Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at Savannah River Site

DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Savannah River Operations Office; Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials at Savannah River Site

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Record of decision and notice of preferred alternatives.

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SUMMARY: The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) prepared a final

environmental impact statement (EIS), ``Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials'', (DOE/EIS-0220, October 20, 1995) to assess the potential

environmental impacts of actions necessary to manage nuclear materials

at the Savannah River Site (SRS), Aiken, South Carolina, until

decisions on their ultimate disposition are made and implemented. The

actions evaluated in the EIS would stabilize SRS materials that

represent environment, safety and health vulnerabilities in their

current storage condition or which may represent a vulnerability within

the next 10 years. These vulnerabilities are the result of the

suspension of nuclear materials production and processing operations

which accompanied the end of the Cold War. Although DOE has initiated

programmatic and project specific environmental evaluations on the

ultimate disposition of the nuclear materials in the DOE complex which

are

[[Page 65301]]

now surplus to national defense requirements, the implementation of

decisions regarding ultimate disposition will take several years. In

the interim, DOE wants to eliminate vulnerabilities associated with

certain current nuclear material storage configurations in order to

protect the environment and the health and safety of workers and the

public.

Several reviews conducted by DOE and the Defense Nuclear Facilities

Safety Board (DNFSB) have identified environment, safety and health

vulnerabilities associated with the continued storage of certain

nuclear materials at the SRS in their current location and physical

condition. The Final EIS evaluates alternatives for managing these

materials. In making the decisions announced in this Record of

Decision, DOE considered environmental and other factors, such as

costs, security and nuclear nonproliferation, facility usage,

technology availability, required new facilities, skilled labor

availability, minimization of continuing custodial care for the

materials, the need for maintenance or modifications to aging SRS

facilities, and, to the greatest possible extent, stakeholder concerns

and preferences.

DOE organized the nuclear materials at the SRS into one of three

categories: stable, programmatic, and candidates for stabilization. The

nuclear materials, the alternatives, and the potential environmental

impacts of implementing the alternatives are all described in detail in

the Final EIS. DOE is announcing its decisions with respect to most of

these nuclear materials today. With respect to the neptunium-237

solutions and targets and the plutonium-239 solutions, DOE has

determined that stabilization is necessary and has narrowed the

alternatives under consideration regarding how to stabilize these

materials. Upon completion of further analysis, DOE will issue a

subsequent Record of Decision to further specify the final

stabilization strategy for these materials. With respect to the Mark-16

and Mark-22 fuels, and other aluminum-clad targets, DOE has designated

new preferred alternatives and will announce its decision on the

management of these materials in an amended Record of Decision no

sooner than 30 days from the availability of this notice.

RECORD OF DECISION: DOE has decided to initiate actions which will

stabilize certain of the SRS materials that represent environment,

safety and health vulnerabilities in their current storage condition or

which may represent a vulnerability within the next 10 years. Based on

the analysis in the Final EIS, and the other factors identified above,

DOE has made the following decisions:

Stable Materials

DOE has decided that stable materials can be safely managed in

their existing physical and chemical forms over the next several years.

Programs and projects to consolidate storage of stable materials in

order to reduce surveillance and maintenance costs will continue. These

materials will remain stored at SRS until DOE makes decisions relative

to their future use or disposition.

Programmatic Materials

DOE identified nuclear materials at SRS which may be required to

support ongoing or planned programs after consultation with national

laboratories and other appropriate federal agencies, such as the

National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA). The bulk of the

following programmatic nuclear materials at the SRS are contained in

acidic solutions stored in tanks in the canyon facilities and would

otherwise be considered Candidates for Stabilization.

Plutonium-242

DOE has decided to process plutonium-242 solutions stored in the H-

Canyon facility to an oxide using the HB-Line facility. The plutonium-

242 oxide will be packaged into containers and stored at the SRS until

DOE makes programmatic decisions on its use or disposition.

Americium and Curium

DOE has decided to process solutions of americium and curium

isotopes stored in the F-Canyon facility into a glass matrix within

small stainless steel canisters, and to store the resulting canisters

at the SRS until programmatic decisions on use or disposition are made

by DOE. Vitrification equipment will be installed in an existing

portion of the F-Canyon facility (previously called the Multi-Purpose

Processing Facility). DOE has decided to continue the storage of metal

reactor targets and slugs containing americium and curium isotopes in

existing SRS basin facilities until DOE makes programmatic decisions on

their use or disposition.

Neptunium-237

DOE will dissolve, chemically separate and process neptunium

contained in the nine (9) obsolete reactor targets and will process

existing solutions in the H-Canyon to either a glass matrix using the

same vitrification equipment installed in F-Canyon or to an oxide using

the HB-Line facility. The final form of the neptunium-237 depends on

actions taken, if any, to consolidate certain activities in the F-

Canyon as outlined in a recently issued DOE staff report entitled

Facility Utilization Strategy for the Savannah River Site Chemical

Separation Facilities (December 1995) . The study principally considers

what effect the consolidation of two primary processing areas to one

would have on the ability to stabilize nuclear materials at the SRS.

Budgetary pressures and safety requirements as well as preserving

capability for future missions necessitates a thorough examination of

the options for these facilities. The report is available to the public

(see below). At this time, DOE is narrowing the potential stabilization

alternatives for the neptunium-237 from the four considered in the EIS

to either the oxide or vitrified (F-Canyon) form. As noted above, DOE

will issue a subsequent Record of Decision to specify which of these

two alternatives will be used to stabilize these materials.

To vitrify the neptunium solutions in F-Canyon, DOE would develop

or procure a container suitable for transporting the solutions from H-

Canyon to F-Canyon and make minor modifications to each facility to

support loading and unloading operations. DOE is currently evaluating

the feasibility of using a container designed for transport of

radioactive solutions which is licensed by the International Atomic

Energy Agency (IAEA). In order to process the solutions to an oxide,

DOE would start up a new portion of the HB-Line facility (Phase II)

which has never been operated. Neptunium recovered from the targets

will be processed along with the existing neptunium solutions into

either a glass or an oxide. The glass canisters or containers of oxide

would be stored inside the shielded canyon facilities or in a new

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility until DOE makes programmatic

decisions on their future use or disposition.

Candidates for Stabilization

Materials that are candidates for stabilization are in forms (e.g.,

liquid) that present inherent management risks, are stored in

facilities that were not designed for long-term storage, or both.

Generally, these materials currently present, or can be expected to

present over the interim period (approximately 10 years),

environmental, worker or public safety and health concerns or

vulnerabilities.

[[Page 65302]]

Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) Solutions

DOE has decided to stabilize highly enriched uranium solutions

stored in H-Area by blending them with depleted uranium at the SRS to

produce solutions containing low enriched uranium (LEU). DOE will make

minor modifications to the F-Canyon and H-Canyon facilities to enable

loading and unloading of the uranium solutions into containers for

transport between the facilities and install a spare dissolver in FA-

Line. The LEU solutions will either be stored in existing tanks at SRS

or converted to a low enriched uranium oxide using the FA-Line

facility. The final form of the HEU solutions after they are blended

down will be dependent upon the timing of DOE decisions related to the

disposition of surplus HEU and upon facility utilization considerations

related to cost and schedule.

Plutonium and Uranium Stored in Vaults

DOE has decided to stabilize plutonium and uranium materials stored

in vaults by (1) heating or repackaging the material into better

containers, and (2) dissolving some materials to chemically remove

impurities or radioactive decay products, converting the resulting

purified solutions to a metal, an oxide or a glass. DOE will determine

the appropriate method to use upon inspection and analysis of the

material in each package. DOE will use the H-Canyon, HB-Line, F-Canyon

and FB-Line facilities to process the materials and remove impurities

that contribute to the stability concerns. DOE will use the FB-Line

facility to convert resulting plutonium-239 solutions to a metal, HB-

Line to convert resulting plutonium-238 and plutonium-239 solutions to

an oxide, and a modified portion of F-Canyon to convert plutonium-239

solutions to a glass matrix. The use of the modified portion of the F-

Canyon will be subject to the successful vitrification of the solutions

containing americium and curium isotopes (see above) and additional

analytical laboratory work. DOE will use a glove box being installed in

FB-Line to package the plutonium metal. DOE has decided to construct a

new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility in F-Area to enable heating

and repackaging of plutonium metals and oxides to meet new storage

criteria (DOE Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides

(DOE-STD-3013-94)) and to provide space for consolidated storage of

plutonium and special actinide materials at SRS. The storage standard

imposes stringent requirements regarding the chemical stability of

plutonium metals and oxides along with requirements for design and

construction of packages used for storage of the material. The standard

identifies such measures as residual moisture content allowed in the

plutonium metal or oxide, materials to be avoided in contact with the

plutonium or used in the packaging configuration, thermal loading

limitations, and packaging seals, closures and containment features.

DOE will incorporate requirements of the IAEA into the design and

construction of the new Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to

provide the latitude for placing the nuclear materials under

international safeguards in the future. DOE is also pursuing

declassification of information related to the amount of plutonium that

would be stored in the new facility.

Mark-31 Targets

DOE has decided to stabilize Mark-31 targets (short cylindrical

metal slugs fabricated with depleted uranium and, if irradiated,

containing plutonium) by dissolving them in the F-Canyon facility and

chemically separating the plutonium and depleted uranium from fission

products and other constituents. The resulting plutonium solutions will

be converted to a metal using the FB-Line facility. Upon installation

of a new glove box in FB-Line, the metal will be packaged in accordance

with DOE's storage standard. DOE will use the depleted uranium

recovered from the Mark-31 targets for blending with highly enriched

uranium solutions in H-Area (see above).

Aluminum-clad Taiwan Research Reactor (TRR) Fuel and Experimental

Breeder Reactor (EBR)-II Slugs

DOE has decided to stabilize 81 canisters of failed fuel from the

Taiwan Research Reactor and one failed canister of de-clad metal slugs

from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-II by dissolving the materials in

F-Canyon and processing them in conjunction with the Mark-31 targets.

The failed fuel and de-clad metal slugs contain natural or depleted

uranium and plutonium, similar to the Mark-31 targets. The resulting

solutions containing plutonium recovered from the fuel and slugs will

be converted to a metal using the FB-Line facility. The plutonium metal

will be packaged in accordance with DOE's storage standard. The

depleted and natural uranium recovered from the fuel and slugs will be

used for blending with the highly enriched uranium solutions stored in

H-Area.

Plutonium-239 Solutions

DOE has decided to stabilize plutonium-239 solutions stored in the

H-Canyon facility to either a glass using the vitrification equipment

installed in a modified F-Canyon, an oxide using the HB-Line facility,

or a metal using the FB-Line facility. At this time, DOE is narrowing

the potential stabilization alternatives from the five considered in

the EIS to either the vitrified (F-Canyon), metal, or oxide form. The

final stabilization strategy would depend in part on actions taken, if

any, to consolidate certain activities in the F-Canyon as described

above for the neptunium-237 stabilization activities. As with the

neptunium-237 materials, a subsequent Record of Decision will be issued

to specify the final strategy for stabilizing the plutonium-239

solutions.

To vitrify the solutions in F-Canyon, DOE would move the solutions

from H-Canyon to F-Canyon using the same container as described above

for the transport of the neptunium solutions and also use the same

facility modifications for loading and unloading the container. The use

of the modified portion (the vitrification equipment) of the F-Canyon

would be subject to the successful vitrification of the solutions

containing americium and curium isotopes (see above) and additional

analytical laboratory work. In order to process the existing solutions

to an oxide in HB-Line, DOE would have to start up a new portion of the

facility which has never been operated. To process the solutions to

metal, DOE would move the solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon as

described for the vitrification alternative and would use FB-Line to

convert the solutions to metal.

Notice: Announcement of Preferred Stabilization Alternatives. DOE

also is announcing today new preferred alternatives for managing the

Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and the ``other aluminum-clad targets.'' In

the Final EIS, DOE identified continued storage (i.e., No Action) as

the preferred alternative for managing the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels

(aluminum-clad, highly enriched uranium fuel from SRS reactors) and the

other aluminum-clad targets (irradiated in SRS reactors) pending

further review of cost, schedules, and technical uncertainties

associated with dry storage techniques for failed fuel. DOE has since

completed its review of these issues and is now announcing the

designation of processing and blending down to low enriched uranium as

the preferred alternative for stabilizing the Mark-16 and Mark-22

fuels. DOE is also

[[Page 65303]]

announcing the designation of Processing and Storage for Vitrification

in the Defense Waste Processing Facility as the preferred alternative

for stabilizing the other aluminum-clad targets. DOE will issue a

subsequent Record of Decision on the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and the

other aluminum-clad targets no sooner than thirty (30) days from the

availability of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For further information on the interim

management of nuclear materials at the SRS or to receive a copy of the

Final EIS, the Facility Utilization Strategy Study, or this Record of

Decision contact: Andrew R. Grainger, NEPA Compliance Officer, U.S.

Department of Energy, Savannah River Operations Office, P.O. Box 5031,

Aiken, South Carolina 29804-5031, (800) 242-8259, Internet:

[email protected].

For further information on the DOE National Environmental Policy

Act (NEPA) process, contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of

NEPA Policy and Assistance, EH-42, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000

Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600, or

leave a message at (800) 472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

I. Background

The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, a predecessor agency of the

Department of Energy (DOE), established the Savannah River Site in the

early 1950's. The SRS occupies approximately 800 square kilometers (300

square miles) adjacent to the Savannah River, mostly in Aiken and

Barnwell Counties of South Carolina, about 40 kilometers (25 miles)

southeast of Augusta, Georgia, and about 32 kilometers (20 miles) south

of Aiken, South Carolina. The SRS mission for the past 40 years has

been the production of special radioactive isotopes to support national

programs. The primary mission was the production of strategic isotopes

(plutonium-239 and tritium) used in the development and production of

nuclear weapons for national defense. The Site produced other special

isotopes (e.g., californium-252, plutonium-238, americium-241) to

support research in nuclear medicine, space exploration, and commercial

applications. To produce the isotopes, DOE fabricated selected

materials into metal targets and irradiated them in the SRS nuclear

reactors. After irradiation and cooling, the targets and reactor fuel

were dissolved in acid and the special isotopes were chemically

separated and converted to a solid form, either an oxide powder or a

metal. The oxide or metal was fabricated into a usable form at the SRS

or at other DOE sites. The final form of the material depended on the

application (nuclear weapon component, encapsulated medical source,

power source, etc.).

Due to the large scale chemical separation capabilities at the SRS,

materials containing significant quantities of plutonium-239, uranium-

235, and other special isotopes were shipped to the Site for processing

and recovery. The materials were in a wide variety of physical shapes

and forms, including (1) small encapsulated plutonium sources returned

after use by national laboratories and domestic universities; (2) cans

or drums of scrap metals and oxides from weapons manufacturing

operations at other DOE sites; (3) irradiated metal fuel rods, tubes,

plates, or assemblies from experimental DOE reactors, university

research reactors, and foreign research reactors; and (4) cans,

bottles, or drums containing residues or samples used in laboratory

experiments at other DOE sites. All the materials were stored until

they could be dissolved and processed in the chemical separations

facilities (F-Canyon or H-Canyon). The small sources, scrap metals,

oxides, residues, and samples were typically stored in cans, bottles,

or drums in safeguarded concrete vaults. The irradiated fuel and

targets were stored under water in metal racks or buckets. The offsite

materials were typically processed in conjunction with the materials

produced at the SRS.

In March 1992, DOE suspended chemical processing operations in the

F- and H-Canyon facilities to address a safety concern regarding the

capacity of the F- and H-Canyon ventilation systems to withstand an

earthquake. That concern, involving the potential failure of the canyon

exhaust stack liner in the event of a severe earthquake, was addressed

through the preparation of appropriate response procedures, training,

and response drills. However, in April 1992, before operation of the F-

and H-Canyons could resume, the Secretary of Energy directed that the

SRS phase out defense-related chemical separations activities in these

facilities. World events in the late 1980's and early 1990's resulted

in the end of the Cold War and a reduction in the demand for new

material for nuclear weapons. As a result, DOE stopped operating the

SRS reactors to produce strategic isotopes. After the Secretarial

decision in April 1992, DOE did not process nuclear materials at the

SRS chemical separations facilities to recover special isotopes, with

the exception of scrap materials containing plutonium-238. DOE

continued the processing of plutonium-238 for use as a thermal power

source by the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) in

exploratory space missions.

By September 1992, SRS had developed plans to phase out chemical

reprocessing. The plans included actions for removing the material that

remained in the canyons, spent fuel basins, and storage vaults as a

result of the suspension of chemical separation activities in March

1992. In February 1993 the Site requested approval from DOE to restart

F-Canyon after the completion of operational readiness reviews

conducted as part of the response to the March 1992 safety concern. The

SRS made this startup request in light of the Secretary's direction to

accelerate the transition of F-Area reprocessing facilities to a

standby condition and because all contemplated actions were typical of

ongoing or previous facility operations.

During this same time period, DOE was developing new requirements

for the performance of operational readiness reviews prior to the

startup (or restart) of nuclear facilities. Under these requirements,

facilities had to be able to demonstrate the capability to perform

satisfactorily in relation to a broad range of topics associated with

the safe operation of a nuclear facility. DOE promulgated these

requirements in DOE Order 5480.31, ``Startup and Restart of Nuclear

Facilities'', which it issued in September 1993. DOE decided that the

SRS should apply these requirements to the F and H-Canyons and, in

November 1993, determined that the Site should hold the proposed F-

Canyon (and FB-Line) restart in abeyance until it had completed a

restart review in accordance with the new Order. In part due to

stakeholder concerns, DOE decided in January 1994 that absent an

emergency condition, there should be no further material processed in

the canyons (beyond processing of plutonium-238 for NASA) before

completion of an environmental impact statement.

On March 17, 1994, DOE published a Notice of Intent (NOI) (59 FR

12588) to prepare an environmental impact statement on the interim

management of nuclear materials at the SRS. The proposed DOE interim

management actions are to stabilize those nuclear materials at the SRS

that represent a health or safety concern for the public, workers, and

the environment and to convert certain materials to a usable form to

support DOE program needs. These interim actions are necessary while

DOE makes and implements long-term decisions on the disposition of

nuclear materials. DOE is addressing

[[Page 65304]]

long-term decisions in the Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement

for Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials, for

which it issued an NOI on June 21, 1994 (59 FR 31985), and in the

Disposition of Surplus Highly Enriched Uranium EIS (60 FR 17344, April

5, 1995) (for which the draft EIS was issued in October 1995 (60 FR

55021, October 27, 1995)).

The NOI for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials EIS

requested public comments and suggestions for DOE to consider in its

determination of the scope of that EIS, and announced a public scoping

period that ended on May 31, 1994. DOE held scoping meetings in

Savannah, Georgia, North Augusta and Columbia, South Carolina, on May

12, 17, and 19, 1994, respectively.

In May 1994, the Manager of the Savannah River Operations Office

recommended that the DOE Assistant Secretary for Defense Programs seek

alternative methods pursuant to the emergency provisions of 10 CFR

1506.11 to comply with the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) to

allow stabilization of plutonium solutions stored in F-Canyon and Mark-

31 targets stored in the L-Reactor Disassembly Basin.

In June 1994, the DOE Office of Environment, Safety and Health

performed an independent evaluation of the SRS request for alternative

arrangements for compliance with NEPA. DOE evaluated the SRS request in

light of the Office of Environment, Safety and Health's report and

determined that the appropriate action would be to accelerate the

evaluation of stabilization alternatives for the F-Canyon plutonium

solutions by preparing a separate expedited environmental impact

statement on this subject. In February 1995, following completion of

the F-Canyon Plutonium Solutions EIS and issuance of that Record of

Decision, DOE resumed F-Canyon operations to eliminate the risks

involved in storing plutonium in solution form.

DOE issued a Draft EIS on the Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials for public review and comment on March 17, 1995 (60 FR

14432). DOE has revised the Draft EIS in response to the comments

received in letters and electronic messages from individuals,

organizations, Federal and state agencies and comments received during

public hearings held in Savannah, Georgia (April 11, 1995) and North

Augusta, South Carolina (April 13, 1995). On October 20, 1995, EPA

published a Notice of Availability of the Final EIS on the Interim

Management of Nuclear Materials in the Federal Register (60 FR 54226),

following distribution of approximately 400 copies to government

officials and interested groups and individuals.

DOE prepared this Record of Decision in accordance with the

regulations of the Council on Environmental Quality for implementing

NEPA (40 CFR 1500-1508) and DOE's NEPA Implementing Procedures (10 CFR

1021). This Record of Decision is based on DOE's Final Environmental

Impact Statement on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials,

Savannah River Site, Aiken, South Carolina (DOE/EIS-0220).

II. Studies of Vulnerabilities of Storage of Nuclear Materials at SRS

The cessation of processing activities resulted in a large

inventory of nuclear materials being caught in various stages of the

production cycle (fabrication, irradiation, reprocessing, and isotope

recovery). These materials include irradiated and unirradiated reactor

fuel, targets, and components; solutions containing dissolved nuclear

materials and recovered isotopes in stainless- steel tanks; and product

and scrap forms of metals or oxides in containers (cans, drums, etc.)

typically used for temporary storage or shipment off the Site.

Between November 1993 and November 1994, DOE completed two

nationwide reviews of how nuclear materials are stored at the SRS and

other sites: Spent Fuel Working Group Report on Inventory and Storage

of the Department's Spent Nuclear Fuel and Other Reactor Irradiated

Nuclear Materials and Their Environment, Safety and Health

Vulnerabilities, and Plutonium Working Group Report on Environment,

Safety and Health Vulnerabilities Associated with the Department's

Plutonium Storage. The reviews identified vulnerabilities with the

continued storage of several nuclear materials at SRS: corroded spent

fuel and targets stored in water-filled basins; tanks with thousands of

gallons of acidic solutions containing plutonium, neptunium, americium

and curium isotopes stored in the canyon facilities; and packages

containing plutonium-bearing materials stored in vaults. The reviews

defined vulnerabilities as conditions or weaknesses that might lead to

radiation exposure to the public, unnecessary or increased exposure to

workers, or release of radioactive materials to the environment.

The Defense Nuclear Facilities Safety Board (DNFSB) is an

independent organization established by Congress to provide oversight

of DOE. In May 1994, the DNFSB transmitted Recommendation 94-1 to the

Secretary of Energy. In its recommendation, the Board observed that the

halt in production of nuclear weapons had frozen the manufacturing

pipeline in a state, that for safety reasons, should not be allowed to

persist unremediated. The Board concluded from observations and

discussions with others that imminent hazards could arise within two to

three years unless certain problems are corrected. The Board expressed

special concern about specific liquids and solids containing fissile

materials and other radioactive substances in spent fuel storage pools,

reactor basins, reprocessing canyons, processing lines, and various

buildings once used for processing and weapons manufacture. On August

3, 1995, the Chairman of the DNFSB transmitted a staff report to the

Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management identifying concerns

with leaking containers of corroded spent fuel stored in the Receiving

Basin for Offsite Fuel at SRS. The staff report from the Board

expressed concerns with DOE having previously identified all of the

nuclear materials in the basin as ``stable'' in the Draft EIS issued

for public comment.

III. Categories of Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site

DOE used information from the two nationwide reviews on spent fuel

and plutonium storage, an SRS site-wide review, and input from the

DNFSB to categorize the nuclear materials at SRS as either Stable or

Candidates for Stabilization. Stable materials have physical and

chemical forms that, combined with their storage configurations, do not

currently pose environmental, safety, or health concerns and are not

likely to pose a concern over the next 10 years. Candidates for

Stabilization are materials that exhibit or could be expected to

exhibit over the next 10 years, health, safety or environmental

vulnerabilities because of their physical condition, chemical

composition, or the manner in which they are stored.

DOE categorized materials containing plutonium-242, neptunium-237

and various isotopes of americium and curium as Programmatic after

consultation with national laboratories and other appropriate federal

agencies, such as NASA. The bulk of these Programmatic nuclear

materials are contained in acidic solutions stored in tanks in the

canyon facilities and would otherwise be considered Candidates for

Stabilization. Programmatic materials contain special isotopes that

could be needed to support DOE programs. In their current forms these

materials are

[[Page 65305]]

not usable and may not be suitable for continued safe storage. DOE may

use plutonium-242 in the nuclear weapons stockpile stewardship program.

Americium-243 and curium-244 are considered national assets for

potential support of research in nuclear medicine, nuclear chemistry,

solid-state chemistry, and nuclear physics. The higher isotopes of

curium (curium-244 through -248) are irreplaceable feedstocks for the

production of californium-252, which is used as a neutron source for

both military and industrial applications. DOE may use neptunium-237 in

the future production of plutonium-238 to provide a power source for

remote terrestrial and space applications. Future DOE decisions will

determine if these Programmatic materials will actually be used. Table

1 lists the nuclear materials at SRS in each category.

IV. Alternatives Evaluated in the Final EIS

DOE evaluated the following alternatives for managing the nuclear

materials: (a) Continued Storage (i.e., ``No Action'' within the

context of NEPA), (b) Processing to Metal, (c) Processing to Oxide, (d)

Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, (e) Processing and Storage for

Vitrification, (f) Vitrification, and (g) Improving Storage. As shown

in Table 2, DOE has evaluated the environmental impacts of managing the

nuclear materials using one or more of these alternatives. The

following is a brief description of each alternative.

A. Continuing Storage (No Action)

Under this alternative, DOE would continue to store materials in

their current physical form. DOE would relocate, repackage, or re-can

nuclear materials stored in vaults, tanks or basins to consolidate the

material or to respond to an immediate safety problem. Periodic

sampling, destructive and non-destructive examination, weighing, visual

inspection and similar activities would continue in order to monitor

the physical and chemical condition of the nuclear material. Chemicals

would be added to existing solutions in order to maintain concentration

and chemistry within established parameters. Repackaging would include

removing materials from a damaged storage container and placing them in

a new container or placing the damaged container in a larger container.

Re-canning would primarily entail placing damaged or degraded fuel or

targets in metal containers, sealing the containers, and keeping them

in wet storage.

Many activities would be required by DOE irrespective of the

management alternative used. For example, DOE would maintain facilities

in good working condition and would continue to provide utilities

(water, electricity, steam, compressed gas, etc.) and services

(security, maintenance, fire protection, etc.) for each facility.

Training activities would ensure that personnel maintain the skills

necessary to operate the facilities and equipment. DOE would continue

with ongoing projects to alleviate facility-related vulnerabilities

associated with storage of the nuclear materials and projects to

upgrade or replace aging equipment (ventilation fans, etc.).

As shown in Table 2, DOE designated Continuing Storage as the

preferred alternative for managing all stable nuclear materials and

metal targets containing isotopes of americium and curium. DOE also

designated Continuing Storage as the preferred alternative for managing

Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and other aluminum-clad targets until

additional reviews on dry storage technologies, costs and schedules

versus chemical processing techniques could be completed.

B. Processing to Metal

Under this alternative, DOE would convert plutonium nitrate

solutions to plutonium metal using the FB-Line facility. After

conversion, the metal would be packaged and stored in accordance with

DOE's storage standard. A new glove box is being installed in FB-Line

to provide the equipment necessary to meet the storage standard

criteria for packaging of plutonium metal. The plutonium metal would be

stored at SRS until programmatic decisions are made by DOE on long-term

storage or disposition.

The plutonium would come from existing nitrate solutions in H-

Canyon or would be generated as a result of dissolving and chemically

processing plutonium-bearing material in the F-Canyon. Existing nitrate

solutions in H-Canyon contain plutonium-239 and plutonium-242.

Additional plutonium-239 solutions would be generated by dissolving and

processing plutonium-bearing metals and oxides stored in SRS vaults,

Mark-31 targets, canisters of failed Taiwan Research Reactor fuel, and

a failed canister of de-clad Experimental Breeder Reactor-II metal

slugs.

DOE would design or procure a container to transport the existing

plutonium-239 and plutonium-242 solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon.

Some degree of uncertainty exists on the ability to transfer these

solutions from one canyon to the other. Minor modifications would be

made to the canyon facilities to support loading and unloading of the

solutions into the transport container.

As shown in Table 2, DOE designated Processing to Metal as the

preferred alternative for stabilizing some of the plutonium and uranium

vault materials, the Mark-31 targets, failed Taiwan Research Reactor

fuel, and the failed canister of Experimental Breeder Reactor-II slugs.

C. Processing to Oxide

Under this alternative, DOE would convert plutonium to an oxide in

HB-Line or FB-Line. The plutonium would come from existing nitrate

solutions in H-Canyon or would be generated as a result of dissolving

and chemically processing material in H-Canyon or F-Canyon. Existing

nitrate solutions in H-Canyon contain plutonium-239 and plutonium-242

and would be converted to an oxide in HB-Line. Additional plutonium-239

nitrate solutions would be generated by dissolving and processing Mark-

31 targets, canisters of failed Taiwan Research Reactor fuel, and a

failed canister of de-clad slugs from the Experimental Breeder Reactor-

II. FB-Line would require modification to convert the resulting

plutonium-239 solutions to an oxide. Plutonium-239 solutions and a

small quantity of plutonium-238 solution could also be generated by

dissolving plutonium-bearing metals and oxides currently stored in SRS

vaults. This material would be dissolved and processed in H-Canyon/HB-

Line and converted to an oxide in HB-Line. After conversion, the

plutonium oxide would be packaged and stored in accordance with the DOE

Criteria for Safe Storage of Plutonium Metals and Oxides (DOE-STD-3013-

94). Modifications would be made to the FB-Line facility to provide the

equipment necessary to heat and package the oxide in accordance with

the DOE storage standard or a new Actinide Packaging and Storage

Facility would be constructed.

DOE would convert neptunium-237 solutions to an oxide in HB-Line.

The neptunium would come from existing solutions in H-Canyon and from

dissolving and processing the obsolete reactor targets containing

neptunium in H-Canyon. Additionally, if one of the alternatives

involving dissolution and chemical separation (Processing to Oxide or

Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium) were implemented for

stabilization of irradiated SRS reactor fuels (Mark-16 and Mark-22),

neptunium would be recovered. After

[[Page 65306]]

conversion of the neptunium solutions to an oxide, the oxide would be

packaged and stored in the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility.

DOE would convert the americium and curium solutions in F-Canyon to

an oxide. DOE would modify an existing portion of F-Canyon to provide

the necessary equipment. After conversion, the americium and curium

oxide would be packaged and stored in an existing vault or the new

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility. DOE could also transport the

obsolete targets and slugs containing americium and curium isotopes to

F-Canyon, dissolve them and convert the resulting solutions in a

similar manner.

DOE would convert highly enriched uranium solutions to highly

enriched uranium oxide. To provide conversion capability, DOE would

complete the partially constructed Uranium Solidification Facility

(USF) in H-Canyon. DOE would also dissolve Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels

containing highly enriched uranium in H-Canyon and convert the

resulting solutions to an oxide in the same manner. The highly enriched

uranium oxide would be packaged and stored in a vault in USF until DOE

makes long-term management and disposition decisions.

As shown in Table 2, DOE designated Processing to Oxide as the

preferred alternative in the Final EIS for stabilizing plutonium-242

solutions, neptunium-237 solutions and targets, plutonium-239

solutions, and some of the plutonium and uranium vault materials.

D. Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium

This alternative is only relevant to materials containing highly

enriched uranium. Existing solutions of highly enriched uranium stored

in H-Area would be blended with existing depleted uranium at SRS. DOE

would modify the canyon facilities to support loading and unloading of

tanks used for transport and install a spare oxide dissolver in FA-

Line. The highly enriched and depleted uranium would be blended to

produce a low enriched uranium solution.

Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels containing highly enriched uranium would

be transported to either H-Canyon or F-Canyon by rail casks, dissolved

in nitric acid, and the highly enriched uranium separated from fission

products and other materials. The highly enriched uranium solutions

would be blended with natural or depleted uranium to produce low

enriched uranium solutions. The low enriched uranium solutions would be

converted to an oxide using FA-Line. The oxide would be stored in drums

in existing facilities or in a new warehouse constructed at SRS.

Dependent upon the timing of future DOE decisions, the highly

enriched uranium solutions and the uranium recovered from the

dissolution of Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels could also be dispositioned in

conjunction with other highly enriched uranium (by commercial sale,

etc.).

As shown in Table-2, DOE designated Blending Down to Low Enriched

Uranium as the preferred alternative for stabilizing highly enriched

uranium solutions.

E. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste

Processing Facility (DWPF)

DOE would perform research and development work to develop a method

for chemically adjusting existing solutions in the canyons in order to

transfer them to the high level waste tanks in F- or H-Area. The

research and development work would be to ensure nuclear criticality

safety due to the large amounts of plutonium-239 and uranium-235

contained in the existing solutions and to evaluate the effects on the

systems and facilities used to store and treat the liquid high level

waste. Upon completion of the studies, existing solutions containing

plutonium-239, plutonium-242, highly enriched uranium, neptunium-237,

and americium and curium isotopes would be chemically adjusted and

transferred to the high level waste tanks via underground pipelines.

Plutonium-bearing vault materials would be dissolved in either a

canyon or B-Line dependent upon the amount of material and the chemical

composition. The degraded reactor components (fuel and targets) stored

in water-filled basins would be transported by rail casks to F- or H-

Canyon and dissolved in nitric acid. The resulting solutions from

dissolution of the vault materials and reactor components would be

chemically adjusted and transferred to the high level waste tanks along

with existing canyon solutions. The solutions would be mixed with the

existing volume of high level waste stored in the F- and H-Area tanks.

The bulk of the radioactivity in the solutions would eventually be

immobilized in borosilicate glass by the Defense Waste Processing

Facility (DWPF). The glass would be contained within stainless steel

canisters that would be stored in an adjacent facility to the DWPF

awaiting geological disposal by DOE. The bulk of the liquid would be

immobilized by the Saltstone facility into a grout containing very low

levels of radioactivity. The grout would be poured into concrete vaults

located at the Saltstone facility.

As shown in Table-2, Processing and Storage for Vitrification in

DWPF was not designated by DOE as a preferred alternative for any of

the materials.

F. Vitrification (in F-Canyon)

This alternative would involve modifying existing space in the F-

Canyon, providing equipment to vitrify radioactive solutions using a

process similar to that developed for the DWPF. The equipment would be

much smaller in scale to that of the DWPF and the stainless-steel

canisters of glass produced would contain much higher concentrations of

actinides, including fissile isotopes. After completing the

modifications, DOE would vitrify existing solutions of plutonium-242,

plutonium-239, neptunium-237, and americium and curium isotopes. The

solutions stored in H-Canyon would be transported to F-Canyon for

vitrification upon development (or procurement) of a suitable shipping

container and upon completion of modifications to the canyon facilities

for loading and unloading.

Plutonium-bearing vault materials would be dissolved in either a

canyon or a B-Line and vitrified in the same manner. Similarly,

degraded reactor components (Mark-31 targets, canisters of failed TRR

fuel and the failed canister of EBR-II slugs) would be transported by

rail cask to F-Canyon, dissolved in nitric acid, and the plutonium

vitrified. The depleted or natural uranium contained in the reactor

components would be chemically separated and stored in tanks or used

for blending with highly enriched uranium (see description of Blending

Down to Low Enriched Uranium).

The obsolete reactor targets and slugs containing neptunium,

americium and curium would be transported to F-Canyon, dissolved in

nitric acid, and the programmatic isotopes chemically separated from

fission products and other materials. The resulting neptunium,

americium and curium solutions would be vitrified in conjunction with

the existing solutions containing those same isotopes.

Neptunium separated from Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels processing in F-

Canyon for blending down to low enriched uranium would be vitrified in

conjunction with the existing neptunium solutions.

As shown in Table-2, DOE designated Vitrification in F-Canyon as

the preferred alternative for stabilizing americium and curium

solutions and

[[Page 65307]]

some of the plutonium and uranium vault materials.

G. Improving Storage

This alternative would be applicable to plutonium-bearing materials

stored in vaults and degraded reactor components stored in water-filled

basins. Based on earlier DOE decisions to stabilize plutonium solutions

stored in F-Canyon (see background), DOE is modifying the FB-Line

facility by installing a glove box to enable handling and packaging of

plutonium without the use of plastic and other organic materials

(rubber, elastomeric seals, etc.). The existing plutonium metal stored

in vaults would be repackaged in FB-Line to meet the DOE storage

standard. DOE would provide the capability to heat, repackage, and

store plutonium oxide by modifying an existing facility (FB-Line or

Building-235) or by building a new Actinide Packaging and Storage

Facility in F-Area. The plutonium-bearing vault materials would be

repackaged to meet the DOE storage standard and would be stored at SRS

until DOE makes long-term storage or disposition decisions.

For degraded reactor components (Mark-31 targets, Mark-16 and -22

fuels, other aluminum-clad targets, failed TRR fuel, and the failed

canister of EBR-II metal slugs), DOE would remove the materials from

the basins and place them in dry storage. Because of technical

uncertainties (e.g., potentially pyrophoric hydrides of uranium,

elimination of potential reactive material) associated with the dry

storage of failed fuel and targets, DOE would perform additional

research to demonstrate concepts for drying and placing the materials

into canisters for storage. Work related to the dry storage of low

enriched uranium and commercial spent nuclear fuel has already been

done in the United States and other countries. This work has not

focused on aluminum-clad highly enriched uranium fuels. In conjunction

with this work, DOE would design and construct a Dry Storage Facility

at SRS.

A typical dry storage facility would be a Modular Dry Storage

Vault. This facility would consist of four major components: a

receiving/unloading area, fuel storage canisters, a shielded container

handling machine, and a modular vault for storing the fuel in storage

canisters. As a variation, canisters could be stored in dry storage

casks rather than a vault. The degraded fuel and target materials would

be removed from the basins and dried; canned or placed directly in

canisters; the cans or canisters would be filled with an inert gas to

inhibit further corrosion; and if cans were used, loaded into storage

canisters. This process could be varied as dictated by the condition of

the material. After the targets were loaded in a canister, a machine

would transport the canister to the modular storage vault. The vault

would consist of a large concrete structure with an array of vertical

tubes to hold the canisters. The canister transport machine would move

into the vault and load the canister into a storage tube. A shielded

plug would be placed on top of the tube. The transport machine and the

vault storage tubes would be heavily shielded to reduce radiation

levels from the canister. To use dry storage casks, the machine would

transport the canister to a cask (horizontal or vertical) and discharge

the canister into the cask, and then the cask would be sealed.

DOE evaluated the potential environmental impacts associated with

two variations for implementing this alternative. The first involved

the use of a traditional project schedule for design and construction

of the facility, estimated to take about ten years. The second was an

accelerated schedule for design and construction, estimated to take

about five years. Until the Dry Storage Facility was completed, DOE

would store the materials in existing basins, as described under

Continued Storage (No Action).

As shown in Table-2, DOE designated Improving Storage as the

preferred alternative for stabilizing some of the plutonium and uranium

vault materials.

V. Environmental Impacts of Alternatives

The Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear Materials evaluated

alternative stabilization methods for each category of nuclear

materials at the Savannah River Site, as shown in Table 2. DOE analyzed

the potential environmental impacts that would result from

implementation of the alternatives and believes there would be little

or no impact from implementation of any of the alternatives for any

material group in the areas of geologic resources, ecological resources

(including threatened or endangered species), cultural resources,

aesthetic and scenic resources, noise, and land use. Impacts in these

areas would be limited because facility modifications or construction

of new facilities would occur within existing buildings or

industrialized portions of the Savannah River Site. DOE anticipates

that the existing SRS workforce would support any construction projects

and other activities required to implement any of the alternatives. As

a result, DOE expects negligible socioeconomic impacts from

implementation of any of the alternatives.

Management alternatives requiring the use of the large chemical

separations facilities (the canyons and B-Lines) would have greater

environmental impacts during the time dissolving, processing or

conversion activities are underway than when these facilities are

storing nuclear materials. After materials have been stabilized,

impacts of normal facility operations related to management of those

materials would decline, and potential impacts of accidents associated

with those materials would be reduced with certain kinds of accidents

eliminated. Potential health effects from normal operations from any of

the alternatives, including those involving the operation of the canyon

facilities, would be low and well within regulatory limits.

Alternatives requiring the use of the canyons are: Processing to Metal,

Processing to Oxide, Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium, Processing

and Storage for Vitrification in the DWPF, and Vitrification (F-

Canyon).

Improving Storage alternatives generally have lower impacts in the

near term because they involve only heating, drying and repackaging the

nuclear materials. These alternatives also potentially involve the use

of new facilities, such as an Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility

and a Dry Storage Facility. The newer facilities would incorporate

improved designs for remote handling, shielding, containment, air

filtration, etc.; these improvements could reduce worker exposures and

releases to the environment below levels associated with existing

storage basins and vaults.

Annual impacts from normal operations and potential accidents

associated with material storage would be reduced after material

stabilization alternatives are implemented. Stabilization alternatives

requiring longer periods of time to complete are estimated to have

relatively higher impacts from normal operation and potential accidents

than alternatives requiring less time to complete.

Continuing Storage (or ``No Action'') alternatives are estimated to

result in relatively low annual environmental impacts, but the impacts

would continue for an indefinite period of time. Stabilization

alternatives typically are estimated to result in slightly higher

annual environmental impacts than ``No Action'' in the near-term, but

upon completion of the stabilization action, result in lower annual

impacts. Under Continuing Storage alternatives, no actions would be

taken to chemically or

[[Page 65308]]

physically stabilize the storage conditions and reduce the potential

for accidents. All of the stabilization alternatives, upon completion

of the actions required, are estimated to reduce the potential for

accidents and the associated consequences. Several of the stabilization

alternatives would involve a short-term increase in the risks from

accidents until the required actions are completed.

Emissions of hazardous air pollutants and releases of hazardous

liquid effluents for any of the alternatives would be within applicable

federal standards and existing regulatory permits for the SRS

facilities. Similarly, high level liquid waste, transuranic waste,

mixed hazardous waste and low level solid waste generated by

implementation of any of the alternatives would be handled by existing

waste management facilities. All of the waste types and volumes are

within the capability of the existing SRS waste management facilities

for storage, treatment or disposal.

SRS facilities that will be used to stabilize and store the nuclear

materials incorporate engineered features to limit the potential

impacts of facility operations to workers, the public and the

environment. All of the engineered systems and administrative controls

are subject to DOE Order requirements to ensure safe operation of the

facilities. No other mitigation measures have been identified;

therefore DOE need not prepare a Mitigation Action Plan.

VI. Other Factors

In addition to comparing the environmental impacts of implementing

the various alternatives, DOE considered other factors in reaching the

decisions announced here. These other factors included issues addressed

by the National Academy of Sciences in the 1994 report, Management and

Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium; the Office of Technology

Assessment's 1993 report, Dismantling the Bomb and Managing the Nuclear

Materials; comments received during the scoping period for the EIS on

the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials, and comments received on

the Draft and Final EIS's. The other factors considered are briefly

summarized in the following paragraphs.

Implementation of certain alternatives would require construction

and operation of new facilities. The new facilities described in the

EIS are: (1) F-Canyon Vitrification Facility (for the Vitrification (F-

Canyon) Alternative), (2) a Dry Storage Facility (for the Improving

Storage Alternative for degraded reactor fuel and targets currently

stored in basins), (3) a Uranium Solidification Facility (for the

Processing to Oxide Alternative for highly enriched uranium solutions

in H-Area and the Mark-16 and -22 fuel stored in basins), (4) an

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility (for the Processing to Metal

and Processing to Oxide Alternatives for plutonium-bearing materials,

for the Improving Storage Alternative for plutonium-bearing vault

materials, for the Processing to Oxide Alternative for neptunium-237

materials, and for the Vitrification (F-Canyon) Alternative for

materials containing plutonium and neptunium). Implementation of some

alternatives would require minor modifications of existing facilities,

as described in the EIS. Examples include minor modifications to the F-

Canyon and H-Canyon facilities to provide the capability to load and

unload radioactive solutions into containers for transport between

facilities and installation of a spare dissolver in the FA-Line

facility.

Preventing the spread of nuclear weapons has been a fundamental

national security and foreign policy goal of the United States since

1945. The current U.S. policy is summarized in the White House Fact

Sheet on Nonproliferation and Export Control Policy, dated September

27, 1993. This policy makes it clear that the United States does not

encourage the civil use of plutonium and, accordingly, does not itself

engage in plutonium reprocessing (that is, separation of plutonium from

spent nuclear fuel) for either nuclear power or nuclear explosives

purposes. In addition, it is U.S. policy to seek to eliminate where

possible the accumulation of stockpiles of highly enriched uranium and

plutonium. The stabilization alternatives vary in regard to the

attractiveness of the stabilized plutonium or highly enriched uranium

for use in nuclear weapons (either by the U.S. or an adversary). None

of the alternatives would denature or eliminate the plutonium from the

current inventory; it would still exist in some form. Of the

alternatives for stabilization of highly enriched uranium, only

Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the Defense Waste

Processing Facility and Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium would

reduce the inventory of highly enriched uranium. Because of the

potential concern regarding any processing and consolidating plutonium

or highly enriched uranium from the SRS inventory, the Secretary of

Energy has committed that any separated or stabilized plutonium-239 and

highly enriched uranium would be prohibited from use for nuclear

explosive purposes. This prohibition would apply to plutonium-239 and

highly enriched uranium stabilized through actions implemented by this

Record of Decision.

In the EIS on the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials, DOE

examined the potential impacts associated with an integrated

implementation schedule for management of nuclear materials. DOE

examined several combinations of alternatives, or management scenarios,

including continued storage of all the materials (No Action),

stabilization using the preferred alternatives for each material, and

alternatives requiring a minimum of chemical processing. DOE expects

that it will take at least 6 to 7 years to stabilize all of the nuclear

materials at SRS under any scenario due to the resources (primarily

trained personnel) required and the time required to make facility

modifications or construct new facilities. DOE has developed an optimum

schedule of proposed actions in response to DNFSB Recommendation 94-1.

DOE will revise and update the schedule as stabilization actions

proceed and as future budget considerations dictate.

DOE considered technology availability and technical feasibility in

reaching decisions on management alternatives. DOE considered the

extent to which technology development would be required and the

likelihood of success of such endeavors. All of the alternatives are

technically feasible. In general, however, the more alternatives vary

from the historical processes and facilities used at SRS, the greater

the technical uncertainty and extent to which new facilities or

modifications to existing facilities would have to be made.

DOE evaluated labor availability and the existence of core

competency at the SRS in reaching decisions on management alternatives.

DOE expects to use the existing workforce at SRS to implement the

management alternatives selected. There would be differences between

the level of personnel knowledge and training required for each

alternative. In general, as an alternative varies from historical

processes and facilities used at the SRS for material management,

additional training of personnel may be required. The more unique or

extensive the differences from past facility operations, the more

training may be required.

In reaching decisions on management alternatives, DOE considered

the fact that many SRS facilities are 30 to 40 years old and do not

meet all current DOE requirements for the design and

[[Page 65309]]

construction of new nuclear facilities. DOE and the DNFSB have

conducted many reviews to evaluate facility vulnerabilities and assess

facility compliance with current requirements. One vulnerability common

to many older facilities is that the facility could sustain structural

damage in the event of a severe earthquake. Rather than initiate

extremely expensive modifications, DOE has chosen to mitigate the

potential consequences of a severe earthquake by using engineering

safeguards, such as structurally reinforcing tanks, and administrative

controls, such as limiting the amount of radioactive material that can

be stored in a facility. Ultimately, removal of nuclear materials from

vulnerable facilities would reduce the risks. All of the alternatives

except Continued Storage (No Action) would support DOE's objective of

removing nuclear materials from vulnerable facilities in preparation

for decontamination and decommissioning.

Some level of custodial care will be required for the nuclear

materials as long as they are stored at the SRS, and DOE considered

minimizing the level of custodial care in reaching management

decisions. Radioactive solutions require the greatest amount of

custodial care to ensure safe storage, and radioactive materials in a

glass matrix (i.e., vitrified) are expected to require the least. Many

alternatives would produce concentrated oxide or metal forms that would

be packaged and stored in compliance with new DOE standards for storage

of nuclear materials. Compliance with the storage criteria will reduce

the need to handle and repackage the material and is intended to

minimize the future level of custodial care required.

In reaching decisions on management alternatives, an important

consideration for DOE was cost. DOE evaluated the costs of implementing

the various management alternatives for each type of material on both

an individual basis and collectively, as part of an integrated

stabilization program. DOE estimates it will cost approximately $3

billion to operate and staff the facilities used to stabilize and store

the SRS nuclear materials over the next 10 years. A large fraction of

this cost (approximately $2.8 billion) would be required for continued

storage of the nuclear materials even if DOE implemented no

stabilization alternatives (i.e., No Action). DOE expects annual costs

of operating and maintaining the facilities to decrease as nuclear

materials are removed, stabilized and consolidated for interim

management. DOE expects further reductions in costs as, and if,

facilities are deactivated.

VII. Environmentally Preferable Alternatives

As described in the Final EIS for Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials, certain management alternatives are expected to result in

lower environmental impacts than others. However, a single alternative

was rarely estimated to have lower impacts for all environmental

factors evaluated by DOE. For example, an alternative might be expected

to result in lower releases of hazardous pollutants to air or water

than the other alternatives, but might generate slightly higher amounts

of radioactive waste. DOE reviewed the environmental impacts estimated

for the alternatives evaluated for each type of nuclear material and

identified the following as the environmentally preferable for each.

The health effects from any of the alternatives are all low and well

within regulatory limits. Included below is a qualitative description

of how the identified environmentally preferable alternative compared

with the other stabilization alternatives for the environmental factors

that generally are of most interest.

Plutonium-242--Processing and Storage for Vitrification (DWPF)

Processing and Storage for Vitrification in DWPF is the

environmentally preferable alternative for stabilizing the plutonium-

242 solutions stored in H-Canyon. Processing and storage for

vitrification in DWPF is estimated to result in the lowest radiological

doses to the offsite public and the SRS workers; result in air and

water emissions of hazardous pollutants comparable to the other

alternatives; and result in the least amount of transuranic and mixed

waste generated among the alternatives with comparable amounts of high

level and low level waste.

Americium and Curium--Processing and Storage for Vitrification (DWPF)

Processing and storage for vitrification in the DWPF is the

environmentally preferable alternative for stabilizing solutions and

metal targets and slugs containing americium and curium isotopes. Of

the stabilization alternatives, processing and storage for

vitrification in DWPF is estimated to result in the lowest radiological

doses to the offsite public and the SRS workers; have the lowest level

of hazardous pollutant emissions to the air with comparable levels of

liquid effluent emissions; and result in the least amount of high

level, transuranic and mixed waste with comparable amounts of low level

waste.

Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable

alternative for stabilizing solutions and targets containing neptunium.

Although vitrification in F-Canyon is estimated to result in slightly

higher radiological doses to the SRS workers, it is estimated to result

in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite public. Similarly,

although it could result in higher airborne emissions of hazardous

pollutants, the levels of liquid effluent emissions would be comparable

to the other alternatives. Vitrification (F-Canyon) would generate the

least amount of high level, transuranic and mixed waste, and would

generate comparable amounts of low level waste to the other

alternatives.

Plutonium-239 Solutions--Vitrification (F-Canyon)

Vitrification in F-Canyon is the environmentally preferable

alternative for stabilizing the plutonium-239 solutions stored in H-

Canyon. Of the stabilization alternatives, Vitrification in F-Canyon is

estimated to result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite

public and SRS workers; result in comparable levels of hazardous

pollutant emissions to the air and water; and result in the least

amount of transuranic, mixed, and low level waste with comparable

amounts of high level waste.

Highly Enriched Uranium Solutions--Processing to Oxide

Processing to Oxide is the environmentally preferable alternative

for stabilizing highly enriched uranium solutions stored in H-Area

facilities. Although it is estimated to result in slightly higher

radiological doses to the offsite public and SRS workers, the

Processing to Oxide alternative has comparable levels of air and water

emissions to the other alternatives and would generate the least amount

of high level, transuranic, mixed and low level waste.

Plutonium and Uranium Vault Materials--Improving Storage

Improving Storage in the environmentally preferable alternative for

stabilizing plutonium and uranium vault materials. Although it is

estimated to result in higher radiological doses to the offsite public

and SRS workers, the Improving Storage alternative has comparable

levels of air and water emissions to the other alternatives and

[[Page 65310]]

would generate the least amount of high level and mixed waste, with

comparable amounts of transuranic and low level waste.

Mark-31 Targets--Improving Storage (Accelerated Schedule)

Improving Storage on an accelerated schedule is the environmentally

preferable alternative for stabilizing the Mark-31 targets. Improving

storage is estimated to result in lower radiological doses to the

offsite public with doses to the SRS workers comparable to other

alternatives; have the lowest estimates of air and water emissions; and

result in the generation of the least amount of high level and

transuranic waste with comparable levels of mixed and low level waste.

However, improving storage will not reverse or arrest the corrosion of

these targets and the release of fission products and radionuclides to

the basin water for the several years prior to the construction and

operation of the improved storage capability.

Failed TRR Fuel and EBR-II Slugs--

Improving Storage (Accelerated Schedule) Improving Storage on an

accelerated schedule is the environmentally preferable alternative for

stabilizing failed TRR fuel and EBR-II slugs stored in canisters in the

Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels. Improving Storage is estimated to

result in the lowest radiological doses to the offsite public with

doses to the SRS workers comparable to other alternatives; have the

lowest estimates of air and water emissions; and, result in the

generation of the least amount of high level, transuranic, mixed, and

low level waste. However, as with the Mark-31 targets, improving

storage will not reverse or arrest the corrosion of the fuel or slugs

and the release of fission products and radionuclides to the basin

water for the several years prior to the construction and operation of

the improved storage capability.

VIII. Decision

After completion of the Final EIS, DOE received several letters

from stakeholders on issues related to the interim management of

nuclear materials at the SRS. Letters were received from the following

individuals and organizations: DNFSB, U.S. Senator Strom Thurmond, U.S.

Representative Charlie Norwood, U.S. Representative Lindsey Graham,

U.S. Representative Edward J. Markey, U.S. Representative Frank

Pallone, Jr., the Energy Research Foundation (ERF), the Natural

Resources Defense Council (NRDC), and Governor David M. Beasley of

South Carolina. Two principal issues were raised in the letters: (1)

the method to be used for the interim- to long-term management of spent

nuclear fuel, and (2) the operational status of the F- and H-Canyon

processing facilities. The DNFSB, Congressional, and Governor Beasley

letters recommended that DOE stabilize the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels

through chemical treatment (processing), and that both the F- and H-

Canyon facilities be maintained in support of DOE missions and tasks.

The ERF/NRDC joint letter urged the Department to thoroughly consider

alternatives, to include the development of new methods, for the

management of spent nuclear fuel, and to consider carefully all

factors, particularly safety, environmental, nonproliferation, and

budgetary issues, in making its materials management and facility

utilization decisions. Congressmen Markey and Pallone's joint letter

urged the Department to pursue the closing of the H-Canyon at the

earliest possible date on the understanding that substantial savings to

taxpayers could be achieved. After careful consideration of the issues

identified in these letters (addressed below), along with the analyses

of environmental impacts and other factors identified in the Final EIS,

DOE has made the following decisions for the interim management of the

nuclear materials at the Savannah River Site:

Stable Material--Continuing Storage

DOE will continue storage of the stable materials in their existing

physical and chemical forms. Programs and projects to consolidate

material storage in order to reduce surveillance and maintenance costs

to DOE will continue.

Plutonium-242--Processing to Oxide

DOE has decided to process the existing plutonium-242 solutions

stored in H-Canyon to a purified oxide in HB-Line. The plutonium-242

oxide will be packaged and stored at the SRS. Processing to Oxide was

selected for many reasons. First, the facilities and equipment to

implement the alternative already exist, with HB-Line specifically

designed for converting purified plutonium nitrate solutions to an

oxide. The portions of the HB-Line facility required to convert the

solutions to an oxide are already fully staffed and operational,

nearing completion of plutonium-238 work in support of NASA. Although

DOE could transfer the solutions to the adjacent high level waste tanks

in H-Area along with other liquid high level waste for processing,

storage and eventual vitrification in DWPF (the environmentally

preferable alternative), the concentration of plutonium-242 would be

significantly diluted due to the existing volume of liquids contained

in the high level waste tanks (approximately 1 million gallons in each

tank). The dilution and mixing of the plutonium-242 with cesium,

strontium and other long-lived fission products contained in the high

level waste tanks would effectively render any future recovery or use

of the material impractical due to cost and technical complexity. In

order not to preclude its recovery while the future use of plutonium-

242 is being decided, DOE considers it prudent to stabilize the

material to a concentrated oxide form, thereby preserving its

availability for potential use. In evaluating the alternatives, DOE

determined Processing to Oxide could be implemented sooner than the

other alternatives, thus eliminating the need to further extend storage

of the solutions. Although Processing to Oxide is not the

environmentally preferable alternative, it is estimated to result in a

similar level of impacts. Processing to Oxide is estimated to have

slightly higher radiological doses to the public and worker

populations, but result in the least amount of high level waste for the

stabilization alternatives.

Americium and Curium--Vitrification (F-Canyon)--Solutions; Continued

Storage (No Action)--Metal Targets and Slugs

DOE has decided to process the existing solutions containing

americium and curium isotopes in F-Canyon to a glass contained within

small stainless steel canisters. DOE will modify an existing portion of

F-Canyon (previously called the Multi-Purpose Processing Facility) to

install the necessary vitrification equipment. The glass canisters will

be stored at the SRS until DOE makes programmatic decisions on the use

of the americium and curium. DOE has also decided to continue wet

storage of the reactor targets and slugs until such programmatic

decisions are made.

DOE selected vitrification in F-Canyon for several reasons. First,

no capability currently exists in either F-Canyon or its associated

facilities (FA-Line or FB-Line) to convert the americium and curium

solutions to a solid physical form suitable for continued safe storage.

DOE could transfer the solutions via underground pipelines to the

adjacent high level waste tanks in F-Area. The solutions, however,

would have to remain stored in the high level waste tanks until they

could be vitrified into glass by the DWPF (the environmentally

preferable alternative). Vitrification of the

[[Page 65311]]

solutions by DWPF would not occur within the next 10 years due to the

large existing inventory (34 million gallons) of high level waste which

must be vitrified in DWPF. Transfer of the solutions to the high level

waste tanks would result in significant dilution of the concentration

of the americium and curium isotopes due to the large volume of the

tanks (approximately 1 million gallons). The americium and curium

isotopes would also be mixed with long-lived fission products such as

cesium and strontium if transferred to the high level waste tanks. The

vitrified glass form produced in DWPF would contain very dilute

quantities of americium and curium combined with highly radioactive

fission products. This would render use of the americium and curium

isotopes impractical due to the technical complexity and cost of future

recovery.

To maintain the americium and curium in a concentrated physical

form, thus preserving their potential future use, DOE evaluated

alternatives for converting the solutions to either an oxide or glass.

Either form could support future use of the material, if required. The

conversion process associated with the two alternatives would require a

similar level of modifications and new equipment to be installed in F-

Canyon. However, DOE found that the glass form offers significant

advantages over the oxide form for future storage and handling. The

glass matrix produced by the vitrification process provides some

``self-shielding'' compared to oxide. This reduces the radiation levels

associated with the glass form, thereby reducing exposure to workers.

The glass matrix is also a much less dispersible form of radioactive

material compared to the oxide in the event of a severe facility-

related accident, such as a major fire. Americium and curium isotopes

do not pose a nonproliferation concern, irrespective of their physical

form. Existing personnel at SRS will be used to operate the facilities

and equipment required, and the level of additional training required

would be similar whether DOE selected conversion to oxide or glass.

DOE has decided to maintain storage of the metal targets and slugs

containing significant quantities of americium and curium isotopes in

the existing storage basins at SRS primarily because there is not an

immediate need for the isotopes. The targets are stored in the

Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF). The RBOF facility has

excellent water chemistry and the targets are in good physical

condition, capable of being safely stored over the next 10 years. The

metal slugs represent a very small amount of nuclear material whose

continued storage can be accommodated by relocation to either the RBOF

facility or the K-Reactor disassembly basin. DOE has made physical

upgrades to the K-Reactor disassembly basin to provide storage

conditions comparable to those in RBOF. By maintaining the targets and

slugs in storage at the SRS, DOE can preserve the option of recovering,

if needed, the americium and curium isotopes at a later date for

programmatic use. The targets and slugs contain varying amounts and

isotopes of americium and curium. It would not necessarily be

advantageous for DOE to process and recover all of the americium and

curium isotopes into a single physical form for continued storage,

because such an operation would result in the mixing of many isotopes,

increasing the technical complexity of their future separation and

recovery or making it impractical.

Neptunium-237--Vitrification (F-Canyon) or Processing to Oxide

DOE has narrowed its alternatives under consideration for the

stabilization of the neptunium-237 materials (neptunium contained in

the H-Canyon solutions and nine (9) obsolete reactor targets) into

either one of two physical forms: (1) a glass matrix using the same

modified portion of F-Canyon used to vitrify the americium and curium

solutions (the environmentally preferable alternative), or (2) a

purified oxide using the HB-Line facility. Only one of these

stabilization methods will be used. Both the vitrified glass and oxide

forms can be stored safely pending DOE's decision on use or

disposition. To implement the vitrification alternative, DOE would move

the neptunium solutions from H-Area to F-Area using a special truck

container designed for transport of highly radioactive solutions. The

nine (9) obsolete reactor targets containing neptunium would be

transported to F-Canyon in shielded casks, dissolved and the neptunium

chemically separated from radioactive decay products and other

impurities. The resulting purified neptunium solution would be

vitrified in F-Canyon. SRS would store the canisters of neptunium glass

until programmatic decisions on neptunium's use are made by DOE. To

implement the Processing to Oxide alternative, DOE would start up and

operate the Phase II portion of the HB-Line facility and would dissolve

and process the obsolete reactor targets in H-Canyon.

Potential environmental impacts, as detailed in the Interim

Management of Nuclear Materials EIS, of implementing any of the

stabilization alternatives, irrespective of location, are low and well

within acceptable regulatory and management limits. In addition, there

are no substantial differences in potential environmental impacts

should DOE operate either or both canyon facilities.

The final form of the neptunium depends on actions taken, if any,

to consolidate certain activities in the F-Canyon as outlined in the

facility utilization strategy report. The study principally considers

what effect the consolidation of two primary processing areas to one

would have on the ability to stabilize nuclear materials at the SRS.

Budgetary pressures and safety requirements as well as preserving

capability for future missions necessitates a thorough examination of

the options for these facilities. The report is available to the

public. A subsequent Record of Decision will be issued when DOE's

review of the utilization strategy, the EIS, and the other relevant

factors is complete.

Highly Enriched Uranium Solutions--Blending Down to Low Enriched

Uranium

DOE has selected Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium for

stabilization of highly enriched uranium (HEU) solutions. These include

existing HEU solutions stored in H-Area facilities and any HEU

solutions produced in conjunction with the stabilization of other

materials (e.g., plutonium and uranium vault materials). DOE will

modify portions of the F- and H-Canyon facilities to provide the

capability to load and unload containers for the transport of depleted,

natural or low enriched uranium solutions. DOE will dissolve depleted

uranium oxide in FA-Line. DOE will transport depleted uranium solutions

to H-Area for blending with the highly enriched uranium solutions. The

resulting low enriched uranium solutions will be transported back to F-

Area and converted to an oxide in FA-Line. The low enriched uranium

oxide will be stored at SRS until disposition decisions can be

implemented.

DOE selected this stabilization alternative for several reasons.

Blending down the highly enriched uranium will reduce DOE's inventory

of this weapons-useable fissile material. This alternative can be

implemented expeditiously at relatively low cost. Processing the

solutions to a highly enriched uranium oxide (the environmentally

preferable alternative) would require the completion and startup of the

Uranium Solidification Facility. Processing for storage and

vitrification in the DWPF would extend

[[Page 65312]]

the period of HEU solution storage with its attendant vulnerabilities

while mechanisms are developed to assure the safe transfer and

stabilization of this fissile material through the affected facilities.

Plutonium and Uranium Stored in Vaults--Improving Storage, Processing

to Metal, Processing to Oxide, and Vitrification (F-Canyon)

DOE has decided to use a variety of alternatives to stabilize

plutonium and uranium materials stored in vaults at SRS. DOE is

installing a glove box in FB-Line (based upon previous decisions to

stabilize F-Canyon plutonium solutions--see ``Background'') to provide

the capability to handle and package plutonium metal without the use of

plastic and other organic materials (rubber, elastomeric seals, etc.).

This will provide SRS the capability to package (or repackage)

plutonium metal in accordance with the DOE storage standard. Upon

completion of the FB-Line modifications, DOE will repackage plutonium

metal stored at SRS in accordance with the storage standard. This

implements the environmentally preferable alternative for the candidate

plutonium metals.

DOE will dissolve some of the existing vault materials that are

Candidates for Stabilization in FB-Line and F-Canyon, and H-Canyon and

HB-Line, chemically separate the plutonium from impurities that

contribute to the stability concerns and radioactive decay products,

and process the plutonium to a metal in FB-Line and an oxide in HB-

Line. After vitrification of the americium and curium solutions in F-

Canyon (see above) and subject to successful analytical laboratory

work, timing and facility availability, and future decisions on

plutonium disposition, DOE may stabilize some of the plutonium-bearing

vault materials by vitrification in F-Canyon. DOE will dissolve vault

materials containing scrap amounts of plutonium-238 that require

chemical stabilization in HB-Line, chemically separate the plutonium-

238 from impurities that contribute to the stability concerns and

radioactive decay products, and convert the plutonium-238 to an oxide

in HB-Line. The plutonium-238 oxide will be stored in an existing SRS

vault.

DOE has decided to construct an Actinide Packaging and Storage

Facility to provide the capability for handling, heating and packaging

of plutonium oxide and metal in accordance with the storage standard

(the environmentally preferable alternative) and to provide space

necessary to consolidate storage of plutonium and special actinides at

the SRS. DOE will incorporate requirements of the IAEA into the design

and construction of the facility to provide the latitude for future

international safeguards inspections. DOE is also pursuing

declassification of information related to the amount of plutonium

resulting from stabilization actions at the SRS that will be stored in

the new packaging and storage facility.

The plutonium oxide and existing SRS vault materials that do not

require chemical processing for stabilization, will be heated and

repackaged in the Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility to meet

criteria in the DOE storage standard. The amount of vault materials

stabilized using each of the methods will be dependent upon: (a) the

physical condition and chemical composition of the material (which DOE

will determine upon opening each of the containers or packages inside a

glove box in either FB-Line or HB-Line) and, (b) the availability of

the required facilities. The plutonium will be stored at SRS until DOE

can implement long-term storage or disposition decisions. Uranium

recovered from the chemical stabilization of any vault materials will

be blended down to low enriched uranium and the solutions will be

stored or converted to an oxide, as described under the stabilization

of highly enriched uranium solutions.

As previously discussed, the Improving Storage alternative is the

environmentally preferable alternative. The environmental impacts

associated with the other alternatives selected for stabilization of

vault materials which require chemical processing (i.e., Processing to

Metal, Processing to Oxide, and Vitrification in F-Canyon) all involve

slightly higher but similar levels of impacts.

As explained in the Final EIS, some of the containers stored in

vaults at SRS have internal packaging configurations which are unknown

and the exact chemical composition of the material inside the

containers may also be unknown, with the exception of its content of

special nuclear materials. Because of the unknown content of some of

the vault containers, and in light of pending DOE decisions on long-

term management or disposition of surplus materials, several

stakeholder groups have raised concerns regarding DOE's current and

future compliance with the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(RCRA). DOE has provided existing information on the vault materials

and other materials stored at SRS to the applicable regulatory agency

for RCRA at SRS, the South Carolina Department of Health and

Environmental Control (SCDHEC). DOE is continuing the dialog with

SCDHEC on the applicability of RCRA to any of the nuclear materials

that will be stabilized as a result of this Record of Decision and will

take appropriate management actions, as necessary to ensure compliance

with RCRA.

Mark-31 Targets--Processing to Metal

DOE has selected Processing to Metal for stabilization of the Mark-

31 targets stored in the F-Canyon basin, reactor disassembly basins and

the Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuels (RBOF). DOE will dissolve the

Mark-31 targets in F-Canyon and chemically separate the plutonium and

depleted uranium from fission products and other materials. The

plutonium solutions will be processed to metal in FB-Line. After

modification of the FB-Line (see vault materials above), the metal will

be packaged to meet the DOE storage standard. The plutonium metal will

remain at SRS until DOE can implement long-term storage or disposition

decisions on weapons usable forms of plutonium. The depleted uranium

solutions recovered from dissolving the targets will be used to blend-

down the highly enriched uranium solutions in H-Area (see highly

enriched uranium solutions discussion above).

The stabilization of the Mark-31 targets by processing to metal can

be accomplished one and one-half to nine years earlier than the other

stabilization alternatives (four to nine years earlier than Improved

Storage (the environmentally preferable alternative)). DOE believes

further delay in removing the Mark-31 targets from wet basin storage

where they have undergone significant corrosion and release of fission

and radioactive products would serve no practicable purpose. This

selected stabilization alternative relies upon existing operating

equipment and trained personnel; the stabilized plutonium metal will be

repackaged in conformance with DOE's storage standard within 3 years

using the FB-Line bagless transfer facility. The technical uncertainty

for this alternative is very low and the associated costs are well

established. Potential waste generation impacts are comparable to the

other alternatives, but greater than the environmentally preferable

alternative for high level and transuranic waste, but lower for

hazardous/mixed and low level radioactive wastes. Potential safety and

health impacts to workers and the public are comparable for all the

stabilization alternatives. Potential impacts to air and water

resources are comparable to the other processing alternatives, and

greater, but well within

[[Page 65313]]

regulatory and management control limits, than the Improved Storage

alternatives. Processing and Storage for Vitrification in DWPF would

make the plutonium more difficult to recover than the selected

alternative. However, this alternative would also require the extended

wet storage of these targets, continuing their corrosion and the

release of fission and radioactive products to the basin water.

The selected stabilization action will result in plutonium metal, a

weapons-useable product. However, the quantity produced will be a small

fraction of DOE's existing inventory of plutonium metal, and DOE

believes this small amount does not present nuclear proliferation

concerns. None of the stabilization alternatives would denature the

plutonium to preclude its recovery and use in nuclear weapons

manufacture. The plutonium metal produced from this stabilization

action will be prohibited for use in nuclear weapons. In addition, DOE

is pursuing options for placing this material under international

safeguards (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency).

Taiwan Research Reactor Fuel and Experimental Breeder Reactor-II

Slugs--Processing to Metal

The 81 canisters of failed Taiwan Research Reactor fuel and a

single canister of Experimental Breeder Reactor-II slugs will be

dissolved in F-Canyon and the plutonium recovered will be converted to

a metal in FB-Line. The processing of these materials will be done in

conjunction with processing of the Mark-31 targets (see above). Upon

installation of the new glove box in FB-Line, the plutonium metal will

be packaged in accordance with the DOE storage standard and be placed

in an SRS vault until long-term storage or disposition decisions can be

implemented on weapons usable plutonium. Natural or depleted uranium

recovered by processing the fuel and slugs located in a failed canister

will be stored at SRS in tanks or used to support blending down of

highly enriched uranium solutions (see above).

DOE selected processing to metal for the Taiwan Research Reactor

fuel and Experimental Breeder Reactor-II slugs for similar reasons as

described for the Mark-31 targets. These materials are very similar in

composition to the Mark-31 targets and can be stabilized concurrently,

four to nine years earlier than the environmentally preferred

alternative (Improving Storage--Accelerated Schedule). Potential waste

generation impacts from the selected alternative are greater than those

of the environmentally preferable alternative, but less than potential

high-level waste impacts (equivalent DWPF canisters) from the

Processing and Storage for Vitrification in DWPF alternative. The

Processing and Storage for Vitrification in DWPF would make the

plutonium more difficult to recover. However, this alternative would

require the extended wet storage of these elements, continuing their

corrosion and the release of fission and radioactive products to the

basin water.

As with the Mark-31 targets, the plutonium metal produced would be

in a form that is weapons-useable. None of the stabilization

alternatives would denature the plutonium to preclude its recovery and

use in nuclear weapons manufacture. The quantity of plutonium to be

produced is such a small amount (a very small fraction) of DOE's

current plutonium metal inventory that, standing alone, it does not

present nuclear proliferation concerns. The plutonium metal produced

will be prohibited for use in nuclear weapons. In addition, DOE is

pursuing options for placing this material under international

safeguards (e.g., International Atomic Energy Agency).

If after removing the Mark-31 targets, failed TRR fuel, and the

failed canister of EBR-II slugs from RBOF, DOE determines that

additional fuel, targets, or canisters have failed, as indicated by gas

releases from a canister, or visible failure of cladding or canisters,

DOE would categorize those materials as Candidates for Stabilization.

DOE would perform the appropriate National Environmental Policy Act

review and evaluation for the stabilization of any additional materials

in RBOF that may be determined at a later date to have failed (e.g.,

Supplement Analysis).

Potential environmental impacts, as detailed in the Interim

Management of Nuclear Materials EIS, of implementing any of the

stabilization alternatives, irrespective of location, are low and well

within acceptable regulatory and management limits. In addition, there

are no substantial differences in potential environmental impacts

should DOE operate either or both canyon facilities. DOE is considering

this study and the results of the Interim Management of Nuclear

Materials EIS, and at this time is announcing a narrowing of potential

stabilization alternatives for the following materials.

Plutonium-239 Solutions--Processing to Metal, Processing to Oxide, or

Vitrification (F-Canyon)

DOE will stabilize the existing plutonium-239 solutions stored in

H-Canyon using one of three alternatives: (1) Processing the solutions

to an oxide in HB-Line, (2) processing to a glass matrix by vitrifying

the solutions in F-Canyon (the environmentally preferable alternative),

or (3) processing to a metal in FB-Line. Only one of these

stabilization methods will be used. To implement the processing to

oxide alternative, DOE would start up and operate Phase II of the HB-

Line facility. The oxide produced would be packaged and stored in an

existing vault at SRS until the new Actinide Packaging and Storage

Facility is constructed. To implement the vitrification alternative,

DOE would transport the solutions from H-Canyon to F-Canyon using a

special truck/container as described above for the movement of the

neptunium solutions and the modifications made to F- and H-Canyon for

loading/unloading of the solutions. The plutonium would be vitrified in

F-Canyon using the equipment installed for vitrification of the

americium and curium solutions. The canisters of plutonium glass would

be stored in an existing SRS vault or the Actinide Packaging and

Storage Facility, upon construction. To implement the processing to

metal alternative, DOE would transfer the solutions to F-Canyon in the

same manner as the vitrification alternative. The plutonium would be

converted to a metal using the currently operating F-Canyon and FB-Line

facilities. The metal would be packaged in conformance with DOE's

storage standard and stored in an existing vault at SRS until the new

Actinide Packaging and Storage Facility is available. Using any of

these methods, the form of the plutonium (metal, glass matrix or oxide)

will remain stored at SRS until DOE implements long-term storage and

disposition decisions on weapons usable forms of plutonium. If

vitrification of the plutonium solutions cannot be supported for

technical or programmatic reasons, but the solutions are transferred to

F-Canyon, then DOE will stabilize the plutonium by conversion to metal

using the F-Canyon and FB-Line facilities.

One of the stabilization alternatives remaining under consideration

(Processing to Metal) would result in plutonium metal, a weapons-

useable product. However, the quantity produced will be a small

fraction of DOE's existing inventory of plutonium metal, and DOE

believes this small amount does not present nuclear proliferation

concerns. None of the stabilization alternatives would denature the

plutonium to preclude its recovery and used in nuclear weapons

manufacture. The plutonium metal produced from this stabilization

action will be prohibited to be used for nuclear

[[Page 65314]]

explosive purposes. In addition, DOE is pursuing options for placing

this material under international safeguards (e.g., International

Atomic Energy Agency).

Potential environmental impacts, as detailed in the Interim

Management of Nuclear Materials EIS, of implementing any of the

stabilization alternatives, irrespective of location, are low and well

within acceptable regulatory and management limits. In addition, there

are no substantial differences in potential environmental impacts

should DOE operate either or both canyon facilities.

The final form of the plutonium solutions depends on actions taken,

if any, to consolidate certain activities in the F-Canyon as outlined

in the facility utilization strategy report. A subsequent Record of

Decision will be issued when DOE's review of the utilization strategy,

the EIS, and the other relevent factors is complete.

IX. Preferred Alternatives for Stabilizing Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels

and Other Aluminum-clad Targets

In addition to reaching decisions on the management and

alternatives under consideration for the materials described above, DOE

is now designating its preferred alternatives for stabilization of the

Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels and Other Aluminum-clad Targets. As explained

in the Final EIS, DOE identified Continued Storage (No Action) as the

preferred alternative for management of these materials pending further

analysis of whether alternatives involving chemical processing or dry

storage were preferable as a stabilization method. The additional

reviews were prompted by public comments that DOE received on potential

stabilization alternatives involving technologies other than chemical

processing. Based on these additional reviews (discussed in Attachment

2 of the Facility Utilization Strategy), DOE is designating the

following as preferred stabilization alternatives:

Mark-16 and Mark-22 Fuels--Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium

DOE is designating Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium as its

preferred alternative for stabilization of the Mark-16 and Mark-22

fuels. Under this alternative, DOE would remove the Mark-16 and Mark-22

fuels from the water- filled basins in which they are stored and

transport them to one, or both, of the canyons using the existing SRS

rail casks. All of the cask shipments would be confined within the

boundaries of SRS, occurring near the center of the site. The fuel

assemblies would be dissolved in nitric acid. The highly enriched

uranium contained in the fuel would be chemically separated from

fission products and other materials. The highly enriched uranium would

be blended with existing SRS inventories of depleted uranium to produce

a low enriched uranium solutions. The resulting low enriched uranium

solution will be stored or converted to an oxide in FA-Line. The low

enriched uranium will be stored at SRS until disposition decisions can

be made. The neptunium separated during the processing of the fuels

would be stabilized with the other neptunium solutions.

DOE is designating Blending Down to Low Enriched Uranium as the

preferred alternative for several reasons. Stabilization of the fuels

with their removal from basin wet storage and elimination of the wet

storage vulnerabilities through processing can be accomplished two to

seven years earlier than the improved storage alternatives. Blending

down to LEU reduces the HEU inventory and eliminates nonproliferation

and security issues associated with the indefinite storage of HEU fuel

which is not self-protecting. Cost and cost uncertainties have also

played a significant role in the selection of the preferred

stabilization alternative. Near-term annual costs to process and blend

down the HEU to LEU are estimated at $20 million to $95 million less

than for the improved storage alternatives. Substantial uncertainty

exists concerning the disposition of dry-stored (improved storage) HEU

spent fuel. Little uncertainty exists with the stabilization of the

fuels through blending down to LEU. Life-cycle costs evaluations favor

blending down to LEU ($38 million to greater than $1 billion

advantage)[Facility Utilization Strategy, Attachment 2]. The potential

environmental impacts from any of the stabilization alternatives are

acceptable and well below any regulatory or management control limits.

Projected impacts evaluated in the Final EIS are several times lower

for the improved storage alternatives than the preferred blending down

to LEU alternative.

Other Aluminum-clad Targets--Processing and Storage for Vitrification

in the DWPF

DOE is designating Processing and Storage for Vitrification in the

DWPF as its preferred alternative for stabilization of the other

aluminum-clad targets stored in reactor disassembly basins at SRS.

Under this alternative, DOE would remove the other aluminum-clad

targets stored in reactor disassembly basins and transport them to one

of the canyons via SRS rail casks. The targets would be dissolved, the

resulting solutions chemically adjusted, and transferred to the

adjacent underground high level waste tanks. The solutions would be

stored in the high level waste tanks until they could be processed in

conjunction with the other high level waste in the tanks. The high

level waste would eventually be vitrified in the DWPF. The stainless

steel canisters of glass would be stored in a facility adjacent to the

DWPF, awaiting geological disposal by DOE. DOE is designating this

alternative as its preferred stabilization alternative for several

reasons. These targets contain little or no fissile material, yet are

in a variety of physical forms and shapes. Their dissolution and

transfer for vitrification in DWPF (the environmentally preferable

alternative) has a minimal impact on all processing facilities and

places these many forms into a single physical form suitable for future

emplacement in a geological repository. Improved storage would require

the development of one or more packaging configurations for repository

emplacement. Although vitrification in DWPF will not occur for several

years, processing and storage for vitrification in DWPF can be

implemented one to six years earlier than the improved storage

alternatives. This will remove the targets and their deteriorating

condition from the reactor disassembly basins, precluding further

release of radioactivity to the basin water. As with the improved

storage alternatives for the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, near-term costs

are considerably less for the processing alternative as compared with

the improved storage alternative. The potential environmental impacts

from any of the stabilization alternatives are acceptable and well

below any regulatory or management control limits. As with the Mark-16

and Mark-22 fuels, projected impacts for the improved storage

alternatives are lower than the preferred alternative of processing and

storage for vitrification in DWPF.

Decisions on facility utilization will determine the canyon

location(s) for implementing the preferred stabilization alternatives

for the Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels, and the other aluminum-clad targets.

DOE will issue a Record of Decision(s) for the stabilization of these

materials no sooner than thirty (30) days following the availability of

this notice.

X. Conclusion

While the Final EIS focuses on the interim management of nuclear

[[Page 65315]]

materials at the Savannah River Site, the decisions associated with the

safe management of these materials directly affect the operational

status of the nuclear material processing facilities at the Site. These

decisions have been made in the context of then Secretary Watkins' 1992

decision to phase out reprocessing at the Savannah River Site. The

decisions in this ROD are structured to effect the earliest completion

of actions necessary to stabilize or convert nuclear materials into

forms suitable for safe storage and prepare the facilities for

subsequent shutdown and deactivation. The actions being implemented

will support the consolidation of the storage of nuclear materials at

the SRS. To a great extent, the alternatives will result in

stabilization of the nuclear materials and alleviation of associated

vulnerabilities within the time frame recommended by the DNFSB.

The stabilization decisions utilize existing facilities and

processes to the extent practical; can be implemented within expected

budget constraints and minimal additional training to required

personnel; rely upon proven technology; and using an integrated

approach, represent the optimum use of facilities to stabilize the

materials in the shortest amount of time. Although minor modifications

of a few facilities will be required, only two new facilities will be

needed: (a) design and construction of an Actinide Packaging and

Storage Facility in F-Area, and (b) a small vitrification facility

within the existing F-Canyon. The decisions in this ROD do not imply or

contribute to any poential decision to change the baseline canyon

operating strategy from the current two-canyon approach.

DOE expects to make decisions related to the future management of

foreign research reactor fuel and on strategies for the disposition of

surplus nuclear materials within the next year. Similarly, DOE is

evaluating alternatives for stabilizing nuclear materials stored at

other locations in the DOE complex. Several years will be required to

achieve stabilization of the nuclear materials within the scope of this

Record of Decision. Stabilization of the nuclear materials at SRS will

entail the operation of many portions of the chemical processing

facilities. Consistent with DNFSB Recommendation 94-1, this will

preserve DOE's capabilities related to the management and stabilization

of other nuclear materials until such decisions are made.

In summary, the Department has structured its decisions on interim

actions related to management of the nuclear materials at SRS to

achieve stabilization as soon as possible, consistent with earlier

decisions to phase out processing activities at the Savannah River

Site, while supporting U.S. nonproliferation policies in a safe and

cost effective manner.

Issued at Washington, DC, December 12, 1995.

Thomas P. Grumbly,

Assistant Secretary for Environmental Management.

Table 1.--Nuclear Materials at the Savannah River Site

[From DOE/EIS-0220, ``Interim Management of Nuclear Materials'']

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Description Quantity a Location(s)

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stable

Spent fuel...................... 3,000 items...................... Receiving Basin for Offsite Fuel (RBOF).

Unirradiated fuel, targets, 315,000 items.................... Buildings 305A, 313-M, 315-M, 320-M, 321-M,

reactor components, and scrap 322-M, 341-M, K- and L-Reactor Assembly

from fabrication operations. Areas.

Unirradiated fuel, targets, and 6,900 items...................... K- and L-Reactors.

reactor components.

Unirradiated and irradiated 420 items........................ C-, K-, L- and P-Reactors.

reactor components and control

rods.

Depleted uranium oxide.......... 36,000 drums..................... R-Reactor, Buildings 221-1F, 221-12F, 221-

21F, 221-22F, 707-R, 714-7N, 728-F, 730-F,

and 772-7B.

Depleted uranium solutions...... 300,000 liters (78,000 gallons).. F-Canyon, F-Area Outside Facilities, and

TNX.

Sources, standards, and samples. 20,000 items..................... Sitewide.

Laboratory materials used in 260 items........................ Savannah River Technology Center (SRTC).

research and development.

Programmatic

Plutonium-242 solutions......... 13,000 liters (3,500 gallons).... H-Canyon.

Americium and curium solutions 14,000 liters (3,800 gallons).... F-Canyon.

and targets.

65 assemblies.................... RBOF.

60 slugs......................... P-Reactor disassembly basin.

114 slugs........................ RBOF.

Neptunium solutions and targets. 6,100 liters (1,600 gallons)..... H-Canyon.

9 targets........................ Building 321-M.

Candidates for Stabilization

Plutonium-239 solutions......... 34,000 (9,000 gallons)........... H-Canyon.

Highly enriched uranium 228,000 liters (60,000 gallons).. H-Canyon and H-Area Outside Facilities.

solutions.

Plutonium vault materials....... 2,800 packages................... FB-Line, HB-Line, Building 772-F, Building

235-F, and SRTC.

Mark-31 targets................. 16,000 slugs..................... K-Reactor, L-Reactor, F-Canyon, and RBOF.

Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels....... 1,900 assemblies................. K-, L-, and P-Reactors and H-Canyon.

Other aluminum-clad targets..... 1,800 slugs and assemblies....... K-, L-, and P-Reactors.

[[Page 65316]]

Failed TRR b and EBR-II c slugs. 82 canisters..................... RBOF.

----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

a Quantities of materials shown are approximate. Quantities of radioactive solutions stored in tanks fluctuate

due to natural evaporation and the addition of materials (e.g., nitric acid) to maintain chemistry within

established parameters.

b Taiwan Research Reactor--81 canisters.

c Experimental Breeder Reactor-II--1 canister.

Table 2.--Alternatives for the Interim Management of Nuclear Materials at the SRS

[From DOE/EIS-0220, ``Interim Management of Nuclear Materials'']

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Alternatives

---------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Processing

Material Continuing Blending and storage

storage (no Processing Processing down to low for Vitrification Improving

action) to metal to oxide enriched vitrification (F-canyon) storage

uranium (DWPF)a

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

Stable.............................................. ............ ............ ............ ............. ............. ............

Plutonium-242....................................... x x ............ x x ............

Americium and curium................................ 1/2 ............ x ............ x c ............

Neptunium........................................... x ............ ............ x x ............

Plutonium-239 solutions............................. x x ............ x x ............

Highly enriched uranium solutions................... x ............ x x ............. ............

Plutonium and uranium in vaultsd.................... x ............ x

Mark-31 targets..................................... x x ............ x x x

Mark-16 and Mark-22 fuels........................... ............ x x x ............. x

Other aluminum-clad targets......................... ............ ............ ............ x ............. x

Failed TRR fuel and EBR-II slugse................... x x ............ x x x

--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------

x=alternative evaluated.

=preferred alternative designated by DOE in Final EIS.

aDWPF=Defense Waste Processing Facility.

bTargets.

cSolutions.

dFor the plutonium and uranium stored in vaults, there were four preferred alternatives. DOE will base its choice of the applicable alternative for a

particular solid upon inspection of the material.

eTRR=Taiwan Research Reactor, EBR-II--Experimental Breeder Reactor-II.

[FR Doc. 95-30750 Filed 12-18-95; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 6450-01-P-M