Finding of No Significant Impact in the Environmental Assessment for the Parallex Project Fuel Manufacture and Shipment

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Finding of No Significant Impact in the Environmental Assessment

for the Parallex Project Fuel Manufacture and Shipment

AGENCY: U.S. Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of Availability.

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SUMMARY: An environmental assessment (EA) has been prepared to assess

potential environmental impacts associated with a U.S. Department of

Energy (DOE) proposed action to conduct limited mixed oxide (MOX) fuel

manufacture and shipment for the purpose of confirming the viability of

using MOX fuel in Canadian Deuterium Uranium (CANDU) reactors. The

Proposed Action would involve preparation and analysis activities in

TA-55 (building PF-4) at Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL), and

shipping of the MOX fuel to the U.S.-Canada border. This EA covers only

those activities necessary to manufacture and ship up to 59.2 lb (26.8

[[Page 48811]]

kg) of MOX fuel. Based on the analysis in this EA, and after

considering comments received, DOE has determined that the proposed

action is not a major federal action significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment within the meaning of the National

Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq). Therefore the

preparation of an environmental impact statement is not required.

ADDRESSES: Single copies of the EA and further information concerning

the proposed action are available from: Bert Stevenson, NEPA Compliance

Officer, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD-4), U.S.

Department of Energy, P.O. Box 23786, Washington, DC 20026-3786,

telephone (202) 586-5368.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information regarding the

DOE NEPA Process, contact: Carol Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA

Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue, SW, Washington, DC, 20585, telephone (202) 586-

4600, or (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Purpose and Need

DOE needs to test and demonstrate the feasibility of using MOX fuel

in CANDU reactors, as a potential disposition option 1 for

surplus weapons-usable plutonium. The proposed action discussed in this

EA is a limited scale test that would provide DOE with information

needed to assess that option.

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\1\ As described in the Record of Decision (ROD) for the Storage

and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Final

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement (S&D PEIS), DOE's

strategy for disposition of surplus plutonium is to pursue an

approach that allows immobilization of surplus plutonium in glass or

ceramic materials for disposal in a geologic repository pursuant to

the Nuclear Waste Policy Act, and burning of some of the surplus

plutonium as MOX fuel in existing, domestic, commercial reactors,

with subsequent disposal of spent fuel in a geologic repository

pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act. The ROD stated that DOE

would retain the option of dispositioning some of the weapons-usable

plutonium as MOX fuel in heavy-water-moderated reactors, such as

CANDU reactors, in the event of a future multilateral agreement

among Russia, Canada, and the United States.

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Background

The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of surplus weapons-

usable fissile materials both in the United States and the former

Soviet Union. The global stockpiles of weapons-usable fissile materials

pose a danger to national and international security in the form of

potential proliferation of nuclear weapons and the potential for

environmental, safety, and health consequences if the materials are not

properly safeguarded and managed. In September 1993, President Clinton

issued a ``Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy'' in response to

the growing threat of nuclear proliferation. Further, in January 1994,

President Clinton and Russia's President Yeltsin issued a ``Joint

Statement Between the United States and Russia on Nonproliferation of

Weapons of Mass Destruction and the Means for Their Delivery.'' To

demonstrate the United States' commitment to these policies, President

Clinton announced on March 1, 1995 that about 224 tons (203 metric

tons) of U.S.-origin weapons-usable fissile materials, of which 182

tons (165 metric tons) are highly enriched uranium and 42 tons (38

metric tons) are weapons-usable plutonium, had been declared surplus to

the United States' defense needs.

To safeguard and manage this material, DOE has decided to implement

a program to provide for safe and secure storage of weapons-usable

fissile materials and a strategy for the disposition of surplus

weapons-usable plutonium, as specified in the ROD for the S&D PEIS. The

fundamental purpose of the program is to maintain a high standard of

security and accounting for these fissile materials while in storage,

and to ensure the plutonium produced for nuclear weapons and declared

surplus to national security needs is never again used for nuclear

weapons.

The Final S&D PEIS ROD, issued January 14, 1997, established a

hybrid strategy to irreversibly dispose of the Nation's surplus

plutonium and to reduce from seven to three the number of sites that

store nuclear weapons materials. The strategy would immobilize some

(and potentially all) of the surplus plutonium in glass or ceramic

formulations and allow the use of some of the surplus plutonium as MOX

fuel. The option of dispositioning some of the weapons-usable surplus

plutonium as MOX fuel in heavy-water-moderated reactors, such as CANDU

reactors, was retained as an option in the event of future multilateral

agreement among Russia, Canada, and the United States. As explained in

the ROD for the S&D PEIS, DOE proposes to engage in a test and

demonstration program for CANDU MOX fuel consistent with ongoing and

potential future cooperative efforts with Russia and Canada, and based

on appropriate NEPA review. The test and demonstration activities would

occur at LANL, New Mexico, and at Chalk River Laboratories (CRL),

Ontario, Canada.

Proposed Action

To meet the purpose and need for Agency action, DOE proposes to

fabricate and transport up to 59.2 lb (26.8 kg) of MOX fuel as part of

the Parallex Project. DOE has already fabricated a portion of this MOX

fuel at LANL, and DOE proposes to fabricate additional MOX fuel at LANL

if needed. MOX fuel would be fabricated in building PF-4 in TA-55 at

LANL. This test and demonstration project has been named Parallex

(parallel experiment) because of the roles of the United States and

Russia in supplying test material. The Parallex Project would be a

joint agreement between Russia, Canada, and the U.S. to demonstrate the

irradiation of U.S. and Russian MOX fuel in parallel in the Atomic

Energy of Canada, Limited (AECL)-owned National Research Universal

(NRU) reactor. This international project would use MOX fuel made in

the U.S. (specifically LANL) and Russia (specifically from Bochvar)

from surplus weapons-usable plutonium out of both countries' nuclear

stockpiles.

Research and development of MOX fuels has already been conducted at

LANL as part of its ongoing mission relating to the development of

energy sources for experiments and research reactors. However, these

various MOX fuel forms were not made with weapons-grade plutonium. In

contrast, the MOX fuel fabrication process involved in the Parallex

Project would use weapons-grade plutonium (in an unclassified form)

obtained from decommissioned nuclear weapons.

The MOX fuel fabricated at LANL would be transported to the

Canadian border. At the border the AECL, per prior agreement, would

take possession of the fuel. The fuel would remain on the same truck

and the AECL would complete the shipment to the reactor site. At Chalk

River, Ontario, the MOX fuel would be delivered to CRL for testing in

the NRU reactor. The AECL would be responsible for conducting all

subsequent tests of the fuel's performance and the function of the

reactor.

Fueling the NRU reactor with MOX fuel would be part of a

feasibility test to determine MOX fuel performance in converted CANDU

reactors. The NRU test reactor is the only available reactor

specifically designed to test MOX fuel performance for CANDU reactors.

Positive test results could support subsequent decisions on the

dispositioning of surplus weapons-usable plutonium in CANDU reactors.

All spent fuel resulting from the tests

[[Page 48812]]

would be managed under the Canadian spent fuel program.

Alternatives Considered

The EA describes several alternatives to the proposed action as

well as the No Action Alternative.

No Action: The No Action alternative provides an environmental

baseline to compare to the potential effects of the Proposed Action.

Under this alternative, LANL would continue to store the existing MOX

fuel at TA-55. No additional fuel pellets or additional fuel rods would

be made for the Parallex Project. The AECL would have no source of U.S.

MOX fuel rods and, therefore, would have to cancel its testing program

at the NRU reactor in parallel with Russian MOX fuel, or if Russian

fuel were made available, operate the testing program in the absence of

U.S. supplied MOX fuel.

Other Transportation Routes: Seven routes were analyzed for the

shipment of MOX fuel from LANL to the Canadian border. Each route

involves a separate point of entry into Canada. In accordance with

standard transportation planning practices, all routes use available

interstate highways and city bypasses, where available, to go around

high-population areas, and meet Department of Transportation routing

requirements. For very specific reasons, DOE has decided not to use two

of these routes. The Port Huron, MI route would not be used because of

construction on the Blue Water Bridge, and the Detroit, MI route would

not be used because the Ambassador Bridge currently does not allow

placarded (i.e., carrying hazardous material) vehicles. Other possible

interstate highway routes, such as via Sweetgrass, Montana and

Champlain, New York were not evaluated because of excessive travel

distances.

MOX Fabrication at Other DOE Facilities: Under this alternative,

MOX fuel would be fabricated at other DOE facilities and then shipped

to CRL. No DOE site other than LANL presently has the ability to

fabricate MOX fuel. Furthermore much of the raw materials that would be

used in the demonstration are already located at LANL. The time

required to upgrade other sites to produce MOX fuel would delay the

further fabrication and shipment of MOX fuel such that the Parallex

Project schedule would not be met. Therefore, this alternative was

dismissed from further analysis.

Other Technologies for MOX Evaluation: This alternative would use

other methods such as computer simulation or surrogate fuels to

evaluate the MOX fuel fabrication process. The use of computer

simulation is not developed to the point where it can be applied to MOX

fuel fabrication. The use of surrogate fuels in the Parallex Project

would not produce the irradiation data required for verifying reactor

performance. Therefore, this alternative was dismissed from farther

analysis.

Transport of MOX Fuel by Air: Federal regulations under 10 CFR

71.88 (Air Transport of Plutonium) explicitly prohibit the transport of

plutonium by air or the delivery to a carrier for air transport unless

the plutonium is in a form with a specific activity no greater than

0.002 Ci/g, and shipped in a single package with no more than

a specified quantity. The restrictions imposed for transportation of

plutonium by air prohibit this alternative for shipment of the MOX fuel

quantities needed for the Parallex Project. Therefore, this alternative

was dismissed from further analysis.

Transport of MOX Fuel by Rail: Rail shipment is an allowable mode

for the transport of radioactive materials and is regulated by the U.S.

Department of Transportation (DOT) under 49 CFR 174.700. However, there

is no direct rail service from Los Alamos, New Mexico. Moreover, this

mode of transport would not be feasible because of the lack of

dedicated rail routes, and long layovers for railcar transfers.

Cumulatively, all these factors negate use of this transport mode.

Shipment of MOX Fuel by Safe Secure Transport (SST): The SST fleet

is a DOE owned and operated transportation system that consists of

armored tractor-trailers and special escort vehicles. The added

security and expense of the SST system is not needed because the MOX

fuel would be in small quantities, would have a negligible radiation

dose to the public, and could not easily be converted into weapons-

usable form.

Environmental Impacts

The results of evaluations in key impact areas are summarized in

the following section; other types of consequences were determined to

be negligible and are not discussed in detail.

Human Health: The potential threat to workers from MOX fuel

fabrication would come from penetrating radiation. No excess fatal

cancers would be expected in the involved workers from penetrating

radiation exposures. Noninvolved workers, those performing other jobs

as well as the usual PF-4 building personnel, would not be expected to

receive a dose from the proposed operation. MOX fuel fabrication is not

expected to measurably increase the airborne radioactive material

emissions from PF-4 associated with routine operations; therefore, no

effects to the public are expected.

Facility Accidents: Abnormal events or accidents are hypothetical

incidents that are not a planned part of routine operations. A fire in

the MOX fuel fabrication line was chosen for the accident analysis. The

likelihood of this accident occurring was categorized as ``unlikely.''

The small amount of material that would be released within PF-4 and the

reduction of that release by the two-stage high-efficiency particulate

air (HEPA) filtration system would result in a negligible dose to the

offsite maximum exposed individual (MEI) and no latent cancer

fatalities (LCFs) within the offsite population. The radiological dose

to involved workers from such an accident was estimated at 1.8 rem,

with calculated LCFs of less than one.

Transportation: No changes to the existing highway infrastructure

would be required to allow passage of the MOX fuel shipment(s), nor

would roads need to be closed. The normal traffic flow along the MOX

fuel transportation routes would not be expected to change with the

added presence of one to three commercial truck(s). The shipment(s) of

MOX fuel by commercial truck from LANL to the Canadian border would not

be expected to adversely affect the health of the truck crew or the

public along any of the analyzed routes.

Transportation Accidents: Two transportation accident scenarios

were analyzed for the shipment of MOX fuel to the Canadian border. One

accident would involve the release of radioactive materials and the

other would not involve the release of radioactive materials.

The first accident relates to an event that leads to the MOX fuel

package container breaking open, igniting, and releasing plutonium

dioxide particles into the air. The probability of such a severe

accident occurring and adversely affecting the public is extremely

unlikely. The accident scenario could occur anywhere along the

transportation corridors, and could have transboundary effects on

Canadian populations. The population and individual doses would be very

small. Therefore, no LCFs would be expected from an accident during the

shipment(s) of MOX fuel to Canada.

Under the second accident scenario for MOX fuel transportation to

the Canadian border, no radioactive material would be released by the

vehicular collision. This scenario

[[Page 48813]]

analyzed potential fatalities from the force of a collision. Results of

the accident analysis indicated that no driver or public fatalities

would be expected.

Air Quality: Air emission from the fabrication of MOX fuel pellets

and rods for the Parallex Project would be a very small percentage of

the overall LANL annual air emissions. The MOX fuel pellets and rods

would be made inside sealed gloveboxes that have negative air pressure

and a primary air system fitted with HEPA filtration. PF-4 laboratories

also have negative air pressure and a separate HEPA filtered air

system. The filters would prevent any measurable release of particles

into the atmosphere. Therefore, no MOX fuel powder particles would be

expected to be released from PF-4 into the environment.

No change to the air quality along the route(s) to Canada would be

expected since the MOX fuel would be sealed in rods and package

container(s) during transportation. A commercial truck carrying MOX

fuel would be one out of thousands of trucks on the road at any one

time. The overall contribution of nonradiological air pollutants from a

single vehicle to the air quality within a given airshed would be

immeasurable.

Waste Management: The small quantities of low-level radioactive

waste (LLW) and transuranic (TRU) waste produced from MOX fuel

fabrication would not appreciably increase waste generation rates at

LANL. No mixed waste, hazardous waste, or additional nonhazardous solid

waste would be generated from MOX fuel fabrication. MOX fuel

fabrication would not measurably increase the volume of sanitary

wastewater generated. No radioactive or hazardous waste would be

generated during the shipment of MOX fuel to the Canadian border.

Environmental Justice: Executive Order 12898, Federal Actions to

Address Environmental Justice in Minority Populations and Low-Income

Populations, requires that Federal agencies identify and address, as

appropriate, disproportionately high and adverse human health or

environmental effects of their programs and activities on minority and

low-income populations. Because no adverse effects are anticipated as a

result of the proposed actions during both normal operations and

accident conditions, there would be no opportunity for

disproportionately high and adverse consequences on minority, or low-

income populations.

Other Environmental Impacts: The consequences of the proposed

action are expected to be negligible for other types of impacts,

including those on land use, socioeconomics, cultural resources,

aesthetic or scenic resources, geologic resources, water resources,

ecological resources, noise, or site services.

Cumulative Impacts: Because the contributions from the Proposed

Action would be extremely small, the proposed action is not expected to

contribute substantially to the overall cumulative impacts from past or

anticipated operations at LANL and along the transportation corridors.

Determination

Based on the analysis in this EA, and after considering the

preapproval review comments, I have concluded that the proposed action

does not constitute a major federal action significantly affecting the

quality of the human environment within the meaning of NEPA. Therefore,

an EIS for the proposed action is not required.

Issued at Washington, DC, this 13th day of August 1999.

Laura Holgate,

Director, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition.

[FR Doc. 99-23331 Filed 9-7-99; 8:45 am]

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