment Period Ending [the Quarter Prior to the Quarter During Which a Final Rule Becomes Effective], Where the Reserve Ratio as of the End of the Prior Assessment Period Is Less Than 2 Percent 2 Established small institutions CAMELS composite 1 or 2 3 4 or 5 Large & highly complex institutions Initial Base Assessment Rate 5 to 18 8 to 32 18 to 32 5 to 32 Unsecured Debt Adjustment −5 to 0 −5 to 0 −5 to 0 −5 to 0 Brokered Deposit Adjustment N/A N/A N/A 0 to 10 Total Base Assessment Rate 2.5 to 18 4 to 32 13 to 32 2.5 to 42 1 The depository institution debt adjustment, which is not included in the table, can increase total base assessment rates above the maximum assessment rates shown in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. (i) CAMELS composite 1- and 2-rated established small institutions total base assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all established small institutions with a CAMELS composite rating of 1 or 2 shall range from 2.5 to 18 basis points.

(ii) CAMELS composite 3-rated established small institutions total base assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all established small institutions with a CAMELS composite rating of 3 shall range from 4 to 32 basis points.

tal base assessment rates for all established small institutions with a CAMELS composite rating of 1 or 2 shall range from 2.5 to 18 basis points.

(iii) CAMELS composite 4- and 5-rated established small institutions total base assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all established small institutions with a CAMELS composite rating of 4 or 5 shall range from 13 to 32 basis points.

(iv) Large and highly complex institutions total base assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all large and highly complex institutions shall range from 2.5 to 42 basis points.

(b) Assessment rate schedules for established small institutions and large and highly complex institutions beginning [the quarter in which a final rule becomes effective], where the reserve ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior assessment period is less than 2 percent.

(1) Initial base assessment rate schedule for established small institutions and large and highly complex institutions. Beginning [the quarter in which a final rule becomes effective], where the reserve ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior assessment period is less than 2 percent, the initial base assessment rate for established small institutions and large and highly complex institutions, except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, shall be the rate prescribed in the schedule in the following table:

dule in the following table:

Table 3 to Paragraph ( b )(1) Introductory Text—Initial Base Assessment Rate Schedule Beginning [the Quarter in Which a Final Rule Becomes Effective], Where the Reserve Ratio as of the End of the Prior Assessment Period Is Less Than 2 Percent 1 Established small institutions CAMELS composite 1 or 2 3 4 or 5 Large & highly complex institutions Initial Base Assessment Rate 3 to 16 6 to 30 16 to 30 4 to 31 1 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Initial base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. (i) CAMELS composite 1- and 2-rated established small institutions initial base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial base assessment rates for all established small institutions with a CAMELS composite rating of 1 or 2 shall range from 3 to 16 basis points.

(ii) CAMELS composite 3-rated established small institutions initial base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial base assessment rates for all established small institutions with a CAMELS composite rating of 3 shall range from 6 to 30 basis points.

(iii) CAMELS composite 4- and 5-rated established small institutions initial base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial base assessment rates for all established small institutions with a CAMELS composite rating of 4 or 5 shall range from 16 to 30 basis points.

(iv) Large and highly complex institutions initial base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial base assessment rates for all large and highly complex institutions shall range from 4 to 31 basis points.

han 2 Percent But Less Than 2.5 Percent 1 Established small institutions CAMELS composite 1 or 2 3 4 or 5 Large & highly complex institutions Initial Base Assessment Rate 2 to 14 5 to 28 14 to 28 3 to 29 1 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Initial base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. (i) * * *

(ii) * * *

(iii) * * *

(2) * * *

Table 6 to Paragraph ( c )(2) Introductory Text—Total Base Assessment Rate Schedule (After Adjustments) 1 If the Reserve Ratio as of the End of the Prior Assessment Period Is Equal To or Greater Than 2 Percent but Less Than 2.5 Percent 2 Established small institutions CAMELS composite 1 or 2 3 4 or 5 Large & highly complex institutions Initial Base Assessment Rate 2 to 14 5 to 28 14 to 28 3 to 29 Resolution Readiness Adjustment N/A N/A N/A −1 to 0 Unsecured Debt Adjustment −5 to 0 −5 to 0 −5 to 0 −5 to 0 Brokered Deposit Adjustment N/A N/A N/A 0 to 10 Total Base Assessment Rate 1 to 14 2.5 to 28 9 to 28 1 to 39 1 The depository institution debt adjustment, which is not included in the table, can increase total base assessment rates above the maximum assessment rates shown in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. (i) * * *

(ii) * * *

(iii) * * *

to 31 32 to 42 1 The depository institution debt adjustment, which is not included in the table, can increase total base assessment rates above the maximum assessment rates shown in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. (1) Risk category I total assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category I shall be 9 basis points.

(2) Risk category II total assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category II shall range from 14 to 24 basis points.

(3) Risk category III total assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category III shall range from 21 to 31 basis points.

(4) Risk category IV total assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category IV shall range from 32 to 42 basis points.

(iv) Assessment rate schedules for new small institutions beginning the [quarter in which a final rule becomes effective ] and for all subsequent assessment periods —

(A) Initial base assessment rate schedule for new small institutions. Beginning in [the quarter in which a final rule becomes effective] and for all subsequent assessment periods, the initial base assessment rate for a new small institution shall be the rate prescribed in the schedule in the following table, even if the reserve ratio equals or exceeds 2 percent or 2.5 percent:

Table 11 to Paragraph (e)(1)(iv)(A) Introductory Text—Initial Base Assessment Rate Schedule Beginning the First Assessment Period [in the Quarter in Which a Final Rule Becomes Effective] and for All Subsequent Assessment Periods 1 Risk Category I Risk Category II Risk Category III Risk Category IV Initial Assessment Rate 7 12 19 30 1 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. ( 1 ) Risk category I initial base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category I shall be 7 basis points.

( 2 ) Risk category II, III, and IV initial base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Categories II, III, and IV shall be 12, 19, and 30 basis points, respectively.

(B) Total base assessment rate schedule for new small institutions. Beginning in [the quarter in which a final rule becomes effective] and for all subsequent assessment periods, the total base assessment rates after adjustments for a new small institution shall be the rate prescribed in the schedule in the following table, even if the reserve ratio equals or exceeds 2 percent or 2.5 percent:

Table 12 to Paragraph (e)(1)(iv)(B) Introductory Text—Total Base Assessment Rate Schedule (After Adjustments) 1 Beginning [the Quarter in Which a Final Rule Becomes Effective] and for All Subsequent Assessment Periods 2 Risk Category I Risk Category II Risk Category III Risk Category IV Initial Assessment Rate 7 12 19 30 Brokered Deposit Adjustment (added) N/A 0 to 10 0 to 10 0 to 10 Total Base Assessment Rate 7 12 to 22 19 to 29 30 to 40 1 The depository institution debt adjustment, which is not included in the table, can increase total base assessment rates above the maximum assessment rates shown in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. ( 1 ) Risk category I total assessment rate schedule

29 30 to 40 1 The depository institution debt adjustment, which is not included in the table, can increase total base assessment rates above the maximum assessment rates shown in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. ( 1 ) Risk category I total assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category I shall be 7 basis points.

( 2 ) Risk category II total assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category II shall range from 12 to 22 basis points.

( 3 ) Risk category III total assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category III shall range from 19 to 29 basis points.

( 4 ) Risk category IV total assessment rate schedule. The annual total base assessment rates for all new small institutions in Risk Category IV shall range from 30 to 40 basis points.

(2) Insured branches of foreign banks—

all range from 30 to 40 basis points.

(2) Insured branches of foreign banks—

(i) Beginning the first assessment period after December 31, 2022, and for all subsequent assessment periods through the assessment period ending [ the quarter prior to the quarter during which a final rule becomes effective ], where the reserve ratio as of the end of the prior assessment period is less than 2 percent. In the first assessment period after December 31, 2022, and for all subsequent assessment periods through the assessment period ending [the quarter prior to the quarter during which a final rule becomes effective], where the reserve ratio as of the end of the prior assessment period is less than 2 percent, the initial and total base assessment rates for an insured branch of a foreign bank, except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, shall be the rate prescribed in the schedule in the following table:

Table 13 to Paragraph (e)(2)(i) Introductory Text—Initial and Total Base Assessment Rate Schedule 1 Beginning the First Assessment Period After December 31, 2022, and for All Subsequent Assessment Periods Through the Assessment Period Ending [the Quarter Prior to the Quarter During Which a Final Rule Becomes Effective], Where the Reserve Ratio as of the End of the Prior Assessment Period Is Less Than 2 Percent 2 Risk Category I Risk Category II Risk Category III Risk Category IV Initial and Total Assessment Rate 5 to 9 14 21 32 1 The depository institution debt adjustment, which is not included in the table, can increase total base assessment rates above the maximum assessment rates shown in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Initial and total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. (A) Risk category I initial and total base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial and total base assessment rates for an insured branch of a foreign bank in Risk Category I shall range from 5 to 9 basis points

n in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Initial and total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. (A) Risk category I initial and total base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial and total base assessment rates for an insured branch of a foreign bank in Risk Category I shall range from 5 to 9 basis points.

(B) Risk category II, III, and IV initial and total base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial and total base assessment rates for Risk Categories II, III, and IV shall be 14, 21, and 32 basis points, respectively.

(ii) Assessment rate schedule for insured branches of foreign banks beginning [the quarter in which a final rule becomes effective ], where the reserve ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior assessment period is less than 2 percent. Beginning [the quarter in which a final rule becomes effective], where the reserve ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior assessment period is less than 2 percent, the initial and total base assessment rates for an insured branch of a foreign bank, except as provided in paragraph (f) of this section, shall be the rate prescribed in the schedule in the following table:

Table 14 to Paragraph (e)(2)(ii) Introductory Text—Initial and Total Base Assessment Rate Schedule 1 Beginning [the Quarter in Which a Final Rule Becomes Effective], Where the Reserve Ratio as of the End of the Prior Assessment Period is Less Than 2 Percent 2 Risk category I Risk category II Risk category III Risk category IV Initial and Total Assessment Rate 3 to 7 12 19 30 1 The depository institution debt adjustment, which is not included in the table, can increase total base assessment rates above the maximum assessment rates shown in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Initial and total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates

y IV Initial and Total Assessment Rate 3 to 7 12 19 30 1 The depository institution debt adjustment, which is not included in the table, can increase total base assessment rates above the maximum assessment rates shown in the table. 2 All amounts for all risk categories are in basis points annually. Initial and total base rates that are not the minimum or maximum rate will vary between these rates. (A) Risk category I initial and total base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial and total base assessment rates for an insured branch of a foreign bank in Risk Category I shall range from 3 to 7 basis points.

(B) Risk category II, III, and IV initial and total base assessment rate schedule. The annual initial and total base assessment rates for Risk Categories II, III, and IV shall be 12, 19, and 30 basis points, respectively.

5. Revise § 327.11 to read as follows:

§ 327.11 Assessments thresholds indexing. (a) Methodology. The dollar thresholds specified in paragraph (c) of this section shall be adjusted by multiplying the baseline threshold value for the thresholds specified in paragraph (c) of this section by one plus the cumulative percent change in the non-seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, measured from [the effective date of this rule], as further described in paragraph (b) of this section, and shall be rounded in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.

aseline threshold value for the thresholds specified in paragraph (c) of this section by one plus the cumulative percent change in the non-seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers, measured from [the effective date of this rule], as further described in paragraph (b) of this section, and shall be rounded in accordance with paragraph (d) of this section.

(b) Frequency —

(1) In general. Except as otherwise provided in paragraph (b)(2) or (3) of this section, the adjustments described in paragraph (a) of this section shall be effective on October 1 following each consecutive four-year period ending August 31, and using the non-seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers as of August 31 of that year.

(2) First adjustment. The first adjustment described in paragraph (a) of this section, which shall be effective on October 1, 2029, shall be made using one plus the cumulative percent change in the non-seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers through August 31, 2029.

(3) Periods of negative inflation. Notwithstanding paragraph (b)(1) or (2) of this section, if an adjustment of dollar thresholds using the cumulative percent change of the non-seasonally adjusted Consumer Price Index for Urban Wage Earners and Clerical Workers from the effective date of this rule or the most recent adjustment, as applicable, would not result in an increase from the current dollar thresholds, no adjustment will be made pursuant to paragraph (a) of this section.

(c) Specified thresholds. The thresholds in the following sections shall be adjusted in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section:

(1) § 327.8(e), baseline threshold value $30 billion as of October 1, 2029; and

(2) § 327.8(f), baseline threshold value $30 billion as of October 1, 2029;

(d) Rounding. When adjusting thresholds under this section, each threshold shall be rounded to the nearest number with two significant digits.

in the following sections shall be adjusted in accordance with paragraph (a) of this section:

(1) § 327.8(e), baseline threshold value $30 billion as of October 1, 2029; and

(2) § 327.8(f), baseline threshold value $30 billion as of October 1, 2029;

(d) Rounding. When adjusting thresholds under this section, each threshold shall be rounded to the nearest number with two significant digits.

(e) Effective date of threshold adjustments. The FDIC shall announce the thresholds adjusted in accordance with this section by publishing in the Federal Register a final rule without notice and comment. Such adjusted thresholds shall be effective on October 1 of the year during which an adjustment is made.

(f) Failure to publish final rule in Federal Register . In the event, for any reason, a final rule is not published in the Federal Register in a year in which an adjustment is made under this section, the thresholds specified in paragraph (c) of this section will adjust as provided in this section and be effective on October 1, notwithstanding the lack of a final rule published in the Federal Register .

§ 327.12 [Removed and Reserved]

6. Remove and reserve § 327.12.

7. Amend § 327.16 as follows:

a. Revise paragraphs (a)(1)(i) and (d)(4)(ii);

b. Revise paragraph (e)(1)(ii);

c. Add new paragraph (e)(4); and

d. Remove and reserve paragraph (f).

The revisions and additions read as follows:

§ 327.16 Assessment pricing methods—beginning the first assessment period after June 30, 2016, where the reserve ratio of the DIF as of the end of the prior assessment period has reached or exceeded 1.15 percent.

(a) * * *

(1) * * *

(ii);

b. Revise paragraph (e)(1)(ii);

c. Add new paragraph (e)(4); and

d. Remove and reserve paragraph (f).

The revisions and additions read as follows:

(a) * * *

(1) * * *

(i) Uniform amount. Except as adjusted for the actual assessment rates set by the Board under § 327.10(f), the uniform amount shall be:

(A) 9.352 whenever the assessment rate schedule set forth in § 327.10(a) is in effect;

(B) 7.352 whenever the assessment rate schedule set forth in § 327.10(b) is in effect;

(D) 4.870 whenever the assessment rate schedule set forth in § 327.10(d) is in effect.

(d) * * *

(4) * * *

(ii) Uniform amount. Except as adjusted for the actual assessment rates set by the Board under § 327.10(f), the uniform amount for all insured branches of foreign banks shall be:

(A) −3.127 whenever the assessment rate schedule set forth in § 327.10(a) is in effect;

(B) −5.127 whenever the assessment rate schedule set forth in § 327.10(b) is in effect;

(D) −7.127 whenever the assessment rate schedule set forth in § 327.10(d) is in effect.

(e) * * *

(1) * * *

(ii) Limitation. No unsecured debt adjustment for any institution shall exceed the lesser of 5 basis points or 50 percent of the institution's initial base assessment rate less any applicable resolution readiness adjustment.

(iii) * * *

(2) * * *

(3) * * *

(4) Resolution readiness adjustment. All large institutions and all highly complex institutions (including new large and new highly complex institutions) shall be subject to the resolution readiness adjustment under § 327.18.

f 5 basis points or 50 percent of the institution's initial base assessment rate less any applicable resolution readiness adjustment.

(iii) * * *

(2) * * *

(3) * * *

(f) [Reserved]

8. Amend § 327.17(e) by removing the last sentence starting with the word “Any” and ending with “§ 327.16(f).”

9. Add § 327.18 to read as follows:

§ 327.18 Resolution Readiness Adjustment for Large Institutions and Highly Complex Institutions. (a) Scope. This section applies to all large institutions as defined in § 327.8(f) and all highly complex institutions as defined in § 327.8(g).

(b) Definitions.

(1) Data access adjustment means a 0.5 basis point downward adjustment applied to a large or highly complex institution's initial base assessment rate.

(2) Key depositors means an institution's depositors that hold or control the largest deposits (whether in one account or multiple accounts) that collectively are material to one or more business segments.

(3) Key personnel has the same meaning as in § 360.10(b) of this chapter, regardless of whether an institution is subject to § 360.10 of this chapter.

(4) Material entity has the same meaning as in § 360.10(b) of this chapter, regardless of whether an

(5) Resolution readiness adjustment means the sum of the virtual data room adjustment and the data access adjustment.

(6) Virtual data room means an online repository where information pertinent to a sale or disposition of an institution is maintained in a secure and confidential manner to facilitate, whether by the institution or the FDIC, such sale or disposition to one or more third-party acquirers.

(7) Virtual data room adjustment means a 0.5 basis point downward adjustment applied to a large or highly complex institution's initial base assessment rate.

where information pertinent to a sale or disposition of an institution is maintained in a secure and confidential manner to facilitate, whether by the institution or the FDIC, such sale or disposition to one or more third-party acquirers.

(7) Virtual data room adjustment means a 0.5 basis point downward adjustment applied to a large or highly complex institution's initial base assessment rate.

(c) Resolution readiness adjustment. The FDIC will apply an adjustment to a large or highly complex institution's initial base assessment rate under § 327.10 as provided in this section.

(d) Electing to participate in resolution readiness adjustment.

(1) A large or highly complex institution may submit to the FDIC a notice of election to participate in the resolution readiness adjustment. In the notice, an institution may elect to participate in the virtual data room component by providing the information described in paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section, the data access component by providing the information described in paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section, or both. An institution may submit a notice for each component at different times.

(2) A notice of election must contain the following:

(i) To elect the virtual data room component:

(A) Electing institution's name, charter/certificate number, and mailing address;

(B) Contact person including name, title, employer, mailing address, email address, and telephone number;

(C) Agreement that the institution will participate in a test of the institution's capabilities to populate a virtual data room as provided by paragraph (e)(2) of this section;

(D) Acknowledgment that any costs required to obtain needed data, information, and other materials to participate in the test under paragraph (e)(2) of this section and to provide and facilitate access to data, documents, and other materials specified by paragraph (e)(1) of this section will be borne by the institution; and

(E) A list of key personnel (including those employed by third parties) needed to suppor

nt that any costs required to obtain needed data, information, and other materials to participate in the test under paragraph (e)(2) of this section and to provide and facilitate access to data, documents, and other materials specified by paragraph (e)(1) of this section will be borne by the institution; and

(E) A list of key personnel (including those employed by third parties) needed to support the institution's efforts to participate in a test of its capabilities to populate a virtual data room as provided by paragraph (e)(2) of this section.

(ii) To elect the data access component:

(A) Agreement to provide and facilitate access to data, documents, and other materials specified in paragraph (f)(1) of this section, including that the institution authorizes the FDIC to communicate with and request such data, information, and other materials from third-party vendors;

(B) Acknowledgment that any costs required to obtain needed data, information, and other materials to participate in the engagement under paragraph (f)(2) of this section and to provide and facilitate access to data, documents, and other materials specified by paragraph (f)(1) of this section will be borne by the institution;

(C) Certification that the institution may be liable for an assessment reimbursement under paragraph (f)(4) of this section;

(D) A complete list of all systems and applications maintained by the institution that serve as core data processors for deposit and loan data and the institution's general ledger;

(E) A complete list of all systems and applications maintained by third-party vendors that serve as core data processors for deposit and loan data and the institution's general ledger; and

(F) A list of key personnel (including those employed by third-party vendors) needed to support and operate each system and application identified pursuant to paragraphs (d)(2)(ii)(D) and (E) of this section identified by name, title, employer, telephone number, and email address.

arty vendors that serve as core data processors for deposit and loan data and the institution's general ledger; and

(3) Timing of election and effect of electing to participate in data access component.

(i) An institution that submits a notice of election for the data access component within 30 days of [the effective date of rule], will receive the data access adjustment beginning the next quarterly assessment period.

(ii) An institution that is a large or highly complex institution on [the effective date of rule] but does not submit a notice of election for the data access component within 30 days of [the effective date of rule] may submit a notice within [four years of the effective date of rule] and will receive the data access adjustment beginning two quarterly assessment periods after submission.

(iii) An institution that becomes a large or highly complex institution after [the effective date of rule] that submits a notice of election for the data access component will receive the data access adjustment beginning the quarterly assessment period after submitting the notice of election.

(iv) An institution that is large or highly complex as of [the effective date of the rule] that submits a notice of election for the data access component after the date that is four years after [the effective date of the rule] will receive the data access adjustment beginning the quarterly assessment period after submitting a notice of election.

and licensing and regulatory information for each material entity;

(vii) A list of key personnel identified by title, function, physical location, employing legal entity, and business line or business segment the individual supports, and if an individual is dual hatted;

(viii) A list of material third-party contracts and a description of what services or business lines each contract supports;

(ix) Recent internal risk management reports, including assessments concerning key financial and regulatory risks; and

(x) Other information that the institution believes is necessary to facilitate a rapid and effective due diligence process for the sale of the institution, as well as data or information requested by the FDIC in a notice described in paragraph (e)(2) of this section.

(2) Testing component: process.

(i) After an institution submits a notice of election pursuant to paragraph (d)(2)(i) of this section, the FDIC will notify the institution when the institution will participate in a test of its capabilities to populate a virtual data room hosted by the FDIC with data, information, and other materials specified by paragraph (e)(1) of this section. The FDIC may notify the institution that it need not populate a data room with certain data, information, or other materials specified by paragraph (e)(1) of this section.

(ii) The FDIC will provide written notice of an institution's date for a virtual data room capabilities test no less than four weeks before the test date. Upon providing such written notice, the FDIC can adjust the test date to a date that provides the institution a reasonable amount of notice.

(3) Testing component: evaluation criteria and notice of test results.

raph (e)(1) of this section.

(3) Testing component: evaluation criteria and notice of test results.

(i) The institution will be deemed to have demonstrated its capabilities to populate a virtual data room if:

(A) All data, information, and other materials specified by paragraph (e)(1) of this section are uploaded to the virtual data room specified by the FDIC no later than 48 hours after the test begins;

(B) The FDIC, after conducting a review and examination of the virtual data room, determines that the data, information, and other materials uploaded are sufficient for a potential bidder to conduct adequate due diligence to inform a potential bid. Among other things, the financial information in materials specified in paragraph (e)(1)(i) of this section should be reconcilable against the general ledger; and

(C) The institution provides the FDIC such information and access to such personnel of the institution as the FDIC in its sole discretion determines is relevant to properly evaluate the data, information, and other materials uploaded to the virtual data room specified by the FDIC, if needed.

(ii) Within an amount of time determined by the FDIC to be commensurate with the nature of the data, information, and other materials provided pursuant to paragraph (e)(1) of this section, the FDIC will notify the institution in writing concerning the results of the test

Application of virtual data room adjustment. The FDIC will apply the virtual data room adjustment beginning the next quarterly assessment period after the institution receives written notice under paragraph (e)(3)(ii)(A) of this section, but in no event will the FDIC apply the virtual data room adjustment earlier than the end of the 12 month period following the [effective date of this section].

(ii) Retesting. The institution will be subject to periodic retesting by the FDIC of the institution's capabilities to populate a virtual data room with data, information, and other materials specified by paragraph (e)(1) of this section. The processes in paragraphs (e)(2) and (3) of this section will apply to such retesting. Retesting following a successful test will occur every three years, unless the institution experiences a material change that could impact its ability to populate a data room, such as undergoing a merger, which may result in retesting sooner, or unless the FDIC extends the timeframe at its discretion. If the institution declines to participate in retesting, the virtual data room adjustment will be removed the next quarterly assessment period.

(f) Data access capabilities.

(1) Required data access. After submitting its notice of election pursuant to paragraph (d)(2)(ii) of this section, the institution must provide, or facilitate the provision to the FDIC of, the following:

(i) The institution's consolidated and unconsolidated ledger;

(ii) Core data regarding the institution's deposit portfolio, including:

(A) Depositor and beneficiary information;

(B) Deposit account title;

(D) Deposit account balances, including principal and accrued interest;

(E) Deposit account status;

(F) Deposit account rate terms; and

(G) Any other information about material characteristics of deposits;

be removed the next quarterly assessment period, and that the institution will be subject to reimbursement under paragraph (f)(4) of this section.

(iv) The FDIC will provide the institution written notice upon completion of the engagement specified in this paragraph (f)(2).

(3) Ongoing data access. Upon an institution receiving written notice pursuant to paragraph (f)(2)(iv) of this section:

(i) Notice of material change. If an institution experiences a change in any internal data system or data service provider that would materially affect the institution's ability to provide or facilitate the provision of access to the FDIC of data, information, or other materials specified in paragraph (f)(1) of this section, the institution must provide the FDIC a written notice of material change within 30 days. The notice of material change must explain the nature of the change, and how it affects the institution's ability to provide or facilitate the provision of access of such data, information, or other materials. If an institution does not submit a notice when required to under this paragraph, the FDIC may provide written notice that the institution is not eligible for the data access adjustment, that the adjustment will be removed the next quarterly assessment period, and that the institution is be liable for reimbursement pursuant to paragraph (f)(4) of this section if multiple quarterly assessment periods have elapsed since the material change occurred.

ired to under this paragraph, the FDIC may provide written notice that the institution is not eligible for the data access adjustment, that the adjustment will be removed the next quarterly assessment period, and that the institution is be liable for reimbursement pursuant to paragraph (f)(4) of this section if multiple quarterly assessment periods have elapsed since the material change occurred.

(ii) Reengagement. The institution will be subject to periodic reengagement with the FDIC to provide or facilitate the provision of access to data, information, and other materials specified in paragraph (f)(1) of this section. The processes in paragraph (f)(2) of this section will apply to such reengagement. Reengagement will occur every seven years, unless there is a material change, which may result in reengagement occurring sooner, or unless the FDIC extends the timeline at its discretion. If the institution declines to participate in reengagement, the data access adjustment will be removed the next quarterly assessment period.

(4) Assessments reimbursement for receiving data access adjustment without providing data access. If the FDIC has applied the data access adjustment to an institution that subsequently receives notice under paragraph (d)(3)(v) of this section or paragraphs (f)(2)(ii), (f)(2)(iii), or (f)(3)(i) of this section that it is required to provide the FDIC reimbursement pursuant to this paragraph (f)(4), the institution will be required to provide reimbursement beginning the next quarterly assessment period. The FDIC will notify the institution, in writing, that it is subject to such reimbursement.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.