Notice of Intent To Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact Statement for Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials

Federal RegisterJun 21, 1994

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Notice of Intent To Prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement for Storage and Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile

Materials

AGENCY: Department of Energy.

ACTION: Notice of Intent (NOI) to Prepare a Programmatic Environmental

Impact Statement (PEIS) for Long-Term Storage and Disposition of

Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials.

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SUMMARY: The changes in the aftermath of the Cold War have significant

implications for the management of weapons-usable fissile materials

(primarily plutonium and highly-enriched uranium). The large reductions

in nuclear weapons agreed to by the United States and Russia reduces

our national security requirements for fissile materials and, as a

result, storage and disposition decisions for these materials will be

required.

The national policy outlined by the President in September 1993 is

to seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles of

highly-enriched uranium (HEU) or plutonium, and to ensure that where

these materials already exist they are subject to the highest standards

of safety, security and international accountability. In addition, the

President has initiated a comprehensive review of long-term options for

plutonium disposition, taking into account technical, nonproliferation,

environmental, budgetary and economic considerations.

The Department of Energy (DOE), which is the agency responsible for

management, storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

from United States nuclear weapons dismantlement and weapons production

processes, proposes to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement (PEIS) pursuant to the National Environmental Policy Act

(NEPA) to evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all weapons-

usable fissile materials, and disposition of weapons-usable fissile

materials declared surplus to national defense needs by the President.

The results of the environmental analysis in the PEIS, information

from technical and economic studies, and national policy objectives

will form the basis for decisions regarding long-term storage of all

weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of surplus

weapons-usable fissile materials. The PEIS may be followed by project-

specific NEPA documents to the extent necessary to implement any

decisions.

The purpose of this NOI, which is the initial step in the NEPA

process, is to inform the public of the PEIS proposal, to solicit

public input, and to announce that a scoping process will be conducted

so that the public may express its opinions and views regarding the

alternatives to be considered and the scope of the issues to be

addressed in the PEIS.

Written comments on the scope of the PEIS for Storage and

Disposition of Weapons-Usable Fissile Materials are invited from the

public. To ensure consideration in preparation of the PEIS, written

comments must be postmarked by October 17, 1994. Late comments will be

considered to the extent practicable. Public scoping workshops to

provide and discuss information, and receive oral comments on the scope

of the PEIS will be held during August and September 1994, both

regionally and in the vicinity of the sites which may be affected by

potential decisions and their implementation. DOE will announce the

location, date and time for these public scoping workshops in a

subsequent Notice in the Federal Register, and by other appropriate

means as early as practicable. The Department will endeavor to provide

30 days notice prior to any applicable workshops. Following this

scoping period, the Department will issue an Implementation Plan which

will describe, among other things, the scope of the PEIS, the

alternatives that will be analyzed, and the schedule for completing the

PEIS.

Note: A definition of terms is included at the end of this NOI.

ADDRESSES: Written comments on the scope of the PEIS, requests for

copies of Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium, a

1994 report prepared by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS),

requests for copies of the PEIS Implementation Plan (when available),

and requests for copies of the PEIS or PEIS Executive Summary (when

available) should be sent to: U.S. Department of Energy, c/o Oak Ridge

Institute for Science & Education, P.O. Box 117, Oak Ridge, TN 37831-

0117, Attn: Robert Menard, EESD.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: For general information on the DOE

NEPA process, please contact: Carol M. Borgstrom, Director, Office of

NEPA Oversight, EH-25, U.S. Department of Energy, 1000 Independence

Avenue SW., Washington, DC 20585, (202) 586-4600 or 1-800-472-2756.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

National Policy Objectives

On September 27, 1993, the President outlined a major principle of

U.S. nonproliferation policy:

Our national security requires us to accord higher priority to

nonproliferation, and to make it an integral element of our

relations with other countries.

The policy further states that the U.S. will:

Seek to eliminate where possible the accumulation of stockpiles

of highly-enriched uranium or plutonium, and to ensure that where

these materials already exist they are subject to the highest

standards of safety, security and international accountability.

In addition, the President called upon the Government to:

Initiate a comprehensive review of long-term options for

plutonium disposition, taking into account technical,

nonproliferation, environmental, budgetary and economic

considerations.

The Department's objectives in furtherance of this policy include:

To strengthen national and international arms control

efforts by providing an exemplary model for storage of all weapons-

usable fissile materials and disposition of surplus weapons-usable

fissile materials;

To ensure that storage and disposition of weapons-usable

fissile materials is carried out in compliance with environmental,

safety and health standards;

To minimize the prospect that surplus United States

weapons-usable fissile materials could be reintroduced into the

arsenals from which they came and therefore increasing the prospect of

reciprocal measures by Russia and other nuclear powers;

To minimize the risk that surplus United States weapons-

usable fissile materials could be obtained by unauthorized parties; and

To accomplish these objectives in a timely and cost-

effective manner.

Purpose of, and Need for, the PEIS

The Department of Energy (DOE), the agency responsible for

management, storage and disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials

from United States nuclear weapons dismantlement and weapons production

processes, proposes to prepare a Programmatic Environmental Impact

Statement (PEIS) to evaluate alternatives for long-term storage of all

weapons-usable fissile materials, and disposition of weapons-usable

fissile materials declared surplus to national defense needs by the

President.

The results of the environmental analysis in the PEIS, information

from technical and economic studies, and national policy objectives

will form the basis for decisions regarding long-term storage of all

weapons-usable fissile materials and the disposition of surplus

weapons-usable fissile materials. The PEIS may be followed by project-

specific NEPA documents to the extent necessary to implement any

decisions.

The purpose of this NOI, which is the initial step in the NEPA

process, is to inform the public of the PEIS proposal, to solicit

public input, and to announce that a scoping process will be conducted

so that the public may express its opinions and views regarding the

alternatives to be considered and the scope of the issues to be

addressed.

Background

In early 1994, the National Academy of Sciences published a report,

Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons Plutonium. This study,

commissioned by the President's National Security Council, provides

information regarding management and disposition of surplus nuclear

materials, in particular plutonium. Copies of this National Academy of

Sciences report are available upon request to the address stated above.

In the United States, weapons-usable fissile nuclear materials are

currently stored at several DOE sites, including Pantex (Amarillo,

Texas), Hanford Site (Richland, Washington), Idaho National Engineering

Laboratory (Idaho Falls, Idaho), Rocky Flats Plant (Denver, Colorado),

Savannah River Site (Aiken, South Carolina), Lawrence Livermore

National Laboratory (Livermore, California), Los Alamos National

Laboratory (Los Alamos, New Mexico), and Oak Ridge Reservation (Oak

Ridge, Tennessee).

The Department is currently performing vulnerability studies to

determine the environmental, safety, and health (ES&H) risks associated

with the current storage of plutonium, highly enriched uranium (HEU),

and other weapons-usable fissile materials. These studies will form the

basis for Departmental actions to ensure safe, secure interim storage

of weapons-usable fissile materials until the long-term storage or

disposition actions are implemented. In addition, plans for bilateral

or International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) inspection and

verification of the surplus material in storage are being developed and

may require action. If any actions required to establish these interim

conditions are considered major federal actions that might have a

significant impact on the environment, appropriate NEPA analysis will

be prepared and documented prior to proceeding. The results of these

efforts will establish the interim condition of safe, controlled,

inspectable storage.

Recent nuclear arms reduction agreements and pledges, along with

Presidential decisions concerning what stocks of plutonium, HEU, and

other nuclear materials are to be reserved for national defense will

largely determine how much and when material will be declared

``surplus'' and will become available for disposition. Discussions are

ongoing with the Nuclear Weapons Council to determine what materials

are surplus and what must be maintained as a reserve. DOE anticipates

that these amounts will be identified so that the analysis planned for

the PEIS can address the storage and disposition alternatives.

Several kilograms of plutonium, or several times that amount of

HEU, are sufficient to make a nuclear weapon. Although both plutonium

and HEU can be used to make nuclear weapons, they pose different risks

and require different controls. HEU is produced by ``enriching''

natural uranium using one of several technologies, all of which are

complex isotopic separation technologies that require commitment of

significant funds and industrial resources. As stated by the National

Academy of Sciences in its study, HEU can be blended down with

naturally occurring, depleted or low-enriched uranium to make a low-

enriched uranium (LEU) reactor fuel that poses lower proliferation risk

and can return a substantial economic benefit. In fact, LEU is the fuel

for most of the world's nuclear power reactors.

In contrast, blending cannot reduce the proliferation risks of

plutonium because all plutonium isotopes can be used to make a nuclear

weapon. Separating plutonium from other elements with which it might be

mixed or from unirradiated reactor fuel containing plutonium requires

only well-understood chemical processing techniques. Thus, the

management of plutonium in any form is a greater challenge than the

management of HEU.

HEU Long-Term Storage and Disposition Alternatives

DOE has proposed to consolidate HEU into secure interim storage at

Oak Ridge in the Y-12 facility (see 59 FR 11783), and may reduce its

surplus by blending down some of the HEU. The resulting LEU could then

be made available for commercial sale.

The PEIS will consider the following alternatives for HEU

disposition: Blending down surplus HEU with other, more abundant,

naturally occurring uranium, depleted uranium or other LEU, to make LEU

for reactor fuel; and any other reasonable alternatives identified in

the scoping process. Additionally, the no-action alternative of

maintaining surplus HEU in a storage facility indefinitely will be

evaluated.

HEU can be made highly proliferation resistant by blending it down

into a LEU (less than 20 percent U-235), and there may be significant

economic benefits that would offset the costs associated with this

alternative. Consequently, alternatives which do not exploit the

economic value of the surplus HEU, such as blending it down into LEU,

are likely to be considered reasonable for disposition of most of the

surplus HEU. However, some HEU may have impurities that make this

material unacceptable as a reactor fuel when blended down and would

have to be disposed of as waste. For these materials, blending down to

less than 20 percent U-235 to prevent use in nuclear weapons, followed

by disposal as waste, may be the only reasonable alternative.

Plutonium Long-Term Storage and Disposition Alternatives

The Department proposes to use the report prepared by the National

Academy of Sciences, Management and Disposition of Excess Weapons

Plutonium, as the starting point for evaluating alternatives regarding

the long-term storage and disposition of plutonium. The Academy

concluded that the existence of surplus fissile materials worldwide

constitutes a ``clear and present danger to national and international

security.'' The Academy further noted that:

None of the options yet identified for managing this material

can eliminate this danger; all they can do is to reduce the risk.

Moreover, none of the options for long-term disposition of excess

weapons plutonium can be expected to substantially reduce the

inventories of excess plutonium from nuclear weapons for at least a

decade.

As a result, the Academy recommended that:

It is important to begin now to build consensus on a road map

for decisions concerning long-term disposition of excess weapons

plutonium. Because disposition options will take decades to carry

out, it is critical to develop options that can muster a sustainable

consensus.

Standards for Action

In its report, the Academy identified standards for managing the

risks associated with surplus weapons plutonium. These standards

include:

The Stored Weapons Standard

The high standards of security and accounting applied to storage of

nuclear weapons should be maintained for weapons-usable fissile

materials throughout the process of dismantlement, storage and

disposition. The Academy concluded that storage should not be extended

indefinitely because of nonproliferation risks and arms reduction

objectives.

The Spent Fuel Standard

The National Academy of Sciences recommended that options for long-

term disposition of plutonium should seek to meet a ``spent-fuel

standard'' in which the plutonium is as inaccessible for weapons use as

the plutonium in spent nuclear fuel from commercial power reactors.

The Department is seeking public comment on the appropriateness of

these standards as well as others.

Long-term Storage Alternatives

The Department proposes to evaluate alternatives for long-term

storage of plutonium, HEU and other weapons-usable fissile materials:

(1) In the current interim storage facilities (the no-action

alternative); (2) in facilities upgraded as necessary to comply with

current ES&H and design requirements; or (3) in a new consolidated

storage facility. Five candidate sites for a new consolidated long-term

storage were selected from those evaluated during the Reconfiguration

Program in preparation for development of the Reconfiguration PEIS,

addressing the nuclear weapons complex for the post-Cold War era. They

are the Idaho National Engineering Laboratory, the Savannah River Site,

the Oak Ridge Reservation, the Pantex Plant, and the Nevada Test Site.

In addition, ongoing evaluation of interim storage sites may result in

other sites being considered reasonable alternatives for consolidated

long-term storage.

Surplus Plutonium Disposition Alternatives (Including Other Surplus

Nuclear Materials Except HEU)

Controlled, interim storage will be required until the materials

are either placed into long-term storage or dispositioned into a more

proliferation resistant form. As mentioned previously, the alternatives

for disposition of plutonium and certain other surplus nuclear

materials were evaluated by the Academy. In general, the Academy

identified several broad alternatives for meeting the ``spent fuel

standard.''

Mixed Oxide fuel alternative, in which the surplus

plutonium would be used as fuel in existing, modified, or new nuclear

reactors, that would consume a fraction of the plutonium and embed the

rest in highly radioactive spent fuel similar to that now produced by

commercial power reactors, and which would be stored and ultimately

disposed of in a geologic repository;

Immobilization alternative, in which the surplus plutonium

would be vitrified or embedded in a ceramic or other material, either

alone or mixed with radioactive high-level wastes, to form glass or

ceramic logs for ultimate disposal in a geologic repository; and

Geologic disposition alternative, in which plutonium in

some other acceptable form would be placed directly in suitable

canisters and buried in deep boreholes drilled into the earth, or in a

mined geologic repository.

Beyond the Spent Fuel Standard

Because plutonium disposition alternatives meeting the ``spent fuel

standard'' result in a form that still entails a risk of use in

weapons, and because the barriers to use diminish with time as the

radioactivity decays, it will be prudent to consider further steps to

reduce long-term proliferation risks. Thus, the alternatives that

result in the plutonium becoming essentially inaccessible or destroyed

include:

Accelerator based conversion, in which a large fraction of

plutonium would be fissioned in a sub-critical reactor aided by

neutrons produced by an accelerator; and

``Deep Burn'' Reactors, in which the plutonium is

fissioned so completely in reactors, without spent fuel reprocessing

and recycling, that only a small amount of plutonium would remain in

the spent nuclear fuel.

There may be other alternatives that are reasonable for disposition

of surplus plutonium (and other surplus weapons-usable fissile

materials) into a form which is substantially and inherently

proliferation resistant. The PEIS will include consideration of any

other reasonable alternatives identified in the scoping process.

The purpose of the PEIS is to develop information to support

decision making concerning long-term storage of all plutonium, HEU, and

other weapons-usable material and disposition of the surplus plutonium

and other weapons-usable fissile materials so that the risk of

proliferation is minimized. Some of the alternatives to accomplish

disposition may require substantial research and development, and could

entail subsequent NEPA analysis prior to any decision concerning

implementation.

The Academy study also considered plutonium disposition

alternatives that the Academy judged to be unreasonable. These

alternatives were: sub-seabed disposal; ocean dilution; underground

detonation; and disposal in space. Comments regarding these, and any

other alternatives, are encouraged to aid DOE in establishing the

reasonable PEIS alternatives for disposition of surplus plutonium (and

other weapons-usable fissile materials).

The NEPA Process

This PEIS is being prepared pursuant to section 102(2)(C) of the

National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) of 1969, as amended (42 U.S.C.

4321 et seq.) and the Council on Environmental Quality (CEQ)

regulations (40 CFR parts 1500-1508). The reason for this PEIS is that

there might be significant environmental impacts from implementing

decisions on the long-term storage and disposition of weapons-usable

fissile materials. Such decisions would be a major Federal action

significantly affecting the quality of the human environment within the

meaning of NEPA and, therefore, requiring the preparation of an

environmental impact statement (EIS).

NEPA requires review of any major Federal action which may

significantly affect the quality of the human environment. The review

is documented through an EIS. The NEPA process is described in the CEQ

regulations implementing NEPA [40 CFR, Parts 1500-1508] and DOE NEPA

regulations at 10 CFR Part 1021. The draft and final PEIS will be

prepared in accordance with these requirements.

A PEIS is a broad-scope environmental analysis of a program or

policy [40 CFR 1500.4(i)]. A PEIS provides an opportunity for NEPA

review to coincide with meaningful points in agency planning and

decisionmaking [40 CFR 1502.4(b)]. A PEIS may be used to support later

NEPA documents of narrower scope (called ``tiering''), such as site-

specific or project-specific NEPA reviews. NEPA documents tiered from

the PEIS would focus on specific actions when they are ripe for review

[40 CFR 1502.20]. Following preparation of an EIS, an agency issues a

Record of Decision (ROD) to document its decision [40 CFR 1505.2]. The

ROD explains how the EIS analysis was balanced against other factors

leading to the agency's decision. DOE has determined that potential

decisions and their implementation regarding the long-term storage and

disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials would be a major

Federal action within the meaning of NEPA; and that the several actions

which might be anticipated under this effort are connected [40 CFR

1508.25] and would constitute a broad agency program [40 CFR 1502.4].

Accordingly, DOE has decided that a PEIS is appropriate to analyze the

environmental consequences associated with long-term storage and

disposition of weapons-usable fissile materials and to factor

environmental considerations into DOE decisions.

At this point in the NEPA process, all alternatives, especially

those identified for plutonium disposition, are broadly stated. This

has been done intentionally so that public input during scoping can be

optimally utilized to identify which alternatives should be

specifically addressed and which significant issues should be included

within the scope of the PEIS. Based on comments received during the

scoping process, the reasonable alternatives to be included in the

PEIS, a discussion of the methodology and the issues to be addressed

will be identified in a PEIS Implementation Plan.

Environmental Issues

The PEIS will identify and analyze direct, indirect, and cumulative

impacts resulting from the alternatives for potential decisions and

their implementation. The impact analyses will address the following

resources: air, water, land, biota, human health and safety, social and

economic, cultural, energy and minerals, transportation, and any other

issues identified as appropriate during the scoping process. The impact

analyses will be at the programmatic level for the proposed action and

each alternative and will not deal with specific site environmental

resource issues unless an alternative proposes a site-specific

activity. Subsequent to the decisions made upon the completion of this

PEIS, DOE may undertake site-specific actions based upon such decisions

and may also perform separate NEPA analyses on those actions prior to

any site implementation. Such analyses would include a detailed

examination of the site-specific environmental impacts of those

activities. DOE invites public comments specifically on the scope of

the PEIS analysis.

Classified Material

DOE plans to prepare the PEIS in unclassified form; however, DOE

will review classified material while preparing the PEIS. In the event

any classified material is included in the completed PEIS or its

associated Record of Decision (ROD), such material would be in a

classified appendix which would not be available for general public

review. This material would, however, be considered by DOE in reaching

a decision on long-term storage and disposition of fissile nuclear

materials. DOE will provide as much information as possible in

unclassified form to assist public understanding and input.