Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of an amended Record of Decision.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final

programmatic environmental impact statement, Storage and Disposition of

Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials (Storage and Disposition PEIS) (DOE/

EIS-0229, December 1996) in accordance with the National Environmental

Policy Act (NEPA), Council on Environmental Quality NEPA implementing

regulations, and DOE implementing procedures. The Storage and

Disposition PEIS, among other things, assesses the potential

environmental impacts of alternatives and locations for storing

weapons-usable fissile materials (plutonium and highly enriched

uranium).

On January 14, 1997, DOE issued a Record of Decision (Storage and

Disposition ROD), 62 FR 3014, (January 21, 1997), selecting weapons-

usable fissile materials storage and surplus plutonium disposition

strategies. For plutonium storage, DOE decided to consolidate part of

its weapons-usable plutonium storage by upgrading and expanding

existing and planned facilities at the Pantex Plant (Pantex) near

Amarillo, Texas and the Savannah River Site (SRS) near Aiken, South

Carolina. For plutonium currently stored at the Hanford Site (Hanford)

near Richland, Washington, and other DOE sites, DOE decided that

surplus weapons-usable plutonium would remain at these sites until

disposition (or move to lag storage at a disposition facility). The

weapons-usable plutonium stored at the Rocky Flats Environmental

Technology Site (RFETS), near Golden, Colorado, would be moved to

Pantex and the SRS. However, the plutonium destined for the SRS, i.e.,

non-pit, weapons-usable surplus plutonium, would be moved only if: (1)

the plutonium had been stabilized under corrective actions in response

to the Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) Recommendation

94-1 and packaged to meet the DOE storage Standard 3013-96, Criteria

for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides, (2) the construction

and expansion of the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (APSF) at

the SRS had been completed, and (3) the SRS had been selected in the

upcoming Record of Decision for the Surplus Plutonium Disposition

Environmental Impact Statement as the immobilization disposition site

for surplus weapons-usable plutonium.

In order to support the early closure of the RFETS and the early

deactivation of plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford site, DOE

is modifying, contingent upon the satisfaction of certain conditions,

some of the decisions made in its Storage and Disposition ROD

associated with surplus plutonium storage pending disposition. Namely,

DOE will take steps that allow: (1) the accelerated shipment of all

non-pit surplus weapons-usable plutonium from the RFETS (about 7 metric

tons) to the SRS beginning in about 2000, in advance of completion of

the APSF in 2001, and (2) the relocation of all Hanford surplus

weapons-usable plutonium (about 4.6 metric tons) to the SRS, between

about 2002 and 2005, pending disposition. However, consistent with the

Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD, DOE will only implement the movement

of RFETS and Hanford non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium

inventories to the SRS if the SRS is selected as the immobilization

disposition site. DOE is preparing the Surplus Plutonium Disposition

Environmental Impact Statement (SPD EIS), draft issued July 1998, as

part of the decision making process for determining an immobilization

site.1

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\1\ SRS has been identified by DOE as the preferred site for the

immobilization disposition facility.

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To accommodate the storage of Hanford surplus weapons-usable

plutonium, DOE will expand the APSF as planned in the Storage and

Disposition ROD. In addition, to accommodate the early receipt and

storage of the RFETS surplus plutonium, the Department will prepare

additional suitable storage space in Building 105-K (i.e., K-Reactor)

in the K-Area at the SRS. Portions of Building 105-K will be modified

to provide safe and secure plutonium storage. Safeguards and security

features will be upgraded, criticality monitoring devices will be

installed, structural features will be inspected and repaired, roof

vents will be added, and doors will be modified. Several areas in the

facility will be decontaminated and excess equipment will be removed to

provide additional floor space.

Modifications will also include dismantling and removing unused

process equipment in four building areas: Stack Area, Crane Maintenance

Area, Crane Wash Area, and Process Room.

Security systems in the four building areas will be reactivated and

upgraded to support using them for plutonium storage. Existing systems

including the K-Area security perimeter, security control system and

building water/power ventilation support systems will be used. Building

modifications will provide for truck loading and unloading, material

conformation, shipping accountability measurements, and storage. The

Department will also declassify (process the metal to produce

unclassified ``buttons'') some of the RFETS plutonium materials using

SRS's FB-Line (in the F-Area) and after declassification, package this

material in the APSF to meet the DOE storage Standard 3013-96, Criteria

for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides.

All plutonium materials shipped to SRS will be stable and, except

for classified metal and/or parts, will be packaged to meet the

requirements of the DOE Standard 3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of

Plutonium Metals and Oxides, before shipment. All shipments of

plutonium to SRS will be by Safe Secure Transport (SST) in accordance

with applicable DOE, U.S. Department of Transportation and U.S. Nuclear

Regulatory Commission requirements and regulations. Some of the RFETS

plutonium material packaged and shipped will be less than 50% plutonium

by weight; as a result, there will be approximately 3% more total

weight of material and a corresponding increase in the number of

shipments than considered in the Storage and Disposition PEIS, although

the total amount of plutonium in the material will remain about the

same.

Under the previous ROD, a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus

plutonium, including plutonium from RFETS and existing onsite

plutonium, would be

[[Page 43387]]

stored at SRS in the APSF, pending disposition, provided that SRS is

selected as the immobilization site following completion of the Surplus

Plutonium Disposition EIS. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS

would begin when the APSF is completed in 2001.

With this amended ROD, a total of approximately 11.6 metric tons of

surplus weapons-usable plutonium from Hanford and RFETS (in addition to

existing onsite SRS surplus plutonium, for a total of approximately 14

metric tons of surplus plutonium) could be stored at SRS in the APSF

and Building 105-K, pending disposition, provided that SRS is selected

as the immobilization site. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS

would begin when the modifications to Building 105-K are completed,

i.e., in about 2000; shipments of plutonium from Hanford to SRS would

begin in about 2002.

This amended ROD only alters DOE's previous decision (Storage and

Disposition ROD) for the storage of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable

plutonium currently located at the RFETS and Hanford sites. No changes

are being made to other storage decisions or any decisions associated

with surplus fissile material disposition.

In accordance with 10 CFR 1021.314, DOE has prepared a Supplement

Analysis to determine if these changes require a supplement to the

Storage and Disposition PEIS under the Council on Environmental Quality

Regulations at 40 CFR 1502.9(c). The Supplement Analysis shows that the

new proposed action does not result in a substantial change to

environmental concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.

Also, the Supplement Analysis shows that the proposed action does not

present significant new circumstances or information relevant to the

environmental concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.

Therefore, based on the Supplement Analysis, DOE has determined that a

supplement to the Storage and Disposition PEIS is not required, and DOE

has decided not to prepare such a supplement.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the long-

term storage or the disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials, or

to receive a copy of the final Storage and Disposition PEIS, the

Storage and Disposition EIS ROD or the Supplement Analysis, contact: G.

Bert Stevenson, NEPA Compliance Officer, Office of Fissile Materials

Disposition (MD-4), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence

Avenue, SW., 1Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-5368.

For further information on the DOE NEPA process, contact: Carol M.

Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy and Assistance (EH-42), U.S.

Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC

20585, (202) 586-4600, or leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

A. Current Storage Program and Original Decision for Surplus Weapons-

Usable Plutonium

DOE is currently phasing out the storage of all weapons-usable

plutonium at RFETS. The phaseout involves shipping all RFETS pits to

Pantex, and shipping all RFETS surplus non-pit, weapons-usable

plutonium to the SRS (subject to certain conditions) starting in about

2001. As decided in the January 1997 Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD,

the stabilized non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium would not be

moved unless and until: expansion of the APSF 2 at the SRS

had been completed; the RFETS material had been stabilized and packaged

to meet the Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides

for long-term storage under corrective actions in response to the

Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board Recommendation 94-1; and DOE

had decided to immobilize plutonium at the SRS. The Department also

decided to continue the current storage of surplus plutonium at

Hanford, the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory

(INEEL), and Los Alamos National Laboratory (LANL) pending disposition

(or movement to lag storage); and to pursue a strategy for plutonium

disposition that would immobilize surplus weapons-usable plutonium in

glass or ceramic forms and would allow the burning of some of the

surplus weapons-usable plutonium (mostly from pits) as mixed oxide fuel

in existing commercial light-water reactors.

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\2\ The APSF has been designed but not built. Construction is

scheduled to start in October 1998 and the facility is scheduled to

be in operation by October 2001. Expansion of the APSF refers to

increasing the vault capacity of the facility to the current design

of 5,000 storage positions (sufficient storage space for current SRS

materials and RFETS materials).

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B. Need to Change Storage Program

Recently, DOE has estimated that accelerating the closure of RFETS

from 2010 to 2006 could save as much as $1.3 billion. Integral to

achieving an accelerated closure of the site would be removal of the

non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium to SRS two years earlier than

the current plan. Removal of the surplus plutonium at RFETS is only one

of several steps to realize the savings. Other steps are proposed or

ongoing pursuant to separate NEPA review. DOE also expects that the

transfer of non-pit, surplus weapons-useable plutonium from Hanford to

Savannah River could save as much as $150 million in upgrade and

operating costs for plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford Site.

As with the RFETS plutonium, the transfer would not be accomplished

unless DOE decided to locate the plutonium immobilization facility at

the Savannah River Site. The implementation cost for the proposed

action is estimated to be approximately $93 million.

Closing RFETS by 2006 would, among other things, require the

removal of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium metal and oxide

from RFETS by 2002. In order to remove all the non-pit, surplus

weapons-usable plutonium from RFETS by 2002, DOE would have to begin

transferring the material to the SRS by January 2000, prior to

completing the construction of the APSF.

DOE has also reevaluated plutonium storage operations at Hanford

and determined that transferring all (about 4.6 metric tons) non-pit,

surplus weapons-usable plutonium from that site for storage could save

the Department as much as $150 million by avoiding upgrade and

operating costs for plutonium storage facilities at the Hanford Site.

DOE is considering the early transfer of plutonium from Hanford to the

SRS as a means of achieving this savings.

These transfers would not occur unless DOE decides to immobilize

plutonium at the SRS. A ROD to select the immobilization site is

anticipated in early 1999 in the SPD EIS.

C. Proposed Action

The Department of Energy is proposing to accelerate the movement of

all (about 7 metric tons) of non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium

at the RFETS and to move all (about 4.6 metric tons) of the surplus

weapons-usable plutonium at Hanford to the SRS for storage pending

disposition. The RFETS plutonium would be shipped to the SRS from about

January 2000 through 2002. The Hanford plutonium would be shipped to

the SRS from about 2002 through 2005.

The plutonium would not be moved to SRS unless the Department

decides to disposition (immobilize) the non-pit,

[[Page 43388]]

surplus weapons-usable plutonium at SRS, after completion of the final

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Environmental Impact Statement. In

addition, the plutonium would not be shipped until it were stabilized

and packaged to meet DOE Standard 3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of

Plutonium Metals and Oxides in response to Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board Recommendation 94-1. This proposed action is consistent

with DOE's objective, as explained in the ROD for the Storage and

Disposition PEIS, to reduce over time the number of locations where

plutonium is stored in the DOE complex.

Starting in about January 2000, all non-pit, surplus weapons-usable

plutonium (except for classified plutonium) would be shipped to

Building 105-K. At Building 105-K, the shipping containers \3\ would be

unloaded using a battery powered fork-lift truck. Material control and

accountability measurements would be made at Building 105-K. The

shipping containers would then be loaded onto metal pallets and

transferred to a storage location in the building. DOE would not open

any of the shipping containers in Building 105-K. While in storage, the

containers would be inspected on a regular basis to assure external

container integrity.3 DOE has successfully used (and

continues to use) shipping containers for plutonium storage at the SRS.

No problems with a loss of material confinement have been experienced

to date.

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\3\ To support the proposed action, DOE would purchase

additional Type 9975 shipping containers, which are Type B

containers and would also be used for storage. This would be done so

that storing the RFETS materials in shipping containers pending

disposition will not impact the Department's supply of Type B

shipping containers.

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Portions of Building 105-K will be modified to facilitate plutonium

storage. Safeguards and security features will be upgraded, criticality

monitoring devices will be installed, structural features will be

inspected and repaired, and roof vents will be added and doors will be

modified. Several areas in the facility will be decontaminated and

excess equipment will be removed to provide additional floor

space.4

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\4\ A portion of these activities could be completed as part of

maintenance, clean-up, and decontamination activities at SRS that

DOE has determined are categorically excluded from further NEPA

review.

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Modifications will include dismantling and removing unused process

equipment in four building areas: Stack Area, Crane Maintenance Area,

Crane Wash Area, and Process Room. These areas total approximately

30,000 square feet, are within the security areas that existed for

reactor operations, and are adjacent to a currently active highly

enriched uranium storage area. Security systems in the four building

areas will be reactivated and upgraded to support using them for

plutonium storage. Existing systems including the K-Area security

perimeter, security control system and building water/power ventilation

support systems will be used. Building modifications will provide for

truck loading and unloading, material conformation, shipping

accountability measurements, and storage.

Some of the RFETS plutonium is in a classified form, which would

restrict the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) from access to

the material. DOE intends to make the APSF vault, and potentially

Building 105-K, available for IAEA inspection. As a result, the RFETS

plutonium needs to be declassified. To accomplish this objective, DOE

would transfer the classified RFETS plutonium to F-Area for processing

(declassifying) in the FB-Line facility at SRS. In the FB-Line

facility, the plutonium would be melted using existing facilities and

equipment that are part of the plutonium metal production process for

which the FB-Line facility was designed. The declassification work

would not be done on a continuous basis, but rather whenever processing

capabilities were available. The RFETS plutonium would be fashioned

into metal ``buttons'' that are the traditional FB-Line product. After

the ``buttons'' are fabricated, the material would be transferred to

the APSF and packaged to meet the requirements of DOE's plutonium

storage standard. Then, the material would be placed in type B shipping

containers and transported to Building 105-K for storage.

Alternatively, the material could remain in the APSF vault, if space is

available to allow for operational flexibility.

Some of the RFETS plutonium materials would be less than 50%

plutonium by weight and would involve approximately 3% more total

weight of material and a corresponding increase in the number of

shipments than considered in the S&D PEIS.

Beginning in about 2002, SRS would begin to receive from Hanford

stabilized plutonium packaged to meet DOE's long-term standard for

placement in the APSF. Once APSF is operating, DOE could transfer a

portion of the RFETS material from Building 105-K to the APSF in order

to provide for operational flexibility. The plutonium from RFETS and

Hanford would remain in storage at the APSF and Building 105-K pending

disposition along with existing SRS surplus plutonium.

The plutonium would be transferred in type B shipping containers by

truck using methods and routes described in the Storage and Disposition

PEIS (i.e., the Department of Energy's Safe Secure Transport System).

If DOE decides to pursue the No Action alternative for the

disposition of surplus plutonium in the SPD EIS Record of Decision, the

SRS, RFETS, and Hanford materials would remain in storage at their

current sites in accordance with the No Action alternative. If the DOE

decides to immobilize surplus plutonium at Hanford, the SRS and RFETS

materials would be shipped to Hanford in accordance with the decisions

reached in the SPD EIS Record of Decision.

II. NEPA Process for Amending ROD

A. Supplement Analysis

Pursuant to DOE regulations in 10 CFR 1021.314, DOE has prepared a

Supplement Analysis, Supplement Analysis for Storing Plutonium in the

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and Building 105-K at the

Savannah River Site (July 1998), to help determine whether a supplement

to the Storage and Disposition PEIS is required under the Council on

Environmental Quality Regulations, 40 CFR 1502.9(c). The Supplement

Analysis compares the potential impacts of the new proposed action to

the impacts discussed for the plutonium storage alternatives in the

Storage and Disposition PEIS. The Supplement Analysis shows that the

new proposed action does not make a substantial change to environmental

concerns evaluated in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. Furthermore,

the Supplement Analysis shows that there are no new significant

circumstances or information relevant to environmental concerns and

bearing on the proposed action or its impact.

B. Comparison of Potential Impacts

The facilities involved (i.e, Building 105-K and the APSF) are or

will be located in existing industrial areas at the SRS.

Land Resources, Site Infrastructure, Geology and Soils,

Biology Resources and Cultural and Paleontological Resources. There are

no aquatic habitats or wetlands in these areas nor are there any

threatened or endangered species. None of the affected facilities have

been nominated for inclusion in the National Register of Historic

Places, and there are no plans for such nominations.

Based on evaluations in the Storage and Disposition PEIS and

information

[[Page 43389]]

incorporated in the Supplement Analysis from the Final Environmental

Impact Statements on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials (DOE/

EIS-0220, October, 1995)(IMNMS EIS) there would be little or no impact

to land resources, site infrastructure, geology and soils, biology

resources and cultural and Paleontological resources by the

construction, operation and expansion of the APSF. This is equally true

for Building 105-K since all storage operations would occur within the

existing Building 105-K structure.

It is expected that declassification of the RFETS material

would require 100 Mw hrs/yr of electricity. This work would not require

modification to the FB-line's electrical system and is well within the

capacity of the facility and the site.

Packaging and Transportation. The transportation routes to

the SRS would be the same as those assumed in the Storage and

Disposition PEIS (i.e., overland truck routes on interstate highways

and state roads). Transportation operations would not change. DOE

estimates that the total inter-site transportation impact associated

with transferring plutonium from the RFETS and Hanford to the SRS would

be 0.07 potential latent cancer fatalities, which would be

approximately the same as for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage

and Disposition PEIS.5 DOE estimates that the intra-site

transportation activities could add an additional 0.01 latent cancer

fatalities to the worker population.6

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\5\ The impact is the sum of the impact of transportation of

RFETS non-pit plutonium under the Preferred Alternative in the

Storage and Disposition PEIS and the incremental impact for shipping

the Hanford plutonium.

\6\ In inter-site transportation analyses, non-radiological

accidents would be the greatest contributor to fatalities. In the

case of intra-site transportation, impacts would be due primarily to

radiation doses received from normal transportation operations.

Effects from intra-site accidents, if any, would likely be

negligible. Historically, certified containers maintain their

integrity in accident situations.

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Air Quality and Noise. Storage: Accomplishing the proposed

action, including the modifications to Building 105-K, would add no

significant air quality and noise impacts above the existing site

baseline. Therefore, air quality and noise impacts from the plutonium

storage aspects of the proposed action would be essentially the same as

the air quality and noise impacts from the Preferred Alternative of the

Storage and Disposition PEIS (i.e., the Upgrade With RFETS Non-Pit

Material alternative).

Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates there would be a small

increase in non-radiological air emissions for declassification

operations (i.e., metal conversion operations in FB-Line) above the

non-radiological air emissions estimated for the No Action and the

Upgrade alternatives in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. Non-

radiological air emissions would be well within State and Federal

regulatory limits. Repackaging activities are not expected to involve

the use of chemicals, beyond a very small amount of decontamination

liquid.

Water Resources. Storage: The maximum impact to water

resources, above existing site baseline usage and discharges, expected

from plutonium storage aspects of DOE's proposed action would be about

the same as presented in the Upgrade With RFETS and LANL Material

alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS,7 i.e.,

there would be a 0.01% increase in water use and a 0.1% increase in

waste water discharges. The water impacts from the proposed action

would have a negligible effect on site water or waste treatment

capacity.

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\7\ Table 4.2.6.4-1 of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.

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The impacts of radiological liquid discharges from Building 105-K

are included as part of the No Action alternative in the Storage and

Disposition PEIS. DOE expects there would be no significant increase

above the No Action alternative discharge levels since, during normal

operations, water is not in contact with plutonium storage containers.

Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates declassification

operations would cause a small and insignificant increase in water

usage beyond the water requirement estimated for other site operations.

Repackaging activities in the APSF are expected to have essentially

no impact to water resources beyond the site base line operations

presented in the No Action alternative of the Storage and Disposition

PEIS. 8 Repackaging operations would not significantly

increase the use of water resources beyond that required to operate the

industrial systems associated with the APSF, e.g., chillers for air

conditioning, sanitary sewer, potable water, etc., because additional

water is not used in repackaging operations.

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\8\ Table 4.2.6.4-1 of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.

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Socioeconomics. Storage: The socioeconomic impact of

operating Building 105-K for plutonium storage would be essentially the

same as the impact described for the Preferred Alternative of the

Storage and Disposition PEIS. The socioeconomic impact of modifying

Building 105-K and operating both APSF and Building 105-K would be well

within the impacts described for the Consolidation alternative of the

Storage and Disposition PEIS.

The socioeconomic impacts at RFETS and Hanford of moving surplus

plutonium to SRS were analyzed in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. The

analysis concluded that this action would phase out plutonium storage

at RFETS and Hanford. Approximately 200 direct job losses at Hanford,

in addition to the 2000 at RFETS, would result. Compared to the total

employment in those areas, the loss of these jobs and the impacts to

the regional economies would not be significant. The proposed action

would not change the magnitude of these impacts at RFETS, but cause

them to occur sooner.

Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates there would be

negligible additional socioeconomic effects due to operating the APSF

for repackaging of RFETS plutonium or operating FB-Line for

declassification purposes because the existing site workforce would be

used.

Public and Occupational Health and Safety (normal

operations). Storage. Public and Non-Involved Workers: Plutonium

storage operations in Building 105-K would not result in any additional

air or water radiological impacts (beyond those currently associated

with other operations in Building 105-K) because no shipping containers

or storage containers would be opened in Building 105-K. Since air and

water emissions create impacts that affect the non-involved workers and

the public, there would be no significant additional radiological

impact to the public or non-involved workers from normal operations in

Building 105-K. Therefore, the impact from the proposed action to the

public and non-involved workers would be essentially the same as the

impact from the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition

PEIS.

Involved Workers: DOE estimated that the potential health impact

from 50 years of APSF storage to individual involved workers for the

Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS was a latent

cancer fatality risk of 5x10-3 and that 1.5x10-1

latent cancer fatalities could occur in the involved worker population.

DOE estimates that the potential health impacts from 10 years of

operating Building 105-K to store plutonium could result in a risk of

latent cancer

[[Page 43390]]

fatality for the average Building 105-K involved worker of

1.5x10-3 and 2.6x10-2 latent cancer fatalities in

the Building 105-K involved worker population. Since the Storage and

Disposition PEIS bases health impacts on 50 years of storage, for

comparison purposes, the impacts from 50 years of plutonium storage in

the APSF are added to the impacts from 10 years of plutonium storage in

Building 105-K. Using this approach, the health impacts from storing

plutonium in the APSF and in Building 105-K would be 0.18 latent cancer

fatalities in the involved worker population of both facilities.

Health impacts to involved workers for the plutonium storage

aspects of the proposed action in this Supplement Analysis (0.18 latent

cancer fatalities) would be essentially the same as the health impact

estimated in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition

PEIS (0.15 latent cancer fatalities).

Declassification/Repackaging Radiological Impacts. Public, Non-

involved Workers, Involved Workers: For declassification operations the

potential health effect from the postulated radiation dose to the

maximally exposed member of the public at the Site boundary would be

1.7x10-6 latent cancer fatalities. The potential health

effect from the postulated radiation dose to the population surrounding

the SRS and to workers would be 0.068 latent cancer fatalities and

0.078 latent cancer fatalities, respectively, above those predicted in

the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.

For repackaging operations (i.e., repackaging all plutonium from

the RFETS in the APSF for 2 years) the potential health effect from the

postulated radiation dose to the maximally exposed member of the public

at the site boundary would be 7.5x10-12 latent cancer

fatalities. The potential health effect from the postulated radiation

dose to the population surrounding the SRS and to workers would be

1.5x10-7 latent cancer fatalities and 2.5x10-2

latent cancer fatalities, respectively, above those predicted in the

Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS. The impacts

from repackaging, only the RFETS plutonium that would be declassified

in the FB-Line would be less.

Building 105-K Modification. Public, Non-Involved Workers, Involved

Workers: No impacts to non-involved workers or the public would be

expected from the decontamination, modification, removal, and

construction work because this work is not expected to generate

significant air or water emissions. Work activities are confined to the

interior of Building 105-K and airborne radioactivity levels are

routinely monitored during work. Liquid sources would not be released

from the building during normal decontamination, removal, or

construction work. The potential health impact to workers, in the form

of the risk of latent cancer fatality, would be 4x10-4 for

18 months of decontamination and construction work and the number of

latent cancer fatalities that could be expected in the worker

population was estimated to be 2x10-2. The risks associated

with the modification of Building 105-K are approximately ten percent

of the risks estimated for storage of the plutonium in the Preferred

Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS.

Summary

Public: In the Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE estimated the

potential health impact to the population surrounding the SRS from

existing site operations and for the Upgrade Alternative over 50 years

was 1.1 latent cancer fatalities. Accomplishing the new proposed action

would slightly increase that potential health impact to about 1.2

latent cancer fatalities. Emissions would remain within the limits of

the National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants permits

for the APSF and Building 105-K.

Workers: In the Storage and Disposition PEIS, DOE estimated that

the potential health impact to the total site workforce from existing

site operations over 50 years would be 5.3 latent cancer fatalities.

Accomplishing the proposed action would increase the potential health

impact to the site workforce by 0.3 to 5.6 latent cancer fatalities.

This new estimate in total site workforce health impact is slightly

greater than the health impact of 5.3 latent cancer fatalities

estimated for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition

PEIS and is slightly lower than the health impact of 5.7 latent cancer

fatalities that DOE estimated for the Consolidation alternative in the

Storage and Disposition PEIS.

Storage Chemical Impacts. There would be no significant impact to

the public or workers from hazardous chemicals due to plutonium storage

operations in Building 105-K. There are no industrial systems or other

operations involved in the plutonium storage operations that would add

to existing Building 105-K chemical impacts.

Waste Management. Modifications to Building 105-K: DOE

estimates that decontamination and removal activities which would make

Building 105-K available for storage operations would generate 750

cubic meters of low level waste, which is less than 1% of the low-level

waste DOE expects to be generated by SRS activities as described in the

No Action alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS. DOE does not

expect to generate any significant quantities of other wastes in order

to modify Building 105-K. No high-level radioactive waste would be

generated.

Storage: DOE estimated that storing plutonium in the APSF, as

described in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition

PEIS, would not generate any of the following radioactive wastes: high-

level, transuranic, mixed transuranic, low-level, mixed low-level or

hazardous (other than minor quantities). DOE estimates that storing

plutonium in Building 105-K would not significantly change the estimate

for the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS.

Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates that declassifying

RFETS plutonium would generate about: 88 m\3\ of transuranic waste; 4

m\3\ of mixed waste; and 44 m\3\ of low-level radioactive waste. No

high-level waste is expected. These additional amounts of waste

represent a small fraction of these types of waste that are generated

at the site by other operations. The site has sufficient capacity to

accommodate this increase in waste volume.

Accidents. Storage: For the Building 105-K design basis

accidents, DOE estimated that the maximum impact to the population

surrounding the SRS could be 0.34 latent cancer fatalities in the

unlikely event that plutonium were released to the 105-K Building as a

result of corrosion of a storage container. This risk is greater than

the risk estimated for storage of plutonium in the Preferred

Alternative and other alternatives of the S&D PEIS; however, the risk

would be comparable to the same type of accident for the storage of

plutonium at SRS in existing storage vaults as analyzed in the

Continuing Storage Alternative for the Storage of Plutonium and Uranium

in the IMNM EIS. (The IMNM accident analysis showed 0.31 latent cancer

fatalities for the population surrounding SRS.) DOE will implement

administrative controls (including scheduled surveillances) to limit

actions or conditions that might lead to a release of radioactive

materials under accident conditions. The risk to the maximally exposed

member of the public and non-involved worker would also be greater than

the risk for storage

[[Page 43391]]

of plutonium estimated in the Preferred Alternative and other

alternatives of the Storage and Disposition PEIS but would be low (less

than 3x10-3 latent cancer fatalities).

For the postulated beyond design basis accidents, DOE estimated

that the maximum impact to the population could be 2.7x10-4

latent cancer fatalities in the event of a vault fire. This risk is

greater than the risk estimated for storage of plutonium in the

Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS, but low. The

risks to the maximally exposed public and the non-involved worker would

also be greater than the risks for the storage of plutonium estimated

in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition PEIS but

would be extremely small (less than 2x10-8 latent cancer

fatalities). DOE estimated that the involved worker may be subject to

injury and, in some cases, fatality as a result of potential beyond

design basis accidents.

Declassification/Repackaging: DOE estimates that for

declassification operation in the FB-Line, the risk to the public would

be 1.2x10-3 latent cancer fatalities, 2.6x10-4

latent cancer fatalities to the maximally exposed off-site individual

and 4.5x10-3 latent cancer fatalities/yr to the non-involved

worker. These risks are slightly greater than the risks for storage of

plutonium estimated in the Upgrade Alternative of the Storage and

Disposition PEIS, but are low. For repackaging operations in the APSF,

the risks are low and similar to the impacts presented for storage of

plutonium in the Preferred Alternative of the Storage and Disposition

PEIS (less than 2x10-4 latent cancer fatalities).

Environmental Justice. For environmental justice impacts

to occur, there must be significant and adverse human health or

environmental impacts that disproportionately affect minority

populations and/or low-income populations. The Supplement Analysis

shows that accomplishing the proposed action would be within regulatory

limits and the impacts would be very low during routine operations.

The same Supplement Analyses also shows that accidents would not

result in a significant risk of adverse human health or environmental

impacts to the population who reside within 80 kilometers of the SRS.

Therefore, such accidents would not have disproportionately high or

adverse risk of impacts on minority or low-income populations.

Based on the analysis in this supplement analysis, no

disproportionate, high or adverse impact would be expected on minority

or low-income populations.

C. Environmentally Preferable Alternative

The environmental analyses in Chapter 4 of the Storage and

Disposition PEIS indicate that the environmentally preferable

alternative (the alternative with the lowest environmental impacts over

the 50 years considered in the PEIS) for storage of weapons-usable

fissile materials would be the Storage and Disposition PEIS Preferred

Alternative, which consists of No Action at Hanford, Idaho National

Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, Los Alamos National

Laboratory, Argonne National Laboratory, and Nevada Test Site (NTS) (no

fissile materials are or would be stored at the NTS) pending

disposition, phaseout of storage at RFETS, and upgrades at the Oak

Ridge Reservation, SRS, and Pantex. The proposed action as modified by

this amended decision is still the environmentally preferred

alternative.

III. Non-Environmental Considerations

A. Economic Analysis

DOE has estimated that accelerating the closure of RFETS from 2010

to 2006 in accordance with the DOE Closure 2006 Rocky Flats Closure

Project Management Plan could save as much as $1.3 billion. Closing

RFETS by 2006 would require the removal of non-pit, surplus weapons-

usable plutonium metal and oxide from RFETS by 2002. The early removal

of the RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium supports the

early deactivation, decontamination, and decommissioning of the RFETS

plutonium storage and packaging facilities.

DOE also expects that the transfer of non-pit, surplus weapons-

usable plutonium from Hanford to the SRS, could save as much as $150

million in upgrade and operating costs for plutonium storage facilities

at the Hanford Site. As with the RFETS plutonium, the transfer would

not be accomplished unless DOE decided to locate the plutonium

immobilization disposition facility at the SRS.

The implementation cost for the proposed action is estimated to be

approximately $93 million.

B. Nonproliferation

From a nonproliferation standpoint, the highest standards for

safeguards and security will be employed during transportation and

storage. There is no change in this regard from the original PEIS ROD.

IV. Amended Decision

Consistent with the Preferred Alternative in the Storage and

Disposition PEIS, and the Supplement Analysis, Storing Plutonium in the

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility and Building 105-K at the

Savannah River Site (July 1998), the Department has decided to reduce,

over time, the number of locations where the various forms of plutonium

are stored, through a combination of storage alternatives in

conjunction with a combination of disposition alternatives.

The Department has decided to modify those aspects of the Storage

and Disposition ROD (62 FR 3014) concerning the storage of weapons-

usable plutonium at RFETS and Hanford, pending disposition. Other

aspects of the Storage and Disposition ROD remain unaltered. DOE has

decided to:

Modify an existing building (105-K) at SRS to allow the

receipt and storage of RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium.

If the Department decides to select SRS as the immobilization site

in the SPD EIS ROD, then the Department will:

Ship all RFETS non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium

(about 7 MT) to SRS beginning in about 2000 through about 2002;

Store RFETS non-classified plutonium metal and/or parts in

shipping containers in Building 105-K at SRS beginning in about 2000;

For RFETS classified surplus metal and/or parts,

declassify the material in the FB-Line facility and repackage the

material in the APSF (after construction of the APSF in about 2001). In

the FB-Line, the plutonium will be melted using existing facilities and

equipment that are part of the plutonium metal production process for

which FB-Line was designed;

Store the declassified material in Building 105-K in

shipping containers or the APSF vault if space is available;

Ship all Hanford non-pit, surplus weapons-usable plutonium

(approximately 4.6 metric tons) from about 2002 through 2005 and store

this material in the APSF;

Before shipment, all plutonium transported from RFETS

(except for the classified metal and/or parts) and Hanford will be

stabilized 9 and packaged in accordance with DOE Standard-

3013-96, Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides for

long-term storage. All shipments of plutonium, including the classified

metal and parts, will be by SST in

[[Page 43392]]

accordance with applicable DOE, U.S. Department of Transportation and

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission requirements and regulations.

Plutonium will be packaged in certified Type B accident resistant

packages for transport; and

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\9\ Hanford plutonium fuel that is stable would not need to be

stabilized.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

The RFETS and Hanford Material stored at SRS may be moved

between Building 105-K and the APSF to allow for operational

flexibility.

Some of the surplus plutonium at RFETS and Hanford, approximately 1

metric ton at each site, is currently under International Atomic Energy

Agency (IAEA) safeguards as a component of the United States

nonproliferation policy to remove weapons-usable fissile materials from

use for defense purposes. DOE has designed the APSF for IAEA safeguards

and intends that plutonium stored in the APSF will be available for

IAEA safeguards. Surplus plutonium under IAEA safeguards at RFETS and

Hanford that may be shipped to the SRS, will remain available for IAEA

safeguards in the APSF. Since plutonium that may be stored in Building

105-K will remain in shipping containers and not be accessible for full

IAEA safeguards controls (e.g., physical sampling, destructive

analyses), DOE is considering, with the IAEA, the application of IAEA

verification controls to ensure the plutonium stored in Building 105-K

is not diverted for defense purposes. In addition, DOE intends, as

indicated in the Storage and Disposition ROD, that DOE's program for

surplus plutonium disposition will include IAEA verification as

appropriate.

If the DOE decides to pursue the No Action alternative for the

disposition of surplus plutonium, the SRS, RFETS, and Hanford materials

would remain in storage at their current sites in accordance with the

No Action alternative in the Storage and Disposition PEIS ROD. If the

DOE decides to immobilize surplus plutonium at Hanford, the SRS and

RFETS materials would be shipped to Hanford in accordance with the

decisions reached in the SPD EIS ROD.

V. Conclusion

Under the previous ROD, a maximum of 10 metric tons of surplus

plutonium, including plutonium from RFETS and existing onsite

plutonium, would be stored at SRS in the APSF, pending disposition,

provided that SRS is selected as the immobilization site following

completion of the SPD EIS. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS

would begin when the APSF is completed in 2001.

With this amended ROD, a total of approximately 11.6 metric tons of

surplus plutonium from both Hanford and RFETS (in addition to existing

onsite SRS surplus plutonium, for a total of approximately 14 metric

tons of surplus plutonium) would be stored at SRS in the APSF and

Building 105-K, pending disposition, provided SRS is selected as the

immobilization site. Transfer of plutonium from RFETS to SRS would

begin when the modifications to Building 105-K are completed, i.e., in

about 2000; shipments of plutonium from Hanford to SRS would begin in

about 2002.

DOE has decided to implement a revised program to provide for safe

and secure storage of weapons-usable fissile materials. DOE will

prepare to advance the consolidation of the storage of weapons-usable

plutonium by modifying existing facilities at the SRS in South

Carolina, and phasing out surplus plutonium storage at RFETS in

Colorado and Hanford in Washington. Consistent with the Storage and

Disposition PEIS ROD, this Amended ROD supports the Department's

objectives to phase out the storage of all weapons-usable plutonium at

the RFETS and Hanford as soon as possible and to reduce the number of

sites where surplus weapons-usable plutonium is stored.

The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the

requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C.

4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations in 40 CFR Parts 1500-

1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.

Issued in Washington, D.C., August 6, 1998.

Laura S. H. Holgate,

Director, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition.

[FR Doc. 98-21744 Filed 8-12-98; 8:45 am]

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