Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry: Guidelines for Individuals Who Relocated to Japan as Minors During World War II

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE

28 CFR Part 74

[AG Order No. 2056-96]

RIN 1190-AA42

Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese Ancestry: Guidelines

for Individuals Who Relocated to Japan as Minors During World War II

AGENCY: Department of Justice.

ACTION: Final rule.

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SUMMARY: The Department of Justice (``Department'') hereby adopts a

change to the regulations governing redress provisions for persons of

Japanese ancestry. This change will amend the standards of the Civil

Liberties Act of 1988 to make eligible for payments of $20,000 those

persons who are otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations,

but who involuntarily relocated during World War II to a country with

which the United States was at war. In practice, this amendment will

make potentially eligible those persons who were evacuated, relocated,

or interned by the United States Government; who, as minors, relocated

to Japan or a country with which the United States was at war during

World War II, and otherwise were unemancipated and lacked the legal

capacity to leave the custody and control of their parents (or legal

guardians) who chose to relocate to Japan during the war; and who did

not enter active military service on behalf of the Japanese Government

or another enemy government during the statutorily-defined war period.

EFFECTIVE DATE: September 30, 1996.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Tink D. Cooper or Emlei M. Kuboyama,

Office of Redress Administration, Civil Rights Division, U.S.

Department of Justice, PO Box 66260, Washington, DC 20035-6260; (888)

219-6900 (voice) (toll-free) or (202) 219-4710 (TDD).

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

The Civil Liberties Act of 1988, Pub. L. 100-383 (codified at 50

U.S.C. app. 1989 et. seq., as amended) (``the Act''), enacted into law

the recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation and

Internment of Civilians (``Commission'') established by Congress in

1980. See Commission on Wartime Relocation and Internment of Civilians

Act, Pub. L. 96-317 (1980). This bipartisan commission was established:

(1) To review the facts and circumstances surrounding Executive Order

9066, issued February 19, 1942, and the impact of that Executive Order

on American citizens and permanent resident aliens of Japanese

ancestry; (2) to review directives of United States military forces

requiring the relocation and, in some cases, detention in internment

camps of these American citizens and permanent resident aliens; and (3)

to recommend appropriate remedies. The Commission submitted to Congress

in February 1983 a unanimous report, Personal Justice Denied, which

extensively reviewed the history and circumstances of the decisions to

exclude, remove, and then to detain Japanese Americans and Japanese

resident aliens from the West Coast, as well as the treatment of Aleuts

during World War II. Redress Provisions for Persons of Japanese

Ancestry, 54 FR 34,157 (1989). The final part of the Commission's

report, Personal Justice Denied Part 2: Recommendations, concluded that

these events were influenced by racial prejudice, war hysteria, and a

failure of political leadership, and recommended remedial action to be

taken by Congress and the President. Id.

On August 10, 1988, President Ronald Reagan signed the Act into

law. The purposes of the Act were to acknowledge and apologize for the

fundamental injustice of the evacuation, relocation, and internment of

Japanese Americans and permanent resident aliens of Japanese ancestry,

to make restitution, and to fund a public education program to prevent

the recurrence of any similar event in the future. 50 U.S.C. app. 1989-

1989a.

Section 105 of the Act makes the Attorney General responsible for

identifying, locating, and authorizing payment of redress to eligible

individuals. Id. 1989b-4. The Attorney General delegated the

responsibilities and duties assigned to her to the Assistant Attorney

General for Civil Rights, who, in keeping with precedent, has

designated the Office of Redress Administration (ORA) in the Civil

Rights Division to carry out the execution of the responsibilities and

duties under the Act. The regulations governing eligibility and

restitution were drafted by ORA and published under the authority of

the Justice

[[Page 51009]]

Department in 1989. 54 FR 34,157 (1989) (final rule) codified at 28 CFR

Part 74).

ORA is charged with the responsibility of identifying and locating

persons eligible for redress under the Act. To date, restitution has

been paid to a total of 79,980 Japanese Americans and permanent

resident aliens of Japanese ancestry.

Section 108 of the Act articulates the standards for redress

eligibility. 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b-7(2). Among those excluded from

eligibility under that section are persons ``who, during the period

beginning on December 7, 1941, and ending on September 2, 1945,

relocated to a country while the United States was at war with that

country * * *'' Id. As part of a citizen exchange program during World

War II, the United States returned formerly interned persons of

Japanese ancestry to Japan on two occasions. On June 18, 1942,

approximately 1,083 persons of Japanese ancestry returned to Japan

aboard the M.S. Gripsholm, and on September 2, 1943, the Gripsholm

returned another 1,340 persons of Japanese ancestry to Japan. A number

of these persons asserted claims for redress based on their evacuation

and internment by the United States Government prior to their

relocation to Japan. However, based on section 108 of the Act and 28

CFR 74.4, ORA found them ineligible for redress. 54 FR 34,162 (1989).

In all, 175 persons who relocated to Japan aboard the Gripsholm claimed

compensation under the Act; approximately 124 of these claimants were

persons who were under the age of 21 upon their departure from the

United States. ORA's denial of redress to these claimants was upheld

during the administrative appeal process set forth in 28 CFR 74.17. 54

FR 34,164-65 (1989).

It is helpful to describe the circumstances of these individuals.

The West Coast voluntary evacuation period began with the issuance of

Proclamation No. 1, on March 2, 1942, and ended with the issuance of

Proclamation No. 4, effective on March 29, 1942. After this date,

persons of Japanese ancestry were prohibited from leaving the West

Coast because the Government was preparing to forcibly relocate and

intern them later. Over 120,000 Japanese Americans were eventually

interned. Of these 120,000, approximately 124 were minor children whose

parents decided to depart the United States for Japan during the war on

one of the M.S. Gripsholm sailings prior to September 2, 1945. The

majority of the passengers on the first sailing were Japanese

diplomats, while many of the passengers on the second sailing were

American citizens or permanent resident aliens. Also aboard were some

Japanese nationals who had left Japan to live and work in the United

States and who, by law, were ineligible to apply for United States

citizenship. Many of these individuals returned to Japan with their

American-born children.

These American children persevered through an arduous period during

which they were forcibly evacuated from their homes on the West Coast

and interned with their parents. The minors were unable legally to

return to their homes in the prohibited military zones on the West

Coast and were required to travel to Japan with their parents on a long

and difficult journey.

The loyalty of most of these American children, however, apparently

never waned. According to ORA research, the vast majority of them did

not enter into the active military service on behalf of an enemy

government during World War II. Furthermore, almost all returned to the

United States after the war. Out of the approximately 124 minors who

have filed for redress, and who relocated to Japan with their parents

during World War II, 108 subsequently returned to the United States,

while only 16 remained in Japan.

II. Responses to Public Comments

As a result of this revised interpretation, more fully discussed

below, the Civil Rights Division published a Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking in the Federal Register, 61 FR 29716 (June 12, 1996),

inviting the public to submit comments on this proposed category of

eligible persons. The comment period expired on July 12, 1996.

By the close of the comment period, the Division had received 1,152

timely comments. Of these comments, 1,096 were based on a form letter

which requested that the rulemaking process be expedited. Of the

remaining comments, 51 were from individuals, 3 were from various

organizations representing the interests of Japanese Americans, and 2

were from organizations that opposed this interpretation. Of these

original comments, 45 were in support of the revision while 11 comments

were against the revision. Also, a few comments were not timely filed

as indicated by the postmark and were not considered. The Department

read and analyzed each comment and considered the merits of the points

of view expressed in them.

The vast majority of comments indicated support for this provision.

The 1,096 form letters were favorable and requested that the regulatory

process be expedited. There were also 45 comments (42 individual

letters, 3 organization letters) in support of the amendment changes.

Twenty-eight of the letters supported the amendments and generally

asserted that the children of the internees suffered as much as their

parents had during the evacuation and relocation period, since the

children themselves were interned as well as being subjected to the

war-time conditions in Japan following their relocation. Several

letters echoed this sentiment and indicated that minors did not have

the ability to freely choose to relocate to Japan during the war, and

that the prisoner exchange was unjust. Several elected officials,

including U.S. Senator Paul Wellstone, favorably agreed with this

amendment. One person was in favor of this proposal but mistakenly

believed that anyone who returned to Japan at any time would now be

eligible; to the contrary, those persons who returned to Japan before

the start of World War II, remained in Japan throughout the war, will

remain ineligible.

In addition, there were several comments that opposed this revision

and indicated that the Act's original exclusionary language in section

108 should apply to all persons, regardless of age, who relocated to

Japan during World War II. There were 11 comments (9 individual

letters, 2 organization letters) opposed to making this category of

claimants eligible for redress. These comments raised four main issues:

(1) That it was wrong to extend redress solely to Japanese Americans

without extending compensation to those of German and Italian descent

and their children who were similarly situated; (2) that the American

children of Japanese parents were not forcibly removed from their

homes, but rather their parents as their natural guardians made the

decision for them; (3) that these children, American-born with Japanese

parents, had dual nationality and were technically citizens of Imperial

Japan under Japanese law, and were not American citizens; and (4) that,

in light of the federal government's current budgetary crisis, such

expensive outlays were not justified.

The Department has considered the merit of each of these comments

and disagrees with the viewpoints that were expressed. First, the

Department notes that it is compelled to comply with the laws

established by Congress and is fulfilling its mandate. In response to

the comments, the Department notes that the purpose of the Act was to

provide compensation for the injustices suffered by Japanese Americans

during World

[[Page 51010]]

War II as a result of specific Federal Government action based solely

on their Japanese ancestry. A Federal appeals court has determined that

Congress' decision to compensate only those of Japanese ancestry who

sustained deprivations of liberty or property as a result of defined

Federal Government actions during World War II survives constitutional

scrutiny. Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 113

S.Ct. 95 (1992). In Jacobs, an American child of German ancestry, who

was detained in an internment camp during the war with his father but

was ineligible for redress under the Act, challenged the Act on equal

protection grounds. Jacobs argued that he was similarly situated with

respect to Japanese Americans who received compensation. The court

indicated that Congress found that there was no mass exclusion or

detention ordered against American citizens of German or Italian

descent. Id. at 319. It also concluded that the Act survived the

strictest level of scrutiny and that Congress' decision to compensate

Japanese Americans and not German Americans was ``substantially related

(as well as narrowly tailored) to the important (and compelling)

governmental interest of compensating those who were interned during

World War II because of racial prejudice.'' Id. at 321.

Second, one of the threshold requirements for eligibility under the

Act is U.S. citizenship or permanent residency status during the

defined statutory period. In each case, minor relocatees who will be

eligible for redress were American-born and meet the other criteria

required by the Act. It is contrary to the law to assert that children

born in the United States are not American citizens, but are

technically citizens of another country. The doctrine of ``jus soli,''

incorporated into the United States Constitution through the Fourteenth

Amendment, makes, with certain limited exceptions, all persons born in

the United States and subject to its jurisdiction citizens at birth.

See U.S. Const., amend. XIV, section 1; 8 U.S.C. 1401(a). (Persons born

to certain foreign diplomats in the United States do not necessarily

obtain U.S. citizenship at birth since their parents have diplomatic

immunity and are therefore not subject to the jurisdiction of the

United States.)

Third, we note that the minor relocatees did not make a knowing and

voluntary decision to relocate to Japan. The Department has concluded

that section 108 should not be construed to make ineligible for redress

those persons who relocated involuntarily. (See Section III for a

detailed legal discussion of this issue.) Finally, Congress

appropriated funds to provide redress to these claimants and the

Department is fulfilling its designated role.

The Department reviewed and analyzed each comment and considered

the merits of the points of view expressed in them. Substantive changes

were not made in the proposals, but other non-substantive changes were

made in order to provide further clarification of this amendment.

III. Revised Interpretation

Following publication of the draft regulations in 1989, the

Department received 61 comments concerning the eligibility of persons

who, as minors, relocated to Japan aboard the Gripsholm. Based on the

comments received at that time, however, it found no reason to

differentiate between adults who returned to Japan during World War II

and minors. As a result, in the preamble of the final regulation, the

Department stated that ``the exclusionary language of the Act would

preclude from eligibility the minors, as well as adults, who were

relocated to Japan during [the relevant] time period.'' 54 FR 34,160

(1989).

The Department, based on an argument not previously presented, now

revises its interpretation regarding the eligibility of persons who

relocated to Japan during World War II. Specifically, it revises its

determination of eligibility with regard to persons who were under the

age of 21 and not emancipated as of their dates of departures from the

United States, who did not participate in the active military service

on behalf of an enemy government during World War II, and who are

otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations.

In effecting this revision, the Department is operating within the

established framework of Chevron versus N.R.D.C., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43.

Under Chevron, an agency must give effect to the unambiguously

expressed intent of Congress when interpreting a statute. However,

where an act is silent or ambiguous with respect to a specific issue,

Congress has assigned to the agency the responsibility to elucidate a

specific provision of the statute by regulation. Id. at 843-44. For the

reasons set forth below, the Department believes that the proscription

of section 108 is ambiguous with respect to its coverage of the class

of individuals described above, and that the revision is a reasonable

interpretation of the statute.

As enacted, section 108 expressly excludes from eligibility ``any

individual who, during the period beginning on December 7, 1941, and

ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to (another) country while the

United States was at war with that country.'' 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b-7

(emphasis added). This language does not specifically resolve whether

the exclusion applies to individuals who relocated involuntarily.

This issue is suggested on the face of the statute when it is read

as a whole because, while the statute uses the active voice in section

108's exclusion clause, the eligibility clauses of the statute use the

passive voice. For example, section 108 begins by defining an

``eligible individual'' as a person of Japanese ancestry ``who, during

the evacuation, relocation and internment period-- * * * was confined,

held in custody, relocated, or otherwise deprived of liberty or

property as a result of * * * (various Executive Orders and Acts).'' 50

U.S.C. app. 1989b-7(2) (emphasis added). Title II of the Act, which

provides reparations to Aleuts evacuated from their home islands during

World War II, similarly defines an eligible Aleut as a person ``who, as

a civilian, was relocated by authority of the United States from his or

her home village * * * to an internment camp * * *.'' 50 U.S.C. app.

1989c-1(5) (emphasis added). The contrasting use of the active voice in

the exclusion clause suggests the possibility that section 108 might be

read to exclude only those individuals who voluntarily relocated to an

enemy country during the war.

This possibility is consistent with judicial decisions. The United

States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Ninth

Circuit have deemed the use of the active as opposed to the passive

voice relevant for purposes of statutory interpretation. Dickson versus

Office of Personnel Mgmt., 828 F.2d 32, 37 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (isolated

use of passive voice in phrase defining liability is significant and

allows suit against Office of Personnel Management whenever an adverse

determination ``is made,'' even if by another agency); United States

versus Arrellano, 812 F.2d 1209, 1212 (9th Cir. 1987) (clause of

statute defining criminal intent phrased in active voice applies to

conduct of the accused, while second clause phrased in passive voice

applies only to the conduct of others). Thus, the statutory language

creates an ambiguity as to whether eligibility decisions should

distinguish between voluntary relocatees and involuntary relocatees.

For the reasons that follow, we believe the better interpretation is to

exclude only individuals who relocated voluntarily.

[[Page 51011]]

The Act's legislative history provides very little significant

insight into congressional intent regarding the eligibility of

involuntary relocatees. As originally introduced, neither the House nor

the Senate bill included a relocation exclusion provision in the

section defining eligible individuals. Entering conference, the House

version of the Act contained the exclusion, while the Senate version

contained no such provision. The conferees agreed to adopt the House

provision, which excluded ``those individuals who, during the period

from December 7, 1941, through September 2, 1945, relocated to a

country at war with the United States.'' H.R. Conf. Rep. No. 785, 100th

Cong., 2d Sess. 22 (1988). There is no additional discussion of the

relocation exclusion in the conference report.

A discussion of whether individuals who returned to Japan should be

included in the definition of ``eligible individuals'' is contained in

a witness statement submitted to the House and Senate subcommittees

considering the legislation. In testimony opposing the enactment of the

bill, the Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division, Richard K.

Willard, noted that as then written (without the relocation exclusion),

the breadth of the definition would cover any individual who had been

subject to exclusion, relocation, or internment, including persons

living outside of the United States. In the Department's view, this

overlooked the fact that at least several hundred of the detainees were

``fanatical pro-Japanese,* * *. and (had) voluntarily sought

repatriation to Japan after the end of the war.'' The Department

believed that allowing these disloyal individuals to receive the

benefit of the legislation would be unfair to the United States and to

loyal persons of Japanese descent. To accept the Findings and to

Implement the Recommendations of the Commission on Wartime Relocation

and Internment of Civilians: Hearing on S. 1009 Before the Subcomm. on

Federal Services, Post Office, and Civil Service of the Senate Comm. on

Governmental Affairs, 100th Cong., 1st Sess. 281, 296 (1987)

(Hearings). This statement, however, does not reveal or suggest an

opinion that the bill ought to exclude from redress persons who

involuntarily relocated to an enemy country.

In sum, the Department believes that section 108's exclusion of

persons who relocated to an energy country during World War II is

susceptible to the interpretation that it does not apply to persons who

relocated involuntarily, that so interpreting the statute gives effect

to the principles Congress meant to embody in the exclusionary

provision, and that this interpretation is otherwise a reasonable

construction of the statute.

The Department further notes that the determination of whether a

person relocated voluntarily to an enemy country during World War II is

extraordinarily difficult to determine at this late date, over half a

century since the period during which the actions that are relevant to

a determination about the state of mind of individual relocatees took

place. Under these circumstances, the Department has discretion to

structure the process for determining redress eligibility in a manner

that avoids the inherent inaccuracy of any attempt to engage in a case-

by-case inquiry into the subjective factor of state of mind, as well as

the potential administrative burdens associated with case-by-case

inquiry, by articulating some reasonable, objective criteria to guide

the process.

To that end, the final rule adopts two bright line standards to

administer section 108's exclusion provision. First, any person who was

21 years of age or older, emancipated by petition of the court or by

marriage, or otherwise emancipated, as of the date of his or her

departure from the United States, shall be irrebuttably presumed to

have relocated voluntarily, and will be ineligible for redress under

the Act. Second, any person who served in the Japanses military, or the

military of another enemy country, during the statutorily-defined war

period shall be irrebuttably presumed to have relocated voluntarily

and, therefore, will be ineligible for redress. All otherwise eligible

persons falling outside these categories, that is, persons who were

minors and not otherwise emancipated as of the dates of their

departures from the United States and who did not serve in the Japanese

military or the military of another enemy government during the

statutorily-defined war period, shall be considered involuntary

relocatees and therefore eligible for redress under the Act.

The Supreme Court has affirmed the ability of agencies to employ

generally applicable rules as an alternative to case-by-case

adjudication. See, e.g., American Hospital Ass'n v. NLRB, 499 U.S. 606,

611 (1991) (``Prior decisions of this Court) confirm that, even if a

statutory scheme requires individualized determinations, the decision-

maker has the authority to rely on rulemaking to resolve certain issues

of general applicability unless Congress clearly expresses an intent to

withhold that authority.''). In particular, the Court has noted that

the Congress is free to use prophylactic rules despite their ``inherent

imprecision'' when it wishes to avoid ``the expense and other

difficulties of individual determinations.'' Weinberger v. Salfi, 422

U.S. 749, 777 (1975).

The Department believes that under American Hospital Ass'n and

other authorities agencies enjoy a similar latitude to that enunciated

in Weinberger. As in Weinberger, justifying the use of such bright-line

rules does not require determining whether the rules ``precisely filter

[] out those, and only those, who are in the factual position which

generated the congressional concern * * * (n) or * * * whether (they)

filter [] out a substantial part of the class which caused the * * *

concern, or whether (they) filter [] out more members of the class than

nonmembers.'' Id. Rather, the question is whether the Department could

``rationally have concluded both that * * * particular (rules) would

protect against (the abuse Congress sought to avoid), and that the

expense and other difficulties of individualized determinations

justified (their) inherent imprecision.'' Id. For the reasons that

follow, the final rule satisfies this standard.

As stated above, the final rule applies an irrebuttable presumption

that persons who were 21 years of age or older, emancipated by petition

of the court or by marriage, or otherwise emancipated as of the dates

of their departures from the United States, were voluntary relocatees.

The Department proposes to apply this irrebuttable presumption because

adult relocatees were more likely than minor relocatees to have been

able to assent freely to their relocation to Japan. The age of 21 as of

the date of departure was chosen because, during the period covered by

the Act's relocation exclusion, the legal age of majority in most

states was 21.

Noting the dearth of legislative history pertaining to the Act's

exclusion clause, the United States Court of Federal Claims stated in

Suzuki v. United States, 29 Fed. Cl. 688 (1993), that Congress may have

enacted the exclusion clause in an effort to deny benefits to

individuals who had either been disloyal to the United States or ``who,

despite possible continued loyalty to the United States, had aided an

energy country during war.'' Id. at 695. Nothing in the Department's

revised interpretation of section 108 is inconsistent with this

observation, since both of the possible purposes cited by the court

assume volition on the part of the relocatee to leave the United States

and relocate to Japan. If, by contrast, an individual relocatee was not

free to

[[Page 51012]]

assent to his or her relocation on account of his or her minority

status, it is reasonable for the Department to conclude that such

individual was not the type of person against whom Congress intended to

apply section 108's exclusion provision. By itself the relocation of

minors during World War II does not raise doubts or inferences

concerning disloyalty. In fact, most American-born minor relocatees

returned to the United States following the war.

Examples of distinctions in the treatment of minors and adults

abound in our law. See Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 823 (1988)

(plurality opinion). Accordingly, it is reasonable for the Department

to apply such a distinction in determing whether individuals who

relocated to Japan during the statutorily-defined war period did so

voluntarily.

The final rule also applies an irrebuttable presumption the

individuals who served in the military of an enemy government during

the statutorily-defined war period relocated voluntarily because the

Department believes that evidence that an individual entered into the

active military service on behalf of an enemy government following his

or her departure from the United States is a strong indication that the

individual relocated voluntarily. In view of that reasonable belief and

the fact that it is difficult at this time to determine with complete

certainty the motivations of individuals who entered the active

military service against the United States during World War II, and in

light of the increased administrative burdens associated with

individualized efforts to ascertain the 50-year old motivations of such

individuals, the Department believes it is appropriate to interpret the

fact that an individual served in the military of an enemy government

following his or her relocation as evidence that the individual

relocated voluntarily.

The Department will thus require individuals who apply for redress

under the Act and who relocated to Japan during the statutorily-defined

war period to provide information as to their ages and emancipation

status upon their dates of departure from the United States to relocate

to Japan, and to state whether or not they participated in the active

military service on behalf of an enemy government, including the

Japanese Government, during World War II. If such individuals state

that they were 21 years of age or older, or emancipated minors, as of

the dates of their departures, they will be deemed ineligible for

redress under the Act. Similarly, if such individuals state that they

participated in the active military service on behalf of an enemy

government during World War II, they also will be deemed ineligible. In

contrast, otherwise eligible relocatees who were under the age of 21

and not otherwise emancipated upon the dates of their departures from

the United States, and who did not serve in the military on behalf of

an enemy government during World War II, will be eligible for redress

under the Act.

IV. Regulatory Matters

This rule relieves a restriction upon individuals otherwise

eligible for redress under the Act and is therefore exempt from the

provision of the Administrative Procedures Act pertaining to delay in

effective date. 5 U.S.C. 553(d). Moreover, the Department has

determined that this final rule will be effective immediately upon

publication in the Federal Register for good cause shown, i.e., to

expedite these claims, since involuntary relocatees are some of the

older claimants and at least four persons, potentially eligible under

this revision, have since passed away; to process the current claims as

quickly as possible because of budgetary concerns and the program's

sunset date of August 10, 1998; and to resolve a pending lawsuit in the

U.S. Court of Federal Claims involving 14 plaintiffs who were minor

children during the war and who will be potentially eligible under this

revision.

The Attorney General in accordance with the Regulatory Flexibility

Act, 5 U.S.C. 605(b), has reviewed this regulation and by approving it

certifies that this regulation will not have a significant economic

impact upon a substantial number of small entities because this rule

confers a benefit on a limited group of individuals.

The Office of Management and Budget has determined that this final

rule is a significant regulatory action under Executive Order No. 12866

and, accordingly, this final rule has been reviewed and approved by the

Office of Management and Budget. Information collection associated with

this regulation has been approved by the Office of Management and

Budget, OMB No. 1190-0010.

List of Subjects in 28 CFR Part 74

Administrative practice and procedure, Aliens, Archives and

records, Citizenship and naturalization, Civil rights, Indemnity

payments, Minority groups, Nationality, War claims.

For the reasons set forth in the preamble and by the authority

vested in me, including 28 U.S.C. 509 and 510, chapter I of title 28,

part 74, of the Code of Federal Regulations is amended as follows:

PART 74--CIVIL LIBERTIES ACT REDRESS PROVISION

1. The authority citation for part 74 continues to read as follows:

Authority: 50 U.S.C. app. 1989b.

2. In Subpart B, Sec. 74.4 is revised to read as follows:

Subpart B--Standards of Eligibility

Sec. 74.4 Individuals excluded from compensation pursuant to section

108(B) of the Act.

(a) The term ``eligible individual'' does not include any

individual who, during the period beginning on December 7, 1941, and

ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to a country while the United

States was at war with that country.

(b) Nothing in paragraph (a) of this section is meant to exclude

from eligibility any person who, during the period beginning on

December 7, 1941, and ending on September 2, 1945, relocated to a

country while the United States was at war with that country, and who

had not yet reached the age of 21 and was not emancipated as of the

date of departure from the United States, provided that such person is

otherwise eligible for redress under these regulations and the

following standards:

(1) Persons who were 21 years of age or older, or emancipated

minors, on the date they departed the United States for Japan are

subject to an irrebuttable presumption that they relocated to Japan

voluntarily and will be ineligible.

(2) Persons who served in the active military service on behalf of

the Government of Japan or an enemy government during the period

beginning on December 7, 1941 and ending on September 2, 1945 are

subject to an irrebuttable presumption that they departed the United

States voluntarily for Japan. If such individuals served in the active

military service of an enemy country, they must inform the Office of

such service and, as a result, will be ineligible.

Dated: September 21, 1996.

Janet Reno,

Attorney General.

[FR Doc. 96-25027 Filed 9-27-96; 8:45 am]

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