Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks

FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION

47 CFR Parts 0, 1, and 43

[OI Docket No. 24-523, MD Docket No. 24-524; FCC 25-49; FR ID 311064]

Review of Submarine Cable Landing License Rules and Procedures To Assess Evolving National Security, Law Enforcement, Foreign Policy, and Trade Policy Risks

AGENCY:

Federal Communications Commission.

ACTION:

Final rule.

SUMMARY:

In this document, the Federal Communications Commission (Commission or FCC) adopted a

Report and Order

that updates the Commission's submarine cable licensing process and adopts rule changes to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats, specifically those posed by an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The

Report and Order

adopts a requirement for certain licensees to file an annual report about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. The

Report and Order

adopts a one-time information collection for licensees to identify, among other things, how many entities currently own or operate submarine line terminal equipment (SLTEs) on existing licensed cable systems. The

Report and Order

also requires applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and requires applicants to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, the

Report and Order

adopts streamlined rules and eliminates the requirement for licensees to file a cable operator report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis.

DATES:

These rules are effective November 26, 2025, except for amendatory instructions 6 (§ 1.767), 7 (§ 1.768), 10 (§ 1.70002), 11 (§ 1.70003), 12 (§§ 1.70005 and 1.70006), 13 (§ 1.70007), 14 (§§ 1.70008 and 1.70009), 15 (§§ 1.70011 through 1.70013), 16 (§ 1.70016), 17 (§ 1.70017), 18 (§ 1.70020), 19 (§§ 1.70023 and 1.70024), and 22 (§ 43.82), which are indefinitely delayed. The One-Time Information Collection will also be indefinitely delayed. The Commission will publish a document in the

Federal Register

announcing the effective date of these rule sections and the One-Time Information Collection.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Desiree Hanssen, Office of International Affairs, Telecommunications and Analysis Division, at

desiree.hanssen@fcc.gov

or at (202) 418-0887. For additional information concerning the Paperwork Reduction Act information collection requirements contained in this document, contact Cathy Williams at 202-418-2918 or

Cathy.Williams@fcc.gov,

or send an email to

PRA@fcc.gov.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

This is a summary of the Commission's

Report and Order,

in OI Docket No. 24-523 and MD Docket No. 24-524; FCC 25-49, adopted on August 7, 2025 and released on August 13, 2025. The full text of this document is available online at

https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/FCC-25-49A1.pdf.

The full text of this document is also available for inspection and copying during business hours in the FCC Reference Center, 45 L Street NE, Washington, DC 20554. To request materials in accessible formats for people with disabilities, send an email to

FCC504@fcc.gov

or call the Consumer & Governmental Affairs Bureau at 202-418-0530 (voice), 202-418-0432 (TTY).

Synopsis

I. Introduction

1. In this item, we modernize and streamline the Commission's submarine cable rules to facilitate faster and more efficient deployment of submarine cables, while at the same time ensuring the security and resilience of this critical infrastructure. We recognize that investment in such infrastructure is vital to American prosperity and economic dynamism. The rules that we adopt today will ensure that the United States remains ready and able to deploy submarine cable infrastructure with increasing amounts of capacity to meet current and future internet and data demands so that the United States remains “the unrivaled world leader in critical and emerging technologies—such as artificial intelligence.” With global competition for submarine cables increasing, connections to the United States should continue to be at the forefront of the submarine cable marketplace. Nonetheless, “[i]nvestment at all costs is not always in the national interest,” because of the potential for foreign adversary exploitation. We also recognize that “[e]conomic security is national security,” and thus protecting our communications networks against foreign threats is crucial. With these principles in mind today, we undertake the first major comprehensive update of our submarine cable rules since 2001. Since that time, technology, consumer expectations, international submarine cable traffic patterns, submarine cable infrastructure, and the foreign threat landscape have changed greatly.

2. To advance the Commission's comprehensive strategy to build a more secure and resilient communications supply chain, we adopt rules that place a strong emphasis on preventing and mitigating national security risks from foreign adversaries, while welcoming investment from United States allies and partners. We also lighten the regulatory burden on industry by modernizing and simplifying the submarine cable license approval process.

3. In this

Report and Order,

we take action to protect the security, integrity, and resilience of submarine cable systems by targeting foreign adversary threats to this critical U.S. communications infrastructure. Specifically, we adopt a clear and consistent standard that incorporates the Department of Commerce's definitions for identifying a “foreign adversary,” “foreign adversary country,” and an individual or entity “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.” Using these definitions, we adopt rules that will better protect U.S. national security and critical U.S. communications infrastructure from foreign adversaries.

4. We update the Commission's submarine cable licensing process to protect critical U.S. communications infrastructure against foreign adversary threats. Specifically, we adopt a presumption that will preclude the grant of applications filed by any entity owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary; any entity identified on the Commission's “Covered List”;

1

and/or

any entity whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity. To ensure that applicants have the requisite character qualifications, we adopt a character presumptive disqualifying condition that an applicant is not qualified to hold a cable landing license if it meets certain criteria. We adopt a presumption that denial of an application is warranted where an applicant seeks to land a submarine cable in a foreign adversary country. Additionally, we adopt a condition prohibiting cable landing licensees from entering into a new or extension of an existing arrangement for Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRU) or leases for capacity where such arrangements would give an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, the ability to install, own, or manage Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) on a submarine cable landing in the United States. For current licensees that meet the presumptive disqualifying criteria or whose cable lands in a foreign adversary country, we adopt a tool for increased oversight. We require these licensees to file an annual report (Foreign Adversary Annual Report) containing information about the licensee, submarine cable system ownership, and submarine cable operations. We also adopt a written hearing process to take action to deny or revoke and/or terminate a cable landing license and a process to address a cable landing license or a licensee that is insolvent or no longer exists.

1

Pursuant to sections 2(a) and (d) of the Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act, and §§ 1.50002 and 1.50003 of the Commission's rules, the Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau (PSHSB) publishes a list of communications equipment and services that have been determined by one of the sources specified in that statute to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons (“covered” equipment and services).

See

Secure and Trusted Communications Networks Act of 2019, Public Law 116-124, 133 Stat. 158 (2020) (codified as amended at 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609 (Secure Networks Act);

see also

47 CFR 1.50002-1.50003; Federal Communications Commission,

List of Equipment and Services Covered by Section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, https://www.fcc.gov/supplychain/coveredlist

(last updated June 5, 2025) (

List of Covered Equipment

and Services

). PSHSB added the latest entry to the Covered Equipment or Services list on July 23, 2024.

Public Safety and Homeland Security Bureau Announces Update to List of Covered Equipment and Services Pursuant to Section 2 of the Secure Network

Act, WC Docket No. 18-89 et al., Public Notice, 39 FCC Rcd 8395 (PSHSB July 23, 2024) (

2024 Covered List PSHSB Public Notice

),

https://docs.fcc.gov/public/attachments/DA-24-712A1_Rcd.pdf.

5. We modernize our submarine cable rules by adopting a definition of the term, “submarine cable system,” that acknowledges the range of technological advancement in existing submarine cable systems. This definition incorporates the future technological evolution of submarine cable systems, all of which include SLTE as a significant component of the system itself. While at this time we decline to require SLTE owners and operators to become licensees, we take steps to identify, through a one-time information collection, how many entities currently own or operate SLTEs on existing licensed cable systems. The one-time information collection we adopt will further inform the Commission about the identities of SLTE owners and operators and their role in operating a portion of the submarine cable system, including information about system capacity, spectrum, or the lighting of a fiber. The one-time collection will also assess for insolvent cables or licensees, and require licensees to disclose whether or not their submarine cable systems use covered equipment or services. Importantly, this one-time information collection will inform our proposed regulatory approach to SLTEs as discussed in the

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

6. We also codify the Commission's longstanding practice of requiring a cable landing license for submarine cables that lie partially outside of U.S. territorial waters. Moreover, while we do retain a number of our current rules, we eliminate the requirement that entities that solely own, and do not control, a U.S. cable landing station must be applicants for, and licensees on, a cable landing license. We update our application rules to require a statement that grant of the application is in the public interest, and require applicants to provide detailed information about the submarine cable system and to report whether or not they use and/or will use third-party foreign adversary service providers in the operation of the submarine cable. We also require applicants and licensees to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their systems and services from cybersecurity and physical security risks that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. Additionally, applicants for a cable landing license are required to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. These rules will ensure that licensees will protect their networks from cybersecurity and physical security threats and threats from foreign adversaries. Finally, to make it easier for applicants and licensees to navigate our rules, we clarify and update the rules for applications to modify, assign, transfer control of, or renew or extend a cable landing license or request special temporary authority. We adopt rules to obligate licensees to keep the Commission abreast of changes to important information such as the contact information of the licensee and other information that will enable the Commission to maintain accurate records regarding licensees.

7. With respect to the circuit capacity data collection, we streamline our rules and eliminate the requirement for licensees to file a Cable Operator Report about the capacity on a cable and clarify the types of capacity that need to be reported on an annual basis. Instead, we require licensees and common carriers to report their capacity on domestic and international cables in a single report, the Capacity Holder Reports—a report filed by each Filing Entity on an individual basis—that will enable the Commission to continue collecting accurate and important data for national security and public safety purposes. Importantly, consistent with other actions, we require cable landing licensees and common carriers to provide certain information about their SLTEs in the Capacity Holder Report.

8. In short, we “maintain[ ] the strong, open investment environment that benefits our economy and our people, while enhancing our ability to protect the United States from new and evolving threats” in the submarine cable ecosystem.

II. Background

9. In November 2024, the Commission adopted the

2024 Cable NPRM,

88 FR 50486, August 1, 2023, initiating a comprehensive review of the submarine cable rules to develop forward-looking rules to better protect submarine cables, identify and mitigate harms affecting national security and law enforcement, and facilitate the deployment of submarine cables and capacity to the market. As explained in the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission's authority to grant, withhold, revoke, or condition submarine cable landing licenses derives from the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530. The Commission discussed in detail its rules and coordination of applications with the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee, to assess applicants and licensees for assessment of any national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and/or trade policy concerns. The Commission also discussed the existing procedures by which it coordinates with the State Department on all submarine cable applications and obtains approval of any proposed grant of an application or revocation of a cable landing license pursuant to the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530.

10.

Recent Commission Actions Regarding National Security.

The Commission has recognized that national security is built on both protecting the nation's communications infrastructure from foreign adversary threats and promoting the prosperity and robustness of the communications sector. The Commission in its recent rulemaking proceedings and actions is continuing its ongoing efforts to secure and protect communications networks from foreign adversaries, while recognizing that investment in U.S. communications networks bolsters national security. In December 2024, the Commission engaged with stakeholders in light of U.S. government confirmed reports that state-sponsored foreign actors tied to the People's Republic of China (PRC) infiltrated at least eight U.S. communications companies in a massive espionage effort, an incident known as Salt Typhoon. The Commission has continued to remain vigilant against this and other foreign adversary cyberthreats.

11. Earlier this year, shortly after President Trump announced in February 2025 the America First Investment Policy, which states that “[e]conomic security is national security” and discusses the need to limit certain investments in strategic sectors by six identified foreign adversaries, the Commission initiated a series of actions. In March 2025, the Commission responded to threats posed by the People's Republic of China and to the evolving threat environment more generally, by establishing a Council for National Security to bring together the Commission's regulatory, investigatory, and enforcement authorities to counter foreign adversaries. The Council was established with a three-part goal: “(1) Reduce the American technology and telecommunications sectors' trade and supply chain dependencies on foreign adversaries; (2) Mitigate America's vulnerabilities to cyberattacks, espionage, and surveillance by foreign adversaries; and (3) Ensure the U.S. wins the strategic competition with China over critical technologies, such as 5G and 6G, AI, satellites and space, quantum computing, robotics and autonomous systems, and the Internet of Things.” In the same month, the Commission opened a separate proceeding, the

Delete, Delete, Delete

proceeding, with an aim to remove outdated and unnecessary regulations to clear away obstacles to investment.

12. On May 22, 2025, the Commission took action in two distinct proceedings to protect our nation's communications infrastructure from foreign adversary threats. First, in the

Equipment Authorization Report and Order and FNPRM,

the Commission adopted new rules to help ensure that the telecommunication certification bodies (TCBs), measurement facilities (test labs), and laboratory accreditation bodies that participate in our equipment authorization program are not subject to ownership, direction, or control by untrustworthy actors, including foreign adversaries, that pose a risk to national security. The

Equipment Authorization Report and Order

prohibits Commission recognition of any TCB, test lab, or laboratory accreditation body owned by, controlled by, or subject to the direction of a prohibited entity, and prohibits such TCBs, test labs, and laboratory accreditation bodies from participating in the Commission's equipment authorization program.

13. Second, in the

Foreign Adversary NPRM,

the Commission proposed to adopt certification and information collection requirements that would fill gaps in the Commission's existing rules and give the Commission, and the public, a new and comprehensive view of threats from foreign adversaries in the communications sector. Specifically, the Commission proposed to apply new certification and disclosure requirements on entities holding every type of license, permit, or authorization, rather than only certain specific licenses, and to go beyond foreign adversary ownership to also cover all regulated entities controlled by or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. The Commission stated that, by focusing on foreign adversary ownership or control, rather than foreign influence more broadly, the proposed rules are tailored to avoid needless burden on regulated entities.

14.

2024 Cable NPRM.

On November 22, 2024, the Commission adopted the

2024 Cable NPRM,

which initiated the first major review of the submarine cable rules since 2001, and sought comment on how best to improve and streamline the rules to facilitate efficient deployment of submarine cables while ensuring the security, resilience, and protection of this critical infrastructure. Among other things, the Commission sought comment on codifying the scope of the Commission's licensing requirements under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530 and other legal requirements, improving the Commission's oversight of submarine cable landing licenses, and adopting targeted requirements to protect submarine cables from national security and law enforcement risks. The Commission further sought comment on streamlining procedures to expedite submarine cable review processes and improving the quality of the circuit capacity data and facilitating the sharing of such information with other federal agencies. To address evolving national security, law enforcement, and other risks, the Commission sought comment on updating application requirements for national security purposes and ensuring the Commission has targeted and granular information regarding the ownership, control, and use of a submarine cable system, adopting new compliance certifications, and on any additional steps the Commission can take to protect this critical infrastructure, including activities in coordination with other federal agencies.

15. Earlier this year, the Commission received 18 comments, nine reply comments, and several ex partes pertaining to a wide range of topics discussed in the

2024 Cable NPRM.

Several commenters supported the proposal to codify a definition of a submarine cable system in the Commission's rules. Some commenters offered reservations about potentially duplicative requirements between the proposed periodic reporting, which sought updated ownership and other information, and similar requirements in mitigation agreements with the Committee, as well as concerns about requiring SLTE owners and operators to be licensees. Other commenters offered generally critical views about the proposal to lower the ownership threshold for reportable interests from 10% to 5%, with some further refinements suggested. Some commenters expressed reservations about including capacity holders or IRU holders and lessees under a licensing requirement. Meanwhile, several commenters supported the effort to streamline applications and offered recommendations. As explained below, we have considered these and other comments in the thorough record received and either take action today or seek additional comment.

III. Report and Order

16. We adopt rules that streamline, modernize, and enhance investment in submarine cable infrastructure, while protecting this critical infrastructure against foreign adversaries in an evolving threat environment. In recent actions, the Commission has taken concrete steps to identify and halt foreign adversaries from participating in U.S. communications markets and supply chains. Our rules take similar steps for submarine cables while reducing regulatory burdens.

A. Foreign Adversary Rules

17. We take action to protect the security, integrity, and resilience of the nation's critical infrastructure by adopting proposals to implement certain information requirements, certification requirements, conditions, and prohibitions that will enable the Commission to identify and mitigate foreign adversary threats, as discussed below. We adopt a modified and tailored version of the Commission's proposals by simplifying and providing a clear and consistent standard that incorporates the Department of Commerce's definitions for identifying a “foreign adversary,” “foreign adversary country,” and “[p]erson owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.” Our approach is aligned with long-standing interagency rules and regulations, pursuant to Executive Order 13873, to identify and mitigate foreign adversary threats to U.S. critical infrastructure, including exploitation through individuals and entities owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. This approach is further supported by the record. For example, FDD states that the Commission should prohibit entities subject to the jurisdiction, direction, or control of a foreign adversary from owning submarine cables connected to the United States. The Committee for the Assessment of Foreign Participation in the U.S. Telecommunications Services Sector (Committee) also supports the Commission relying on the Department of Commerce's determinations and definitions in its efforts to mitigate threats to submarine cable infrastructure presented, such as prohibiting the use of such vendors for equipment or services.

1. Foreign Adversary Definition

18.

Foreign Adversary.

We define “foreign adversary” consistent with the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.2, which defines “foreign adversary” as “any foreign government or foreign non-government person determined by the Secretary to have engaged in a long-term pattern or serious instances of conduct significantly adverse to the national security of the United States or security and safety of United States persons.”

19. In identifying foreign adversaries for the purposes of implementing the rules we adopt today, we follow the Department of Commerce's determinations. Currently, the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4(a), identifies the following “foreign governments or foreign non-government persons” as “foreign adversaries”: (1) The People's Republic of China, including the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region and the Macau Special Administrative Region (China); (2) Republic of Cuba (Cuba); (3) Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran); (4) Democratic People's Republic of Korea (North Korea); (5) Russian Federation (Russia); and (6) Venezuelan politician Nicolás Maduro (Maduro Regime). For purposes of the submarine cable rules, we define “foreign adversary” to include the foreign governments and foreign non-government persons identified in 15 CFR 791.4(a), including the Maduro Regime.

20.

Foreign Adversary Country.

In this

Report and Order,

our use of the term “foreign adversary country” incorporates the meaning of the Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.4, which specifically identifies “foreign governments or foreign non-government persons” (in lieu of “countries”) as “constitut[ing] foreign adversaries.” For purposes of the submarine cable rules, we define “foreign adversary country” to include both the foreign governments identified as foreign adversaries in 15 CFR 791.4, and countries controlled by a foreign adversary (including foreign non-government persons) identified in 15 CFR 791.4. For example, we will apply any reference to “a government organization of a foreign adversary country” to include the Maduro Regime. Further, we will apply the term “foreign adversary country” to include Venezuela as a country controlled by a foreign adversary identified in 15 CFR 791.4.

21.

Owned By, Controlled By, or Subject to the Jurisdiction or Direction of a Foreign Adversary.

For purposes of the submarine cable rules, we define an individual or entity “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary” consistent with Department of Commerce's rule, 15 CFR 791.2, with certain narrow modifications. Specifically, we define “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary” to apply to:

(1) Any individual or entity, wherever located, who acts as an agent, representative, or employee, or any person who acts in any other capacity at the order, request, or under the direction or control, of a foreign adversary or of an individual or entity whose activities are directly or indirectly supervised, directed, controlled, financed, or subsidized in whole or in majority part by a foreign adversary;

(2) Any individual, wherever located, who is a citizen of a foreign adversary or a country controlled by a foreign adversary, and is not a United States citizen or permanent resident of the United States;

(3) Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, that has a principal place of business in, or is headquartered in, incorporated in, or otherwise organized under the laws of a foreign adversary or a country controlled by a foreign adversary; or

(4) Any entity, including a corporation, partnership, association, or other organization, wherever organized or doing business, that is owned or controlled by a foreign adversary, to include circumstances in which any person identified in paragraphs (1) through (3) of this section possesses the power, direct or indirect, whether or not exercised, through the ownership of a majority or a dominant minority (10% or greater) of the total outstanding voting interest and/or equity interest, or through a controlling interest, in an entity, board representation, proxy voting, a special share, contractual arrangements, formal or informal arrangements to act in concert, or other means, to determine, direct, or decide important matters affecting an entity.

22. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission proposed similar language with the term “influence.” However, we adopt here a clearer and narrower version of the proposal to align with other recent Commission actions. Moreover, our adopted approach is also aligned with interagency national security regulations deriving from President Trump's Executive Order 13873, covering the closely related matter of “Securing the Information and Communications Technology and Services Supply Chain.” We also recognize that industry has recommended and prefers clear lines and directions rather than ambiguous and potentially capacious terminology. After all, while every major global company is “subject to the influence” of the government of the People's Republic of China, including many prominent cable landing licensees, not all companies may be subject to a degree of influence such that they threaten national security and law enforcement interests. While we wish to sweep broadly enough to cover private entities subject to multi-faceted forms of foreign adversary control, we do not desire or intend a scope as broad as “subject to the influence” by itself implies.

23. Our approach is also recommended by the Committee, whose expertise the Commission frequently

seeks on national security matters, and others. The Heritage Foundation, for example, states that, “the Commission could adopt the phrasing `persons owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,' as has been recommended by other commenters.” Horizon Advisory also references 15 CFR 791.2, stating that “[a] practical approach to start in the right direction would be to apply the US Commerce Department's definition of `person owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary' for defining restrictions.”

24. Importantly, our rule will also assess private entities that are operating in foreign adversary countries. Some entities that are “ `ostensibly private and civilian' ” may “ `directly support China's military, intelligence, and security apparatuses and aid in their development and modernization.' ” Horizon Advisory stresses that “no Chinese company is private in any traditional sense,” adding that “[a]s the Chinese government refines its use and messaging around authorities like the National Security Law, the Anti-Espionage Law, and the Personal Information Protection Law, any firm operating in China is at risk of official influence that belies traditional conceptions of a private company.” Recently, the Supreme Court unanimously accepted findings that a privately held company that has operations in China “is subject to Chinese laws that require it to `assist or cooperate' with the Chinese Government's `intelligence work' and to ensure that the Chinese Government has the power to access and control private data the company holds.”

25. We note that the Commission's rules recognize that “[b]ecause the issue of control inherently involves issues of fact, it must be determined on a case-by-case basis and may vary with the circumstances presented by each case.” While we include factors indicative of control in our definition of “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,” a determination of control is not limited to these factors. The Commission will consider the totality of the circumstances reflected in the record.

26. We make certain modifications from the Department of Commerce's definition to appropriately tailor the Commission's definition and clearly define terms for purposes of the submarine cable rules, including the disclosure requirements and conditions adopted herein.

First,

we use the specific terms “individual” and/or “entity” to clarify the applicability of each subpart of the definition.

Second,

our definition of an individual “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary,” does not include a resident of a foreign adversary country.

27.

Finally,

we define “that is owned . . . by a foreign adversary” in subpart (4) to include both voting and equity interests, as well as controlling interests, and also define the term “dominant minority” in subpart (4) as 10% or greater direct or indirect voting and/or equity interests. We find that this ownership threshold is consistent with the Commission's consideration of the ownership threshold of concern in the

2024 Cable NPRM

and our rules requiring disclosure of such ownership information in submarine cable applications. Our approach is also consistent with Commission precedent and recent actions in other proceedings related to the ownership threshold that we adopted or proposed to adopt to determine foreign adversary ownership or control. The Commission has found that an individual or entity may exert direction or control, or significant influence, over a subject entity even without holding a majority of the equity and/or voting interests and that ownership interests as low as five and ten percent are relevant to protecting national security by identifying foreign adversary involvement in a licensee.

2. Foreign Adversary Presumptive Disqualifying Condition

28. To protect the security, integrity, and resilience of this critical U.S. communications infrastructure against national security, law enforcement, and other threats, we adopt a presumption that a foreign adversary applicant, as further described below, is not qualified to hold a cable landing license unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. No commenter opposes the Commission's proposals. We find that adopting this presumptive disqualifying condition is consistent with the Commission's authority to withhold cable landing licenses and condition the grant of licenses to “promote the security of the United States” under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, and will protect this critical submarine cable infrastructure and help ensure that it is secure from foreign adversaries and entities identified on the Commission's Covered List.

29. Specifically, the disqualifying condition will presumptively preclude the grant of a submarine cable application filed by any applicant:

(1) That is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);

(2) That is identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act; and/or

(3) Whose authorization, license, or other Commission approval, whether or not related to operation of a submarine cable, was denied or revoked and/or terminated or is denied or revoked and/or terminated in the future on national security and law enforcement grounds, as well as the current and future affiliates or subsidiaries of any such entity.

30. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to: (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order,

and (2) all other types of submarine cable applications—including an application for modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license—that are filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order

by a licensee whose initial application for a cable landing license is granted after the effective date of the

Report and Order

or by an existing licensee that currently does not exhibit (prior to the effective date of the

Report and Order

) any of the aforementioned criteria set out in the disqualifying condition. In this

Report and Order,

we use the term “existing licensees” to refer to a cable landing licensee whose license was or is granted prior to the effective date of the

Report and Order

or the new rules, as applicable and discussed herein. An applicant can overcome this adverse presumption only by establishing through clear and convincing evidence that the applicant does not fall within the scope of the adverse presumption, as described above, or that grant of the application would not pose risks to national security or that the national security benefits of granting the application would substantially outweigh any risks. Given our adoption of this presumption is necessitated by national security threats to critical U.S. communications infrastructure presented by untrustworthy actors, including foreign adversaries, we find it is appropriate and justified to apply a clear and convincing evidence standard to overcome the adverse presumption rather than NASCA's recommendation to apply a standard for rebutting a presumption that considers licensing conditions and other safeguards. We will exercise our discretion to exclude such applications from referral to the

Executive Branch agencies. We address below the process that will apply where the Commission considers whether denial of a submarine cable application is warranted. If an applicant fails to overcome any of the criteria in the presumptive disqualifying condition, we will find that denial of the application is warranted to promote the security of the United States and we will deny the application.

31. To the extent an application for modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order

by existing licensees that currently exhibit (prior to the effective date of the

Report and Order

) any of the criteria set out in the presumptive disqualifying condition, instead of applying the presumption, we will refer those applications to the Executive Branch agencies, irrespective of whether the applicant has reportable foreign ownership.

32. Importantly, we will presume that denial of an application as specified herein is warranted where it is filed by any applicant that is subject to any of the aforementioned criteria.

First,

foreign adversaries are deemed to present a national security threat that undermines the security, integrity, and resilience of critical submarine cable infrastructure and the national security interests of the United States. Entities subject to foreign adversary ownership, control, jurisdiction, or direction are identified through the application process, or through the Commission's Covered List, or by Commission action.

Second,

entities identified on the Commission's Covered List have been found to produce or provide equipment and services that have been deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons.

Third,

we conclude that the Commission's determinations in denial and revocation and/or termination proceedings concerning any regulated activity are directly relevant to the determination as to whether denial of a submarine cable application by an affected entity or its current and future affiliates and subsidiaries would “promote the security of the United States.”

33. For example, the presumptive disqualifying condition will apply to any initial application for a cable landing license filed by China Mobile International (USA) Inc. (China Mobile USA), China Telecom (Americas) Corporation (CTA), China Unicom (Americas) Operations Limited (CUA), Pacific Networks Corp. (Pacific Networks), and ComNet (USA) LLC (ComNet) and their current and future affiliates and subsidiaries. In the

China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination, China Unicom Americas Order on Revocation,

and

Pacific Networks and ComNet Order on Revocation and Termination,

the Commission extensively evaluated national security and law enforcement concerns and determined, based on thorough record development, that each entity is “subject to exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese government and is highly likely to be forced to comply with Chinese government requests without sufficient legal procedures subject to independent judicial oversight.” In the

China Mobile USA Order,

the Commission found that the entity is “vulnerable to exploitation, influence, and control by the Chinese government” and there is a significant risk that the Chinese government would use the entity “to conduct activities that would seriously jeopardize the national security interests and law enforcement activities of the United States.”

3. Character Presumptive Disqualifying Condition

34. Today, we adopt a standard by which the Commission will consider whether an applicant seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license has the requisite character qualifications. To ensure that applicants have the requisite character qualifications, we adopt a presumption that an applicant is not qualified to hold a cable landing license if it meets any of the criteria listed below, unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. This presumption will supplement the foreign adversary presumptive disqualifying condition and codifies a narrower application of the longstanding Commission practice of considering the character qualifications of applicants for submarine cable applications.

35. We presume an applicant does not possess the requisite character qualifications to become a cable landing licensee if the applicant has within the last 20 years:

(1) Materially violated the Cable Landing License Act where the violation (a) was not remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan, (b) resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization, or (c) was found by the Commission to be intentional;

(2) Committed national security-related violations of the Communications Act or Commission rules as identified in Commission orders, including but not limited to violations of rules concerning the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act;

(3) Made materially false statements or engaged in fraudulent conduct concerning national security or the Cable Landing License Act;

(4) Been subject to an adjudicated finding of making false statements or engaging in fraudulent conduct concerning national security before another U.S. government agency; or

(5) Materially failed to comply with the terms of a cable landing license, including but not limited to a condition requiring compliance with a mitigation agreement with the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee, where the violation (a) was not remediated with an adjudication involving a consent decree and/or compliance plan, (b) resulted in a loss of Commission license or authorization, or (c) was found by the Commission to be intentional.

36. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order,

and (2) all other types of submarine cable applications—including an application for modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license—that are filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order

by a licensee whose initial application for a cable landing license is granted after the effective date of the

Report and Order

or by an existing licensee that currently does not exhibit (prior to the effective date of the

Report and Order

) any of the aforementioned criteria set out in the disqualifying condition. Where such an application is filed for an assignment or transfer of control of a cable landing license, we will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition in our evaluation of the licensee, assignor/transferor, and assignee/transferee. We will not apply this presumptive disqualifying condition where an application for modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order

by existing licensees that currently exhibit (prior to the effective date of the

Report and Order

) any of the criteria set out in the presumptive disqualifying condition.

37. The criteria set out in this presumptive disqualifying condition are not the only grounds on which the Commission may deny an application

due to character concerns. The public interest may require, in a particular case, that the Commission deny an application on other grounds or evidence that may be indicative of the applicant's truthfulness and reliability, including violation of other provisions of the Communications Act, Commission rules, or laws.

38. An applicant subject to any of the aforementioned criteria can overcome this adverse presumption only by establishing that the applicant has the requisite character, despite its past conduct. We will not require applicants to disclose pending investigations, but rather only disclose violations as preliminarily or finally determined by the Commission, and as adjudicated by another U.S. government agency or a court in the United States.

39. We disagree with Microsoft's and NASCA's comments that the Commission's proposal regarding character qualifications was “overbroad.” Nevertheless, we choose to narrow the scope of the character qualifications to initially prioritize considerations related to national security in our assessment of an applicant's truthfulness and reliability and to better allocate administrative resources. Microsoft and NASCA disagree, for example, with any requirement to disclose any felony absent a material or specific threshold. The Commission considers all felonies as relevant to its evaluation of character qualifications in the broadcast licensing context, as such is indicative of an applicant's or licensee's “propensity to obey the law.” Further, the Commission retains the authority to take enforcement action or to revoke a licensee's cable landing license when warranted, including but not limited to reasons involving these or other character qualifications or misconduct of a licensee. Finally, while we agree with Microsoft's and NASCA's recommendation to limit the scope of the character qualifications to conduct related to ownership and operation of a submarine cable, we consider that fraudulent conduct and false statements before the Commission or other U.S. government agencies are relevant to determining the qualification of an applicant to become a cable landing licensee because such conduct bears directly on the licensee's truthfulness and propensity to obey the law and thus our ability to rely on the licensee to comply with our rules and the Cable Landing License Act. We find that the character qualifications discussed above are relevant to the determination of whether denial of a submarine cable application is warranted.

4. Foreign Adversary Cable Landing Presumptive Disqualifying Condition

40. To further protect U.S. communications networks from national security and law enforcement threats, we adopt a presumption that denial of an application, as specified below, is warranted where an applicant seeks to land a submarine cable in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f) of our newly adopted rules, unless the applicant overcomes the adverse presumption. The Committee supports a presumption of denial on building new cable landings connecting foreign adversary countries to the United States, given the intent and capabilities of such countries to harm U.S. interests and the vulnerabilities inherent in submarine cable infrastructure. No other commenter addressed this issue. We find that adopting this presumptive disqualifying condition is consistent with the Commission's authority to withhold cable landing licenses and condition the grant of licenses to “promote the security of the United States” under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530, and will protect this critical submarine cable infrastructure and ensure that it is secure from foreign adversaries and entities identified on the Commission's Covered List.

41. Specifically, we adopt a disqualifying condition that will presumptively preclude the grant of a submarine cable application filed by any applicant:

(1) That seeks to land a new submarine cable in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).

(2) That seeks to modify, renew, or extend its cable landing license to add a new landing located in a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f).

42. We will apply this presumptive disqualifying condition to: (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order,

and (2) an application for modification or renewal or extension of a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order

by a licensee whose initial application for a cable landing license is granted after the effective date of the

Report and Order

or by an existing licensee. An applicant can overcome this adverse presumption only by establishing through clear and convincing evidence that the applicant does not fall within the scope of the adverse presumption, as described above, or that grant of the application would not pose risks to national security or that the national security benefits of granting the application would substantially outweigh any risks. We will exercise our discretion to exclude such applications from referral to the Executive Branch agencies. We address below the process that will apply where the Commission considers whether denial of a submarine cable application is warranted. If an applicant fails to overcome any of the criteria in the presumptive disqualifying condition, we will find that denial of the application is warranted to promote the security of the United States and we will deny the application.

43. We agree with the Committee that there are substantial and serious national security and law enforcements risks associated with landing submarine cables in foreign adversary countries. Since 2017, there have been two submarine cable applications filed in part by entities with ties to foreign adversary countries and with the proposed cable landings in foreign adversary countries. The Executive Branch agencies recommended that the Commission partially deny the PLCN cable system application due to national security and law enforcement risks, stating that the proposed connection to Hong Kong, “combined with other pending applications seeking to directly connect the United States to Hong Kong, furthers the PRC's ambitions to have access to an information hub that is directly linked to U.S. ICT infrastructure” and “potentially could place voluminous amounts of sensitive U.S. person data in these companies' possession at risk.” The Committee recommended that the Commission deny the ARCOS-1 modification application due to national security and law enforcement risks, stating that “[i]f the application is granted as proposed, U.S. persons' internet traffic, data, and communications transiting the proposed ARCOS-1 cable expansion (Segment 26) to Cuba are very likely to be compromised,” given the “Cuban government maintains tight control of the Cuban telecommunications networks through [Empresa de Telecomunicaciones de Cuba S.A. (ETECSA)].”

5. Prohibition on IRUs and Capacity Leases With Foreign Adversaries

44. To further protect U.S. communications networks from national security, law enforcement, and other threats, we adopt a condition that cable landing licensees are prohibited from entering into arrangements for Indefeasible Rights of Use (IRUs) or leases for capacity on submarine cable systems landing in the United States,

where such arrangement for IRUs or lease for capacity would give an entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g), the ability to install, own, or manage SLTE on a submarine cable landing in the United States. While we clarify that we do not apply a strict liability standard, we expect licensees to conduct substantial due diligence to ensure compliance with FCC requirements. To the extent a licensee conducts substantial due diligence to verify all relevant information and reasonably believes the entity is not owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined herein, such licensee would not be subject to enforcement sanctions. We would consider all of the facts and circumstances raised in an individual case and take into consideration the steps a licensee took in conducting substantial due diligence to ensure compliance with the rule. We adopt this condition with respect to new and extension of existing arrangements for IRUs or leases for capacity between a cable landing licensee and any of the aforementioned entities, subject to any exception granted by the Commission. A licensee may petition the Commission for waiver of the condition. Any waiver of the condition would be granted only to the extent the licensee demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that such new or extension of an existing arrangement or lease would serve the public interest and would present no risks to national security or that the national security benefits of granting the waiver would substantially outweigh any risks.

45. The Commission sought comment on whether it should prohibit cable landing licensees from entering into arrangements for IRUs or leases for capacity on submarine cables landing in the United States with entities associated with foreign adversaries. Specifically, the Commission sought comment on applying this prohibition to any entity that is directly and/or indirectly owned or controlled by, or subject to the influence of, (1) a government organization of a foreign adversary country, and/or (2) any individual or entity that has a citizenship(s) or place(s) of organization in a “foreign adversary” country, as defined under 15 CFR 791.4. For the reasons discussed above, we instead adopt the narrower, more precise, and previously-used formulation “owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.”

46. We are persuaded by the record support for our action today. NASCA argues that the proposal “to ban certain commercial transactions is not supported by specific findings that the transactions pose a national security or law enforcement risk, given that the customers in such transactions typically do not have the ability to exert influence or control over the cable.” Other commenters, however, address national security risks associated with submarine cables in the current threat environment. FDD states that “Beijing has also repeatedly demonstrated its willingness to use security gaps within U.S. critical infrastructure” and “[t]hese risks are heightened by private firms' use of remote network management systems, particularly those connected directly to the [I]nternet, to control submarine cable systems.” The Committee states that “the United States and its networks are under constant threat from various foreign adversaries, particularly China” and recent compromise of U.S. telecommunications infrastructure “reflects the increasing capability of China to target critical American infrastructure and systems.” The Committee states that prohibiting cable landing licensees from entering into dark fiber IRU agreements with foreign adversary-affiliated entities would reduce risks posed by such entities owning or operating SLTE on submarine cables landing in the United States “pursuant to an IRU or similar or similar legal instrument,” and also provide “a bright line rule” requested by commenters. The Committee emphasizes the national security risks presented by foreign adversary entities with this type of access, including serious counterintelligence risks where an adversary could intercept or misroute U.S. persons' communications and sensitive data transiting the submarine cable.

47. We find there are serious national security and law enforcement risks associated with access, ownership, and control of communications fiber and principal equipment on this critical U.S. infrastructure by entities that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. Capacity may be held on submarine cables through ownership, leasing, purchasing, selling, buying, or swapping of capacity, spectrum, or fiber (partial fiber pair or a full fiber pair) for transmission of voice, data, and internet over the submarine cable system to interconnect with a U.S. terrestrial network. Significant national security and law enforcement risks are raised where an untrustworthy actor has access to U.S.-based infrastructure and sensitive information that traverses such infrastructure. In the

China Telecom Americas Order on Revocation and Termination,

for example, the Commission discussed that “the opportunities for harmful conduct associated with [China Telecom (Americas) Corporation's (CTA)] ability, as a service provider, to carry U.S. communications traffic present risks of unauthorized access to U.S. customer data and/or metadata.” Moreover, there are serious national security and law enforcement risks where an untrustworthy actor with access, ownership, and control of submarine cable communications fiber and principal equipment, has physical presence within U.S. communications networks and “can potentially access and/or manipulate data where it is on the preferred path for U.S. customer traffic.” Our action today further protects the submarine cable infrastructure from threats and ensures foreign adversaries are precluded from exploiting the domestic supply chain.

B. Cable Landing License Processes To Withhold or Revoke and/or Terminate a License

1. Process To Withhold or Revoke and/or Terminate a License

48. We adopt the Commission's proposal to apply an informal written process in cases involving withholding or revocation and/or termination of a cable landing license. Below, we describe the procedures we will use for revocations and denials, respectively. We find that these procedures are consistent with due process and procedural requirements under the Cable Landing License Act, the Communications Act, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA).

49. The Cable Landing License Act states that the President may “withhold or revoke such [cable landing] license . . . after due notice and hearing,” but does not identify particular procedures that must be followed. Where a statute does not expressly require an “on the record” hearing and instead calls simply for a “hearing,” a “full hearing,” or uses similar terminology, the statute does not trigger the APA's formal adjudication procedures absent clear evidence of congressional intent to do so. Agencies must adhere to the formal hearing procedures in sections 554, 556, and 557 of the APA only in cases of “adjudication required by statute to be determined on the record after opportunity for an agency hearing.” In addition to the Cable Landing License

Act, neither the Communications Act, the Commission's rules, nor the APA requires the Commission to use trial-type hearing procedures when it withholds or revokes a cable landing license. Congress has granted the Commission broad authority to “conduct its proceedings in such manner as will best conduce to the proper dispatch of business and to the ends of justice.” The Commission has broad discretion to craft its own rules “of procedure and to pursue methods of inquiry capable of permitting them to discharge their multitudinous duties.” Furthermore, the Communications Act gives the Commission the power of ruling on facts and policies in the first instance. In exercising that power, the Commission may resolve disputes of fact in an informal hearing proceeding on a written record. Below, we explain how we will conduct application and revocation proceedings.

50.

Revocation Informal Written Process.

We adopt an informal written process for revocations that will allow for the presentation and exchange of full written submissions before the Commission or OIA. The informal written process will provide cable landing licensees with timely and adequate notice of the reasons for any revocation action, and opportunity to cure noncompliance to the extent such an opportunity is required by the APA, and to respond to allegations and evidence in the record and to make any factual, legal, or policy arguments through the presentation and exchange of full written submissions. To the extent required by the APA, licensees will also be afforded the opportunity to cure any noncompliance before the institution of a revocation proceeding.

See

5 U.S.C. 558(c) (“Except in cases of willfulness or those in which public health, interest, or safety requires otherwise, the withdrawal, suspension, revocation, or annulment of a license is lawful only if, before the institution of agency proceedings therefor, the licensee has been given—(1) notice by the agency in writing of the facts or conduct which may warrant the action; and (2) opportunity to demonstrate or achieve compliance with all lawful requirements.”). We adopt the proposal that the Commission may commence a revocation proceeding either on its own initiative or upon the filing of a recommendation by the Executive Branch agencies, including the Committee, to revoke the license of a cable landing licensee. A few commenters state that the Commission cannot revoke a cable landing license “without prior coordination and approval from the State Department.” We note that the Commission and the State Department have existing procedures by which the State Department approves the Commission's grant of a cable landing license application or revocation of a cable landing license, as required by Executive Order 10530, and these procedures would continue to apply to any revocation of a cable landing license.

51. While we believe that oral hearing procedures are not warranted in all cases involving revocation of cable landing licenses, we delegate authority to OIA to determine appropriate procedures on a case by case basis, including addressing requests for oral hearing procedures, providing an opportunity for oral hearing procedures where warranted by the facts and circumstance, and designating an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) as the presiding officer if the hearing includes oral procedures, if OIA determines that doing so would be appropriate based on the ALJ's expertise or for other reasons. Courts have held that the question of whether to hold an evidentiary hearing is “within [the agency's] discretion, and it may `properly deny an evidentiary hearing if the issues, even disputed issues, may be adequately resolved on the written record, at least where there is no issue of motive, intent or credibility.'” As stated in the

2024 Cable NPRM,

we do not believe it would be appropriate to require live hearing procedures involving testimony and cross-examination in all proceedings to revoke cable landing licenses, particularly in cases involving national security issues, where the Commission has previously concluded that the burdens on the Government of implementing such procedures outweighed the private interest and the probable value of additional procedures. We also believe that live hearing procedures could entail significant administrative burdens on the Commission even in cases involving other issues that do not involve the Executive Branch agencies, such as character concerns, or other Commission rule violations. The informal written process we will apply is also distinct from the Commission's subpart B hearing rules, including the written hearing rules codified in §§ 1.371 through 1.377. No commenter addressed these proposals or argued that we should require oral hearing procedures in cases involving revocation of cable landing licenses.

52. While no commenter opposed an informal written hearing process, a few commenters state that revocation procedures should provide licensees with notice and an opportunity to resolve or cure concerns. A few commenters state generally that revocation will have an impact on investments, or that the Commission should “provide licensees with a clearly established process to revoke a license,” but they do not claim that the informal written process itself would provide insufficient process or fail to provide adequate opportunities for affected licensees to address the Commission's concerns. However, a few commenters propose mitigation as an additional procedural safeguard to resolve concerns or as a substitute for any revocation action. For example, INCOMPAS states that, “[b]efore the Commission resorts to revocation, it first should engage with licensees” to provide an opportunity to work with the Commission and Executive Branch agencies to identify national security concerns and develop mitigation measures. U.S. Chamber of Commerce states that licensees should be provided “a meaningful opportunity” to respond to allegations of misconduct and to cure or to mitigate concerns. As discussed below, we delegate authority to OIA to implement procedures on a case by case basis in accordance with section 558(c) of the APA, including providing notice and opportunity, where appropriate, to achieve compliance unless the facts and circumstances indicate willfulness or that the public interest or safety requires otherwise (including harm to national security). The Commission may determine, for example, in light of the relevant facts and circumstances that national security and law enforcement risks presented in a particular case cannot be addressed through mitigation with the Executive Branch agencies. Moreover, Executive Order 10530 requires the Commission to obtain the approval of the State Department, and, “as the Commission may deem necessary,” to seek advice from other Executive Branch agencies, before granting or revoking or terminating a cable landing license. The Commission has sought the expertise of the relevant Executive Branch agencies in identifying and evaluating issues of concern that may arise from an applicant's or licensee's foreign ownership, while also emphasizing that it will make an independent decision and will evaluate concerns raised by the Executive Branch agencies in light of all the issues raised. Further, revocation cases may involve other issues that do not involve the Executive Branch agencies, such as character concerns, or other Commission rule violations. To

the extent any revocation proceeding is commenced either on the Commission's own initiative or upon the filing of a recommendation by the Executive Branch agencies, we find that our informal written process will ensure the development of an adequate administrative record and appropriate procedural safeguards to ensure due process, including procedures for participation by affected licensees, the Executive Branch agencies, and other interested parties.

53. We disagree with proposals to curtail the Commission's authority to revoke and/or terminate a cable landing license under the Cable Landing License Act, Executive Order 10530, and the Commission's rules. Commenters suggest, for example, that the Commission should only revoke the license of a cable landing licensee on national security and economic security grounds or solely based on a history of noncompliance, or otherwise provide a clear standard such as specific national security threats posed by changed circumstances or noncompliance with the terms of a license or Commission rules. We cannot effectively discharge our duty to protect national security by limiting our revocation and termination process to a prescribed list of circumstances, as we cannot predict with certainty what circumstances might threaten national security in the future. However, in general, we will consider the possibility of initiating revocation proceedings, for example, where a licensee's actions or failure to act, or other circumstances, raise concerns about our ability to trust the licensee to comply with the Cable Landing License Act, our submarine cable rules, and/or national security commitments, or to otherwise protect national security interests. Further, a licensee's violation of other statutory or regulatory requirements, as well as serious non-FCC misconduct, may call into question our ability to trust a licensee in this regard. We will consider the possibility of initiating termination proceedings where a licensee fails to comply with any condition of its license. Separate and apart from revocation, the Commission uses the term “termination” where a license or authorization is terminated based on the licensee's or authorization holder's failure to comply with a condition of the license or authorization, and has determined that the informal written procedures applicable to termination need not mirror the procedures used for revocation of licenses or authorizations. To the extent any revocation and/or termination proceeding is commenced, we find that our informal written hearing process will ensure the Commission obtains the approval of the State Department, and will seek advice from other Executive Branch agencies, “as the Commission may deem necessary,” before revoking or terminating a cable landing license. As discussed below, we delegate authority to OIA to determine appropriate procedures on a case by case basis for revocation and/or termination of a cable landing license, as required by due process and applicable law and in light of the relevant facts and circumstances.

54.

Application Proceedings.

As stated in the

2024 Cable NPRM,

we believe that the statutory language “withhold . . . such license” authorizes the denial of an application, including an initial application for a cable landing license and an application to modify, assign, transfer control of, or renew or extend a cable landing license. The

2024 Cable NPRM

sought comment on the extent to which the Commission's existing procedures for denial of applications should be modified in any respect. The Commission also sought comment on whether its procedures for denial of an application to modify, assign, or transfer control of a license, or for renewal and extension applications should mirror its procedures for denial of an initial application. One commenter addressed the procedural framework applicable to denial. We conclude that additional informal written procedures beyond our existing procedures are not warranted for denial of applications, but as proposed we delegate authority to OIA to adopt additional procedures on a case-by-case basis as circumstances warrant, and consistent with due process.

55. Consistent with Executive Order 10530, we also adopt the proposal to amend § 1.767(b) of the rules so that it does not state that denial of an application requires approval by the Secretary of State. No commenter addressed this proposal. Executive Order 10530 does not require the State Department's approval of a denial action and expressly states that “no such license shall be

granted or revoked

by the Commission except after obtaining approval of the Secretary of State . . . .” Section 1.767(b) of the current rules, however, is inconsistent with the language in Executive Order 10530, as it states that submarine cable applications are “acted upon by the Commission after obtaining the approval of the Secretary of State.” The term “acted upon” would appear to include denial of an application. Therefore, we remove the language “[t]hese applications are acted upon” in the rule and state instead, “[c]able landing licenses shall be granted or revoked by the Commission after obtaining the approval of the Secretary of State . . . .”

56.

Delegation of Authority to OIA to Implement Procedures.

Further, we adopt the Commission's proposal to modify OIA's existing delegated authority to permit OIA to deny an application and to revoke and/or terminate a cable landing license under the Cable Landing License Act and Executive Order 10530. While no commenter opposes this proposal, INCOMPAS asserts that any codification of the revocation procedures should state that any reservation of the Commission's authority to modify its approach as circumstances warrant “is limited by the requirements of due process.” The rule we adopt sets forth, among other things, that OIA shall determine appropriate procedures, initiate revocation and/or termination proceedings, and revoke and/or terminate a cable landing license, “as required by due process and applicable law.” Specifically, we delegate authority to OIA to determine appropriate procedures on a case by case basis for grant or denial of an application or revocation and/or termination of a cable landing license, to initiate and conduct application, revocation and/or termination proceedings, and to grant or deny an application and revoke and/or terminate a cable landing license, as required by due process and applicable law and in light of the relevant facts and circumstances, including providing the applicant or licensee with notice and opportunity to cure noncompliance to the extent such an opportunity is required by the APA, and to respond to allegations and evidence in the record.

2. Process To Revoke Licenses of Licensees That Are Insolvent or No Longer Exist

57. We adopt a process to revoke the cable landing licenses of licensees that are insolvent or no longer exist. Section 1.767(m)(2) of the rules requires that “[a]ny licensee that seeks to relinquish its interest in a cable landing license shall file an application to modify the license.” The Commission's records in the International Communications Filing System (ICFS) and other records, indicate that some submarine cables licensed by the Commission may not have commenced service and/or some cable landing licensees of record may be insolvent or no longer in operation. Furthermore, some licensees that may be insolvent or no longer exist did not file a modification application to

relinquish their interest in the cable landing license or otherwise notify the Commission. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission sought comment on what processes it should adopt when submarine cables and/or licensees are insolvent or no longer exist. No commenter addressed this issue. Given we are conducting a one-time collection below, we will require all licensees to provide updated information so that the Commission can ensure it has accurate information regarding submarine cables and licensees subject to its oversight and begin a process to revoke licenses for insolvent cables and/or held by insolvent licensees.

58. If a licensee fails to timely respond to the information collection required in the

Report and Order

adopted herein and subsequently fails to achieve compliance after notice of the failure, we will apply our revocation process to revoke its license or remove the licensee from a license held by multiple licensees. We would deem the failure to respond to this

Report and Order

as presumptive evidence that the licensee is no longer in operation. We will publish in the

Federal Register

a list of non-responsive licensees and non-operating licensees identified by responding licensees and provide an additional thirty (30) days from that publication for those licensees to respond to the information collection requirement or file a notification to relinquish their interests in the license.

59. In situations where a licensee has gone out of business and is no longer able to make the filing on its own behalf, other licensees that jointly hold the license, if any, may appoint one licensee to make a filing that demonstrates and certifies that the licensee has ceased to exist and that the remaining licensee(s) will retain collectively

de jure

and

de facto

control of the U.S. portion of the cable system. If the licensee has not responded within thirty (30) days of the publication of the notice in the

Federal Register

,

we will institute a proceeding to revoke the license or the licensee's rights under a license held by multiple licensees. We note that licensees that fail to comply fully and timely with the information collection required in this

Report and Order

are subject to enforcement action, including forfeitures, revocation, or termination. We find this process is reasonable and necessary to ensure the accuracy of the Commission's records regarding cable landing licensees.

60. Any licensee whose cable landing license is revoked for failure to respond following the institution of a proceeding may file a petition for reinstatement

nunc pro tunc

of the license or its rights under a license held by multiple licensees. A petition for reinstatement will be considered: (1) if it is filed within six months after publication of the

Federal Register

notice; (2) if the petition demonstrates that the licensee is currently in operation, including operation of the submarine cable; and (3) if the petition demonstrates good cause for the failure to timely respond. A licensee whose cable landing license or whose rights under a license held by multiple licensees is cancelled under these procedures would be able to file a new application to become a licensee in accordance with the Commission's rules, which would be subject to full review.

C. Cable Landing License General Requirements

1. FCC Licensing Authority Under the Cable Landing License Act

61. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission proposed to codify its longstanding practice of applying the licensing requirement to submarine cables that lie partially outside of U.S. territorial waters. The Commission sought to bring additional clarity to the application process as well as regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators. Based on the comments, we codify the proposal with one nomenclature change. That is, to clarify the application of the rule, we replace the originally proposed term “international waters” with the phrase “areas beyond the U.S. territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles seaward from the coastline.”

62. Accordingly, we agree with the suggestion of NTIA and the State Department that we refrain from using the term “international waters” because the term is not used in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and to instead use “areas beyond the limits of national jurisdiction” or similar phrasing. Although the United States has neither signed nor ratified UNCLOS, the United States considers provisions of UNCLOS concerning traditional uses of the ocean as generally reflective of customary international law binding on all States. One provision of UNCLOS that the United States abides by is that:

“[t]he territorial sea is a belt of ocean established by a coastal State extending seaward up to 12 nautical miles from the baseline of that State and subject to its sovereignty.”

Our practice has been to require a cable landing license for a cable that connects points within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession if part of that cable is laid in an area beyond 12 nautical miles from the U.S. coastline, which is consistent with UNCLOS. Therefore, we adopt this modification to the proposed rule to ensure that the industry clearly understands when a cable landing license is required, which will benefit applicants and promote efficiency for the Commission. Our clarification is consistent with the Act's definition of “United States” to mean territory “subject to the jurisdiction of” the United States.

63. We therefore adopt the proposed rule with clarification as follows:

A cable landing license must be obtained prior to landing a submarine cable that connects:

(1) The continental United States with any foreign country;

(2) Alaska, Hawaii, or the U.S. territories or possessions with:

(i) a foreign country,

(ii) the continental United States, or

(iii) with each other; or

(3) Points within the continental United States, Alaska, Hawaii, or a territory or possession in which the cable is laid in areas beyond U.S. territorial waters, which extend 12 nautical miles seaward from the coastline.

64.

One Portion of the United States.

We disagree with Lumen and USTelecom that the Commission's rule is overbroad based on their view that the term “portion” as used in the Cable Landing License Act is intended to mean state, territory, or possession and that the Act does not require a license if a cable connects two points within one “portion.” Based on this interpretation, these commenters claim that the Act does not require a license if a cable connects two points within a single state, territory, or possession, because the statute only requires a license when a submarine cable connects “one portion of the United States with any

other

portion,”

i.e.,

one state with any

other

state. We reject this interpretation. Rather, we believe the best reading of the statute is that the phrase “connecting one portion of the United States with any other portion thereof” was intentionally broad and refers to cables connecting any parts of the United States. The Cable Landing License Act does not define the term “portion.” Had Congress meant for the term “portion” to mean state, territory, or possession, it could have used those terms instead, or it could have included such a definition as it did when it defined the term “United States.” Likewise, if Congress intended for this term to be limited in scope, it could have included an exception to the licensing requirement just as it did in

the second sentence of the same statutory section. Instead, Congress included no such limiting language. To help shed light on the requirement's intended scope, we thus look to the term's “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” when that term was adopted by Congress in 1921. At that time, the “ordinary, contemporary, common meaning” of the term “portion” was “a part of any whole.” And a cable connecting two landing points—even if they lie within a single state, territory, or possession—connects parts of the whole of the United States. Accordingly, our interpretation best satisfies the statutory language chosen by Congress. Lumen further argues that there is “no textual basis in the statute” for treating differently cables connecting two points in a single state based on whether the cable is laid in international waters, as proposed in the NPRM. Lumen thus suggests that under the Commission's proffered reading of the statute, a license would be required under such circumstances unless the statutory exception relating to cables lying “wholly within the continental United States” applies—an exception that would not apply in the case of Hawaii, whether or not the cable is laid in international waters. Nonetheless, consistent with longstanding practice and to avoid any possible impingement of intrastate matters with respect to such cables, we codify our existing practice of not requiring a cable landing license for wholly local cables that remain within the territorial waters of the United States. For example, a submarine cable that connects one point in Hawaii to another point in Hawaii, if laid within U.S. territorial waters, would not require a cable landing license.

65.

Alaska and Continental United States.

ATA argues that “cables solely connecting points within the state of Alaska, or connecting Alaska to the lower 48 states, are outside the scope of the licensing requirement [the Cable Landing License Act].” We disagree with ATA's arguments and will address them in turn.

66. First, we disagree that the licensing requirement in the Cable Landing License Act is not intended to apply to cables connecting Alaska to other parts of the United States. Congress limited the application of the Cable Landing License Act by adding the following language that is now codified at section 34 of title 47 of the U.S. Code: “The conditions of sections 34 to 39 of this title shall not apply to cables, all of which, including both terminals, lie wholly within the continental United States.” Even if Alaska was a part of the continental United States as ATA would argue is a proper interpretation, a cable landing license would nonetheless be required for a submarine cable connecting Alaska to the United States because the submarine cable would in no way meet the statutory exception that the “cable[ ], all of which, including both terminals, lie[s] wholly within the continental United States.” The plain language of the statute does not state that

only

the terminals of the submarine cable must lie within the continental United States, instead, it says that

all

of the cable, which includes the terminals, must lie within the continental United States. There is no basis in the plain text of the statute to read “all of which, including both terminals,” to exclude the “wet segment” of the cable, and ATA's reliance on legislative history does not support its reading. Moreover, construing the language in this way would conflict with the Commission's longstanding interpretation, which reflects the best reading of the statute. Thus, in order for a cable connecting Alaska to other states to be exempt from the licensing requirement,

i.e.,

wholly within the continental United States, the entire submarine cable system would need to remain within U.S. territorial waters up to 12 nautical miles seaward from the coastline, which we know geographically would be impossible for a cable laid from Alaska to the continental United States. Therefore, even if Alaska was a part of the continental United States, a cable connecting Alaska to another state would not meet the exception under the Act. Second, our rule will not require a cable landing license when a submarine cable connects points within Alaska if the cable remains within U.S. territorial waters. Thus, cables connecting two points in Alaska are subject to the same licensing requirement as cables connecting any other two points within the United States.

67. ATA makes two additional claims. First, ATA claims that “submarine cables connecting solely domestic points—even those laid in international or foreign waters—do not implicate any of the evolving national security risks that the NPRM seeks to address.” ATA's argument is based on the mistaken premise that domestic cables are only owned or operated by domestic entities, such as U.S. carriers. This is an inaccurate assessment of the submarine cable industry in the United States as foreign entities are often cable landing licensees subject to Commission rules or there may be other foreign components of submarine cables, domestic or international. Further, domestic cables connect the United States to faraway U.S. territories such as Guam, where U.S. military bases are strategically located. It is inaccurate to indicate that there are no such concerns regarding national security or law enforcement with regard to domestic submarine cables. The Commission has long stated that foreign participation in submarine cables licensed by the Commission may pose risks to national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy for which Executive Branch agencies' expertise is needed to assist the Commission with its public interest determination. Therefore, we reject ATA's claim that cables connecting solely domestic points do not implicate national security risks. Second, ATA states that “[i]f the Commission finds that any category of purely domestic submarine cables is subject to the Cable Act's licensing mandate, it should streamline that requirement by granting blanket license authority by rule to land such fully domestic cables, whether or not they traverse international waters.” We address this request in the

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

2. Submarine Cable System Definition

68. We adopt a submarine cable system definition that will provide regulatory certainty to submarine cable owners and operators and ensure administrative efficiency for the Commission. The

2024 Cable NPRM

sought comment generally on whether it is necessary to adopt a definition of a submarine cable system for purposes of licensing a submarine cable system and whether we should codify a submarine cable definition in our rules. As the record overwhelmingly demonstrates, commenters support the proposal to define a submarine cable system and to codify a definition of a submarine cable system in the Commission's rules, stating that it will add clarity to the Commission's rules and licensing regime.

69. We adopt a definition that is consistent with the Committee's proposed definition as well as the Commission's definition in its outage reporting rules. Importantly, our definition ensures that a submarine cable system extends to and includes the SLTE, whether it is located in a cable landing station near the initial beach landing or further in-land within data centers. We believe this definition captures what a submarine cable system is under the Cable Landing License Act and clearly identifies the demarcation point of where the submarine cable system ends and the terrestrial system begins. Based on the record, we adopt the following definition:

A submarine cable system carries bidirectional data and voice telecommunications traffic consisting of one or more submarine cable(s) laid beneath the water, and all associated components that support the operation of the submarine cable system end-to-end, including the segments up to the system's terrestrial terminations at one or more SLTEs as well as the transponders that convert optical signals to electrical signals and vice versa.

70. Where the submarine cable system ends and the terrestrial system begins has changed over time and our definition establishes that the cable extends to and includes the SLTE, whether it is located in a cable landing station near the initial beach landing or further in-land within data centers. In older architectural deployments prior to the advent of open cable systems, the SLTE was placed at the cable landing stations. Some subsequent architectural deployments place an Optical Add-Drop Multiplexer (OADM), or a Reconfigurable Optical Add/Drop Multiplexer (ROADM) in the cable landing station, with the SLTEs distributed further inland. ROADMs facilitate adding and dropping optical signals used in a fiber cable, and ROADMs add additional flexibility by allowing the operator to reconfigure the device. Both of these components add efficiency and flexibility to the optical network by inserting or removing channels. Remote management of the SLTE and all other submarine cable system equipment is also a necessity of modern systems. Remote management includes configuration, performance and fault management and testing, which emphasizes the need to have trusted management systems and personnel who can access the cable system and all associated components and facilities, including the SLTE.

71. The Committee stated that it has historically viewed a submarine cable system as including SLTE, adding that the Committee shares the Commission's view on the importance of the SLTE and the access and control it offers its owners and users. NASCA, a trade association whose members include over 25 submarine cable owners and submarine cable maintenance authorities for cable systems operating in North America, supports codification of a submarine cable definition, stating that such is “clear and consistent with licensees' current reporting requirements to the Team Telecom agencies.” Microsoft also maintains that the proposed definition—cable system SLTE to cable system SLTE—is consistent with the Committee's current mitigation instrument conditions imposed on many licensees.

72. Some commenters disagreed with the proposed definition, and argued that the Commission should define a submarine cable system in terms of its components that would not include SLTE. NASCA does not specifically address or take a position on inclusion of SLTE in the Commission's proposed definition, but does propose that the Commission could define a submarine cable to include only the components up to and including the optical distribution frame (ODF),” contending that the ODF is the “demarcation point at which the submarine cable terminates and interconnects to terrestrial fiber.” NASCA maintains that because the “SLTE also converts terrestrial signals to submarine signal,” the SLTE is “just as much a terrestrial network element as a submarine network element.” Microsoft also takes the position that the SLTE is a terrestrial component used to “convert terrestrial signals to submarine signals,” and states that the “Commission equally could modify the NPRM's proposed definition to delimit the end points of a submarine cable at the ODF,” claiming this is the demarcation point at which a submarine cable terminates and interconnects to SLTE. ICC disagrees with inclusion of SLTE as the end point of the submarine cable system, arguing that the definition is somewhat outdated and that modern submarine cable systems typically terminate at an ODF, Open Cable Interface (OCI), ROAD-M, or similar device—which serves as a given system's interface with a particular user's optical network.

73. While we adopt ICC's recommendation to clarify in our definition that the components relate to the “operation of” the submarine cable system, we decline to accept commenters recommendations concerning SLTEs or comments that would limit the definition. For example, ICC recommends that we limit the definition to cover only transponders that are solely located within the SLTEs. We find that doing so would incorrectly limit the definition because transponders that support the operation of submarine cable systems can be located elsewhere. We also decline to accept NCTA's recommendation to exclude fully domestic SLTE operators and lessees as some SLTE operators and lessees do not have foreign ownership and may not pose a meaningful risk to U.S. national security. Contrary to NCTA's argument, the definition is meant to encapsulate the scope of what constitutes a submarine cable system, not whether particular components of the system pose risks.

74. Finally, we do not accept commenters' suggestion that ODF, OCI, ROADM, and similar devices should be considered as the end point of a submarine cable system. We recognize that the Commission's proposed definition of a submarine cable reflects traditional/legacy architecture when the terminal cable landing station was located near the shore and cable operators were not, as is the case today, purchasing SLTE(s) from independent equipment vendors that can be remotely managed. We also understand that cable operators today require multiplexing and other equipment to manage their fiber in cable landing stations, and that SLTE equipment allows for routing of fiber from one cable landing station to another cable landing station, or a data center located further inland and beyond the initial cable landing station. We find it necessary to include SLTE as a component in our definition because it is the SLTE that converts between submarine cable signals and terrestrial signals. While the reverse is also true, as was raised by commenters, only the SLTE converts cable signals to terrestrial signals. Therefore, whether this conversion occurs at the first, or initial, cable landing station, or occurs inland at a cable landing station or data center, we include the SLTE as the end point component of the submarine cable in our definition of a submarine cable under the Cable Landing License Act. Several commenters, noting that the Commission's proposed definition of a submarine cable system aligns with that used by the Committee in its mitigation agreements (SLTE to SLTE), support continued engagement by the Commission with other governmental entities to address risks to submarine cable infrastructure and to limit regulatory compliance burdens by avoiding unnecessary duplication on licensees' parallel Committee obligations.

3. Twenty-Five Year License Term

75. Based on the comments in the record, we retain the 25-year term for cable landing licenses. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission sought comment, as an alternative to the proposed periodic reporting, on whether shortening the current 25-year submarine cable license term or adopting a shorter license term in combination with periodic reporting would similarly account for evolving national security, law enforcement, and other risks. We agree with the commenters that shortening the 25-year license term could have outsized negative impacts on the deployment and resilience of submarine cable systems

without providing a corresponding benefit to national security, and we therefore do not adopt a shortened license term. Instead, we retain the routine condition that a cable landing license shall expire twenty-five (25) years from the in-service date, unless renewed or extended.

D. Submarine Cable Applicant/Licensee Requirements

1. Licensee Requirements

76. In this

Report and Order,

we largely retain the current requirements for who must be an applicant/licensee for a cable landing license. We retain the licensing requirements for those entities that own or control a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and use the U.S. points of the cable system and those entities that control a cable landing station, but we exclude those entities that merely own, but do not control, a cable landing station from becoming an applicant/licensee for a cable landing license. At this time, we decline to adopt a licensing requirement for SLTE owners and operators. Instead, based on the comments in the record, we seek to further develop the record with a one-time information collection. The one-time information collection will assist the Commission to better understand the scope of SLTE owners and operators. In the

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,

the results from the one-time information collection will assist us in adopting a more targeted SLTE regulatory framework.

a. Five Percent Ownership Threshold and Use of U.S. Points

77. We retain the requirement that an entity owning or controlling a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and using the U.S. points of the cable system must submit an application to become a licensee. We decline to adopt other proposals at this time. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission sought comment on whether to retain the requirement that an entity that owns or controls a 5% or greater interest in the cable and uses the U.S. points of the cable system shall be an applicant for and licensee on a cable landing license. The Commission also sought comment on whether to require any entity that owns the submarine cable system or any entity that has capacity on the submarine cable system to become a licensee. The Commission additionally sought comment on whether it should require entities that own or control a U.S. landing station or submarine line terminal equipment (SLTE) to become licensees.

78. Commenters generally support the Commission's retention of the current requirement with its 5% interest threshold and use of the U.S. points of the cable system, and oppose other options. Commenters argue that the rule continues to serve a good purpose. The Coalition, for example, asserts that there is no need to change the 5% threshold because it is still an efficient method to remove regulatory burden for small carriers or investors that do not have any ability to control the submarine cable system. NASCA and INCOMPAS echo this point and state that “imposing licensing burdens on [cable] owners [with no interest in the U.S. territory portion of a submarine cable system] would harm the market by making it less attractive for systems with multiple non-U.S. landing points to partner with investors who have no interest in the U.S. endpoint.” Many commenters, including Microsoft, ICC, INCOMPAS, AP&T, ITI, CTIA, USTelecom, and the Coalition disagree that capacity holders should be licensees because they assert that there is no basis under the Cable Landing License Act to require such entities to become licensees, as capacity holders do not land or operate the cable system.

79. We agree with commenters that there is not a sufficient reason to disturb the requirement that any entity owning or controlling a 5% or greater interest in the cable system and using the U.S. points of the cable system must become an applicant/licensee. Additionally, requiring entities that merely own capacity on the cable system, without meeting the requisite licensing requirements of ownership of 5% or greater interest and using the U.S. points of the cable system, to become applicants/licensees would greatly increase the number of entities that must comply with our regulatory framework. At this time, pure capacity holdings, without ownership of infrastructure or deployment of certain equipment, have a negligible impact or harm on national security and do not rise to the level of requiring a license. Instead, we tailor the licensing requirements to identify those entities that can exercise ownership or control over the submarine cable system, as discussed below and in the

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

This approach, as raised by commenters, maintains our ability to know about potential foreign adversaries without harming the market and investment in and deployment of submarine cable systems connecting to the United States.

b. Control of Cable Landing Station

80. In this

Report and Order,

we revise our license requirement with respect to cable landing stations and require entities that control cable landing stations to be licensees. Entities that merely own a cable landing station are no longer required to become licensees. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission sought comment on an appropriate rule that would capture which entities should be an applicant/licensee on a cable landing license under the Cable Landing License Act to ensure the Commission meets its public interest responsibilities. The Commission sought additional comment on the applicability of the Commission's rules to entities that own the real property/facility in which the cable landing station is located, but do not have any ability to significantly affect the cable system's operation, such as data center owners, who often request waivers from the Commission because they do not seek to be an applicant or a licensee. Moreover, the Commission sought comment on the applicability of its rules to data center owners, “including the access they have over submarine cables and the site operations, such as physical security, power, backup power, HVAC, and other environmental support essential to proper operations of cable landing systems housed in their facilities.”

81. We agree with commenters that licensing requirements should not apply to entities that may own the cable landing station but are not directly involved in cable operations and do not control the operations of the cable system. Commenters were generally supportive of the proposal to reduce the licensing requirement. INCOMPAS does not support licensing for data center owners, claiming it would be a shift beyond the Commission's legal authorities and would not yield useful information for advancing the Commission's national security goals because “data center owners often lack visibility into or control over cable operations” unlike licensed cable operators. The Commission's standard practice has been to grant requests for waiver of the licensing requirements filed by entities that own the real property or facility in which the cable landing station is located but that do not have the ability to significantly affect the cable system's operation. Instead of continuing to process waivers on a case-by-case basis, we now revise our licensing requirement to require a license for “[a]ny entity that controls a cable landing station in the United States” and to require the applicant to

provide specific information in an application regarding ownership of the cable landing station. We find that adoption of this rule will streamline and clarify our licensing process and will reduce burdens by narrowing the scope of the licensing requirement and making it unnecessary for non-controlling property or facility owners to file waiver requests.

c. Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) Owners and Operators

82. While we include SLTE within the definition of a submarine cable system, we decline to adopt a licensing requirement for owners and operators of SLTE at this time. A SLTE owner would need to be a licensee if it otherwise meets the Commission's requirements to be a licensee (

i.e.,

5% or greater ownership in the cable system or controls a cable landing station). For purposes of this section, SLTE refers to technology that converts optical signals that traverse the submarine cable system into electrical signals that transmit across terrestrial networks and vice versa. We agree with commenters that we should seek comment in the

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking

as to how the Commission can best incorporate such entities into its regulatory framework. We recognize that we need further information on the number of SLTE owners and operators. We understand that at least one SLTE is needed per fiber, but due to dark fiber IRU or lease agreements where entities light their own fiber that could then be subject to further resale through separate IRU or lease agreements for fiber, capacity, or spectrum, there may be numerous SLTEs deployed on one fiber alone. We adopt below a one-time information collection to assist the Commission in obtaining comprehensive and current information on SLTEs so that the Commission may consider appropriate rules for purposes of ensuring the safety and security of submarine cable infrastructure. As the Commission stated in the

2024 Cable NPRM,

we need to know which entities own or control SLTE so that we can protect national security and law enforcement interests in carrying out our licensing duties. As the Committee noted, “[a] foreign adversary-controlled non-licensee entity that owns, controls, or operates its own SLTE, or equivalent equipment, on a submarine cable landing in the United States may have connectivity comparable to operating their own communications cable to the United States without a license, or any regulatory review, mitigation, or monitoring for national security or law enforcement risk.” Through the

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,

we anticipate developing a record to take the best approach balancing our focus on supporting industry's ability to deploy submarine cable systems and our obligations to protect national security.

2. Application Requirements

83. Today, we adopt new application requirements that will ensure the Commission has targeted and granular information about the submarine cable system and third-party foreign adversary service providers, which is critical to improve the Commission's assessment of national security risks. We also adopt new certification requirements that will require applicants and licensees to certify whether or not they meet any of the Commission's presumptive disqualifying conditions; that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan; and that they comply with Covered List requirements. For purposes of the information requirements, unless otherwise indicated, we use the terms “applicant” or “applicants” to refer to an applicant or licensee that currently files the following applications or notifications: (1) applicants that file an initial application for a cable landing license or an application for modification, substantial assignment, substantial transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license; (2) cable landing licensees that file a notification of pro forma assignment or transfer of control of a cable landing license; and/or (3) applicants that file a request for special temporary authority (STA) related to the operation of a submarine cable.

See

47 CFR 1.767(a), (g)(6)-(7); 63.24(e) (referring to “substantial” transactions); 63.24(d) (defining “Pro forma assignments and transfers of control”). Unless otherwise indicated, we use the term “application” or “submarine cable application” to refer to an initial application for a cable landing license; an application for modification, substantial assignment, substantial transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license; and a pro forma assignment or transfer of control notification. These requirements will apply to all applications for a cable landing license and modification, assignment, transfer of control, renewal or extension of a cable landing license. We will retain the current requirement for applicants to identify their 10% or greater direct and indirect equity and/or voting interests.

a. Public Interest Statement

84. Consistent with longstanding practice, we adopt the proposed requirement that “an applicant seeking a submarine cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a submarine cable landing license shall include in the application a statement demonstrating how the grant of the application will serve the public interest.” The Commission has long found that national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy concerns are important to its public interest analysis of submarine cable applications, and these concerns warrant continued consideration in view of evolving and heightened threats to the nation's communications infrastructure.

85. We agree with NASCA that the requirements of the public interest standard should be clarified so they are “targeted, objective, and express.” Accordingly, our final rule clarifies the scope of this obligation. Specifically, and consistent with the express statutory objectives, the public interest statement must explain how the application will “assist in securing rights for the landing or operation of cables in foreign countries, or in maintaining the rights or interests of the United States or of its citizens in foreign countries, or will promote the security of the United States,” provide “just and reasonable rates and service,” and prohibit “exclusive rights of landing or of operation in the United States.”

86. NASCA acknowledges that a reasonably tailored public interest standard “would not be overly burdensome,” observing that “applicants already routinely include information relevant to the public interest in their applications.” However, NASCA argues that “the Commission must have an identifiable legal basis” for imposing such requirements, which it claims the

2024 Cable NPRM

fails to do. We disagree. As articulated in the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission has “long found that national security, law enforcement, foreign policy, and trade policy concerns are important to its public interest analysis of submarine cable applications, and these concerns warrant continued consideration in view of evolving and heightened threats to the nation's communications infrastructure.” The legal basis to require applicants to provide this public interest statement is grounded on our authority to grant, withhold, revoke, or condition a license and the statutory criteria for doing so.

First,

the Commission can withhold the grant of

a license to protect the interests of the public as expressed in the statutory licensing criteria. The determination of whether to grant a license rests on the same statutory criteria, including consideration of how grant of the application will ensure the security of the United States.

Second,

the Cable Landing License Act authorizes the Commission to impose terms upon grant of a license that are “necessary to assure just and reasonable rates and service,” and to prohibit “exclusive rights of landing or of operation in the United States.” Accordingly, the legal basis for the public interest standard we adopt today is derived from Congress' directive as reflected in the statutory language.

b. Ten Percent Threshold for Reportable Interests

87. We retain our current requirement for applicants to identify the 10% or greater direct and indirect equity and/or voting interests held in the submarine cable applicants. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission sought comment on whether to lower the current 10% ownership reporting threshold to five percent (5%) or greater direct or indirect equity and/or voting interests in the applicant(s) and licensee(s). Some commenters raised concerns about cost burden of compliance, impact on investment, privacy for smaller investors, and raised doubts that owners of smaller interests could wield significant influence over the cable, while others urged we go further and consider requiring the reporting of any known foreign adversary interest in cable landing license applicants and licensees instead of adopting the 5% reportable ownership threshold. At this time, we will not modify the 10% ownership threshold for disclosing reportable interest holders, because we assess that national security risks are best addressed through the certifications regarding whether the applicant is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary.

c. Submarine Cable System Information

88. Below, we adopt rules to provide the Commission with important and relevant information concerning the submarine cable system. As discussed, we find that collection of this information is critical to our review of submarine cable applications and cable landing licensees for national security purposes and will advance our efforts to protect the security, integrity, and resilience of this critical U.S. infrastructure.

89. We adopt the Commission's proposal to require applicants seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a license, and licensees submitting a Foreign Adversary Annual Report, to provide additional detailed information concerning the submarine cable system. Specifically, we adopt the proposal to require applicants and licensees to submit with these applications and/or Foreign Adversary Annual Reports the following detailed information regarding the submarine cable system:

(1) the states, territories, or possessions in the United States and the foreign countries where the submarine cable system will land;

(2) the number of segments in the submarine cable system and the designation of each (

e.g.,

Segment A, Main Trunk, A-B segment);

(3) the length of the submarine cable system by segment and in total;

(4) the location, by segment, of any branching units;

(5) the number of optical fiber pairs, by segment, of the submarine cable system;

(6) the design capacity, by segment, of the submarine cable system;

(7) specific geographic location information (geographic coordinates, street address, county or county equivalent, as applicable), or if not available, a general geographic description and specific geographic location information to be filed no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction regarding:

(i) each U.S. and non-U.S. cable landing station and beach manhole;

(ii) each network operations center (NOC) and backup NOC and, if distinct from the NOC, each security operations center (SOC) and backup SOC, or else a statement that the SOC and backup SOC are not distinct from the NOC and/or backup NOC;

(iii) where each Power Feed Equipment (PFE) and each Submarine Line Terminal Equipment (SLTE) is connected with the terrestrial land based system(s) and from where each is operated; and

(iv) the route position list including the wet segment of the submarine cable system; and

(8) Anticipated time frame when the applicant(s) intends to place the submarine cable system into service.

90. In addition, we adopt the proposal to modify the rules by requiring applicants to provide a specific description of the submarine cable system, including a map and geographic data in generally accepted GIS formats or other formats. We adopt the proposal to delegate authority to OIA, in coordination with the Office of Economics and Analytics (OEA), to determine the file formats and specific data fields in which data will ultimately be collected. We will allow applicants for a cable landing license to initially file a general geographic description of the geographic location information described in our newly adopted rule at § 1.70005(e)(7) concerning the submarine cable, but grant of the application will be conditioned on the Commission's final approval of specific geographic location information, consistent with the new requirements, to be filed by the applicant no later than ninety (90) days prior to construction.

91. With respect to route position lists, cable landing licensees with a license granted prior to the effective date of the new rules must submit a route position list consistent with the requirement under § 1.70005(e)(7)(iv) under the relevant license file number in the Commission's International Communications Filing System (ICFS), or any successor system, no later than sixty (60) days after the effective date of the new rules. Existing licensees may petition the Commission for waiver of the requirement, which may be granted only to the extent the licensee demonstrates that the required information is unavailable by the submission deadline.

92. We disagree with commenters' suggestions that requiring applicants and licensees to provide this information does not serve a regulatory purpose. We find that requiring specific information about the submarine cable system, including a map and route list data, is essential for ensuring the Commission can properly evaluate applications for cable landing licenses for their national security implications, determining if the application is in the public interest, and ensuring the Commission has fundamental and accurate knowledge about the security and resilience of submarine cable systems. The Coalition, for example, is generally supportive of requiring the specific location of each beach manhole, cable landing station (including locations of each PFE and each SLTE), NOC, and route position lists, provided the Commission ensures it does not involve disclosure of material non-public technical information and does not delay the review of the Commission or the Committee. We find the concerns about application delay are addressed by our adopted rules, permitting a general description at the application stage supplemented by landing points notifications. We find that concerns regarding confidentiality are addressed

below by our adoption of the Commission's proposal to provide confidential treatment. We are unpersuaded by the Coalition's suggestion that the Commission should require route position lists only for the portion of the wet segment that is in U.S. territorial waters because the Commission's jurisdiction does not extend beyond U.S. territory. We agree with the Committee that route position lists would enhance the ability of the Commission and Committee to ensure the protection of this critical infrastructure.

93. NASCA requests that the Commission allow applicants to file this information at a time closer to the in-service date. While we decline to adopt the in-service date, we recognize that the final specific geographic location information may not be available at the time an application for a cable landing license is filed. In those cases, the Commission will accept a general geographic description, provided the Commission is notified of the specific geographic location no later than ninety (90) days prior to commencing construction as a condition of any grant of such application. NASCA also requests that the Commission accept a route position list that is limited to the geocoordinate data in a full route position list. We believe our clarification to § 1.70005(e)(7) of our adopted rules shows that the Commission will require geographic location information and not other potentially competitively-sensitive information about system design as raised by NASCA. NASCA asserts that the Committee does not currently require NOC information and recommends that the Commission instead require a certification that a NOC is not located in a “high-risk jurisdiction.” We find that the location information of NOCs is critical for the Commission's knowledge and assessment of from where a submarine cable is or will be accessed and controlled, including by third parties, through network management, monitoring, maintenance, performance measurement, or other operational functions, and any risks presented by such access and control.

94.

Confidential Treatment.

Based on our review of the record, we adopt the Commission's proposal to provide confidential treatment for the exact addresses and specific geographic coordinates required by the newly adopted rule at § 1.70005(e)(7). We adopt the proposal to withhold the exact location information from public inspection where it concerns the wet segment as it approaches the shore, the submarine cable as it reaches the beach manhole, and the dry segment including the cable landing station(s), such as where the SLTE is located and/or from where it is operated. The record supports adoption of these proposals. Commenters explain that such location information is competitively sensitive and that public disclosure would harm the security of the submarine cable. We will release publicly more general location information, such as the city or locality, state/province/department, and country in which the submarine cable system will land.

95.

Sharing with Federal Agencies.

We adopt a rule to allow the Commission to share with the Committee information about the submarine cable system—including the location information of cable landing stations, beach manholes, PFE, SLTE, NOCs and backup NOCs, SOCs and backup SOCs, and route position lists—that is filed on a confidential basis without the pre-notification procedures of § 0.442(d) of the Commission's rules. The Commission may share information that has been submitted to it in confidence with other federal agencies when they have a legitimate need for the information and the public interest will be served by sharing the information. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission sought comment on whether to adopt a rule that would allow the Commission to share submarine cable landing geographic coordinates, route position lists, and other information with relevant federal agencies, including information for which confidential treatment is requested, without the pre-notification procedures of § 0.442(d). No commenters oppose the sharing of the information with federal agencies. The Committee supports adoption of this rule and recommends that the Commission include all of the Committee members in any effort to share relevant submarine cable infrastructure information.

d. Third-Party Foreign Adversary Service Provider or Access From Foreign Adversary Information

96. We adopt a modified, narrower version of the Commission's proposals to require applicants to report whether or not they use and/or will use third-party foreign adversary service providers in the operation of the submarine cable. Specifically, we will require applicants to report whether or not they use and/or will use the following third-party service providers in the operation of the submarine cable system:

(1) any entity that is owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary, as defined in § 1.70001(g);

(2) any entity identified on the Covered List that the Commission maintains pursuant to the Secure Networks Act, 47 U.S.C. 1601-1609; and/or

(3) any entity that can access the submarine cable from a foreign adversary country, as defined in § 1.70001(f), and to identify any such foreign adversary country.

97. This targeted approach sufficiently addresses the national security and law enforcement risks from foreign adversaries. In the

2024 Cable NPRM,

the Commission used the term “managed network service provider” (MNSP) to refer to the kinds of service providers licensees should disclose. The Commission proposed to define an “MNSP” as “any entity other than the applicant(s) or licensee(s) (

i.e.,

third-party entity) with whom the applicant(s) or licensee(s) contracts to provide, supplement, or replace certain functions for the U.S. portion of the submarine cable system (including any cable landing station and SLTE located in the United States) that require or may require access to the network, systems, or records of the applicant(s) or licensee(s).” We agree with the Committee that we should refer more generally to “service providers” to avoid confusion about which service providers are involved in managing networks as compared to other tasks that involve access to and control of the cable system. We also clearly define “third-party service provider” as an entity that is involved in providing, hosting, analyzing, repairing, and maintaining the equipment of a submarine cable system, including third-party owners and operators of NOCs. We find that our approach provides requested clarity in response to commenters that claim the Commission's proposed definition of MNSP is too vague.

98. We find that obtaining information about the third-party service providers is important and relevant to the Commission's consideration of national security, law enforcement, and other risks associated with a submarine cable application. We therefore disagree with INCOMPAS' suggestion that information about providers of “supporting services” exceeds the scope of the Cable Landing License Act. While NASCA and Microsoft argue that the most effective way to address risks of third-party access involves implementing “rigorous” or “robust” access controls, we find that requiring disclosure as to whether untrustworthy third-party

actors have access to this critical U.S. communications infrastructure will ensure that the Commission and applicants and licensees consistently identify and address such threats. The Committee supports prohibiting licensees from using vendors for equipment or services that are owned by, controlled by, or subject to the jurisdiction or direction of a foreign adversary. While we do not go so far as to

prohibit

use of such third-party service providers, because the Commission did not seek comment on it in the

2024 Cable NPRM,

we do seek comment on whether to prohibit the use of such third-party service providers.

99. A few commenters recommend requiring such information only to the extent it is available at the time an application is filed given third-party service arrangements may not be known until a later time. Based on this, if an applicant is unable to confirm this information at the time of filing, we will require such applicants to file a request for waiver with status updates every thirty (30) days until they provide the information. We also find that our tailored approach addresses concerns that the information requirements we adopt relating to third-party service providers would duplicate information that is currently submitted to the Committee. Finally, as discussed below, as an initial step, we adopt a one-time collection that requires licensees to disclose whether they use certain third-party service providers.

3. Required Certifications for Applicants and Licensees

100. Below, we adopt rules requiring applicants to certify whether or not they exhibit any of the criteria set out in the presumptive disqualifying conditions adopted herein; that they have created and will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan; and that they comply with Covered List requirements. We will require licensees to inform the Commission of any Covered List equipment/services in a one-time collection. We also hold applicants and licensees responsible for the acts, omissions, or failures of third-parties with whom the applicant or licensee has a contractual relationship that impact the cybersecurity of the applicant's or licensee's systems and services.

a. Certification of Presumptive Disqualifications

101. We adopt new certification requirements consistent with the presumptive disqualifying conditions adopted herein. Specifically, we will require an applicant seeking a cable landing license or modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license to certify whether or not it exhibits any of the criteria set out in the foreign adversary and character presumptive disqualifying conditions. We will require an applicant seeking a cable landing license or modification, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license to certify whether or not it exhibits any of the criteria set out in the foreign adversary cable landing presumptive disqualifying condition. We delegate authority to OIA to develop the questions and certifications for the applications.

102. As discussed above, we will apply the foreign adversary and character presumptive disqualifying conditions to: (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order,

and (2) all other types of submarine cable applications—including an application for modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license—filed by a licensee whose initial application for a cable landing license is granted after the effective date of the

Report and Order

or an existing licensee that currently does not exhibit (prior to the effective date of the

Report and Order

) any of the criteria set out in the disqualifying condition. We will apply the foreign adversary cable landing disqualifying condition to: (1) any initial application for a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order,

and (2) an application for modification or renewal or extension of a cable landing license that is filed after the effective date of the

Report and Order

by a licensee whose initial application for a cable landing license is granted after the effective date of the

Report and Order

or by an existing licensee.

b. Cybersecurity and Physical Security Risk Management Plan Certifications

103. To protect submarine cable infrastructure from cybersecurity and physical security threats, we require all applicants for an initial cable landing license to certify that they have created and will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their systems and services from these threats that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system, as supported by the record. We require all licensees seeking a modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license to certify in the application that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their systems and services from cybersecurity and physical security risks that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. We also require existing licensees to implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan within one year of the effective date of the new rules to also protect against these threats that could affect the provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. As discussed below, we do not require that these plans use any particular framework, in line with commenters who supported a flexible approach. Cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan certification is also supported by the Committee, as it will “bring all licensees up to the minimum standards . . . needed to protect our critical infrastructure from foreign adversary threats.”

104. All applicants and licensees must certify that the cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan meets the following three requirements:

• The plan describes how the applicant or licensee takes or will take reasonable measures to employ its organizational resources and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its systems and services that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system;

• The plan identifies the cyber risks they face, the controls they use or plan to use to mitigate those risks, and how they ensure that these controls are applied or will be applied effectively to their operations; and

• The plan addresses both logical and physical access risks, as well as supply chain risks.

105. Although the

2024 Cable NPRM

proposal focused on cybersecurity, rather than physical security, the Commission sought comment on “whether to require applicants' and licensees' cybersecurity risk management plans to include provisions for identifying, assessing, and mitigating supply chain cybersecurity threats” and proposed to require that plans cover all “systems and services that could affect [applicants'/licensees'] provision of communications services.” The

2024 Cable NPRM

also sought comment on whether the Commission should require the implementation of other “common security controls to protect applicants' and licensees' systems and services.”

Additionally, several commenters urged the Commission to address physical risks. Most notably, the Committee “additionally propose[d] applicants to certify that they have created, updated, and implemented comprehensive security risk management plans, consistent with industry best practices, for the cable systems that would also include supply chain risk management and physical security.” Therefore, we require the risk management plans have measures to address physical security risks as well.

106. Beyond those baseline requirements, applicants and licensees will retain flexibility to tailor their cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans to the risks they face that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system and their organizational needs. Applicants and licensees will have flexibility to determine, for example, how to best mitigate the risks of compromised access controls by, at a minimum, using multifactor authentication or other suitable measures to protect their systems and services. Although we do not require applicants and licensees to follow any particular frameworks in creating their plans, we further find a plan will presumptively satisfy our requirements if it is structured according to an established risk management framework, such as the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) Cybersecurity Framework (CSF), and incorporates best practices, such as the standards and controls set forth in the Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency's (CISA) Cybersecurity Cross-Sector Performance Goals and Objectives (CISA CPGs), or the Center for internet Security's Critical Security Controls (CIS Controls). The plan should address both cybersecurity and physical security risks.

107. This approach is consistent with views of commenters that support a flexible approach to cybersecurity grounded in the NIST CSF. Given our approach and to reflect the evolving nature of cybersecurity risks, we decline to require that all plans include the six additional security controls identified in the

2024 Cable NPRM

or some other subset of common security controls. However, we still expect applicants and licensees to consider these types of controls, or reasonable alternatives, as may be necessary to mitigate the risks that they face or will face that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. Importantly, the Committee emphasized in its reply comment, that the CISA CPGs and CIS Controls represent a “baseline” of cybersecurity measures “that all licensees can and should surpass”—in other words, they are “a floor, not a ceiling, when it comes to cybersecurity.” Thus, allowing licensees and applicants to satisfy their duty under our rules by adopting a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan that adheres to these well-established best practices ensures that submarine cable networks will be operated with a baseline of key security controls.

108. The rules promote the harmonization of cybersecurity certification requirements for licensees and applicants, as many commenters requested. CTIA and USTelecom suggest that the Commission should align its rules for submarine cable licensees with its rules for 5G Fund recipients. Submarine cable applicants and licensees that satisfy the requirements adopted in the

5G Fund Order

will necessarily also satisfy the requirements we impose today. Those rules require 5G Fund recipients to implement operational cybersecurity and supply chain risk management plans that “must reflect” the NIST CSF as well as “established cybersecurity best practices that address each of the Core Functions described in the NIST CSF, such as the standards and controls set forth in” the CISA CPGs or the CIS Controls. The same is true of the Commission's other rules governing the receipt of Universal Service Funds, which similarly require recipients' plans to reflect those sources. SCCL also urges us to also conclude that certain International Organization for Standardization (ISO) standards would satisfy the Commission's rules. While we do not conclude that compliance with any particular ISO standard would necessarily satisfy the rules, we observe that ISO standards, where appropriately mapped onto the NIST CSF's Core Functions, may also be useful to applicants and licensees seeking to comply and mitigate the risks they face or will face.

109. We agree with commenters on the importance of harmonizing cybersecurity certification requirements with requirements imposed by the Committee and other Executive Branch agencies. We find that licensees that have an existing mitigation agreement or are required to enter into a new mitigation agreement with the Committee, and who implement those agreements in full, will be presumed to satisfy the cybersecurity certification requirements. We expect that the logical security measures or other measures to prevent unauthorized or unlawful access, use, or disclosure of information being carried on a licensee's cable imposed by the Committee in such agreements will be comparable to, or more demanding than, the baseline measures we require here.

110. We stress that, while this is our expectation, a mitigation agreement would not satisfy the requirements of the rules if it does not comprehensively identify the cybersecurity risks that the licensee faces (including physical and supply chain risks), the controls it uses to mitigate those risks, and how it ensures that these controls are applied effectively to its operations. This approach is consistent with the Committee's request in its reply comments that the Commission work with the Committee to harmonize cybersecurity requirements to the extent possible, while supporting the Commission's proposed certification requirement and acknowledging that “there may be instances where the Commission needs . . . information independent of the Committee's actions.” NCTA suggests that the rules are unnecessary in view of the Committee's imposition of logical access requirements as part of its review. We disagree as the Committee does not review all cable landing license applications, therefore, not all cable landing licenses are subject to mitigation agreements. Instead, we agree with Microsoft that “adoption of uniform rules for cybersecurity” is important “to avoid unnecessary duplication or complexity,” and we establish a baseline certification requirement here that applies to all applicants and licensees, with the conditions in a mitigation agreement presumed to satisfy these requirements, which will contribute to a more streamlined approach across the U.S. government.

111. We also reject ICC's argument that the physical resiliency of submarine cable infrastructure should be the sole focus of the Commission's security requirements, and that adopting cybersecurity requirements that also address logical access and supply chain risks would “significantly increase regulatory burden and privacy concerns without meaningfully increasing the security of the underlying data.” While the most common threat to submarine cables remains physical damage from fishing, shipping, or undersea weather events, intentional damage from state or non-state actors using more subtle means of infiltration is “of greater concern.” These threats require holistic planning, including both cybersecurity and physical security. Physical resiliency protections (

e.g.,

identity

management, authentication and access controls) should also be included in applicants' and licensees' cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans, to the extent necessary to reasonably protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of their communications systems and services. While more difficult, infiltrators (including foreign adversaries) could also tap into cables to “record, copy, or steal data” for espionage, thereby compromising its confidentiality. This could occur through backdoors inserted during the cable manufacturing process, targeting onshore landing stations and SLTEs, or by tapping cables at sea. Encryption alone is insufficient to ensure cyber protections, as encrypted data can still be disrupted or delayed, and encrypted data can be exfiltrated and stored pending technological advances that will enable decryption and exploitation of the data at a later time. Although some of these attack vectors present technical challenges using current technologies, it is critical for cable systems to be secure into the future as technology advances.

112. Submarine cable infrastructure also faces a threat of malicious cyber activities that target the broader networks of which submarine cables represent only one link. Malicious actors may take advantage of vulnerabilities in these larger networks at locations with remote access to the submarine cable infrastructure to disrupt data flows, divert traffic, or delete data transmitted through the submarine cables, with serious consequences for the operational security of this critical infrastructure and the confidentiality, availability, and integrity of the information. Accordingly, we adopt cybersecurity and physical security risk management requirements to ensure that appropriate cybersecurity protections are in place against the physical, logical, and supply chain threats to applicants' and licensees' communications systems and services that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system.

113. We adopt commenters' suggestion to limit the scope of the cybersecurity certification requirement to the submarine cable system operator and the submarine cable network management systems only. In the interests of tailoring our requirements to the specific problem of submarine cable security and to limit regulatory burdens, the risk management plans only need to explain how the applicant or licensee takes or will take reasonable measures to employ its organizational resources and processes to ensure the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its systems and services that could affect its provision of communications services through the submarine cable system.

114.

Senior Officer Review.

We adopt the Commission's proposal that an applicant's or licensee's Chief Executive Officer (CEO), Chief Financial Officer (CFO), Chief Technology Officer (CTO), or a similarly situated senior officer responsible for governance of the organization's security practices, must sign the applicant's or licensee's cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan. We affirm that a signatory with organization-wide visibility and governance authority is critical to ensuring that the plan is comprehensively, effectively, and widely implemented.

115. Commenters raise a variety of concerns regarding this requirement. CTIA recommends harmonizing the signatory requirement with the

5G Fund Order,

which does not specify who must sign a plan. Microsoft contends that requiring senior staff signoff would be impractical for large network operators and suggests allowing entities to designate another appropriate authority within the organization. USTelecom expresses similar concerns, and suggests that a Chief Information Security Officer (CISO) or equivalent technical expert would be better positioned to assess and certify the plan's content. In response to these comments, we clarify that the requirement is not intended to impose unnecessary burdens or to prescribe a one-size-fits-all governance structure. Rather, the objective is to ensure meaningful executive oversight and accountability for cybersecurity and physical security risk management. Accordingly, we expressly recognize that an applicant's or licensee's CISO, or an equivalent officer with overall responsibility for the organization's security governance, qualifies as a “similarly situated senior officer” under this rule. This approach maintains the integrity of the executive accountability framework while providing sufficient flexibility for applicants and licensees to designate an officer who possesses the requisite authority and subject matter expertise.

116.

Submarine Cable Applications.

Applicants for a cable landing license must certify in the application that they have created and will implement and update a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan consistent with the requirements herein. If an application for a cable landing license is filed prior to the effective date of the new rules and remains pending on or after the effective date of the new rules, the applicant(s) must submit a certification, within thirty (30) days of the effective date of the new rules, attesting that it will create and implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the date the submarine cable is placed into service. All licensees seeking a modification, assignment, transfer of control, or renewal or extension of a cable landing license must certify in the application that they have created, updated, and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan and will take reasonable measures to protect their systems and services from cybersecurity risks that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system. We delegate authority to OIA to update application forms as necessary to include applicants' certifications.

117.

Routine Conditions for Licensees.

All licensees whose cable landing license is granted after the effective date of the new rules must implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the date the submarine cable is placed into service. We will require licensees to submit a certification, within thirty (30) days of the date the submarine cable is placed into service, that they have created and implemented a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the in-service date. Licensees must continue to implement and update the cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan, as required based on material changes to the cybersecurity and physical security risks and vulnerabilities that the licensee faces that could affect their provision of communications services through the submarine cable system.

118.

Implementation Timeline for Existing Licensees.

Existing licensees must implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan within one year of the effective date of the new rules. To the extent an existing licensee does not commence service on the submarine cable by this timeframe, the licensee must implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan as of the date the submarine cable is placed into service. Existing licensees must file a certification, within thirty (30) days of the effective date of the new rules, attesting that they will implement a cybersecurity and physical security risk management plan within this timeframe. The certification shall be submitted in the license file number(s) associated with the licensee's cable landing license(s) in ICFS. We find that this phased approach appropriately

balances the urgency of enhancing cybersecurity preparedness with the need to allow for thoughtful, effective plan development and integration into existing operations.

119.

Reporting Requirements and Confidentiality.

We adopt the Commission's proposal requiring that applicants and licensees submit cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans to the Commission upon request. We delegate to OIA, in coordination with PSHSB, the authority to request, at their discretion, submission of such plans and to evaluate them for compliance with the rules adopted in this proceeding. We decline to adopt NCTA's recommendation that the Commission should only obtain the plans based on a specific need. Access to these plans will enable the Commission to confirm whether cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans are being regularly updated, to review a specific plan as needed, or to proactively review a sample of plans to ensure they identify the relevant cybersecurity risks to communications systems and services. Consistent with the Commission's proposal and with the unanimous support of commenters, we will treat cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans as presumptively confidential under our rules. We agree with commenters that this approach will best protect and cultivate their cybersecurity practices.

120.

Recordkeeping.

We also adopt a recordkeeping requirement to support Commission oversight and ensure that applicants and licensees maintain accountability for creating and implementing their cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans. Specifically, applicants and licensees must preserve data and records related to their cybersecurity and physical security risk management plans, including documentation necessary to demonstrate how those plans are or will be implemented, for a period of two years from the date the related risk management plan certification is submitted to the Commission. We agree with FDD that ensuring documentation of cybersecurity efforts is important to bolster the resilience of submarine cable infrastructure and mitigate intrusions. Accordingly, we adopt the proposed two-year record retention requirement, which aligns with industry practices and supports our ability to assess compliance when needed.

121.

Third-Party Liability.

As part of today's action, we hold applicants and licensees responsible for the acts, omissions, or failures of third parties with whom the applicant or licensee has a contractual relationship, or whose acts or omissions the applicant or licensee otherwise has the ability to control, that impact the cybersecurity of the applicant's or licensee's systems and services. For purposes of this requirement, third parties include non-licensee individuals and entities with access to U.S.-licensed submarine cable systems that are hired by the licensee to provide services in connection with the management of the cable system (including service providers) and other third-party entities with access to the cable system's NOC. In connection with the Commission's requirement that an applicant or licensee take reasonable measures to protect the confidentiality, integrity, and availability of its communications systems and services, if an applicant or licensee relies on a third party to provide equipment or services, and an unreasonable act or omission of that third party results in the applicant's or licensee's failure to protect the confidentiality, integrity, or availability of its systems and services, the applicant or licensee will be responsible for that act or omission.

122. However, we find that reliance upon a third party to manage, route, or otherwise contribute to critical system operations does not relieve licensees of their cybersecurity responsibilities. The Commission has long held that “licensees and other regulatees are responsible for the acts and omissions of their employees and independent contractors,” and has recognized that “under long established principles of common law, statutory duties are nondelegable.” The risk of systemic harm to critical infrastructure warrants a regulatory approach that ensures licensees remain ultimately accountable for the security of their systems, including those operated or maintained by third parties.

c. Covered List Certifications

123. We adopt the proposal in the

2024 Cable NPRM

with some modifications, as described in detail below. We require applicants submitting initial cable landing license applications to certify that their submarine cable system will not use covered equipment or services (

i.e.,

the equipment or services identified on the Covered List). We require existing licensees to certify that they will not add covered equipment or services to their submarine cable system under the license in two scenarios, as described below. We further require licensees to disclose information about the covered equipment or services in their submarine cable system as part of the one-time information collection adopted today. We find that such equipment and services have been deemed to pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States and the security and safety of United States persons. As discussed below, there is general support in the record for the proposal to protect U.S. communications networks and the communications supply chain against national security threats. These certifications will further both the Commission's efforts and whole-of-government efforts to prevent untrusted equipment or services from entering the submarine cable communications ecosystem.

124.

Covered List Certification for Cable Landing License Applications, and for Addition of New Segment to Currently Licensed Cable.

Specifically, we adopt the proposal that, as a condition of a potential grant of an application for a cable landing license, applicants are required to certify that the submarine cable system will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. At this time, we decline to require such certification based on entity lists of other Federal agencies or the Department of Commerce's identification of foreign adversaries in 15 CFR 791.4, which were discussed in the

2024 Cable NPRM.

In addition, we decline to require existing licensees to file a certification on or after sixty (60) days after the date that any equipment or service is newly placed on the Covered List, and instead seek comment in the

Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking.

Applicants must certify that the submarine cable system will not use covered equipment or services. Since the Commission's Covered List was originally created, PSHSB has added multiple entries to the Covered List, the most recent as of July 23, 2024.

125. Many commenters are generally supportive of the use of the Commission's Covered List as a tool to promote national security. Equipment or services are placed on the Covered List based on a determination made by, among others, an appropriate national security agency that the equipment and/or services pose an unacceptable risk to the national security of the United States or the security and safety of United States persons pursuant to the Secure Networks Act. NASCA explicitly supports adopting the Commission's proposal to require applicants to certify that any proposed submarine cable systems will not use covered equipment or services. NASCA supports the Commission's proposal to “require applicants . . . to certify whether or not

they use equipment or services identified on the Commission's `Covered List,' provided the Commission's rules limit application to the relevant submarine cable system.” We agree with NASCA and will require that the certification apply to the submarine cable system relevant to the particular application pending before the Commission.

126. We also require, as a condition of a potential grant of an application to modify a cable landing license to add a new segment, that applicants must certify that the new submarine cable segment and landing point will not use equipment or services identified on the Commission's Covered List. For example, if a licensee files a modification application to add a new landing point, the certification would apply to the segment connecting the submarine cable to the new landing point to ensure the protection of the new segment and landing point from any national security threats.

127. We are not persuaded by CTIA's argument that we should decline to prohibit the use of covered equipment or services in submarine cable systems because it would expand the Covered List “in ways that were not originally contemplated by pertinent statutory authorities” and “without Congressional direction.” The Commission's responsibility to place equipment and services on the Covered List is set out in section 2 of the Secure Networks Act, and both that Act and the Secure Equipment Act of 2021 impose certain related duties on the Commission. However, the Commission can adopt, and has adopted, certain requirements that are not specifically required by statute but that take into consideration the fact that the Covered List represents a list of equipment and services that have been determined to pose risks to national security and public safety. In fact, the Secure Equipment Act recognizes the Commission's legal authority to take actions concerning the Covered List to fulfill the Commission's national security mission. We act here pursuant to our authority under the Cable Landing License Act and on the basis of this record to prevent new or additional insecure equipment and services from being integrated into this critical U.S. infra

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