Explosives Detection Systems

summary: The FAA is issuing the final Criteria for Certification of

Explosives Detection Systems (EDS's) (hereafter referred to as

``Criteria''). The Criteria introduces minimum performance standards

for EDS equipment designed to identify detonators. The prior EDS

Criteria issued September 10, 1993, established minimum performance

standards only for EDS equipment designed to identify main/bulk

explosive charges. The current Criteria allows the FAA to certify EDS

equipment that meets or exceeds either the minimum performance

standards for explosive material categorized as main/bulk explosive

charges, or the minimum performance standards for explosive material

categorized as detonators. This action is responsive to 49 U.S.C. 44913

(formerly section 108 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990,

Public Law 101-604), which requires the Administrator to certify, prior

to mandating its deployment, that EDS equipment ``can detect under

realistic air carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations,

and types of explosive material which would be likely to be used to

cause catastrophic damage to commercial aircraft.''

effective date: May 13, 1998.

for further information contact: Mr. Armen A. Sahagian, Senior Engineer

(ACP-400), Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning,

Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, D.C., 20591, telephone (202) 267-7076.

supplementary information:

Availability of Document

Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a

request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking,

ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by

calling (202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the docket number

of this notice.

Release of National Security and Sensitive Information

The Associate Administrator for Civil Aviation Security has

determined that certain portions of the Criteria are of national

security concern and require safeguarding from unauthorized disclosure

pursuant to Executive Order 12356 (National Security Information).

Further, pursuant to 14 CFR part 191 (Protection of Sensitive Security

Information), certain unclassified information has been determined to

be sensitive security information. Upon request, the complete Criteria

will be provided to prospective manufacturers of explosives detection

equipment, and other interested parties with a bona fide need to have

the complete Criteria, provided such persons have appropriate

authorization for access to U.S. Government national security

information and/or sensitive security information.

Availability of Criteria

Persons requesting access to, or a copy of, the complete text

(including all classified and sensitive security information) of the

Criteria may write to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of

Civil Aviation Security Operations, Attention: FAA Security Control

Point (ACO-400), Docket No. 28671, 800 Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, D.C. 20591.

Individuals requesting the classified portion of the Criteria must

include information regarding authorizations and security clearances

for access to U.S. Government national security information, and

sufficient explanatory information supporting the request to

demonstrate a bona fide need to know the information contained in the

Criteria.

Background

The Criteria are responsive to the statutory mandate for testing

and certifying EDS. The FAA has had a long-standing research and

development (R&D) effort to counter the threat of explosive materials

to civil aviation. Along with other technologies, the FAA invested in

detonator detection R&D beginning in 1985. However, based upon early

research, the FAA focused its R&D resources primarily on the detection

of main/bulk explosive charges, because it appeared to be the most

technologically feasible approach. The effort resulted in the September

10, 1993, Criteria (58 FR 47804), which established minimum performance

standards for main/bulk explosive charges detection equipment; however,

recent technological advances suggest that equipment capable of

detecting the different types of detonators used to initiate or

detonate an explosive may also be effective means of screening checked

baggage. On August 30, 1996, the FAA published a Proposed Amendment to

Criteria for Certification of Explosive Detection Systems (61 FR 46011)

with a request for public comments by October 29, 1996, which was later

extended to January 6, 1997 (61 FR 57511; Nov. 6, 1996). After

considering the comments received, the FAA now considers it appropriate

to adopt amendments to the minimum performance standards for the

detection of detonators.

Detection of Main/Bulk Explosive Charges

During the past two decades, the FAA has been working on the

development of explosive detection equipment, with the initial

explosive detection research and development (R&D) efforts beginning in

1977. As part of these R&D efforts, in 1983 the FAA established a

formal, internal statement of detection and false alarm performance

goals for explosive detection equipment designed to identify main/bulk

explosive charges in checked baggage, air cargo, carry-on baggage and

on passengers. Based upon additional information and further

evaluation, these FAA explosives detection goals were revised and

upgraded in 1986 to reflect the changing terrorist threat to civil

aviation. Portions of these performance requirements were further

revised in August 1989 in anticipation of using explosives detection

equipment for screening international checked baggage. In October 1991,

the FAA completed an internal review of all previous studies, reviews,

analyses and other materials associated with explosive detection. The

review was the most extensive examination yet conducted of previous

classified and unclassified technical reviews and available information

on the amounts, types, and configurations of explosives used in

attempted or successful acts of sabotage against civil aviation. This

review culminated with the issuance of the Criteria (58 FR 47804; Sept.

10, 1993) which established minimum performance standards only for

main/bulk explosive charges detection equipment.

Detection of Detonators

In October 1995, the FAA completed its compilation and analyses of

detonator technical designs obtained during visits to 38 detonator

manufacturers located in the United States and 20 other countries.

These analyses were the most extensive

[[Page 18105]]

examinations on the types, materials, and configurations of detonators.

As a result, the FAA developed a comprehensive database on detonators

manufactured worldwide, as well as global detonator production and

consumption profiles. The types of detonators specified in the Criteria

were based, in part, upon reports which identified the types of

detonators used in terrorists acts, as well as those likely to be used

in future attempts to destroy or sabotage civil aviation, other modes

of transportation, and physical structures. This analysis was conducted

by the FAA with advice and consultation from U.S. and international

explosive materials experts, and agencies of the United States and

other governments.

Development of the Amended Criteria

The primary change to the September 10, 1993, EDS Criteria is the

introduction of minimum performance standards for the detection of

detonators. These standards are included in the portion of the document

not published in the Federal Register because they involve national

security and sensitive information. The principal purpose of the

Criteria is to state that it is possible to obtain certification of an

EDS to automatically detect explosive materials in two distinct ways,

either by identifying bulk/main explosive charges, or by identifying

detonators.

The changes to the September 10, 1993, EDS Criteria, which are

published here, include a definition for the term ``explosive

material.'' The definition distinguishes between two principal

components of explosive material: bulk/main explosive charges and

detonators.

Management Plan for Certification Testing

To facilitate testing of EDS candidate equipment under either of

the two methods of explosives material detection, the Criteria

references separate management test plans. The FAA previously developed

a management test plan for EDS certification of bulk/main explosive

charges detection equipment. A notice of availability of the draft

management test plan was published in the Federal Register on June 22,

1993, for public comment (58 FR 33967). That management test plan,

entitled FAA Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing, was based

upon the National Academy of Science's General Testing Protocol for

Bulk Explosive Detection Systems. A separate management test plan for

EDS certification of detonator detection equipment is currently being

developed. The FAA expects to issue a notice of availability of a draft

management test plan for EDS certification of detonator detection

equipment in the near future.

Discussion of Comments

The FAA received only one comment, from the Air Line Pilots

Association (ALPA), to the unclassified sections of the Notice of

Proposed Amendment to Criteria for Certification of Explosives

Detection Systems, and five responses from commenters addressing

sections that contain national security and sensitive information.

The Air Line Pilots Association opposes formal certification of

detonator detection equipment as EDS on several grounds. First, ALPA

states that it will be too difficult to detect detonators in cluttered

bags, a problem ALPA believes will increase as terrorists become more

sophisticated. The FAA agrees that the development of equipment to

detect detonators in baggage, whether cluttered or not, is a difficult

task. However, the FAA, in concert with foreign governments, has

conducted extensive research that indicates detection of detonators is

possible in cluttered baggage. The Criteria are designed to assure that

only equipment that can reliably detect detonators, even in cluttered

baggage, will be certified.

Second, ALPA opposes certification of detonator detection equipment

because it would not detect bulk explosive material, even though that

undetected explosive material is not part of a device designed to

explode, i.e., there is no detonator present to initiate an explosion.

The Air Line Pilots Association believes that the inability to detect

such bulk explosive material poses some risk of catastrophic damage

because of the instability of some explosive material. The FAA

acknowledges that detonator detection equipment is not designed to

detect bulk explosive material; however, EDS designed to detect bulk

explosive material will not identify detonators. Both detonators and

bulk explosive material could be transported aboard aircraft in

violation of the hazardous materials regulations, and both would pose

some risk. However, neither by itself is ``likely to be used to cause

catastrophic damage to an aircraft.'' The FAA vigorously enforces the

hazardous materials regulations and would take aggressive action in any

instance where either a detonator or bulk explosive material is

transported in violation of those regulations.

The Air Line Pilots Association also opposes certification of

detonator detection equipment because it does not believe that a

detonator is an ``explosive material'' as that term is used in the

statutory provision on certification of EDS. The Air Line Pilots

Association views certification of detonator detection equipment as

weakening the existing Criteria. The FAA shares ALPA's commitment to

ensuring that equipment is certified as an EDS only when it meets the

rigorous standard of the statute, but does not agree with ALPA's

analysis. A detonator is designed to explode, and contains explosives

to achieve that purpose. More important, a detonator is a critical part

of an explosive device. A narrow reading misses the real purpose of the

statutory provision, which is to foster the development and

certification of EDS equipment that reliably detect explosive devices

that can cause catastrophic damage to aircraft. The FAA is committed to

that goal, and will encourage all technologies that demonstrate the

potential to reliably detect such explosive devices. The standards for

certification of detonator detection equipment are very high and are

not weaker than the standards for certification of bulk explosive

detection equipment.

The FAA also fully considered the five comments to sections of the

Proposed Amendment to Criteria that contain national security and

sensitive information. The FAA's analysis and response to those

comments has been placed in the non-public docket. The comments

resulted in the addition of another detonator to the list of detonators

and in minor revisions to the language of both the unclassified and

confidential portions of the proposed amendment. The comments

determined to contain sensitive security information, and the FAA's

response to them, are available, upon written request to the FAA, to

prospective manufacturers of explosives detection equipment and other

interested parties with a bona fide need, provided such persons have

appropriate authorization for access to U.S. Government national

security information.

Revisions to the Proposed Amendment

Based upon comments it received, the FAA added one detonator to the

list prescribed in the sensitive portion of the original proposal.

Additionally, in the ``Component Testing'' section, FAA has deleted

reference to detonator detection equipment in the discussion of

explosives detection devices (EDS's).

Regulatory Evaluation

The FAA has considered the impact of the Criteria as required under

Executive Order 12866 and under the Department of Transportation's

[[Page 18106]]

regulatory policies and procedures. The FAA has determined that this

action is not significant under either of these directives. In

addition, the FAA has determined that no cost-benefit analysis is

needed for the Criteria and related matters such as the Management Test

Plans. Any final EDS deployment decision will be subject to further

review, according to the requirements of Executive Order 12866. In this

regard, the Department determined that the rule authorizing deployment

of an EDS for screening international flights was a major rule as

defined in the Executive Order. Based upon circumstances and

information available at the final rule stage in 1989, the FAA

determined that the EDS available at that time, the Thermal Neutron

Analysis (TNA) device, would be cost-beneficial. The FAA has not

required, nor will it require the deployment of TNA or any other EDS

until such equipment meets the prescribed requirements of 49 U.S.C.

44913. The FAA's deployment strategy requires deployment of effective

EDS equipment in a cost-effective manner.

Information relevant to deployment decisions was developed in the

1989 final rule (54 FR 36946) in terms of the development,

installation, and annual operating costs of a TNA device. However, as

the EDS certification process proceeds and policies affecting EDS

deployment are developed, all relevant issues influencing the ultimate

decision on the timing and scope of deployment will be reviewed. The

FAA will analyze the information submitted by manufacturers during the

certification testing process to determine its effect on the scope and

timing of deployment.

Regulatory Flexibility Determination

The Regulatory Flexibility Act of 1980 (RFA) was enacted by

Congress to ensure that small entities are not unnecessarily burdened

by government regulations. The RFA requires agencies to consider the

impact of rules on small entities, that is, small businesses, non-

profit organizations, and local governments. If there is a significant

impact on a substantial number of small entities, the agency must

prepare a Regulatory Flexibility Analysis.

The small entities that could be potentially affected by the

implementation of this action are small business enterprises that are

or might seek to become manufacturers of EDS equipment. The number of

small business enterprises that are in, or that might seek to enter,

this market cannot be determined.

The Criteria imposes minimal costs on those small business

enterprises. These costs are primarily for obtaining access to or

copies of the classified and sensitive security information portions of

the Criteria. Because the incremental cost imposed by this proposed

action is expected to be small, the FAA finds that this proposed action

would not have a significant economic impact on a substantial number of

small entities.

International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and Joint Aviation

Regulations

In keeping with U.S. obligations under the Convention on

International Civil Aviation, it is FAA's policy to comply with ICAO

Standards and Recommended Practices and the Joint Aviation Regulations

to the maximum extent practicable. The FAA is not aware of any

differences that the Criteria would present.

Paperwork Reduction Act

In accordance with the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995 (44 U.S.C.

3507(d)), there are no requirements for information collection

associated with the Criteria.

The Amended Criteria (Excluding Sensitive Portions)

The following sets forth the entire text of the Criteria except

those portions of the document that contain either national security

information that requires safeguarding pursuant to Executive Order

12356, or sensitive security information that requires safeguarding

pursuant to 14 CFR part 191. (Note: Paragraph markings (U) indicate

that the content of the paragraph is unclassified consistent with

standard procedures for paragraph markings in the original classified

document.)

Criteria for Certification of Explosives Detection Systems

Introduction

(U) Prior to any requirement for the deployment or purchase of

explosives detection equipment under 14 CFR, 49 U.S.C. 44913 (formerly

section 108 of the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, Public

Law 101-604) requires the FAA to certify that, based upon the results

of tests conducted pursuant to protocols developed in consultation with

experts from outside the FAA, such equipment can detect under realistic

air carrier operating conditions the amounts, configurations, and types

of explosive materials likely to be used in attacks against commercial

aircraft.

(U) The criteria establish the minimum acceptable performance

requirements for an Explosives Detection System (EDS) to meet the

mandate of 49 U.S.C. 44913 for certification by the FAA, and supersede

previous EDS performance requirements established by the FAA.

Explosive Materials Definition

(U) For purposes of these Criteria for Certification of Explosives

Detection Systems: ``Explosive materials'' consist of bulk/main

explosive charges and detonators; a ``bulk/main explosive charge'' is

an explosive which may be detonated or initiated by a detonator; and a

``detonator'' is a device, containing an initiating or primary

explosive, used for initiating detonation if the bulk/main explosive

charge.

Explosives Detection System (EDS) Definition

(U) An EDS is an automated device or combination of devices, which

has the ability to detect, in passenger checked baggage, the amounts,

types, and configurations of explosive materials as specified by the

FAA. The term ``automated'' means that the ability of the system to

detect explosive materials, prior to the initial automated system

alarm, does not depend on human skill, vigilance, or judgment.

(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted): In the full text of the

classified Criteria document, this portion addresses alarm resolution

requirements subsequent to the initial automated alarm.)

General Operational Requirements

(U) The EDS must detect and differentiate explosive materials from

among all other materials found in checked baggage.

(U) The detection must not be dependent on the shape, position,

orientation, or configuration of the explosive materials.

(U) The EDS must not pose a health hazard to system operators or

the public (as detailed in 10 CFR part 20--Standards for Protection

Against Radiation and 10 CFR part 51--Environmental Protection

Regulations for Domestic Licensing and Related Regulatory Functions and

21 CFR part 1020--Performance Standards for Ionizing Radiation Emitting

Products).

(U) The EDS must not cause damage or significant residual

alteration of the luggage or its contents, other than highly sensitive

materials such as photographic film.

Detection Requirements

(U) The detection of explosive materials in checked baggage is

affected by the type, quantity, and configuration of the bulk/main

explosive charges or detonators, as well as the bag and its

[[Page 18107]]

contents. Depending on the type of detection equipment used, the EDS

must reliably detect a mix of types and quantities of explosive

materials selected by the FAA when any of these charges or detonators

are present in checked baggage.

(U) The term ``checked baggage'' applies to all passenger bags

destined for the cargo hold, including originating and transfer

baggage, regardless of whether or not the bags accompany a passenger on

a particular flight.

(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the

classified Criteria, this portion contains two tables. The first table

identifies the types and quantities of explosive materials (bulk/main

explosive charges) that must be detected, the minimum detection rate

for each category of bulk/main explosive charges; and the overall

detection and maximum false alarm rates. The first table also specifies

the requirement to detect the minimum quantity and larger quantities of

each listed bulk/main explosive charge. The second table lists the

makes, models, and U.N. classification numbers of detonators that must

be detected, and the overall detection and maximum false alarm rates.

The throughput requirement that appears in both the main/bulk explosive

charges and detonator tables, is quoted under ``Overall Performance

Requirements'' below, because it is the only item that is not sensitive

security information.)

Overall Performance Requirements

(U) All the criteria pertaining to detection rate, false alarm

rate, and throughput are based exclusively on the fully automated

component(s) or element(s) of the system.

(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the

classified Criteria document, this portion includes information

regarding requirements for no human intervention, detection rate, and

false alarm rate.)

(U) The cumulative minimum automated system throughput processing

rate during the certification tests must be at least 450 bags/hour (not

including alarm resolution).

Other Operational Issues

(U) In addition to the mandatory criteria discussed above, there

are a number of other operational considerations that will influence

any future FAA decision to require the purchase, deployment, and use of

EDS for screening checked baggage. While these considerations are not

mandatory for certification of EDS equipment, they should be factored

into development and design decisions made by potential manufacturers

and vendors of EDS equipment.

(U) The FAA has not yet established precise EDS parameters which

would serve to define what is practical or cost-effective (e.g.,

precise physical characteristics such as unit weight and size, or

precise unit cost). Given the variety of airport and air carrier

operating environments, the FAA does not wish to foreclose the

development of technologies which may work under some, but not all,

operating conditions.

(U) The FAA can, however, provide potential manufacturers and

vendors, as well as air carriers and airports with the following

guidance. In general, EDS equipment that is less costly, smaller and

lighter is more practical for use in a variety of airports than a

system that is more expensive, larger, and heavier, especially if such

equipment would require separate structures or substantial

modifications of existing terminal structures for installation or

operation. Also, systems which are easily operated and maintained, and

are proven to be reliable, will be more acceptable than systems that

require extensive specialized training for operation, calibration, and

maintenance.

(U) In addition, systems with throughput rates that substantially

exceed the minimum rate established in the certification criteria are

operationally more efficient in many applications, and are less likely

to cause delays and congestion when large numbers of passenger bags

must be screened in short periods of time. Further, systems that can be

more easily integrated into existing passenger and baggage processing

systems would presumably be more acceptable to potential users.

(U) Trade-offs are often made among these and other operational

considerations during the course of system design. For example,

reliability, maintainability, and availability can usually be improved,

but often at the expense of an increase in purchase price. While such

trade-offs may not affect certification, they will be considered during

decision making to require deployment of certified EDS.

System Certification

(U) The FAA will certify EDS equipment based upon the mandatory

detection criteria and develop a list of certified equipment that would

be eligible for use by air carriers. Additional action must be taken by

the FAA to require the deployment of certified EDS to screen checked

baggage.

(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the

classified Criteria document, this portion contains information on the

Act's requirement to detect likely-to-be-used explosive materials.)

(U) The FAA will not require air carriers to use certified EDS

equipment until such time as the FAA determines that such equipment is

available in sufficient quantities to satisfy air carrier and airport

operational concerns, and is practical for use under realistic air

carrier operating conditions (e.g., cost, size, weight, reliability,

maintainability, and availability), and cost-effective.

(U) The FAA will only certify complete systems. It will not certify

or allow for use, individual component devices. Prior to final

certification, the FAA will require manufacturers and vendors to

provide full system documentation. This documentation will include, but

is not limited to: recommended system installation and calibration

procedures; minimum essential test equipment and devices; routine field

testing procedures and test objects to be used; routine and emergency

operation procedures; field preventative maintenance and repair

procedures; and training programs.

Certification Testing

(U) Testing of bulk/main explosive charges detection equipment

presented to the FAA for EDS certification, will be performed in

accordance with the FAA's Management Plan for EDS Certification

Testing, based upon A General Testing Protocol for Bulk Explosives

Detection Systems, (National Advisory Board, final report 1993).

(U) Testing of detonator detection equipment presented to the FAA

for EDS certification, will be performed in accordance with the FAA's

Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing of Detonator Detection

Equipment, based upon FAA's General Testing Protocol for Detonator

Detection Systems.

(U) The FAA Technical Center in Atlantic City, New Jersey will

perform certification tests for producers of candidate explosives

detection systems. The EDS Certification Test Director in the Office of

Aviation Security Research and Development is the point of contact.

(U) As required by both the FAA Management Plan for EDS

Certification Testing, and the FAA Management Plan for EDS

Certification Testing of Detonator Detection Equipment, manufacturers

seeking FAA certification for their candidate EDS must submit complete

descriptive data and their test results to the FAA prior to receiving

permission to ship their equipment to the FAA Technical Center. The FAA

reserves the right to visit manufacturers' facilities for technical

quality assurance purposes, require and/or monitor in-

[[Page 18108]]

house tests, and review associated data prior to granting permission to

ship equipment for certification testing.

(U) There may be extenuating circumstances that make it impractical

for the equipment to be accommodated at the FAA Technical Center.

Therefore, the FAA will consider requests for an exception that would

permit equipment to be tested at a facility other than the FAA

Technical Center. The written request must explain in detail why an

exception is in the best interest of the U.S. Government and indicate

the methods and procedures that will be used to conduct equivalent

tests to those conducted at the FAA's facility.

(U) The FAA may recognize, on a reciprocal basis, EDS testing and

certification conducted by a foreign government's aviation security

organization. Such recognition by the FAA will be considered only if

certain conditions are met. These conditions include, but are not

limited to, the negotiation of an appropriate security technical

exchange agreement which assures compliance with the FAA Criteria for

Certification of Explosives Detection Systems using strict quality

control procedures that are consistent with FAA testing procedures. The

agreement must also provide for full reciprocity for certifications

issued by both the foreign government aviation security organization

and the FAA.

(U) All direct costs associated with testing and certification

(e.g., insurance, shipping, installation, set-up, technical operation,

maintenance, calibration, disassembly, and FAA laboratory testing

costs) must be borne by the manufacturers or vendors. Both the FAA

Management Plan for EDS Certification Testing, and the FAA Management

Plan for EDS Certification Testing of Detonator Detection Equipment

contain specific information on the incremental costs associated with

tests performed at the FAA Technical Center facilities, or other

locations.

(Sensitive Portion of Document Deleted: In the full text of the

classified Criteria, this portion contains information pertaining to

test objects used in EDS certification testing.)

Component Testing

(U) As part of the FAA Security R&D program, the FAA Technical

Center evaluates explosives detection devices (EDD's) that do not meet

all of the EDS performance standards. An EDD is an automated,

uncertified EDS that is capable of meeting the partial detection

requirements for bulk/main explosive charges, in the criteria. For

instance, some of the devices that the FAA has evaluated have

relatively low throughput rates and higher false alarm rates than the

maximum acceptable rate. It will be possible under certain

circumstances, for example, for a manufacturer of an automated EDD to

have the FAA test and evaluate the device, even though it is not

expected to fully meet the EDS certification criteria (e.g., false

alarm rate or throughput).

(U) Although only complete systems can be certified, the FAA may

attest to the performance of, but not certify or approve for use, EDD's

or individual components. Attesting to the performance of EDD's is

intended to assist manufacturers and vendors who are seeking partners

with whom they can create a functioning EDS composed of multiple

devices.

(U) Testing of EDD's will only be conducted: (1) on a first-come,

first-served basis; (2) if adequate resources and facilities are

available at the FAA Technical Center to permit such testing (The FAA

will also consider requests to test the equipment at a facility other

than the FAA Technical Center; these requests will be given the lowest

priority and the testing will be performed only if it does not delay

other testing being performed by the FAA Technical Center.); (3) at a

lower precedence than EDS certification testing; and (4) if the FAA

determines from the manufacturer's test data that there is a

substantial likelihood that the device will meet the partial detection

criteria.

(Authority: 49 U.S.C. 106(g), 5103, 40113, 40119, 44701-44702,

44705, 44901-44905, 44907, 44913-44914, 44932, 44935-44936, 46105)

Issued in Washington, DC, on April 7, 1998.

Jane F. Garvey,

Administrator.

[FR Doc. 98-9642 Filed 4-10-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 4910-13-M