Record of Decision for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Record of Decision for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched

Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of Decision

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SUMMARY: The Department of Energy (DOE) has decided to implement a

program to make surplus highly enriched uranium (HEU) non-weapons-

usable by blending it down to low-enriched uranium (LEU), as specified

in the Preferred Alternative in the Disposition of Surplus Highly

Enriched Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (HEU Final EIS,

DOE/EIS-0240, June 1996). DOE will gradually sell up to 85 percent of

the resulting LEU over time for commercial use as fuel feed for nuclear

power plants to generate electricity (including 50 metric tons of HEU

and 7,000 tons of natural uranium that will be transferred to the

United States Enrichment Corporation), and will dispose of the

remaining LEU as low-level radioactive waste. This program applies to a

nominal 200 metric tons of United States-origin HEU that the President

has declared, or may declare, surplus to defense needs. The purposes of

this program are to support the United States' nuclear weapons

nonproliferation policy by reducing global stockpiles of excess

weapons-usable fissile materials, and to recover the economic value of

the materials to the extent feasible.

EFFECTIVE DATE: The decisions set forth in this Record of Decision

(ROD) are effective upon being made public July 29, 1996 in accordance

with DOE's National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) Implementing

Procedures and Guidelines (10 CFR Part 1021) and the Council on

Environmental Quality (CEQ) regulations for implementing NEPA (40 CFR

Parts 1500-1508).

ADDRESSES: Copies of the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium

Final Environmental Impact Statement, the separate Cost Comparison for

Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives, and this ROD are

available in the public reading rooms identified at the end of this

Federal Register notice (section VIII of the Supplementary

Information). Copies of these documents may be obtained by writing to

the U.S. Department of Energy, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition,

MD-4, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, D.C. 20585, or by

calling (202) 586-4513. The 72-page Summary of the HEU Final EIS, the

Cost Comparison for Highly Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives,

and this ROD are also available on the Fissile Materials Disposition

Electronic Bulletin Board/World Wide Web Page at: http://web.fie.com/

htdoc/fed/doe/fsl/pub/menu/any/

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For information on the HEU disposition

program or this ROD contact: Mr. J. David Nulton, Director, NEPA

Compliance and Outreach, Office of Fissile Materials Disposition (MD-

4), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence Avenue, SW.,

Washington, DC 20585, telephone (202) 586-4513.

For information on the DOE National Environmental Policy Act

process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of NEPA Policy

and Assistance (EH-42), U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence

Ave., SW., Washington, DC 20585, telephone (202) 586-4600 or leave a

message at 1-800-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Synopsis of Decision

DOE issued the HEU Final EIS (DOE/EIS-0240) on June 28, 1996. In

the HEU Final EIS, DOE considered the potential environmental impacts

of alternatives for a program to reduce global nuclear proliferation

risks by blending up to 200 metric tons of United States-origin surplus

HEU down to LEU to make it non-weapons-usable. The resulting LEU could

either be sold for commercial use as fuel feed for non-defense nuclear

power plants, or disposed of as low-level radioactive waste (LLW).

After consideration of the HEU Final EIS, public comments received on

the Draft EIS, and the conclusions of a Cost Comparison for Highly

Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives, DOE has decided to implement

the proposed program as identified in the Preferred Alternative

contained in the HEU Final EIS. This implementation will involve

gradually blending up to 85 percent of the surplus HEU to a U-235

enrichment level of approximately 4 percent for eventual sale and

commercial use over time as reactor fuel feed, and blending the

remaining surplus HEU down to an enrichment level of about 0.9 percent

for disposal as LLW. This would take place over an estimated 15- to 20-

year period.

Three possible blending technologies may be used: uranyl nitrate

hexahydrate (liquid) blending, uranium hexafluoride (gas) blending, or

molten metal blending. Four potential blending facilities may be used:

DOE's Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee;

DOE's Savannah River Site in Aiken, South Carolina; the Babcock &

Wilcox Naval Nuclear Fuel Division Facility in Lynchburg, Virginia; and

the Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. Plant in Erwin, Tennessee. As a first

concrete disposition action consistent with these programmatic

decisions, DOE will transfer title to 50 metric tons of its surplus HEU

and 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium from its stockpiles to the

United States Enrichment Corporation (USEC), for eventual sale and

commercial use. This will comply with legislative directions contained

in the USEC Privatization Act (Public Law 104-134, Sec. 3112(c)).

II. Background

The end of the Cold War has created a legacy of weapons-usable

fissile materials both in the United States and the former Soviet

Union. Further agreements on disarmament may increase the surplus

quantities of these materials. The global stockpiles of weapons-usable

fissile materials pose a

[[Page 40620]]

danger to national and international security in the form of potential

proliferation of nuclear weapons and the potential for environmental,

safety, and health consequences if the materials are not properly

safeguarded and managed.

In September 1993, President Clinton issued a Nonproliferation and

Export Control Policy in response to the growing threat of nuclear

proliferation. Further, in January 1994, President Clinton and Russia's

President Yeltsin issued a joint statement between the United States

and Russia on nonproliferation of weapons of mass destruction and the

means of their delivery. In accordance with these policies, the focus

of the U.S. nonproliferation efforts in this regard is five-fold: to

secure nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union; to assure safe,

secure, long-term storage and disposition of surplus weapons-usable

fissile materials; to establish transparent and irreversible nuclear

reductions; to strengthen the nuclear nonproliferation regime; and to

control nuclear exports.

To demonstrate the United States' commitment to these objectives,

President Clinton announced on March 1, 1995, that approximately 200

metric tons of U.S.-origin weapons-usable fissile materials, of which

165 metric tons are HEU, had been declared surplus to the United

States' defense needs.\1\

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\1\ The Secretary of Energy's Openness Initiative announcement

of February 6, 1996, declared that the United States has about 213

metric tons of surplus fissile materials, including the 200 metric

tons the President announced in March, 1995. Of the 213 metric tons

of surplus materials, the Openness Initiative indicated that about

174.3 metric tons (hereafter referred to as approximately 175 metric

tons) are HEU, including 10 metric tons previously placed under

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) safeguards in Oak Ridge,

Tennessee. The February 1996 Openness Initiative announcement

released additional details about the forms and quantities of

surplus HEU at various locations, and that information is presented

in Figure 1.3-1 of the HEU Final EIS.

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The disposition of surplus HEU, consistent with the Preferred

Alternative in the Draft and Final HEU Disposition EIS and the

decisions described in section VI of this ROD, is consistent with the

President's policies and complies with the recently enacted USEC

Privatization Act (Public Law 104-134). The sale of LEU derived from

surplus HEU is also consistent with the Vice President's Reinventing

Government initiatives pertaining to sales of unneeded government

assets.

III. National Environmental Policy Act Process

A. HEU Draft EIS

On June 21, 1994, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) in the

Federal Register (59 FR 31985) to prepare a Storage and Disposition of

Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement (Storage and Disposition PEIS), including both surplus and

nonsurplus HEU. DOE subsequently concluded that a separate EIS on

surplus HEU disposition would be appropriate. Accordingly, DOE

published a notice in the Federal Register (60 FR 17344) on April 5,

1995, to inform the public of the proposed plan to prepare a separate

EIS for the disposition of surplus HEU.

In accordance with a then-applicable DOE regulation implementing

NEPA, 10 CFR 1021.312, DOE published an implementation plan (IP) for

the HEU EIS in June 1995. The IP recorded the issues identified during

the scoping process, indicated how they would be addressed in the HEU

EIS, and provided guidance for the preparation of the HEU EIS. DOE

issued the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium Draft

Environmental Impact Statement (HEU Draft EIS, DOE/EIS-0240-D) for

public comment in October 1995. On October 26, 1995, DOE published a

Notice of Availability of the HEU Draft EIS in the Federal Register (60

FR 54867). The Environmental Protection Agency's Notice of Availability

of the HEU Draft EIS appeared in the Federal Register (60 FR 55021) on

October 27, 1995, announcing a public comment period from October 27,

1995 until December 11, 1995. In response to requests from the public,

DOE on November 24, 1995 published another Notice in the Federal

Register (60 FR 58056) announcing an extension of the comment period

until January 12, 1996. Public workshops on the HEU Draft EIS were held

in Knoxville, Tennessee, on November 14, 1995, and in Augusta, Georgia,

on November 16, 1995.

During the public comment period, the public was encouraged to

provide comments via mail, toll-free fax, electronic bulletin board

(Internet), and toll-free telephone recording device. By these means, a

total of 72 organizations and 125 individuals submitted a total of 464

comments for consideration. In addition, 224 comments were recorded

from some of the 134 individuals who attended the two public workshops.

All of the comments received, and the Department's responses to them,

are presented in Volume II of the HEU Final EIS, the Comment Analysis

and Response Document. All of the comments were considered in

preparation of the HEU Final EIS, and in some cases, resulted in

changes to the document.

B. Alternatives Considered

The HEU Final EIS analyzed the No Action Alternative and four

reasonable alternatives for blending a nominal 200 metric tons of

surplus HEU down to LEU to make it non-weapons-usable. The surplus HEU

consists of numerous material forms, including metal (pure and

alloyed), oxides, unirradiated fuel (including aluminum alloy fuel),

nitrate solutions, and other forms. The inventory of material declared

surplus also includes irradiated HEU fuel (the total quantity of which

remains classified). As discussed in section VI.A of this ROD, below,

the irradiated fuel is not directly weapons-usable. Thus, the

irradiated fuel is not within the scope of the HEU Final EIS or this

ROD unless the HEU is separated from the fission products pursuant to

other DOE programs (such as stabilization for materials management).

There are two possible end products from the action alternatives

considered in the HEU Final EIS: (1) LEU that can be used as commercial

nuclear reactor fuel feed (at a U-235 enrichment level of about 4

percent), and (2) LEU that can be disposed of as low-level radioactive

waste (at a U-235 enrichment level of about 0.9 percent). The HEU Final

EIS analyzed down-blending of HEU using one or more of three blending

technologies: uranyl nitrate hexahydrate (UNH) blending, molten metal

blending, and uranium hexafluoride (UF6) blending.

The HEU Final EIS analyzed the blending of HEU to LEU at four

existing U.S. facilities that presently have the capability to

undertake such activities. Two of them, the Y-12 Plant at the Oak Ridge

Reservation in Oak Ridge, Tennessee, and the Savannah River Site (SRS)

in Aiken, South Carolina, are DOE facilities that have conducted

extensive HEU operations in support of nuclear weapons and other DOE

programs in the past. The other two analyzed facilities are the only

commercial enterprises in the United States that have licenses from the

Nuclear Regulatory Commission to engage in HEU operations: the Babcock

& Wilcox (B&W) facility in Lynchburg, Virginia, and the Nuclear Fuel

Services, Inc. (NFS) facility in Erwin, Tennessee.

Each of the analyzed facilities presently has the capability to

engage in UNH blending, which could be used either for blending for

commercial use or for blending to waste. Only DOE's Y-12 Plant has the

capability to conduct

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molten metal blending, which would only be used for blending to waste,

since the metal product could not be used directly by the commercial

fuel fabrication industry. The capability to conduct UF6

conversion and blending does not currently exist at any of the

facilities. It is nonetheless analyzed in the EIS as a possible

blending technology that may be added at one or both of the commercial

facilities, since UF6 is the form in which commercial fuel

fabricators prefer to receive LEU product, and the two commercial

facilities have indicated that they may decide to add UF6

capability by modifying existing facilities.

Because there are many possible combinations of end-products,

blending technologies, and blending sites, DOE has formulated several

representative, reasonable alternatives that are described and assessed

in Chapters 2 and 4 of the HEU Final EIS. In addition to the No Action

Alternative (continued storage of surplus HEU), there are four

alternatives that represent blending different proportions of the

surplus HEU for commercial use or for disposal as waste, in some cases

with variations on number and locations of blending sites:

Alternative 1--No Action (continued storage)

Alternative 2 (No Commercial Use)--Blend 100% to waste (at

all 4 sites)

Alternative 3 (Limited Commercial Use)--Blend 75% to waste

(at all 4 sites), 25% to fuel (at 2 commercial sites)

Alternative 4 (Substantial Commercial Use)--Blend 35% to

waste, 65% to fuel (at any 1 site, the 2 commercial sites, the 2 DOE

sites, or all 4 sites)

Alternative 5 (Maximum Commercial Use)--Blend 15% to

waste, 85% to fuel (at any 1 site, the 2 commercial sites, the 2 DOE

sites, or all 4 sites)

Each of the alternatives involving commercial use of LEU derived

from surplus HEU (Alternatives 3, 4, and 5) include within them the

transfer of 50 metric tons of surplus HEU and 7,000 metric tons of

natural uranium from DOE stockpiles to USEC. The alternatives, which

were formulated to represent reasonable choices within the matrix of

possible combinations, were unchanged from the HEU Draft EIS to the HEU

Final EIS.

C. Results of Environmental Analyses

The environmental analyses in sections 4.3, 4.4, and 4.5 of the HEU

Final EIS estimated that incremental radiological and several other

impacts for HEU disposition during normal, accident- free operations

would be low for workers, the public or the environment, and well

within regulatory requirements, for all alternatives, technologies, and

sites. Because no new construction would be required, and the blending

activities that would be conducted for this proposed action are either

the same as or very similar to operations that have occurred at the

analyzed facilities in the past, most of the incremental impacts from

this action at the blending sites would be low. There would be

increases in electrical energy consumption, fuel needs, and waste

generation, depending on the site and the alternative. Section III.D,

below, discusses potential floodplains impacts.

The transportation analyses in section 4.4 and Appendix G of the

HEU Final EIS indicate that radiological impacts to the public and

workers from transportation of materials, under both accident-free and

accident conditions, would be low. Approximately one to three

fatalities, depending on the alternative, could occur over the 20-year

duration of the program, primarily as a result of non-radiological

impacts from traffic accidents. The facility accident analyses in

section 4.3 and Appendix E.5 of the HEU Final EIS indicate that the

maximum credible accident from HEU blending operations, using

conservative assumptions, could result in latent cancer fatalities to

workers and members of the public surrounding the facility. However,

the estimated likelihood of occurrence of such accidents is low, so

total accident risk (consequences if the accident occurs times

probability of occurrence) to the public is low.

An environmental justice analysis was performed (section 4.10 of

the HEU Final EIS) to assess whether the proposed action or

alternatives could cause disproportionate adverse health impacts on

minority or low-income populations residing in communities around the

candidate blending sites. First, a demographic analysis was performed

for all of the 1990 Census tracts located within an 80-km (50-mi)

radius of the candidate sites. Then public health impact analyses were

performed to assess whether minority or low-income populations would be

disproportionately affected by facility operations through routine and

accidental releases of radiation and toxic emissions. Analyses of

public and occupational health impacts from normal operations showed

that air emissions and releases would be low and within regulatory

limits at all candidate sites. The analyses also showed that cumulative

effects of continuous operation over time would result in low levels of

exposure to workers and the public. As just discussed, the overall risk

from maximum postulated accidents is also low. Thus, there would not be

any disproportionate risk of significant adverse impacts to particular

populations, including low-income or minority populations, from

accidents.

Although the EIS indicates that the projected accident-free

radiological impacts and overall accident radiological risk from all

alternatives would be low, section 2.4 of the HEU Final EIS, Comparison

of Alternatives, shows that there would be some differences in impacts

among the alternatives, depending on the extent of commercial use vs.

disposal as waste of the product LEU material. Table 2.4-2 of the EIS,

Summary Comparison of Total Campaign Incremental Environmental Impacts

for the Disposition of Surplus HEU for Each Alternative, indicates that

the Preferred Alternative (85 percent fuel/15 percent waste at four

sites) generally would result in somewhat lower impacts from accident-

free blending and transportation than would the No Commercial Use

Alternative (100 percent waste). Blending for commercial use under the

Preferred Alternative would result in lower impacts than blending to

waste in the following resource areas: diesel/fuel oil, natural gas,

coal, and steam consumption; water use and wastewater; radiological

exposure from normal operations; most waste streams; and transportation

(under both accident and accident-free conditions). The Maximum

Commercial Use Alternative would result in higher total impacts than

the No Commercial Use Alternative for the following resources areas:

electricity consumed; facility accident consequences (estimated

accident probability is low); and mixed low-level and hazardous wastes

generated. The differences among the alternatives are negligible for

air quality and noise, socioeconomics, and chemical exposure.

As discussed in section 4.7 of the HEU Final EIS, the avoided

adverse impacts from displaced uranium mining, milling, conversion, and

enrichment over time increase the environmental advantage of commercial

use of LEU derived from surplus HEU. Because LEU fuel feed derived from

surplus HEU would displace LEU fuel feed derived from virgin uranium,

the environmental impacts that normally result from the front end of

the nuclear fuel cycle (mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment)

would be avoided by using the HEU-derived material instead.

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In actuality, those front-end environmental impacts have already been

incurred for the HEU. By making beneficial use of the material rather

than wasting it, the Department would derive both environmental and

economic benefit from those sunk costs. The analysis in section 4.7 of

the HEU Final EIS indicates that the total avoided impacts in terms of

radiological exposure, nonradiological air quality impacts, and waste

generation would be greater than those that are projected to result

from the HEU blending program.

An unavoidable corollary to the physical environmental advantages

of commercial use of surplus HEU is the potential socioeconomic

disadvantage: displacing the front end of the nuclear fuel cycle could

impact employment in the domestic uranium mining, conversion, and

enrichment sectors. The analysis in section 4.8 of the HEU Final EIS

concludes that DOE will be able to avoid causing adverse material

impacts on those industry sectors, as required by provisions of the

USEC Privatization Act.

D. Floodplains Impacts

1. Floodplain Assessment

As required by DOEs regulations on protection of floodplains and

wetlands (10 CFR Part 1022), the HEU Final EIS assesses whether the

proposed action would impact or be impacted by the floodplains at the

involved sites. The proposed action in the HEU Final EIS involves

blending activities that would be accommodated within existing

facilities at Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS. The locations of facilities at

the candidate sites with respect to delineated floodplains are

presented in the maps shown in Figures 3.3.4-2, 3.4.4-2, 3.5.1-2, and

3.6.4-1 of the HEU Final EIS, respectively.

Because HEU blending activities associated with the proposed action

and its alternatives could be accommodated in existing facilities, no

positive or negative impacts on floodplains would be expected at any of

the candidate sites. Similarly, since no new construction activity is

proposed at any of the candidate sites and blending facilities are not

located in the vicinity of wetlands, no impacts to wetlands are

anticipated.

As discussed in sections 3.3.4 and 3.5.4 of the HEU Final EIS, and

shown in Figures 3.3.4-2 and 3.5.1-2, blending operations at the Y-12

Plant and B&W, respectively, would be accommodated in facilities

located outside the 100- and 500-year floodplains. At SRS, the F- or H-

Canyons that could be used for blending also fall outside the 100-year

floodplains of the Fourmile Branch and the Upper Three Runs Creek (EIS

Section 3.4.4). The 500-year floodplain limits at SRS are not currently

delineated. However, the blending alternatives at SRS would not likely

affect, or be affected by, the 500-year floodplain of either the

Fourmile Branch or Upper Three Runs Creek because the F- and H-Canyons

are located at an elevation of about 91 m (300 ft) above mean sea level

and are approximately 33 m (107 ft) and 64 m (210 ft) above these

streams and at distances from these streams of 0.8 km (0.5 mi) to 1.5

km (0.94 mi), respectively. The maximum flow that has occurred on the

Upper Three Runs Creek was in 1990, with a flow rate of about 58 m\3\/s

(2,040 ft\3\/s). At that time the creek reached an elevation of almost

30 m (98 ft) above mean sea level. The elevations of the buildings in

F- and H-Canyons are located more than 62 m (202 ft) above the highest

flow elevation of the Upper Three Runs Creek. The maximum flow that has

occurred on the Fourmile Branch was in 1991 with a rate of

approximately 5 m\3\/s (186 ft\3\/s), and an elevation of about 61 m

(199 ft) above mean sea level. Elevations of the buildings in F- and H-

Areas are located more than approximately 30 m (101 ft) higher than the

maximum flow level that has occurred.

The NFS site is partially located on the 100- and 500- year

floodplains of the Nolichucky River and Martin Creek (as determined by

the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA), Flood Insurance Rate

Map, January 3, 1985). However, as described in section 3.6.4 of the

EIS and below, mitigation measures have been and would continue to be

implemented to reduce potential flooding of the site and the likelihood

of adverse impacts to site operations.

2. Final Floodplain Statement Of Findings

The HEU Final EIS includes, in section 4.13.1, a Proposed

Floodplain Statement of Findings. The Federal Register Notice of

Availability for the Final EIS (61 FR 33719) stated that DOE would

accept comments on the proposed statement of findings during a 15-day

period. The Department received no comments in response to that notice.

This section of the ROD constitutes the Final Floodplain Statement of

Findings, as required by 10 CFR 1022.15.

Four candidate sites, two DOE (Y-12 and SRS) and two commercial

(B&W and NFS), were considered in the HEU Final EIS as potential sites

where the proposed action could be implemented. These candidate sites

were selected for evaluation because they currently have technically

viable HEU conversion and blending capabilities and could blend surplus

HEU to LEU for commercial fuel or waste. In addition, the commercial

sites considered are the only ones in the United States presently

licensed for the processing of HEU.

As described above, all facilities except NFS that are proposed to

be used for this proposed action at the candidate sites would be

outside the limits of the 100-year floodplain and are at least one foot

above the 100-year floodplain elevation and, therefore would conform to

both State and local floodplain requirements.

The floodplains of the Nolichucky River and Martin Creek at NFS, as

presented in Figure 3.6.4-1 of the HEU Final EIS, cover approximately

one-third and two-thirds of the NFS site's northern portion under 100-

year and 500-year floodplain conditions, respectively. Based on the

Flood Insurance Rate Map and the flood profiles, both published by

FEMA, floodplain elevations at the NFS site are determined to be 499.5

m (1639 ft) and 500 m (1640 ft) above mean sea level for the 100-year

and 500-years floods, respectively. As stated in the Nuclear Regulatory

Commission's (NRC) Environmental Assessment for Renewal of Special

Nuclear Material License No. SNM-124, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc.,

Erwin Plant, Erwin, Tennessee (August 1991), elevations of the building

floors are between 500 m (1640 ft) and 510 m (1660 ft) above mean sea

level. At the time of construction of the plant (1956), there were no

local, State, or NRC requirements prohibiting construction or operation

of nuclear facilities in 100- or 500-year floodplains. Presently, the

State of Tennessee has no requirements pertaining to building in 100-

or 500-year floodplains. Local standards require that any new

construction or substantial improvement of any commercial, industrial,

or non-residential structure should have the lowest floor, including

basement, elevated no lower than one foot above the level of base flood

(100-year flood) elevation. Because NFS was built prior to 1974, site

operations are grandfathered, and this local requirement does not apply

to existing facilities at NFS. NRC, which regulates the NFS site, also

has no regulations against building or operating nuclear facilities in

floodplains. Nevertheless, with the widening of the site's culvert,

upgraded drainage system, rechanneling of the Nolichucky River, and

rerouting of Martin Creek to enter the Nolichucky River farther

downstream, the chance of flood levels at the site has been lowered.

[[Page 40623]]

In addition, warning devices and systems have been placed by the State

of Tennessee along the river to warn the public and the NFS plant of

the chance of possible flooding. In addition, NFS and the State of

Tennessee have emergency action plans to mitigate potential flood

impacts and protect the public water supply from any possible

contamination.

There are two alternatives in addition to no action that could be

considered to remediate potential flooding of facilities at NFS. One

would be to use the facilities in the 300 Area at NFS, which is outside

both the 100- and 500-year floodplain limits, for blending activities.

Facilities in the 300 Area have building floor elevations of at least

500.5 m (1642 ft) above mean sea level, which would conform to the

local requirement of at least one foot above the 100-year floodplain

and would also fall outside of the 500-year floodplain. The second

alternative is to eliminate NFS as a candidate blending site. Based on

the analyses in the HEU Final EIS and on the information in the

Floodplains Assessment and this Statement of Findings, DOE will, for

any blending done at NFS on the Department's behalf pursuant to this

ROD, specify that the work should be done in the 300 Area, and/or that

measures to mitigate potential flood impacts at NFS will continue.

E. Preferred Alternative

The Preferred Alternative is identified in the HEU Final EIS as

Alternative 5, Maximum Commercial Use (four sites), which is:

To gradually blend down surplus HEU and sell as much as

possible (up to 85 percent) of the resulting commercially usable LEU

for use as reactor fuel over time (including 50 metric tons of HEU that

are to be transferred to USEC over a 6-year period, along with 7,000

metric tons of natural uranium), using a combination of four sites (Y-

12, SRS, B&W, and NFS) and two possible blending technologies (blending

as UF6 and UNH); implemented over an approximate 15- to 20-year

period; with continued storage of the HEU until blend-down occurs; and

To blend down surplus HEU that has no commercial value

using a combination of four sites (Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS) and two

blending technologies (blending as UNH and metal); to dispose of the

resulting LEU as low-level radioactive waste (LLW) pursuant to the

Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Managing, Treatment,

Storage, and Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste (DOE/EIS-0200-

D, draft issued in August 1995) (Waste Management PEIS) and associated

RODs, and any subsequent NEPA documents tiered from or supplementing

the Waste Management PEIS; implemented over an approximate 15- to 20-

year period; with continued storage of the HEU until blend-down occurs.

Because some material is in difficult-to-access forms, only about

65-70% of the nominal 200 metric tons of surplus HEU could be blended

and made available for commercial use over the next 10-15 years. The

Department expects that 15-20 years would be needed to bring about the

disposition of the entire nominal 200 metric tons of surplus HEU

analyzed in the EIS.

F. Notice of Availability for HEU Final EIS / Basis for Record of

Decision

On June 28, 1996, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

published in the Federal Register (61 FR 33735) a Notice of

Availability of the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium

Final Environmental Impact Statement (DOE/EIS-0240), after DOE had

disseminated approximately 750 copies of the EIS and/or the EIS Summary

to government officials, states, Indian tribes, and interested groups

and individuals. A separate DOE Notice of Availability, summarizing the

HEU Final EIS, appeared in the Federal Register that same day (61 FR

33719).

DOE has prepared this ROD in accordance with the regulations of the

Council on Environmental Quality for implementing NEPA (40 CFR Parts

1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR Part 1021).

This ROD is based on DOE's Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched

Uranium Final Environmental Impact Statement (the HEU Final EIS). In

making the decisions announced in this ROD, DOE considered

environmental impacts and other factors, such as cost considerations

and public comments received on the HEU Draft EIS.

IV. Cost Analysis

To assist the Department in reaching a decision on the HEU

disposition program, a study comparing the expected costs of the

various disposition alternatives was conducted. The Cost Comparison was

completed in April 1996, and was disseminated at the beginning of May

1996 to over 200 individuals who either expressed an interest in the

cost issue in comments, or attended one of the public workshops on the

HEU Draft EIS, or requested the study. In addition, the availability of

the Cost Comparison was noted in the June 28, 1996 Notice of

Availability for the Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium

Final Environmental Impact Statement (61 FR 33719), along with

notification that the Department would entertain comments on it during

a 15- day period. No comments were received.

The Cost Comparison provides estimates of the potential costs for

blending HEU by using each of the blending technologies analyzed in the

HEU EIS (UNH, UF6, and metal blending). It compares the economic

impact for disposition of the surplus HEU according to the various

action alternatives (Alternatives 2 through 5) defined in the EIS,

which are based on different proportions of the material being blended

for commercial use or for disposal as waste. The report derives the

following estimated unit costs for the various blending technologies

and end-products:

Metal blending to 0.9-percent LEU for disposal--$13,900/kg of HEU

UNH blending to 0.9-percent LEU for disposal--$22,900/kg of HEU

UF6 blending to 4-percent LEU for commercial use--$3,200/kg of HEU

UNH blending to 4-percent LEU for commercial use--$5,700/kg of HEU

Unit costs for blending to waste include estimated disposal costs

as well as blending costs. The report estimates that the potential

sales revenue for each kilogram of HEU blended for commercial use is

$11,700, which is substantially greater than the costs for blending it.

The cost of ultimate disposal of spent nuclear fuel derived from down-

blended HEU that is used commercially would be borne by the utility

purchasers of the fuel pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.

Based on these unit costs and revenues from commercial sales, the

Cost Comparison concludes that disposition of the entire nominal 200

metric tons of surplus HEU under the waste option (Alternative 2) would

cost approximately $3.4 billion. In contrast, disposition of 170 metric

tons of surplus HEU for commercial use, and disposition of the

remaining 30 metric tons as waste (the Preferred Alternative) would

result in a net return of about $340 to $770 million. The analyses

indicate that, on average, each metric ton of surplus HEU that is

blended to LEU fuel and sold, rather than blended for disposal as

waste, would save taxpayers $21 million to $26 million (depending on

the mix of blending technologies used). The report concludes that it is

economically attractive to pursue the commercial fuel option to the

maximum extent possible

[[Page 40624]]

rather than to pursue the waste option exclusively.

V. Environmentally Preferable Alternative

CEQ regulations (40 CFR 1505.2) require that a Record of Decision

identify the environmentally preferred alternative(s). The analysis of

alternatives presented in Chapter 4 and section 2.4 of the HEU Final

EIS indicates that, even using conservative assumptions (that is,

assumptions that tend to overestimate risks), all of the action

alternatives (Alternatives 2 through 5) would have low radiological

impacts on the human environment in or around the analyzed blending

sites during accident-free operations or on workers or the populations

near the potential transportation routes. However, there are

differences among the estimated impacts for the various action

alternatives. As discussed in section III.C. of this ROD, above, except

for the No Action Alternative, the analyses in the HEU Final EIS

indicate that the Preferred Alternative (Alternative 5, blend 85

percent to fuel/15 percent to waste at four sites) would generally

result in the somewhat lower total environmental impacts for many

resources, including radiological impacts, during accident-free

operations, and that the risk of accidents would also be low. Thus, the

environmentally preferable alternative is the Preferred Alternative

identified in the HEU Final EIS, which, as discussed above, also best

serves the economic recovery objective, and fully serves the

nonproliferation objective, of the HEU disposition program.

The environmental analyses in the HEU Final EIS indicate that the

radiological, air, hazardous chemical, and socioeconomic impacts on the

environment during accident-free operations would be low and within

regulatory standards for all blending technologies. There would be a

choice of two technologies for each of the two end-products (fuel or

waste). For surplus HEU that is blended to waste for disposal, either

UNH blending or molten metal blending could be used. On the whole, the

data in section 2.2.2 and the analyses in section 4.3 of the HEU Final

EIS show that molten metal blending would be the environmentally

preferable blending technology for most resources for blending surplus

HEU to waste, although molten metal blending would generate more

process LLW (as opposed to the LEU end-product waste) than would UNH

blending.

For surplus HEU that is blended for commercial use as reactor fuel

feed, either UNH blending or UF6 blending could be used. The data

in section 2.2.2 and the analyses in section 4.3 of the HEU Final EIS

show that, on the whole, at the commercial sites, UNH blending would be

the environmentally preferable blending technology for blending surplus

HEU for commercial use, although UNH blending would produce greater

impacts in three resource areas: liquid hazardous waste generated,

solid nonhazardous waste after treatment, and transportation. In the

area of potential facility accidents, in particular, UF6 blending

would result in higher accident consequences because of the possibility

of a UF6 cylinder breach accident that could release gaseous

UF6 (both radiologically and chemically toxic) into the

environment. However, as discussed in section III.C, above, the

probability of accidents that would release significant quantities of

material into the environment is estimated to be low. DOE concludes

that these differences in impacts would not dictate against the use of

UF6 blending technology for blending surplus HEU for commercial

use.

The analyses in section 4.3 of the HEU Final EIS indicate that all

four of the analyzed blending facilities (Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS) have

the capacity to process surplus HEU with low impacts to workers, the

public, and, for many parameters, the environment during normal

operations. For the two DOE sites, the generation of waste based on an

increased usage of utilities represents small increases--less than 5

percent over current operations. For the two commercial sites, the

generation of waste based on an increased usage of utilities represents

increases of over 20 percent, but both facilities have adequate

capacities to accommodate the increases since neither site is currently

operating at full capacity. Because the NFS site has not been operating

recently, it would require a large increase in water usage (166

percent) and fuel requirements (933 percent) relative to the current

baseline. However, because the quantity of water and fuel used in the

past for similar operations is comparable to that which would be used

for the proposed action, it is anticipated that the increase in these

requirements can easily be accommodated at NFS. As discussed in section

III.D, above, the potential for flooding at NFS is another relative

disadvantage of that facility.

For postulated facility accidents, there are also differences among

the sites based on different proximities and concentrations of workers

and nearby populations, as well as meteorological factors. The analyses

in section 4.3 of the HEU Final EIS indicate that accident impacts to

the maximally exposed individual member of the public and to the

population within 80 kilometers (50 miles) would be lowest at SRS,

where the involved facilities are in the middle of a very large,

limited-access, rural site, so the distances to members of the public

are large. The greatest impacts to the public from accidents would be

experienced at Y-12 and NFS, at both of which the involved facilities

are relatively close to site boundaries (in the case of NFS, the site

is small) and population centers. The postulated accident impacts to

on-site non-involved workers would be lowest at SRS (because the

workers are fairly widely dispersed) and NFS (because there are

relatively few workers on the site). The non-involved worker impacts

would be highest at B&W, which has a relatively large workforce in

close proximity to the blending facility. However, as noted in section

III.C, above, the probabilities of serious accidents at all sites are

low.

The environmental justice analysis shows that the SRS site has a

substantial minority and low-income population in surrounding census

tracts (more than 25 percent minority and low-income in most census

tracts, and more than 50 percent minority in several). However, the

impacts to surrounding populations are projected to be low for all

sites, and lowest for SRS, so there would be no disproportionate

adverse impacts on minority populations.

In summary, the analyses in the HEU Final EIS indicate that the

environmentally preferable blending facility would be SRS. However,

since the impacts at all sites are expected to be low during normal

operations for many parameters (including radiological impacts), well

within regulatory limits, and since overall risks associated with

potential accidents are low, DOE concludes that environmental

differences among the sites would not serve as a basis for choosing

among them. Each of the facilities would be capable of blending up to

the entire inventory of surplus HEU without significant adverse

environmental impacts, and use of a combination of facilities can

facilitate mission accomplishment.

VI. Decisions

A. Programmatic Decisions

DOE has decided to implement a program to make surplus HEU non-

weapons-usable by blending it down to LEU, as specified in the

Preferred Alternative (Alternative 5, site variation c [all four

sites]) in the HEU Final EIS.

[[Page 40625]]

As defined in section 1.4.2 of the HEU Final EIS, the Preferred

Alternative is:

To gradually blend down surplus HEU and sell over time as

much as possible (up to 85 percent) of the resulting commercially

usable LEU for use as reactor fuel feed, (including 50 metric tons of

HEU to be transferred to USEC over a 6-year period 2); using a

combination of four sites (Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS), and two possible

blending technologies (blending as UF6 and UNH); over an

approximate 15-to 20-year period; with continued storage of the surplus

HEU until blend-down occurs; and

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\ 2\ The transfer of 50 metric tons of HEU and 7,000 metric

tons of natural uranium from DOE stockpiles to USEC is specifically

mandated by section 3112(c) of Public Law 104-134. Both of those

transfers are components of the Preferred Alternative and this

decision. The delivery to commercial end users of the surplus

uranium transferred to USEC could not begin before 1998 pursuant to

the statute. Although the transfer of 7,000 metric tons of natural

uranium from DOE to USEC is not part of the HEU disposition program,

it is part of the same transaction as the transfer of 50 metric tons

of HEU, so the environmental impacts of that transfer are assessed

in section 4.9 of the HEU Final EIS.

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To blend down surplus HEU that has no potential commercial

value; using a combination of four sites (Y-12, SRS, B&W, and NFS), and

two blending technologies (blending as UNH and metal); to dispose of

the resulting LEU as LLW pursuant to Record(s) of Decision associated

with the Waste Management PEIS and any other relevant site- or project-

specific NEPA reviews 3; over an approximate 15-to 20-year period;

with continued storage of the surplus HEU until blend-down occurs.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\ 3\ For purposes of analysis of transportation impacts in the

HEU EIS, the LLW facility at DOE's Nevada Test Site (NTS) was

assessed as a representative site for disposal of LLW from the HEU

disposition program. The possibility that this material may be

received at the NTS facility is also reflected in the NTS Site-Wide

EIS (DOE/EIS-0243, draft published January 1996).

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

Because a portion of the surplus HEU is in forms, such as weapons

components, that would require considerable time to make available for

blending, it is anticipated that no more than 70 percent of the current

surplus HEU could be blended down and commercialized in the near term

(over the next 10-to 15-year period).

The preferred site variation is to use all four of the analyzed

sites. For purposes of analysis in the EIS, it was assumed that the

blending operations would be divided evenly among the four facilities

(25 percent to each) under this site variation. However, as noted in

section 2.1.2 of the HEU Final EIS, the defined alternatives and site

variations were not intended to represent exclusive choices among which

the decisionmaker must choose, but rather were proffered to define a

spectrum of reasonable alternatives. While the Department considers it

likely that each of the four analyzed blending facilities will be used

for part of the surplus HEU disposition program, it is highly unlikely

that the work would be so evenly divided, and there is no intent to

seek such a distribution. Section 4.5.6 of the HEU Final EIS explains

how impacts would change over the life of the campaign if the exact

fuel/waste ratio or division among sites were different. Because the

HEU Final EIS analyzes the impacts of site variations for the Preferred

Alternative that would involve blending 0, 25, 50, and 100 percent of

the surplus HEU at each of the sites, and concludes that expected

impacts would be low for many parameters (including radiological

impacts) during normal operations and within regulatory limits for each

site even if that site were to blend 100 percent of the inventory, the

impacts at any site from any possible distribution of the blending work

among the facilities would be low for many parameters (including

radiological impacts) during normal operations, and would be bounded by

the analyses in the EIS.

As noted in sections 1.3 and 1.4.2 of the HEU Final EIS, decisions

about the timing and details of specific disposition actions (which

facility or process to use) might be made in part by DOE, by other

government agencies, by USEC, by a private successor to USEC, or by

other private entities acting as marketing agents for DOE. In the case

of the 50 metric tons of surplus HEU that is being transferred to USEC

as part of this decision (see below), the choice of blending sites for

that work will be made by USEC or its private, corporate successor. The

quantities and other characteristics of additional specific ``batches''

of surplus HEU and the exact time and blending sites at which such

batches would be subject to disposition are unknown at this time, and

would depend on a number of factors, including the rate of weapons

dismantlement; the timing and rate at which any additional HEU may be

declared surplus; market conditions; legislative restrictions on

delivery to commercial end users (see Public Law 104-134); and

available throughput capacities and unrelated workloads at the blending

facilities. (See section VI.B.2, below, for a discussion of a possible

transfer of ``off-spec'' surplus HEU material to the Tennessee Valley

Authority.) Competitive bidding procedures--including both the

commercial and DOE facilities (the latter under their ``Work for

Others'' programs)--as well as facility availability and other business

considerations are likely to be key components of disposition actions.

DOE is preparing an HEU Disposition Plan, which will be available

shortly following publication of this ROD, that will provide additional

information concerning specific disposition actions that are expected

to commence during the next several years, as well as describe an

approach to other future, specific actions. The ultimate distribution

of blending work among the four facilities will be determined in

multiple individual decisions by multiple decisionmakers, based largely

on business and facility availability considerations, over a period of

up to 15-20 years.

This programmatic decision does not include within it the choice of

blending technologies for specific batches of HEU. The HEU Final EIS

analyses indicate that all three of the analyzed technologies (UNH,

UF6, and metal blending) could be used. As in the case of facility

selection, the choices of blending technologies are expected to be made

largely on the basis of business and technical considerations, and may

be made by DOE, USEC, USEC's corporate successor, or other

entities.4

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\ 4\ The UF6 blending technology will not even be

available unless the potential commercial blenders make the business

decisions to deploy it. If UF6 blending capability is not

developed, all blending for commercial use would use the UNH

process. If new blending facilities or processes are proposed in the

future, additional NEPA review would be conducted, as appropriate,

either by DOE or in connection with NRC licensing proceedings for a

commercial facility.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

A portion of DOE's surplus HEU inventory is in various forms of

irradiated HEU fuel (the total quantity of which remains classified)

from the Department's nuclear weapons, naval nuclear propulsion, or

nuclear energy research programs. The irradiated fuel is not directly

weapons- usable, is under safeguards and security, and poses no

proliferation threat. DOE is not proposing to process the irradiated

fuel to separate the HEU for down-blending as part of this decision.

There are no current or anticipated DOE plans to process irradiated

fuel solely for the purposes of extracting HEU. However, activities

associated with the irradiated fuel for purposes of stabilization,

facility cleanup, treatment, waste management, safe disposal, or

environment, safety, and health reasons could result in the separation

of HEU in weapons-usable form that could pose a proliferation threat

and thus be within the scope of this EIS. Under the Preferred

Alternative

[[Page 40626]]

and this decision, DOE would blend such recovered HEU to LEU.5 To

provide a conservative analysis presenting maximum potential impacts,

the HEU Final EIS includes such HEU (currently in the form of

irradiated fuel) in the material to be blended to LEU, as if such HEU

had been separated from the irradiated fuel pursuant to health and

safety, stabilization, or other non-defense activities. However, such

HEU may actually remain in its present form (without the HEU ever being

separated) and be disposed of as high level waste in a repository or

alternative pursuant to the Nuclear Waste Policy Act.6

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\ 5\ For example, weapons-usable HEU is anticipated to be

recovered from dissolving and stabilizing targets and spent fuel at

SRS pursuant to the analysis and decisions in the Final EIS (October

1995) and RODs (December 1995 and February 1996) on the Interim

Management of Nuclear Materials at SRS.

\ 6\ If HEU currently in irradiated fuel remains in its current

form, it would be managed pursuant to the analyses and decisions in

the Programmatic Spent Nuclear Fuel Management and Idaho National

Engineering Laboratory Environmental Restoration and Waste

Management Programs Environmental Impact Statement (April 1995) and

the associated RODs (60 FR 28680, June 1, 1995, amended by 61 FR

9441, March 8, 1996), and subsequent, project- specific or site-

specific NEPA documentation. Such spent fuel could be disposed of as

high level waste in a repository pursuant to the Nuclear Waste

Policy Act (42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.). DOE is in the process of

characterizing the Yucca Mountain Site in Nevada as a potential

repository for disposal of spent fuel pursuant to that Act.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

B. Basis for Decisions

DOE has concluded that the Preferred Alternative identified in the

HEU Final EIS would best serve the purpose and need for the HEU

disposition program for several reasons. In terms of the fundamental

nonproliferation objective, DOE considers all of the action

alternatives (2 through 5) to be roughly equivalent in terms of serving

that objective. Both 4-percent LEU in the form of commercial spent

nuclear fuel and 0.9-percent LEU oxide for disposal as LLW--and any

allocation between them--are considered highly proliferation-resistant

material forms, because both reprocessing of commercial spent fuel (to

separate the roughly 1 percent of plutonium it contains), and re-

enrichment of the 0.9-percent LEU to make HEU again, are

technologically difficult, time-consuming, and expensive.

In terms of the economic recovery objective of the program, that

objective is best served by the Maximum Commercial Use Alternative.

Commercial use would reduce the amount of blending that would be

required for disposition (a 14 to 1 blending ratio of blendstock to HEU

as opposed to 70 to 1 for waste) and minimize Government waste disposal

costs that would be incurred if all (or a greater portion of) the

material were blended to waste. The sale of LEU derived from surplus

HEU would yield returns on prior investments to the Federal Treasury.

As noted in section IV of this ROD, the Cost Comparison for Highly

Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives indicates that the Preferred

Alternative could save as much as $4 billion compared to the blend-to-

waste alternative. Under the best case, the proceeds from commercial

sales of 85 percent of the inventory could actually more than pay for

the entire HEU disposition program, including the blending and disposal

of the 15 percent that would still need to be disposed of as waste, and

yield $340 million to $770 million in net revenues. (As noted above,

however, this degree of commercialization may not ultimately be

achieved.)

Finally, as discussed in section III.C of this ROD, the analyses in

the EIS indicate that the Preferred Alternative would have somewhat

lower overall environmental impacts than the other action alternatives.

The Maximum Commercial Use Alternative would generate smaller

quantities of radioactive waste requiring disposal than would the No

Commercial Use Alternative. Adverse environmental impacts from uranium

mining, milling, conversion, and enrichment would be avoided by using

this material rather than virgin uranium to produce nuclear fuel.

Making beneficial use of the LEU derived from surplus HEU would derive

some environmental benefit (when compared to the blend-100-percent-to-

waste alternative) in return for the environmental costs that were

expended in making the HEU in the first place, thus conserving non-

renewable natural resources.

The Maximum Commercial Use Alternative would, as discussed in

section 4.8 of the HEU Final EIS, displace some uranium mining,

milling, conversion, and enrichment. However, in light of the provision

in the USEC Privatization Act that requires DOE to determine that its

sales of uranium would not have adverse material impacts on those

industries, and the rate at which DOE expects to be able to make

surplus HEU available for disposition, serious, long-lasting impacts on

those industry sectors is not anticipated. Mitigation of any such

impacts, as required by the USEC Privatization Act, is discussed in

section VII of this ROD, below.

An indirect impact of the Preferred Alternative would be the

creation of spent nuclear fuel (through the use of commercial LEU fuel

derived from surplus HEU in power reactors). However, since the LEU

nuclear fuel derived from surplus HEU would replace nuclear fuel that

would have been created from newly mined uranium without this action,

there would be no additional spent fuel that would not otherwise be

generated. The domestic spent fuel would be stored, and potentially

disposed of in a repository or other alternative, pursuant to the

Nuclear Waste Policy Act, as amended (42 U.S.C. 10101 et seq.), with

appropriate associated NEPA review.

With respect to the ultimate disposal of LLW material, certain DOE

LLW is currently disposed of at commercial facilities, and other DOE

LLW is stored or disposed of at DOE sites. A location where LLW derived

from DOE s surplus HEU can be disposed of has not been designated.

Disposal of DOE LLW would be pursuant to DOE's Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement for Managing, Treatment, Storage, and

Disposal of Radioactive and Hazardous Waste (DOE/EIS-0200-D, draft

issued in August 1995) (Waste Management PEIS) and associated ROD(s),

any subsequent NEPA documents tiered from or supplementing the Waste

Management PEIS, and any applicable project- or site-specific NEPA

reviews (such as the NTS Site-Wide EIS, currently in preparation).

Waste material derived from surplus HEU would be required to meet LLW

acceptance criteria of DOE's Office of Environmental Management. No LLW

would be transferred to any LLW facility until completion of the Waste

Management PEIS (or other applicable project or site-specific NEPA

documentation) and would be in accordance with decisions in the

associated RODs. Additional options for disposal of LLW may be

identified in other documents.

Continued storage of surplus HEU prior to blending may be required

for some time. The storage, pending disposition (for up to 10 years) of

surplus HEU at the Y-12 Plant (where most of the HEU is stored or

destined to be stored), is analyzed in the Environmental Assessment for

the Proposed Interim Storage of Enriched Uranium Above the Maximum

Historical Storage Level at the Y-12 Plant, Oak Ridge, Tennessee (DOE/

EA-0929, September 1994) (Y-12 EA). Impacts from storage, as analyzed

in the Y-12 EA, are summarized and incorporated by reference in the HEU

Final EIS (see section 4.2). Should storage of surplus HEU pending

disposition be required beyond 10 years, it would be done pursuant to

and

[[Page 40627]]

consistent with the ROD associated with the Department's Storage and

Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials Programmatic

Environmental Impact Statement or tiered NEPA documents.

C. Specific Action Decisions

1. Transfer of HEU and Natural Uranium to USEC

As a first concrete disposition action pursuant to the programmatic

decisions described in section VI.A of this ROD, above, DOE has decided

to transfer title to 50 metric tons of surplus HEU and 7,000 metric

tons of natural uranium to USEC for gradual sale and commercial use. In

addition to serving the objectives of the HEU disposition program,

these transfers are consistent with the Fiscal Year 1996 Federal

Budget, and are specifically mandated by the USEC Privatization Act

(Pub. L. 104-134, Sec. 3112(c)(1)).

Specifics concerning the timing of deliveries and the

characteristics and locations of material to be delivered to USEC (or

to blending contractors that USEC selects) are to be established in a

separate DOE/USEC Memorandum of Agreement pertaining to the transfers.

USEC or its corporate successor will make decisions concerning where

and when blending of the 50 metric tons of HEU being transferred will

occur, what technologies will be used, and when and how the resultant

LEU will be marketed (consistent with the USEC Privatization Act). It

is anticipated that USEC will utilize one or both of the commercial

blending facilities for down-blending, that the first transfers of HEU

will occur before the end of 1996, and that they will continue for

about six years. Under the USEC Privatization Act, USEC (or its

corporate successor) may not deliver this material for commercial end

use prior to 1998, and there are quantitative limits on annual

deliveries to end users (Pub. L. 104-134, Sec. 3112(c)(2)).

The transfer of 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium to USEC is not

part of the HEU disposition program. However, since it is part of the

transaction transferring 50 metric tons of HEU, the impacts of the

transfer are assessed in section 4.9 of the HEU Final EIS. This

material is in the form of UF6, and is part of a larger quantity

of UF6 that is in storage at DOE's Portsmouth (Ohio) and Paducah

(Kentucky) Gaseous Diffusion Plants, which are currently being leased

to USEC for uranium enrichment operations. The most likely disposition

of the 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium is eventual use as

feedstock for enrichment to nuclear power plant fuel, the usual

business of the enrichment plants. If it is so used, and follows the

typical path of such uranium, it would probably be enriched to about 2

percent U-235 at the Paducah Plant, then transported to the Portsmouth

Plant for additional enrichment to an appropriate commercial material,

generally about 4 percent. From there the enriched UF6 would be

transported to a commercial fuel fabrication plant for conversion and

fabrication of nuclear fuel. The analysis in section 4.9 of the HEU

Final EIS indicates that the environmental impacts from enrichment and

transportation of this material would be negligible. Commercialization

of the 7,000 metric tons of natural uranium by USEC is regulated by the

same USEC Privatization Act limits as described in the preceding

paragraph for commercialization of the 50 metric tons of HEU.

2. Down-Blending of ``Off-Spec'' Materials at SRS

A significant portion of the surplus HEU inventory, including most

of the approximately 22 metric tons of surplus HEU that is currently

located at the SRS site, is in various forms of off-specification or

``off-spec'' material which, when blended down, would not meet standard

U.S. commercial nuclear fuel specifications for content of the uranium

isotopes U-234 and/or U-236.7 As noted in section 2.1.1 of the HEU

Final EIS, such off-spec material might nonetheless be commercially

used as reactor fuel feed under certain circumstances, which might

involve blending to somewhat higher enrichment levels, and NRC license

amendments for reactors that would use the material.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

\ 7\ The quantities of the various surplus HEU material forms

located at SRS remain classified.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

DOE had previously decided, in two RODs pursuant to the Interim

Management of Nuclear Materials at Savannah River Site Final EIS (DOE/

EIS-0220, October 1995)(IMNM EIS), to use the H-Canyon and/or F-Canyon

and associated facilities at SRS for down-blending, as part of its

interim stabilization activities under the IMNM EIS, for UNH solutions

(60 FR 65300, December 19, 1995), and Mark-16 and Mark-22 (irradiated)

fuels (61 FR 6633, February 21, 1996). These materials are part of the

inventory of surplus HEU. The IMNM RODs stated that these HEU materials

would be blended down to LEU and then either oxidized using the FA-Line

in the F-area at SRS, or stored as LEU solutions pending decisions on

ultimate disposition.8

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\ 8\ As discussed in section 2.2.3.3 of the HEU Final EIS, due

to criticality issues, the FA-Line is not capable of oxidizing

material at commercial enrichment levels (4-5 percent), so that

facility would not be used for oxidation of the commercial material.

Rather, these LEU solutions will be stored at SRS until other

arrangements can be made for oxidation of commercial-enrichment

material. There are several options for providing for solidification

of UNH solutions at commercial enrichment levels at SRS, although

none is being proposed by DOE at this time. One option being

considered is construction of a private, commercial facility on land

leased from DOE at SRS. Such a private facility would need to be

licensed by the NRC, and would be accompanied by appropriate NEPA

review.

---------------------------------------------------------------------------

In addition to the materials noted above, there is also off-spec

unirradiated aluminum alloy HEU reactor fuel material located at SRS

and Y-12. Pursuant to this HEU ROD, DOE has decided that the

unirradiated HEU reactor fuel will also be down-blended at the F-Canyon

and/or H-Canyon and associated facilities at SRS, and will eventually

be sold for commercial use, if possible. The ability of SRS facilities

to withstand earthquakes is currently being reviewed. No surplus HEU

from decisions made in this HEU ROD would be introduced into the

canyons or blended in the canyon facilities until completion of the

seismic review. The HEU down-blending activities at SRS pursuant to

this decision will occur during a relatively limited period, subject to

facility operations and availability.

The SRS canyon facilities, with their large chemical processing and

separations capabilities, are capable of processing these off-spec

materials. Commercial blending facilities are reluctant to handle these

materials because of the resultant contamination of their facilities

with undesirable uranium isotopes. The UNH blending facilities at the

Y-12 Plant are also not considered likely candidates for blending of

such off-spec material, as their processing capacity and chemical

separation capabilities are much lower than the SRS canyon facilities,

and may be needed for future defense programs activities.

The USEC Privatization Act (Pub. L. 104-134, Sec. 3112(e)(1))

provides that DOE may transfer off-spec uranium to a Federal agency

without resale or transfer to another entity. Pursuant to the Act, DOE

may pursue discussions with the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA), a

Federal agency that operates several nuclear power plants, to try to

reach agreement on a demonstration of the use of off-spec LEU derived

from surplus HEU that would be down-blended at SRS.

[[Page 40628]]

3. Other Future Actions

DOE has no other concrete surplus HEU disposition actions under

specific contemplation at this time. DOE has decided that, when

additional HEU blend-down actions for either commercial use or for

disposal as waste are developed in the future, they could involve the

use of all four of the analyzed blending facilities. The commercial

facilities (B&W and NFS) are considered to be available for such

activities immediately. The SRS facilities may also be available for

blending some of the HEU. The Y-12 facilities are currently not

operational. Under DOE Order 425.1, Startup and Restart of Nuclear

Facilities, DOE must successfully complete an Operational Readiness

Review addressing operational health and safety issues prior to restart

of the Y-12 facilities. HEU operations are expected to resume at Y-12

in 1998. Thus, all four of the facilities would potentially be

available, and could be used for portions of the HEU down-blending, in

the timeframes that additional disposition actions might develop.

DOE is preparing an HEU Disposition Plan, which will be available

shortly after publication of this ROD, that will provide additional

information concerning specific disposition actions that are expected

to commence during the next several years, as well as describe an

approach to other future, specific actions. The plan will be updated

periodically based on industry response and program progress.

VII. Avoidance/Minimization of Environmental Harm

As discussed in section III.C. above, implementation of the

decisions reached in this ROD will result in low environmental and

health impacts during normal operations. However, DOE will take all

reasonable steps to avoid or minimize harm, including the following:

DOE will use current safety and health programs and

practices to reduce impacts by maintaining worker radiation exposure as

low as reasonably achievable.

DOE will meet appropriate waste minimization and pollution

prevention objectives consistent with the Pollution Prevention Act of

1990. As discussed in section 2.3 of the HEU Final EIS, segregation of

activities that generate radioactive and hazardous wastes will be

employed, where possible, to avoid the generation of mixed wastes.

Treatment to separate radioactive and non-radioactive components will

be employed to reduce the volume of mixed wastes. Where possible,

nonhazardous materials will be substituted for those that contribute to

the generation of hazardous or mixed waste. Waste streams would be

treated to facilitate disposal as nonhazardous wastes, where possible.

In addition to following such practices at its own facilities, DOE will

seek to include comparable requirements in any contracts with

commercial facilities.

Consistent with the requirement of the USEC Privatization

Act (Pub. L. 104-134, Sec. 3112(d)(2)(B)), DOE will determine, before

making sales of LEU derived from HEU for commercial use, whether such

sales would have adverse material impacts on the domestic uranium

mining, conversion, or enrichment industries, taking into account other

DOE sales of uranium and the sales of uranium under the Russian HEU

Agreement and the Suspension Agreement. Such determinations may be made

on a periodic basis (for example, for all contemplated sales over a

certain period), as opposed to a sale-by-sale basis. (No such

determination is required under the USEC Privatization Act for the

initial transfer of 50 metric tons of HEU and 7,000 metric tons of

natural uranium to USEC, as provided in section VI.B. of this ROD, or

to transfers to other government agencies [such as TVA] of off-spec

material.)

VIII. DOE Public Reading Rooms

Copies of the HEU Final EIS, the Cost Comparison for Highly

Enriched Uranium Disposition Alternatives, and this ROD, as well as

technical data reports and other supporting documents, are available

for public review at the following locations:

Department of Energy Headquarters, Freedom of Information Reading

Room, Forrestal Building, 1000 Independence Ave., SW, Washington, DC

20585, Attn: Carolyn Lawson, 202-586-6020

Albuquerque Operations Office, Technical Vocational Institute, 525

Buena Vista, SE, Albuquerque, NM 87106, Attn: Russ Gladstone

(contractor), 505-224-3286, Elva Barfield (DOE), 505-845-4370

Nevada Operations Office, Nevada Operations Office, U.S. Department

of Energy, Public Reading Room, 2753 South Highland Dr., P.O. Box

98518, Las Vegas, NV 89193-8518, Attn: Janet Fogg, 702-295-1128

Oak Ridge Operations Office, U.S. Department of Energy, Public

Reading Room, 200 Administration Road, P.O. Box 2001, Oak Ridge, TN

37831-8501, Attn: Amy Rothrock, 615-576-1216

Richland Operations Office, Washington State University, Tri-Cities

Branch Campus, 300 Sprout Road, Room 130 West, Richland, WA 99352,

Attn: Terri Traub, 509-376-8583

Rocky Flats Office, Front Range Community College Library, 3645 West

112th Avenue, Westminister, CO 80030, Attn: Dennis Connor, 303-469-

4435

Savannah River Operations Office, Gregg-Graniteville Library,

University of South Carolina-Aiken, 171 University Parkway, Aiken,

SC 29801, Attn: Paul Lewis, 803-641-3320, DOE Contact: Pauline

Conner, 803-725-1408

Los Alamos National Laboratory, U.S. Department of Energy, c/o Los

Alamos Community Reading Room, 1450 Central, Suite 101, Los Alamos,

NM 87544, Attn: LANL Outreach Manager, 505-665-2127

Chicago Operations Office, Office of Planning, Communications & EEO,

U.S. Department of Energy, 9800 South Cass Avenue, Argonne, IL

60439, Attn: Gary L. Pitchford, 708-252-2013

Amarillo Area Office, U.S. Department of Energy, Amarillo College,

Lynn Library/Learning Center, P.O. Box 447, Amarillo, TX 79178,

Attn: Karen McIntosh, 806-371-5400

U.S. DOE Reading Room, Carson County Library, P.O. Box 339,

Panhandle, TX 79068, Attn: Tom Walton (DOE), 806-477-3120, Kerry

Cambell (contractor), 806-477-4381

Sandia National Laboratory/CA, Livermore Public Library, 1000 S.

Livermore Avenue, Livermore, CA 94550, Attn: Julie Casamajor, 510-

373-5500

IX. Conclusion

DOE has decided to implement a program to make surplus HEU non-

weapons-usable by blending it down to LEU, and gradually selling as

much of it as possible for commercial use over time, as specified in

the Preferred Alternative in the HEU Final EIS, and including the

mitigation activities identified in section VII. This programmatic

decision is effective upon being made public, in accordance with DOE's

regulations implementing NEPA (10 CFR Sec. 1021.315). The goals of this

program are to support the United States' nuclear weapons

nonproliferation policy by reducing global stockpiles of excess fissile

materials so that they may never be used in weapons again, and to

recover the economic value of the material to the extent feasible. This

program will demonstrate the United States' commitment to its

nonproliferation goals, as specified in the President's

Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy of 1993, and provide an

example for other nations, where stockpiles of surplus HEU may be less

secure from potential theft or diversion than those in the United

States, to encourage them to take similar actions. The impacts on the

environment, workers, and the public from implementing this HEU

disposition program are estimated to be low for most parameters

(including radiological impacts) during normal

[[Page 40629]]

operations, and well within applicable regulatory limits.

The decision process reflected in this Notice complies with the

requirements of the National Environmental Policy Act (42 U.S.C.

Sec. 4321 et seq.) and its implementing regulations at 40 CFR Parts

1500-1508 and 10 CFR Part 1021.

Issued in Washington, D.C., July 29, 1996.

Hazel R. O'Leary,

Secretary.

[FR Doc. 96-19798 Filed 8-2-96; 8:45 am]

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