Personnel Security Policies for Granting Access to Classified Information

Federal RegisterJan 30, 1998

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE

Office of the Secretary

32 CFR Part 147

RIN 0790-AG54

Personnel Security Policies for Granting Access to Classified

Information

AGENCY: Department of Defense.

ACTION: Interim final rule.

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SUMMARY: This rule is published to streamline security practices

throughout the government, uniform adjudicative guidelines,

investigative standards and guidelines for temporary access are being

established. This initiative will simplify security processing and

allow the deserving public to obtain a security clearance in a faster,

more efficient manner.

DATES: This rule is effective March 24, 1997. Comments must be received

by March 31, 1998.

ADDRESSES: Forward comments to the Security Policy Board Staff, 1215

Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1101, Arlington, VA 22202.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Mr. T. Thompson, 703-602-9969.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Executive Order 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review

It has been determined that this interim rule (32 CFR part 147) is

not a significant regulatory action. The rule does not:

(1) Have an annual effect to the economy of $100 million or more or

adversely affect in a material way the economy; a section of the

economy; productivity; competition; jobs; the environment; public

health or safety; or State, local, or tribal governments or

communities;

(2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an

action taken or planned by another Agency;

(3) Materially alter the budgetary impact of entitlements, grants,

user fees, or loan programs, or the rights and obligations of

recipients thereof; or

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(4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal

mandates, the President's priorities, or the principles set forth in

this Executive Order.

Public Law 96-354, Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601)

It has been certified that this rule is not subject to the

Regulatory Flexibility Act (5 U.S.C. 601) because it would not, if

promulgated, have a significant economic impact on a substantial number

of small entities. This part will streamline personnel security

clearance procedures and make the process more efficient.

Public Law 96-511, Paperwork Reduction Act (44 U.S.C. Chapter 35)

It has been certified that this part does not impose any reporting

or recordkeeping requirements under the Paperwork Reduction Act of

1995.

List of Subjects in 32 CFR Part 147

Classified information, Investigations, Security measures.

Accordingly, Title 32 of the Code of Federal Regulations, Chapter

I, subchapter C is amended to add part 147 to read as follows:

PART 147--ADJUDICATIVE GUIDELINES FOR DETERMINING ELIGIBILITY FOR

ACCESS TO CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

Subpart A--Adjudicative Guidelines

Sec.

147.1 Introduction.

147.2 Adjudicative process.

147.3 Guideline A--Allegiance to the United States.

147.4 Guideline B--Foreign influence.

147.5 Guideline C--Foreign preference.

147.6 Guideline D--Sexual behavior.

147.7 Guideline E--Personal conduct.

147.8 Guideline F--Financial considerations.

147.9 Guideline G--Alcohol consumption.

147.10 Guideline H--Drug involvement.

147.11 Guideline I--Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.

147.12 Guideline J--Criminal conduct.

147.13 Guideline K--Security violations.

147.14 Guideline L--Outside activities.

147.15 Guideline M--Misuse of information technology systems.

Subpart B--Investigative Standards

147.18 Introduction.

147.19 The three standards.

147.20 Exception to periods of coverage.

147.21 Expanding investigations.

147.22 Transferability.

147.23 Breaks in service.

147.24 The national agency check.

Subpart C--Guidelines for Temporary Access

147.28 Introduction.

147.29 Temporary eligibility for access.

147.30 Temporary eligibility for access at the CONFIDENTIAL AND

SECRET levels and temporary eligibility for ``L'' access

authorization.

147.31 Temporary eligibility for access at the TOP SECRET levels

and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization. For

someone who is the subject of a favorable investigation not meeting

the investigative standards for access at those levels.

147.32 Temporary eligibility for access at the TOP SECRET and SCI

levels and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization: For

someone who is not the subject of a current, favorable personnel or

personnel-security investigation of any kind.

147.33 Additional requirements by agencies.

Authority: E.O. 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p 391).

Subpart A--Adjudication

Sec. 147.1 Introduction.

The following adjudicative guidelines are established for all

United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants,

contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders

or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require

access to classified information. They apply to persons being

considered for initial or continued eligibility for access to

classified information, to include sensitive compartmented information

and special access programs and are to be used by government

departments and agencies in all final clearance determinations.

Sec. 147.2 Adjudicative process.

(a) The adjudicative process is an examination of a sufficient

period of a person's life to make an affirmative determination that the

person is eligible for a security clearance. Eligibility for access to

classified information is predicated upon the individual meeting these

personnel security guidelines. The adjudicative process is the careful

weighing of a number of variables known as the whole person concept.

Available, reliable information about the person, past and present,

favorable and unfavorable, should be considered in reaching a

determination. In evaluating the relevance of an individual's conduct,

the adjudicator should consider the following actors:

(1) The nature, extent, and seriousness of the conduct;

(2) The circumstances surrounding the conduct, to include

knowledgeable participation;

(3) The frequency and recency of the conduct;

(4) The individual's age and maturity at the time of the conduct;

(5) The voluntariness of participation;

(6) The presence or absence of rehabilitation and other pertinent

behavioral changes;

(7) The motivation for the conduct;

(8) The potential for pressure, coercion, exploitation, or duress;

(9) The likelihood of continuation of recurrence.

(b) Each case must be judged on its own merits, and final

determination remains the responsibility of the specific department or

agency. Any doubt as to whether access to classified information is

clearly consistent with national security will be resolved in favor of

the national security.

continuing of eligibility for a security clearance is clearly

consistent with the interests of national security must be an overall

common sense determination based upon careful consideration of the

following, each of which is to be evaluated in the context of the whole

person, as explained further below:

(1) Guideline A: Allegiance to the United States.

(2) Guideline B: Foreign influence.

(3) Guideline C: Foreign preference.

(4) Guideline D: Sexual behavior.

(5) Guideline E: Personal conduct.

(6) Guideline F: Financial considerations.

(7) Guideline G: Alcohol consumption.

(8) Guideline H: Drug involvement.

(9) Guideline I: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders.

(10) Guideline J: Criminal conduct.

(11) Guideline K: Security violations.

(12) Guideline L: Outside activities.

(13) Guideline M: Misuse of Information Technology Systems.

(d) Although adverse information concerning a single criterion may

not be sufficient for an unfavorable determination, the individual may

be disqualified if available information reflects a recent or recurring

pattern of questionable judgment, irresponsibility, or emotionally

unstable behavior. Notwithstanding, the whole person concept, pursuit

of further investigations may be terminated by an appropriate

adjudicative agency in the face of reliable, significant,

disqualifying, adverse information.

(e) When information of security concern becomes known about an

individual who is currently eligible for access to classified

information, the adjudicator should consider whether the person:

(1) Voluntarily reported the information;

(2) Was truthful and complete in responding to questions;

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(3) Sought assistance and followed professional guidance, where

appropriate;

(4) Resolved or appears likely to favorably resolve the security

concern;

(5) Has demonstrated positive changes in behavior and employment;

(6) Should have his or her access temporarily suspended pending

final adjudication of the information.

(f) If after evaluating information of security concern, the

adjudicator decides that the information is not serious enough to

warrant a recommendation of disapproval or revocation of the security

clearance, it may be appropriate to recommend approval with a warning

that future incidents of a similar nature may result in revocation of

access.

Sec. 147.3 Guideline A--Allegiance to the United States.

(a) The concern. An individual must be of unquestioned allegiance

to the United States. The willingness to safeguard classified

information is in doubt if there is any reason to suspect an

individual's allegiance to the Untied States.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Involvement in any act of sabotage,

espionage, treason, terrorism, sedition, or other act whose aim is to

overthrow the Government of the United States or alter the form of

government by unconstitutional means;

(2) Association or sympathy with persons who are attempting to

commit, or who are committing, any of the above acts;

(3) Association or sympathy with persons or organizations that

advocate the overthrow of the United States Government, or any state or

subdivision, by force or violence or by other unconstitutional means;

(4) Involvement in activities which unlawfully advocate or practice

the commission of acts of force or violence to prevent others from

exercising their rights under the Constitution or laws of the United

States or of any state.

The individual was unaware of the unlawful aims of the individual or

organization and severed ties upon learning of these;

(2) The individual's involvement was only with the lawful or

humanitarian aspects of such an organization;

(3) Involvement in the above activities occurred for only a short

period of time and was attributable to curiosity or academic interest;

(4) The person has had no recent involvement or association with

such activities.

Sec. 147.4 Guideline B--Foreign influence.

(a) The concern. A security risk may exist when an individual's

immediate family, including cohabitants and other persons to whom he or

she may be bound by affection, influence, or obligation are not

citizens of the Untied States or may be subject to duress. These

situations could create the potential for foreign influence that could

result in the compromise of classified information. Contacts with

citizens of other countries or financial interests in other countries

are also relevant to security determinations if they make an individual

potentially vulnerable to coercion, exploitation, or pressure.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) An immediate family member, or a person to

whom the individual has close ties of affection or obligation, is a

citizen of, or resident or present in, a foreign country;

(2) Sharing living quarters with a person or persons, regardless of

their citizenship status, if the potential for adverse foreign

influence or duress exists;

(3) Relatives, cohabitants, or associates who are connected with

any foreign government;

(4) Failing to report, where required, associations with foreign

nationals;

(5) Unauthorized association with a suspected or known collaborator

or employee of a foreign intelligence service;

(6) Conduct which may make the individual vulnerable to coercion,

exploitation, or pressure by a foreign government;

(7) Indications that representatives or nationals from a foreign

country are acting to increase the vulnerability of the individual to

possible future exploitation, coercion or pressure;

(8) A substantial financial interest in a country, or in any

foreign owned or operated business that could make the individual

vulnerable to foreign influence.

determination that the immediate family member(s) (spouse, father,

mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters), cohabitant, or

associate(s) in question are not agents of a foreign power or in a

position to be exploited by a foreign power in a way that could force

the individual to choose between loyalty to the person(s) involved and

the United States;

(2) Contacts with foreign citizens are the result of official

United States Government business;

(3) Contact and correspondence with foreign citizens are casual and

infrequent;

(4) The individual has promptly complied with existing agency

requirements regarding the reporting of contacts, requests, or threats

from persons or organizations from a foreign country;

(5) Foreign financial interests are minimal and not sufficient to

affect the individual's security responsibilities.

Sec. 147.5 Guideline C--Foreign preference.

(a) The concern. When an individual acts in such a way as to

indicate a preference for a foreign country over the United States,

then he or she may be prone to provide information or make decisions

that are harmful to the interests of the United States.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include:

(1) The exercise of dual citizenship;

(2) Possession and/or use of a foreign passport;

(3) Military service or a willingness to bear arms for a foreign

country;

(4) Accepting educational, medical, or other benefits, such as

retirement and social welfare, from a foreign country;

(5) Residence in a foreign country to meet citizenship

requirements;

(6) Using foreign citizenship to protect financial or business

interests in another country;

(7) Seeking or holding political office in the foreign country;

(8) Voting in foreign elections;

(9) Performing or attempting to perform duties, or otherwise

acting, so as to serve the interests of another government in

preference to the interests of the United States.

Dual citizenship is based solely on parents' citizenship or birth in a

foreign country;

(2) Indicators of possible foreign preference (e.g., foreign

military service) occurred before obtaining United States citizenship;

(3) Activity is sanctioned by the United States;

(4) Individual has expressed a willingness to renounce dual

citizenship.

Sec. 147.6 Guidance D--Sexual behavior.

(a) The concern. Sexual behavior is a security concern if it

involves a criminal offense, indicates a personality or emotional

disorder, may subject the individual to coercion, exploitation, or

duress, or reflects lack of judgment or discretion.\1\ Sexual

orientation or

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preference may not be used as a basis for or a disqualifying factor in

determining a person's eligibility for a security clearance.

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\1\ The adjudicator should also consider guidelines pertaining

to criminal conduct (Guideline J) and emotional, mental and

personality disorders (Guideline I) in determining how to resolve

the security concerns raised by sexual behavior.

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(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Sexual behavior of a criminal nature,

whether or not the individual has been prosecuted;

(2) Compulsive or addictive sexual behavior when the person is

unable to stop a pattern or self-destructive or high-risk behavior or

that which is symptomatic of a personally disorder;

(3) Sexual behavior that causes an individual to be vulnerable to

coercion, exploitation, or duress;

(4) Sexual behavior of a public nature and/or that which reflects

lack of discretion or judgment.

The behavior occurred during or prior to adolescence and there is no

evidence of subsequent conduct of a similar nature;

(2) The behavior was not recent and there is no evidence of

subsequent conduct of a similar nature;

(3) There is no other evidence of questionable judgment,

irresponsibility, or emotional instability;

(4) The behavior no longer serves as a basis for coercion,

exploitation, or duress.

Sec. 147.7 Guideline E--Personal conduct.

(a) The concern. Conduct involving questionable judgment,

untrustworthiness, unreliability, lack of candor, dishonesty, or

unwillingness to comply with rules and regulations could indicate that

the person may not properly safeguard classified information. The

following will normally result in an unfavorable clearance action or

administrative termination of further processing for clearance

eligibility:

(1) Refusal to undergo or cooperate with required security

processing, including medical and psychological testing;

(2) Refusal to complete required security forms, releases, or

provide full, frank and truthful answers to lawful questions of

investigators, security officials or other representatives in

connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying also include: (1) Reliable, unfavorable information

provided by associates, employers, coworkers, neighbors, and other

acquaintances;

(2) The deliberate omission, concealment, or falsification of

relevant and material facts from any personnel security questionnaire,

personal history statement, or similar form used to conduct

investigations, determine employment qualifications, award benefits or

status, determine security clearance eligibility or trustworthiness, or

award fiduciary responsibilities;

(3) Deliberately providing false or misleading information

concerning relevant and material matters to an investigator, security

official, competent medical authority, or other representative in

connection with a personnel security or trustworthiness determination;

(4) Personal conduct or concealment of information that may

increase an individual's vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or

duties, such as engaging in activities which, if known, may affect the

person's personal, professional, or community standing or render the

person susceptible to blackmail;

(5) A pattern of dishonesty or rule violations, including violation

of any written or recorded agreement made between the individual and

the agency;

(6) Association with persons involved in criminal activity.

The information was unsubstantiated or not pertinent to a determination

of judgment, trustworthiness, or reliability;

(2) The falsification was an isolated incident, was not recent, and

the individual has subsequently provided correct information

voluntarily;

(3) The individual made prompt, good faith efforts to correct the

falsification before being confronted with the facts;

(4) Omission of material facts was caused or significantly

contributed to by improper or inadequate advice of authorized

personnel, and the previously omitted information was promptly and

fully provided;

(5) The individual has taken positive steps to significantly reduce

or eliminate vulnerability to coercion, exploitation, or duress;

(6) A refusal to cooperate was based on advice from legal counsel

or other officials that the individual was not required to comply with

security processing requirements and, upon being made aware of the

requirement, fully and truthfully provided the requested information;

(7) Association with persons involved in criminal activities has

ceased.

Sec. 147.8 Guideline F--Financial considerations.

(a) The concern. An individual who is financially overextended is

at risk of having to engage in illegal acts to generate funds.

Unexplained affluence is often linked to proceeds from financially

profitable criminal acts.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) A history of not meeting financial

obligations;

(2) Deceptive or illegal financial practices such as embezzlement,

employee theft, check fraud, income tax evasion, expense account fraud,

filing deceptive loan statements, and other intentional financial

breaches of trust;

(3) Inability or unwillingness to satisfy debts;

(4) Unexplained affluence;

(5) Financial problems that are linked to gambling, drug abuse,

alcoholism, or other issues of security concern.

The behavior was not recent;

(2) It was an isolated incident;

(3) The conditions that resulted in the behavior were largely

beyond the person's control (e.g., loss of employment, a business

downtrun, unexpected medical emergency, or a death, divorce or

separation);

(4) The person has received or is receiving counseling for the

problem and there are clear indications that the problem is being

resolved or is under control;

(5) The affluence resulted from a legal source;

(6) The individual initiated a good-faith effort to repay overdue

creditors or otherwise resolve debts.

Sec. 147.9 Guideline G--Alcohol consumption.

(a) The concern. Excessive alcohol consumption often leads to the

exercise of questionable judgment, unreliability, failure to control

impulses, and increases the risk of unauthorized disclosure of

classified information due to carelessness.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Alcohol-related incidents away from work,

such as driving while under the influence, fighting, child or spouse

abuse, or other criminal incidents related to alcohol use;

(2) Alcohol-related incidents at work, such as reporting for work

or duty in an intoxicated or impaired condition, or drinking on the

job;

(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g.,

physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of alcohol abuse or

alcohol dependence;

(4) Evaluation of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence by a licensed

clinical social worker who is a staff

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member of a recognized alcohol treatment program;

(5) Habitual or binge consumption of alcohol to the point of

impaired judgment;

(6) Consumption of alcohol, subsequent to a diagnosis of alcoholism

by a credentialed medical professional and following completion of an

alcohol rehabilitation program.

The alcohol related incidents do not indicate a pattern;

(2) The problem occurred a number of years ago and there is no

indication of a recent problem;

(3) Positive changes in behavior supportive of sobriety;

(4) Following diagnosis of alcohol abuse or alcohol dependence, the

individual has successfully completed impatient or outpatient

rehabilitation along with aftercare requirements, participates

frequently in meetings of Alcoholics Anonymous or a similar

organization, has abstained from alcohol for a period of at least 12

months, and received a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical

professional or a licensed clinical social worker who is a staff member

of a recognized alcohol treatment program.

Sec. 174.10 Guideline H--Drug involvement.

(a) The concern. (1) Improper or illegal involvement with drugs

raises questions regarding an individual's willingness or ability to

protect classified information. Drug abuse or dependence may impair

social or occupational functioning, increasing the risk of an

unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

(2) Drugs are defined as mood and behavior altering substances, and

include:

(i) Drugs, materials, and other chemical compounds identified and

listed in the Controlled Substances Act of 1970, as amended (e.g.,

marijuana or cannabis, depressants, narcotics, stimulants, and

hallucinogens),

(ii) Inhalants and other similar substances.

(3) Drug abuse is the illegal use of a drug or use of a legal drug

in a manner that deviates from approved medical direction.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Any drug abuse (see above definition);

(2) Illegal drug possession, including cultivation, processing,

manufacture, purchase, sale, or distribution;

(3) Diagnosis by a credentialed medical professional (e.g.,

physician, clinical psychologist, or psychiatrist) of drug abuse or

drug dependence;

(4) Evaluation of drug abuse or drug dependence by a licensed

clinical social worker who is a staff member of a recognized drug

treatment program;

(5) Failure to successfully complete a drug treatment program

prescribed by a credentialed medical professional. Recent drug

involvement, especially following the granting of a security clearance,

or an expressed intent not to discontinue use, will almost invariably

result in an unfavorable determination.

The drug involvement was not recent;

(2) The drug involvement was an isolated or aberration event;

(3) A demonstrated intent not to abuse any drugs in the future;

(4) Satisfactory completion of a prescribed drug treatment program,

including rehabilitation and aftercare requirements, without recurrence

of abuse, and a favorable prognosis by a credentialed medical

professional.

Sec. 147.11 Guideline I--Emotional, mental, and personality

disorders.

(a) The concern: Emotional, mental, and personality disorders can

cause a significant deficit in an individual's psychological, social

and occupation functioning. These disorders are of security concern

because they may indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or

stability. A credentialed mental health professional (e.g., clinical

psychologist or psychiatrist), employed by, acceptable to or approved

by the government, should be utilized in evaluating potentially

disqualifying and mitigating information fully and properly, and

particularly for consultation with the individual's mental health care

provider.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) An opinion by a credentialed mental health

professional that the individual has a condition or treatment that may

indicate a defect in judgment, reliability, or stability;

(2) Information that suggests that an individual has failed to

follow appropriate medical advice relating to treatment of a condition,

e.g., failure to take prescribed medication;

(3) A pattern of high-risk, irresponsible, aggressive, anti-social

or emotionally unstable behavior;

(4) Information that suggests that the individual's current

behavior indicates a defect in his or her judgment or reliability.

There is no indication of a current problem;

(2) Recent opinion by a credentialed mental health professional

that an individual's previous emotional, mental, or personality

disorder is cured, under control or in remission and has a low

probability of recurrence or exacerbation;

(3) The past emotional instability was a temporary condition (e.g.,

one caused by a death, illness, or marital breakup), the situation has

been resolved, and the individual is no longer emotionally unstable.

Sec. 147.12 Guideline J--Criminal conduct.

(a) The concern. A history or pattern of criminal activity creates

doubt about a person's judgment, reliability and trustworthiness.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Allegations or admissions of criminal

conduct, regardless of whether the person was formally charged;

(2) A single serious crime or multiple lesser offenses.

The criminal behavior was not recent;

(2) The crime was an isolated incident;

(3) The person was pressured or coerced into committing the act and

those pressures are no longer present in that person's life;

(4) The person did not voluntarily commit the act and/or the

factors leading to the violation are not likely to recur;

(5) Acquittal;

(6) There is clear evidence of successful rehabilitation.

Sec. 147.13 Guideline K--Security violations.

(a) The concern. Noncompliance with security regulations raises

doubt about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness, and ability

to safeguard classified information.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include. (1) Unauthorized disclosure of classified

information;

(2) Violations that are deliberate or multiple or due to

negligence.

actions that: (1) Were inadvertent;

(2) Were isolated or infrequent;

(3) Were due to improper or inadequate training;

(4) Demonstrate a positive attitude towards the discharge of

security responsibilities.

Sec. 147.14 Guideline L--Outside activities.

(a) The concern. Involvement in certain types of outside employment

or activities is of security concern if it poses a conflict with an

individual's

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security responsibilities and could create an increased risk of

unauthorized disclosure of classified information.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include any service, whether compensated, volunteer, or

employment with: (1) A foreign country;

(2) Any foreign national;

(3) A representative of any foreign interest;

(4) Any foreign, domestic, or international organization or person

engaged in analysis, discussion, or publication of material on

intelligence, defense, foreign affairs, or protected technology.

Evaluation of the outside employment or activity indicates that it does

not pose a conflict with an individual's security responsibilities;

(2) The individual terminates the employment or discontinues the

activity upon being notified that it is in conflict with his or her

security responsibilities.

Sec. 147.15 Guideline M--Misuse of Information technology systems.

(a) The concern. Noncompliance with rules, procedures, guidelines,

or regulations pertaining to information technology systems may raise

security concerns about an individual's trustworthiness, willingness,

and ability to properly protect classified systems, networks, and

information. Information Technology Systems include all related

equipment used for the communication, transmission, processing,

manipulation, and storage of classified or sensitive information.

(b) Conditions that could raise a security concern and may be

disqualifying include: (1) Illegal or unauthorized entry into any

information technology system;

(2) Illegal or unauthorized modification, destruction, manipulation

or denial of access to information residing on an information

technology system;

(3) Removal (or use) of hardware, software, or media from any

information technology system without authorization, when specifically

prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations;

(4) Introduction of hardware, software, or media into any

information technology system without authorization, when specifically

prohibited by rules, procedures, guidelines or regulations.

The misuse was not recent or significant;

(2) The conduct was unintentional or inadvertent;

(3) The introduction or removal of media was authorized;

(4) The misuse was an isolated event;

(5) The misuse was followed by a prompt, good faith effort to

correct the situation.

Subpart B--Investigative Standards

Sec. 147.18 Introduction.

The following investigative standards are established for all

United States Government civilian and military personnel, consultants,

contractors, employees of contractors, licensees, certificate holders

or grantees and their employees and other individuals who require

access to classified information, to include Sensitive Compartmented

Information and Special Access Programs, and are to be used by

government departments and agencies as the investigative basis for

final clearance determinations. However, nothing in these standards

prohibits an agency from using any lawful investigative procedures in

addition to these requirements in order to resolve any issue identified

in the course of a background investigation or reinvestigation.

Sec. 147.19 The three standards.

There are three standards (Attachment D to this subpart part

summarizes when to use each one):

(a) The investigation and reinvestigation standards for ``L''

access authorizations and for access to confidential and secret

(including all secret-level Special Access Programs not specifically

approved for enhanced investigative requirements by an official

authorized to establish Special Access Programs by section in 4.4 of

Executive Order 12958) (60 FR 19825, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 33);

(b) The investigation standard for``Q'' access authorizations and

for access to top secret (including top secret Special Access Programs)

and Sensitive Compartmented Information;

listed in paragraph (b) of this section.

Sec. 147.20 Exception to periods of coverage.

Some elements of standards specify a period of coverage (e.g. seven

years). Where appropriate, such coverage may be shortened to the period

from the subject's eighteenth birthday to the present or to two years,

whichever is longer.

Sec. 147.21 Expanding investigations.

Investigations and reinvestigations may be expanded under the

provisions of Executive Order 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p.

391) and other applicable statutes and Executive Orders.

Sec. 147.22 Transferability.

Investigations that satisfy the requirements of a given standard

and are current meet the investigative requirements for all levels

specified for the standard. They shall be mutually and reciprocally

accepted by all agencies.

Sec. 147.23 Breaks in service.

If a person who requires access has been retired or separated from

U.S. government employment for less than two years and is the subject

of an investigation that is otherwise current, the agency regranting

the access will, as a minimum, review an updated Standard Form 86 and

applicable records. A reinvestigation is not required unless the review

indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive

Order 12968 (60 FR 40245, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 391); (Attachment D to

this subpart, Table 2).

Sec. 147.24 The national agency check.

The National Agency Check is a part of all investigations and

reinvestigations. It consists of a review of;

(a) Investigative and criminal history files of the FBI, including

a technical fingerprint search;

(b) OPM's Security/Suitability Investigations Index;

(d) Such other national agencies (e.g., CIA, INS) as appropriate to

the individual's background.

Attachment A to Subpart B--Standard A--National Agency Check With Local

Agency Checks and Credit Check (NACLC)

(a) Applicability. Standard A applies to investigations and

reinvestigations for;

(1) Access to CONFIDENTIAL and SECRET (including all SECRET-

level Special Access Programs not specifically approved for enhanced

investigative requirements by an official authorized to establish

Special Access Programs by sect. 4.4 of Executive Order 12958) (60

FR 19825, 3 CFR 1995 Comp., p. 333);

(2) ``L'' access authorizations.

(b) For Reinvestigation: When to Reinvestigate. The

reinvestigation may be initiated at any time following completion

of, but not later than ten years (fifteen years for CONFIDENTIAL)

from the date of, the previous investigation or reinvestigation.

(Attachment D to this subpart, Table 2, reflects the specific

requirements for when to request a reinvestigation, including when

there has been a break in service.)

as follows:

[[Page 4578]]

(1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86,

including applicable releases and supporting documentation.

(2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency

Check.

(3) Financial Review: Verification of the subject's financial

status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where

the subject has resided, been employed, or attended school for six

months or more for the past seven years.

(4) Date and Place of Birth: Corroboration of date and place of

birth through a check of appropriate documentation, if not completed

in any previous investigation; a check of Bureau of Vital Statistics

records when any discrepancy is found to exist.

(5) Local Agency Checks: As a minimum, all investigations will

include checks of law enforcement agencies having jurisdiction where

the subject has lived, worked, and/or attended school within the

last five years, and, if applicable, of the appropriate agency for

any identified arrests.

(d) Expanding the Investigation: The investigation may be

expanded if necessary to determine if access is clearly consistent

with the national security.

Attachment B to Subpart B--Standard B--Single Scope Background

Investigation (SSBI)

(a) Applicability. Standard B applies to initial investigations

for;

(1) Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access

Programs) and Sensitive Compartment Information;

(2) ``Q'' access authorizations.

(b) Investigative Requirements. Investigative requirements are

as follows:

(1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86,

including applicable releases and supporting documentation.

(2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency

Check.

(3) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if

applicable): Completion of a National Agency Check, without

fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant.

(4) Date and Place of Birth: Corroboration of date and place of

birth through a check of appropriate documentation; a check of

Bureau of Vital Statistics records when any discrepancy is found to

exist.

(5) Citizenship: For individuals born outside the United States,

verification of US citizenship directly from the appropriate

registration authority; verification of US citizenship or legal

status of foreign-born immediate family members (spouse, cohabitant,

father, mother, sons, daughters, brothers, sisters).

(6) Education: Corroboration of most recent or most significant

claimed attendance, degree, or diploma. Interviews of appropriate

educational sources if education is a primary activity of the

subject during the most recent three years.

(7) Employment: Verification of all employments for the past

seven years; personal interviews of sources (supervisors, coworkers,

or both) for each employment of six months or more; corroboration

through records or sources of all periods of unemployment exceeding

sixty days; verification of all prior federal and military service,

including discharge type. For military members, all service within

one branch of the armed forces will be considered as one employment,

regardless of assignments.

(8) References: Four references, of whom at least two are

developed; to the extent practicable, all should have social

knowledge of the subject and collectively span at least the last

seven years.

(9) Former Spouse: An interview of any former spouse divorced

within the last ten years.

(10) Neighborhoods: Confirmation of all residences for the last

three years through appropriate interviews with neighbors and

through records reviews.

(11) Financial Review: Verification of the subject's financial

status, including credit bureau checks covering all locations where

subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended school for six

months or more for the last seven years.

(12) Local Agency Checks: A check of appropriate criminal

history records covering all locations where, for the last ten

years, the subject has resided, been employed, and/or attended

school for six months or more, including current residence

regardless of duration.

Note: If no residence, employment, or education exceeds six

months, local agency checks should be performed as deemed

appropriate.

(13) Public Records: Verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and

other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the

subject.

(14) Subject Interview: A subject interview, conducted by

trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel.

During the investigation, additional subject interviews may be

conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant

inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations

may be taken whenever appropriate.

(15) Polygraph (only in agencies with approved personnel

security polygraph programs): In departments or agencies with

policies sanctioning the use of the polygraph for personnel security

purposes, the investigation may include a polygraph examination,

conducted by a qualified polygraph examiner.

expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able

to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not

limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists,

other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may

be conducted.

Attachment C to Subpart B--Standard C--Single Scope Background

Investigation Periodic Reinvestigation (SSBI-PR)

(a) Applicability. Standard C applies to reinvestigation for;

(1) Access to TOP SECRET (including TOP SECRET Special Access

Programs) and Sensitive Compartmented Information;

(2) ``Q'' access authorizations.

(b) When to Reinvestigate. The reinvestigation may be initiated

at any time following completion of, but not later than five years

from the date of, the previous investigation (see Attachment D to

this subpart, Table 2).

are as follows:

(1) Completion of Forms: Completion of Standard Form 86,

including applicable releases and supporting documentation.

(2) National Agency Check: Completion of a National Agency Check

(fingerprint cards are required only if there has not been a

previous valid technical check of the FBI).

(3) National Agency Check for the Spouse or Cohabitant (if

applicable): Completion of a National Agency Check, without

fingerprint cards, for the spouse or cohabitant. The National Agency

Check for the spouse or cohabitant is not required if already

completed in conjunction with a previous investigation or

reinvestigation.

(4) Employment: Verification of all employments since the last

investigation. Attempts to interview a sufficient number of sources

(supervisors, coworkers, or both) at all employments of six months

or more. For military members, all services within one branch of the

armed forces will be considered as one employment, regardless of

assignments.

(5) References: Interviews with two character references who are

knowledgeable of the subject; at least one will be a developed

reference. To the extent practical, both should have social

knowledge of the subject and collectively span the entire period of

the reinvestigation. As appropriate, additional interviews may be

conducted, including with cohabitants and relatives.

(6) Neighborhoods: Interviews of two neighbors in the vicinity

of the subject's most recent residence of six months or more.

Confirmation of current residence regardless of length.

(7) Financial Review:--Financial Status: Verification of the

subject's financial status, including credit bureau checks covering

all locations where subject has resided, been employed, and/or

attended school for six months or more for the period covered by the

reinvestigation;

(ii) Check of Treasury's Financial Data Base: Agencies may

request the Department of the Treasury, under terms and conditions

prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury, to search automated

data bases consisting of reports of currency transactions by

financial institutions, international transportation of currency or

monetary instruments, foreign bank and financial accounts, and

transactions under $10,000 that are reported as possible money

laundering violations.

(8) Local Agency Checks: A check of appropriate criminal history

records covering all locations where, during the period covered by

the reinvestigation, the subject has resided, been employed, and/or

attended school for six months or more, including current residence

regardless of duration. (Note: If no residence, employment, or

education exceeds six months, local agency checks should be

performed as deemed appropriate.)

(9) Former Spouse: An interview with any former spouse unless

the divorce took place before the date of the last investigation or

reinvestigation.

[[Page 4579]]

(10) Public Records: Verification of divorces, bankruptcies, and

other court actions, whether civil or criminal, involving the

subject since the date of the last investigation.

(11) Subject Interview: A subject interview, conducted by

trained security, investigative, or counterintelligence personnel.

During the reinvestigation, additional subject interviews may be

conducted to collect relevant information, to resolve significant

inconsistencies, or both. Sworn statements and unsworn declarations

may be taken whenever appropriate.

(d) Expanding the Reinvestigation: The reinvestigation may be

expanded as necessary. As appropriate, interviews with anyone able

to provide information or to resolve issues, including but not

limited to cohabitants, relatives, psychiatrists, psychologists,

other medical professionals, and law enforcement professionals may

be conducted.

Attachment D to Subpart B--Decision Tables

Table 1.--Which Investigation to Request

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

And the person Based on this Then the investigation

If the requirement is for has this access investigation required is Using standard

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Confidental Secret; ``L''...... None.............. None.............. NACLC................. A

Out of date NACLC

or SSBI.

Conf, Sec; ``L''

Top Secret, SCI; ``Q''......... None.............. None.............. SSBI.................. B

None; Conf, Sec; Current or out of

``L''. date NACLC

Out of date SSBI

TS, SCI; ``Q''.... SSBI-PR............... C

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Table 2.--Reinvestigation Requirements

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Type required if there has been a break in

And the age of the service of

If the requirement is for investigation is ---------------------------------------------

0-23 months 24 month's or more

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Confidential........................ 0 to 14 years. 11 mos....... None (note 1).......... NACLC

15 yrs. or more............. NACLC..................

Secret; ``L''....................... 0 to 9 yrs 11 mos........... None (note 1)..........

10 yrs. or more............. NACLC

Top Secret, SCI; ``Q''.............. 0 to 4 yrs. 11 mos.......... None (note 1).......... SSBI

5 yrs or more............... SSBI-PR................

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Note: As a minimum, review an updated Standard Form 84 and applicable records. A reinvestigation (NACLC or SSBI-

PR) is not required unless the review indicates the person may no longer satisfy the standards of Executive

Order 12968.

Subpart C--Guidelines for Temporary Access

Sec. 147.28 Introduction.

The following minimum investigative standards, implementing section

3.3 of Executive Order 12968, Access to Classified Information, are

established for all United States Government and military personnel,

consultants, contractors, subcontractors, employees of contractors,

licensees, certificate holders or grantees and their employees and

other individuals who require access to classified information before

the appropriate investigation can be completed and a final

determination made.

Sec. 147.29 Temporary eligibility for access.

Based on a justified need meeting the requirements of section 3.3

of Executive Order 12968, temporary eligibility for access may be

granted before investigations are complete and favorably adjudicated,

where official functions must be performed prior to completion of the

investigation and adjudication process. The temporary eligibility will

be valid until completion of the investigation and adjudication;

however, the agency granting it may revoke it at any time based on

unfavorable information identified in the course of the investigation.

Sec. 147.30 Temporary eligibility for access at the confidential and

secret levels and temporary eligibility for ``L'' access authorization.

As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the

Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation,

favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority,

and submission of a request for an expedited National Agency Check with

Local Agency Checks and Credit (NACLC).

Sec. 147.31 Temporary eligibility for access at the top secret levels

and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization: For someone

who is the subject of a favorable investigation not meeting the

investigative standards for access at those levels.

As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the

Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation,

favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority,

and expedited submission of a request for a Single Scope Background

Investigation (SSBI).

Sec. 147.32 Temporary eligibility for access at the top secret and

SCI levels and temporary eligibility for ``Q'' access authorization:

For someone who is not the subject of a current, favorable personnel or

personnel-security investigation of any kind.

As a minimum, such temporary eligibility requires completion of the

Standard Form 86, including any applicable supporting documentation,

favorable review of the form by the appropriate adjudicating authority,

[[Page 4580]]

immediate submission of a request for an expedited Single Scope

Background Investigation (SSBI), and completion and favorable review by

the appropriate adjudicating authority of relevant criminal history and

investigative records of the Federal Bureau of Investigation and of

information in the Security/Suitability Investigations Index (SII) and

the Defense Clearance and Investigations Index (DCII).

Sec. 147.33 Additional requirements by agencies.

Temporary eligibility for access must satisfy these minimum

investigative standards, but agency heads may establish additional

requirements based on the sensitivity of the particular, identified

categories of classified information necessary to perform the lawful

and authorized functions that are the basis for granting temporary

eligibility for access. However, no additional requirements shall

exceed the common standards for background investigations developed

under section 3.2(b) of Executive Order 12968. Temporary eligibility

for access is valid only at the agency granting it and at other

agencies who expressly agree to accept it and acknowledge understanding

of its investigative basis. It is further subject to limitations

specified in sections 2.4(d) and 3.3 of Executive Order 12968, Access

to Classified Information.

Dated: January 22, 1998.

L.M. Bynum,

Alternate OSD Federal Register Liaison Officer, Department of Defense.

[FR Doc. 98-1955 Filed 1-29-98; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 5000-04-M

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