Philadelphia Electric Co.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

NUCLEAR REGULATORY COMMISSION

[Docket Nos. 50-352 and 50-353]

Philadelphia Electric Co.; Notice of Consideration of Issuance

of Amendment to Facility Operating License, Proposed No Significant

Hazards Consideration Determination, and Opportunity for a Hearing

The U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (the Commission) is

considering issuance of an amendment to Facility Operating License Nos.

NPF-39 and NPF-85 issued to the Philadelphia Electric Company (PECO or

the licensee) for operation of the Limerick Generating Station, Units 1

and 2, located in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania.

The proposed amendment request of January 14, 1994, would increase

the storage capacity in each spent fuel pool (SFP) from their current

2040 fuel assemblies to 4117 fuel assemblies. In addition, the proposed

amendment would extend the ``full core reserve'' capability from year

1998 to 2013.

On May 6, 1994, PECO submitted another application requesting an

interim increase in the capacity of the Unit 1 SFP, from 2040 to 2500

fuel assemblies. PECO's submittal of June 3, 1994 supplemented their

submittal of May 6, 1994. The Commission granted approval of the May 6,

1994 application by Amendment No. 72 to Facility Operating License No.

NPF-39 for the Limerick Generating Station, Unit 1, on June 30, 1994.

Before issuance of the proposed license amendment, the Commission

will have made findings required by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as

amended (the Act) and the Commission's regulations.

The Commission has made a proposed determination that the amendment

request involves no significant hazards consideration. Under the

Commission's regulations in 10 CFR 50.92, this means that operation of

the facility in accordance with the proposed amendment would not (1)

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of an

accident previously evaluated; or (2) create the possibility of a new

or different kind of accident from any accident previously evaluated;

or (3) involve a significant reduction in a margin of safety. As

required by 10 CFR 50.91(a), the licensee has provided its analysis of

the issue of no significant hazards consideration, which is presented

below:

1. The proposed Technical Specifications (TS) changes do not

involve a significant increase in the probability or consequences of

an accident previously evaluated.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity in each Spent Fuel

Pool (SFP) to 4117 fuel assemblies does not increase the probability

of occurrence of an accident. Since all fuel handling activities

will be performed using approved procedures and compatible

equipment, the probability of a fuel handling accident occurring is

unchanged.

The intermediate configuration involving the installation of the

new maximum density racks in the Unit 2 SEP and placement of

additional existing racks in the Unit 1 SFP will not prevent the

ability of the Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup (FPCC) systems from

adequately cooling their respective SFP. The backup cooling and

makeup systems (i.e., Residual Heat Removal (RHR), Emergency Service

Water (ESW), and Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW)

systems) will continue to function as designed to provide an

alternate source of cooling and makeup water to ensure SFP cooling

is maintained. Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity in each

SFP will result in a slight increase in the maximum normal decay

heat load from 16.32 x 10\6\ Btu/hr to 18.05 x 10\6\ Btu/hr.

This increase is due to 1) the heat load associated with a maximum

storage capacity of 4117 fuel assemblies, 2) a 5% power rerate

consideration (i.e., the effects of increasing the rated core

thermal power from 3293 MWt to 3458 MWt), 3) a reduction in the

minimum decay time until fuel movements begin, and 4) the effects of

increasing our refueling cycles from 18-months to 24 months. Section

9.1.3, ``Spent Fuel Pool Cooling and Cleanup,'' of NUREG-0800,

``Standard Review Plan for the Review of Safety Analysis Reports for

Nuclear Power Plants,'' recommends that the SFP temperature be

maintained at or below 140 deg.F. However, due to the increase in

the maximum normal decay heat load, and with two (2) trains of fuel

pool cooling operating, the temperature that the SFP can be

maintained will increase from 140 deg.F to 143 deg.F. The time

period that two (2) trains of fuel pool cooling can not maintain the

pool temperature below 140 deg.F is 2.5 days and the SFP temperature

will exceed 140 deg.F approximately 160 hours after plant shutdown.

The slight increase in SFP temperature (i.e., 140 deg.F to

143 deg.F) is considered acceptable since the increase is small

(i.e., 3 deg.F), and the duration in which the temperature exceeds

140 deg.F is short (i.e., 2.5 days). In addition, during this period

the RHR system will be available for operation to maintain the

desired SFP temperature. The maximum decay heat load, assuming full

core discharge and remaining cells filled, will increase from 36.4 x

10\6\ Btu/hr to 37.6 x 10\6\ Btu hr; however, the RHR system is

still be [sic] capable of maintaining SFP temperature less than

140 deg.F as described in LGS Updated Final Safety Analysis Report

(UFSAR) and supporting Safety Analysis Report provided in Attachment

2 [See application dated January 14, 1994 for Attachment 2]. This

increase in temperature will not increase the probability of a loss

of fuel pool cooling accident or adversely affect the Refuel Floor

ventilation system.

The proposed piping modifications to the RHR system piping

inside the Unit 2 SFP will not interfere with the RHR system's

ability to adequately cool the SFP or to prevent siphoning of the

SFP water.

Movement of the Unit 2 SFP gates to the new storage location and

installation of the new fuel storage racks will be accomplished in

accordance with the guidance specified in NUREG-0612, ``Control of

Heavy Loads at Nuclear Power Plants.'' Approved procedures, safe

load paths, and single failure proof rigging will be used.

Therefore, the probability of a heavy load drop is unchanged.

The consequences of a Fuel Handling Accident as described in the

LGS UFSAR is not increased since the number of fuel assemblies

stored in a SFP is not an input to the initial conditions of the

accident evaluation. This accident evaluates the dropping of a spent

fuel assembly and the fuel grapple assembly into the reactor core

during refueling operations. A drop height of 32 feet for the spent

fuel assembly and 47 feet for the fuel grapple assembly are assumed

and will produce the largest number of failed fuel rods. The tops of

the new spent fuel racks are at the same level as the existing spent

fuel racks. Since the maximum possible height a fuel assembly can be

dropped over the SFP does not exceed 32 feet, the consequences of a

Fuel Handling Accident will not be increased by increasing the

number of fuel storage cells. The increase in dose estimates

presented in the Safety Analysis Report are within 10 CFR 100 limits

and are the result of increased fuel enrichment for power rerate and

24-month refueling cycles, and not as a result of an increase in the

number of fuel storage cells. These other changes are the subject of

separate TS Change Requests that have already been submitted to the

NRC for approval.

The consequence of a loss of fuel pool cooling as described in

Section 9.1.3.6 of the LGS UFSAR will not be increased. The event

described in the UFSAR assumes that the iodine in the fuel from past

refuelings is negligible, due to long decay time. Iodine is the

major contributor to thyroid dose. Since the iodine in the fuel from

past refuelings is negligible, due to the long decay time,

increasing the number of fuel storage cells will not increase the

dose due to the release of iodine in the SFP water resulting from

boiling and therefore, the consequences are not increased. The time

to boil of 13.5 hours currently specified in UFSAR bounds the time

to boil of 9.15 hrs presented in the supporting Safety Analysis

Report since the 13.5 hrs is for 21 days after reactor shutdown and

the 9.15 hrs is for 7.25 days after reactor shutdown, and the decay

heat from the newly discharged fuel decreases exponentially with

time after plant shutdown.

The new maximum density storage racks have been designed and

analyzed to maintain Keff less than or equal to 0.95. The

supporting Safety Analysis Report includes the effects of various

anomalies such as a fuel assembly drop event, manufacturing

tolerance variations, and abnormal location of a fuel assembly.

Since a Keff of less than or equal to 0.95 with a confidence

factor of 95% is maintained, the consequences of an event that would

affect criticality control will not increase. The planned interim

configuration of the Unit 1 pool is bounded by the current analyses

in the UFSAR, since the rack design is unchanged.

The new maximum density storage racks have been designed and

analyzed to seismic Category 1 criteria and are capable of remaining

functional during the event of a fuel assembly and fuel grapple

assembly impacting the rack from a height of 36 inches, as described

in the attached Safety Analysis Report [See application dated

January 14, 1994 for Attachment 2]. Since the new maximum density

storage racks are capable of withstanding an impact from a height of

36 inches, the consequences of the events described in the LGS UFSAR

which use a drop height of 16 inches, are not increased.

Increasing the on-site storage capacity by installing additional

storage cells will not increase the probability of a malfunction of

the stored spent fuel based on the thermal-hydraulic analysis

presented in the supporting Safety Analysis Report [See application

dated January 14, 1994 for Attachment 2] which concludes that

sufficient cooling exists with 4117 fuel assemblies in a SFP. As for

fuel criticality, the determination is based on the criticality

analysis documented in the supporting Safety Analysis Report which

confirms that the stored fuel assemblies will remain sub-critical

under normal and abnormal conditions.

Increasing the on-site storage capacity by installing additional

storage cells will not increase the probability of a malfunction of

the SFP liner based upon the SFP structural analysis as documented

in the supporting Safety Analysis Report which indicates that

adequate margin exists to prevent overstressing of the SFP liner.

Increasing the on-site capacity by installing addition[al]

storage cells will not increase the probability of a malfunction of

the SFP structure. This is based upon the SFP structural analysis as

documented in the supporting Safety Analysis Report which confirms

that the SFP structure still has adequate margin to prevent

overstressing and meets the code requirements for the LGS.

Increasing the on-site storage capacity by installing additional

storage cells will not increase the probability of a malfunction of

the spent fuel storage racks based on the seismic/structural

analysis documented in the supporting Safety Analysis Report which

concludes that interaction of racks during a seismic event will not

result in loss of spent fuel storage racks' ability to function. The

planned relocating the storage location of the SFP gates will not

increase the probability of a malfunction of the SFP gates since,

while being store, the SFP gates do not perform a safety function.

The hangers used to secure the SFP gates will be designed/installed

to the same requirements as the existing hangers.

Increasing the on-site spent fuel storage capacity will not

increase the probability of a malfunction of the Fuel Pool Cooling

and Cleanup (FPCC) system. The only impact on the FPCC system of

increasing the spent fuel storage capacity will be a slight increase

in fluid temperature (i.e., 140 deg.F to 143 deg.F) which is within

the design temperature of the system (i.e., 150 deg.F) as described

in the LGS UFSAR.

Modifying the RHR piping in the Unit 2 SFP such that it will not

interfere with increased fuel storage will not increase the

probability of a malfunction of the RHR system since the RHR

system's ability to cool the SFP and to prevent siphoning of the SFP

water will remain unchanged. Only the RHR discharge piping inside

the SFP will be modified. the proper flow pattern will be maintained

and net postivie suction head requirements will be unaffected.

The probability of a malfunction of fuel handling equipment will

not be increased since increasing the on-site storage capacity does

not affect fuel handling equipment.

Increasing the on-site spent fuel storage capacity does not

increase the consequences of a spent fuel assembly failure since the

failure of one assembly will not result in additional spent fuel

assembly failures.

Increasing the on-site spent fuel storage capacity does not

increase the consequences of a loss of fuel pool cooling as

described in Section 9.1.3.6 of the LGS UFSAR which evaluated the

radiological affects due to thyroid dose. Iodine is the major

contributor to thyroid dose. The iodine in the fuel from past

refuelings is negligible, due to the long decay time. Since the

release of iodine resulting from the SFP water boiling is entirely

due to the freshly discharged fuel, the consequences of reracking

the SFPs are unchanged from that previously evaluated. The

evaporation rate will increase due to higher decay heat load.

However, since the time to boil is 9.15 hours, as discussed

previously, adequate time exists to align the alternate makeup water

sources (e.g., RHR, Emergency Service Water (ESW), and Residual Heat

Removal Service Water (RHRSW) systems) to maintain SFP water level

and therefore, the consequences are not increased.

Increasing the on-site storage capacity will not increase the

consequences of spent fuel storage rack failure, since both the new

maximum density racks and the existing racks have been designed/

qualified to limit the consequences of a failure. A failure of or

damage to one (1) storage rack will not result in failure or damage

to another storage rack.

Increasing the on-site storage capacity will not increase the

consequences of a failure of the SFP gates or SFP liner since the

design of the SFP to maintain adequate water level and the available

makeup capacity are unaffected.

Increasing the on-site storage capacity will not increase the

consequences of the failure of fuel handling equipment since the

maximum expected number of fuel rods damaged by a fuel handling

equipment failure remains as evaluated in the LGS UFSAR.

Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not involve an increase in

the probability or consequences of an accident previously evaluated.

2. The proposed TS changes do not create the possibility of a

new or different kind of accident from any accident previously

evaluated.

Increasing the spent fuel storage capacity in each of the SFPs

at LGS to a maximum of 4117 fuel assemblies as analyzed in the

attached Safety Analysis Report [See application dated January 14,

1994 for Attachment 2] will not create the possibility of an

accident of a different type. The SFP configurations have been

analyzed for reactivity/criticality effects, thermal/seismic-

structural effects, radiological effects, and thermal-hydraulic

effects. Sine the increase in storage capacity is achieved by

installation of additional storage racks which are passive

components, the possibility of creating a new accident does not

exist.

No new operating schemes or active equipment types will be

required to store additional fuel bundles in the SFP. Therefore, the

possibility of a different type of malfunction occurring is not

created.

Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not create [the]

possibility of a new or different kind of accident from any

previously evaluated.

3. The proposed TS changes do not involve a significant

reduction in a margin of safety.

Since the existing TS limits for fuel handling interlocks, heavy

loads restrictions, water coverage over irradiated fuel, and fuel

sub-criticality will be maintained, the margin of safety will not be

reduced.

Therefore, the proposed TS changes do not involve a reduction in

a margin of safety.

The NRC staff has reviewed the licensee's analysis and, based on

this review, it appears that the three standards of 10 CFR 50.92(c) are

satisfied. Therefore, the NRC staff proposes to determine that the

amendment request involves no significant hazards consideration.

The Commission is seeking public comments on this proposed

determination. Any comments received within 30 days after the date of

publication of this notice will be considered in making any final

determination.

Normally, the Commission will not issue the amendment until the

expiration of the 30-day notice period. However, should circumstances

change during the notice period such that failure to act in a timely

way would result, for example, in derating or shutdown of the facility,

the Commission may issue the license amendment before the expiration of

the 30-day notice period, provided that its final determination is that

the amendment involves no significant hazards consideration. The final

determination will consider all public and State comments received.

Should the Commission take this action, it will publish in the Federal

Register a notice of issuance and provide for opportunity for a hearing

after issuance. The Commission expects that the need to take this

action will occur very infrequently.

Written comments may be submitted by mail to the Rules Review and

Directives Branch, Division of Freedom of Information and Publications

Services, Office of Administration, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,

Washington, DC 20555, and should cite the publication date and page

number of this Federal Register notice. Written comments may also be

delivered to Room P-223, Phillips Building, 7920 Norfolk Avenue,

Bethesda, Maryland, from 7:30 a.m. to 4:15 p.m. Federal workdays.

Copies of written comments received may be examined at the NRC Public

Document Room, the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC

20555.

The filing of requests for hearing and petitions for leave to

intervene is discussed below.

By September 7, 1994, the licensee may file a request for a hearing

with respect to issuance of the amendment to the subject facility

operating license and any person whose interest may be affected by this

proceeding and who wishes to participates as a party in the proceeding

must file a written request for a hearing and a petition for leave to

intervene. Requests for a hearing and a petition for leave to intervene

shall be filed in accordance with the Commission's ``Rules of Practice

for Domestic Licensing Proceedings'' in 10 CFR Part 2. Interested

persons should consult a current copy of 10 CFR 2.714 which is

available at the Commission's Public Document Room, the Gelman

Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the local

public document room located at Pottstown Public Library, 500 High

Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464. If a request for a hearing or

petition for leave to intervene is filed by the above date, the

Commission or an Atomic Safety and Licensing Board, designated by the

Commission or by the Chairman of the Atomic Safety and Licensing Board

Panel, will rule on the request and/or petition; and the Secretary or

the designated Atomic Safety and Licensing Board will issue a notice of

hearing or an appropriate order.

As required by 10 CFR 2.714, a petition for leave to intervene

shall set forth with particularity the interest of the petitioner in

the proceeding, and how that interest may be affected by the results of

the proceeding. The petition should specifically explain the reasons

why intervention should be permitted with particular reference to the

following factors: (1) The nature of the petitioner's right under the

Act to be made party to the proceeding; (2) the nature and extent of

the petitioner's property, financial, or other interest in the

proceeding; and (3) the possible effect of any order which may be

entered in the proceeding on the petitioner's interest. The petition

should also identify the specific aspect(s) of the subject matter of

the proceeding as to which petitioner wishes to intervene. Any person

who has filed a petition for leave to intervene or who has been

admitted as a party may amend the petition without requesting leave of

the Board up to 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, but such an amended petition must satisfy

the specificity requirements described above.

Not later than 15 days prior to the first prehearing conference

scheduled in the proceeding, a petitioner shall file a supplement to

the petition to intervene which must include a list of the contentions

which are sought to be litigated in the matter. Each contention must

consist of a specific statement of the issue of law or fact to be

raised or controverted. In addition, the petitioner shall provide a

brief explanation of the bases of the contention and a concise

statement of the alleged facts or expert opinion which support the

contention and on which the petitioner intends to rely in proving the

contention at the hearing. The petitioner must also provide references

to those specific sources and documents of which the petitioner is

aware and on which the petitioner intends to rely to establish those

facts or expert opinion. Petitioner must provide sufficient information

to show that a genuine dispute exists with the applicant on a material

issue of law or fact. Contentions shall be limited to matters within

the scope of the amendment under consideration. The contention must be

one which, if proven, would entitle the petitioner to relief. A

petitioner who fails to file such a supplement which satisfies these

requirements with respect to at least one contention will not be

permitted to participate as a party.

Those permitted to intervene become parties to the proceeding,

subject to any limitations in the order granting leave to intervene,

and have the opportunity to participate fully in the conduct of the

hearing, including the opportunity to present evidence and cross-

examine witnesses.

If a hearing is requested, the Commission will make a final

determination on the issue of no significant hazards consideration. The

final determination will serve to decide when the hearing is held.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves

no significant hazards consideration, the Commission may issue the

amendment and make it immediately effective, notwithstanding the

request for a hearing. Any hearing held would take place after issuance

of the amendment.

If the final determination is that the amendment request involves a

significant hazards consideration, any hearing held would take place

before the issuance of any amendment.

A request for a hearing or a petition for leave to intervene must

be filed with the Secretary of the Commission, U.S. Nuclear Regulatory

Commission, Washington, DC 20555, Attention: Docketing and Services

Branch, or may be delivered to the Commission's Public Document Room,

the Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555, by the

above date. Where petitions are filed during the last 10 days of the

notice period, it is requested that the petitioner promptly so inform

the Commission by a toll-free telephone call to Western Union at 1-

(800) 248-5100 (in Missouri 1-(800) 342-6700). The Western Union

operator should be given Datagram Identification Number N1023 and the

following message addressed to Charles L. Miller: petitioner's name and

telephone number, date petition was mailed, plant name, and publication

date and page number of this Federal Register notice. A copy of the

petition should also be sent to the Office of the General Counsel, U.S.

Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Washington, DC 20555, and to J.W.

Durham, Sr. V.P. and General Counsel, Philadelphia Electric Company,

2301 Market Street, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19101, attorney for the

licensee.

Nontimely filings of petitions for leave to intervene, amended

petitions, supplemental petitions and/or requests for hearing will not

be entertained absent a determination by the Commission, the presiding

officer or the presiding Atomic Safety and Licensing Board that the

petition and/or request should be granted based upon a balancing of the

factors specified in 10 CFR 2.714(a)(1)(i)-(v) and 2.714(d).

The Commission hereby provides notice that this is a proceeding on

an application for a license amendment falling within the scope of

Section 134 of the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA), 42 U.S.C.

10154. Under Section 134 of the NWPA, the Commission, at the request of

any party to the proceeding, must use hybrid hearing procedures with

respect to ``any matter which the Commission determines to be in

controversy among the parties.'' The hybrid procedures in Section 134

provide for oral argument on matters in controversy, preceded by

discovery under the Commission's rules, and the designation, following

argument, of only those factual issues that involve a genuine and

substantial dispute, together with any remaining questions of law, to

be resolved in an adjudicatory hearing. Actual adjudicatory hearings

are to be held on only those issues found to meet the criteria of

Section 134 and set for hearing after oral argument.

The Commission's rules implementing section 134 of the NWPA are

found in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart K, ``Hybrid Hearing Procedures for

Expansion of Spent Nuclear Fuel Storage Capacity at Civilian Nuclear

Power Reactors'' (published at 50 FR 41662, October 15, 1985) to 10 CFR

2.1101 et seq. Under those rules, any party to the proceeding may

invoke the hybrid hearing procedures by filing with the presiding

officer a written request for oral argument under 10 CFR 2.1109. To be

timely, the request must be filed within 10 days of an order granting a

request for hearing or petition to intervene. (As outlined above, the

Commission's rules in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G, and 2.714 in

particular, continue to govern the filing of requests for a hearing or

petitions to intervene, as well as the admission of contentions.) The

presiding officer shall grant a timely request for oral argument. The

presiding officer shall grant an untimely request for oral argument

only upon showing of good cause by the requesting part for the failure

to file on time and after providing the other parties an opportunity to

respond to the untimely request. If the presiding officer grants a

request for oral argument, any hearing held on the application shall be

conducted in accordance with hybrid hearing procedures. In essence,

those procedures limit the time available for discovery and require

that an oral argument be held to determine whether any contentions must

be resolved in adjudicatory hearing. if no party to the proceedings

requests oral argument, or if all untimely requests for oral argument

are denied, then the usual procedures in 10 CFR Part 2, Subpart G,

apply.

For further details with respect to this action, see the

application for amendment dated January 14, 1994, which is available

for public inspection at the Commission's Public document Room, the

Gelman Building, 2120 L Street, NW., Washington, DC 20555 and at the

local public document room located at Pottstown Public Library, 500

High Street, Pottstown, Pennsylvania 19464.

Dated at Rockville, Maryland, this 1st day of August 1994.

For the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.

Frank Rinaldi,

Project Manager, Project Directorate I-2, Division of Reactor

Projects--I/II, Office of Nuclear Reactor Regulation.

[FR Doc. 94-19266 Filed 8-5-94; 8:45 am]

BILLING CODE 7590-01-M