Final Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups From Canada

DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE

International Trade Administration

[A-122-085]

Final Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups From Canada

AGENCY: Import Administration, International Trade Administration,

Department of Commerce.

ACTION: Notice of Final Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups

from Canada.

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SUMMARY: On April 26, 1999, the Department of Commerce (``the

Department'') published a notice of preliminary results of the full

sunset review of the antidumping duty order on sugar and syrups from

Canada (64 FR 20253) pursuant to section 751(c) of the Tariff Act of

1930, as amended (``the Act''). We provided interested parties an

opportunity to comment on our preliminary results. We received comments

from both domestic and respondent interested parties. As a result of

this review, the Department finds that revocation of this order would

be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping at the

levels indicated in the Final Results of Review section of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Scott E. Smith or Melissa G. Skinner,

Office of Policy for Import Administration, International Trade

Administration, U.S. Department of Commerce, 14th Street and

Constitution Avenue, NW, Washington, D.C. 20230; telephone: (202) 482-

6397 or (202) 482-1560, respectively.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 3, 1999.

Statute and Regulations

This review was conducted pursuant to sections 751(c) and 752 of

the Act. The Department's procedures for the conduct of sunset reviews

are set forth in Procedures for Conducting Five-year (``Sunset'')

Reviews of Antidumping and Countervailing Duty Orders, 63 FR 13516

(March 20, 1998) (``Sunset Regulations''). Guidance on methodological

or analytical issues relevant to the Department's conduct of sunset

reviews is set forth in the Department's Policy Bulletin 98:3--Policies

Regarding the Conduct of Five-year (``Sunset'') Reviews of Antidumping

and Countervailing Duty Orders; Policy Bulletin, 63 FR 18871 (April 16,

1998) (``Sunset Policy Bulletin'').

Scope

The merchandise subject to the antidumping duty order is sugar and

syrups from Canada produced from sugar cane and sugar beets. The sugar

is refined into granulated or powdered sugar, icing, or liquid

sugar.1 The subject merchandise is currently classified

under Harmonized Tariff Schedule of the United States (``HTSUS'') item

numbers 1701.99.0500, 1701.99.1000, 1701.99.5000, 1702.90.1000, and

1702.90.2000. Although the subheadings are provided for convenience and

customs purposes, the written description remains dispositive.

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\1\ This order excludes icing sugar decorations as determined in

the U.S. Customs Classification of January 31, 1983 (CLA-2

CO:R:CV:G).

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On March 24, 1987, the Department revoked the order, in part, with

respect to Redpath Sugar Ltd. (``Redpath'') (52 FR 9322). On January 7,

1988, the Department revoked the order, in part, with respect to Lantic

Sugar, Ltd. (``Lantic'') (53 FR 434). In 1996, the Department

determined that Rogers Sugar, Ltd. (``Rogers''), was the successor in

interest to British Columbia Sugar Refining Company, Ltd. (``BC

[[Page 48363]]

Sugar'').2 In its November 2, 1998, substantive response,

the United States Beet Sugar Association and its individual members

(collectively, the ``USBSA'') stated that three companies in Canada

constitute the Canadian domestic industry: Lantic, Redpath, and Rogers.

Because the order was revoked with respect to Lantic and Redpath, only

Rogers is currently subject to the order.

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\2\ See Sugar and Syrups from Canada; Final Results of Changed

Circumstances Antidumping Duty Administrative Review, 61 FR 51275

(October 1, 1996).

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Background

On April 26, 1999, the Department issued the Preliminary Results of

Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from Canada (64 FR 20253). Based

on the continued absence of a dumping margin for Rogers, the sole

producer/exporter subject to the order, and the continued existence of

imports from Rogers in substantial quantities, in our preliminary

results we found that revocation of the order is not likely to lead to

continuation or recurrence of dumping.

We conducted verification in Taber, Alberta, of Rogers' response on

May 12, 1999, and issued our verification report on May 19, 1999. On

June 8, 1999, within the deadline specified in 19 CFR 351.309(c)(1)(i),

we received comments on behalf of the USBSA and on behalf of Rogers. On

June 15, 1999, within the deadline specified in 19 CFR 351.309(d), the

Department received rebuttal comments from both the USBSA and Rogers.

The Department held a public hearing on June 18, 1999.

As a result of the comments, we have changed our determination. We

have addressed the comments received below.

Likelihood of Continuation or Recurrence of Dumping

Comment 1: The USBSA asserts that sugar produced at Rogers' Taber

facility will have to be sold below constructed value (``CV'') and

therefore will be dumped when it enters the U.S. market. The USBSA

asserts that, despite repeated requests, the Department did not conduct

a CV analysis in which an accurate calculation of CV could be compared

to Rogers' selling price on current U.S. sales. Relying on the 1998

cost of production (``COP'') contained in the verification report,

which the USBSA asserts does not include all costs, the USBSA states

that it calculated a CV. The USBSA asserts that this and evidence of

Rogers' pricing in 1996, which is on the record, demonstrates that

Rogers sold sugar in the United States at prices below CV.

Additionally, the USBSA argues, the recent improvements made at Rogers'

Taber facility will increase its COP and force Rogers to sell sugar at

below cost prices. Asserting that the recent downward spiral in world

prices makes dumping by Rogers more pervasive, the USBSA requests that

the Department revisit the CV analysis and conclude that dumping is

likely to continue or recur if the order is revoked.

In its rebuttal brief Rogers cites to the Department's Policy

Bulletin 94-1 regarding COP and asserts that the Department found

USBSA's allegations of below-cost sales speculative correctly, thereby

falling short of the standard for providing reasonable grounds for

suspecting that Rogers made sales at below cost prices. Further, Rogers

argues, the Department is not required to do a COP investigation in

reviews when there is no earlier determination of below-cost sales and

there has been no reasonable evidence submitted which suggests that

sales at prices less than COP were made.

Rogers notes that the Department looked correctly at the cost basis

for sugar beet production and at the audited financial statements of

Rogers during verification. Rogers asserts that the verified

information confirmed its submissions showing sales in Canada and the

United States at prices significantly above the COP. Additionally,

Rogers asserts that the verified information shows that profits were

made and distributed by Rogers in every year of the period covered by

the Department's sunset review. With respect to the Taber facility

expansion, Rogers argues that the consolidation and expansion of its

facilities has only increased its cost efficiencies. Rogers provided

information from an independent audit of the expansion in support of

this assertion. Further, Rogers argues that the wholly speculative CV

constructed by USBSA does not reflect actual numbers provided to, and

verified by, the Department. In conclusion Rogers asserts that there is

no credible evidence on the record that would lead to a decision by the

Department to conduct a CV analysis.

Department's Position: The Department's Sunset Policy Bulletin

notes that the Department will consider other factors (such as prices

and costs) in full sunset reviews where an interested party identifies

good cause through the provision of information or evidence that would

warrant consideration of such factors. In our preliminary results, we

determined that the USBSA did not provide evidence of good cause to

support our consideration of other factors.

Rogers, in its November 3, 1998, substantive response, provided

information to the Department concerning its COP for processed beets to

support its argument that prices were above cost. Although we had not

requested the information and had determined for the preliminary

results that there was no basis to consider such additional

information, because Rogers had presented the information in its

substantive and rebuttal responses, we conducted an on-site

verification of this information on May 12, 1999 (see Memorandum to

Jeffrey May, Re: Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from Canada, dated May

19, 1999). Therefore, we agree with both parties that verified

information related to Rogers' 1998 COP is now on the record in this

review. In addition, verified information on Rogers' Canadian and U.S.

sales prices for the years 1993 through 1997 is on the record.

As noted above, the USBSA's pre-hearing brief contained an

allegation of sales below cost, based on verified information already

on the record. Rogers did not rebut this allegation; rather, Rogers

claimed that its verified submissions show sales in Canada and the

United States at prices significantly above COP. For the purpose of our

final results we considered this allegation.

We have analyzed the verified information and find that it provides

sufficient support for a determination that dumping is likely to

continue or recur if the order were revoked. The Department normally

will not, and has no reason to, conduct a cost investigation in the

context of a sunset review. However, both USBSA and Rogers' arguments

concerning likelihood of continuation of dumping revolve around whether

or not pricing and cost data indicate that dumping has been taking

place. The Department, therefore, has conducted a sort of abbreviated

cost test with the limited data on the record.

Specifically, using the verified information, the Department

constructed a COP and CV (per metric ton) of processed sugar (see

Memorandum to File, Re: Cost of Production, dated August 20, 1999).

Section 773(b)(1) of the Act provides that the Department will

disregard below cost sales made within an extended period of time in

substantial quantities and which were not made at prices which permit

recovery of all costs within a reasonable period of time. We compared

Rogers' verified weighted-average home market price to the COP and

found that it was below the COP.

[[Page 48364]]

Specifically, we compared a weighted-average home market price, based

on 1997 price data supplied by Rogers, with a COP based on 1998 costs

derived from Rogers' data. We found the weighted-average price to be

below the COP. Based on this limited data, we determine, therefore,

that Rogers made below cost sales within an extended period of time in

substantial quantities at prices which did not permit recovery of all

costs within a reasonable period of time. Because there are, in

essence, no remaining above cost sales, we compared Rogers' verified

average U.S. export selling price to the CV. We found that this average

price was below CV. Based on this comparison, we conclude that at least

some of Rogers sales to the United States are at prices below

CV.3 These calculations, using verified information,

therefore, provide a sufficient basis for determining that dumping is

likely to continue or recur if the order were revoked.

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\3\ Absent specific information, we did not make any adjustments

to U.S. prices, as we would in an investigation or administrative

review conducted for the purpose of measuring dumping. Such

adjustments typically would result in a reduction of U.S. price and,

therefore, an increase in the magnitude of the dumping margin.

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Comment 2: The USBSA disagrees with the Department's preliminary

decision that revocation of the order would not be likely to lead to

continuation or recurrence of dumping. The USBSA argues that the

Department incorrectly and unlawfully equated the domestic industry's

decision not to request an administrative review of this order over the

past 16 years as a lack of interest in the order. Furthermore, the

USBSA argues that its decision not to request an administrative review

does not indicate an absence of dumping by Rogers.

Rogers, in its rebuttal comments, argues that the USBSA admits that

it was satisfied with the status quo and the status quo, with respect

to this order, was a deposit rate of zero. If the USBSA was satisfied

with this zero deposit rate, according to Rogers, it must have believed

that no dumping was occurring. Rogers argues further that it has been

the Department's practice to revoke orders where there have been

several years of zero margins. With respect to this sunset review,

Rogers argues that the burden is on the domestic industry to

demonstrate why the existence of a zero percent deposit rate for 16

years coupled with exports of the subject merchandise in substantial

quantities is not sufficient to determine that revocation of the order

would not be likely to lead to continuation or recurrence of dumping.

Department's Position: We disagree with the USBSA's assertion that

we equated the domestic industry's decision not to request an

administrative review with a lack of interest in the order. Nowhere in

our preliminary results did we state that the domestic industry's

decision not to request an administrative review over the last 16 years

was tantamount to having no interest in the continuation of this order.

In our preliminary results we attempted to ascertain the likelihood of

continuation or recurrence of dumping. In doing so, the Department

examined the deposit rates over the life of the order for Rogers, the

only producer/exporter of Canadian sugar still subject to the order.

The deposit rate for Rogers has been zero percent for the past 16

years. Because there has been no request by the domestic industry for

an administrative review of this order for the past 16 years, we had no

reason to believe that Rogers had dumped sugar in the United States

during any part of this time period.

Furthermore, the preamble to the Department's regulations

concerning revocation of orders states that ``it is reasonable to

presume that if subject merchandise, shipped in commercial quantities,

is being dumped or subsidized, domestic interested parties will react

by requesting an administrative review to ensure that duties are

assessed and that cash deposit rates are revised upward from zero. If

domestic interested parties do not request a review, presumably it is

because they acknowledge that subject merchandise continues to be

fairly traded'' (Antidumping Duties; Countervailing Duties; Final Rule,

62 FR 27296, 27326 (May 19, 1997)).

Therefore, this factor points to a finding of no dumping since the

issuance of the zero deposit rate. This would generally be our

conclusion, except where, as here, information on the record is

sufficient to determine dumping is likely to continue or recur.

Comment 3: The USBSA argues that the Department erred by making its

likelihood determination on an order-wide basis. It argues that,

although the Statement of Administrative Action (``the SAA''

)4 at 879 states expressly that the Department will make its

sunset determinations on an order-wide basis, the Department improperly

compared recent import data for only one respondent (Rogers) to data

following the issuance of the order for one respondent (BC Sugar). If

the Department had made the proper comparison of total pre-order

imports to total post-order imports, according to the USBSA, the

Department would have no alternative but to conclude that import

volumes have declined significantly during the life of the order.

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\4\ H.R. Doc. No. 103-316, vol. 1 (1994).

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Rogers did not address this comment.

Department's Position: The Department disagrees with the USBSA.

Prior to the issuance of the order, Rogers was not the only exporter of

subject merchandise. Other Canadian producers and exporters were

subject to the original investigation and subsequent order. In its

November 2, 1998, substantive response, however, the USBSA acknowledges

that only Rogers is currently subject to this antidumping duty order

(November 2, 1998, Substantive Response from the USBSA at 9).

Therefore, comparison of Rogers' pre-and post-order import volumes was

approriate.

On October 1, 1996, the Department determined that Rogers was the

successor in interest to BC Sugar. In this determination, the

Department found that BC Sugar changed its name legally to Rogers

Sugar, Ltd. Because the structure and organization of the company did

not change and Rogers was, for all intents and purposes, BC Sugar, the

Department also determined that the deposit rate assigned to BC Sugar

was applicable to Rogers. Therefore, the Department determined that,

for the purposes of this antidumping duty order, BC Sugar and Rogers

were predecessor and successor companies, respectively, of the same

entity.

Because Rogers (formerly BC Sugar) is the only producer/exporter of

sugar and syrups from Canada still subject to the order, the Department

finds that it would be unreasonable to compare the present import

volumes of Rogers with the pre-order import volumes of the four (or

more) producers/exporters which were subject to the order in 1980. If

it made this comparison, the Department would almost certainly find

that total imports had decreased over the life of the order not only

because there are fewer producers/exporters which are currently subject

to the order but also because the tariff rate quota (TRQ) currently in

effect restricts imports. Generally speaking, the purpose of the

Department's comparison of current and pre-order import volumes is to

determine whether companies (or the company) have been able to

consistently and continually sell subject merchandise in the United

States without dumping. Here, we compared the volume of BC Sugar's 1979

exports to the volume of Rogers' recent exports. Current imports of

subject merchandise from Rogers (formerly BC Sugar) are

[[Page 48365]]

substantially greater than the pre-order levels of BC Sugar (now

Rogers). Therefore, our examination of import levels of BC Sugar/Rogers

over the life of the order was appropriate.

Comment 4: The USBSA argues that the Department should have

confirmed whether Canadian producers and refiners of subject

merchandise have imported at dumped prices since the discipline of the

order went into effect. The USBSA asserts that the Department's

comparison should have included imports of refined cane and beet sugar

from all Canadian exporters, except Lantic and Redpath, for which the

order has been revoked. Furthermore, the USBSA argues that the

Department never attempted to verify whether new Canadian sugar

refiners have entered the market and instead limited its review to

those producers previously involved in the initial investigation.

Department's Position: In its November 2, 1998, substantive

response, the USBSA itself stated that only Rogers was subject to this

antidumping duty order (November 2, 1998, Substantive Response from the

USBSA at 9). There is no evidence on the record in this case of any

other Canadian producer/exporter of cane or beet sugar which is

currently subject to the order. Therefore, because we had no reason to

doubt the USBSA's claim that Rogers is the only producer/exporter of

subject merchandise still subject to this antidumping duty order, we

have not investigated whether other Canadian producers exported subject

merchandise to the United States.

Comment 5: The USBSA argues that the Department included non-

subject merchandise in its examination of imports of sugar and syrups

from Canada. The USBSA states further that increases in the imports of

non-subject merchandise are irrelevant to this sunset review and their

inclusion in the Department's examination is misrepresentation of the

true amount of imports of subject merchandise.

Department's Position: Increases or decreases in non-subject

merchandise are irrelevant to our sunset determination. For this

reason, the Department has endeavored to determine an accurate amount

of import volumes of the subject merchandise.

In the instant case, however, there are limitations to the data

which do not make an exact accounting of the import volumes possible.

The HTS item numbers used by the U.S. Census Bureau and the U.S.

Customs Service with respect to imports of sugar and syrups from Canada

include some non-subject merchandise. Furthermore, the age of this

information in question and changes in the HTS system over the life of

this order make estimation of imports of subject merchandise necessary.

As noted above, the Department recognizes that there are data

limitations. The Department has, nevertheless, attempted to compile the

most accurate calculation of import volumes of subject merchandise over

the life of the order.

Comment 6: The USBSA argues that the TRQ is no longer an effective

means of preventing surges in dumped sugar from entering the U.S.

market. The USBSA argues further that the U.S. Sugar Program is under

assault in an attempt to expand access to the U.S. market

significantly.

Department's Position: We agree with the USBSA that the TRQ has

been effective in the past at limiting all imports of sugar. The TRQ,

as part of the U.S. Sugar program, was designed to provide protection

from imports of foreign sugar. However, the USBSA misunderstands the

intent behind the creation and implementation of an antidumping duty

order. The purpose behind this order is not to provide blanket

protection from all imports of Canadian sugar; rather, its purpose is

to counteract the effects of unfairly traded imports. This is evidenced

by the fact that this order has been revoked with respect to Redpath

and Lantic because the Department determined that these companies were

not selling sugar in the United States at less than fair value. In the

same vein, the TRQ was not created to be a substitute for an

antidumping duty order, nor should it be viewed as such. The TRQ

provides the U.S. industry protection from all imported sugar. It was

not intended to act as an antidumping duty order on sugar from all of

the world's sugar producers, whether their sugar was being sold at

dumped prices or not.

The only issue in this sunset review is whether Canadian sugar and

syrups are likely to be dumped in the United States in the foreseeable

future. Whether the TRQ is no longer effective in limiting imports,

dumped or not, is irrelevant to this sunset review.

Comment 7: The USBSA argues that the sugar market has fallen to

unprecedented levels and shows no signs of recovery in the foreseeable

future. The USBSA argues further that the Department, in its

preliminary results, quickly dismissed the USBSA's argument as

speculative when the conduct of sunset reviews is inherently

speculative.

Rogers rebuts that an analysis of long-term trends in the history

of the international sugar market shows that price peaks and troughs

are characteristically short-lived. It states that the most recent

severe price trough was in 1985 when the annual average price for raw

sugar was $0.04/lb. Furthermore, Rogers argues that the current price

trough appears to have bottomed out in April 1999 at about $0.04/lb.

for raw sugar.

Rogers continues by reiterating that the USBSA's arguments

concerning the declining world price for sugar are speculative and

subjective which, Rogers notes the USBSA admits, may change depending

on unpredictable events and changes in circumstances in producing and

importing countries.

Department's Position: Sunset determinations are inherently

speculative and predictive and, in our preliminary results, we stated

that the USBSA's arguments concerning the decreases in world sugar

prices were speculative. We also believe that, since sunset reviews are

inherently predictive, the best predictor of future behavior is past

behavior. In examining the world sugar prices over the life of the

order, we find that, although prices in early 1999 are at their lowest

point in 12 years, generally prices have fluctuated over this time,

with prices in fiscal year 1998 being only marginally below fiscal year

1993 prices. We also find that the current prices for refined sugar are

not unprecedented, as Rogers' information concerning 1985 raw sugar

prices demonstrates.

Comment 8: The USBSA argues that the recent downward spiral of the

world refined-sugar price has a direct impact on Canadian prices and

incentives to export to the United States. According to the USBSA, with

a world price standing near $0.09/lb. and a Canadian price that Rogers

argues mimics the world price, it is inescapable that Rogers' home

market sales in Canada are today priced at less than cost and will be

so priced in the future. As the record in this proceeding shows, the

USBSA contends, not even the most efficient sugar producers can produce

sugar for around $0.09/lb.

Rogers argues that it has had a zero margin through 16 years of

world price fluctuations, including times of prices lower than at

present, while maintaining a dumping margin of zero. It states that the

Department verified its information and that the verification

demonstrated that sales in Canada and the United States are at prices

significantly above cost of production.

Furthermore, Rogers states that, since prices in the United States

were verified as higher than prices in Canada, there is no credible way

Rogers could have been selling below the COP.

[[Page 48366]]

Department's Position: The recent decreases in the world refined-

sugar price undoubtedly affected the Canadian price of refined sugar

because the Canadian price parallels the world price. Although the

Canadian price parallels the world price, it is not the same as the

world price. Therefore, it is quite reasonable to assume, given Rogers'

costs of manufacturing and the transportation costs associated with the

location of its sales within Canada, that the selling price of its

product could be above its cost of manufacturing and still be

competitive with other producers/exporters.

The world price of refined sugar obviously affects the selling

price of sugar in Canada and, thus, indirectly, may affect Rogers'

selling price. Nevertheless, the salient issue for this sunset review

is not the world price of refined sugar but, rather, Rogers' costs and

prices. Thus, we have limited our examination to Rogers' costs and

prices.

Comment 9: The USBSA states that, as the United States slowly

reduces the Canadian tier-2 tariff rate through 2008, the U.S. market

will become increasingly vulnerable to imports of Canadian sugar if the

world price of sugar falls below certain levels. Specifically, the

USBSA argues that, given the world refined price of $0.0913/lb., the

ability of Canadian producers to export refined sugar to the United

States profitably while paying the tier-2 tariff is already becoming a

reality.

Rogers argues that, given the current U.S. selling price of $0.28/

lb., with the addition of the tier-2 duty of $0.1621/lb., Rogers would

be required to sell in the United States at prices significantly below

the lowest price it now receives for the same product in Canada.

Furthermore, Rogers asserts, its production is not in excess of market

demand in Western Canada. Finally, according to Rogers, the refusal of

sugar beet growers to participate and support prices low enough to take

account of the tier-2 level (which would be necessary to sell any

product in the United States) would make such sales prohibitive.

Department's Position: The Department finds no evidence to suggest

that Rogers would sell sugar in the United States above the country-

specific quota established for Canada (i.e., paying the tier-2 tariff

rate).5 In order for Rogers to sell sugar in the United

States and pay the tier-2 tariff rate, Rogers would have to sell its

product (1) at prices substantially less than the lowest price it

receives for a similar product sold in Canada, (2) at prices far below

its costs of production, and (3) at prices far below the current world

price of refined sugar. The Department finds it extremely unlikely that

Canadian producers could export refined sugar to the United States

profitably while paying the tier-2 tariff.

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\5\ The Department notes that the USBSA has examined the effects

of the Canadian tier-2 tariff rate on the possibility of increased

imports from Canada through the year 2008. However, the USBSA has

stringently argued that the TRQ will be phased out by the year 2002.

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Magnitude of the Margin

Neither party addressed this issue in its case or rebuttal briefs.

Therefore, we have relied on the arguments submitted prior to the

preliminary results.

Comment 1: In its substantive response, the USBSA argued that the

dumping margin likely to prevail is at least as large as the margin

that prevailed at the time of the original investigation; the highest

dumping margin established in the original investigation was US$0.0237/

lb.6 Further, based on current U.S. and Canadian pricing,

the USBSA estimated dumping margins ranging from 9.3 percent to 409.0

percent. As noted above, the USBSA did not comment on the margin likely

to prevail in either its case or rebuttal brief.

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\6\ See Antidumping Duty Order; Sugar and Syrups from Canada, 45

FR 24128 (April 9, 1980).

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In its substantive response, Rogers argued that, given the price

spread between the U.S. supply-managed sugar market and the Canadian

market based on world pricing, the dumping margin likely to prevail if

the order were to be revoked is zero. Rogers argued that, because of

its limited access to the U.S. market, it is motivated to sell subject

merchandise at U.S. refined-sugar prices to maximize returns. Rogers

provided a chart depicting sugar prices in the Canadian and U.S.

markets and its price into the United States for the past eight years,

as well as a calculation for producing processed beet sugar at its

facility in Canada. Rogers contended that the chart indicates that

Rogers' price into the United States has been above its prices in

Western Canada. In its case and rebuttal briefs, Rogers also asserted

that there is no likelihood of continuation or recurrence of dumping if

the order were to be revoked.

Department's Position: The Department disagrees with Rogers. As

discussed in detail above, evidence placed on the record of this sunset

review by Rogers, and verified by the Department, indicates that there

is a likelihood that dumping would continue or recur if the order were

to be revoked.

In the Sunset Policy Bulletin, the Department stated that it will

normally provide to the International Trade Commission (the

``Commission'') the margin that was determined in the final

determination in the original investigation because that is the only

calculated rate that reflects the behavior of exporters absent the

discipline of the order. (See section II.B.1 of the Sunset Policy

Bulletin.) Exceptions to this policy include the use of a more recently

calculated margin, where appropriate, and consideration of duty

absorption determinations. (See sections II.B.2 and 3 of the Sunset

Policy Bulletin.)

In our preliminary results, we determined that the use of a more

recently calculated rate was appropriate and that such rate reflected

an absence of dumping. However, as noted above, for our final results,

we find that verified information demonstrates the likelihood of

dumping. Therefore, we conclude that the more recently calculated rate

from an administrative review can no longer be considered the magnitude

of the margin likely to prevail if the order were revoked.

We agree with the USBSA that the dumping margin likely to prevail

if the order were to be revoked is at least as high as the dumping

margin determined in the original investigation for BC Sugar. We

recognize that our dumping calculation for purposes of determining

likelihood of future dumping is not as accurate as a determination

which would reflect the adjustments typically made in an investigation

or administrative review. Therefore, the Department finds that the

margins calculated in the original investigation (45 FR 24126, April 9,

1980)7 are probative of the behavior of Canadian producers/

exporters of the subject merchandise. As such, the Department will

report to the Commission the company-specific and all others rates from

the original investigation as the magnitude of the margin likely to

prevail if the order were revoked.

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\7\ As the Department noted in its preliminary results (see

Preliminary Results of Full Sunset Review: Sugar and Syrups from

Canada, 64 FR 20253 (April 26, 1999)) and above, Rogers (formerly BC

Sugar) is the only known producer/exporter of the subject

merchandise currently subject to the order.

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Final Results of Review

As a result of this review, the Department finds that revocation of

the antidumping duty order would be likely to lead to continuation or

recurrence of dumping at the margins listed below:

[[Page 48367]]

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Manufacturer/exporter Margin

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Rogers (B.C. Sugar)..................................... $0.010105/lb.

All Others.............................................. 0.023700/lb.

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This notice serves as the only reminder to parties subject to

administrative protective order (APO) of their responsibility

concerning the disposition of proprietary information disclosed under

APO in accordance with 19 CFR 351.305 of the Department's regulations.

Timely notification of return/destruction of APO materials or

conversion to judicial protective order is hereby requested. Failure to

comply with the regulations and the terms of an APO is a sanctionable

violation.

This five-year (``sunset'') review and notice are in accordance

with sections 751(c), 752, and 777(i)(1) of the Act.

Dated: August 27, 1999.

Bernard T. Carreau,

Acting Assistant Secretary for Import Administration.

[FR Doc. 99-23039 Filed 9-2-99; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 3510-DS-P