Collection and Use of Biometrics by U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services

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Federal Register › Vol. 90 › 90 FR 49062

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October 27, 2025, CBP published the final rule, “Collection of Biometric Data from Aliens Upon Entry to and Departure from the United States,” 90 FR 48604 (Oct. 27, 2025) (CBP Final Rule). DHS considered the CBP Final Rule during the drafting of this NPRM and notes that the CBP Final Rule specifically amends DHS regulations relating to aliens' photographs when entering or exiting the United States. While the CBP Final Rule states that exemptions in current biometrics collections based on age ( i.e., under 14 and over 79) will continue to apply to biometrics other than facial images, 90 FR at 48609, DHS is now proposing to amend such exemptions for the reasons stated throughout this rule.Found 1 occurrence(s) in 1 file(s)

4 In this notice, the terms “benefit request” or “other request” or “collection of information” refers to all requests processed by USCIS, including those that do not meet the definition of “benefit request” at 8 CFR 1.2 (“any application, petition, motion, appeal, or other request relating to an immigration or naturalization benefit”). For example, deferred action is solely an exercise of prosecutorial discretion by DHS, whereby an alien can request that DHS defer removal action for a certain period of time, and not an immigration benefit. Accordingly, a request for deferred action is not a “benefit request,” but is instead a request processed by USCIS.

DHS is precluded in many cases from approving, granting, or providing immigration benefits to individuals with a record of certain criminal offenses or administrative violations, or who may pose risks to national security or public safety. Criminal histories are relevant because they are used to determine eligibility for immigration benefits and are part of the totality of the circumstances that USCIS considers when making a discretionary determination. Therefore, DHS must include national security considerations and criminal history background checks in its adjudications

or who may pose risks to national security or public safety. Criminal histories are relevant because they are used to determine eligibility for immigration benefits and are part of the totality of the circumstances that USCIS considers when making a discretionary determination. Therefore, DHS must include national security considerations and criminal history background checks in its adjudications. Several statutes authorize DHS to conduct biometrics collections in relation to national security and public safety purposes, as well as for document production. 5 Additionally, DHS is authorized to collect the biometrics of U.S. citizen and lawful permanent resident petitioners of family-based immigrant and nonimmigrant fiancé(e) petitions to determine if a petitioner has been convicted of certain crimes. Therefore, DHS requires a robust system for biometrics collection, storage, and use related to adjudicating immigration benefits and other requests and performing other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws.

5 See section III.A. of this preamble for a detailed description of DHS's statutory authorities to collect biometrics.

Current regulations also provide general authorities for the collection of biometrics in connection with administering immigration and naturalization benefits requests and in connection with administering and enforcing immigration laws. For example, any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or individual filing a benefit request, other request, or collection of information request may be required to appear for biometrics collection. See 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9). DHS currently has authority to require an individual to submit biometric information to conduct background and security checks and perform other functions related to administering and enforcing immigration laws. See 8 CFR 103.16(a)

or individual filing a benefit request, other request, or collection of information request may be required to appear for biometrics collection. See 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9). DHS currently has authority to require an individual to submit biometric information to conduct background and security checks and perform other functions related to administering and enforcing immigration laws. See 8 CFR 103.16(a).

The immigration benefit request adjudication process requires DHS to verify the identity of an individual applying for or seeking to receive any benefit and requires that national security and criminal history background checks be conducted to determine if such an individual is statutorily eligible for the benefit. In general, adjudication of an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information includes a review of the individual's current immigration status, current and past immigration filings, and whether previous benefits were granted or denied. Immigration laws preclude DHS from granting many immigration and naturalization benefits to individuals with certain criminal or administrative violations, or with certain disqualifying characteristics, while also providing DHS discretion in granting an immigration benefit in many instances. DHS conducts checks to determine if an individual has a history that could render him or her inadmissible or removable, including a criminal record or association or involvement with human rights violations or terrorist activities or organizations. The current DHS biometric collection process for adjudication of immigration benefit requests or other requests or collections of information often begins with the collection of an individual's photograph, fingerprints, and signature at an authorized biometrics collection site. Collections outside the United States may be conducted on behalf of DHS by other federal agencies

ities or organizations. The current DHS biometric collection process for adjudication of immigration benefit requests or other requests or collections of information often begins with the collection of an individual's photograph, fingerprints, and signature at an authorized biometrics collection site. Collections outside the United States may be conducted on behalf of DHS by other federal agencies.

While DHS has the authority to collect biometrics from any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, requestor, or individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information, or to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws, submission of biometrics is currently only mandatory for certain benefit requests and enforcement actions. For all other benefit requests or other requests or collections of information and enforcement actions, DHS has discretion, in accordance with its statutory and regulatory authorities, to determine if the circumstances of the specific request or enforcement action warrant the collection of biometrics. If DHS determines that biometrics are needed in the individual case, DHS issues a notice to the individual with instructions for submitting biometrics and an explanation of the general purposes for which they may be used.

DHS has determined that it is necessary to expand its routine biometric collections to include individuals associated with immigration benefit requests or other requests or collection of information, and to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws, such as verifying identity. Using biometrics for identity verification 6 and management will assist DHS's efforts to combat trafficking, confirm the results of biographical criminal history checks, and deter fraud

mmigration benefit requests or other requests or collection of information, and to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws, such as verifying identity. Using biometrics for identity verification 6 and management will assist DHS's efforts to combat trafficking, confirm the results of biographical criminal history checks, and deter fraud. Therefore, DHS proposes in this rule that any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, supporter, derivative, dependent, beneficiary, or individual filing or associated 7 with a benefit request or other request or collection of information, 8 including U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents, and without regard to age, must submit biometrics unless DHS otherwise exempts the requirement. For the same reasons, the proposed rule proposes to authorize DHS to require biometrics for all aliens subject to section 240 removal proceedings, as well as aliens processed through other removal pathways including expedited removal under section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, and aliens being processed for removal under section 238(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1228(b). This rule also proposes that DHS may collect biometrics from aliens subject to reinstatement of a prior removal order under section 241 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231, and aliens subject to removal under the Visa Waiver Program, INA sec. 217, 8 U.S.C. 1187. Additionally, DHS proposes to remove the age restrictions for biometrics submission when issuing an NTA for section 240 removal proceedings or when processing aliens for removal

through other pathways. See proposed 8 CFR 236.5.

6 See https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics (last updated Jan. 24, 2025).

7 By “associated,” DHS means a person with substantial involvement or participation in the immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information, such as a named derivative, beneficiary, petitioner's signatory, sponsor, or co-applicant

h a benefit request, other request, or collection of information is subject to the biometrics requirement, unless DHS exempts a category of requests or individuals, or a specific individual. This includes any alien apprehended, arrested or encountered by DHS in the course of performing its functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws of the United States. As it relates to benefit requests, other requests and collections of information, notice of this requirement will be added in the form instructions for the relevant forms, as needed.

Under this proposed rule, if finalized, DHS will use biometrics for identity management in the immigration lifecycle, 9 which will assist DHS in transitioning to a person-centric model to organize and manage its records, manage unique identities, and verify immigration records. Critically, it will also allow DHS to reduce reliance on biographic data for identity management. In general, biographic data is associated with an individual and is not intrinsically unique to that individual, at least as such biographic data relates to identification. For example, thousands of individuals may share the same name. Additionally, biographic data possesses inherent characteristics that limit its suitability for identity management, such that it can be changed over time. A person's name could have multiple spellings, a name can be legally changed, the digits in a date of birth could be transposed, and any identifier could relate to multiple individuals. Exclusive reliance on biographic data may result in errors, misidentification of individuals, and the potential that immigration benefits may be granted to ineligible or incorrect individuals or imposters.

9 Immigration lifecycle refers to the processing period between an alien's first benefit request, other request, or collection of information submission, encounter, or apprehension, through naturalization or removal

iographic data may result in errors, misidentification of individuals, and the potential that immigration benefits may be granted to ineligible or incorrect individuals or imposters.

In contrast to biographic data, using biometrics for identity verification and management in the immigration lifecycle will help ensure that an individual's immigration records pertain only to that specific individual. Biometrics-based identity management will also help DHS locate, maintain, and update the individual's immigration status, previously submitted identity documentation, as well as certain biographic data. DHS proposes to collect biometrics at any age to ensure the immigration records created for children can be related to their adult records later, and to help combat child trafficking, smuggling, and labor exploitation by facilitating identity verification, while also confirming the absence of criminal history or associations with terrorist organizations or gang membership.

In sum, the changes proposed in this rule will help DHS transition towards a biometric based system for identity verification and management. This will ensure that DHS can carry out its various responsibilities under the INA related to the administration and enforcement of the immigration and naturalization laws. It will also help ensure that DHS grants immigration-related benefits only to individuals who are statutorily eligible to receive them and will enable DHS to more effectively enforce the immigration laws against aliens who are potentially subject to removal.

y eligible to receive them and will enable DHS to more effectively enforce the immigration laws against aliens who are potentially subject to removal.

DHS also plans to implement a program of continuous immigration vetting and require that aliens receive continued and subsequent evaluation to ensure they continue to present no risks to national security or public safety subsequent to their entry. This rule proposes that any individual alien who is present in the United States following an approved immigration benefit may be required to submit biometrics—without regard to any immigration filing—until they obtain or acquire U.S. citizenship. The rule further proposes that a U.S. citizen, U.S. national or lawful permanent resident may be required to submit biometrics if he or she filed a benefit request, other request, or collection of information in the past and it was either reopened or the previous approval is relevant to a benefit request, other request, or collection of information currently pending with DHS. The changes to the use and collection of biometrics and expanded scope of populations also are pertinent to CBP, ICE, and the Executive Office for Immigration Review (EOIR), a component of the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ), given that immigration judges and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) are prohibited from granting relief or protection from removal to an alien 14 years of age or older unless an ICE attorney reports that all required “identity, law enforcement, or security investigations or examinations” have been completed. See INA sec. 262, 8 U.S.C. 1302, and 8 CFR 1003.1(d)(6) and 1003.47(g) (related to fingerprinting biometrics specifically). ICE attorneys rely, in part, on USCIS' biometric collection to confirm and report this. Further, DHS has leeway in terms of which background and security checks are performed in this regard

ddna-june2019_3.pdf.

Under this proposed rule, DHS may also require, request, or accept raw DNA (deoxyribonucleic acid) or DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, 14 as evidence of genetic relationship, to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws. Where evidence of a relationship is required, this rule proposes to grant DHS express authority to require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results (which include a partial DNA profile) from relevant parties such as applicants, petitioners, derivatives, dependents, and beneficiaries, to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship or biological sex. 15 DHS recognizes that there are qualifying family members, such as adopted children, who do not have a genetic relationship to the individual who makes an immigration benefit request on their behalf. To the extent the rule discusses using DNA evidence to establish claimed or unclaimed relationships in support of certain immigration benefit requests, it refers only to genetic relationships that can be demonstrated through DNA testing. Current regulations generally require documentary evidence such as marriage and birth certificates, and secondary evidence such as medical records, school records, religious documents, and affidavits to support claims based on familial relationships. DHS currently does not have regulatory provisions in place to require, request, or accept DNA testing results to prove or disprove the existence of claimed or unclaimed genetic relationships, but because documentary evidence may be unreliable or unavailable, in some situations, individuals are allowed to voluntarily submit DNA test results. Under this rule, DHS may expressly require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results which include a partial DNA profile to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship

evidence to prove or disprove an individual's biological sex in instances where that determination will impact benefit eligibility. DHS currently does not have regulatory provisions in place to require, request, or accept DNA testing results for such purposes, but because documentary evidence may be unreliable or unavailable, in some situations, individuals may voluntarily submit DNA test results.

DHS proposes to collect, treat, and locate raw DNA (the physical sample taken from the applicable individual) that is taken as a biometric modality distinct from the other biometric modalities it is authorized to collect, at a DHS or DHS-authorized facility and further proposes to not handle, store or share any raw DNA for any reason beyond the original purpose of submission ( e.g., to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship or biological sex), unless DHS is required to share by law. 16 DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, like other evidence, becomes part of the record, and DHS will store and share DNA test results for adjudication purposes, including to determine eligibility for immigration benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws, to the extent permitted by law. 17

16 See https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/understanding-our-data (last updated Dec. 2, 2020).

17 Id.

eterminations of eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits; the production of secure identity documents; to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship; establish biological sex (in circumstances when needed to determine benefit eligibility) and to perform other functions related to administering and enforcing the immigration and naturalization laws. To conform to the proposed definition, DHS proposes to remove individual references to “fingerprints,” “photographs,” and “signatures” in various provisions of its regulations and replace them with the term “biometrics.”

DHS has internal procedural safeguards to ensure technology used to collect, assess, and store the differing modalities is accurate, reliable, and valid. 18 Further, as to any USCIS adjudication subject to 8 CFR 103.2(b)(16), if a decision will be adverse to an applicant, petitioner, or requestor, and is based on unclassified derogatory information the agency considered, including information obtained through biometrics, he or she shall be advised of that fact and offered an opportunity to rebut the information. DNA, while a biometric, would only be collected in limited circumstances, for example to prove or disprove existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship or biological sex, to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits, or perform any other function necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws.

18 See https://www.dhs.gov/biometrics (last updated Jan 24, 2025).

DHS originally codified restrictions on the ages of individuals from whom biometrics could be collected based on the Department policies, practice, and on technological limitations. For biometrics use to expand to allow for identity management and verification through the entire immigration lifecycle, this rule would allow for biometric collection from any individual, without age limitation

vices appointment. Under the proposed rule, an individual may reschedule their biometric services appointment one time prior to the date of their scheduled biometric services appointment for any reason. However, after the first reschedule, the individual must meet the standard of “extraordinary circumstances” to justify rescheduling a subsequent biometrics services appointment any additional times. DHS also proposes to apply the “extraordinary circumstances” standard if the individual fails to appear at any biometric services appointment that was not rescheduled. 19 DHS believes in most cases the current “good cause” standard in 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9)(ii) does not create a high enough standard for rescheduling a biometrics appointment. The current “good cause” standard allows appointments to be frequently rescheduled and creates operational inefficiencies in the biometric submission process.

19 Upon publication of this rule, USCIS will issue policy guidance providing examples of “extraordinary circumstances” that meet the standard for rescheduling a biometric services appointment. USCIS similarly does not define the term “good cause” in the current text of 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9) but has issued accompanying policy guidance in the USCIS Policy Manual. See USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 1, Part C, Chapter 2—Biometrics Collection, A—Biometric Services Appointments.

DHS further proposes to define instances that justify USCIS biometric reuse for an individual who may have a pending benefit request, other request, or collection of information that requires biometric submission and has previously submitted biometrics for another benefit request, other request, or collection of information. In those situations, USCIS must obtain a positive biometric-based identity verification before reusing an individual's previously submitted biometrics to process a benefit request, other request, or collection of information

collection of information that requires biometric submission and has previously submitted biometrics for another benefit request, other request, or collection of information. In those situations, USCIS must obtain a positive biometric-based identity verification before reusing an individual's previously submitted biometrics to process a benefit request, other request, or collection of information. Identity verification based solely upon a comparison of the individual's name or other non-unique biographic identification characteristics or data, or combinations thereof, does not constitute positive identity verification and will not be permitted to justify biometric reuse.

DHS is also proposing to remove or replace language that applies to paper filings with language that encourages electronic filing. References to position titles, form numbers, mailing addresses, copies, and office jurisdiction are proposed to be removed. In addition, DHS is proposing to remove internal USCIS processes from the regulatory text. DHS is also proposing to eliminate outdated requirements for submitting photographs for certain immigration benefit requests. The photograph submission and use requirements specified in the INA may be met by the collection and storage of digital images.

DHS is also proposing to require biometrics from U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, or lawful permanent residents, including when they submit a family-based visa petition. This will assist in compliance with the Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA), 20 which prohibits DHS from approving family-based immigrant visa petitions and nonimmigrant fiancé(e) visa petitions if the petitioner has been convicted of certain offenses. In addition, the International Marriage

Broker Regulation Act (IMBRA) 21 provides that petitioners for an alien fiancé(e) or alien spouse must submit criminal conviction information for certain crimes

iminal history background checks. The proposed change will reduce the evidence required to establish good moral character for many self-petitioners. Law enforcement clearances or background checks will be required for self-petitioners who resided outside the United States or were physically present for 6 months or more, during the 3-year period immediately preceding the filing of the self-petition. DHS proposes to require the self-petitioner submit arrest reports which occurred during the 3 years prior to filing the self-petition, regardless of the petitioner residing or being physically present in the jurisdiction for 6 or more months. In addition, DHS proposes in certain cases to consider VAWA self-petitioners' conduct beyond the 3 years immediately before filing where earlier conduct is relevant to establishing the good moral character for a VAWA self-petitioner. See proposed 8 CFR 204.2(c)(2)(v), (e)(2)(v), and (j)(2)(v).

DHS further proposes to remove the automatic presumption of good moral character for VAWA self-petitioners under 14 years of age and require VAWA self-petitioners under 14 to submit biometrics like any other VAWA self-petitioner. Similarly, DHS proposes to eliminate the requirement that VAWA self-petitioners submit police clearance letters, unless they lived outside the United States during the requisite period. Adjudicators would assess good moral character based on the applicant's criminal history, national security background check, and any other credible and relevant evidence submitted. DHS also proposes to amend 8 CFR 245.23(g) to refer to the relevant “continuous period” rather than “continued presence,” and to provide that USCIS would be able to consider the applicant's conduct beyond the requisite period, where earlier conduct is relevant to the applicant's moral character and conduct during the requisite period does not reflect a reform of character

evant evidence submitted. DHS also proposes to amend 8 CFR 245.23(g) to refer to the relevant “continuous period” rather than “continued presence,” and to provide that USCIS would be able to consider the applicant's conduct beyond the requisite period, where earlier conduct is relevant to the applicant's moral character and conduct during the requisite period does not reflect a reform of character.

DHS also proposes to remove the presumption of good moral character for T nonimmigrant adjustment of status applicants under 14 years of age. The rule proposes that such applicants submit biometrics that USCIS will use in the determination of good moral character and provides USCIS with the authority to require additional evidence of good moral character. See proposed 8 CFR 245.23(g). The proposed changes would remove the superfluous need for police clearance letters from T nonimmigrant adjustment applicants.

DHS proposes to continue its existing practice and collect biometrics and perform background checks on U.S. citizens, lawful permanent residents, and any other persons involved with an EB-5 regional center, new commercial enterprise or job-creating entity. See INA sec. 203(b)(5)(H)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1152(b)(5)(H)(iii). USCIS proposes to also continue its existing practice to review the results of national security and criminal history background checks to decide whether such persons involved with such entities, and the entities themselves, are bona fide and eligible to participate in the regional center program. Id.

d with such entities, and the entities themselves, are bona fide and eligible to participate in the regional center program. Id.

DHS also proposes to remove 8 CFR 216.4(b)(1), “Authority to waive interview,” and 8 CFR 216.4(b)(2), “Location of interview” as they apply to a joint petition to remove the conditional basis of lawful permanent resident status filed by the alien and the alien's spouse. As any decision to waive the mandatory interview is purely discretionary, and 8 CFR 216.4(b)(1) simply reiterates this discretion, it serves no purpose, especially since determining whether the eligibility requirements for removal of conditions in 8 CFR 216.4(c) were established is central to the adjudication of the petition itself. Additionally, the limitation on who can conduct an interview and who has jurisdiction over an interview created by 8 CFR 216.4(b)(2) is unnecessary and creates operational restrictions that interfere with USCIS' ability to adjudicate the Form I-751, Petition to Remove Conditions on Residence. The decision to assign an interviewer and the location of an interview is a purely operational and procedural decision, and one that should be made upon the adjudicative priorities and operational resources available to USCIS.

DHS does not plan to immediately expand all of its programs to provide that all new biometrics modalities would be required of all individuals as of the effective date of a potential final rule. Only those revised forms that propose to add a particular biometric collection or DNA submission requirement in conjunction with this rule (as described in the Paperwork Reduction Act section of this preamble) will be immediately subject to new biometrics, modalities, or DNA requirements. 22 DHS proposes that DHS component agencies may expand or contract their biometrics submission requirements described within this rule

in the future by notice in the Federal Register , updated form instructions, or otherwise consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the PRA

ection of this preamble) will be immediately subject to new biometrics, modalities, or DNA requirements. 22 DHS proposes that DHS component agencies may expand or contract their biometrics submission requirements described within this rule

in the future by notice in the Federal Register , updated form instructions, or otherwise consistent with the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and the PRA.

22 Under this proposed rule USCIS maintains the right to request biometrics, as needed, via individualized notice to the individual.

USCIS is authorized to collect biometric services fees and has generally incorporated the biometric services costs into most of the underlying immigration benefit request fees for which biometric services are applicable in its most recent rule addressing the USCIS fee schedule (89 FR 6194, Jan. 31, 2024 (Fee Rule)).

In 2020, DHS previously published a similar Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NPRM) proposing to amend DHS regulations governing the use and collection of biometrics in the enforcement and administration of immigration laws (85 FR 56338, Sept. 11, 2020), however that NPRM was later withdrawn in May 2021 consistent with E.O. 14012 (86 FR 8277, Feb. 5, 2021), and the priorities of the administration at that time (86 FR 24750, May 10, 2021). On January 20, 2025, E.O. 14012 was rescinded by President Trump, and DHS intends to continue its previous efforts to enhance biometric submission, while also ensuring that all aliens seeking admission to the United States, or who are already in the United States, are vetted and screened (E.O. 14159, 90 FR 8443, Jan. 29, 2025; E.O. 14161, 90 FR 8451, Jan. 30, 2025).

86 FR 24750, May 10, 2021). On January 20, 2025, E.O. 14012 was rescinded by President Trump, and DHS intends to continue its previous efforts to enhance biometric submission, while also ensuring that all aliens seeking admission to the United States, or who are already in the United States, are vetted and screened (E.O. 14159, 90 FR 8443, Jan. 29, 2025; E.O. 14161, 90 FR 8451, Jan. 30, 2025).

B. Summary of Costs and Benefits

The proposed rule would enable DHS to conduct the administration and adjudication of immigration benefit requests with increased fidelity and is conducive to the evolution to a person-centric model for organizing and managing its records, enhanced and continuous vetting, and reduced dependence on paper documents, as is described more fully in the preamble. DHS estimates that about 1.12 million more biometrics submissions will be collected annually, and the resulting biometrics-submitting population will increase from a current baseline of 2.07 million to 3.19 million.

DHS estimates that the annual costs for individuals who will submit biometrics under the proposed rule will be $231.5 million. This includes costs to petitioners of family-based requests, costs to VAWA self-petitioners and T nonimmigrant petitioners submitting evidence to demonstrate good moral character, costs to potential persons involved with regional centers, and fee costs incurred by Temporary Protected Status (TPS) registrants and individuals in EOIR proceedings. DHS estimates costs to the government of $55,040 for fees that the FBI will collect for providing fingerprint-based Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) checks prior to issuing NTAs. Combining the biometrics portion, which includes the biometric services fees and fees charged by the FBI related to CHRI checks (noted above), plus $57.1 million in the DNA submission costs, the total monetized costs of this proposed rule will potentially be $288.7 million annually

will collect for providing fingerprint-based Criminal History Record Information (CHRI) checks prior to issuing NTAs. Combining the biometrics portion, which includes the biometric services fees and fees charged by the FBI related to CHRI checks (noted above), plus $57.1 million in the DNA submission costs, the total monetized costs of this proposed rule will potentially be $288.7 million annually. To compare costs over a 10-year period of analysis Fiscal Year (FY) 2026 through FY 2035, DHS applies 3 percent and 7 percent discount rates to the total estimated costs of the proposed rule. DHS estimates the 10-year total costs of the proposed rule to be $2.5 billion discounted at 3 percent, and $2.0 billion discounted at 7 percent.

The proposed rule will benefit the public by reducing the evidentiary burden of VAWA self-petitioners and T nonimmigrant petitioners who will in most cases no longer have to gather evidence such as police clearance reports and affidavits to demonstrate good moral character. It will provide individuals requesting or associated with immigration and naturalization benefits a more reliable system for verifying their identity when submitting a benefit request. This will limit the potential for identity theft while also reducing the likelihood that DHS will be unable to verify an individual's identity and consequently deny the benefit. DHS is unable to quantify this benefit because it has no data on how often these events happen under existing regulations. Increasing the types of biometrics collected will allow for better identification of individuals because each modality increases the unique physical, biological or behavioral characteristics that USCIS can use to identify the individual

ntity and consequently deny the benefit. DHS is unable to quantify this benefit because it has no data on how often these events happen under existing regulations. Increasing the types of biometrics collected will allow for better identification of individuals because each modality increases the unique physical, biological or behavioral characteristics that USCIS can use to identify the individual.

Finally, the allowance of individuals to use DNA testing as evidence to demonstrate the existence of a claimed genetic relationship provides them the opportunity to demonstrate a genetic relationship using quicker, less intrusive, and more effective technology than the blood tests provided for in past regulations. See 8 CFR 204.2(d)(2)(vi). Similarly, the use of DNA test results as evidence to establish biological sex will also allow applicants to provide proof without the need to produce additional documentation such as birth records, or other information.

The proposed rule will benefit the U.S. Government by providing it with the necessary tools to tackle and limit identity fraud and improve USCIS identity management systems. The proposed rule will enable DHS to have more fidelity and efficiency in identity management in the immigration lifecycle and vetting of individuals seeking certain immigration and naturalization benefits. Expanding the population subject to biometrics submission provides DHS with the ability to better identify and limit fraud because biometrics comprise unique physical or behavioral characteristics that are difficult to falsify and are less likely to change over time the way biographical information does in the majority of cases. Biometrics will also help to reduce the administrative burden involved in identity verification and the performance of criminal history checks, by reducing the need for manual document review and name-based security checks. The proposed rule will also enhance the U.S

hat are difficult to falsify and are less likely to change over time the way biographical information does in the majority of cases. Biometrics will also help to reduce the administrative burden involved in identity verification and the performance of criminal history checks, by reducing the need for manual document review and name-based security checks. The proposed rule will also enhance the U.S. Government's capability to identify criminal activity and protect vulnerable groups by extending the submission of biometrics to populations under certain benefit requests. The removal of age restrictions and the collection of biometrics from all aliens under the age of 14 will assist DHS in its mission to combat human trafficking, child sex trafficking, forced labor exploitation, and alien smuggling.

III. Background and Purpose

A. Legal Authority and Guidance for DHS Collection and Use of Biometrics

As discussed in detail below in section IV of this preamble, DHS is proposing to amend its regulations governing its use and collection of biometrics by USCIS and other DHS components. In short, the key proposed changes include:

• Requiring any individual filing or associated with an immigration-related benefit request or other request adjudicated by DHS, regardless of age, to appear for biometrics submission unless exempted.

• Clarifying the purposes for which biometrics are collected, stored, and utilized and when they can be reused, including for enhanced and continuous vetting.

• Expanding biometrics collection authority upon alien arrest or encounter.

• Defining the term “biometrics” as the measurable biological (anatomical, physiological and molecular structure) or behavioral characteristics of an individual

direction of the Secretary and the Director of USCIS with exercising this function. See also DHS, “Delegation to The Bureau of Citizenship and Immigration Services,” Delegation of Authority 0150.1, https://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=234775.

24 See INA secs. 235, 236, 241, 8 U.S.C. 1225, 1226, 1231.

Section 287(b) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1357(b), also provides DHS with authority for this proposed rule. That statute provides DHS with broad discretion and authority to “take and consider evidence concerning the privilege of any person to enter, reenter, pass through, or reside in the United States, or concerning any matter which is material or relevant to the enforcement of this chapter and the administration of the Service.” 25 Id. DHS's authority to adjudicate benefits under the INA necessarily includes an obligation to ensure that benefits are granted only to those individuals who are statutorily eligible and warrant a favorable exercise of discretion. If finalized, this proposed rule would enhance DHS's ability to take and use evidence, through biometrics, to better ensure that USCIS grants benefits only to eligible individuals and identifies criminal or other threat actors attempting to obtain immigration benefits.

25 Prior to the HSA, the legacy Immigration and Naturalization Service (“INS”) administered the provisions of the INA related to immigration enforcement and benefits adjudication. In 2002, Congress abolished the INS and transferred these functions to the then-newly created DHS. By operation of the HSA, certain references to the “Attorney General” and the “Service” in the INA are understood to refer to the “Secretary” and “DHS”. HSA 1517, 6 U.S.C. 557.

torney General” and the “Service” in the INA are understood to refer to the “Secretary” and “DHS”. HSA 1517, 6 U.S.C. 557.

As explained below in section IV of the preamble, this proposed rule, if finalized, would allow DHS to collect and use biometrics more robustly to help verify and manage an individual's identity to deter fraud and provide DHS with increased fidelity in benefits adjudications. It would also enhance DHS's ability to complete background, criminal history, and other immigration history checks necessary to adjudicate certain benefits consistent with law. The expanded use of DNA would enable DHS to confirm or non-confirm eligibility for certain family-based immigration-benefit requests where relevant. This rule, if finalized, would also support DHS's efforts to use biometrics more robustly through enhanced and continuous vetting to ensure that aliens who have been granted benefits under the INA should continue to have the “privilege” of “residing” in the United States and are not a risk to national security or the public safety. It would also support DHS's ability to collect and use or reuse biometrics to establish identity throughout the immigration lifecycle which will increase the effective and efficient “administration” of DHS functions related to benefits adjudications. Therefore, this proposed rule fits within the authority granted under INA sec. 287(b), 8 U.S.C. 1357(b).

For similar reasons, INA sec. 235(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1225(d)(3), provides additional authority for this proposed rule. This statute provides that the Secretary and immigration officers shall:

at the Secretary and immigration officers shall:

have power . . . to take and consider evidence of or from any person touching the privilege of any alien or person he believes or suspects to be an alien to enter, reenter, transit through, or reside in the United States or concerning any matter which is material and relevant to the enforcement of this chapter and the administration of the Service. This statute, in addition to the other statutes discussed above, provides authority to collect biometrics from all inadmissible and deportable aliens, regardless of age, that are subject to section 240 removal proceedings or other proceedings under INA secs. 235 (expedited removal) and 238(b) (aggravated felon removal), 8 U.S.C. 1225, 1238(b), in addition to certain other removable aliens, as proposed in this rule.

Accordingly, DHS is proposing to issue this regulation pursuant to the Secretary's broad authority under INA sec. 103(a), 8 U.S.C. 1103(a), to issue regulations necessary to carry out DHS's various functions and authorities under the INA, including under INA secs. 287(b) and 235(d)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1357(b) and 1225(d)(3), and the various statutes in the INA related to benefits administered and adjudicated by DHS.

1. Background Checks

In addition to DHS's broad authorities discussed above, various provisions of the INA governing immigration benefits impose an obligation on USCIS to confirm that an alien has not been convicted of a disqualifying offense and does not pose a threat to national security or public safety. Indeed, DHS is precluded in many cases from approving, granting, or providing immigration benefits to aliens with a record of certain criminal offenses or administrative violations. 26 Whether granting a benefit is discretionary or not, criminal histories are relevant because they are used to determine eligibility for benefits and are part of the totality of the circumstances that USCIS considers when making a discretionary determination

om approving, granting, or providing immigration benefits to aliens with a record of certain criminal offenses or administrative violations. 26 Whether granting a benefit is discretionary or not, criminal histories are relevant because they are used to determine eligibility for benefits and are part of the totality of the circumstances that USCIS considers when making a discretionary determination. Additionally, DHS is mandated to protect the American public from “aliens who intend to commit terrorist attacks, threaten our national security, espouse hateful ideology, or otherwise exploit the immigration laws for malevolent purposes” and to “vet and screen to the maximum degree possible all aliens

who intend to be admitted, enter, or are already inside the United States.” See E.O. 14161 secs. 1(a) and 2(a), 90 FR 8451, (Jan. 20, 2025). Therefore, DHS adjudications must include national security considerations and criminal history background checks.

26 DHS would like to note that limitations on biometric collection or use in this proposed rule would not impact existing law enforcement authorities or other national security or intelligence gathering activities.

For example, one statute precludes the filing of a family-based immigrant petition by someone who has been convicted of a “specified offense against a minor.” See INA sec. 204(a)(1)(A)(viii), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii). The criminal and security-related grounds of inadmissibility found in INA secs. 212(a)(2) through (3), 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2) through (3), apply to many benefits, such as adjustment to lawful permanent resident status, refugee status, and TPS. The INA provides that refugee applicants must be admissible as immigrants and the criminal, security, and terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility apply to refugee applicants. See INA sec. 207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1157(c)(1); INA sec. 212, 8 U.S.C. 1182. The INA provides that asylum may be granted on a discretionary basis. See INA sec. 208(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1)(A)

, refugee status, and TPS. The INA provides that refugee applicants must be admissible as immigrants and the criminal, security, and terrorism-related grounds of inadmissibility apply to refugee applicants. See INA sec. 207(c)(1), 8 U.S.C. 1157(c)(1); INA sec. 212, 8 U.S.C. 1182. The INA provides that asylum may be granted on a discretionary basis. See INA sec. 208(a)(1)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(a)(1)(A). It provides that asylum applicants are subject to mandatory criminal and security bars. See INA sec. 208(b)(2)(A), 8 U.S.C. 1158(b)(2)(A). Sections of the INA apply the criminal, security, and terrorism-related bars to TPS applicants, including the mandatory asylum bars above. See INA secs. 244(c)(2)(A)(iii) through (B), 8 U.S.C. 1254a(c)(2)(A)(iii) through (B). Various INA sections require that adjustment of status applicants be admissible in order to qualify. See, e.g., INA secs. 245(a)(2) and 209(b)(5), 8 U.S.C. 1255(a)(2) and 8 U.S.C. 1159(b)(5). The INA also provides a good moral character requirement for any applicant to be naturalized. See INA sec. 316(a)(3), 8 U.S.C. 1427(a)(3).

As discussed further below in section III.B. of this preamble, USCIS has long required aliens and certain other individuals associated with benefits applications to submit certain biometrics. USCIS needs these biometrics to run background checks to verify that an individual is not statutorily ineligible for the requested benefit and to protect national security and public safety. This proposed rule, if finalized, would enhance DHS's ability to establish an individual's identity through required biometrics collections and expanded modalities, which in turn will increase USCIS' ability to run background checks more quickly and with greater accuracy as discussed below.

Other statutes explicitly authorize DHS to conduct biometric services in relation to national security and public safety purposes

finalized, would enhance DHS's ability to establish an individual's identity through required biometrics collections and expanded modalities, which in turn will increase USCIS' ability to run background checks more quickly and with greater accuracy as discussed below.

Other statutes explicitly authorize DHS to conduct biometric services in relation to national security and public safety purposes. For example, Congress directed in the Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism Act of 2001 (USA PATRIOT Act), Public Law 107-56, 115 Stat. 354 (2001), reauthorized by Public Law 114-23, 129 Stat. 268 (2015) (codified at note to 8 U.S.C. 1365a, that “biometric technology” should be utilized in the development of the integrated entry-exit system originally mandated by the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA), Public Law 104-208, 110 Stat. 3009 (1996) (codified at 8 U.S.C. 1365a). The Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Public Law 108-458, 118 Stat. 3638 (2004) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1365b), required the completion of a biometric data system to facilitate efficient immigration benefits processing and to protect the United States by preventing the entry of terrorists. These statutes reflect that Congress has recognized the importance and value of biometrics to the administration and enforcement of immigration laws, including to make the process of identifying aliens more efficient and accurate, and to protect national security. Although the primary focus of this proposed rule is biometrics collection and use for immigration-related benefits and processes, the rule is consistent with these overall goals. For USCIS, any limitations on the collection or use of biometrics in this proposed rule does not impact DHS law enforcement authorities or other national security or intelligence gathering activities

statutes require the collection of biometrics for secure document production. For example, photographs are required by statute to create certificates of naturalization. See INA sec. 333(a), 8 U.S.C. 1444(a). Additionally, an alien granted asylum will be granted an employment authorization document (EAD) that shall at a minimum contain the fingerprint and photograph of such alien. See 8 U.S.C. 1738. Relatedly, the Enhanced Border Security and Visa Entry Reform Act of 2002 (Border Security Act), Public Law 107-173, 116 Stat. 543 (2002), requires that DHS issue aliens machine-readable, tamper-resistant visas and other travel and entry documents using biometric identifiers. See 8 U.S.C. 1732(b)(1).

3. Biometric Collection From U.S. Citizens, U.S. Nationals, and Lawful Permanent Residents

DHS is also authorized to collect the biometrics of U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent resident petitioners of family-based immigrant petitions, and U.S. citizen petitioners of nonimmigrant fiancé(e) petitions, to determine if a petitioner has been convicted of certain crimes pursuant to the AWA, Public Law 109-248, 120 Stat. 587 (2006) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 18 and 42 U.S.C.) See INA secs. 402(a) and (b) (applicable immigration provisions), and IMBRA, Public Law 109-162, 119 Stat. 2960 (2006) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. 1375a). The AWA:

• Prohibits U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents who have been convicted of any “specified offense against a minor” from filing a family-based immigrant visa petition on behalf of any beneficiary, unless the Secretary determines, in his or her sole and unreviewable discretion, that the petitioner poses “no risk” to the beneficiary. INA secs. 204(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) and (B)(i)(II); 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) and (B)(i)(II).

• Renders ineligible to file “K” nonimmigrant fiancé(e) petitions those U.S

a minor” from filing a family-based immigrant visa petition on behalf of any beneficiary, unless the Secretary determines, in his or her sole and unreviewable discretion, that the petitioner poses “no risk” to the beneficiary. INA secs. 204(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) and (B)(i)(II); 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) and (B)(i)(II).

• Renders ineligible to file “K” nonimmigrant fiancé(e) petitions those U.S. citizens convicted of such offenses, unless the Secretary determines, in his or her sole and unreviewable discretion,

that the petitioner poses “no risk” to the fiancé(e) beneficiary. INA sec. 101(a)(15)(K), 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(15)(K).

Independent of the AWA, USCIS is also required to disclose information regarding certain violent arrests and convictions for some U.S. citizen petitioners who file K-visas for fiancés or spouses in accordance with IMBRA, 8 U.S.C. 1375a.

4. Required Biometric Collections

Several sections of the INA also require DHS to collect certain biometrics from certain aliens for specific purposes. For example:

• INA sec. 203(b)(5)(H)(iii), 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(H)(iii), requires the Secretary to collect “fingerprints or other biometrics” from certain purposes related to the EB-5 visa category, specifically the regional center program.

• INA secs. 333 and 335, 8 U.S.C. 1444 and 1446, require the submission of photographs and a personal investigation before an application for naturalization, citizenship or other similar requests may be approved.

• INA sec. 262(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1302(a), generally requires aliens aged 14 and older, in the United States, to register with DHS and be fingerprinted, and INA sec. 264, 8 U.S.C. 1302, generally directs DHS to prepare registration and fingerprinting forms for such aliens.

• INA sec. 287(f), 8 U.S.C. 1357(f), requires DHS to fingerprint and photograph each alien 14 years of age or older when DHS issues an NTA

trics from any person to establish and verify an individual's identity, eligibility for a benefit, and for other purposes material and relevant to DHS's benefits adjudication and enforcement functions under the INA. This authority also includes taking measures like the biometrics requirements proposed in this rule that are necessary for the effective and efficient administration of these functions. Therefore, Congress's decision to require certain biometric modalities from certain populations, does not limit DHS's broad authority to collect additional biometrics or expand the populations subject to biometrics submission requirements.

5. Administrative Guidance

This proposed rule is also consistent with non-statutory guidance on effective mechanisms for foreign national vetting, screening, and identification. DHS was directed by executive branch guidance to take actions that require a robust system for biometrics collection, storage, and use related to providing adjudication and naturalization services of immigration benefits. For example, with respect to secure documents, Homeland Security Presidential Directive (HSPD) 11, “ Comprehensive Terrorist-Related Screening Procedures, ” (Aug. 27, 2004) directs DHS to “incorporate security features . . . that resist circumvention to the greatest extent possible.” DHS is directed to consider the “. . . information individuals must present, including, as appropriate, the type of biometric identifier[s] or other form of identification or identifying information to be presented, at particular screening opportunities.” DHS was also directed to expand the use of biometrics, consistent with applicable law, to identify and screen for individuals who may pose a threat to national security by HSPD 24, “Biometrics for Identification and Screening to Enhance National Security,” (June 5, 2008)

y or applicant would submit fingerprints which were then checked against FBI databases to determine if they matched any criminal activity on file. The fingerprints were not retained by the INS and delays in processing would often result in individuals needing to submit fingerprints multiple times for the same application. Photographs were not historically collected by INS as a biometric identifier. For those immigration benefit requests that required a photograph to produce a resulting identity document, the regulations required submission of a

passport-style photograph. See, e.g., 8 CFR 204.2, 8 CFR 2210.5, and 8 CFR 264.2.

Today, DHS handles biometrics differently. Biometrics are still used in criminal history background checks to determine eligibility for immigration benefits and for public safety, fraud, and national security vetting. In addition, biometrics may be stored by DHS and used to verify an individual's identity in subsequent encounters with DHS. These encounters could vary from travel to and from the United States where an individual may encounter CBP officers, to arrest and detention by law enforcement components such as ICE, or to initiate removal proceedings.

DHS also uses collected biometric information for document production related to immigration benefits and status, including but not limited to: Travel Documents (Form I-512L), Permanent Resident Cards (Form I-551), Employment Authorization Documents (Form I-766), Certificates of Citizenship (Form N-560), Certificates of Naturalization (Form N-550), Replacement Certificates of Citizenship (Form N-561), and Replacement Certificates of Naturalization (Form N-570). 29 Most of these secure documents are created using the digital photograph (and signature) that is taken by DHS at an ASC, and not the paper photograph mailed with the benefit request

Next Generation Identification (NGI) system, and the Department of Defense (DoD) Automated Biometric Identification System (ABIS). 32 33 34 DHS also uses biometrics to determine if an individual has ties in their background, to activities such as an association with human rights violations, involvement in terrorist activities, or affiliation with terrorist organizations rendering them inadmissible. To that end, DHS may vet an individual's biometrics against data sets of foreign partners in accordance with international arrangements. 35

32 IDENT will be replaced by a system called the Homeland Advanced Recognition Technology (HART). DHS will use the term “IDENT” in this rule to refer to both the current and successor systems.

33 The FBI NGI system is operated by the FBI's Criminal Justice Information Services (CJIS) Division and provides the criminal justice community with multi-modal biometric and criminal history information. See “Privacy Impact Assessment Update for Biometric Interoperability Between the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the U.S. Department of Justice,” (Oct. 13, 2011), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/publications/privacy_pia_nppd_visit_update-b.pdf. FBI's NGI database, in turn, also provides access to DoD's ABIS database.

34 DoD's ABIS system is operated by the DoD and contains biometric records of individuals encountered overseas by the DoD that include known or suspected terrorists. The biographic and biometric data from ABIS is also transferred to the DoD's Special Operations Force Exhibition (SOFEX) Portal for additional biometric matching. Once complete, the NGI system forwards responses back from both the NGI and the ABIS systems to the IDENT system

oD and contains biometric records of individuals encountered overseas by the DoD that include known or suspected terrorists. The biographic and biometric data from ABIS is also transferred to the DoD's Special Operations Force Exhibition (SOFEX) Portal for additional biometric matching. Once complete, the NGI system forwards responses back from both the NGI and the ABIS systems to the IDENT system. When data is initially submitted and processed through IDENT, NGI, and ABIS, an ICE Analyst conducts biometric and biographic checks against other law enforcement and classified Intelligence Community databases before processing, exploiting, summarizing, and disseminating findings to the relevant ICE Attaché and Biometric Identification Transnational Migration Alert Program (BITMAP) PMT.

35 See DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the International Biometric Information Sharing Program (IBIS),” DHS/ALL/PIA-095, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/dhsallpia-095-international-biometric-information-sharing-program-ibis; DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Immigration Benefits Background Check System (IBBCS),” DHS/USCIS/PIA-033, https://www.dhs.gov/publication/immigration-benefits-background-check-systems-ibbcs; “Statement of Mutual Understanding on Information Sharing,” https://www.canada.ca/en/immigration-refugees-citizenship/corporate/mandate/policies-operational-instructions-agreements/agreements/statement-mutual-understanding-information-sharing/statement.html (last updated Feb. 19, 2003); “Canada (13-1121)—Agreement for the Sharing of Visa and Immigration Information,” (Dec. 21, 2013), https://www.state.gov/13-1121; “Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Amending the agreement of April 18, 2013, as amended,” (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/20-1231.3-Consular-Affairs-Visa-UK.pdf

“Canada (13-1121)—Agreement for the Sharing of Visa and Immigration Information,” (Dec. 21, 2013), https://www.state.gov/13-1121; “Agreement between the United States of America and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, Amending the agreement of April 18, 2013, as amended,” (Dec. 31, 2020), https://www.state.gov/wp-content/uploads/2021/06/20-1231.3-Consular-Affairs-Visa-UK.pdf.

The DHS biometrics process for benefits adjudication purposes generally begins with the collection of an individual's biometrics at an authorized biometrics collection site, including DHS offices, ASCs, military installations, U.S. consular offices abroad, and, in some cases, Federal, State, and local law enforcement installations. Biometrics may also be collected digitally by an agency-approved technology. Domestically, DHS established a robust program to allow individuals to provide biometrics at ASC facilities, where individuals are generally scheduled to appear at a location close to their address of record. DHS has also established mobile biometrics collection capabilities domestically for certain limited scenarios ( e.g., those who are homebound or reside in certain remote locations). For collections outside the United States, biometrics may be handled differently. When biometrics are required by DHS and DHS does not have a presence in that country, the Department of State (DOS) will continue to collect biometrics on behalf of DHS. In cases where DOS will issue a boarding foil, immigrant visa, or non-immigrant visa associated with a DHS form, DOS will continue to collect biometrics under its existing authority.

Currently, USCIS biometrics consist of a photograph, fingerprints, and signature to conduct identity, eligibility, national security, and criminal history background checks, and in certain

situations, voluntary DNA testing to verify a claimed genetic relationship

rant visa, or non-immigrant visa associated with a DHS form, DOS will continue to collect biometrics under its existing authority.

Currently, USCIS biometrics consist of a photograph, fingerprints, and signature to conduct identity, eligibility, national security, and criminal history background checks, and in certain

situations, voluntary DNA testing to verify a claimed genetic relationship. For certain family-based benefit requests, where other evidence proves inconclusive, USCIS accepts, but does not require, DNA test results obtained from approved laboratories (along with other necessary identifiers, such as a name and date of birth), as evidence to assist in establishing the existence of genetic relationships. In these limited cases where DNA test results are voluntarily submitted, USCIS requires that DNA test results establish a sufficient probability of the existence of the alleged relationship to be accepted as evidence of that relationship.

DHS is bound by the confidentiality provisions of section 1367 of title 8 of the U.S. Code, “Penalties for disclosure of information” (originally enacted as section 384 of IIRIRA). Unless certain statutory exceptions apply ( e.g., the alien was convicted of a crime or crimes listed at INA 237(a)(2), etc.), all DHS officers and employees are generally prohibited from permitting use by or disclosure to anyone other than a sworn officer or employee of DHS, DOS, or DOJ of any information relating to a beneficiary of a pending or approved request for certain victim-based immigration benefits, such as an abused spouse waiver of the joint filing requirement to remove conditions on residence, a VAWA self-petition by an abused spouse or child of a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident, VAWA cancellation of removal or suspension of deportation, or application or petition for T or U nonimmigrant status, including the fact that they have requested such a benefit

irement may also be made through law, regulation, form instructions or as provided in a Federal Register notice. See 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9), 103.7(b)(1)(i)(C), and 103.17. Under this construct, although DHS has the authority to collect biometrics from any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or requestor, or individual filing a request, biometrics are only mandatory for certain benefit requests. For all others, DHS must decide if the benefit requested, or circumstances of the request, justifies collection of biometrics and, if so, notify an individual that their biometrics are required along with when and where they will be collected.

36 See, e.g., 8 CFR 204.310(b), 210.2(c)(2)(i), 210.5(b)(2), 212.7(e)(3)(ii), 214.2(w)(16), 245.15(g)(1), 245a.2(d), 245a.4(b)(4).

37 See e.g., 8 CFR 236.5 (2025).

The primary purpose of this proposed rule is to flip the current construct from one where biometrics may be collected based on past practices, individual notice, regulations, or the form instructions for a particular benefit, to a system under which biometrics are required for any immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information unless DHS determines that biometrics are unnecessary for a specific population or benefit.

To this end, DHS is proposing to revise 8 CFR 103.16 to require that any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information, to include U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals, and lawful permanent residents, and without regard to age, must submit biometrics, unless DHS otherwise exempts the requirement. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(1). 38 This proposed rule would also give DHS discretion to require any individual associated with such requests or collections of information to submit or update biometrics while the request is pending with DHS for adjudication. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(c)(1)

individuals requesting or associated with immigration-related benefits. DHS believes that the proposed changes, if finalized, would enhance DHS's ability to ensure that benefits are granted only to those who are eligible and to identify fraud, national security, and public safety risks during the benefits adjudication process, while also improving services to those who submit such benefit requests. USCIS' use of biometrics for criminal history background checks and document production is outdated.

As outlined above, DHS has broad statutory authority to administer and enforce immigration laws and adjudicate immigration-related benefits. This authority necessarily includes the use of tools, such as biometrics, needed to better verify identity and statutory eligibility, and to determine whether or not the individual poses a risk to national security or public safety in those instances where these factors may impact eligibility for an immigration benefit. Moreover, this proposed rule is intended to increase the collection and use of biometric information beyond benefits eligibility determinations. To this end, DHS proposes to expand the population of aliens who are subject to biometrics collection upon apprehension, arrest, or encounter by: (1) clarifying that DHS may require biometrics for all aliens subject to section 240 removal proceedings, as well as aliens processed through other removal pathways including expedited removal under section 235 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1225, and aliens subject to reinstatement of a prior removal order under section 241 of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1231 and (2) removing age restrictions on biometrics as discussed further below in section IV.C.3 of this preamble. See proposed 8 CFR 236.5.

Biometrics collection upon apprehension, arrest, or encounter by

DHS will allow DHS in subsequent encounters or filings to accurately identify the individuals encountered, and can prove or disprove any claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship

U.S.C. 1231 and (2) removing age restrictions on biometrics as discussed further below in section IV.C.3 of this preamble. See proposed 8 CFR 236.5.

Biometrics collection upon apprehension, arrest, or encounter by

DHS will allow DHS in subsequent encounters or filings to accurately identify the individuals encountered, and can prove or disprove any claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship. This in turn will allow DHS to make better informed decisions as to the processing, transporting, and managing the custody of aliens subject to DHS's law enforcement authorities. Having more reliable data about the identities of aliens in DHS custody will increase the safety of DHS facilities in which aliens are held in custody for both DHS law enforcement officers and aliens. It would also eliminate an incentive that currently exists for unscrupulous aliens to jeopardize the health and safety of minors to whom they are unrelated, transporting the minors on a dangerous journey across the United States border, and claiming to be the parents of unrelated minors in order to claim to be a “family unit” and thus obtain a relatively quick release from DHS custody.

This rule also supports DHS's efforts to implement a program of continuous immigration vetting. Under this proposed rule, any alien who is present in the United States following an approved immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information may be required to submit biometrics or undergo biometric-based screening and vetting unless and until they are granted U.S. citizenship. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(3), (c)(2)

implement a program of continuous immigration vetting. Under this proposed rule, any alien who is present in the United States following an approved immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information may be required to submit biometrics or undergo biometric-based screening and vetting unless and until they are granted U.S. citizenship. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(3), (c)(2). To further implement continuous vetting, the rule proposes to clarify that DHS may store biometrics (other than raw DNA) submitted by an individual in connection with an immigration-related benefits request or other collection of information and use or reuse biometrics to conduct background checks to verify continued eligibility for immigration and naturalization-related benefits and for administering and enforcing the immigration laws. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(1).

In sum, these proposed changes and others discussed throughout this preamble, are intended to enhance DHS's ability to collect and use biometrics throughout the immigration lifecycle, i.e., the period between an alien's first benefit request, other request, or collection of information submission, encounter, or apprehension, through naturalization or removal.

However, DHS does not propose to impose an absolute biometrics collection requirement in all instances for all forms filed with the USCIS. 40 There may be circumstances where biometric collection would be unnecessary or duplicative. A particular application or petition ( e.g., an inadmissibility waiver request) may not require its own complete biometric collection when it is filed in conjunction with another benefit request, other request, or collection of information that already carries a biometrics collection requirement, and/or DHS determines it may reuse previously collected biometrics after a biometric-based verification

particular application or petition ( e.g., an inadmissibility waiver request) may not require its own complete biometric collection when it is filed in conjunction with another benefit request, other request, or collection of information that already carries a biometrics collection requirement, and/or DHS determines it may reuse previously collected biometrics after a biometric-based verification. Under appropriate circumstances, DHS proposes to retain discretion to exempt certain forms from the complete biometric collection requirement because it would result in waste or redundancy to both the agency and the public. For example, when an alien files Form I-485, Application to Register Permanent Residence or Adjust Status, biometrics are collected from all applicants. However, if the same applicant also files Form I-601, Application for Waiver of Grounds of Inadmissibility, due to an inadmissibility concern, that form is associated with the Form I-485. In most cases, there is no need to independently require complete biometrics collection in conjunction with Form I-601 because DHS is already collecting biometrics in association with Form I-485. Form I-601 would never be filed without an associated form carrying a biometrics collection requirement ( i.e., an immigrant visa application, adjustment of status application, certain non-immigrant visa applications, etc.). In instances such as this, DHS will simply reuse and associate the biometrics collected on the Form I-485 to the Form I-601. If the Form I-601 was not concurrently filed with the Form I-485, USCIS would first obtain a positive biometrics-based identity verification and a biographic data match to the previously submitted Form I-485 before associating different biometrics to the Form I-601. Identity verification based solely upon a comparison of the individual's name or other non-unique biographic identification characteristics or data, or combinations thereof, would never constitute positive identity verification for purposes of USCIS biometric reuse

fication and a biographic data match to the previously submitted Form I-485 before associating different biometrics to the Form I-601. Identity verification based solely upon a comparison of the individual's name or other non-unique biographic identification characteristics or data, or combinations thereof, would never constitute positive identity verification for purposes of USCIS biometric reuse.

40 Only certain family-based or other benefit requests would be impacted by the proposed provision to allow, request, or require DNA evidence to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship or biological sex.

Further, DHS recognizes that there is no value in imposing a biometric collection for forms that are only filed in conjunction with other forms that already require biometrics collection. Consequently, the DHS forms that are being revised and posted in accordance with the PRA for public comments do not include an absolute requirement for biometrics collection. Instead, the revised form instructions put the individual on notice that (1) every applicant, petitioner, sponsor, supporter, derivative, dependent, and beneficiary of an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information submitted to DHS is required to provide biometrics unless DHS otherwise exempts the requirement, and (2) that the individual will be notified of the time and place for the appointment. For most forms for which DHS proposes to mandate biometrics as proposed under this rule, DHS has incorporated any costs and fees associated with a biometric services appointment within the filing fee for the immigration benefit being sought. 41 See the PRA section of this rule for information on how to comment on the proposed form instructions for implementing the changes proposed in this rule.

41 See 8 CFR part 106.

1. Identity Management

DHS is proposing to use biometrics for identity management, during the entire course of the immigration lifecycle for several reasons

ection and verification. After an identity has been biometrically verified, reusable fingerprints allow for more immediate and recurrent background checks, and reusable photographs allow for quick production of documents with high consistency and integrity.

42 See DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Person Centric Identity Services (PCIS) Initiative,” DHS Reference No. DHS/USCIS/PIA-087 (Dec. 7, 2022), https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2022-12/privacy-pia-uscis-pia087-pcis-december2022.pdf.

43 See https://www.dhs.gov/exchanging-biometric-data (last updated Apr. 4, 2025).

In this proposed rule, DHS recognizes that biometric reuse is acceptable only when there is a biometric-based identity verification. 44 See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(4). DHS has a duty to the public to ensure that immigration benefits are granted only to those who are eligible for them, to ensure that no benefit is provided to the wrong individual, and to verify that individuals entering the country are who they say they are. See generally INA sec. 103, 8 U.S.C. 1103 (charging DHS with the administration and enforcement of the INA). Further, DHS's responsibility is reinforced by E.O. 14161, which directs the Secretary of Homeland Security to “determine the information needed from any country to adjudicate any visa, admission, or other benefit under the INA for one of its nationals, and to ascertain whether the individual seeking the benefit is who the individual claims to be and that the individual is not a security or public-safety threat.”

44 USCIS has allowed biometric reuse in specific situations including during the COVID-19 pandemic to address public health concerns. See https://www.uscis.gov/archive/uscis-to-continue-processing-applications-for-employment-authorization-extension-requests-despite (last updated Mar. 30, 2020).

A biometrically-based, person-centric records model ensures that an individual's records are complete and pertain only to that individual

tification and the detection of possible threats to national security and public safety. Collectively, information obtained via biometric submission per this proposed rule will improve national security and public safety while ensuring that only eligible individuals are granted immigration benefits and are permitted to maintain a previously granted benefit.

48 See generally INA sec. 212, 8 U.S.C. 1182, Grounds of Inadmissibility.

49 See, e.g., “ Individuals with Multiple Identities in Historical Fingerprint Enrollment Records Who Have Received Immigration Benefits,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, OIG-17-111 (Sept. 2017); “Potentially Ineligible Individuals Have Been Granted U.S. Citizenship Because of Incomplete Fingerprint Records,” Department of Homeland Security, Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, OIG-16-130 (Sept. 2016); “Review of U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services' Alien Security Checks, Department of Homeland Security,” Office of Inspector General, Office of Inspections and Special Reviews, OIG-06-06 (Nov. 2005).

DHS plans to implement a program of continuous immigration vetting during the entirety of the immigration lifecycle. Under continuous vetting, DHS may require aliens to be subject to continued and subsequent evaluation of eligibility for their immigration benefits to ensure they continue to present no risk of causing harm subsequent to their entry and are maintaining and complying with any terms of admission or conditions required of their nonimmigrant or immigrant status. This rule proposes that any individual alien who is present in the United States following an approved immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information may be required to submit biometrics or undergo biometric-based screening and vetting unless and until they are granted U.S. citizenship

relationship or legal relationship in the case of gestational parentage. Current regulations generally require documentary evidence such as marriage and birth certificates as primary evidence of such a claimed relationship. 54 In the absence of primary evidence, acceptable secondary evidence includes medical records, school records, religious documents, and affidavits. See, e.g., 8 CFR 204.2(d)(2). However, documentary evidence may be unreliable or unavailable, and individuals need additional means to establish claimed genetic relationships, in cases where a genetic relationship is claimed, to avoid denial of a benefit request, other request, or collection of information. USCIS currently accepts DNA test results from laboratories accredited by the AABB (formerly the American Association of Blood Banks) as proof of the existence of a claimed genetic relationship where other evidence is unavailable. 55

54 See, e.g., 8 CFR 103.2(b)(2)(i), 204.2(c)(2)(ii), (d)(2)(i) through (iii), (d)(5)(ii), (f)(2)(i) through (iii), (g)(2)(i) through (iii), 207.7(e), 208.21(f), 245.11(b), 245.15(l)(2), and 254.24(h)(1)(iii).

55 Although most of the collection of DNA samples is performed by the AABB-accredited laboratory conducting the testing, for individuals residing overseas, DHS or the Department of State facilitate collection and transmission of the DNA sample to the laboratory to ensure regularity in the collection and proper chain of custody of the DNA sample.

DHS proposes to revise its regulations to provide that DNA genetic testing can be required, requested, or accepted as evidence, either primary or secondary, to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship where necessary. 56 See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2). DNA is the only biometric that can verify a genetic relationship. Current regulations allow USCIS to require Blood Group Antigen or Human Leukocyte Antigen (HLA) tests to prove parentage only after other forms of evidence were inconclusive. See 8 CFR 204.2(d)(2)(vi)

w.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3375130/.

58 AABB, “Standards for Relationship Testing Laboratories,” Appendix 9 Immigration Testing, 16th ed (Jan. 1, 2024).

DHS proposes to define the term “DNA” in regulation as “deoxyribonucleic acid, which carries the genetic instructions used in the growth, development, functioning, and reproduction of all known living organisms.” See proposed 8 CFR 1.2. When DHS uses the term “DNA” in this rule it is a reference to the raw genetic material, typically saliva, collected via buccal swab from an individual in order to facilitate DNA testing to prove or disprove genetic relationships or biological sex. 59 DHS will only require, request, or accept DNA testing to prove or disprove a claimed, or unclaimed genetic relationship or to confirm biological sex. DHS will only store or share raw DNA or biological samples to facilitate DNA testing (by using a DHS or DHS-authorized facility, an on-site automated machine, or transmitting to the AABB-accredited laboratory conducting the testing), unless DHS is required to share by law. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2).

59 https://www.uscis.gov/tools/reports-and-studies/understanding-our-data (last updated Dec. 2, 2020).

For DHS, there are two different means of testing the raw DNA to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship. After DNA samples are collected, an individual's raw DNA material will be tested at a DHS facility or DHS authorized facility (locally by an automated machine ( i.e., Rapid DNA) 60 or mailed to a traditional AABB-accredited laboratory for testing). This testing allows for the comparison of partial DNA profiles to determine the statistical probability that the individuals tested have or do not have a genetic relationship. In either case, a partial DNA profile would be produced as a result of the test. When DHS uses the term “partial DNA profile” it is a reference to a visual or printed partial representation of a small portion of an individual's particular DNA characteristics

ison of partial DNA profiles to determine the statistical probability that the individuals tested have or do not have a genetic relationship. In either case, a partial DNA profile would be produced as a result of the test. When DHS uses the term “partial DNA profile” it is a reference to a visual or printed partial representation of a small portion of an individual's particular DNA characteristics. 61 An individual's partial DNA profile is a biometric identifier as unique as their fingerprints. Significantly, when an individual's DNA is tested in order to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed or unclaimed genetic relationship, the test

does not reveal medical or hereditary conditions. 62 The particular genetic markers profiled for relationship testing are markers specifically used to illustrate the existence of a genetic relationship. More specifically, the partial DNA profile created for relationship testing is a very small portion of an individual's full DNA characteristics. At present, DHS relationship tests profile between 16 and 24 genetic markers out of the nearly 2 million genetic markers typically contained in human DNA. In contrast with raw DNA or biological samples, which will not be shared or stored under any circumstances unless required to share by law, DHS may store or share DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, with other law enforcement agencies to the extent permitted by and necessary to enforce and administer the immigration and naturalization laws. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2). For example, if a claimed genetic relationship is fraudulent and USCIS denies a petition, the DNA test results would be retained in the alien's A-file, the same as a rap sheet or a birth certificate; and if that alien is placed in removal proceedings EOIR would need to review the basis for the denial and any finding of fraud

ionship, depending on the particular relationship in question ( i.e., parent, full-sibling, half-sibling, etc.). 64 DNA test results which include a partial DNA profile, where they indicate a sufficient probability of the existence of the relationship tested, are now accepted as evidence to establish parent and sibling genetic relationships. See Matter of Ruzku, 26 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2016).

63 Id.

64 See USCIS, DHS, “DNA Evidence of Sibling Relationships,” PM 602.0106.1, (April 17, 2018) (establishing the threshold probabilities for full and half sibling relationships); USCIS, DHS, “Genetic Relationship Testing; Suggesting DNA Tests Revisions to the Adjudicators Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 21 (AFM Update AD07-25),” (Mar. 19, 2008) (establishing voluntary or suggested nature of DNA testing to verify claimed relationships and citing AABB testing standards); DOS, “Foreign Affairs Manual,” 9 FAM 601.11-1(A)(a)(2), CT: VISA-1276 (May 12, 2021) (stating that DNA “test results reporting a 99.5 percent or greater degree of certainty” may be accepted by consular officers as “sufficient to support a biological relationship between a parent and child in visa cases”); See also DOJ, “Matter of Nejat Ibrahim RUZKU, Beneficiary of a visa petition filed by Abdalla Ibrahim Ruzku, Petitioner,” 26 I&N Dec. 731 (BIA 2016) (Mar. 29, 2016) (holding direct sibling-to-sibling DNA test results reflecting a 99.5 percent degree of certainty or higher that a full sibling biological relationship exists should be accepted and considered to be evidence of the relationship).

This rule further proposes to grant DHS express authority to require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, from relevant parties, such as applicants, petitioners, derivatives, dependents, and beneficiaries, to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits, or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws

gibility. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2)(i) and (ii). DHS proposes to collect, treat and locate raw DNA (the physical sample taken from the applicable individual), at a DHS or DHS-authorized facility. DHS will not handle or share any raw DNA for any reason beyond the original purpose of submission ( e.g., to prove or disprove an individual's biological sex), unless DHS is required to share by law. DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, become part of the record, and DHS will store and share DNA test results, for adjudication purposes, including to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws, to the extent permitted by law.

65 See E.O. 14201, Keeping Men Out of Women's Sports, section 1, 90 FR 9279 (Feb. 5, 2025).

Consistent with current practice, the DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, obtained by DHS and showing the ultimate probability of relationship or biological sex, would be retained in the individual's Alien file (A-file) and made part of the record. Under this proposed rule, if finalized, DHS may use and store DNA test results as necessary to administer and enforce the immigration and naturalization laws, and share said DNA results with other law enforcement agencies to the extent permitted by law. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2)(iii).

Currently, DHS allows individuals in certain situations to voluntarily submit DNA test results from AABB-accredited laboratories 66 where other documentary evidence is inconclusive or unavailable

ry to administer and enforce the immigration and naturalization laws, and share said DNA results with other law enforcement agencies to the extent permitted by law. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2)(iii).

Currently, DHS allows individuals in certain situations to voluntarily submit DNA test results from AABB-accredited laboratories 66 where other documentary evidence is inconclusive or unavailable. 67 This rule proposes to clarify and codify that DHS may require, request, or accept raw DNA or DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, from relevant parties, such as applicants, petitioners, derivatives, dependents, and beneficiaries, to an immigration-related benefit request, other request, or collection of information as evidence of a claimed, or unclaimed genetic relationship or biological sex. It also proposes to clarify that DHS may consider DNA test results in adjudicating certain immigration benefits as a means of proving or disproving a claimed, or unclaimed genetic relationship, biological sex or to establish eligibility for the requested benefit. And the rule proposes to clarify DHS's authority to collect raw DNA from relevant parties, such as applicants, petitioners, derivatives, dependents, and beneficiaries, and

either perform a DNA test at a DHS or DHS-authorized facility or send the raw DNA to a traditional AABB-accredited lab. DHS requests comments on all aspects of this proposal, including the collection, use, and retention of DNA evidence.

66 See https://www.aabb.org/home (last visited Apr. 3, 2025).

67 See USCIS, DHS, “Genetic Relationship Testing; Suggesting DNA Tests Revisions to the Adjudicators Field Manual (AFM) Chapter 21 (AFM Update AD07-25),” (Mar. 19, 2008) (establishing voluntary or suggested nature of DNA testing to verify claimed relationships and citing AABB testing standards).

2. Special Treatment of DNA Evidence

While DNA is fundamentally a biometric identifier, DHS recognizes the increased sensitivity surrounding the use of genetic information

istering its programs. Unfortunately, there is no guaranteed way to prevent the manufacturing, counterfeiting, alteration, sale, and use of fraudulent identity documents or other fraudulent documents to circumvent immigration laws or for identity theft. On the other hand, biometric identifiers are not transferable and may provide confirmation or non-confirmation of an individual's claimed identity. Therefore, DHS believes that the best approach to address the vulnerabilities in the immigration process, preclude imposters, and deter fraud would be to rely more on biometrics for identity management in the immigration lifecycle.

C. Flexibility in Biometrics Requirements

1. Definition of Biometrics

In recent years, government agencies have grouped together identifying features and actions, such as fingerprints, photographs, and signatures under the broad term, biometrics. 69 The terms biometric “information,” “identifiers,” or “data” are used to refer to all of these features, including additional features such as ocular image (iris, retina and sclera), palm print, DNA, and voice print. 70 For example, authorities such as 18 U.S.C. 1028(d)(7)(B) and 17 CFR 162.30(b)(8) refer to identifying information, including “unique biometric data, such as fingerprint, voice print or iris image, or other unique physical representation.” The term “biometrics” is also used in other laws and regulations. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. 1028(d)(7)(B), 17 CFR 162.30(b)(8)(ii), 21 CFR 11.3(b)(3), and 27 CFR 73.3. As a result, DHS has adopted the practice of referring to fingerprints and photographs collectively as “biometrics,” “biometric information,” or “biometric services.”

69 See FBI, “Next Generation Identification (NGI),” https://www.fbi.gov/services/cjis/fingerprints-and-other-biometrics/ngi (last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

70 See FBI, “Biometrics and Fingerprints,” https://le.fbi.gov/science-and-lab/biometrics-and-fingerprints (last visited Apr. 11, 2025)

iometrics would codify and authorize the collection of specific biometric modalities and the use of biometrics for: identity enrollment, verification, and management in the immigration lifecycle; national security and criminal history background checks; determinations of eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits; and the production of secure identity documents. See proposed 8 CFR 1.2. DNA, while a biometric, would be collected by USCIS in limited circumstances to prove or disprove the existence of a claimed, or unclaimed, genetic relationship, or biological sex and to determine eligibility for immigration and naturalization benefits or to perform any other functions necessary for administering and enforcing immigration and naturalization laws. Such examples include instances to verify a genetic relationship between a claimed biological parent and biological child or to prove or disprove an individual's biological sex in instances where that determination will impact benefit eligibility. Additionally, DNA evidence could be used to identify fraud in instances where DHS establishes the likelihood of a genetic relationship that invalidates eligibility for the benefit sought, such as the discovery of a parent-child or sibling relationship affiliated with a fraudulent claim of a marital relationship. See proposed 8 CFR 1.2 and 8 CFR 103.16(d)(2).

2. Additional Modalities

In addition to the current use of fingerprints 71 and photographs 72 (facial images) as biometric modalities, DHS proposes to begin requesting biometric collection (now and through emerging technologies) with the following additional biometric modalities: ocular (iris, retina, and sclera), palm print, voice, and DNA. 73 See proposed Definition of Biometrics in 8 CFR 1.2. The technology for collecting and using biometrics has undergone constant and rapid change

s 72 (facial images) as biometric modalities, DHS proposes to begin requesting biometric collection (now and through emerging technologies) with the following additional biometric modalities: ocular (iris, retina, and sclera), palm print, voice, and DNA. 73 See proposed Definition of Biometrics in 8 CFR 1.2. The technology for collecting and using biometrics has undergone constant and rapid change. 74 DHS needs to keep up with technological developments that will be used by the FBI and agencies with which we will be sharing and comparing biometrics and adjust collection and retention practices for both convenience and security, and to ensure the maximum level of service for all stakeholders. USCIS also has internal procedural safeguards to ensure technology used to collect, assess, and store the differing modalities is accurate, reliable, and valid. Additionally, as with any other USCIS petition or application, if a decision will be adverse to an applicant or petitioner and is based on unclassified derogatory information the agency considered, he or she shall be advised of that fact and offered an opportunity to rebut the information per current 8 CFR 103.2(b)(16). Therefore, DHS proposes that, as of the effective date of this rule, if finalized, it may begin collecting new biometrics modalities as follows.

71 Currently USCIS does not routinely use signatures for identity verification purposes other than for document production and visual verification.

72 DHS, “Privacy Impact Assessment for the Customer Profile Management System,” DHS Reference No. DHS/USCIS/PIA-060(d) (Sept. 27, 2024) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/24_0930_priv_pia-dhs-uscis-cpms-060d.pdf.

73 While DNA is included in the list of additional modalities, USCIS is addressing DNA as a distinct modality and discusses DNA separately.

74 FBI, “Science and Technology,” https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-investigate/science-and-technology (last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

HS/USCIS/PIA-060(d) (Sept. 27, 2024) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-11/24_0930_priv_pia-dhs-uscis-cpms-060d.pdf.

73 While DNA is included in the list of additional modalities, USCIS is addressing DNA as a distinct modality and discusses DNA separately.

74 FBI, “Science and Technology,” https://www.fbi.gov/how-we-investigate/science-and-technology (last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

a. Ocular Image

DHS proposes to collect and use ocular images as a biometric modality. The term ocular image refers to the eye and the structures within the eye to include the iris, retina and sclera. Ocular structure as a biometric modality is a valuable identifier especially for individuals whose fingerprints are unclassifiable or unattainable through loss of fingers, hand amputation, normal wear in the ridges and patterns over time ( e.g., due to age, types of employment, etc.), or deliberate eradication/distortion of fingerprint ridges to avoid identification and detection. Ocular scanning biometric technology measures the unique characteristics and patterns within the iris, 75 retina and sclera to verify and authenticate identity. Biometric ocular recognition is fast, accurate, and offers a form of identification verification that requires no physical contact to collect. DHS may collect ocular images as part of the biometric enrollment process to enroll and verify identity against IDENT, as well as to assist in the adjudication process by verifying against previous immigration encounters.

75 See DHS, “Biometric Technology Report,” (Dec. 26, 2024) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24_1230_st_13e-Final-Report-2024-12-26.pdf.

b. Palm Print

Report,” (Dec. 26, 2024) https://www.dhs.gov/sites/default/files/2024-12/24_1230_st_13e-Final-Report-2024-12-26.pdf.

b. Palm Print

DHS proposes to add palm prints as a biometrics modality in this rule. This proposal is consistent with what the FBI has announced as part of its NGI initiative for the development of the requirements for and deployment of an integrated National Palm Print Service. 76 Law enforcement agencies indicate that at least 30 percent of the prints lifted from crime scenes—from knife hilts, gun grips, steering wheels, and window panes—are of palms, not fingers. For this reason, capturing and scanning latent palm prints is becoming an area of increasing interest among the law enforcement community. The National Palm Print Service 77 is being

developed to improve law enforcement's ability to exchange a more complete set of biometric information, make additional identifications, and improve the overall accuracy of identification through criminal history records. Collecting palm prints would permit DHS to align our background checks capability with the total available records at the FBI's CJIS Division, keep current with the changing records of law enforcement, and make sure immigration benefit background checks are as accurate and complete as possible. Therefore, DHS proposes to reserve the authority to incorporate palm prints into its biometrics collection.

76 See Subcommittee on Biometrics, Committee on Homeland and National Security, Committee on Technology, National Science and Technology Council, Executive Office of the President, “Palm Print Recognition,” https://ucr.fbi.gov/fingerprints_biometrics/biometric-center-of-excellence/files/palm-print-recognition.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2025). For a basic explanation of NGI, see https://le.fbi.gov/science-and-lab/biometrics-and-fingerprints/biometrics/next-generation-identification-ngi (last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

77 CJIS Division, FBI, “National Palm Print System, Repository Available for Law Enforcement Access,” (Apr

of significantly reducing the time to verify a person's identity. Voice biometrics can be passive, where the user can say anything and a match is made from the voice to a voiceprint, or it can be active, where the caller is asked to recite a previously captured passphrase. In either option, the process is a natural, effortless way to identify the caller.

79 Annual Statistics Report: FY2023, U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (2024), https://www.uscis.gov/sites/default/files/document/reports/fy2023_annual_statistical_report.pdf (last accessed June 1, 2025).

80 Calculation: 14,000,000 annual calls received/approximately 260 operational working days in a year = 53,846 calls received per operational working day (rounded).

Third, voice verification could be used for identity verification in remote locations where an interview is required to adjudicate a benefit being sought, reducing the need for an applicant to travel to a USCIS Office. Finally, USCIS may also use voice prints, where applicable, to identify indicia of fraud, screen for public safety or criminal history, and vet potential national security issues.

DHS welcomes public comment on the various proposed modalities, reliability of technology, suggestions for alternative modalities, as well as its proposal for future modalities.

3. Amend Related Regulations To Align With the Purposes of This Proposed Rule and To Facilitate Electronic Filing

a. Clarify Terms

To conform with the proposed changes to expand biometric collection as previously discussed, DHS proposes to remove restrictive language elsewhere in regulations. Therefore, DHS proposes to remove individual references to “fingerprints,” “photographs,” and “signatures” where appropriate, and replace them with the more appropriate term “biometrics.” Further, DHS proposes to remove references to Blood Group Antigen tests as DHS seeks to expand biometric collection abilities to require, request or accept DNA or DNA test results

nguage elsewhere in regulations. Therefore, DHS proposes to remove individual references to “fingerprints,” “photographs,” and “signatures” where appropriate, and replace them with the more appropriate term “biometrics.” Further, DHS proposes to remove references to Blood Group Antigen tests as DHS seeks to expand biometric collection abilities to require, request or accept DNA or DNA test results. DHS proposes the following changes on account of proposed 8 CFR 103.16:

• Removing and Reserving 204.2(d)(2)(vi);

• Deleting 8 CFR 204.3(c)(3), which requires biometric submissions from prospective adoptive parent(s), or adult members of the adoptive parents' household, and outlining potential waivers;

• Removing the fingerprint requirement at 8 CFR 204.4(d)(1), and references to fingerprint and completed background checks as elements specifically mentioned in 8 CFR 204.4(g)(2)(ii) regarding the determination that a sponsor is of good moral character;

• Deleting biometric submission requirement in 8 CFR 204.5(p)(4);

• Deleting and reserving 8 CFR 204.310(b), which outlines the biometrics, waiver, and alternative evidentiary requirements for Form I-800A, Application for Determination of Suitability to Adopt a Child from a Convention Country;

• Replacing “fingerprint processing” in the second sentence of 8 CFR 208.10 with “biometric submission requirements;”

• Removing and reserving 8 CFR 210.1(b);

• Replacing “must be fingerprinted for the purpose of issuance of Form I-688A” with “submit biometrics” pursuant to 8 CFR 103.16 and replacing “shall” with “will” in proposed 8 CFR 210.2(c)(2)(iv);

• Replacing “shall” with “will” and “presentation or completion of Form FD-258 (Fingerprint Card)” with “biometric submission” in proposed 8 CFR 210.2(c)(3)(iv);

• Replacing “shall” with “will” and “complete Form FD-258 (Fingerprint Card)” with “appear for biometric submission” in proposed 8 CFR 210.2(c)(4)(iii).

• Removing biometrics content at 8 CFR 212.7(e)(6)

posed 8 CFR 210.2(c)(2)(iv);

• Replacing “shall” with “will” and “presentation or completion of Form FD-258 (Fingerprint Card)” with “biometric submission” in proposed 8 CFR 210.2(c)(3)(iv);

• Replacing “shall” with “will” and “complete Form FD-258 (Fingerprint Card)” with “appear for biometric submission” in proposed 8 CFR 210.2(c)(4)(iii).

• Removing biometrics content at 8 CFR 212.7(e)(6).

• Replacing “biometric information would be required” with “biometric information will be required” at 8 CFR 215.9.

• Replacing “fingerprints on Form FD-258” with “biometric collection” in 8 CFR 235.7(a)(3) and replacing

“fingerprints” with “biometrics” in 8 CFR 235.7(a)(4)(vi).

• Replacing references to fingerprints and photographs with “submission of biometrics” at 8 CFR 236.5.

• Replaces “Fingerprinting requirements” with “Interview and biometric collection” and replaces references to fingerprints and FD-258s with biometrics at 8 CFR 240.67(a).

• Replacing reference to “fingerprinting” with “biometrics” in 8 CFR 240.68.

• Removing “fingerprinting” and replacing with “biometrics” in 8 CFR 240.70(d)(4).

• Removing reference to “photographs,” “a completed fingerprint card (Form FD-258)” and “fingerprint” and replacing with “biometrics” at 8 CFR 245a.2(d), d(2)(ii), and (e)(1).

• Removing reference to fingerprints in 8 CFR 245a.3(b)(1)(e).

• Removing reference to “photographs” and “a completed fingerprint card (Form FD-258))” in 8 CFR 245a.4(b)(4) and removal of “Form FD-258 (Applicant Card)” with biometrics in 8 CFR 245a.4(b)(5).

• Removing references to fingerprinting and replacing them with biometrics in 8 CFR 264.1(e)(1), (2), (3), (3)(g), and 3(g)(1).

• Removing and reserving 8 CFR 264.2(d) which addressed fingerprinting.

• Removing and reserving 8 CFR 264.5(i) which addressed photographs and fingerprinting.

• Removing “fingerprints” and replacing with “biometrics” in 8 CFR 287.11(b)(3).

• Removing “fingerprint” and replacing with “biometrics or biometric data” in 8 CFR 335.2.

submission inaccurate, the photograph of the child is accurate the day it is collected, but over time the accuracy and reliability of the photograph diminishes. For those reasons, the removal of age restrictions may lead to more frequent biometric collections compared to adults. 85

81 “Children” and “minor” are used interchangeably here and without regard to any single or specific INA definition.

82 See Michael Pearson, “Fingerprint Waiver Policy for All Applicants for Benefits Under the Immigration and Naturalization Act and Procedures for Applicants Whose Fingerprint Responses Expire after the Age Range During Which Fingerprints are Required,” Headquarters Office of Field Operations, Immigration and Naturalization Service, United States Department of Justice, (July 20, 2001) (waiving general fingerprinting requirements for certain ages and classifications of individuals otherwise required under regulation).

83 DOS, “Apply for a Child Under 16,” https://travel.state.gov/content/travel/en/passports/need-passport/under-16.html (last updated Feb. 11, 2025).

84 DOS, “Application for a U.S. Passport,” https://eforms.state.gov/Forms/ds11_pdf.PDF (last visited Apr. 11, 2025).

85 DHS acknowledges that some biometric data are more subject to change over time in children than adults, which may result in lower accuracy match rates. For example, matches resulting from facial images of children, when using facial recognition tools, may have lower accuracy rates than adults due to changes attributed to growth and development. However, this potential issue can be mitigated with more frequent image collection, similar to the Department of State's approach to the validity period of child passport photos. See generally, U.S

nsuring that every individual's identity is established or verified—regardless of age—when they are placed in removal proceedings under the INA. Just as with the granting of immigration benefits, biographical identifiers are of limited use when verifying identity because individuals share common names and an individual may misrepresent his or her identity when facing immigration enforcement action. Furthermore, with respect to children under the age of 14 who are issued NTAs, the collection of biometric information to determine identity will significantly assist DHS in its mission to combat human trafficking, child sex trafficking, forced labor exploitation, and alien smuggling, while simultaneously promoting national security, public safety, and the integrity of the immigration system.

86 See, e.g., INA secs. 103(a) and 239; 8 CFR 2.1 and 239.1.

DHS is authorized to share relevant information internally, with other law enforcement agencies, and as otherwise permitted under law, including “biometrics” and, consequently, is proposing that it may share DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, with other agencies where there are national security, public safety, fraud, or other investigative needs, but always consistent with any legal limitations on such information sharing. Therefore, because the proposed requirements in this rule, requiring appearance for biometric collection or interview would apply to any individual, without age limitation, DHS proposes to remove all age limitations or restrictions on biometrics collection. However, DHS also proposes that the biometric collection may be exempted at DHS's discretion. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16.

at the biometric collection may be exempted at DHS's discretion. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16.

Under the authority granted by the proposed rule, individual DHS components will be able to establish an age threshold for biometric collection specific to a particular component's operational needs. Immigration officers may collect biometrics, pursuant to the authority granted by INA sec. 287(b), 8 U.S.C. 1357(b) from individuals under the age of 14 categorically or on a case-by-case basis, depending on the circumstances. Section 287(f)(1) of the INA 8 U.S.C. 1357(f)(1) provides that through regulation DHS shall provide for the fingerprinting and photographing of each alien 14 years of age or older placed into removal proceedings. While this requires DHS to fingerprint and photograph any alien who is 14 years or older who is placed into removal

proceedings, it does not limit or prohibit DHS authority to collect biometrics from aliens younger than 14 when authorized by other laws. Removing the age restrictions associated with biometric collections from the regulations will permit DHS components maximum flexibility in their day-to-day operations.

DHS reviewed statutes containing requirements for individuals to submit biometrics to DHS at a certain age and determined those statutes do not restrict or limit the collection of biometrics to these ages. First, INA sec. 262(b), 8 U.S.C. 1302, states “Whenever any alien attains his fourteenth birthday in the United States he shall, within 30 days thereafter, apply in person for registration and to be fingerprinted.” Second, INA sec. 264(a), 8 U.S.C. 1304, provides that the Secretary is authorized “to prepare forms for the registration and fingerprinting of aliens” aged 14 and older in the United States, as required by INA sec. 262, 8 U.S.C. 1302. While section 264(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C

irthday in the United States he shall, within 30 days thereafter, apply in person for registration and to be fingerprinted.” Second, INA sec. 264(a), 8 U.S.C. 1304, provides that the Secretary is authorized “to prepare forms for the registration and fingerprinting of aliens” aged 14 and older in the United States, as required by INA sec. 262, 8 U.S.C. 1302. While section 264(a) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1304(a) requires that biometrics be submitted by lawful permanent residents aged 14 and older, it does not limit or prohibit DHS authority from requiring anyone, including lawful permanent residents or individuals seeking immigration benefits who are under the age of 14, from submitting biometrics as authorized by other laws.

In addition to removing the age limit on biometrics, DHS proposes to update the regulations at 8 CFR 207.2(a) to provide that, at its discretion, USCIS may conduct interviews for refugee applicants under the age of 14. This proposed change will clarify that applicants for refugee status may be subject to the same interview requirements provided in proposed 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9), allowing USCIS, at its discretion to require an interview for any applicant, regardless of age. In applying this provision, if finalized, USCIS will exercise its discretion on a case-by-case basis, consistent with USCIS guidance and training materials related to interviewing and adjudicating claims involving children.

c. Remove Redundant Provisions

DHS proposes in this rule to have one regulatory provision that governs the requirement to submit biometrics for all immigration benefit requests or other requests or collections of information. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16. As discussed in section IV.E of this preamble, this new provision will also include the standard for rescheduling a biometrics services appointment and the consequences for failure to submit required biometrics, unless exempted. Id

U.S.C. 1444, states:

(a) Three identical photographs of the applicant shall be signed by and furnished by each applicant for naturalization or citizenship. One of such photographs shall be affixed by the Attorney General to the original certificate of naturalization issued to the naturalized citizen and one to the duplicate certificate of naturalization required to be forwarded to the Service.

(b) Three identical photographs of the applicant shall be furnished by each applicant for—

(1) a record of lawful admission for permanent residence to be made under INA sec. 249;

(2) a certificate of derivative citizenship; (3) a certificate of naturalization or of citizenship;

(4) a special certificate of naturalization;

(5) a certificate of naturalization or of citizenship, in lieu of one lost, mutilated, or destroyed;

(6) a new certificate of citizenship in the new name of any naturalized citizen who, subsequent to naturalization, has had his name changed by order of a court of competent jurisdiction or by marriage; and

(7) a declaration of intention.

One such photograph shall be affixed to each such certificate issued by the Attorney General and one shall be affixed to the copy of such certificate retained by the Service.

There is nothing in INA sec. 333 that prohibits the submission of photographs electronically or with a digital image. A digital photograph collected at an ASC satisfies all of the requirements of INA sec. 333. Therefore, DHS proposes to revise 8 CFR 333.1 to provide that every applicant under section 333 of the Act must provide a photograph in the manner prescribed in his or her biometrics notice or other notification by USCIS.

at prohibits the submission of photographs electronically or with a digital image. A digital photograph collected at an ASC satisfies all of the requirements of INA sec. 333. Therefore, DHS proposes to revise 8 CFR 333.1 to provide that every applicant under section 333 of the Act must provide a photograph in the manner prescribed in his or her biometrics notice or other notification by USCIS.

e. Technical Edits and Edits for Clarity

DHS is also proposing technical edits to update or remove references to position titles, form numbers, mailing addresses, copies, and office jurisdiction, edits to regulatory text for clarity, and edits that remove unnecessary operational or procedural constraints that have become technologically or organizationally outdated. For example, proposed 8 CFR 207.7(d) uses the correct form name for “Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition,” but updates the regulatory text by replacing “revoke” with “reopened and denied” to accurately describe the procedural disposition of the “Refugee/Asylee Relative Petition” under the scenario governed by 8 CFR 207.7(d). DHS also proposes to amend its regulations to remove 8 CFR 216.4(b)(1) and (2) because the two sections are purely operational and are superfluous given the statutory requirements and regulatory revisions proposed to 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9). See INA sec. 216; 8 U.S.C. 1186a. The proposed changes would not alter regulatory eligibility requirements but rather would clarify certain interview procedures for conditional permanent residents to reduce potential redundancies and ensure greater uniformity within USCIS operations. Additionally, DHS is proposing edits to update terms and cross-references resulting from the revisions of this proposed rule. See proposed 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9), 208.21(f), 209.1(b), 209.2(c), 214.2(e)(23)(viii), 214.2(k)(1), 214.15(f)(1), 240.21(b)(2)(ii), 244.6(a), 244.17(a), and 245a.12(b) and (d).

D. Biometrics Requirement for U.S. Citizens, U.S

ensure greater uniformity within USCIS operations. Additionally, DHS is proposing edits to update terms and cross-references resulting from the revisions of this proposed rule. See proposed 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9), 208.21(f), 209.1(b), 209.2(c), 214.2(e)(23)(viii), 214.2(k)(1), 214.15(f)(1), 240.21(b)(2)(ii), 244.6(a), 244.17(a), and 245a.12(b) and (d).

D. Biometrics Requirement for U.S. Citizens, U.S. Nationals, and Lawful Permanent Residents

DHS proposes that any individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information, must submit biometrics. In certain circumstances this will include U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents (LPRs). See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(1). Under current regulations, biometrics from U.S. citizens are generally mandatory only in connection with adoption-based petitions and applications. See 8 CFR 204.3(c)(3); 8 CFR 204.310(b). The regulations do not generally require biometrics from U.S. citizens or LPRs filing family-based petitions. See generally 8 CFR 204.1 and 214.2(k). As discussed below, DHS has determined that U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and LPR petitioners must submit biometrics in connection with certain benefit requests in order for DHS to better ensure that it can comply with existing laws.

1. The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006

The Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006 (AWA) amended the INA to prohibit a U.S. citizen or LPR from filing a family-based immigrant visa petition or nonimmigrant fiancé(e) visa petition if he or she has been convicted of a “specified offense against a minor,” unless the Secretary first determines, in the Secretary's sole and unreviewable discretion, that the petitioner poses “no risk” to the beneficiary. See Adam Walsh Child Protection and Safety Act of 2006, Public Law 109-248 (July 27, 2006), codified at INA secs. 204(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) and (B)(i)(II), 8 U.S.C. 1154(a)(1)(A)(viii)(I) and (B)(i)(II), and INA sec. 101(a)(15)(K), 8 U.S.C

iminal sexual conduct involving a minor, or the use of the internet to facilitate or attempt such conduct; or

• Any conduct that by its nature is a sex offense against a minor. 89

89 “Sex offense” is defined in section 111(5)(A) of the Adam Walsh Act, Public Law 109-248 (2006), codified at 34 U.S.C. 20911(5).

2. The International Marriage Broker Regulation Act (IMBRA)

IMBRA 90 requires U.S. citizen petitioners for an alien fiancé(e) (K-1) or alien spouse (K-3) nonimmigrant to submit with his or her Form I-129F, Petition for Alien Fiancé(e), criminal conviction information on any of the following “specified crimes”:

90 International Marriage Broker Regulation Act of 2005, Public Law 109-162 (Jan. 5, 2006), codified at INA secs. 214(d)(1), (r)(1), and (r)(4), 8 U.S.C. 1184(d)(1), (r)(1), and (r)(4).

• Domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse and neglect, dating violence, elder abuse, and stalking, or an attempt to commit any of these crimes;

• Homicide, murder, manslaughter, rape, abusive sexual contact, sexual exploitation, incest, torture, trafficking, peonage, holding hostage, involuntary servitude, slave trade, kidnapping, abduction, unlawful criminal restraint, false imprisonment, or an attempt to commit any of these crimes; and

• Crimes relating to a controlled substance or alcohol where the petitioner has been convicted on at least three occasions and where such crimes did not arise from a single act. 91

91 INA secs. 214(d), (r), 8 U.S.C. 1184(d), (r).

It also requires petitioners to submit information on any protection or restraining orders issued against the petitioner related to the “specified crimes” of domestic violence, sexual assault, child abuse and neglect, dating violence, elder abuse, and stalking, or an attempt to commit any of these crimes. 92

92 INA secs. 214(d), (r), 8 U.S.C. 1184(d), (r)

tims the opportunity to “self-petition” or independently seek legal immigration status. DHS proposes in this rule that any applicant, petitioner, sponsor, beneficiary, or individual filing or associated with a benefit request, other request, or collection of information, to include VAWA self-petitioners, must appear for biometrics collection unless biometrics are exempted. See proposed 8 CFR 204.2. In addition, as noted in the PRA section of this preamble, DHS proposes to revise the applicable forms to require VAWA self-petitioners to comply with the biometrics submission requirement proposed in this rule.

95 For purposes of this proposed rule, “VAWA self-petitioner” refers to aliens who file Form I-360, Petition for Amerasian, Widow(er), or Special Immigrant under INA secs. 204(a)(1)(A)(iii), (iv), or (vii).

VAWA self-petitioners are currently not subject to a categorical biometric collection, however they may be required to submit biometrics on a non-routine basis for identity verification and the production of EADs, and they must establish good moral character required under 8 CFR 204.2(c)(2)(v) and 204.2(e)(2)(v). Currently, VAWA self-petitioners may establish good moral character through primary evidence, such as the self-petitioner's affidavit and local police clearances, or state-issued criminal background checks from each locality or state in the United States where the self-petitioner has resided for 6 or more months during the 3 years before filing. While VAWA self-petitioners are encouraged to submit primary evidence, when possible, USCIS considers any credible evidence of good moral character, such as affidavits from responsible persons who can knowledgeably attest to the self-petitioner's good moral character. USCIS does not currently categorically use biometrics to verify the accuracy or completeness of the disclosed criminal history information

more gambling offenses committed during such period ” (emphasis added). In the 1996 VAWA Interim Rule, INS characterized its interpretation and implementation of this statutory regime as requiring self-petitioners, including children ages 14 and older, to provide evidence establishing that they have been persons of good moral character for the 3 years preceding the date of filing. See 61 FR 13066. Additionally, INS retained discretion to consider the self-petitioner's conduct or acts prior to the 3-year period, if it found reason to believe the self-petitioner had not been a person of good moral character in the past. Id. The 1996 VAWA Interim Rule, however, did not codify an eligibility requirement that self-petitioners must demonstrate that they have been persons of good moral character for the 3 years before filing; the only reference to such a period is found in the evidentiary provisions stating that self-petitioners should submit police clearances or similar background reports for the 3 years before filing. 8 CFR 204.2(c)(2)(v) and (e)(2)(v). The regulation also provides for the denial of a pending self-petition, or the revocation of an approved self-petition if the self-petitioner has not yet been issued an immigrant visa or adjusted to LPR status, upon disclosure of evidence that the self-petitioner “is no longer” a person of good moral character or had not been a person of good moral character “in the past.” 8 CFR 204.2(c)(1)(vii) and (e)(1)(vii).

Upon publication of the 1996 VAWA Interim Rule, INS asserted in policy that the rule required self-petitioners 14 years of age and older to provide evidence of their good moral character for the 3 years before filing

tion unless biometrics are exempted. Second, official criminal history results from biometric-based security checks will provide a more reliable means for obtaining or verifying an accurate and complete criminal history for an applicant than official criminal history results that rely on applicants to obtain and present appropriate local police clearances or state-issued criminal background checks. Third, this proposed rule eliminates the additional burden that the submission of local police clearance letters creates for certain applicants ( e.g., applicants who resided in multiple jurisdictions during the requisite period). Fourth, since the submission of local police clearance letters is redundant, because T nonimmigrant adjustment of status applicants are currently subject to a biometrics requirement, it logically follows that the regulation should reflect that adjudicators assess good moral character with the most reliable and comprehensive evidence available ( i.e., official criminal history results from the biometric-based security checks). 100 Presently, USCIS requires biometrics for T adjustment of status applicants, however, the regulations also require applicants to submit police clearance letters, if available, which adjudicators consider in addition to other credible evidence when determining good moral character. For these reasons, DHS proposes to eliminate the requirement that applicants for adjustment status based on underlying T nonimmigrant status submit self-obtained police clearance letters from United States jurisdictions.

100 Office of the Attorney General, DOJ, “Matter of Castillo-Perez,” 27 I&N Dec. 664, 666-67 (A.G. 2019) (Oct. 25, 2019) (discussing meaning of “good moral character” and explaining that “an alien's criminal record is highly probative of whether he possesses good moral character”).

There are several additional benefits to eliminating the self-obtained police clearance requirement for T adjustment of status applicants

rcement clearance, criminal background check, or similar report issued by an appropriate authority from the foreign jurisdiction in which criminal arrest, charge or conviction took place, until USCIS has automated data-sharing capabilities that allow the agency to query foreign partner countries for a self-petitioner's criminal history record information, and notifies the public of such capability.

As noted above, USCIS currently assesses good moral character based on

biometric-based security check results and other relevant evidence in the file, including an affidavit from the applicant attesting to their good moral character accompanied by a local police clearance or a state-issued criminal background check from each locality or state in the United States in which the applicant has resided for 6 or more months during the requisite period in continued presence or T-1 nonimmigrant status. The proposed revision of 8 CFR 245.23(g) would codify the current USCIS policy and practice of collecting biometrics and eliminate the need for USCIS adjudicators to verify past addresses against police clearance letters, because the information in the applicant's criminal history and national security background check result will be the most relevant and reliable evidence for assessing good moral character. However, as proposed, if an applicant has been subject to criminal arrest, charge, or been convicted outside the United States during the requisite period, the applicant will have to provide a law enforcement clearance, criminal background check, or similar report issued by an appropriate authority from the foreign jurisdiction. Additionally, DHS may, in its discretion, request evidence of good moral character of a T applicant under the age of 14.

DHS also proposes to clarify regulatory language referring to the requisite period of good moral character for T nonimmigrant adjustment of status applicants

earance, criminal background check, or similar report issued by an appropriate authority from the foreign jurisdiction. Additionally, DHS may, in its discretion, request evidence of good moral character of a T applicant under the age of 14.

DHS also proposes to clarify regulatory language referring to the requisite period of good moral character for T nonimmigrant adjustment of status applicants. The current regulation references evaluating good moral character during a requisite period of “continued presence.” See 8 CFR 245.23(g)(1). “Continued presence” is an established term in the immigration and trafficking in persons context but is not the correct term to refer to the period relevant to USCIS' evaluation of good moral character. Rather, USCIS believes the current regulatory language was intended to refer to the requirement that the applicant be physically present “for a continuous period of at least 3 years since the date of admission as a nonimmigrant” or “continuous period during the investigation or prosecution of acts of trafficking.” See INA sec. 245(l)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. 1255(l)(1)(A). Therefore, DHS proposes to amend 8 CFR 245.23(g) to refer to the relevant period, per INA sec. 245(l)(1)(A); 8 U.S.C. 1255(l)(1)(A), as the “requisite period” and remove references to “continued presence.”

Consistent with other adjudicative determinations of good moral character in certain limited circumstances, when assessing good moral character for T nonimmigrant adjustment applicants, USCIS would be able to consider the applicant's conduct beyond the requisite period, where: (1) the earlier conduct directly relates to a determination of the applicant's moral character during the requisite period; and (2) the conduct of the applicant during the requisite period does not reflect that there has been a reform of character from an earlier period. See generally 8 CFR 316.10(a)(2)

to remove the presumption of good moral character for T nonimmigrant adjustment of status applicants under 14 years of age. See 8 CFR 245.23(g)(4). Rather, the rule provides that such applicants will submit biometrics like any other applicant, and it preserves USCIS' discretionary authority to require that applicants provide additional evidence of good moral character. See proposed 8 CFR 245.23(g).

DHS does not believe this change is a significant departure from the existing regulatory scheme or that it will burden applicants under 14 generally, because they will still not be required to submit evidence of good moral character apart from biometrics as initial evidence with their applications. Furthermore, the existing presumption is rebuttable. USCIS may currently request evidence of good moral character for applicants under 14 years of age if USCIS has reason to believe the applicant lacks good moral character. The proposed changes would remove the superfluous need for police clearance letters from T nonimmigrant adjustment applicants and remove the good moral character presumption for T nonimmigrant adjustment of status applicants under age 14. As noted in the PRA section of this preamble, DHS will revise the applicable forms to eliminate the police clearance letter requirement for T nonimmigrant adjustment applicants concomitant with this rule.

DHS proposes these changes to align the T nonimmigrant adjustment of status provisions with the agency's goals regarding biometrics collection, including identity management in the immigration lifecycle (without regard to age, unless USCIS exempts the biometrics requirement), while still preserving USCIS' discretionary authority to define evidentiary requirements for child applicants to demonstrate good moral character.

to align the T nonimmigrant adjustment of status provisions with the agency's goals regarding biometrics collection, including identity management in the immigration lifecycle (without regard to age, unless USCIS exempts the biometrics requirement), while still preserving USCIS' discretionary authority to define evidentiary requirements for child applicants to demonstrate good moral character.

6. Persons Involved With EB-5 Regional Center Program

DHS proposes to continue its existing practice to require biometrics collection and perform biometric-based criminal history and national security background checks, as well as for purposes of identity verification, on all persons involved with a regional center, new commercial enterprise or job-creating entity, U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents, as part of its determination of whether such persons and entities are eligible to participate in the regional center program. INA sec. 203(b)(5)(H); 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(H). DHS proposes to continue its existing practice that the biometric collection for background checks also extend, if the person is a legal entity or organization, to those persons having ownership, control, or beneficial interest in such legal entity or organization. See INA sec. 203(b)(5)(H)(v); 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5)(H)(v). Further, DHS proposes that the biometrics requirement may also include additional collections or checks for purposes of continuous vetting. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(c)(2). Section 203(b)(5) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1153(b)(5), authorizes the EB-5 program generally as well as the related EB-5 regional center program.

7. Collection of Biometrics From Other Individuals Associated With a Benefit Request, Other Request, or Collection of Information

In addition to previously discussed petitioners, beneficiaries, co-applicants and persons involved with EB-5 regional center program, this rule, if finalized, would also authorize DHS to require biometrics from any individual,

including U.S

ional center program.

7. Collection of Biometrics From Other Individuals Associated With a Benefit Request, Other Request, or Collection of Information

including U.S. citizens, nationals, and LPRs, who is otherwise associated with an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information as a means to deter and prevent fraud and protect the public. The proposed rule, if finalized, expands biometric submission to individuals associated with an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information, to include individuals who are not beneficiaries, petitioners or filers of forms submitted to USCIS. This can include but is not limited to financial sponsors of aliens or individuals who file affidavits of support on an alien's behalf as part of an immigration benefit request. 101

101 The terms “file,” “submit,” “associated with” or variations thereof, as used throughout this rule, do not relate to attorneys and accredited representatives, although attorneys and accredited representatives may file or submit a request on behalf of a client. DHS, at this time, is not proposing biometrics submission by attorneys and accredited representatives. Further, DHS, at this time, is not proposing biometrics submission by interpreters who may be associated with the filing of a benefit request, other request, or collection of information.

By expanding biometric submission to all individuals filing or associated with an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information, USCIS can prevent and deter fraud by identifying fraudulent trends that impact the integrity of the request and identifying national security or public safety threats associated with the benefit request, other request or collection of information

expanding biometric submission to all individuals filing or associated with an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information, USCIS can prevent and deter fraud by identifying fraudulent trends that impact the integrity of the request and identifying national security or public safety threats associated with the benefit request, other request or collection of information. For example, in July 2024, USCIS suspended parts of the Cuban, Haitian, Nicaraguan, Venezuelan (CHNV) parole processes after a USCIS Fraud Detection and National Security Directorate preliminary assessment identified concerns related to fraudulent supporter requests. 102 These reported fraud trends and concerns were identified primarily by analyzing the biographical information provided by the financial supporters and filed with USCIS. Had USCIS possessed biometric data submitted by CHNV financial sponsors, USCIS would have been able to identify these emerging fraud trends in a more efficient manner. Biometrics submitted by financial sponsors would have provided USCIS with a person-centric approach to record management enabling USCIS systems to quickly detect problematic supporter requests. For example, the information obtained from biometric submission may have identified the immigration history of every sponsor, including previous sponsorships, as well as criminal histories that would be considered during adjudication of the request. 103

ships, as well as criminal histories that would be considered during adjudication of the request. 103

102 See generally, U.S. House of Representatives, Interim Staff Report of the Committee on the Judiciary and Subcommittee on Immigration Integrity, Security, and Enforcement, The Biden-Harris Administration's CHNV Parole Program Two Years Later: A Fraud-Ridden Unmitigated Disaster (Nov 20, 2024). Available at: https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-11-20%20The%20Biden%20Harris%20Administration%27s%20CHNV%20Parole%20Program%20Two%20Years%20Later%20-%20A%20Fraud-Ridden%2C%20Unmitigated%20Disaster.pdf (last visited Jul. Available at: https://judiciary.house.gov/sites/evo-subsites/republicans-judiciary.house.gov/files/evo-media-document/2024-11-20%20The%20Biden%20Harris%20Administration%27s%20CHNV%20Parole%20Program%20Two%20Years%20Later%20-%20A%20Fraud-Ridden%2C%20Unmitigated%20Disaster.pdf (last visited Jul. 25, 2025).

103 In March 2025, the Secretary exercised her discretionary authority to terminate the CHNV parole programs in addition to the parole of aliens who had been granted parole under those programs but reserved the authority to grant case-by-case exceptions. See 90 FR 13611 (March 25, 2025). The Federal Notice announcing the termination explained that those parole programs had not accomplished their stated aims, and that the programs had exacerbated backlogs, or risked exacerbating backlogs, for the immigration system writ large”; “had a disruptive impact” CBP operations at air-ports of entry; and were inconsistent with the Administration's foreign policy goals and “other measures to prevent the entry of illegal aliens”. Id. at 13615-13616.

DHS welcomes public comment on all aspects of this proposal, including expanding biometric collection to U.S

s, or risked exacerbating backlogs, for the immigration system writ large”; “had a disruptive impact” CBP operations at air-ports of entry; and were inconsistent with the Administration's foreign policy goals and “other measures to prevent the entry of illegal aliens”. Id. at 13615-13616.

DHS welcomes public comment on all aspects of this proposal, including expanding biometric collection to U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident family-based petitioners including in order to better comply with AWA and IMBRA, expanding biometric collection to VAWA self-petitioners, eliminating police clearance letters for VAWA self-petitioners and T nonimmigrant adjustment applicants, modifying the VAWA self-petitioner and T nonimmigrant adjustment applicant's good moral character requirements for those under 14 years of age, and continuing biometric collection of persons involved with a regional center, new commercial enterprise or job-creating entity, U.S. citizens, U.S. nationals and lawful permanent residents, under the EB-5 program, as well as additional collections or checks for purposes of continuous vetting throughout the immigration lifecycle.

E. Biometrics Services Appointments and Interviews

1. Biometric Services Appointments

DHS is also proposing a new “extraordinary circumstance” standard when an individual requests rescheduling of a biometrics services appointment. 104 Under the proposed rule, an individual may reschedule their biometric services appointment one time prior to the date of the scheduled biometric services appointment for any reason. Any additional requests to reschedule by an individual before the date of the biometric services appointment must be justified by extraordinary circumstances that prevent the individual from attending. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(8). If an individual fails to attend their scheduled appointment, absent extraordinary circumstances, DHS may take adverse administrative action on the associated benefit request, other request, or collection of information

5 See USCIS Policy Manual, Volume 1, Part C, Chapter 2—Biometrics Collection, A—Biometric Services Appointments.

106 This data was obtained from USCIS Immigration Records and Identity Service (IRIS), NASS database, data queried July 25, 2025. The data provided here for FY 2023 and FY 2024 reflects biometrics services appointment reschedule requests for only USCIS appointments as of July 25, 2025.

However, USCIS data also show that in FY2023 33,285 receipts were associated with more than one reschedule request; by FY2024 that number increased to 36,855. In FY2023 and FY2024, USCIS data show 5,917 and 5,343, respectively, receipts associated with more than two reschedule requests. Realistically, this is over 11,000 receipts absorbing at least 33,000 ASC appointment slots (two rescheduled appointment slots and the presumptive third appointment where he or she appeared). In FY2023, 333 different receipts had five or more reschedule requests and, within that population, multiple receipts were associated with nine reschedule requests. In FY2024, 241 receipts had five or more reschedule requests and, within that population, one receipt was associated with ten reschedule requests. 107 Depending on when the reschedule request is received, USCIS may be able to fill the appointment slot with a different individual's biometrics service appointment, but not all rescheduled appointment slots can be filled which inevitably results in an unused appointment slot and wasted ASC capacity. Because biometrics service appointment slots are finite, unused appointments can contribute to overall increases in USCIS processing times. USCIS endeavors to achieve the most efficient ASC operations possible, however USCIS notes that under this proposed rule there is an increased risk of unused biometrics services appointment slots adversely impacting USCIS processing times

used by another individual whereby that available appointment slot ends up being unfilled and wasted. In general, this leads to increased processing times for the adjudication of immigration benefit requests. Under typical adjudication processes, biometrics are submitted prior to an adjudicator reviewing a case and, if the biometrics are delayed, then it necessarily delays the adjudicator's review. However, USCIS recognizes that an individual may be originally scheduled for a biometric services appointment on a date they are not able to attend. To allow some flexibility, under the proposed rule, USCIS will allow individuals to reschedule their biometric services appointment, one time, for any reason, and select a new date and time to submit biometrics. See proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(8).

The proposed rule authorizes biometrics submission for all individuals, regardless of age, filing or associated with an immigration benefit request, other request, or collection of information, unless exempted. This will likely result in additional biometric services appointments with USCIS. To ensure a reduced burden on USCIS biometric services operations and efficient processing times for benefit requestors, the proposed rule establishes a higher standard for rescheduling biometrics services appointments and excusing failure to appear for previously scheduled biometric services appointments. The proposed “extraordinary circumstances” standard will be assessed on a case-by-case basis to include examples of unforeseen scenarios that impact an individual's ability to attend a previously scheduled appointment. For example, the unexpected death of an immediate family member or if the individual experiences a serious medical emergency requiring immediate medical attention or hospitalization. USCIS will exercise discretion in evaluating biometrics services appointment reschedule requests and requests to excuse a failure to appear for a previously scheduled biometric services appointment

f the application or waiver of the right to a USCIS adjudication, and failure to appear for a biometrics appointment or for an interview will only be excused if the applicant can demonstrate “exceptional circumstances.” See proposed 8 CFR 208.10. DHS is retaining this standard as to not create a disparity between USCIS asylum adjudications and EOIR asylum proceedings governed under DOJ regulations. See 8 CFR 1003.10, 1208.10, 1240.67(b)(3), and 1240.68.

108 DHS is proposing to amend 208.10 to replace references to “fingerprints” and with the term “biometrics” consistent with the goals of this rule.

2. Interviews for Benefits

DHS is also proposing to clarify the standards that apply when an individual seeks to reschedule or fails to appear for an interview with USCIS. Under the proposed rule, any individual required to appear for an interview may request to reschedule an interview for extraordinary circumstances. See proposed 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9)(iv). In contrast to proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(8)—allowing an alien to reschedule a biometric services appointment one time for any reason—USCIS will only reschedule an interview at the request of the individual, for extraordinary circumstances. DHS proposes to make these changes to increase operational efficiency within the adjudicative process. As with the rescheduling of biometric services appointments noted above, USCIS believes interviews with individuals filing or associated with a pending benefit request, other request, or collection of information, are often rescheduled leading to adjudicative delays. Interviews are required for the adjudication of many form types and delays caused by rescheduling can hinder USCIS processing times and delay adjudication, impacting the agency as well as the individual requesting the benefit. The interviews performed by USCIS personnel require extensive preparation, research, and file review to be conducted prior to the interview

d leading to adjudicative delays. Interviews are required for the adjudication of many form types and delays caused by rescheduling can hinder USCIS processing times and delay adjudication, impacting the agency as well as the individual requesting the benefit. The interviews performed by USCIS personnel require extensive preparation, research, and file review to be conducted prior to the interview. Officer review in preparation for an interview is a more robust process than what is performed prior to a biometric services appointment, which

is completed by contract staff. As such, the proposed rule, in contrast to the rescheduling of biometric services appointments, does not provide that an individual may reschedule an interview one time for any reason, because permitting individuals to fail to appear for an interview has a much greater and adverse impact on an officer's time and agency resources. By establishing “extraordinary circumstances” as a standard for rescheduling of interviews, USCIS seeks to permit rescheduling under limited circumstances while preventing delays in the adjudicative process.

Consistent with existing regulations, see 8 CFR 103.2(b)(13)(ii), USCIS is also proposing to clarify in 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9)(v) that failure to appear at an interview without prior authorization may result in a variety of consequences including denial of a benefit request, other request, or collection of information. With respect to a showing of exceptional circumstances in the asylum context, USCIS proposes to maintain the status quo. See proposed 8 CFR 208.10. As stated above, DHS is retaining this standard as to not create a disparity between USCIS asylum adjudications and EOIR asylum proceedings governed under DOJ regulations. See 8 CFR 1003.10, 1208.10, 1240.67(b)(3), and 1240.68.

ce of extraordinary circumstances, that the interview be rescheduled or withdraw the petition. See proposed 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9)(iv). Additionally, the provisions at proposed 8 CFR 216.4(b) would permit petitioners to request rescheduling if the petitioners failed to appear and the petitioner demonstrates that extraordinary circumstances prevented the petitioner from attending the scheduled interview.

Lastly, 8 CFR 216.4(b)(3) will be redesignated as proposed 8 CFR 216.4(b).

F. Proposed Implementation

1. Phased-In Additional Biometrics Collection

DHS does not plan to immediately expand all biometric programs to provide that all populations or all new modalities would be required as of the date the new regulations proposed in this rule take effect. As provided in proposed 8 CFR 103.16(a)(1), USCIS may exempt certain benefits requests, other requests, or collections of information, or any individuals or a specific individual from the rule's proposed biometric submission requirement. Only those revised forms that propose to add a particular biometric submission requirement in conjunction with this rule (as described in the PRA section of this preamble) or where individual notice is given will be immediately subject to new biometric requirements.

This rule permits DHS to request, require, or accept raw DNA and DNA test results, which include a partial DNA profile, for individual benefit requests or other requests or collections of information at its discretion.

As provided in proposed 8 CFR 103.16, DHS may expand or contract its biometrics submission requirements in the future when required by law, when required by regulation, by notice in the Federal Register , or by revising form instructions, consistent with the APA and PRA. Additionally, just as it is today, a non-routine biometric submission may be required through direct notice to an individual. 109 If a decision by DHS to categorically collect biometrics from a new population of filers or to categorically collect new biometric modalities implicate the PRA, DHS will comply with any requirements that the PRA may impose based on the particular circumstances that are being changed. 110

109 See generally, 8 CFR 103.2(b)(9).

110 In general, form revisions requiring a new biometric submission are subject to public notice in accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (PRA), 44 U.S.C. 3501-3512, and its implementing regulations at 5 CFR 1320.

Regarding biometrics collections outside of the USCIS adjudication context, this rule proposes to give DHS components, including ICE and CBP, expanded authority to collect biometrics from aliens for use in relation to certain immigration enforcement activities as discussed in Sections IV.A.3 and IV.C.3.b of this preamble; however, the proposed rule provides these component with flexibility and discretion to implement this authority as appropriate within their own mission spaces and based on operational needs. See proposed 8 CFR 236.5.

2. Collection of the Biometric Services Fee

DHS currently incorporates most fees for biometric services into the underlying immigration benefit request fees for which biometric services are applicable to simplify the fee structure, reduce rejections of benefit requests for failure to include the biometric services fee, and better reflect how USCIS uses biometric information

identities of the child's birth parents (if known). See proposed 8 CFR 204.2(d)(2)(vii). Section 101(b)(1)(E) of the INA, 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E), may serve as the basis of the approval of an immigrant visa petition filed by a U.S. citizen or an alien lawfully admitted for permanent residence on behalf of an adopted child whose adoption meets the requirements of INA sec. 101(b)(1)(E). Under INA sec. 101(b)(1)(E), an adopted child is the adoptive parent's child for immigration purposes, if the adoptive parent adopted the child before the child reached the age of 16 (or 18 if the sibling exception at INA sec. 101(b)(1)(E)(ii) applies), and the child has jointly resided with the adoptive parent in a bona fide parent-child relationship for at least 2 years, and has been under the legal custody of the adoptive parent for at least 2 years. To show that the adopted child was under the requisite age, the petitioner must prove the beneficiary's date of birth. To show a bona fide parent-child relationship, the petitioner must, among other things, identify the beneficiary's birth parents and show that they no longer reside with the child in a parent-child relationship and no longer exert primary parental control over the child. The best evidence to show age and birth parentage is a birth certificate issued by civil authorities. Therefore, DHS proposes to require that the petitioner submit a copy of the beneficiary's birth certificate, if available, to establish the beneficiary's identity, age, and the identities of the beneficiary's birth parents (if known). See proposed 8 CFR 204.2(d)(2)(vi).

beneficiary's birth parents (if known). See proposed 8 CFR 204.2(d)(2)(vi).

DHS additionally proposes to update the regulation to align with INA sec. 101(b)(1)(E)(ii), 8 U.S.C. 1101(b)(1)(E)(ii), which provides that a beneficiary adopted while under age 18 (rather than age 16) may qualify as an adopted child under that provision if he or she is the birth sibling of a child described in INA secs. 101(b)(1)(E)(i) or (F)(i), was adopted by the same adoptive parent(s), and otherwise meet the requirements of INA sec. 101(b)(1)(E). While the INA uses the term “natural sibling,” DHS generally uses the term “birth siblings” synonymously, which includes half-siblings but does not include adoptive siblings. See proposed 8 CFR 204.2(d)(2)(vii).

DHS is soliciting public comment on all aspects of the proposed implementation plan

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