Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Proposed Rule Change by the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to Amendments to the NASD's Proposed NbulletPROVE System for Price Improvement and Execution of Small Orders
Federal RegisterDec 6, 1994
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SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION
[Release No. 34-35024; File No. SR-NASD-94-13, Amendment No. 3]
Self-Regulatory Organizations; Notice of Proposed Rule Change by
the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. Relating to
Amendments to the NASD's Proposed NPROVE System for Price
Improvement and Execution of Small Orders
November 29, 1994.
Pursuant to Section 19(b)(1) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
(``Act''),\1\ notice is hereby given that on November 21, 1994, the
National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (``NASD'' or
``Association'') filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission
(``Commission'' or ``SEC'') an amendment to a proposed rule change
previously published for comment.\2\ The amendment is described in
Items I, II, and III below, which Items have been prepared by the NASD.
The Commission is publishing this notice to solicit comments on the
proposed rule change, as amended, from interested persons.
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\1\15 U.S.C. 78s(b)(1).
\2\See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34145 (June 1, 1994),
59 FR 29649 (June 8, 1994) (notice of filing, incorporating
Amendment No. 1) and Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34453 (July
28, 1994), 59 FR 39808 (Aug. 4, 1994) (notice of Amendment No. 2).
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I. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Terms of Substance
of the Proposed Rule Change
The NASD is amending its proposed rules governing the operation of
The Nasdaq Primary Retail Order View and Execution System
(``NPROVE''), a new system developed by The Nasdaq Stock
Market, Inc. (Nasdaq) for the execution of small-sized customer orders
that provides individual investors enhanced limit order protection and
important price improvement opportunities through an enhanced automated
system. Specifically, the NASD is proposing a variety of amendments to
NPROVE designed to: (1) Enhance the operational efficiency of
the system; (2) increase the breadth of exposure of limit orders
entered into the system priced between the inside bid or offer, which
increased limit order exposure will facilitate greater opportunities
for order interaction within the inside market on Nasdaq; (3) further
improve the opportunities for price improvement available through
NPROVE; (4) expand the types of orders (i.e., short sales) that
may be entered into NPROVE, and, thereby, afford a broader
spectrum of retail orders in Nasdaq an opportunity to take advantage of
NPROVE's price improvement and limit order protection features;
and (5) facilitate the efforts of NASD members to provide their
customers with the same quality of order execution that they would have
received had their orders been entered into NPROVE. Following
is the text of the proposed rule change. (Additions are italicized;
deletions are bracketed.)
Rules of Operation and Procedures for the NPROVE System
(1) Definitions
a.-g. No change.
h. The term ``preferenced order'' shall mean an order entered into
NPROVE and directed to a particular market maker or an order
entered by a market maker that is self-preferenced. Each market maker
has the ability to select order entry firms from which it will accept
preferenced orders.
(2)-(3) No Change
(4) Participant Obligations in NPROVE
a. Market Makers
1. No change.
2. Participation as an NPROVE market maker obligates the
firm, upon presentation of [preferenced or] a designated, unpreferenced
market order or marketable limit order[s] (as that term is defined in
subsection (5)c. below) through the service, to execute [those] such
order[s]; provided, however, that for a designated, unpreferenced
order[s], the NPROVE market maker shall have an
opportunity,a consistent with Rule 11Ac1-1 promulgated under the
Act to decline the order[; if no action is taken the order will be
automatically executed against the market maker]. The market maker may
decline to execute the designated, unpreferenced NPROVE order
only if the market maker has executed an order (or is in the process of
executing an order) in the security and has updated its quotation (or
is in the process of updating its quotation) for the security. An
NPROVE market maker that receives an undesignated,
unpreferenced market order or marketable limit order (as that term is
defined in subsection (5)c. below) through NPROVE also may
decline such order consistent with Rule 11Ac1-1 promulgated under the
Act. If a market maker rejects a designated, unpreferenced
NPROVE order and no other market maker accepts the order within
the 15-second period, upon expiration of the 15-second period, the
system will automatically execute the order against the market maker
next in rotation who received the order on an undesignated basis that
has not rejected the order. [If a market maker rejects the
NPROVE order, it will be displayed to all other market makers
at the inside quotation simultaneously and executed against the market
maker that accepts the order, or if no market maker accepts the order,
the next market maker in rotation that has not rejected the order will
receive the execution.] If all market makers reject an unpreferenced
[the] order because they have had an execution (or are in the process
of effecting a trade) and have updated their quotations (or are in the
process of updating their quotations), the order will be automatically
executed against the market maker next in rotation at the new inside
quotation. [delivered to the first market maker at the new inside quote
on Nasdaq and that market maker will not be able to reject that order].
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\a\This period of time shall initially be established as 15
seconds, but may be modified upon appropriate notification to
NPROVE participants.
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With the exception of those instances where a market order or
marketable limit order has matched with a limit order and is processed
according to the procedures contained in subsection (5)c. below,
participation as an NPROVE market maker obligates the firm,
upon presentation of a preferenced market order or marketable limit
order through the service, to automatically execute such order at the
inside bid or offer displayed by Nasdaq when the order is processed
through NPROVE. NPROVE market makers are [will also]
not [be] permitted to reject orders preferenced to the firm pursuant to
a preferencing arrangement acknowledged by the market maker.
The system will transmit to the market maker on the Nasdaq
Workstation screen and printer, if requested, or through a computer
interface, as applicable, an execution report generated following each
execution.
3. Notwithstanding subsection (5)c. below, a[A]n NPROVE
market maker that improves the best bid or offer in Nasdaq is eligible
to receive all unpreferenced orders entered into NPROVE on an
exclusive basis (for a specific period of time or number of executions
as established by the NASDb) so long as the market maker manually
accepts the orders prior to automatic execution of the orders.
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\b\The parameters for market makers receiving priority in the
rotation when they have created an improved inside market have been
initially established as five minutes or five executions (whichever
occurs first) after one or more market makers have changed their
quote to equal the improved price. The NASD may modify these
parameters upon notification to members.
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4.-6. No change.
7. Aside from market makers entering self-preferenced orders into
NPROVE, f[F]or each security in which a market maker is
registered, the market maker may not enter orders on an agency basis
into NPROVE, unless a locked or crossed market exists for that
security. This prohibition against use of NPROVE does not
obviate the market maker's duty to give its agency orders best
execution in the prevailing market, according to the Board of
Governor's Interpretation on Executions of Retail Transactions, Article
III, Section 1 of the NASD Rules of Fair Practice.
8. No change.
9. Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (8) above, (i) a
market maker that obtains an excused withdrawal pursuant to Part V of
Schedule D to the NASD By-Laws prior to withdrawing from NPROVE
may reenter NPROVE according to the conditions of its
withdrawal; and (ii) a market maker that fails to maintain a clearing
arrangement with a registered clearing agency or with a member of such
an agency, and is thereby withdrawn from participation in ACT and
NPROVE for Nasdaq [National Market] securities, may reenter
NPROVE after a clearing arrangement has been reestablished and
the market maker has complied with ACT participant requirements.
Provided however, that if the Association finds that the ACT market
maker's failure to maintain a clearing arrangement is voluntary, the
withdrawal of quotations will be considered voluntary and unexcused
pursuant to Schedule D and these rules.
10. No change.
b. NPROVE Order Entry Firms
1.-5. No change.
[6. No short sales may be entered into NPROVE.]
(5) Execution of NPROVE Orders
a. Orders in Nasdaq equity securities entered into NPROVE
may be preferenced or unpreferenced. Preferenced market orders will be
automatically executed against the preferenced market maker pursuant to
subsection (4)a.2. above. Preferenced limit orders to buy (sell) will
not be treated as preferenced orders unless the limit order price is at
or above (below) the inside offer (bid), in which case the orders will
be automatically executed against the preferenced market maker pursuant
to subsection (4)a.2. above. Preferenced odd-lot orders (orders of less
than 100 shares) that are market orders or marketable limit orders also
will be automatically executed against the preferenced market maker.
[Preferenced orders will be delivered to the designated market maker.
Except as provided in subparagraph (c) below, unpreferenced orders will
be delivered to market makers at the current inside bid or offer in
rotation.]
Unpreferenced market orders and limit orders will be processed
according to the procedures established in subsections (5)b. and c.
below. Unpreferenced o[O]dd-lot orders [(orders of less than 100
shares)] that are market orders or marketable limit orders will be
automatically executed in NPROVE against the market maker next
in rotation at the inside market and execution reports will be
delivered to the order entry firm and the market maker.
b. Limit orders may be entered into NPROVE. A limit order
priced at the Nasdaq inside market (e.g., the bid side for a sell
order) when the order is delivered to an NPROVE market maker
will be handled as a market order. Limit orders priced away from
[outside] the Nasdaq inside bid or offer (as the case may be) [market]
will be stored in the NPROVE limit order file, and when the
inside market equals or betters the limit price, the order will be
handled as a market order. Limit orders priced within [better than] the
inside market upon entry or thereafter will establish the minimum price
at which subsequent incoming market orders on the other side of market
will [may] be priced and executed (e.g., a sell order priced between
the best bid and offer would improve the price of an incoming buy
order). All Nasdaq Level 2 and 3 subscribers [Market makers] will
receive notification on their quote retrieval screens of the existence
of a limit order priced better than the inside market along with an
indication of which side of the market it is on. [on their quote
retrieval screens,] regardless of whether the limit order is
preferenced or unpreferenced [; provided, however, that notification of
the existence of a preferenced limit order will only be delivered to
the designated market maker]. A separate dissemination of
NPROVE limit orders priced between than the inside market
consisting of the price of the highest priced limit order to buy and
the price of the lowest priced limit order to sell and the aggregate
size of all orders at such prices also will be made available to
securities information processors. A limit order priced better than the
inside market on Nasdaq shall be automatically executed against a
subsequent limit order on the opposite side of the market at a price
equal or superior to the limit price of the initial limit order (a sell
(buy) limit order priced at or below (above) a limit order to buy
(sell)), up to the size of the initial limit order or the subsequent
limit order, whichever is smaller, and without the participation of a
market maker.
c. Market orders may be entered into NPROVE. For
preferenced market orders, if there is no limit order residing in
NPROVE priced between the inside market on the opposite side of
the market from the market order, the order will be automatically
executed against the preferenced market maker at the inside bid or
offer (buy orders will be executed at the best offer and sell orders at
the best bid) displayed in Nasdaq when the order becomes subject to
NPROVE's order execution methodology. For unpreferenced market
orders, except as provided in subsection (4)a.3. above, if there is no
limit order residing in NPROVE priced between the inside market
on the opposite side of the market from the market order, the order
will be broadcast to all NPROVE market makers at the applicable
inside market (i.e., market makers at the inside bid will receive
market orders to sell and market makers at the inside offer will
receive market orders to buy) displayed in Nasdaq when the order
becomes subject to NPROVE's order execution methodology for
acceptance within 15 seconds, with the market maker next in rotation
for an NPROVE execution receiving an indicator that the system
will execute the order against him should be fail to reject the order
or if no other market maker accepts the order (for purposes of these
rules, market orders with such notifications appended to them are
referred to as ``designated, unpreferenced orders'' and orders without
such a notification are referred to as ``undesignated, unpreferenced
orders''). If a market maker rejects a designated, unpreferenced
NPROVE order and no other market maker accepts the order within
the 15-second period, upon expiration of the 15-second period, the
system will automatically execute the order against the market maker
next in rotation who received the order on an undesignated basis that
has not rejected the order. If all market makers decline the order
consistent with Rule 11Ac1-1 promulgated under the Act, the order will
be automatically executed against the market maker next in rotation at
the new inside quotation. [A market order will be delivered to a market
maker for execution at the current inside market (buy orders will be
executed at the best offer and sell orders at the best bid)].
If a limit order has previously been entered into NPROVE at
a price superior to the best bid or offer, the incoming market order
will be repriced to a price equal to the limit order price plus 1/16th
of a point in the case of a limit order to buy or the limit order price
minus a 1/16th of a point in the case of a limit order to sell [match
the price of the limit order] and will be displayed for 15 seconds to
all market makers whose current quotation equals the applicable inside
quote[, in the case of an unpreferenced market maker in the case of a
preferenced order]. If no market maker accepts the incoming market
order within the 15-second period, the market order will be
automatically executed against the limit order at the limit order
price. In addition, if adding (subtracting) 1/16th of a point to the
price of a limit order to buy (sell) would cause the acceptance price
of the market order to sell (buy) to be at or above (below) the current
inside offer (bid), then the market order and the limit order will be
automatically executed against each other at the limit order price
without the participation of a market maker. [All market orders entered
into NPROVE will be executed in compliance with market maker
obligations as established in subsection (4).]
(6)-(9) No Change
II. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
In its filing with the Commission, the NASD included statements
concerning the purpose of and basis for the amendment to the proposed
rule change and discussed any comments it received on the proposed rule
change. The text of these statements may be examined at the places
specified in Item IV below. The NASD has prepared summaries, set forth
in Sections (A), (B), and (C) below, of the most significant aspects of
such statements.
A. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement of the Purpose of, and
Statutory Basis for, the Proposed Rule Change
On March 28, 1994, the NASD proposed rules governing the operation
and procedures for a new service for the delivery, handling and
execution of individual investors' small-sized agency orders.\3\ The
NPROVE service, operated by Nasdaq, will provide automated
executions of individual investors' small agency orders in Nasdaq
equity securities, and will offer small retail investors new
opportunities for price improvement of market orders. The new service
will also heighten protections for individual investors' limit orders
while enhancing the ability of market makers to monitor and maintain
competitive quotations accessible to investors participating in an
automated execution environment.
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\3\See Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34145 (June 1, 1994),
59 FR 29649 (June 8, 1994).
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The purpose of this proposal is to modify NPROVE to further
enhance the operational efficiency of the system and enhance the limit
order protection and price improvement benefits of NPROVE to
retail investors. As described in more detail below, the NASD proposes
to enhance the operational efficiency of NPROVE by collapsing
the current proposal for three rounds of NPROVE order
processing for unpreferenced orders into one 15-second round. With this
streamlined order execution procedure, NPROVE will be less
susceptible to the development of order queues during peak volume
periods and retail investors will have greater assurance that they will
receive a timely execution through NPROVE. The NASD also
proposes to further enhance the price improvement opportunities
afforded small retail investors through NPROVE by modifying
NPROVE's order processing algorithm for the execution of
matched market orders and limit orders. In addition, the NASD proposes
to modify the limit order processing features NPROVE to provide
for a broader, more detailed dissemination of NPROVE limit
order information. With these changes, market participants will have a
greater opportunity to interact with limit orders in NPROVE,
thereby enhancing the limit order protection and price improvement
features of NPROVE. Following is a more detailed description of
these proposed changes.
1. Collapsing of NPROVE Order Processing Rounds
As currently designed, the execution of unpreferenced market and
marketable limit orders may involve up to three 15-second rounds in
NPROVE.\4\ In light of these three rounds of NPROVE
order processing, some comment letters submitted to the SEC regarding
NPROVE have expressed concern that it may take 45 seconds to
process each order entered into NPROVE.\5\ These commenters
believe that executing NPROVE orders in 45-second intervals
will create substantial order queues that will paralyze the system and
result in investors receiving significantly delayed executions through
NPROVE at prices wholly unrelated to the quotes that were
displayed when their orders were entered into the system.
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\4\ In Round 1, an unpreferenced order will be routed to the
market maker at the inside bid or offer that is next in line for an
NPROVE execution. The market maker may manually execute the
order or allow the system to automatically execute the order after
15 seconds. If the market maker has effected a trade (or is in the
process of executing a trade in that security) and has updated its
quotation (or is in the process of updating), it may reject the
NPROVE unpreferenced order. When, consistent with the
requirements of Rule 11Ac1-1 under the Act, an order is rejected by
the first market maker in rotation, the order will enter Round 2 and
will automatically be displayed to all remaining market makers at
the inside quote. All of these market makers will have the
opportunity to execute the order during a 15 second period. If no
market maker manually accepts the order, it will be automatically
executed against the first market maker in rotation. In the unlikely
event that all of these market makers reject the order during Round
2 pursuant to a valid exception from Rule 11Ac1-1, the order will be
executed automatically by the first market maker in rotation quoting
at the new inside market. This is called Round 3.
\5\See, e.g., letters from John C. Coffee, Jr., Adolf A. Berle
Professor of Law, Columbia University in the City of New York,to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, dated August 22, 1994 (``Coffee
Letter''); and Simon S. Kogan, J.D., L.L.M., Attorney at Law, to
Jonathan G. Katz, dated August 26, 1994.
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Given market makers' obligations to adhere to Rule 11Ac1-1
promulgated under the Act, the NASD believes most NPROVE orders
would be executed during Round 1 and that it would be extremely rare
for an NPROVE order to ever go beyond Round 2 order processing.
As a result, the NASD does not believe that the commenters concerns are
realistic. Nevertheless, while the NASD does not believe that prolonged
order queues will develop under the current configuration of
NPROVE, the NASD thinks it is appropriate to take prudent steps
to ensure that such order queues do not develop. Accordingly, with one
limited exception discussed below, the NASD proposes to collapse the
three rounds of NPROVE order processing into one 15-second
round.
Specifically, under the revised order processing methodology,
unpreferenced market orders entered into the system will be broadcast
to all NPROVE market makers at the applicable inside market for
acceptance within 15 seconds, with the market maker next in rotation
for an NPROVE execution receiving an indicator that the system
will execute the order against him should he fail to reject the order
or if no other market maker accepts the order (market orders with such
notifications appended to them are referred to as ``designated,
unpreferenced orders'' and orders without such a notification are
referred to as ``undesignated, unpreferenced orders'').\6\ If a market
maker rejects a designated, unpreferenced NPROVE order and no
other market maker accepts the order within the 15-second period, upon
expiration of the 15-second period, the system will automatically
execute the order against the market maker next in rotation who
received the order on an undesignated basis that has not rejected the
order. If all market makers decline the order consistent with Rule
11Ac1-1 promulgated under the Act, the order will be automatically
executed against the market maker next in rotation at the new inside
quotation. Thus, with this proposal, Rounds 1 and 2 would be
effectively collapsed into one round and Round 3 would be eliminated
because orders rejected by all market makers would be executed
automatically at the new inside market.
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\6\Market orders matched against limit orders (preferenced or
unpreferenced) priced between the inside bid or offer also will be
processed pursuant to this one-round order processing procedure. See
infra Section 5 for a more detailed description of how market orders
matching with limit orders will be processed under the NASD's
proposed revision to NPROVE.
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Accordingly, with this one-round order processing format, the NASD
believes even more strongly that significant order queues will not
occur in NPROVE, during normal trading days or peak volume
days, and that investors will receive timely executions at prices at or
superior to the quotes displayed when they entered their orders into
NPROVE.
The NASD proposes, however, to retain the ability of NPROVE
market makers to improve upon the inside bid or offer and achieve a
``priority market maker'' status; thus, providing a meaningful
incentive for market makers to narrow their spreads. In particular, as
currently proposed, when a market maker improves its bid or offer to
better the inside best bid or offer and it becomes a ``priority market
maker.'' Thereafter, for a short period of time (initially established
as five minutes or five executions, whichever occurs first, after one
or more market makers have changed their quote to equal the improved
price) all unpreferenced NPROVE orders will be directed only to
that market maker for acceptance within 15 seconds. The priority market
maker will retain its ``priority'' status only if it does not reject an
order, allow the system to automatically execute an order after 15
seconds, or a new inside has been established. Even if other market
makers adjust their quotes to match the new inside quote established by
the priority market maker, the priority market maker will be able to
maintain its priority status, provided the priority market maker
manually accepts each order within 15 seconds.
Because of the retention of the ``priority market maker'' feature,
it is conceivable that an order rejected by a priority market maker
could take 30 seconds to receive an execution in NPROVE. The
NASD notes, however, that this potential delay will be limited to a
single order directed to a priority market maker and that a delay will
occur only if the market maker declines the order in compliance with
Rule 11Ac1-1 promulgated under the Act. If a priority market maker
allows one order to execute against him automatically after 15 seconds
or it manually accepts all orders, all orders sent to the market maker
on a priority basis will receive an execution within 15 seconds.
Moreover, unless the priority market maker declines an order at the
last second, the maximum length of time the order will be delayed will
be less than 30 seconds. Accordingly, in weighing the de minimis costs
to the marketplace resulting from the possibility that a maximum of one
order directed to any given priority market maker will be delayed for
no more than 30 seconds, if at all, against the benefits to the
marketplace derived from providing market makers with an incentive to
narrow their spreads and improve the prices at which individual
investors may execute their orders, the NASD believes it is appropriate
and consistent with the maintenance of fair and orderly markets to
retain the priority market maker feature of NPROVE.
2. Automatic Execution of Preferenced Market Orders
Consistent with the NASD's desire to minimize the potential for
order queues in NPROVE, the NASD is proposing to modify
NPROVE to provide that preferenced market orders or marketable
limit orders will be automatically executed against the preferenced
market maker at the inside bid or offer displayed on Nasdaq when the
order is processed through NPROVE.\7\ As explained in more
detail in Section 5 below, preferenced market orders will only be
automatically executed if they did not match against a limit order
residing in NPROVE.
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\7\Previously, preferenced market makers had 15 seconds to
accept a preferenced market order. They could not decline the orders
and, if they failed to accept them within 15 seconds, the orders
would be automatically executed against them.
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3. Modifications to NPROVE's Execution Algorithm for Limit
Orders to Provide Greater Limit Order Protection and Enhanced Price
Improvement Opportunities
As currently proposed, if a limit order is entered into
NPROVE at a price between the spread, the next incoming market
order on the opposite side of the market (e.g., the limit order is to
sell stock and the market order is to buy stock) would automatically
``pass over'' or read the limit order file to see if there are any
orders residing in the limit order file at prices superior to the best
bid or offer in the Nasdaq marketplace. If a limit order resides in the
file at a superior price, then the market order will be flashed on the
screen at that superior price for acceptance within a brief 15-second
period, instead of at the inside bid or offer. In that event, all
market makers at the inside quotation would have the opportunity for 15
seconds to execute the market order at the superior limit price. If no
market maker elected to execute the order at that improved price, the
system would execute the orders against each other at the limit price.
Several comment letters submitted to the SEC regarding
NPROVE have expressed concern that this order processing
methodology places limit orders at an unfair disadvantage.\8\ In
particular, these commenters maintain that the limit orders, which
provide liquidity to the marketplace at prices inside the best bid or
offer, are disadvantaged because market makers can trade through them
by taking out the market order at the limit order price within 15
seconds and deprive the limit order of an execution for an indefinite
period of time. To address this concern, the NASD is proposing to
modify NPROVE to provide that market makers must improve upon
the limit order price if they want to execute the matched market
order.\9\ Specifically, under the proposal,\10\ if a limit order is
residing in NPROVE priced superior to the best bid or offer,
any incoming market order on the opposite side of the market will be
repriced to a price equal to the limit order price plus 1/16th of a
point in the case of a limit order to buy or the limit order price
minus a 1/16th of a point in the case of a limit order to sell. The
market order will then be displayed for 15 seconds to all market makers
whose current quotation equals the applicable inside quote.\11\ If no
market maker accepts the incoming market order within the 15-second
period, the market order will be automatically executed against the
limit order at the limit order price. In addition, if adding
(subtracting) 1/16th of a point to the price of a limit order to buy
(sell) would cause the acceptance price of the market order to sell
(buy) to be at or above (below) the current inside offer (bid), then
the market order and the limit order will be automatically executed
against each other at the limit order price without the participation
of a market maker.\12\
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\8\See, e.g., letter from Lawrence R. Glosten, Associate
Professor, Columbia University Graduate School of Business, to
Jonathan G. Katz, Secretary, SEC, dated August 24, 1994; and Coffee
Letter, supra note 3.
\9\As discussed infra at Section 5, preferenced limit orders
matching against market orders will be processed the same way as
unpreferenced limit orders.
\10\In this connection, the NASD notes the contribution of the
Board of the Securities Traders Association in the formulation and
endorsement of this concept.
\11\For example, if the inside market for a security is 10--
10\1/4\ and a limit order to buy at 10\1/8\ is residing in the
NPROVE limit order file when a market order to sell is
entered into the system, NPROVE will reprice the market
order to 10\3/16\ for flash display and acceptance to all market
makers in that security at the inside bid or offer.
\12\For example, if the inside market for a security is 10--
10\1/4\ and a limit order to buy at 10\3/16\ is residing in the
NPROVE limit order file when a market order to sell is
entered into the system, these orders will be automatically executed
against each other at a price of 10\3/16\.
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The NASD believes the proposal strikes a reasonable balance between
the concern that matched limit orders could remain unexecuted while
market makers are able to trade at the limit order price without
executing the limit order and the need to preserve the liquidity of the
market by ensuring that market makers have an ability to interact with
customer orders. In this connection, the NASD notes that one of the
cornerstones of the success of Nasdaq's competing dealer system has
been the availability of market maker capital to satisfy investors'
liquidity demands and that this capital is critically dependent on the
ability of market makers to interact with customer order flow. The NASD
also notes that the proposal will provide an even greater opportunity
for price improvement for market orders matching against limit orders,
as market makers will have to accept them at a price at least a \1/
16\th of a point superior to the price at which they otherwise would
have matched against the limit orders. In sum, the NASD believes the
proposal significantly enhances the price improvement and limit order
protection features of NPROVE and eliminates the possibility
that a pending limit order will remain unexecuted while other public
customer orders receive executions at the order's limit price, while
preserving the liquidity and orderliness of Nasdaq by allowing a
minimal, yet essential, opportunity for market makers to interact with
retail order flow.
4. Broader Dissemination of NPROVE Limit Order Information
The NASD is proposing several amendments to NPROVE and
other Nasdaq services to achieve a broader, more detailed dissemination
of NPROVE limit order information. The NASD believes these
system modifications will facilitate the ability of market participants
to readily observe and react to limit orders entered into
NPROVE priced better than the inside market, which, in turn,
will maximize order interaction in NPROVE and maximize the
price improvement and limit order protection benefits available to
investors through NPROVE.
First, the NASD proposes to create a separate feed of
NPROVE limit order information to vendors. This feed will
consist of the price of the highest priced limit order to buy and the
price of the lowest priced limit order to sell that are inside the best
bid or offer displayed in Nasdaq, along with the aggregate size of all
limit orders at such prices. Second, the NASD proposes to modify the
``NPRV'' indicator displayed when a limit order is residing in
NPROVE between the spread to indicate which side of the market
the limit order is on. Third, the NASD is proposing to modify the
functionality of Nasdaq Workstation I and Nasdaq Workstation II so that
subscribers can readily obtain information on all limit orders residing
in NPROVE, including those limit orders priced within the
inside market on Nasdaq. This ready display of NPROVE limit
order information will be accomplished with one key stroke in the
Nasdaq Workstation I environment and one mouse click in the Nasdaq
Workstation II environment. Fourth, the NASD is proposing to develop a
separate feed of NPROVE transaction information and limit order
information to registered market makers. Specifically,, the feed to the
market makers will include all NPROVE orders, cancellations,
corrections, and executions. With this information, which is in
response to a comment letter received by the SEC regarding
NPROVE,\13\ market makers will be able to assure their
customers that they are receiving the same quality of execution that
they would have received had their orders been entered into
NPROVE. Accordingly, with this feed, while a market maker's
customer order may not interact directly with a limit order in
NPROVE, it would benefit indirectly from the existence of the
limit order in NPROVE. In sum, the NASD believes these changes
will enhance the limit order protection and price improvement benefits
available to retail investors through NPROVE.
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\13\See letter from Leonard Mayer, Vice President & Chief
Operating Officer, Mayer & Schweitzer, Inc., to Jonathan G. Katz,
Secretary, SEC, dated July 13, 1994.
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5. Modifications to the Processing of Preferenced Limit Orders
As currently proposed, while preferenced limit orders are able to
take advantage of the limit order protection feature of NPROVE,
the existence of these orders are known only to the preferenced market
makers. Unlike unpreferenced limit orders, when a preferenced market
order is entered between the spread, it does not activate the
NPROVE limit order indicator and it is not retrievable by other
market makers in the summary scan of pending NPROVE limit
orders. In addition, when a preferenced limit order is matched against
an incoming market order, the matched market order is only displayed to
the preferenced market maker for acceptance. Accordingly, in order to
afford preferenced limit orders the same opportunity for order
interaction that is afforded unpreferenced limit orders, the NASD
proposes to amend NPROVE to provide that preferenced limit
orders priced within the inside bid or offer on Nasdaq will be
processed the same way as unpreferenced limit orders.\14\ However, once
the price of a preferenced limit order to buy (sell) is at or above
(below) the inside offer (bid), it will be automatically executed
against the preferenced market maker. The NASD also proposes to amend
the NPROVE rules to reiterate and clarify that market makers
may enter orders into NPROVE on self-preferenced basis and that
these orders will be processed like preferenced orders.
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\14\Arguably, only flashing matched market orders to the
preferenced market maker may increase the likelihood that the limit
order will be executed because the market order is not exposed to
multiple market makers for acceptance. It would be inappropriate and
confusing to market participants, however, to disseminate
information about preferenced limit orders and at the same time
preclude investors from interacting with them.
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6. Inclusion of Short Sales in NPROVE
As currently proposed, short-sales would be prohibited through
NPROVE, just as they are prohibited through the NASD's Small
Order Execution System rules currently in effect. In light of the SEC's
approval of the NASD's proposed short-sale rule in June 1994,\15\
coupled with NPROVE's order acceptance feature that enables
market makers to handle exposure to transactions such as short sales by
permitting them to reject trades if they have already traded, however,
the NASD believes it is appropriate to permit short sales through
NPROVE. By so doing, the NASD will expand the spectrum of
retail orders that are available to take advantage of NPROVES's
price improvement and limit order protection benefits. Nevertheless,
while NPROVE will provide a 15-second period for a market maker
to react to an NPROVE order, the NASD remains concerned that
this 15-second period is sufficiently short the there remains a risk of
destabilizing short term trading through the service. Accordingly the
NASD will review the volume and impact of short sales effected through
NPROVE on an on-going basis to determine whether it is
appropriate in the interests of maintaining fair and orderly markets to
continue to allow short-sales through NPROVE.
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\15\Securities Exchange Act Release No. 34277 (June 29, 1994),
59 FR 34885 (July 7, 1994).
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The NASD believes that the proposed NPROVE system, as
amended, is consistent with Section 15A(b)(6), 15A(b)(9), 15A(b)(11),
and 11A(a)(1)(C) of the Act. Section 15A(b)(6) requires that the rules
of a national securities association be designed to prevent fraudulent
and manipulative acts and practices, to promote just and equitable
principles of trade, to foster cooperation and coordination with
persons engaged in regulating, clearing, settling, processing
information with respect to, and facilitating transactions in
securities, to remove impediments to and perfect the mechanism of a
free and open market and a national market system and in general to
protect investors and the public interest. Section 15A(b)(9) requires
that rules of an association not impose any burden on competition not
necessary or appropriate in furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
Section 15A(b)(11) requires the NASD to formulate rules governing the
quality of fair and informative quotations. Section 11A(a)(1)(C) finds
that it is in the public interest to, among other things, assure
economically efficient execution of securities transactions. The
fundamental purpose of NPROVE is to assist individual investors
in achieving prompt, efficient executions of their small orders, to
provide individual investors an opportunity for price improvement
within an automated execution environment, and to afford individual
investors an automated and effective means to protect their limit
orders. The integrity and efficiency of Nasdaq for public investors and
market-making participants is critical and the NASD believes that
NPROVE will provide benefits to both constituencies. The design
of NPROVE is not anti-competitive as it treats all
unpreferenced orders uniformly; to the extent that preferenced orders
are distinguished, by entering into preferencing arrangements with
known customers, market maker's effectively waive the protections
offered by the system. NPROVE may also enhance the quality of
quotations in the Nasdaq market as market makers participating in the
service may be encouraged to narrow the spread and improve the best
inter-dealer quotations in Nasdaq in order to be first in priority and
continue to receive unpreferenced order flow through NPROVE.
Lastly, the NASD believes that NPROVE is fully consistent
with the significant national market system objectives contained in
Section 11A of the Act. The facilities of NPROVE would advance
these objectives by offering efficient execution of investors' small
orders, by maintaining market maker participation through the automated
delivery of orders with the ability to reject those orders if trades
have already occurred, and by offering the opportunity for price
improvement to NPROVE orders. The system's functionality will
more accurately reflect market makers' affirmative obligations to
provide liquidity to the market, without depriving market makers of
legitimate exceptions from the firmness requirements contained in Rule
11Ac1-1 promulgated under the Act.
B. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Burden on Competition
The NASD believes that the proposed rule change will not result in
any burden on competition that is not necessary or appropriate in
furtherance of the purposes of the Act.
C. Self-Regulatory Organization's Statement on Comments on the Proposed
Rule Change Received from Members, Participants, or Others
Comments were neither solicited nor received.
III. Date of Effectiveness of the Proposed Rule Change and Timing for
Commission Action
Within 35 days of the date of publication of this notice in the
Federal Register or within such longer period (i) as the Commission may
designate up to 90 days of such date if it finds such longer period to
be appropriate and publishes it reasons for so finding or (ii) as to
which the NASD consents, the Commission will:
A. By order approve such proposed rule change, or
B. Institute proceedings to determine whether the proposed rule
change should be disapproved.
Solicitation of Comments
Interested persons are invited to submit written data, views, and
arguments concerning the foregoing. Persons making written submissions
should file six copies thereof with the Secretary, Securities and
Exchange Commission, 450 Fifth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20549.
Copies of the submission, all subsequent amendments, all written
statements with respect to the proposed rule change that are filed with
the Commission, and all written communications relating to the proposed
rule change between the Commission and any person, other than those
that may be withheld from the public in accordance with the provisions
of 5 U.S.C. 552, will be available for inspection and copying in the
Commission's Public Reference Room. Copies of such filing will also be
available for inspection and copying at the principal office of the
NASD. All submissions should refer to File Number SR-NASD-94-13 and
should be submitted by December 27, 1994.
For the Commission, by the Division of Market Regulation,
pursuant to delegated authority.\16\
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\16\17 CFR 200.30-3(a)(12) (1994).
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Margaret H. McFarland,
Deputy Secretary.
[FR Doc. 94-29932 Filed 12-5-94; 8:45 am]
BILLING CODE 8010-01-M
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.