Normalizing Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations

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Federal Register › Vol. 90 › 90 FR 38212

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08 and the framework for third-party service suppliers proposed by part 146. Section V of this preamble describes the operational requirements applicable to all BVLOS operations conducted under part 108. These general operating requirements include the administrative requirements for the two tiers of operational authorization, permits and certificates, as discussed in section VIII of this preamble. Section VI of this preamble outlines FAA's approach for airspace management, including requirements for strategic deconfliction, detect and avoid (DAA), operations in uncontrolled and controlled airspace, operations over people, operations of multiple aircraft, and other conditions for safe operation.

This rule proposes a novel structure for operations personnel, as discussed in section VII of this preamble. Under this proposal, FAA would not require airman certificates but would require each operator—both permitted and certificated—to have an operations supervisor responsible for the overall safety of the operation. In addition, FAA proposes that operators must have qualified flight coordinators, who are individuals responsible for monitoring and, if necessary, intervening in an operation to ensure safe conditions. Whereas the operations supervisor has operational control over the entire operation, the flight coordinator(s) would have tactical oversight of individual aircraft.

FAA anticipates that the operations conducted under part 108 would have a variety of operational personnel positions and therefore does not propose to require any additional operations personnel positions. All operators would be responsible for identifying the necessary operations personnel to ensure the safety of the operation, in addition to ensuring that the operations personnel have the necessary knowledge and skills for their role. In this manner, responsibility is tied to the company operating the UAS rather than an individual that has limited control of the actual operation and can be removed from their position if necessary

e for identifying the necessary operations personnel to ensure the safety of the operation, in addition to ensuring that the operations personnel have the necessary knowledge and skills for their role. In this manner, responsibility is tied to the company operating the UAS rather than an individual that has limited control of the actual operation and can be removed from their position if necessary.

As noted above, section VIII of this preamble describes the permit and certificate structure proposed by this rule. Permitted operations would allow operators to conduct certain BVLOS operations using a streamlined approach under a permit issued by FAA. The permit structure would allow package delivery, agricultural operations, aerial surveying, civic interest, unmanned aircraft (UA) operations training, flight test, demonstration, and recreational operations, though subject to certain limitations on size, number of aircraft, and other operating requirements. Those operators conducting higher risk

threshold operations, due to size, weight, speed, or other parameters, would instead need to seek operational certification. Obtaining an operating certificate would allow for more complex package delivery, agricultural operations, aerial surveying, and civic interest operations than operating under an operating permit. Certificated operations would receive greater oversight from FAA but would also be able to use larger aircraft, have more aircraft, and have more flexibility to operate over people. Operations conducted under an operating certificate would require operators to develop a safety management system (SMS) and a training program for operations personnel.

Maintenance personnel would not be certificated under this proposed rule. Section IX of this preamble details the requirements for maintenance and maintenance personnel

aircraft, and have more flexibility to operate over people. Operations conducted under an operating certificate would require operators to develop a safety management system (SMS) and a training program for operations personnel.

Maintenance personnel would not be certificated under this proposed rule. Section IX of this preamble details the requirements for maintenance and maintenance personnel. Maintenance standards for these aircraft would be set by the manufacturer and be based on industry adopted consensus standards, and personnel that maintain them would be required to be competent in their duties and receive the training required by the manufacturer to perform those duties.

Sections X and XI of this preamble lay out the proposal for the new airworthiness acceptance process developed to allow for an efficient approval process of part 108 UAS, while maintaining the integrity of the NAS and the safety of the public. Using industry consensus standards, this action would establish a regulatory process for airworthiness acceptance of a UAS, consisting of a UA and its associated elements (AE), where the UA weighs not greater than 1,320 pounds (including anything attached to, or carried by the UA). Proposed part 108 would include new operational requirements for UA with airworthiness acceptance, enabling routine BVLOS operations without waivers or exemptions.

Section XII of this preamble discusses corresponding changes to related regulations in other parts of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) including a noise regulatory approach for UAS operating under proposed part 108.

s of title 14 of the Code of Federal Regulations (CFR) including a noise regulatory approach for UAS operating under proposed part 108.

Finally, this action would create a defined regulatory approval pathway for third-party services and providers of those services—first to approve services that support UTM, and then eventually, to approve services that support extensible traffic management (xTM). FAA broadly defines all those service providers—be it third-party service suppliers or services self-provided by the operators—as Automated Data Service Providers. 2

2 The term Extensible Traffic Management (xTM) is used to refer to cooperative service environments in general and is comprised of UTM, AAM, etc. FAA further discusses these concepts in its Urban Air Mobility (UAM) Version 2.0 Concept of Operations (ConOps) (Apr. 26, 2023), available at www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/Urban%20Air%20Mobility%20%28UAM%29%20Concept%20of%20Operations%202.0_1.pdf .

As further discussed in section XIII of this preamble, FAA would create a new part 146 to establish the process by which FAA would regulate automated data service providers as well as their automated data services. The purpose of part 146 is to provide a regulatory framework for appropriate government oversight of automated data services that support aircraft operations, especially those conducted under part 108. At the same time, the framework is designed to be flexible enough to accommodate the natural evolution and development of the technologies and systems on which these services are based. Through proposed part 146, FAA would authorize automated data service providers certificated under part 146 to provide services that would manage UAS traffic and information necessary for safe and efficient operation in the airspace. The provision of such services would be crucial, given the projected increase in numbers of UAS operating in the NAS once part 108 is finalized

se services are based. Through proposed part 146, FAA would authorize automated data service providers certificated under part 146 to provide services that would manage UAS traffic and information necessary for safe and efficient operation in the airspace. The provision of such services would be crucial, given the projected increase in numbers of UAS operating in the NAS once part 108 is finalized. Under this proposal, strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring services provided under part 146 would be key to the successful integration of UAS into the NAS and would be a requirement for several categories of UAS BVLOS operations under proposed part 108.

C. Summary of the Costs and Benefits

The benefits of the proposed rule are the economic, safety, and health values that would result from scaled BVLOS operations. These benefits derive from the increase in regulatory certainty and efficiency, and framework for scaled operations, that proposed rule would provide. FAA evaluates the benefits of the proposed rule qualitatively. Compared with operations under the current regulatory framework, this proposed rule may result in incremental costs to comply with requirements for design, production, and operations. There may also be cost implications to becoming certificated to provide automated data services. FAA provides potential unit costs and example total costs.

However, given that the proposed rule includes requirements that mirror current BVLOS exemptions while also proposing several new requirements to mitigate risks inherent in expanded BVLOS operations, incremental costs are few, and benefits would likely exceed costs. See section XIV.A of this preamble for more information.

II. Authority for This Rulemaking

FAA's authority to issue rules on aviation safety is found in title 49 of the United States Code (U.S.C.). subtitle I, § 106 describes the authority of FAA Administrator. Subtitle VII, Aviation Programs, describes in more detail the scope of FAA's authority

unmanned aircraft systems in the national airspace system.”

3 See section 927 of FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024, Public Law 118-63.

In addition, FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024 (section 930 of Pub. L. 118-63) amended chapter 448 of title 49 of the U.S.C. by adding section 44811 to require the FAA Administrator to establish performance-based regulations for UAS to be used for BVLOS operations. The FAA Administrator must, at a minimum, establish acceptable risk levels for BVLOS operations; standards for remote pilots or UAS operators; an approval or acceptance process for UAS which may leverage special airworthiness certificates (SAC) or a manufacturer declaration of compliance (DOC) process; operating rules for UAS that are approved or accepted; protocols of

networked information; and safety of manned aircraft operating in the NAS. However, § 44811 does not require the FAA Administrator to rescope any ongoing rulemaking efforts. This regulation is within the scope of these authorities.

The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-254), which adopted 49 U.S.C. 44808, requires FAA to conduct rulemaking to authorize the carriage of property by small UAS for compensation or hire within the United States. FAA intends this proposal will also address that requirement. Furthermore, this rulemaking is promulgated pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 40103(b)(1) and (2), which directs FAA to issue regulations: (1) to ensure the safety of aircraft and the efficient use of airspace; and (2) to govern the flight of aircraft for purposes of navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft, and protecting individuals and property on the ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) charges FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft by prescribing regulations FAA finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.

On June 6, 2025, the President issued Executive Order No

o govern the flight of aircraft for purposes of navigating, protecting, and identifying aircraft, and protecting individuals and property on the ground. In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(5) charges FAA with promoting safe flight of civil aircraft by prescribing regulations FAA finds necessary for safety in air commerce and national security.

On June 6, 2025, the President issued Executive Order No. 14307, Unleashing American Drone Dominance, which directs that “the Secretary of Transportation, acting through the Administrator of the FAA, shall issue a proposed rule enabling routine BVLOS operations for UAS for commercial and public safety purposes. 4 A final rule shall be published within 240 days of the date of this order, as appropriate.” FAA is publishing this proposed rule to fulfill that directive.

4 90 FR 24727.

A. Section 44807 Statutory Findings

To determine whether certain UAS may operate safely in the NAS pursuant to 49 U.S.C. 44807, the Administrator must find that the operation of the UAS would not create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public. The Administrator must also determine whether a certificate under 49 U.S.C. 44703 (“Airman certificates”) or section 44704 (“Type certificates, production certificates, and airworthiness certificates, and design and production organization certificates”), or a certificate of waiver or certificate of authorization, is required for the operation of the UAS subject to this proposed rule. Using a risk-based approach, the Administrator has determined that UAS operations under this proposed rule would operate safely in the NAS; the individual findings required by section 44807 are as follows.

d are mitigated through the designation of population density categories (and the corresponding restrictions on certain operations to certain population density categories), the general prohibition of operations over open-air assemblies, and the hazardous material carriage restrictions. 5

5 This rulemaking uses the definition of hazardous material as defined in 49 U.S.C. 5102(2) and 49 CFR 171.8.

Accordingly, the Administrator has found that the UAS operations subject to this proposed rule would not create a hazard to users of the NAS or the public. FAA invites comments on this finding.

2. Certificate Requirements

In addition, 49 U.S.C. 44807(b)(2) requires the Administrator to determine whether the UAS operations subject to this proposed rule pose a safety risk sufficient to require airworthiness certification or airman certification.

i. Airworthiness Certification

The Administrator has determined that airworthiness certification should not be required for the UAS subject to this proposed rule. As discussed in section X of this preamble, the proposed airworthiness acceptance regulatory framework would prevent incidents like loss of flight or control stemming from factors such as structural integrity, software and hardware functionality, performance attributes, and operational factors. Specifically, the proposed design and performance standards require the UAS to handle all expected flight and ground stresses during its operations without compromising the UAS's safe operation.

From a risk perspective, FAA considers UAS operations under proposed part 108 fall between part 107 small UAS and aircraft with a SAC. 6 Part 108, which encompasses BVLOS operations, presents higher risks than part 107 due to the potential for airspace conflicts with other users, operation of larger aircraft, operation over densely populated areas, and riskier operational use cases such as package delivery

the 2016 Final Rule included a waiver provision 12 allowing individual operators to deviate from certain specifically identified operating limitations if FAA found the applicant could safely conduct the proposed operation under the terms of the COA.

11 Operation and Certification of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems final rule, 81 FR 42064 (Jun. 28, 2016).

12 See 14 CFR 107.200 and 107.205.

3. Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People

Published by FAA on January 15, 2021, the Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People final rule 13 allowed routine operations over people in accordance with part 107 and routine operations at night under certain conditions without a waiver or exemption. Under regulations implemented by the rule, the requirements for routine operations over people vary depending on the level of risk that operations of small UA present to people on the ground. In the Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People final rule, FAA established four categories of permissible operations over people based on the risk of injury they present: Category 1, Category 2, Category 3, and Category 4. Under this rule, operations over people (in accordance with the categories) are permitted with small UA that have an airworthiness certificate.

13 Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems over People final rule, 86 FR 4314 (Jan. 15, 2021). Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People; Delay of Effective Date; Correction final rule, 86 FR 11623 (Feb. 26, 2021); Operation of Small Unmanned Aircraft Systems Over People; Delay; Withdrawal; Correction final rule, 86 FR 3630 (Mar. 10, 2021).

4. External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft

The External Marking Requirement for Small Unmanned Aircraft interim final rule (External Marking Rule, 2019) was published on February 13, 2019

from those potentially posing a safety or security risk. The Remote ID Final Rule applies to UA flown for both recreational and commercial purposes. It allows operators to request authorization to operate without remote identification for aeronautical research and other limited purposes. UA manufactured for operation in the NAS are subject to the production requirements of the Remote ID Final Rule. There are limited exceptions in the Remote ID regulations that allow manufacturing UA without remote identification, including home-built UA and United States Government UA, amongst others.

15 Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft final rule, 86 FR 4390 (Jan. 15, 2021); Remote Identification of Unmanned Aircraft; Delay final rule, 86 FR 13629 (Mar. 10, 2021).

6. Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and the Safety Continuum

On July 24, 2023, FAA published the Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification (MOSAIC) NPRM. 16 The MOSAIC NPRM proposed enabling enhancements in safety and performance and would increase privileges under several sport pilot and light-sport aircraft rules. The proposed language in the MOSAIC NPRM would also expand the types and characteristics of aircraft that sport pilots may operate. The proposed changes would increase the suitability of light-sport category aircraft for flight training, limited aerial work, and personal travel. As the MOSAIC NPRM notes, FAA is updating the requirements for light-sport aircraft due to a developed understanding about the purposes and flexibilities of light sport aircraft. This development is framed in the context of the safety continuum. As noted in the MOSAIC NPRM, FAA bases the rigor of certification requirements and operational limitations on a safety continuum that looks at public exposure to risk for each aircraft and operation

e requirements for light-sport aircraft due to a developed understanding about the purposes and flexibilities of light sport aircraft. This development is framed in the context of the safety continuum. As noted in the MOSAIC NPRM, FAA bases the rigor of certification requirements and operational limitations on a safety continuum that looks at public exposure to risk for each aircraft and operation. As the risk increases due to increased operating privileges and aircraft capability, so do the requirements and corresponding rigor of requirements and procedures for aircraft and airman certification. 17

16 Modernization of Special Airworthiness Certification notice of proposed rulemaking, 88 FR 47650 (Jul. 24, 2023).

17 88 FR 47653.

The safety continuum represents the targeted level of safety because of FAA regulation, guidance, and oversight, which changes based on risk and societal expectations of safety. FAA uses the safety continuum to determine the appropriate level of regulatory oversight for a variety of aircraft, from small UAS to large transport category aircraft. The differing targeted level of safety balances the needs of the flying public, applicants, and operators while facilitating both the advancement of safety and the encouragement of technological innovation.

Light-sport aircraft appear at the low end of the safety continuum for manned operations because of its aircraft design and recreational use. As a result, there is less FAA oversight. Given there is no pilot nor passengers on board UAs, FAA has decided UA operations involve less risk and should fall lower on the safety continuum than light sport aircraft. Therefore, UAS operations under parts 107 and 108 are positioned on the lower end of the safety continuum and FAA is proposing a level of oversight for part 108 operations are positioned between the oversight for part 107 small UAS and MOSAIC aircraft. The reasons for this placement and for more information as to risk, please see section III.A of this preamble.

inuum than light sport aircraft. Therefore, UAS operations under parts 107 and 108 are positioned on the lower end of the safety continuum and FAA is proposing a level of oversight for part 108 operations are positioned between the oversight for part 107 small UAS and MOSAIC aircraft. The reasons for this placement and for more information as to risk, please see section III.A of this preamble.

B. Use of Exemptions, Type Certificates, and Waivers

The intent of this proposed rule is to provide a predictable, stable, and transparent regulatory construct that enables scaled BVLOS operations. Presently, UAS operators looking to conduct BVLOS operations require some level of regulatory relief by way of exemption or waiver.

1. Exemptions for UAS BVLOS operations

The exemption process has proven to be a useful tool for FAA to enable operations that cannot be conducted under part 107, particularly for operations using UA weighing 55 pounds or more. 18 However, operating by exemption often requires navigating a labyrinth of regulations designed for both manned and unmanned aviation to determine from which regulations exemption should be sought to operate UAS BVLOS. Each exemption is specific to the operation that the petitioner is pursuing, but typically the exemptions include relief from certain requirements of parts 91 and 135 that are not compatible with UAS operations. This section describes the history of using the exemption process for UAS operations and what the exemption process requires. This background is intended to help draw out how this rulemaking will move UAS operations from the limits of “enablement though exemption”, which requires case-by-case assessment and contributes to the current “patchwork” of rules and exemption precedents that today's operators rely on, to “enablement by rule”, in which a right-size regulatory framework could streamline how FAA enables operation, manufacture, and supporting services of BVLOS UAS.

18 The 55 lb

will move UAS operations from the limits of “enablement though exemption”, which requires case-by-case assessment and contributes to the current “patchwork” of rules and exemption precedents that today's operators rely on, to “enablement by rule”, in which a right-size regulatory framework could streamline how FAA enables operation, manufacture, and supporting services of BVLOS UAS.

18 The 55 lb. weigh limit for UAS operating under part 107 is not waivable under § 107.205.

In the early 2010s, prior to the development and implementation of the regulatory framework of part 107 (the 2016 Final Rule), FAA relied on the flexibility provided in section 333 of Public Law 112-95 to allow certain UAS operations in the NAS by way of the FAA exemption process. Under the section 333 authority, the Secretary of Transportation was granted the authority to determine if an airworthiness certificate was necessary for safe operation of a UAS. While this statutory flexibility permitted FAA to issue thousands of exemptions, the regulatory framework resulting from the 2016 Final Rule created a much more stable, transparent, and scalable system for early civil UAS operations and this process of evolving from operation by exemption to operation by rule is a precursor to FAA's objectives through this proposed rule.

Section 347 of the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 (Pub. L. 115-254) granted the Secretary the authority to determine, using a risk-based approach, which UAS may operate safely in the NAS. Congress further extended this discretionary authority to determine if an airworthiness certificate was necessary and clarified that the Secretary may determine if an airman certificate under section 44703 was necessary. This authority, codified at 49 U.S.C. 44809, was further extended in the FAA Reauthorization Act of 2024. 19 The FAA Reauthorization Act of 2018 also established an additional avenue for limited recreational operations under 49 U.S.C. 44809.

19 Per updates to 49 U.S.C

d provide a level of safety at least equal to that provided by the rule from which exemption is sought; a summary that FAA can publish in the Federal Register that states the rule from which the exemption is sought along with a brief description of the nature of the exemption sought; any additional information, views, or arguments available to support the exemption request; and, if a petitioner wants to exercise the privileges of their exemption outside of the U.S., the reason why the petitioner needs to do so.

FAA recommends that the petitioner review all FAA guidance to ensure that the petition includes all necessary information, if relevant, including concept of operations, operations manual, emergency procedures, checklists, maintenance manual, training program, flight history (hours, cycles, accidents), and a safety risk analysis. 20 The safety risk analysis is required for all complex operations for any proposal that includes, but is not limited to, flight over or in the proximity of people, flight beyond visual line of sight, operation of multiple UAS, operations from a moving vehicle, package delivery, part 135 operations, or ground speeds. Guidance for the safety risk analysis can be found in FAA Order 8040.4, Safety Risk Management Policy, and FAA Order 8040.6, UAS Safety Risk Management Policy.

20 FAA, Section 44807: Special Authority for Certain Unmanned Aircraft Systems (Mar. 20, 2024), available at www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/certification/section_44807 .

FAA has issued thousands of exemptions using the 49 U.S.C. 44807 authority described herein. 21 Many of

ein. 21 Many of

these exemptions permit the use of UAS for agricultural operations, including thousands of exemptions enabling agricultural operations with UAS over 55 pounds. Agricultural spraying operations comprise the vast majority of exemptions for UAS above 55 pounds, with over 1,700 operator certificates issued for agricultural operations at the time of publication of this proposed rule. FAA-issued exemptions also include advanced UAS operations reflected in four precedent-setting exemptions issued in fall of 2023 expanding BVLOS operational capabilities and supporting the Unmanned Traffic Management Operational Evaluation. 22 FAA has also issued several exemptions for UAS operators operating under part 135. Upon obtaining their exemption(s), operators must then seek operational approval, typically by obtaining an operating certificate under 14 CFR part 135 or 137, depending on the operation type.

21 Prior to the finalization of the 2016 Final Rule, FAA had granted numerous exemptions to unmanned aircraft operators for purposes such as experimental operations, agricultural operations, BVLOS and other various use-case applications. These exemptions were granted with minimal Part 61 pilot certification requirements to the remote pilot-in-command. Examples include unmanned aircraft agricultural operations only requiring the remote pilot-in-command to possess a private pilot certificate or even in later cases a minimum of remote pilot certificate, as opposed to similar operations with manned aircraft that require a commercial pilot certificate. The 2016 Final Rule obviated the need for exemptions for this particular relief for UA under 55 pounds with the establishment of a part 107 remote pilot certificate but did not extend to UA weighing 55 pounds or

exemptions for this particular relief for UA under 55 pounds with the establishment of a part 107 remote pilot certificate but did not extend to UA weighing 55 pounds or

more. The first exemption to substitute a part 61 commercial pilot certificate with a part 107 remote pilot certificate with additional training requirements under these circumstances was to DroneSeed Co., Exemption No. 17936. FAA subsequently issued several grants of exemption allowing the use of a remote pilot certificate for commercial operations with UA above 55 pounds, although requiring a second-class medical certificate. In November 2022, FAA issued a grant of exemption to Amazon Prime Air permitting them to conduct BVLOS operations with a UA weighing 55 pounds or more and requiring the pilot-in-command to hold a part 107 remote pilot certificate with a third-class medical certificate, Exemption No. 18601B.

22 See Phoenix Air Unmanned, LLC, Exemption No. 20973, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2023-1827, available at www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2023-1827-0009 ; uAvionix Corporation, Exemption No. 21097, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2022-0921, available at www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2022-0921-0013 ; Zipline International, Inc. Exemption No. 19111B, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2020-0499, available at www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2020-0499-0033 ; UPS Flight Forward, Exemption No. 18339D, Regulatory Docket No. FAA-2019-0628, available at www.regulations.gov/document/FAA-2019-0628-0029 .

Exemptions are issued on a case-by-case basis and each exemption petition is individually assessed by FAA. This process can be time and resource-intensive for operators. This proposed rule is intended to level the playing field for operators by offering a well-defined and purpose-built set of regulations for the operation, manufacture, and supporting services for BVLOS UAS operations. Furthermore, this proposed rule should foster innovation and growth among U.S

ions, operation of multiple UA, and operations over people. Waivers are processed faster than exemptions and submission and approval of them has improved as UAS operators have become more familiar with the appropriate safety cases. FAA recognizes the flexibility that comes with waivers and, as noted in various sections below, many of the proposed requirements of part 108 are subject to waiver.

C. Beyond Visual Line of Sight Aviation Rulemaking Committee

On June 8, 2021, FAA established the UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight Operations ARC with the goal of providing recommendations to FAA for performance-based regulatory requirements to normalize safe, scalable, and economically viable UAS BVLOS operations that are not receiving the provisioning of Air Traffic Management (ATM) services. 23 This ARC took a holistic approach in recommending a performance-based regulatory framework for BVLOS operations.

23 FAA, UAS Beyond Visual Line-of-Sight Operations Aviation Rulemaking Committee, Aviation Rulemaking Committee Charter (Jun. 8, 2021), available at www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/media/UAS%20BVLOS%20ARC%20Charter%20(eff.%206-8-2021).pdf .

FAA requested that, at a minimum, the ARC's recommendations clearly address requirements to support the following concept of operations (ConOps): long-line linear infrastructure inspections, industrial aerial data gathering, small package delivery, and precision agriculture aircraft operations, including crop spraying. The ARC did not specifically address aircraft or operations carrying passengers or crew, nor did it address the integration of operations for which ATM services are being provided.

assengers or crew, nor did it address the integration of operations for which ATM services are being provided.

The ARC's final report was submitted to FAA on March 10, 2022. 24 In this report, the ARC provided an extensive list of recommendations to FAA. Overall, the ARC recommended that FAA set an acceptable level of risk for UAS that is consistent across all types of operations being performed. The ARC also recommended a series of modifications to the right-of-way rules in Low Altitude Shielded Areas (within 100 feet of a structure or critical infrastructure as defined in 42 U.S.C. 5195c) and in Low Altitude Non-Shielded Areas (below 400 feet above ground level (AGL)) to accommodate UAS operations. The ARC's report provided comprehensive recommendations that the UAS industry argued would enable BVLOS operations by regulation, including package delivery by UAS, in a safe and economically viable manner. In addition, it provided recommendations for developing a regulatory approach to enable the use of third-party services to support UAS BVLOS operations. 25 As discussed throughout this preamble, FAA considered the recommendations provided by the BVLOS ARC in developing this proposed framework.

24 Unmanned Aircraft Systems Beyond Visual Line of Sight Aviation Rulemaking Committee Final Report (“BVLOS ARC Report”) (Mar. 10, 2022), available at www.faa.gov/regulations_policies/rulemaking/committees/documents/index.cfm/document/information/documentID/5424.

25 Section XIII of this preamble discusses the ARC recommendation regarding third-party services in greater detail.

D. BVLOS Operations and International Leadership

/5424.

25 Section XIII of this preamble discusses the ARC recommendation regarding third-party services in greater detail.

D. BVLOS Operations and International Leadership

Establishing a regulatory framework for BVLOS operation that enables several valuable use cases would establish the U.S. as a global leader in UAS operations. Home of the Wright Brothers and the Chicago Convention, the U.S. has long been a leader in aviation and has claimed many firsts in this industry including the first powered airplane, the home of the pilot who flew the first solo transatlantic flight, and the first pilot to break the sound barrier. 26 For UAS, however, the

United States has strong peers competing for leadership in this space. Globally, several countries have taken significant steps to enable BVLOS operations including China, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Australia, Japan, and Rwanda. 27 Key to other countries' successes is that these other countries have provided the UAS industry with a clear regulatory framework that facilitates the scaling of BVLOS operations.

26 Vaughn College, Greatest First Flights in Aviation History in Honor of Aviation History Month (Nov. 14, 2019), available at www.vaughn.edu/blog/greatest-first-flights-in-aviation-history-in-honor-of-aviation-history-month/.

27 Commercial Drone Alliance, U.S. Global Leadership in Aviation at Stake: Scaled BVLOS UAS Operations Around the World (Nov. 27, 2024).

There are several recent examples of countries advancing the integration of UAS operations into their airspaces, including BVLOS operations. In June of 2023, Canada's Minister of Transport announced standardized BVLOS rules for small and medium drones. 28 In 2021, the European Aviation Safety Administration (EASA) adopted three regulations that together create the conditions necessary for both drones and manned aircraft to operate safely and has begun the gradual implementation of U-space, a type of airspace designated for safely integrated operation of manned and unmanned aircraft

ions-for-beyond-visual-line-of-sight-operations.html.

29 Drones: Commission adopts new rules and conditions for safe, secure and green drone operations, Directorate-General for Mobility and Transportation, European Commission (Apr. 22, 2021), available at transport.ec.europa.eu/news-events/news/drones-commission-adopts-new-rules-and-conditions-safe-secure-and-green-drone-operations-2021-04-22_en.

30 See European Aviation Safety Agency, Specific Category—Civil Drones, available at www.easa.europa.eu/en/domains/drones-air-mobility/operating-drone/specific-category-civil-drones#Registration%20of%20drone%20operators ; see also Civil Aviation Safety Authority. Beyond visual line of sight operations, available at www.casa.gov.au/drones/flight-authorisations/beyond-visual-line-sight-operations#HowtorenewyourBVLOSflightapproval.

31 See Zeyi Yang, Food delivery by drone is just part of daily life in Shenzhen, MIT Technology Review (May 23, 2023), available at www.technologyreview.com/2023/05/23/1073500/drone-food-delivery-shenzhen-meituan .

32 See World Economic Forum, Medicines from the sky: how drones can save lives (Apr. 21, 2020), available at www.weforum.org/stories/2020/04/medicines-from-the-sky-how-a-drone-may-save-your-life/ ; see also World Economic Forum, Medicine from the Sky: Opportunities and Lessons Learned from Drones in Africa (Mar. 2021), available at www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_Medicine_from_the_Sky_2021.pdf.

Foreign commercial aviation authorities (CAAs) enabling BVLOS operations through their own regulatory frameworks have fostered attractive environments for U.S. companies to expand their operations abroad. Today, U.S. companies are performing BVLOS operations abroad including in Italy, the U.K., Rwanda, and Japan. 33 An overarching goal of this proposed rule is to encourage U.S. UAS companies to expand, innovate, and thrive domestically. A robust domestic UAS BVLOS operating environment could spur technological innovation, bolster U.S

nvironments for U.S. companies to expand their operations abroad. Today, U.S. companies are performing BVLOS operations abroad including in Italy, the U.K., Rwanda, and Japan. 33 An overarching goal of this proposed rule is to encourage U.S. UAS companies to expand, innovate, and thrive domestically. A robust domestic UAS BVLOS operating environment could spur technological innovation, bolster U.S. aerospace manufacturing, provide services like package delivery to large swaths of the public, create skilled jobs, and secure the U.S. as a leader for UAS BVLOS operations, UTM, and UAS manufacturing.

33 Italy Chosen For Amazon Prime Air Service In Late 2024, Intrieste (Oct. 20, 2023), available at www.intrieste.com/2023/10/20/italy-chosen-for-amazon-prime-air-service-in-late-2024/ ; Jack Daleo, Google's Wing to Use Drones to Fly Blood Between London Hospitals, Flying Magazine (Sep. 17, 2024), available at www.flyingmag.com/modern/googles-wing-to-use-drones-to-fly-blood-between-london-hospitals/ ; Jack Daleo, Rwanda launches nationwide drone delivery service with Zipline, Freight Waves (Dec. 15, 2022), available at www.freightwaves.com/news/rwanda-launches-nationwide-drone-delivery-service-with-zipline ; Skydio Secures Nationwide BVLOS Approval for Remote Drone Operations In Japan, Skydio (Jun. 6, 2023), available at www.skydio.com/blog/nationwide-bvlos-approval-for-remote-drone-operations-in-japan .

Due to the relatively low cost of highly capable UAS technology, hundreds of thousands 34 of new operators have entered the aviation community. This significant increase in the volume of UAS and UAS operators, as well as the rapid advancement of UAS technologies, has created significant opportunities—and challenges—for the integration of UAS into the United States airspace. These UAS in the NAS pose new challenges and risks but safety remains paramount for FAA

hundreds of thousands 34 of new operators have entered the aviation community. This significant increase in the volume of UAS and UAS operators, as well as the rapid advancement of UAS technologies, has created significant opportunities—and challenges—for the integration of UAS into the United States airspace. These UAS in the NAS pose new challenges and risks but safety remains paramount for FAA. Through research, industry partnerships and feedback, and regulatory changes, FAA has made steady progress toward integrating UAS operations of varying complexity in the NAS in a safe, timely, and equitable manner.

34 FAA, Drones by the Numbers, available at www.faa.gov/uas.

In proposing this rule, FAA fully expects that the scope and frequency of UAS operations in the NAS would increase as BVLOS operations become normalized. FAA also appreciates that this proposal would open a new range of opportunities and possible concepts of operations for local communities interested in leveraging the benefits of UAS. FAA emphasizes that it is important for community leaders, local elected officials, and operators to ensure that the general public is informed and engaged in early planning discussions and that the individuals involved in planning the operation have a clear plan for how they will respond to the public's interest, questions, and concerns about operations occurring in local communities. FAA will support community leaders, local elected officials, and operators with responding to the public in its role as a regulator and encourages localities and operators to leverage best practices for community engagement in introducing UAS operations. 35

35 For more information regarding legal considerations applicable to state and local regulation of UAS, please see FAA and DOT's 2023 Fact Sheet, available at www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/State-Local-Regulation-of-Unmanned-Aircraft-Systems-Fact-Sheet.pdf.

IV. UAS Integration Into the NAS

and operators to leverage best practices for community engagement in introducing UAS operations. 35

IV. UAS Integration Into the NAS

A. Enabling UAS BVLOS Operations

FAA has long intended to develop a regulatory framework for more advanced UAS operations, enabling the more complex operations that industry has successfully demonstrated at small scale using waivers and exemptions. Waivers, exemptions, and other authorizations, such as operations conducted at UAS Test Sites or through the Integration Pilot Program 36 and BEYOND 37 initiatives, have safely enabled numerous BVLOS operations including infrastructure inspection, package delivery, and surveillance. These operational advancements have occurred within the existing aviation regulatory framework, one that did not imagine the types of technologies that could, at a minimum, replace the human eye or that could coordinate operations through decentralized automation platforms. To realize the

next phase in UAS operations, FAA proposes a new set of regulations specific to UAS.

36 Available at www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/completed/integration_pilot_program.

37 Available at www.faa.gov/uas/programs_partnerships/beyond.

UAS technology, as well as the various systems that support it, has advanced faster than the regulatory framework. Having clear regulations and guidance about how to operate BVLOS is essential for future integration of UAS. This rule proposes requirements for airworthiness acceptance, operating requirements, and a framework for automated data service providers to enable scalable, repeatable, and safe BVLOS operations

ives to manned aircraft to perform the same function safely. UAS can supplement tasks that would otherwise be accomplished by surface transportation or individuals, which could have a positive impact on safety. A UA can fly over crops distributing pesticide or fertilizer without the need for a person to fly a full-sized aircraft low to the ground and risk an accident or pilot exposure to chemicals. Enabling BVLOS operations could have a transformative impact on logistics. Life-saving medicine, equipment, or even human organs can be transported rapidly between points, without having to contend with traffic congestion, or requiring a pilot to fly a helicopter into a high-risk situation. Local regulatory authorities can use UAS to inspect the underside of bridges or check the integrity of the railroad tracks that crisscross the wide expanse of the United States, both more efficiently and more safely than is possible without UAS. UAS-based collection and analytics can inspect more energy production, transmission, and storage infrastructure per day compared to a manual, ground-based inspection, which significantly increases the opportunity to detect and remedy leaks and other issues.

Through the proposed airworthiness acceptance process, operational and personnel frameworks, and standards for automated data service supply, the level of risk proposed in this rulemaking would be equivalent to the level of acceptable risk in part 107, but for more complex aircraft and operations. Part 107 notably did not require any airworthiness certification or design standards, instead fixing the weight at 55 pounds and relying on operating limitations to ensure safe operation. In the 2016 Final Rule, FAA acknowledged the biggest concerns for risk were the inability of a pilot to maintain safe separation from other aircraft and the possibility of a loss of control in flight due to a failure of the control link. The risk-based approach in part 107 has proven to be safe and effective for operations conducted within VLOS

ons. In addition, this rule proposes the utilization of flight coordinators, if required by the aircraft design, who would have more direct involvement in the operation of a UA and would similarly require training in safe operation.

This proposed rule is designed to assess and manage risks to people and property on the ground and other users in the NAS while allowing the growth of UAS operations. The main factors considered in assessing the risks are the industry-consensus standards that inform the design of the UAS, the weight, speed, and size of the UA, the environment it is operating in or over, technological mitigations to include strategic deconfliction, conformance monitoring, and DAA capabilities, and what, if anything, it is transporting.

Under proposed part 108, many types of operations would take place over people. One significant risk factor for these operations would depend on the number of people the UA is operating over. Proposed part 108 would address a variety of operating environments. To

present an accurate and consistent picture of population, FAA is proposing the use of LandScan, a Federally sponsored and freely accessible set of population data. LandScan provides a basis for operational categories to allow complex operations over areas with increased population density, with both technological and operational requirements to ensure continued safety.

In proposed part 108, operations would be conducted primarily below 400 feet AGL (unless authorized by the Administrator to go higher), and this rule would establish new requirements to allow for safe operations BVLOS in this more integrated airspace. UAS operating under part 108 would be required to yield right of way to traffic broadcasting their position using Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment

ns would be conducted primarily below 400 feet AGL (unless authorized by the Administrator to go higher), and this rule would establish new requirements to allow for safe operations BVLOS in this more integrated airspace. UAS operating under part 108 would be required to yield right of way to traffic broadcasting their position using Automatic Dependent Surveillance-Broadcast (ADS-B) Out equipment. Under proposed part 108, strategic deconfliction would be required for operations over certain populated areas, and operations in controlled airspace would require strategic deconfliction, conformance monitoring, and the ability to detect cooperative and non-cooperative aircraft in certain airspace classifications. Operators would need to be aware of factors such as the location, weather, obstacles, and other traffic to ensure safe operation, even as they may not be physically present at the flight operation.

As discussed in section III.A.5 of this preamble, FAA is approaching airworthiness in the context of a safety continuum that considers exposure of the public to risk for each aircraft and operation. Whereas traditional manned aircraft generally require a type certification or special airworthiness certification to operate in the NAS, FAA is proposing a process that would ensure public safety while also being mindful of the level of appropriate rigor associated with the operational envelope of UA operating under proposed part 108. While type certification is appropriate for manned operations, it does not necessarily follow that the time, resources, or requirements for type certification are appropriate to allow safe operation of UAS under proposed part 108. With airworthiness acceptance and industry consensus standards, FAA is proposing a process that will provide a more time and resource appropriate avenue to allow more complex UAS operations while appropriately mitigating risk. FAA is also proposing changes that will streamline compliance with UAS noise requirements

e complex operations, an operating certificate would be required. This certificate would be more akin to operating certificates in traditional aviation and would entail a higher level of interaction with FAA for both issuance and oversight of the certificate.

FAA further proposes new part 146 to create requirements for the standards and establish FAA oversight of automated data service providers. As part 108 enables UAS BVLOS operation, data is critical to the safe and effective operation of these aircraft, as the ability to operate BVLOS is predicated on the fidelity and assurance of the data. To support the operational and airworthiness requirements of part 108, FAA proposes part 146 to enable those providing these services to obtain certification and defines minimum performance standards for those services using industry consensus standards. Proposed part 146 is essential for laying the groundwork for the next step for UAS operations and providing a service approval pathway that could be used to support other types of operations, both manned and unmanned, in the future. This proposal would ensure operators have options in the services that they use depending on their needs, while being assured that they meet a standard that will keep the public safe. And by keeping the regulation flexible, and allowing operators to choose the service they need, future technological innovations would be recognized while allowing choice by the part 108 operators and competition among the part 146 service providers.

B. Need for Automated Data Service Providers

An automated data service provider is a person or company who provides an automated data service using a distributed computational system to support or manage aircraft operations, promoting safety and efficiency of the operation. Automated data service providers may or may not be directly involved in the aircraft operation but would nonetheless support the operation before or during its flight

ted under proposed part 146. Strategic deconfliction would significantly scale UAS BVLOS operations under proposed part 108. Using strategic deconfliction, a UAS operator can strategically deconflict flight paths, thereby operate safely in the NAS. In contrast, automated data services providers providing fleet management services to aircraft operators would not be regulated under proposed part 146. Fleet management services are used by operators to fulfill a business need, not a safety objective, thus would not be regulated under proposed part 146. For a detailed discussion on the scope and applicability of automated data services and providers of those services under proposed part 146, see section XIII.E of this preamble.

FAA selected the term “automated data service provider” to avoid confusion with terms used to describe services provided by FAA's Air Traffic Organization, which are not subject to this rulemaking. In addition, in presentations and discussions, FAA personnel and industry stakeholders have also used terms such as “third-party service suppliers” and “UTM

service providers.” The term automated data service provider is intended to cover both of those terms. The selected term would also include persons and companies that self-provision their own services (often referred to as vertically integrated companies), as well as persons and companies that provide distributed services dependent on ground-based sensors or equipment—sometimes referred to as Infrastructure-as-a-Service. In addition, the term “automated data service providers,” and part 146 in general, may apply to companies that are new to aviation and market a specific product to UAS operators, such as mobile network operators that have a UAS-specific command-and-control (C2) link offering. 40

40 Under proposed part 146, all these terms referring to UTM servicers or third-party servicers and the providers of such services would fall within the umbrella term of automated data service provider

might not be feasible for some UAS operators to provide all the services and functionality necessary to meet BVLOS safety requirements in-house. This could be for a variety of reasons, including resource and technical knowledge constraints. Automated data services may provide a cost-effective, safe, and scalable means for those UAS operators to meet some of the regulatory requirements in part 108. As a result, automated data services that meet the minimum requirements proposed in this rule would provide a viable set of alternative solutions to ensure operational safety and regulatory compliance without placing undue restrictions or responsibilities on UAS operators.

FAA expects that automated data service providers will deploy services to meet emerging demands and capabilities, some of which are yet to be developed. These services may be based on emerging industry standards that will develop to meet market demands. Recognizing the rapid pace of technological change, FAA proposes a flexible regulatory structure designed to enable the recognition of new services as future standards are designed. Section XIII of this preamble provides the framework for regulating automated data service providers and their services.

C. Definitions (§ 108.5)

FAA proposes to add several definitions in § 108.5 that are unique to operations conducted under proposed part 108. FAA is proposing definitions for AE, C2 link, conformance monitoring, DAA, flight coordinator, ground control station, hazardous material, life-limited part, operational intent, operations personnel, package delivery, safe distance, strategic deconfliction, strategic conflict detection, strategic conflict resolution, and target average conformance. These terms have specific meanings and usage in part 108 that may be unfamiliar to readers, or their usage in part 108 is specifically important to the new UAS framework

azardous material, life-limited part, operational intent, operations personnel, package delivery, safe distance, strategic deconfliction, strategic conflict detection, strategic conflict resolution, and target average conformance. These terms have specific meanings and usage in part 108 that may be unfamiliar to readers, or their usage in part 108 is specifically important to the new UAS framework. These definitions would help the public understand the context of how these terms are used and identify their specific usages throughout part 108. FAA invites comments on the use of the terms and the associated language used in the definitions, as well as if any definitions are not needed, or if any definitions should be added to the list. Discussion and further context for the definitions included in this section can be found in the pertinent sections of the preamble.

V. Part 108 General Requirements (Subpart A)

Currently, most UAS operations in the United States fall under part 107, which applies to small UAS operated within VLOS of the remote operator. Since larger and more complex UAS operations are not covered by part 107, nor are operations permitted beyond VLOS under part 107 without a waiver, UAS operators continue to rely on requesting regulatory exemptions and waivers to allow them to conduct such operations. While FAA has utilized the flexibility of the existing structure broadly to permit increasingly complex and advanced UAS operations, the current regulatory framework impedes full integration of all operations into the U.S. airspace. FAA seeks to fulfill its regulatory responsibility of ensuring the safety and efficiency of the NAS by facilitating the increased integration of UAS into the NAS and realizing UAS operational benefits. Therefore, FAA proposes to enable complex UAS operations, specifically those conducted BVLOS of the operator, under the proposed structure of part 108.

FAA understands that expanding UAS operations may introduce certain safety risks to the NAS

operators who wish to conduct BVLOS operations using an operating permit to comply with subpart D of part 108. Likewise, operators who wish to conduct BVLOS operations using an operating certificate would be required to comply with subpart E of proposed part 108. For a discussion on the distinction between part 108 operating permits versus operating certificates, see section VIII of this preamble.

Regardless of whether an operator holds an FAA-issued operating certificate or an FAA-issued operating permit, the proposed rule would require all part 108 operators to comply with the applicable operating rules under subpart B. Subpart B of proposed part 108 would prescribe the general rules of engagement that each operator would need to abide by in order to conduct UAS BVLOS operations under part 108, including preflight operating

requirements and regulations related to operating BVLOS over people. A further discussion on general operating rules is contained in section VI.B of this preamble. Lastly, proposed part 108 would also prescribe operating personnel requirements under subpart C, aircraft maintenance and alterations requirements under subpart F, and general procedural requirements—which includes inspection requirements and prohibitions against engaging in fraudulent or deceptive practices—under subpart A of the proposed part. 42

42 For subpart A, General, see section V of this preamble; for subpart C, Operations Personnel, see section VII of this preamble; for subpart F, Maintenance and Alterations, see section IX of this preamble.

A. Applicability (§ 108.1)

, see section IX of this preamble.

A. Applicability (§ 108.1)

Proposed § 108.1 states that the requirements in proposed part 108 would apply to any person 43 who wishes to conduct UAS BVLOS operations in the NAS. Regarding operator requirements, as proposed in § 108.1(a), the requirements of part 108 would apply to any person who (1) conducts, or intends to conduct, UAS BVLOS operations in U.S. airspace; (2) requests FAA issuance of an operating permit or an operating certificate; (3) performs maintenance on a UAS under an operating permit or certificate issued in accordance with this proposed part; (4) is involved in the design, manufacture, or production of UAS to be operating in accordance with part 108; (5) requests FAA airworthiness acceptance of a UAS in accordance with subparts G and H of this part; or (6) submits a voluntary consensus standard for acceptance or approval by FAA as a means of compliance for any provision of part 108.

43 Per 14 CFR 1.1, a person is described as an individual or an entity, including a corporation, company, association, governmental entity, etc.

In addition to noting who part 108 would apply to, FAA is also proposing specific exclusions from part 108 to delineate between the different regulations that UAS could be operated under. As proposed in § 108.1(b), part 108 would not be applicable to any persons who choose to conduct UAS operations under 14 CFR part 107 or part 91.

In addition, UAS operations conducted under the recreational flyer provisions of 49 U.S.C. 44809 would not be subject to this rulemaking. FAA anticipates that certain operations such as agricultural, package delivery, aerial surveying, photography, and flight testing currently conducted under waivers or exemptions to 14 CFR part 107, 91, or 135 would transition to the operations under part 108 when their exemptions expire, and a reasonable transition can occur

ions. Operation of larger VLOS aircraft is a different risk set than what is being addressed in proposed part 108 and including it would add significant complexity to the structure of this proposed rule.

In addition, at this time FAA has also opted out of expanding the VLOS rules under part 107 to add UAS weighing 55 pounds or greater because doing so could unnecessarily delay this proposed rule. The 55-pound limit within part 107 functions as a significant risk mitigation in VLOS UAS operations and increasing the weight threshold would require FAA to either develop new risk mitigation measures or have sufficient data to establish that operations can be safely conducted at a higher weight threshold with no additional risk mitigation measures.

Also, FAA is unable to gauge the public's need or desire for VLOS operations of aircraft weighing 55 pounds or greater where the operator cannot, or would be seriously disadvantaged to, meet the airworthiness or operational requirements proposed for part 108. While FAA anticipates that there may be business cases in which manually operated UA equal to or exceeding 55 pounds may be the best option, FAA expects these cases to be limited in number based on current operations. Further, FAA's intention with proposed part 108 is to create a regulatory framework for greatly expanded UAS operations with new and more capable UA, not to create a retrofit model for existing UAS with limited lifespans. Nevertheless, FAA recognizes that there are many existing UAS weighing 55 pounds or greater that are currently operating under an exemption to part 91 and those types of operations will be able to continue as they always have. FAA invites comments on whether there is a need or desire to expand part 107 for VLOS UAS operations weighing 55 pounds or greater. FAA also considered updating the relevant part 91 regulations 44 that are not currently in alignment with operations of a UA and are frequently the cause of exemptions needed for operators choosing to operate under that part

regulation has its own set of unique requirements and allowances. An operator would have to meet all relevant requirements associated with the regulatory part they choose to operate under.

Proposed part 108 is not intended to be used for carriage of people. The risk mitigations provided by this part are not sufficient for passenger carriage nor were they designed with carriage of people in mind. To that end, FAA proposes in § 108.1(b)(4) that UA operated under part 108 are not permitted to carry a person. Operations contemplating carriage of people would appropriately occur under other regulatory parts, such as 14 CFR parts 91 or 135.

B. Reporting and Prohibitions

1. Reproduction or Alteration (§ 108.10)

FAA expects that all parties affected by this proposed rulemaking would comply with FAA requirements when conducting UAS BVLOS operations under proposed part 108. Engaging in fraudulent or deceptive practices would be prohibited under proposed part 108, as it is under all existing FAA regulations. 45

45 As proposed in the Falsification, Reproduction, Alteration, Omission, or Incorrect Statements notice of proposed rulemaking (89 FR 8560), FAA intends to use a comprehensive prohibition on fraudulent or deceptive practices that covers all FAA regulations. If that rule becomes final, proposed § 108.10 would be redundant.

Proposed § 108.10(a) would prohibit anyone from making any fraudulent or intentionally false statement to any information submitted to FAA to show compliance with proposed part 108. Persons would be prohibited from fraudulently reproducing or altering an FAA-issued operating certificate or permit. If anyone were to engage in fraudulent or deceptive practices, proposed § 108.10(b) would enable FAA to issue penalties to those persons for their violations. Those penalties could include issuing a denial to applications for part 108 operating permits, part 108 operating certificates, certificates of waiver or authorizations, or declarations of compliance

ensure the safe and efficient use of the NAS. FAA notes that nothing in this requirement would preclude law enforcement, emergency services, the intelligence community, military personnel, or FAA personnel executing their authorized duties from intervening in operations in the interests of national security, emergency response, or oversight and surveillance necessary for the safety of the NAS.

3. Inspection, Testing, and Demonstration of Compliance (§ 108.20)

To ensure operations are conducted in accordance with existing rules and limitations, and FAA's statutory oversight responsibilities, 46 §§ 108.20(a)(1) and (2) proposes that an operator would need to have their authorization to operate and identification readily accessible when operating and present it to any of the following: FAA, the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB), and law enforcement officers. This measure would ensure that all operators are appropriately authorized, enhancing the safety and security of airspace operations. This requirement would set the stage for obligations aimed at maintaining operational integrity and oversight. This mandate would hold the operator accountable for unauthorized access and operation of UAS, which could result in incidents or accidents. The proposed requirement that operators have their authorization and identification on hand is so that government personnel would be able to verify that the operation is authorized and that qualified personnel are in control. This would ensure that operations are conducted efficiently and in compliance with regulatory standards.

46 See 49 U.S.C. 44701(a)(2)(A).

Section 108.20(a)(3) further proposes that an operator would need to make available, upon request of FAA or any authorized representative of the NTSB, any document, record, or report required to be kept under the regulations of 14 CFR chapter I

e effectiveness of this program in improving safety depends on the free, unrestricted flow of information from the users of the NAS.” FAA is concerned that, without such a prohibition on enforcement actions, pilots, UAS operators and other NAS users would be disincentivized from making safety reports, including acknowledging unintentional or honest mistakes, for fear of being penalized by FAA.

5. Base of Operation and Operator Identification (§§ 108.30 and 108.35)

FAA proposes in §§ 108.30(a) and (b) that each operator would be required to maintain a principal base of operations in the United States and would be required to provide FAA with a physical address. This physical address would serve as the primary point of contact for FAA, though (per proposed § 108.30(d)) the operator may perform operations at locations other than the principal base of operations, as authorized by FAA. Further, per proposed § 108.30(c), the operator would need to notify FAA at least 30 days prior to changing their principal base of operations. However, recreational operators would not be required to submit a principal base of operations, in accordance with proposed § 108.475(f)(3). Recreational operators would only be required to submit a physical address.

By ensuring that all operators supply a physical address, FAA would have the ability to accomplish prompt and cost-effective service of process and service of other safety-critical or time-sensitive documents, including notices of proposed civil penalties, orders of suspension or revocation, and emergency orders of suspension or revocation. In addition, as this proposed rule would only apply to operations conducted within the United States, FAA finds it necessary that the physical base of operations is also located in the United States

ss and service of other safety-critical or time-sensitive documents, including notices of proposed civil penalties, orders of suspension or revocation, and emergency orders of suspension or revocation. In addition, as this proposed rule would only apply to operations conducted within the United States, FAA finds it necessary that the physical base of operations is also located in the United States. While part 47 aircraft registration does require the aircraft owner to provide a mailing address, FAA is including this requirement for a principal base of operations in proposed part 108 because it is important for FAA to know the primary location where the operator will be conducting operations to conduct inspections. The address required for part 47 is the owner's mailing address, which may or may not be where the UA is located or from which it is operated.

In addition, FAA proposes in § 108.35(a) that an operator would not be able to operate or advertise services of a UA under part 108 using a business name other than what is listed on the operating permit or operating certificate. If the operator were to operate under a d/b/a, the business names would need to be provided on the application and listed on the permit or certificate to be valid. Furthermore, in proposed § 108.35(b), no person would be able to operate a UA under part 108 unless the identity of the operator is displayed on the UA in a manner acceptable to FAA. In addition to the registration number, FAA proposes that an operator would need to include the company name or trademark on the exterior of the aircraft for ease of identity in the case of a lost aircraft or off-site landing. FAA also encourages the addition of contact information in the form of a phone number, QR code, or other method to enable people who may come across the UA be able to report the sighting easily

egistration number, FAA proposes that an operator would need to include the company name or trademark on the exterior of the aircraft for ease of identity in the case of a lost aircraft or off-site landing. FAA also encourages the addition of contact information in the form of a phone number, QR code, or other method to enable people who may come across the UA be able to report the sighting easily.

These proposed requirements in § 108.35 would be consistent with FAA practices for other commercial operations and would ensure FAA has sufficient information to contact the operator as necessary, including in instances where a UA is destroyed and access to remote ID or other electronic systems is not possible, or FAA has other reason to contact the operator. In addition, as with other regulations applicable to commercial operations, the proposed prohibition on advertising under a different name would ensure that the people using the operator have the assurance that the company is operating within the regulatory framework established by FAA and would ensure FAA can appropriately link the operator who is advertising with the approval for the operation.

C. Recordkeeping (§ 108.40)

FAA proposes in § 108.40 to require each operator under proposed part 108 to maintain records for each aircraft used in part 108 operations, each required operations personnel used in part 108 operations, any mechanical irregularities for the UA and its AE, any maintenance or alterations performed on the UA or its AE, and all initial and recurrent training taken by each person required to receive training under proposed part 108. The operator would also be expected to provide FAA access to the records upon request, either electronically or in paper form.

For aircraft records, FAA proposes under § 108.40(a) that operators would need to include a current list of UA used in the permitted or certificated operation, the total time in service of each UA, and the status of any life-limited parts

raining under proposed part 108. The operator would also be expected to provide FAA access to the records upon request, either electronically or in paper form.

heavily on current aircraft status and past aircraft servicing and inspections to determine airworthiness of an aircraft. FAA would therefore require these records to be kept by the operator under this part.

FAA further proposes in § 108.40(a)(3) that an operator who performs a flight under this proposed rule would need to maintain records of each flight, including the date, time, and duration of the flight; the aircraft registration number; the type of operation ( e.g., package delivery); the flight path including destination, origin, and altitude(s); the name of the designated operations personnel assigned to each flight; and landing locations if different from origin and destination locations. FAA is proposing this recordkeeping to ensure the availability of information critical to incident or accident investigations. By requiring the operator to maintain these, FAA and operator would have historical data to determine root causes of occurrences, incidents, or accidents.

rical data to determine root causes of occurrences, incidents, or accidents.

Proposed §§ 108.40(a)(3)(vii) and 108.40(a)(3)(viii) include operation type-specific recordkeeping requirements for package delivery and agricultural operators. Under proposed § 108.40(a)(3)(vii), FAA would require package delivery operators to keep a record of the pickup points and delivery locations for each operation. FAA is proposing this requirement in addition to destination, origin, and landing locations because some UA do not physically land to pick up or deliver packages and it would be critical for FAA to know who the customers or warehousers are and where they are located in the event of an incident or accident investigation. Under proposed § 108.40(a)(3)(viii), FAA would also require the operators performing agricultural operations to keep a record of the name and address of each person for whom agricultural UA services were provided, the date of the service, and the name and quantity of the substance dispensed be kept as a record by the operator. The rationale for this additional requirement is that the agricultural operator may be contracted to provide services to one or more customers, and it is important for FAA to know who these customers are and where they are located in the event of an incident or investigation. Oftentimes, FAA does not discover non-compliance, accidents, or incidents involving aircraft until after the flight has been completed. By requiring these detailed records to be kept by the operator, FAA and operator would have historical data to look back on to determine root causes to occurrences, incidents, or accidents

re and where they are located in the event of an incident or investigation. Oftentimes, FAA does not discover non-compliance, accidents, or incidents involving aircraft until after the flight has been completed. By requiring these detailed records to be kept by the operator, FAA and operator would have historical data to look back on to determine root causes to occurrences, incidents, or accidents.

Because personnel are a key contributor to how any permit or certificate holder conducts safe operations, FAA proposes in § 108.40(b) that each operator would need to maintain records on each person required for the safe operation of the UAS used in its operations, including their full name, qualifications in sufficient detail to determine the individual's ability to participate in part 108 operations, current duties and date of duty assignment, and information relating to an individual's release from employment for cause. In addition, for operators holding an operating certificate, the operator would also need be required to maintain records on the date and times of operations personnel assigned work shifts, the length of the rest period prior to each duty period for each of the required personnel, and the total hours on duty per calendar day for each of the required operations personnel which, as discussed in VII.F, would require a minimum of 10-hour rest periods and maximum 14-hour duty days. This information would be valuable in understanding if persons are fit for duty and appropriately qualified. In addition, this information would be beneficial to FAA for continued surveillance purposes.

ersons are fit for duty and appropriately qualified. In addition, this information would be beneficial to FAA for continued surveillance purposes.

FAA proposes in § 108.40(c) that operators would need to provide logs for personnel to record mechanical irregularities. Having this log would allow personnel to view current and previous discrepancies for corrections and airworthiness of the aircraft. FAA further proposes that operations personnel would be required to enter, or to have entered, in the log each mechanical irregularity for the UA and their AE that comes to the person's attention. For operators to ensure that faulty or inoperative equipment is addressed per manufacturers’ maintenance instructions, operations personnel would need to create a log of the faulty item should it come to their attention. This log would ultimately be used by both maintenance personnel for correction and operations personnel for determining overall UA airworthiness. In addition, when entering a log of mechanical irregularity, FAA proposes that personnel who take corrective action concerning a reported or observed failure or malfunction would need to enter, or need to have entered, the action taken in the log. This would ensure that any person(s) responsible for determining UA airworthiness can decide the UA's overall operational status.

Further, FAA proposes that, under § 108.40(d), the operator would be required to maintain records of the UA inspection status for each maintenance or alteration activity to the UA or its AE. It is important for anyone operating the UA to be able to determine when the last inspections were performed and the status of all the required inspections as outlined in the manufacturer's maintenance instructions

er, FAA proposes that, under § 108.40(d), the operator would be required to maintain records of the UA inspection status for each maintenance or alteration activity to the UA or its AE. It is important for anyone operating the UA to be able to determine when the last inspections were performed and the status of all the required inspections as outlined in the manufacturer's maintenance instructions. In addition, persons performing maintenance on the UA would be required under proposed § 108.40(d)(1) to make a record of that activity, including a description of the work performed, the date of completion of the work, the identification of the person who performed the maintenance, and a return to service approval. These requirements would additionally help persons responsible for airworthiness determination to ensure proper airworthiness status of the UA by showing a complete log of all work performed.

FAA proposes in § 108.40(d)(2) that operators would not need to comply with the logging and documenting requirements of proposed § 108.40 for removal and replacement of UA batteries designed for frequent, toolless replacement if the operator has other means of tracking battery use, life, and performance. Some UA designs necessitate the removal of the aircraft batteries on every flight for charging. Aircraft designed this way are expected to have an easy, toolless feature that prevents the battery from being installed improperly and ensures that the battery is secure. Therefore, all of the information generally required for other maintenance entries may not be needed in these cases and may become overly burdensome if required for every flight. However, FAA recognizes that batteries are essential to most UA operations and does propose that operators would still need a way to track battery use, life, and performance

roperly and ensures that the battery is secure. Therefore, all of the information generally required for other maintenance entries may not be needed in these cases and may become overly burdensome if required for every flight. However, FAA recognizes that batteries are essential to most UA operations and does propose that operators would still need a way to track battery use, life, and performance.

FAA also proposes in § 108.40(d)(3) that operators would not need to comply with the logging and documenting requirements of § 108.40 for removal and replacement of UA components that are designed for toolless removal and installation, such as removable rotors which may be necessary to remove for UA storage, so long as the operator has procedures for ensuring that any part that is removed is inspected for serviceability prior to being reinstalled and: (1) the parts are reinstalled on the same aircraft; (2) the parts are not subject to time limits; or (3) the operator has other means of tracking installations and use. Through current experience, FAA understands that UA often have various removable parts that are frequently removed and replaced without being deemed faulty. These typical parts are removed for

reasons such as storage or repositioning of the UA. FAA does not intend to overburden an operator with logging and documenting parts that the manufacturer has designed to be normally removed and reinstalled. So long as operators have procedures for ensuring parts are removed, inspected, and reinstalled, FAA has concluded that safety would not be affected by not requiring logging and documenting normal removal and reinstallation of parts.

Personnel training is of great importance, as it ensures appropriate qualification, competency, and proficiency of a person performing their duties. To understand each person's qualification, competency, and proficiency, proposed § 108.40(e) would require the operator to keep a record showing personnel training

ined, which would show that training has been completed satisfactorily. All of this documentation would help not only the operator to have a complete description of the training event for tracking, scheduling of future training, and archival documentation for non-compliances, but also would help FAA to determine continued compliance.

Finally, this proposal would include minimum retention periods. FAA recognizes that operators may struggle to keep track of old records and the necessity for archival data from those records becomes unnecessary and non-applicable as time goes on. FAA therefore proposes that UA records, mechanical irregularity records, and maintenance records would need to be kept either for the life of the aircraft, or for 24 months, as applicable. Records of the total time in service of each UA and the status of any life-limited parts must be kept for the life of the aircraft as they establish important history for the UA that must be maintained. Records of each flight performed, must be retained for a period of 24 months. Personnel records must generally continue to be maintained as long as the employee is employed and continue until 12 months after the person has separated from the company, to include any training performed or received, however, duty and rest records only have to be maintained for 3 months. Records of mechanical irregularities and maintenance performed must also be retained for a period of 24 months.

In addition, personnel and training records would need to be retained for 12 months following the separation of the personnel from the operator. This amount of time would be sufficient for these records to be useful. FAA does not want to impose on an operator record filing that, after years of retention, may create faulty, inundated databases with records that have not shown to be of concern within the previous 12 months

th data. During routine surveillance, FAA typically reviews samplings of this type of data to determine overall compliance. FAA does not see the need to retain lengthy archival data concerning individual flights.

D. Reporting (§ 108.45)

FAA has a duty to ensure the safety of the NAS. To do so, FAA needs to be aware of accidents, incidents, and precursor safety events and occurrences in the NAS. The reporting requirements proposed in § 108.45 are intended to capture a diverse set of data ensuring that FAA can appropriately track and monitor the safety of UAS operations under this part.

In § 108.45(a)(1), FAA proposes that each operator would be required to report aggregate flight data to FAA. This data would include the total number of flight hours operated for each individual UA, including the specific make, model, or series of aircraft and the associated FAA registration number. This data would be helpful for three reasons. First, it would support FAA's safety oversight functions. By collecting flight data, FAA would gain insights into UAS operations. This information would help FAA identify potential risks, and areas for improvement. Second, this data would be useful in identifying trends that could otherwise lead to accidents or incidents. Monitoring flight hours would allow FAA to track usage patterns and identify any anomalies or excessive usage. This would also aid in preventing accidents due to overuse or fatigue-related issues. Third, reporting flight data would ensure compliance with regulations by enabling FAA to verify that operators are adhering to their operational limits.

In § 108.45(a)(2) FAA proposes requiring operators to provide flight data to the manufacturer or permit and facilitate flight data collection by the manufacturer to ensure continued operational support for the operator. Traditionally, these data collection systems are already voluntarily implemented within the industry to analyze flight data to aid in the identification of safety issues with the UA design

.45(a)(2) FAA proposes requiring operators to provide flight data to the manufacturer or permit and facilitate flight data collection by the manufacturer to ensure continued operational support for the operator. Traditionally, these data collection systems are already voluntarily implemented within the industry to analyze flight data to aid in the identification of safety issues with the UA design. FAA envisions that this could be accomplished by submitting the data log file to support both § 108.725 and § 108.905. In § 108.45(b), FAA proposes requiring each operator to report the registration and serial numbers of each aircraft used in part 108 operations. This report would need to be made in a form or manner acceptable to the Administrator. FAA notes in proposed § 108.45(b) that this reporting can be combined with the flight data reporting required under

proposed § 108.45(a). Requiring this reporting allows FAA to easily determine an operator's compliance with § 108.115 as well as to ensure ongoing regulatory compliance.

In § 108.45(c), FAA proposes that operators would be required to submit a monthly interruption report summary to FAA when there is an occurrence related to an unplanned or precautionary landing away from the normally designated landing location or where the planned UAS route is altered due to known or suspected mechanical difficulties or malfunctions. By analyzing these occurrences, FAA would gain insights into common failure modes. This information would inform maintenance practices and would help improve reliability—including potential changes that the manufacturer may need to make or that can be addressed through revisions to industry consensus standards. Aggregated reports would allow FAA to assess the overall health of a growing and diverse fleet of UAS. This would inform regulatory decisions, training programs, and safety best practices, among other outcomes

ce practices and would help improve reliability—including potential changes that the manufacturer may need to make or that can be addressed through revisions to industry consensus standards. Aggregated reports would allow FAA to assess the overall health of a growing and diverse fleet of UAS. This would inform regulatory decisions, training programs, and safety best practices, among other outcomes. Taken together, these reporting requirements would serve as essential tools for maintaining safety, compliance, and operational efficiency.

FAA further proposes that operators certificated under subpart E would be mandated under § 108.45(d)(1) to report to the UA manufacturer any failure, malfunction, or defect that results in a momentary or permanent loss of control or communication of the UAS if it has endangered, or may endanger, the safe operation of the UA. Under the proposed rule, operators would also have to provide such reports to FAA upon request. FAA's intent for this proposed requirement is that this information could be used by the manufacturer to monitor and identify negative trends affecting the safe operation of the UA and its AE. Reporting reliability issues to the UAS manufacturer would provide a vital source of data to help detect and mitigate potential hazards and improve aircraft design. Safety reporting can provide precursor data before a hazard leads to a more significant event. By analyzing these events, industry may be able to avoid future incidents or accidents.

Operators would need to include specific details in their reports, including the date, aircraft identification and nature of the failure. Furthermore, FAA proposes in § 108.45(d)(1) that service difficulty reports would also need to include identification of a part or system involved, which aids in pinpointing root causes and assessing overall system reliability. FAA also proposes in § 108.45(d)(1) requiring operators to indicate the apparent cause of the failure, malfunction, or defect

endangered or may endanger the safe operation of the aircraft. This proposed rule would require that users report details of the apparent failure of an automated data service, which could include operational or functional issues including notification of a contingent state, interface issues, data issues, time delay/latency issues, or the operational response to information or alerts from a service. FAA intends for this to be broad so that users and service providers alike can recognize a range of issues, including systemic incorrect usage of a service that may be due to ambiguities in documentation, design, or other factors.

Prompt reporting of service difficulties of not later than 7 days after the occurrence would enable manufacturers and automated data service providers to play a proactive role in assessing and mitigating potential safety risks. By reporting to the aircraft manufacturer or the automated data service providers, operators would contribute to a broader understanding of real-world performance and reliability. This feedback would inform design improvements, corrective actions, and other sets of standards upon which the airworthiness acceptance and service authorization rely. Therefore, in proposed § 108.45(h)(4), FAA proposes that reporting under (d)(1) and (d)(2) would need to occur no later than 7 days after the occurrence.

FAA proposes several security-related reporting requirements in § 108.45(e). Any security breach where an operator loses control of the UAS would need to be reported to FAA. This would include unauthorized control that may be careless in nature or perpetrated by a malicious agent, regardless of if that individual is an employee or an outsider. Furthermore, an operator would need to report unauthorized access to the operator's facilities, including areas where UAS are loaded, hazardous materials are stored, or goods are prepared for transport

he event. This would be consistent with the corresponding reporting requirement in proposed § 107.20.

Finally, FAA proposes in § 108.45(h) reporting timeframes for each reporting requirement enumerated under proposed § 108.45. Under the proposed rule, flight data and UA registration and serial numbers (§§ 108.45(a) and 108.45(b)) would need to be provided to FAA at least once each calendar month. FAA intends to provide an automated interface to facilitate the collection of this data and anticipates that most manufacturers and operators will incorporate automation to comply with this request, so that data collection could be as frequent as near real-time, weekly, or any other frequency that is at least once a month. As this is a new requirement, FAA invites comments on the impact this might have on operators, including potentially less-burdensome alternatives.

Summaries of occurrences under interruption reports (§ 108.45(c)) would need to be provided no later than the end of the 10th day of the following month in which the occurrence took place, which would be consistent with other similar requirements in other regulations. 47 Service difficulty reports (§ 108.45(d)) would need to be submitted 7 days after the occurrence, with additional information provided as needed to supplement the initial report which is also consistent with similar requirements. 48 Security occurrences (§ 108.45(e)) would need to be reported no later than 96 hours after the occurrence, with supplemental information after the initial report as needed, which would be a new requirement but is being proposed as a 96-hour requirement due to the nature of the information. Emergency conditions and event reporting (§§ 108.45(f) and (g)) would need to be submitted within 10 days of the deviation or event, respectively.

47 See, e.g., 14 CFR 135.417, 14 CFR 121.705, 14 CFR 91.1417.

48 See, e.g., 14 CFR 135.415, 14 CFR 121.703, 14 CFR 125.409

operating requirements for all operators conducting operations under proposed part 108. To conduct UAS BVLOS operations in the NAS under this proposed rule, FAA would require part 108 operators to comply with all applicable requirements of this part. As noted in proposed § 108.100(a), this rule would establish two pathways for operation under part 108, operating permits and operating certificates. Subpart B applies to operations conducted under an operating permit (subpart D) and operations conducted under an operating certificate (subpart E). Further description of the operating permits and certificates can be found in section VIII of this preamble and personnel requirements can be found in section VII of this preamble.

This rule proposes requirements for BVLOS operations conducted within the United States, using risk-based criteria that permit further evolution of operations than currently allowed in existing regulations. The below section lays out FAA's reasoning and proposed requirements for a BVLOS operating framework, while this section describes the overall requirements applicable to all BVLOS operations envisioned under this rule.

Proposed part 108, like part 107, would have specific risk mitigation and hazard reduction provisions that would facilitate integration. The requirement for all part 108 operations to have a means to avoid manned aircraft broadcasting their position using ADS-B Out equipment would extend to Class G airspace, providing additional collision risk reduction compared with the strategic mitigations provided through the regulatory requirements of part 107. In addition, UAS would be required to have anti-collision lighting that conforms to an industry standard to ensure that they are visible to manned aircraft

In order to enable operations in controlled airspace and over people, this rule also proposes requirements for strategic deconfliction (section VI.I), changes to right-of-way rules (section VI.J), and Remote ID performance (section VI.K). These three proposed requirements would provide a framework for the kind of shared, dynamic environment FAA anticipates this proposed rulemaking could enable. In addition, this rule sets requirements for shielded operations (section VI.L), which would permit BVLOS operations within 50 feet of an obstacle or a structure or other designated areas, without further authorization. The

proposed rule would permit operations with multiple UA (section VI.M).

Finally, this rule proposes requirements to prohibit careless or reckless operation (section VI.N), manuals (section VI.O), and emergency conditions (section VI.P).

A. Operating Unmanned Aircraft Under Part 108

As explained in section X of this preamble, FAA is proposing that a UA operating under this rule would be required to have an airworthiness acceptance rather than an airworthiness certification. Because an individual UA evaluation by FAA would not take place, FAA would additionally require under proposed § 108.720(a)(1) that the manufacturer develop limitations for the UAS to be operated as specified in the manufacturer's UAS operating instructions. This requirement would ensure that operators do not exceed the manufacturer's operational limits on the UA, which could lead to UA failure. Under this proposed rulemaking, manufacturers would develop and test UA to meet consensus standards for FAA airworthiness acceptance. Manufacturers would need to demonstrate that the UAS design may be safely used in BVLOS operations in accordance with FAA-accepted consensus standards.

Accordingly, to operate under proposed part 108, operators would be required to use a UA that holds an airworthiness acceptance, as noted in proposed § 108.105(b), except for UA operated under the flight test permit of proposed § 108.470

keoff or landing area is clear for operations.

The primary purpose of requiring lighted position lights on UA during night operations is to enhance the visibility of these aircraft to other airspace users. This requirement would help prevent midair collisions and ensure safe distance between aircraft, particularly in areas of high traffic density or when operating in proximity to manned aircraft. Position lights would make it easier for pilots of manned aircraft and other UA operators to see and track UA, thereby facilitating better situational awareness and decision-making in flight.

Enforcing the use of lighted position lights at night would align with existing regulations for manned aircraft, promoting a consistent and predictable environment for all airspace users. This requirement would ensure that UA are visible to other pilots and air traffic control, thereby supporting safer coexistence and minimizing the risk of incursions or airspace violations.

2. Registration (§ 108.115)

Per 49 U.S.C. 44101, all aircraft operated in the NAS must be registered with FAA. No person is allowed to operate a UA unless it has been registered by its owner, unless the aircraft meets a limited exception from registration. 49 There are currently two ways to register a UAS. Part 47, which broadly applies to all aircraft, including UA, and part 48, which provides an alternate route to register a small UA, defined as those weighing less than 55 pounds. Since part 108 would cover operations of UA weighing greater than 55 pounds, part 48 could not be used for all part 108 operations without making significant changes to part 48. FAA has determined that it is appropriate for UA operated under part 108 to follow the existing registration structure set out in part 47. Though small UA may operate under part 108, FAA is proposing that all aircraft conducting part 108 operations would be required to follow the registration procedures of part 47, as proposed in § 108.115(a)

erations without making significant changes to part 48. FAA has determined that it is appropriate for UA operated under part 108 to follow the existing registration structure set out in part 47. Though small UA may operate under part 108, FAA is proposing that all aircraft conducting part 108 operations would be required to follow the registration procedures of part 47, as proposed in § 108.115(a). As a result, FAA is proposing to amend § 48.1, Applicability, to require small UA that operate under 108 to use the registration procedures of part 47.

49 Section 48.105 Registration: Small unmanned aircraft intended exclusively for limited recreational operations adds an exception to the general registration requirement for small UA for recreational flyers. In those cases, a Certificate of Aircraft Registration issued in accordance with § 48.110 constitutes registration for all the small UA used exclusively for operations in compliance with 49 U.S.C. 44809 owned by the individual identified on the application.

The web-based registration process under part 48 was designed as an alternative streamlined system for the registration and marking of small UA. Aircraft records created under part 48 only contain a minimal amount of data, such as the owner's name, email address, physical address, and phone number, the manufacturer and model of the UA, and the standard remote identification serial number or remote identification broadcast module serial number, if applicable. The part 48 database cannot house document images, such as transfers, security conveyances, or airworthiness applications and certificates. Such documents would likely be commonplace for part 108 UAS. Therefore, any UAS operating under part 108 would be required to register under part 47 ( e.g., an N-number), regardless of weight. To facilitate this,

FAA is also proposing to amend the applicability under part 48 to restrict the registration of small UA operating under part 108, in addition to small UA that hold an airworthiness certificate

rative.

Finally, as proposed in § 108.120(d), FAA proposes that persons occupying this position would be directly responsible for, and be the final authority as to, the safe and secure operation of all aircraft under their purview. If a company has multiple operations supervisors, each operations supervisor would only be responsible for the operations of aircraft in their assigned responsibility. Similarly, FAA proposes to require that the operations supervisor ensure that the operator complies with all applicable regulatory requirements and its operations manual. Accordingly, the operations supervisor should demonstrate skill in ensuring safe operations and in management. This role would oversee the entire operation, or where multiple operations supervisors are used, their specific areas of responsibility. They must have knowledge of all other roles involved, as well knowledge of the UA, the AE, and flight plans. Though other personnel may be responsible for performing individual safety-of-flight actions, both before and during flight, the operations supervisor holds the overall responsibility and is the final authority for safe operations. The operations supervisor would also be responsible for ensuring that all applicable personnel are properly trained and knowledgeable before an operation commences. FAA proposes in § 108.140 that operations conducted under part 108 would be limited to a speed equal to or less than what is prescribed in the manufacturer's operating instructions. The aircraft manufacturer is in the best position to know the design limits for the aircraft that they produce. FAA chose to use groundspeed because most small UAS lack the equipment to determine true airspeed and generally rely on technologies such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to determine UA speed. However, this poses some challenges. If a UA has a strong tailwind, it is possible that the true airspeed might be very low

the best position to know the design limits for the aircraft that they produce. FAA chose to use groundspeed because most small UAS lack the equipment to determine true airspeed and generally rely on technologies such as Global Positioning Systems (GPS) to determine UA speed. However, this poses some challenges. If a UA has a strong tailwind, it is possible that the true airspeed might be very low. As such, FAA recognizes that some UA may need to operate at higher ground speeds to maintain a minimum safe operating speed and FAA would provide relief for an operator to exceed the stated groundspeed in the manufacturer's operating instructions in those operating conditions.

FAA proposes in § 108.140(b) that operations conducted under part 108 would be limited to a weight equal to or less than specified for the type of operating permit or operating certificate that the operator is using for that operation. The weight would include the weight of the UA as well as the weight of any items attached to or carried by the UA. While part 108 would allow operations with varying sizes of UA weighing not greater than 1,320 pounds, FAA has proposed weight limitations associated with different types of operations to further mitigate the risks associated with BVLOS operations. For further information about the specific weight restrictions, see the descriptions of permitted and certificated operations in section VIII.

FAA proposes in § 108.145 that operations conducted under part 108 would not be allowed to be conducted in weather conditions other than those described in the manufacturer's

operating instructions. In developing a UA for airworthiness acceptance under part 108, manufacturers would be required to identify which weather conditions the UA may safely operate in or ensure the UA has the capability to identify and avoid those weather conditions for which the UA is not designed to operate, per proposed §§ 108.720(a)(1)(i) and 108.890

ensure appropriate oversight for safety of flight.

In addition, FAA proposes in § 108.150(b) that UA operated under part 108 would need to be monitored and controlled from a location that is physically located within the United States, including its territories and inter-island operations when operating in United States airspace. This would follow the same restriction that is present in part 107. As discussed in the part 107 final rule, the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) recognizes UAS as aircraft and therefore has applied existing standards and recommended practices (SARPS) for aircraft to UAS. ICAO remains in the process of determining how the SARPS can accommodate UAS, but presently, the ICAO SARPS are quite restrictive for UAS. This proposed rulemaking would likely go beyond what ICAO currently allows for UAS. As such, FAA would restrict proposed part 108 to operations within United States airspace. Any operations outside the United States would not fit within the applicability of part 108. FAA considered adding an option to request authorization to monitor and control UAS from outside the United States. FAA seeks comment on whether it should expand the scope of § 108.150 to allow UAS to be monitored or controlled from outside the United States.

Finally, FAA proposes in § 108.150(c) that operators must address physical security and seek to prevent unauthorized access to the operation's facilities, including controlled access areas, as applicable. An operator may use controlled access areas to protect hazardous materials before those materials are loaded onto a UA, for example. FAA also anticipates that, due to the size, scope, and complexity of operations, the operator may have other areas they deem sensitive and choose to utilize controlled access areas. FAA is utilizing performance-based language in this proposed requirement to provide operators flexibility with how controlled access areas are designated

d aircraft and potentially blinding ADS-B ground receivers. Currently, operators conducting operations under part 107 cannot operate a UA with ADS-B Out in transmit mode, per § 107.53. FAA also prohibits the use of ADS-B Out to meet the requirements of remote identification, as per § 89.125. The proposed restriction on ADS-B equipment in § 108.160 is consistent with FAA's existing limitations.

D. Area of Operations (§ 108.165)

FAA proposes in § 108.165 that all operators would be required to obtain approval from FAA for the area of intended operations prior to operation. Understanding potential risks, anticipating their impact on both flight and ground operations, and mitigating those risks are all critical to safe part 108 operations. Under this proposed requirement, before beginning operations in a new area the operator would identify known hazards, mitigate such hazards with proper planning and effective controls, and plan for contingencies for any new hazards identified during operations. In developing this proposal, FAA utilized its ongoing experience with the authorization and oversight of waiver and exemption holders. In proposed § 108.165(a), FAA would require operators to receive approval from FAA prior to beginning operations in an area and would expect the operator to be responsible for certain requirements as described below for those intended operations. In requesting approval from FAA for a new operating location, the operator would submit information to FAA that includes the operating area boundaries, estimated number of daily operations, and other operating characteristics as appropriate. FAA anticipates that operators would report, and FAA would collect, this information through the same portal as the application process uses for permit and certificate oversight.

Proposed § 108.165(b) would require the operator to designate safe alternate landing areas that the UA can reach if it is unable to complete the intended flight

tions, and other operating characteristics as appropriate. FAA anticipates that operators would report, and FAA would collect, this information through the same portal as the application process uses for permit and certificate oversight.

Proposed § 108.165(b) would require the operator to designate safe alternate landing areas that the UA can reach if it is unable to complete the intended flight. Proposed § 108.165(b) lists specific requirements that landing areas would have to meet to satisfy the proposed regulation. First, the safe alternate landing area would need to avoid areas where overflight is prohibited. Second, the safe alternate landing area would need to provide for a landing without posing undue hazard to persons or property on the ground. FAA has proposed these requirements to ensure that, in a situation when an immediate landing is required, the operator is prepared with an area that would not create a hazard to persons and property on the ground. In the planning of these proposed alternate landing areas, it is critical that operators understand that the need to land the UA in a timely manner is paramount for circumstances such as emergencies or abnormal events.

In § 108.165(c), FAA proposes that the operator would be required to designate appropriate takeoff, landing, and loading areas that have restricted access to only those persons participating in the operation and that are free of any obstructions that could pose a hazard to persons who are not participating in the operation. Designating appropriate takeoff, landing, and loading areas that have restricted access would ensure that only authorized people have access to the operating areas. This would keep unauthorized persons away from operating areas and lower the risk to non-participants, who may not be aware that an operation is in progress. In addition, FAA proposes that takeoff, landing, and loading areas would need to be adequate for the planned operation, considering such items as size, surface, obstructions, and lighting

the intended operation, in accordance with the aircraft limitations specified by the manufacturer, and that are determined in a manner acceptable to FAA. This is because flying in adverse weather conditions, or in weather conditions that the UA is not designed to handle, may increase operational risk. Familiarity with forecast weather conditions is an important part of the flight planning process. Title 14 of the CFR contains requirements on the use of weather information and the level of approval required for that information for various operations. For example, within 14 CFR parts 121 or 135, there is a requirement to use weather reports or forecasts from a source “approved by the Administrator.”

Aviation weather currently provides surface weather observations [ e.g., Meteorological Aerodrome Report (METAR)] and forecasts [ e.g., Terminal Area Forecast (TAF)] at and around many airports. These observations and forecasts are typically only valid out to five miles from the location where the observation was taken or around the airport the TAF was generated for. To date, FAA's current sources “approved by the Administrator” include, but are not limited to, Automated Surface Observing System (ASOS), Automated Weather Observing System (AWOS), and information provided by the National Weather Service (NWS).

Massachusetts Institute of Technology Lincoln Laboratory (MIT/LL) reports 50 from November 2017 note the sparseness of off-airport observations of visibility, clouds and ceiling, and surface winds. The report summaries state that: “airport-specific weather information ( e.g., METAR, TAFs, etc.) do not readily translate to conditions at remote launch locations, which may be 10-30 miles from the nearest airport . .

erator can determine whether the vehicle can safely operate within the manufacturer's limitations. Traditionally FAA has required operators to use weather information that was from sources approved or provided by FAA. However, for the reasons stated above, this is not practical or appropriate for most UA operations, so FAA is proposing to allow operators to obtain weather information in other ways. This could include the use of weather services provided under an automated data service provider construct under proposed part 146, or through other sources found acceptable to the Administrator.

FAA proposes in § 108.170(b) that the operator would need to be familiar with any airspace and flight restrictions along the entire route of flight, including the review of any applicable Notices to Airmen (NOTAMs). Another important aspect of assessing the operational environment is the consideration of airspace information to identify any known flight restrictions along the

route. To comply with this requirement, FAA expects the operator to assess the departure, enroute, and destination airspace; special use airspace; NOTAMs; temporary flight restrictions; and UA flight restrictions to ensure compliance with airspace rules and restrictions. As stated in proposed § 108.180 and further discussed in section VI.G, UAS operations under this proposal would only be allowed in controlled airspace under certain conditions and may be subject to FAA authorization. If an operator did not assess this information prior to conducting operations, operations could transverse through controlled airspace and result in adverse events, such as disruptions to aircraft receiving ATM services or loss of separation between controlled and uncontrolled aircraft. Similarly, an operator would need to be familiar with special use airspace, NOTAMs, and any ground hazards associated with the flight

d hazards would enable the flight coordinator to appropriately plan around or avoid such hazards that may result in adverse events when preparing to conduct the operation. Given the advances in geospatial information systems, 3D mapping software, and publications, operators should have access to sufficient information to be able to comply with this requirement. FAA seeks comment on this assumption.

To comply with proposed § 108.170(e), the operator would be required to ensure that the UAS are in a condition for safe operation. It is critical that all aircraft operated in the NAS, including UAS operated under proposed part 108, are in a safe condition to minimize risk. Being in a safe condition not only minimizes the risk for other aircraft in the NAS, but also minimizes the risk for persons and property on the ground.

FAA proposes in § 108.170(f) that the operator would need to ensure there are sufficient personnel available for the operation. While there are no specific staffing requirements under this proposal, an operator not having sufficient personnel necessary for their individual operation could present a safety risk. Increased pressure to “get the job done,” and personnel taking on additional work beyond their duty assignment, or lack of experience with certain duties, can degrade the safety of the operation. Operations with insufficient personnel may experience mistakes with potential undesired results in any part of the operation. Task saturation or diversion of attention could create gaps in monitoring the automated systems and over-reliance on those systems. Incomplete knowledge and experience with those systems could cause errors that could lead to an incident or accident at various points during an operation.

FAA is proposing in § 108.170(g) that, if required by § 108.180 or § 108.185, the operator would need to ensure that a strategically deconflicted operational intent is accepted prior to takeoff

y outside the approved limits could result in control difficulty and unstable or unknown flight characteristics. Operating within the center of gravity would ensure the UA is operating in the most stable, balanced, and predicted condition. As listed in section X of this preamble, under the proposed process for airworthiness acceptance, the manufacturer would need to provide weight and balance data. Therefore, because of the effects of an out-of-balance or overweight condition, FAA proposes that the operator should ensure that weight and balance will be calculated and conducted within the limitations defined by the aircraft manufacturer.

In § 108.170(j), FAA proposes that, for the safety of the operation, property, and people around the operation, the operator would need to ensure that any object attached to, or carried by, the UA is secure and does not adversely affect the flight characteristics or controllability of the UA. If not directly

attached to the underside of the UA during transport or if lowered during operations, the operator should be able to calculate weight and balance with emphasis on a lateral center of gravity. If during maneuvering forward airspeed is increased, light loads generally tend to shift further aft and may become unstable. Any unstable load may flutter, oscillate, or rotate, resulting in reduced aircraft control and undue stress on the UA.

Finally, in proposed § 108.170(k), the operator of a part 108 UA would need to ensure that their UA navigation and communication systems are working properly. This is critical for ensuring that the UAS operation can be conducted successfully.

her aft and may become unstable. Any unstable load may flutter, oscillate, or rotate, resulting in reduced aircraft control and undue stress on the UA.

F. Operating Restrictions (§ 108.175)

FAA proposes in § 108.175 that an operator would not be allowed to operate a UA under part 108 higher than 400 feet AGL unless the operator is in Class G airspace and temporarily transiting steeply changing terrain, is operating within a 400-foot radius of a structure and does not fly higher than 400 feet above the structure's immediate uppermost limit, or needs to maneuver up to 450 feet AGL temporarily in order to avoid a collision.

Like part 107 and existing UAS exemptions and waivers, FAA proposes to permit UA operating under proposed part 108 to operate up to 400 feet AGL. An altitude limitation provides a necessary barrier between UA operations and most manned aircraft operations in the NAS. In addition to the altitude limitation of 400 feet AGL, FAA would require the altitude of the UA to be flown within a 400-foot radius of a structure to not fly higher than 400 feet above the structure's immediate uppermost limit when operating within the confines of a structure. This limitation has the same reasoning as the buffer of 500 feet from manned aircraft in that manned aircraft must generally maintain at least 500 feet from a structure. In addition, FAA would permit operations to exceed 400 feet AGL if necessary to avoid a collision.

This prohibition against close operation near obstacles and structures is intended to mitigate the risk of collision. The operating speed of manned aircraft is another factor that contributes to collisions with structures or obstacles. For most manned aircraft, the operating speed is much higher than the operating speed of a UAS

perations to exceed 400 feet AGL if necessary to avoid a collision.

FAA does not believe that an altitude above 400 feet AGL is justified for part 108 UAS operations, except in the narrow circumstances prescribed in this part. If allowed, higher altitude UA operating in the NAS would potentially be unable to maintain adequate separation from manned aircraft. If UAS were permitted to operate above 400 feet AGL, it could increase the risk of a collision between UAS and non-equipped aircraft. At this time, FAA does not have sufficient data to eliminate the 100-foot buffer between UA operating at 400 feet AGL and below and manned aircraft generally occupying airspace 500 feet AGL and above established in part 107. The United States aviation system is designed to have sufficient safety margins, as well as redundancy in risk mitigations. The 400-foot AGL maximum altitude proposed by this rule upholds those principles.

The maximum operating altitude imposed by this rule is intended to limit the height of the UA above the ground over which it is flying AGL. It is incumbent upon the operator to maintain flight at or below this maximum operating altitude. Lastly, during all operations, the UA must be operated at an altitude that would not create a hazard to persons or property. Operating at an altitude that would not create a hazard to persons or property also means that the UA must be operated at a distance from a structure or obstruction to not create a hazard to persons or property.

FAA recognizes, however, that certain terrain may obstruct the operator's ability to comply with this requirement to remain at or below 400 feet AGL

eate a hazard to persons or property. Operating at an altitude that would not create a hazard to persons or property also means that the UA must be operated at a distance from a structure or obstruction to not create a hazard to persons or property.

FAA recognizes, however, that certain terrain may obstruct the operator's ability to comply with this requirement to remain at or below 400 feet AGL. For example, in areas with steep terrain, such as open pit mines, gorges, and small canyons, it may be unsafe or impractical for the aircraft to dive or climb rapidly to stay no more than 400 feet above the terrain immediately below. Rather than require operators to maintain a consistent altitude of 400 feet AGL or below, FAA deems it would be more important for the operator to use their best judgment in maintaining a safe altitude and reduce any operating safety risks. FAA's primary objective is to ensure that UAS BVLOS operations promote NAS safety and efficiency. As such, FAA proposes in § 108.175(a)(1) that, in the interest of safety, the operator would be able to operate higher than 400 feet AGL in situations where the operator is briefly transiting steeply changing terrain.

In addition, FAA proposes in § 108.175(a)(2) that an operator may operate higher than 400 feet AGL when operating a UA within a 400-foot radius of a structure and does not fly higher than 400 feet above the structure's immediate uppermost limit. Manned aircraft are not able to operate safely that closely to a structure, so the UAS operator would be able to maintain separation.

FAA proposes in § 108.175(a)(3) that the operator could temporarily exceed 400 feet AGL if necessary to avoid a collision. While it would remain incumbent upon the operator to be aware of any obstructions that could pose a hazard, per § 108.165(c)(2) and maintain safe distance from other aircraft in line with the requirements in § 108.195, FAA acknowledges that there are circumstances that may require the operator to temporarily climb to avoid a collision

14 CFR 91.133, 91.137-91.145, and 14 CFR 99.7. Flight restrictions are established under certain circumstances to maintain the safety and security of the NAS. Scenarios warranting the establishment of flight restrictions may include responses to disaster areas such as wildfires and hurricanes, protection of sensitive sites, major sporting events, and for emergency and national security situations.

FAA proposes in § 108.175(c) that operators should notify the controlling agency for any operations planned within a military operating area (MOA) or on and military training route (MTR). Operators must always exercise extreme caution and remain vigilant of all MTRs and or non-regulatory SUAs. While MOAs and MTRs do not rise to the level of being classified as prohibited or

restricted areas, the potential for low level military operations are higher in these areas and increased awareness and precautions are warranted.

Finally, similar to the restriction found in part 107, FAA proposes in § 108.175(d) a provision that would prohibit any UAS operations that interfere with operations and traffic patterns at airports, heliports, seaplane bases, space launch and reentry sites or any facilities used for VTOL aircraft landing and takeoffs. Airspace designations as described in proposed § 108.180(a) should help ensure UA operations do not interfere with operations at airports within controlled airspace. However, since many airports are within uncontrolled airspace, this proposal would also cover uncontrolled airspace where such operations could represent a higher likelihood of an encounter with a part 108 operation during takeoff or landing.

G. Operation in Controlled Airspace (§ 108.180)

FAA proposes in § 108.180(a) to enable routine BVLOS UAS operations in certain areas within controlled airspace at or below 400 feet AGL when participating in strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring (as described further in this section, and in section VI.I)

e section XII.B.6 for additional details about FAADroneZone and LAANC services). LAANC and FAADroneZone collect data about the operator, including contact information, location and altitude of operation, date of operation, and time of operation. Once the operator has authorization through LAANC or FAADroneZone, they usually do not have any other interaction with FAA prior to accessing the airspace.

BVLOS operations in controlled airspace under proposed part 108 would present a different regulatory construct than part 107 or recreational operations. An operator otherwise in compliance with part 108 would have other touchpoints with FAA that would provide the minimum information that FAADroneZone and LAANC currently provide for part 107 and recreational operations. For example, under this proposal, a part 108 BVLOS operator in controlled airspace would be required to participate in strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring services, as defined in section VI.I. As a result, FAA would not need to rely on a system like FAADroneZone or LAANC to have the basic informational touchpoint with part 108 operators. This would negate the need for automated approvals. Instead, FAA could limit its interaction to operators seeking to conduct higher risk, more complex operations that require individual evaluation and coordination.

In § 108.180, FAA proposes that operations at or below 400 ft AGL in Class B, Class C, Class D airspace, or within the lateral boundaries of the surface area of Class E airspace designated for an airport, can occur without an exemption or waiver, except for in those areas FAA specifically designates as requiring airspace authorization (as provided in proposed §§ 108.180(c) and (d)). FAA would engage in a risk-based analysis to determine where BVLOS operations cannot be conducted safely or cannot be conducted safely without prior authorization

low likelihood of interaction with manned aircraft. Strategic deconfliction would provide the situational awareness for operators to understand where other UA are operating or intend to operate. This would help provide predictability and structure at 400 feet AGL and below that would help reduce the risk that UA would have an unexpected encounter or near miss that would require avoidance maneuvers. This would be particularly helpful in areas with a high density of UAS operations, as it would reduce the likelihood of a cascading set of uncoordinated maneuvers that could introduce risk to both UAS and manned aircraft operating in the area.

Third, using strategic deconfliction services would enable NAS users to participate in a data exchange network that would benefit the entire community of NAS stakeholders. Flight notification would allow the operator to share relevant operational information with other data exchange networks and users, including manned aircraft. For manned aircraft operating at 400 feet AGL and below, this would provide information that could help mitigate risk associated with BVLOS and aircraft not broadcasting their position using ADS-B Out equipment operating in the same airspace. For example, manned aircraft and UA could use this information for operational prioritization. FAA anticipates that the demand for UA operations in controlled airspace around major metropolitan areas would continue to grow, causing interactions between lower priority routine operations and higher priority emergency or first responder operations (manned or unmanned) to become more frequent. Universal exchange of information would facilitate operational prioritization, to avoid preventable interference with priority services.

In § 108.180(a), FAA also proposes requiring conformance monitoring in controlled airspace to help provide predictability, structure, and the necessary situational awareness to reduce risk associated with introducing UA operating BVLOS at 400 feet AGL or below

inal operations occur and what their impact is on safety would help FAA and other stakeholders improve safety and efficiency for BVLOS operations at 400 feet AGL or below.

H. Operations Over People (§ 108.185)

Part 107 currently allows for operations over people; however, part 107 is limited to UA weighing under 55 pounds and includes restrictions on how operations over people may be conducted. Under part 107, operations over people may only be conducted over persons directly participating in the operation or located under a covered structure or inside a stationary vehicle that can provide reasonable protection from a falling UA, or if the operation complies with categorical requirements. The categorical eligibility requirements for operations over people under part 107 are based on aircraft weight, compliance with aircraft impact severity limits, and FAA-accepted DOC.

Currently, to operate a UA under part 107 over people, an operator must either (1) operate in compliance with part 107 subpart D; (2) request a waiver under part 107; or (3) obtain a type certificate. If the UA weighs 55 pounds or more, the operator must obtain a 49 U.S.C. 44807 determination for the specific aircraft and operation and, at a minimum depending upon location and type of operation, an exemption that provides relief from several part 91 and part 61 regulations that do not apply to UAS.

As noted in section III.A.2, the current part 107 process is limited in scalability. Part 107 was developed for VLOS operations, small UA, and individual pilots operating a single UA. As such, the part 107 regulations allowing operations over people and related waiver provision were crafted with this limited scale in mind. Proposed part 108, however, would allow for a much larger scale of operations, which merits the proposed approach for operations over people.

A calculation based on population density can be used as a general estimation for ground risk to people

single UA. As such, the part 107 regulations allowing operations over people and related waiver provision were crafted with this limited scale in mind. Proposed part 108, however, would allow for a much larger scale of operations, which merits the proposed approach for operations over people.

A calculation based on population density can be used as a general estimation for ground risk to people. As the population density overflown increases, there is a corresponding increase in the risk of a person being harmed by a UA crash. Since some portion of UAS operations are expected to be driven by demand from the population nearby, such as package delivery, FAA anticipates that increasing the required mitigations as the overflown population increases would help mitigate risks in a proportional fashion.

In § 108.185(c), FAA is proposing five categories of ground risk to people based on population density for part 108. The proposed population categories seek to find a balance between risk and increasing integration of UAS in the NAS. Though FAA strives to establish performance-based regulations where possible, in this case, prescriptive requirements are appropriate to ensure that is no ambiguity when determining a population density level ( i.e., one operator's determination of population density level would not differ from another's). This would ensure applied mitigations would be consistent across operators. This would be especially important with strategic deconfliction, which relies on all UA complying with the requirement for it to mitigate risk successfully.

The categories would be defined by metrics that could be assessed consistently by independent users and regulators. FAA proposes to use the Oak Ridge National Laboratory's LandScan USA product as a source of population location and density to assess population density for low-risk UAS BVLOS operations considered under this rule. The LandScan data is accessible in machine-readable format at no cost

dScan website also offers a viewing application. While the map on the LandScan website is not as precise as the downloadable data, it can be useful in understanding the general population density of an area. The LandScan website map does not give exact population count nor measure distance, both necessary for making a final decision about which population density category an operation falls within. FAA is considering publishing a map, similar to the UAS Facility Map for LAANC data, which would assist operators in determining population density categories. FAA invites comments on whether this would be helpful or desirable.

All operators would need to reach the same conclusion for the population density category for any point in the NAS. This would ensure that all operators in that area will enact the same minimum level of mitigations. Knowing what mitigations other operators would be required to employ would create certainty for an operator. As such, FAA is proposing using the LandScan data to determine the population density category for a specific place.

FAA considered including a “shelter factor” in the population density determination to account for the protection offered by a building. However, FAA decided to not include it in proposed § 108.185. The static nature of the population density data does not account for the ratio of time spent inside and outside of buildings, nor does it account for abnormal events which could cause people to go outside unexpectedly. In addition, the ability of a building to protect its occupants from a falling UA is not assumed, particularly with larger and heavier UA.

Each population density category would have operational restrictions. Each category level would build upon the prior level, layering on mitigations as deemed appropriate for the additional risks posed by increased population density

to reduce risk of harm to people on the ground.

1. Category 1 Operations

FAA proposes in § 108.185(c)(1) that Category 1 areas would be those with few to no people, defined as being farther than 1 statute mile from any LandScan USA cell which contains 10 or more people. In addition, any operations that are unable to comply with the requirements for Category 2 would be limited to this category. This would be the lowest category with the fewest number of mitigations being applied to the operation. As a result, Category 1 would be the most restrictive in terms of location regarding flights over higher population density. While all part 108 operations would be allowed to operate in Category 1 airspace, those permitted operations that would be limited to Category 1 would be ones that pose a higher risk to persons and property on the ground. As such, it is critical to operate in airspace over areas with very low population densities.

2. Category 2 Operations

FAA proposes in § 108.185(c)(2) that under Category 2, the operational area would cover locations where people are expected near the flight path, but at low densities, such as rural areas found near farms. This would be defined as being within 1 statute mile of a LandScan USA cell which contains 10 or more people. In areas of this level of population density, operations would be more likely to be targeted toward mission types which overfly fields and infrastructure, such as agricultural and inspection missions, which generally have fewer people than areas in which

package delivery would be likely to be more prevalent.

y to be more prevalent.

Because of the increased risk to the overflown population compared to Category 1, FAA proposes to preclude Category 2 operations from using radio frequency devices that operate in accordance with 47 CFR parts 5 and 15 in their C2 systems. These radio frequency devices operate on specific radio frequency spectrum allocations in a manner in which all users have equal access. As such, systems and equipment that use that spectrum should expect harmful radio frequency interference anytime during use. This harmful interference could prevent the UA from staying in its intended flight area or from being directed by an operator to perform avoidance maneuvers from other traffic.

The likelihood of the harmful interference would be expected to increase commensurate with increasing overflown population since many household consumer electronics operate on these same radio frequencies. Because of this, FAA proposes to manage the risks associated with spectrum interference of the C2 link by precluding operators from relying on radio frequency devices that are susceptible when in Category 2 operations.

3. Category 3 Operations

FAA proposes in § 108.185(c)(3) that Category 3 operational areas would include areas of moderate population, such as developments and single-family homes, which are often located within a few miles of small, higher density areas such as shopping centers or schools. Specifically, proposed Category 3 would be defined as being within 1 statute mile of a LandScan USA cell which contains 25 or more people. Package delivery operations under this proposal would drive portions of the quantity of UAS missions to higher population density levels.

Because Category 3 operations would be conducted over a population density greater than that of Category 2, FAA proposes to increase the mitigations in these areas to enhance and further protect associated ground risks

ory 3 or higher would be required to use an approved capability for strategic deconfliction. Operators may meet these respective requirements by opting into using an authorized automated data service provided by an appropriately certificated service provider under proposed part 146, or by receiving their own part 146 certificate and authorization so that the operator can self-provision the service. This is so long as the service provision meets part 146 requirements to provide reasonable and non-discriminatory access to airspace and adhere to other procedural requirements for all users of the service. 53 For further discussion on part 146, see section XIII of this preamble.

53 FAA emphasizes that automated data service providers do not have the authority to provide operators with access to the NAS, as that authority resides solely within FAA. However, certain services—such as strategic deconfliction—have the capability to coordinate its user's operational intent with others in the network, therefore may block that space for a specific time, which may inadvertently result in non-equitable treatment of aircraft operators. FAA has established a priority of operations schema, providing guidance to operators in identifying priorities of operations, and providing an indication of whether conflicts can exist among operations at the same priority level. FAA's priority schema, for applicable services, is addressed in AC 146-1, available in the public docket for comment.

1. Description of Strategic Deconfliction and Conformance Monitoring

In proposed §§ 108.190(b) and (c), FAA sets forth performance-based requirements for performing strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring

nflicts can exist among operations at the same priority level. FAA's priority schema, for applicable services, is addressed in AC 146-1, available in the public docket for comment.

1. Description of Strategic Deconfliction and Conformance Monitoring

In proposed §§ 108.190(b) and (c), FAA sets forth performance-based requirements for performing strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring. 54 FAA proposes in § 108.190(b) that having a strategic deconfliction capability—required in both controlled airspace and when flying over a population density of Category 3 or higher—would mean being able to perform strategic conflict detection and resolution prior to takeoff, and in relation to other UA operations that are discoverable at that time, as well as being able to maintain a target average conformance to all operational intents that are utilized by the operator.

54 FAA derived definitions for strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring, as well as several terms used in the regulatory text, from ASTM F3548-21, Standard Specification for UAS Traffic Management (UTM) UAS Service Supplier (USS) Interoperability, which is an industry consensus standard.

The first requirement for strategic deconfliction is a preflight function; it is the ability to perform strategic conflict detection prior to takeoff and in relation to other UA operations that are discoverable at that time. 55 This capability would check the operator's operational intent against conflicts with other discoverable operational intents. 56 In addition to detecting conflicts, through the ability for strategic conflict resolution, strategic deconfliction provides the operator with an opportunity to adjust their operational intent (for example, by following a different path, flying at a different altitude, or departing at a different time) until a conflict-free route is found.

55 See proposed § 108.190(b)(1)

e operational intents. 56 In addition to detecting conflicts, through the ability for strategic conflict resolution, strategic deconfliction provides the operator with an opportunity to adjust their operational intent (for example, by following a different path, flying at a different altitude, or departing at a different time) until a conflict-free route is found.

55 See proposed § 108.190(b)(1).

56 In proposed § 108.5, FAA defines operational intent as a volume-based representation encapsulating the intended flight path for a UAS operation and comprising one or more overlapping or contiguous 4-dimensional volumes defined by length, height, width, and a beginning and ending time.

The second requirement for strategic deconfliction is to achieve a target average conformance when operating the UA in accordance with the operational intent. A target average conformance is a lagging indicator of how safely and efficiently the operator flew the strategically deconflicted routes. The operator's automated data service provider would support this function by calculating how often the operator stayed within its operational intents and then notifying the operator if the value were to fall below an established threshold. 57

57 This calculated value would be provided by the automated data service provider on a recurring basis for the duration of the flight operation and is generally represented as a percentage.

UAS operators and service providers would not be required to report the target average conformance value to FAA on an ongoing basis. However, FAA would be able to verify these values through compliance and safety assurance activities via the operator-reported data in accordance with proposed § 108.45 in any instance of failure, malfunction, or defect in an authorized service. Furthermore, FAA may verify these values by inspecting records maintained by the operator's automated data service provider certificated under part 146, in accordance with § 146.330

to verify these values through compliance and safety assurance activities via the operator-reported data in accordance with proposed § 108.45 in any instance of failure, malfunction, or defect in an authorized service. Furthermore, FAA may verify these values by inspecting records maintained by the operator's automated data service provider certificated under part 146, in accordance with § 146.330.

In addition to strategic deconfliction, UAS operated in controlled airspace would also be required to have a conformance monitoring capability provided by an automated data service provider certificated under proposed part 146. 58 FAA proposes in § 108.190(c) that this capability would need to include two specific functions. The first function would be to provide time-sensitive alerts to operations personnel whenever the UA exits its operational intent, consistent with criteria or parameters established prior to takeoff. The second function would be to communicate information to other airspace users and FAA about the alert—via means acceptable to FAA. 59

58 A service providing conformance monitoring for a UAS operation is required to also provide strategic deconfliction for the operation. This is further discussed in AC-146, available in the docket for this proposed rulemaking.

59 When communicating information about alerts to FAA, FAA generally anticipates that only alerts that result in safety concerns would need to be communicated immediately to the Agency. For example, alerts regarding operational intents transitions from a conforming to a nonconforming state may not pose a safety concern because the non-conformance is expected and may only be

temporary until conformance is re-established. Such alerts would not need to be communicated to FAA immediately. However, alerts regarding operational intents transitions to a contingent state may pose a safety concern; such alerts are considered time-sensitive and would need to be communicated to FAA immediately

Manned aircraft who choose to do so would be able to receive alerts, provided they subscribe to receive push notifications for a given area of interest.

Proposed § 108.190(d) states that, unless otherwise authorized by FAA, operators would need to meet the requirements in §§ 108.190(b) and (c) by using a service provider certificated under proposed 146 with the appropriate service authorization. Operators could choose to either self-provision the necessary services described above by applying for and receiving their own certificate and corresponding service authorization under proposed part 146 or use another certificated service provider to provide the service for them. These options are meant to strike the optimal balance between ensuring airspace safety, while providing a degree of flexibility to UAS operators. Some operators may choose to build their own service that includes features uniquely suited to their own needs, while other operators may prefer to shop across an open and competitive marketplace of qualified services. Overall, FAA anticipates automated data service providers would offer a range of products with various price points and additional value-added features for UAS operators.

2. Requiring Use of Strategic Deconfliction and Conformance Monitoring

In 2022 and 2023, in response to BVLOS ARC recommendation TP 2.2, 61 FAA contracted with Johns Hopkins University Applied Physics Laboratory to conduct extensive simulation-based research of UAS interactions using USS to provide strategic deconfliction to determine the safety benefit of the functionality and to inform FAA policy about its use, including for this rulemaking. The simulation environment represented commonly expected UAS mission profiles, vehicle behavior, airspace restrictions and variations in population density

boratory to conduct extensive simulation-based research of UAS interactions using USS to provide strategic deconfliction to determine the safety benefit of the functionality and to inform FAA policy about its use, including for this rulemaking. The simulation environment represented commonly expected UAS mission profiles, vehicle behavior, airspace restrictions and variations in population density. In total, the Applied Physics Laboratory conducted more than 450,000 airspace simulations representing nearly 94 million UAS flight hours, the research showed midair collisions between UAS were about 100 times less likely to occur when strategic deconfliction was used by all UAS, compared with simulations in which UAS did not use strategic deconfliction. 62 The use of strategic deconfliction resulted in a corresponding two-order-of-magnitude decrease in the rates of ground-based injuries or fatalities when simulated over a wide range of locations and variations in population density. 63 However, with 75 percent of UAS participating in strategic deconfliction, the midair collision rate decreased by only about half. This is a significantly higher number of midair collisions, which occurs because non-participating UAS would follow routes that would intersect with operational intents, resulting in collisions in some instances.

61 ARC recommendation TP 2.2 states: “FAA and NASA should conduct a study to determine what level of aircraft operations in a defined volume of the airspace would trigger the need for mandatory participation in federated or third-party services.” The ARC recommendation further mentioned that an “interoperable safety services such as strategic deconfliction” is an example of one of these services.

62 Johns Hopkins Applied Physics Laboratory, Initial Safety Criticality Assessment of Unmanned Aircraft System Traffic Management (UTM) Strategic De-Confliction and Impacts to Beyond Visual Line of Sight Operations (2022) (provided in docket)

highly effective at reducing midair collisions between UAS.

64 Standard Specification for UAS Traffic Management (UTM) UAS Service Supplier (USS) Interoperability, ASTM F3548-21 (2022), www.astm.org/f3548-21.html.

The strategic deconfliction model is less effective if there is not an inflight means, such as conformance monitoring, to verify that UAS are flying within their operational intents. The Applied Physics Laboratory research indicated that deviations outside of those operational intents could increase collision risk with another UAS, even if it is operating in its own strategically deconflicted operational intents nearby. 65 Separately, conformance monitoring capabilities have been demonstrated in the UTM Pilot Program (UPP) and UTM Field Test (UFT) scenarios to be effective at further reducing collision risk, especially if the UAS did not have DAA that could recognize and maneuver away from other UAS. 66

65 Zanlongo, S., Conformance Monitoring Assessment Report for Urban UTM Operations, AOS-23-1253 Version 1 (2023) (provided in docket).

66 FAA, UTM Field Test (UFT) Final Report (Nov. 6, 2023), www.faa.gov/uas/advanced_operations/traffic_management/UFT-Final-Report.pdf.

Furthermore, beginning in the fall of 2023, FAA established the UTM Key Site Operational Evaluation in North Texas. This initiative establishes partnerships with operators and UAS Service Suppliers (USS) 67 and works with suitable participants in attaining the necessary exemptions to operate BVLOS at a key site. As discussed further in section XIII, USS are UAS-specific automated data service providers and form a crucial component

in the development of the UTM ecosystem. FAA anticipates that USS will coalesce into networks that provide all manner of services necessary for full integration of UAS including, but not limited to, strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring services

en paired with a UAS operator, if the pair has successfully demonstrated that their automated data service is effective in managing UA to UA collision risk. 69

68 Per the UTM Concept of Operations v2.0 (Mar. 2, 2020), www.faa.gov/sites/faa.gov/files/2022-08/UTM_ConOps_v2.pdf , USS Network is an amalgamation of USSs connected to each other, exchanging information on behalf of subscribed operators. The USS Network shares operational intent data and other relevant details across the network to ensure shared situational awareness for UTM participants.

69 Each FAA-issued letter of acceptance to an automated data service provider compliments an FAA waiver or exemption issued to the UAS operator paired with that same provider. While the waiver or exemption issued to the UAS operator highlight the operational conditions or limitations the operator needs to abide by to deviate from FAA's requirements, the letter of acceptance documents FAA's analysis of industry's self-governance documents and the automated data service's testing results.

Based on the success observed, FAA issued 2 letters of acceptance to automated data service providers in July 2024—one to Zipline and another to Wing. In the letter of acceptance issued to the automated data service providers, FAA highlighted its findings that using strategic deconfliction is a safe and effective means of managing collision risk among UA flying simultaneously, by multiple operators, and in the same area. In addition, FAA took the opportunity from this industry-led initiative to develop a streamlined regulatory approval process of certain automated data services. The UAS industry has expressed to FAA the need for approving certain automated data services, in this case strategic deconfliction, to scale their UAS BVLOS operations safely. As a result, FAA proposes the creation of part 146 in this rulemaking, allowing UAS operators to scale their BVLOS operations, given a service's proven safety benefit

g strategic deconfliction and conformance monitoring in any airspace. Many of the comments argued that such a requirement was not proportionate to the underlying risk of collision between UA in sparsely populated areas. Commenters argued that the likelihood of collision between UA in such areas would be lower because fewer UA are likely to be operating simultaneously and in proximity to each other. Commenters also argued that, in the event of a collision, it would be unlikely that falling debris would cause property damage or injuries to people on the ground in sparsely populated locations. Commenters also emphasized that, because conformance monitoring relies on a real-time network connection to send alerts, the function may not be implementable in remote parts of the United States with poor cellular connectivity, especially if alternative C2 link options were not available. FAA agrees with the commenters, and therefore has proposed requiring strategic deconfliction only in controlled airspace, or when flying over a population density of Category 3 or higher, and conformance monitoring only in controlled airspace.

FAA also considered the approach recommended by the BVLOS ARC, which was to not require strategic deconfliction or conformance monitoring, but rather to allow their use via a service if an operator chose to do so. However, FAA has determined that, without a requirement for all operators in certain environments to perform strategic deconfliction, there would be only a marginal safety benefit. As discussed earlier, strategic deconfliction is most effective when all UAS in a given area are participating in the function.

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