Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators

Federal RegisterNov 30, 2016

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DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission

18 CFR Part 35

[Docket Nos. RM16-23-000; AD16-20-000]

Electric Storage Participation in Markets Operated by Regional Transmission Organizations and Independent System Operators

AGENCY:

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Department of Energy.

ACTION:

Notice of proposed rulemaking.

SUMMARY:

The Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is proposing to amend its regulations under the Federal Power Act (FPA) to remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources and distributed energy resource aggregations in the capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets operated by regional transmission organizations (RTO) and independent system operators (ISO) (organized wholesale electric markets).

DATES:

Comments are due January 30, 2017.

ADDRESSES:

Comments, identified by docket number, may be filed in the following ways:

• Electronic Filing through

http://www.ferc.gov

. Documents created electronically using word processing software should be filed in native applications or print-to-PDF format and not in a scanned format.

•

Mail/Hand Delivery:

Those unable to file electronically may mail or hand-deliver comments to: Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, Secretary of the Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426.

Instructions:

For detailed instructions on submitting comments and additional information on this process, see the Comment Procedures Section of this document.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

Michael Herbert (Technical Information), Office of Energy Policy and Innovation, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8929,

michael.herbert@ferc.gov

Heidi Nielsen (Legal Information), Office of the General Counsel, Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, 888 First Street NE., Washington, DC 20426, (202) 502-8435,

heidi.nielsen@ferc.gov

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Table of Contents

I. Introduction

II. Background

A. Electric Storage Resource and Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation Participation in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets

B. The Need for Reform

III. Discussion

A. Elimination of Barriers to Electric Storage Resource Participation in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets

1. Creation of a Participation Model for Electric Storage Resources

i. Introduction

ii. Current Rules

iii. Comments

iv. Proposed Reforms

2. Requirements for the Participation Model for Electric Storage Resources

a. Eligibility To Participate in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets

i. Introduction

ii. Current Rules

iii. Comments

iv. Proposed Reforms

b. Bidding Parameters for Electric Storage Resources

i. Introduction

ii. Current Rules

iii. Comments

iv. Proposed Reforms

c. Eligibility To Participate as a Wholesale Seller and Wholesale Buyer

i. Introduction

ii. Current Rules

iii. Proposed Reforms

d. Minimum Size Requirement

i. Introduction

ii. Current Rules

iii. Comments

iv. Proposed Reforms

e. Energy Used To Charge Electric Storage Resources

i. Introduction

ii. Current Rules

iii. Comments

iv. Proposed Reforms

B. Participation of Distributed Energy Resource Aggregators in the Organized Wholesale Electric Markets

1. Introduction

2. Current Rules

3. Comments

4. Proposed Reforms

a. Eligibility To Participate in the Organized Wholesale Electric Markets Through a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator

b. Locational Requirements for Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations

c. Distribution Factors and Bidding Parameters for Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations

d. Information and Data Requirements for Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations

e. Modifications to the List of Resources in a Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation

f. Metering and Telemetry System Requirements for Distributed Energy Resource Aggregations

g. Coordination Between the RTO/ISO, the Distributed Energy Resource Aggregator, and the Distribution Utility

h. Market Participation Agreements for Distributed Energy Resource Aggregators

IV. Compliance

V. Information Collection Statement

VI. Regulatory Flexibility Act Certification

VII. Environmental Analysis

VIII. Comment Procedures

IX. Document Availability

I. Introduction

1. In this Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (NOPR), the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (Commission) is proposing reforms to remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources

and distributed energy resource

aggregations in the organized wholesale electric markets.

Specifically, we propose to require each RTO and ISO to revise its tariff to (1) establish a participation model consisting of market rules that, recognizing the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, accommodates their participation in the organized wholesale electric markets and (2) define distributed energy resource aggregators as a type of market participant that can participate in the organized wholesale electric markets under the participation model that best accommodates the physical and operational characteristics of its distributed energy resource aggregation. We are taking this action pursuant to our legal authority under section 206 of the FPA to ensure that the RTO/ISO tariffs are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential.

We define an electric storage resource as a resource capable of receiving electric energy from the grid and storing it for later injection of electricity back to the grid regardless of where the resource is located on the electrical system. These resources include all types of electric storage technologies, regardless of their size, storage medium (

e.g.,

batteries, flywheels, compressed air, pumped-hydro, etc.), or whether located on the interstate grid or on a distribution system.

We define distributed energy resources as a source or sink of power that is located on the distribution system, any subsystem thereof, or behind a customer meter. These resources may include, but are not limited to, electric storage resources, distributed generation, thermal storage, and electric vehicles and their supply equipment.

We define, for present purposes, organized wholesale electric markets as the capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets operated by regional transmission organizations (RTO) and independent system operators (ISO).

16 U.S.C. 824e (2012).

2. Resource participation in the organized wholesale electric markets is currently governed by (1) participation models

consisting of market rules designed for different types of resources and (2) the technical requirements for

market services that those resources are eligible to provide. Each RTO/ISO establishes the participation models for different types of resources and the technical requirements for providing services in a slightly different way. Sometimes RTO/ISO participation models place limitations on the services that certain types of resources are eligible to provide. For example, Stored Energy Resources are only allowed to provide regulation service in the Midcontinent Independent System Operator, Inc. (MISO). In addition, sometimes the technical requirements for providing a service may limit the types of resources that are able to provide it, such as the requirement for a resource to be running and synchronized to the grid to provide spinning reserves. Many tariffs were originally developed in an era when traditional generation resources were the only resources participating in the organized wholesale electric markets. As new and innovative resources have reached commercial maturity, RTOs/ISOs have updated their tariffs to establish participation models for these resources and, to some degree, reviewed the technical requirements for each service or determined which service the new resource could provide. If an RTO/ISO is not able to update its market rules before a new resource becomes commercially able to sell into the organized wholesale electric markets, the new resource may need to participate under one of the existing participation models developed for some other type of resource. Doing so may limit the market opportunities for new resources and correspondingly limit the potential supply of some services. For instance, some electric storage resources have chosen to participate as demand response resources simply because, absent other participation models, that is the participation model that more closely resembles the manner in which electric storage resources might participate in the organized wholesale electric markets. Further, new resources may have difficulty creating momentum for the market rule changes necessary to facilitate their participation and may thus need to spend considerable time and effort to gain entry to the organized wholesale electric markets. Where rules designed for traditional generation resources are applied to new technologies, where new technologies are required to fit into existing participation models, and where participation models focus on the eligibility of resources to provide services more so than the technical ability of resources to provide services, barriers can emerge to the participation of new technologies in the organized wholesale electric markets. We are therefore issuing this NOPR to address these barriers to the participation of electric storage resources and distributed energy resource aggregations in the organized wholesale electric markets.

We define a participation model as a set of tariff provisions that accommodate the participation of resources with particular physical and operational characteristics in the organized wholesale electric markets of the RTOs and ISOs.

3. First, we propose to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to establish a participation model consisting of market rules that, recognizing the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, accommodates their participation in the organized wholesale electric markets. As noted above, in this NOPR, we define a participation model as a set of tariff provisions that accommodate the participation of resources with particular physical and operational characteristics in the organized wholesale electric markets of the RTOs and ISOs.

For example, the California Independent System Operator Corporation's (CAISO) tariff defines several participation models, including those for Participating Generators, Proxy Demand Resources, Reliability Demand Response Resources, and Non-Generator Resources. These participation models create unique rules for these different types of resources where they need to be distinguished from other types of market participants. For example, the CAISO Tariff defines Non-Generator Resources as “[r]esources that operate as either Generation or Load and that can be dispatched to any operating level within their entire capacity range but are also constrained by a MWh limit to (1) generate Energy, (2) curtail the consumption of Energy in the case of demand response, or (3) consume Energy.”

Since Non-Generator Resources are operationally unique, CAISO has created rules for them that include, but are not limited to, the requirement to enter into participating generator and participating load agreements to participate in the CAISO markets,

the ability to participate in the Regulation Energy Management program,

the conditions under which payments are rescinded due to MWh constraints,

and the relevant bidding parameters.

Given the unique attributes of electric storage resources, establishing a participation model consisting of market rules that acknowledge their unique attributes will enable them to effectively participate in the organized wholesale electric markets. This participation model could adapt existing market rules to incorporate the reforms proposed below and/or create a new set of rules to accommodate the participation of electric storage resources, depending on the existing market construct in each RTO/ISO.

See supra

note 5.

CAISO Response at 3 (citing CAISO Tariff, App. A).

See

CAISO Tariff, sections 4.6 and 4.7.

See

CAISO Tariff, section 8.4.1.2. Regulation Energy Management is a market feature for resources located within the CAISO Balancing Authority Area that require Energy from the Real-Time Market to offer their full capacity as Regulation. CAISO Tariff, App. A (Definitions).

See

CAISO Tariff, sections 8.10.8.4 and 8.10.8.6.

See

CAISO Tariff, section 30.5.6.

4. The proposed participation model must (1) ensure that electric storage resources are eligible to provide all capacity, energy and ancillary services that they are technically capable of providing in the organized wholesale electric markets; (2) incorporate bidding parameters

that reflect and account for the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources; (3) ensure that electric storage resources can be dispatched and can set the wholesale market clearing price as both a wholesale seller and wholesale buyer consistent with existing market rules that govern when a resource can set the wholesale price; (4) establish a minimum size requirement for participation in the organized wholesale electric markets that does not exceed 100 kW; and (5) specify that the sale of energy from the organized wholesale electric markets to an electric storage resource that the resource then resells back to those markets must be at the wholesale locational marginal price (LMP).

We refer to bidding parameters as the physical and operational constraints that a resource would identify per RTO/ISO requirements when submitting offers to sell capacity, energy, or ancillary services or bids to buy energy in the organized wholesale electric markets. Commission Staff referred to these as “bid parameters” in the Data Requests and Request for Comments issued on April 11, 2016 in Docket No. AD16-20-000.

5. Second, we propose to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to allow distributed energy resource aggregators,

including electric storage resources, to participate directly in the organized wholesale electric markets. Specifically, we propose to require each RTO/ISO to establish distributed energy resource aggregators as a type of market participant and allow the distributed energy resource aggregators to register distributed energy resource aggregations under the participation model in the

RTO/ISO tariff that best accommodates the physical and operational characteristics of the distributed energy resource aggregation. We also propose to require that each RTO/ISO, to accommodate the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations in the organized wholesale electric markets, establish market rules on: (1) Eligibility to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets through a distributed energy resource aggregator; (2) locational requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations; (3) distribution factors and bidding parameters for distributed energy resource aggregations; (4) information and data requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations; (5) modifications to the list of resources in a distributed energy resource aggregation; (6) metering and telemetry system requirements for distributed energy resource aggregations; (7) coordination between the RTO/ISO, distributed energy resource aggregator, and the distribution utility; and (8) market participation agreements for distributed energy resource aggregators.

We define distributed energy resource aggregator as an entity that aggregates one or more distributed energy resources for purposes of participation in the organized wholesale capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets of the RTOs and ISOs.

II. Background

A. Electric Storage Resource and Distributed Energy Resource Aggregation Participation in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets

6. The Commission has an ongoing interest in removing barriers to resources that are technically capable of participating in the organized wholesale electric markets and has been monitoring electric storage resource participation in these markets for some time. In 2010, Commission Staff issued a Request for Comments Regarding Rates, Accounting and Financial Reporting for New Electric Storage Technologies related to alternatives for categorizing and compensating storage services and, in particular, ideas on how best to develop rate policies that accommodate the flexibility of storage, consistent with the FPA.

Following that request, the Commission issued several rulemakings that have helped alleviate some of the barriers to electric storage resource participation in organized wholesale electric markets.

In addition, the Commission has addressed electric storage-related issues on a case-by-case basis.

Request for Comments Regarding Rates, Accounting and Financial Reporting for New Electric Storage Technologies, Docket No. AD10-13-000 (June 11, 2010).

See, e.g., Frequency Regulation Compensation in the Organized Wholesale Power Markets,

Order No. 755, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,324 (2011),

reh'g denied,

Order No. 755-A, 138 FERC ¶ 61,123 (2012) (addressing the provision of frequency regulation in organized wholesale electric markets);

Third-Party Provision of Ancillary Services; Accounting and Financial Reporting for New Electric Storage Technologies,

Order No. 784, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,349 (2013),

order on clarification,

Order No. 784-A, 146 FERC ¶ 61,114 (2014) (addressing third-party sales of ancillary services in bilateral markets);

Small Generator Interconnection Agreements and Procedures,

Order No. 792, 145 FERC ¶ 61,159 (2013),

clarifying,

Order No. 792-A, 146 FERC ¶ 61,214 (2014) (addressing interconnection for small generators, including electric storage resources).

See, e.g., California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.,

156 FERC ¶ 61,110 (2016);

Nev. Hydro Co., Inc.,

122 FERC ¶ 61,272 (2008),

reh'g denied,

133 FERC ¶ 61,155 (2010);

Western Grid Development, LLC,

130 FERC ¶ 61,056,

reh'g denied,

133 FERC ¶ 61,029 (2010);

Midwest Indep. Trans. Sys. Operator, Inc.,

129 FERC ¶ 61,303 (2009);

New York Indep. Sys. Operator, Inc.,

127 FERC ¶ 61,135 (2009);

California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.,

132 FERC ¶ 61,211 (2010);

PJM Interconnection L.L.C.,

151 FERC ¶ 61,208,

order on reh'g,

152 FERC ¶ 61,064 (2015),

order on reh'g and compliance,

155 FERC ¶ 61,157,

order on reh'g and compliance,

155 FERC ¶ 61,260 (2016);

PJM Interconnection, L.L.C.,

132 FERC ¶ 61,203 (2010);

Commonwealth Edison Co.,

129 FERC ¶ 61,185, at P 8 (2009).

7. As the capabilities of electric storage resources and distributed energy resources continue to improve and their costs continue to decline, the Commission has become concerned that these resources may face barriers that limit them from participating in organized wholesale electric markets. To further examine this issue, the Commission hosted a panel to discuss electric storage resources at the November 19, 2015 Commission meeting. Subsequently, on April 11, 2016, Commission Staff issued data requests to each of the six RTOs/ISOs, seeking information about the rules in the organized wholesale electric markets that affect the participation of electric storage resources (Data Requests).

Concurrently, Commission Staff issued a Request for Comments, seeking comments on whether barriers exist to the participation of electric storage resources in the organized wholesale electric markets that may potentially lead to unjust and unreasonable wholesale rates (Request for Comments). In addition to the responses from the RTOs/ISOs, Commission Staff received 44 sets of comments from the entities identified in Appendix A.

Specifically, Commission Staff requested information related to (1) the eligibility of electric storage resources to participate in the capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets in the RTOs/ISOs; (2) the technical qualification and performance requirements for market participants; (3) the bidding parameters for different types of resources; (4) opportunities for distribution-level and aggregated electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets; (5) the treatment of electric storage resources when they are receiving electricity for later injection to the grid; and (6) any forthcoming rule changes or other stakeholder initiatives that may affect the participation of electric storage resources in the organized wholesale electric markets.

8. A number of RTOs/ISOs allow participation of distributed energy resources, including electric storage resources, in the organized wholesale electric markets through distributed energy resource aggregations. For example, CAISO's Distributed Energy Resource Provider model allows for the participation of aggregated distributed energy resources in the energy and ancillary service markets.

Other RTOs/ISOs, including PJM Interconnection, L.L.C. (PJM), MISO, New York Independent System Operator, Inc.'s (NYISO), and SPP, allow aggregation in limited circumstances, typically linked to the requirement that the demand-side, generation, and electric storage resources are located behind the same point of interconnection or pricing node.

ISO New England Inc. (ISO-NE) also allows limited aggregations of generators, Alternative Technology Regulation Resources, Asset Related Demands, and demand resources subject to certain parameters.

See California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.,

155 FERC ¶ 61,229 (2016) (conditionally accepting tariff provisions to facilitate participation of aggregations of distribution-connected or distributed energy resources in CAISO's energy and ancillary service markets).

See

PJM Response at 20; MISO Response at 16; SPP Response at 7.

ISO-NE Response at 26.

B. The Need for Reform

9. The Commission must ensure that the rates, terms and conditions of jurisdictional services under the FPA are just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential. Our proposal in this proceeding is a continuation of efforts pursuant to our authority under the FPA to ensure that the RTO/ISO tariffs and market rules produce just and reasonable rates, terms and conditions of service.

The Commission has observed that market rules designed for traditional generation resources can create barriers to entry for emerging technologies. The Commission has responded by promulgating rules that recognize the operational characteristics of non-traditional resources such as variable energy

resources and demand response.

For example, in Order No. 719, the Commission required each RTO/ISO to accept bids from demand response resources, on a basis comparable to any other resources, for ancillary services that are acquired in a competitive bidding process, if the demand response resources met certain criteria.

In Order No. 764, the Commission took action to remedy operational and other challenges associated with the integration of variable energy resources caused by existing practices as well as the ancillary services used to manage system variability that were developed at a time when virtually all generation on the system could be scheduled with relative precision and when only load exhibited significant degrees of intra-hour variation.

See, e.g., Integration of Variable Energy Resources,

Order No. 764, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,331,

order on reh'g,

Order No. 764-A, 141 FERC ¶ 61,232 (2012),

order on reh'g,

Order No. 764-B, 144 FERC ¶ 61,222 (2013);

Wholesale Competition in Regions with Organized Electric Markets,

Order No. 719, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 (2008),

order on reh'g,

Order No. 719-A, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,292 (2009),

order on reh'g,

Order No. 719-B, 129 FERC ¶ 61,252 (2009).

See, e.g.,

Order No. 764, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,331; Order No. 719, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281.

Order No. 719, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,281 at PP 19, 47-48.

Order No. 764, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,331.

10. In this proceeding, we propose to require RTOs/ISOs to address barriers to participation of electric storage resources in the organized wholesale electric markets. As noted above, in this NOPR, we define an electric storage resource as a resource capable of receiving electric energy from the grid and storing it for later injection of electricity back to the grid regardless of where the resource is located on the electrical system.

These resources include all types of electric storage technologies, regardless of their size, storage medium (

e.g.,

batteries, flywheels, compressed air, pumped-hydro, etc.), or whether located on the interstate grid or on a distribution system.

Electric storage resources include a number of different technologies that can serve as a sink for, or source of, electricity. Electric storage resources' ability to charge and discharge electricity provides these resources with significant operational flexibility, and they can be designed to provide a variety of grid services, including bulk energy services (

e.g.,

capacity and energy) and ancillary services (

e.g.,

regulation and reserves).

See supra

note 1.

Id.

Sandia National Laboratories,

DOE/EPRI Electricity Storage Handbook in Collaboration with NRECA,

Report No. SAND2015-1002, Chapter 1 (Feb. 2015) (Sandia Report).

11. The RTOs/ISOs have taken different approaches to integrating electric storage resources into their organized wholesale electric markets. While electric storage resources (including batteries, flywheels, and pumped-hydro facilities) are already providing energy and ancillary services in some organized wholesale electric markets, these resources often must use existing participation models designed for traditional generation or load resources that do not recognize electric storage resources' unique physical and operational characteristics. Some organized wholesale electric markets have defined participation models in their tariffs for electric storage resources, but those models limit the services that electric storage resources may provide.

For example, these models often allow eligible electric storage resources to participate only in the regulation market. Other organized wholesale electric market rules are designed for electric storage resources with very specific characteristics, such as pumped-hydro facilities or resources with less than a one-hour maximum run time. Smaller electric storage resources are also generally restricted to participating in the organized wholesale electric markets as demand response, which can limit their ability to employ their full operational range, prohibit them from injecting power onto the grid, and preclude them from providing certain services that they are capable of providing such as operating reserves.

See, e.g., Midwest Indep. Trans. Sys. Operator, Inc.,

129 FERC ¶ 61,303 at PP 40, 64 (Commission “note[d] that the Midwest ISO [SER] proposal is intended to implement a specific technology, the fly-wheel technology developed by Beacon Power”; and SER category was “specifically designed for a specific technology that provides short-term Stored Resources only in the regulating reserve market”); MISO FERC Electric Tariff, section 1.S (Stored Energy Resources); NYISO Services Tariff, section 2.12 (defining Limited Energy Storage Resource as a “Generator authorized to offer Regulation Service only and characterized by limited Energy storage, that is, the inability to sustain continuous operation at maximum Energy withdrawal or maximum Energy injection for a minimum period of one hour.”). NYISO limits Limited Energy Storage Resources to providing regulation service only and Demand Side Resources and Generators that can sustain operation for longer than one hour are not eligible to be Limited Energy Storage Resources. NYISO Response at 3-4.

12. We take action in this NOPR so that electric storage resources will be able to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets to the extent they are technically capable of doing so based on rules that take into account their unique characteristics and not based on market rules designed for the unique characteristics of other types of resources. Requiring electric storage resources to use participation models designed for a different type of resource may fail to recognize electric storage resources' physical and operational characteristics and their capability to provide energy, capacity and ancillary services in the organized wholesale electric markets. Current tariffs that do not recognize the operational characteristics of electric storage resources serve to limit the participation of electric storage resources in the organized wholesale electric markets and result in inefficient use of these resources (

i.e.,

electric storage resources may be dispatched to provide one service when they could, absent market rule limitations, provide another service more economically). As a result, resources, including electric storage resources, do not get dispatched efficiently, thereby impacting the competitiveness of the market outcomes. Limiting the services an electric storage resource is eligible to provide and limiting the efficiency in which it is dispatched to provide services may also inhibit developers' incentives to design their electric storage resources to provide all capacity, energy and ancillary services these resources could otherwise provide. This further reduces competition for providing those services in the organized wholesale electric markets. Effective integration of electric storage resources into the organized wholesale electric markets would enhance competition and, in turn, help to ensure that these markets produce just and reasonable rates.

13. We are also concerned that existing RTO/ISO tariffs impede the participation of distributed energy resources in the organized wholesale electric markets by providing limited opportunities for distributed energy resource aggregations. Distributed energy resources include a variety of constantly evolving technologies (including, but not limited to, electric storage resources, distributed generation, thermal storage, and electric vehicles and their supply equipment) that are connected to the power grid at distribution-level voltages. While these distributed energy resources can at times effectively supply the capacity, energy, and ancillary services that are exchanged in the organized wholesale electric markets, they can at times be too small to participate in these markets individually. In addition, responses to the Data Requests and Request for Comments demonstrate that current organized wholesale electric market rules often limit the services distributed energy resources are eligible to provide, in many cases only allowing these resources to be used as demand response or load-side resources when they are located behind a customer

meter

or by imposing prohibitively expensive or otherwise burdensome requirements.

See, e.g.,

MISO Response at 15 (noting that electric storage resources connected to the distribution system can participate in its markets as Load Modifying Resources and Demand Response Resources—Types I or II); PJM Response at 3-6 (stating that, if an electric storage resource is located behind a customer meter, then PJM considers it demand response, which is not studied for deliverability and is not eligible to inject energy into the distribution or PJM transmission system and noting that any injection would subject it to generator interconnection obligations).

See

Energy Storage Association Comments at 29 (stating that metering and telemetry requirements and interconnection processes can pose prohibitively high transaction costs for the small project sizes that characterize behind-the-meter storage, which creates undue burdens on behind-the-meter storage participation in most RTOs/ISOs and noting that the ability to bid aggregated distributed resources into wholesale markets is not possible in some RTOs/ISOs and is unclear in others (such as NYISO, which does not allow aggregations to meet the 1 MW size for a Limited Energy Storage Resource)). Energy Storage Association also asserts that at present most RTOs/ISOs do not allow behind-the-meter storage to net inject power to provide wholesale generator services.

Id. See also

NextEra Comments at 11 (stating that every RTO/ISO prohibits behind-the-meter resources from having net injections to the grid).

14. As with electric storage resources, we preliminarily find that the barriers to the participation of distributed energy resources through distributed energy resource aggregations in the organized wholesale electric markets may, in some cases, unnecessarily restrict competition, which could lead to unjust and unreasonable rates. Effective wholesale competition encourages entry and exit and promotes innovation, incentivizes the efficient operation of resources, and allocates risk appropriately between consumers and producers. Removing these barriers will enhance the competitiveness, and in turn the efficiency, of organized wholesale electric markets and thereby help to ensure just and reasonable and not unduly discriminatory or preferential rates for wholesale electric services. We also note that participation of electric storage resources in the organized wholesale electric markets allows for more efficient operation of large thermal generators, enhances reliability, provides congestion relief, improves integration of variable energy resources, and reduces the burden on the transmission system.

Among the benefits cited by a recent report by the Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory are (1) a less costly, cleaner, and more competitive bulk power system and (2) greater reliability through consumer reliance upon distributed energy resources to provide resilience from bulk power and system and distribution service interruptions. Lawrence Berkeley National Laboratory,

Electric Industry Structure and Regulatory Responses in a High Distributed Energy Resources Future,

at 26-28 (Report 1, Nov. 2015),

https://emp.lbl.gov/sites/all/files/lbnl-1003823_0.pdf

(Berkeley Lab Report).

See also

DNV-GL,

A Review of Distributed Energy Resources: New York Independent System Operator,

at 18 (Sept. 2014) (DNV-GL Report),

http://www.nyiso.com/public/webdocs/media_room/publications_presentations/Other_Reports/Other_Reports/A_Review_of_Distributed_Energy_Resources_September_2014

(“Benefit streams commonly attributed to distributed energy resources include, among others: Avoided expansion of generation, transmission, or distribution facilities, power outage mitigation or critical power support during power outages (resiliency) and power quality improvement (enhanced reliability); U.S. Department of Energy,

The Potential Benefits of Distributed Generation and Rate-related Issues that May Impede Their Expansion: A Study Pursuant to Section1817 of the Energy Policy Act of 2005

(Feb. 2007),

https://www.ferc.gov/legal/fed-sta/exp-study.pdf

.; IEA,

Re-powering Markets: Market design and regulation during the transition to low-carbon power systems,

at 33 (2016) (“active management of renewable resources connected to distribution networks can help reduce or delay distribution network investments”).

15. Distributed energy resource aggregations are often limited to participating in organized wholesale electric markets as demand response, which can limit the aggregations' design and operations, as well as the services they may provide. However, advancements in metering, telemetry, and communication technologies support the aggregation of distributed energy resources, allowing these resources to meet the minimum size requirements to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets under participation models other than demand response. Additionally, demand response models often prohibit distributed energy resources from injecting power back onto the grid or increasing consumption if there is an operational requirement for such performance.

By requiring RTOs/ISOs to allow the participation of distributed energy resource aggregations, aggregators will be able to bundle distributed energy resources to meet RTO/ISO qualification and performance requirements, and the RTOs/ISOs will be able to capitalize on the aggregation's full operational range. The recent proliferation of, and technological advancements in, distributed energy technologies, as well as their decreasing costs, create opportunities for distributed energy resource aggregations to be eligible to provide a variety of services to the organized wholesale electric markets.

See

PJM Response at 5 (stating that, like other types of resources that participate in PJM's markets only by providing load reductions, demand-side electric storage resources are not studied by PJM through the generation interconnection process and are not allowed to inject energy beyond the customer's meter and onto the distribution or transmission system, as applicable).

The Berkeley Lab Report notes that technological and procedural innovation and advancements are leading to substantial reduction in the cost of some of these resources, such as through a continued long-term downward trend in the installed cost of solar PV. Berkeley Lab Report at 50, App. A. It adds that there is a wide range of forecasts of the potential for distributed energy resources over the coming decades, some of which suggest that penetrations could be significant. Estimated increases range from a current 11 percent distributed energy resource penetration rate to 19 percent of required capacity (MW) in the Eastern Interconnection under a base case analysis by 2030; and a projection of a 37.5 percent penetration in the Western Interconnection by 2032.

Id.

at 51 (citing Western Electricity Coordinating Council,

SPSC Study High EE/DR/DG

(Sept. 19, 2013),

https://www.wecc.biz/_layouts/15/WopiFrame.aspx?sourcedoc=/Reliability/2032_HighEEDSMDG_StudyReport.docx&action=default&DefaultItemOpen=1

; Navigant Consulting, Inc.,

Assessment of Demand-Side Resources Within the Eastern Interconnection,

March 2013,

http://bit.ly/EISPCdsr

16. Accordingly, we propose to require the RTOs/ISOs to revise their tariffs to: (1) Establish a participation model consisting of market rules that, recognizing the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, accommodates their participation in the organized wholesale electric markets and (2) define distributed energy resource aggregators as a type of market participant that can participate in the organized wholesale electric markets under the participation model that best accommodates the physical and operational characteristics of its distributed energy resource aggregation. These proposed requirements will clarify how electric storage resources and distributed energy resources of all types and sizes may provide services in the organized wholesale electric markets that they are technically capable of providing.

III. Discussion

A. Elimination of Barriers to Electric Storage Resource Participation in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets

1. Creation of a Participation Model for Electric Storage Resources

i. Introduction

17. Resource participation in organized wholesale electric markets is currently governed by (1) participation models consisting of market rules designed for different types of resources and (2) the technical requirements for market services that those resources are eligible to provide. As noted above, in this NOPR, we define a participation model as a set of tariff provisions that accommodate the participation of resources with particular physical and operational characteristics in the organized wholesale electric markets of the RTOs and ISOs.

While these participation models are designed to

accommodate the unique characteristics of different resources, new technologies may be required to fit into existing participation models when market rules for their unique characteristics have not been developed. Moreover, even where participation models for new technologies, such as electric storage resources, do exist, they may unnecessarily limit a resource's ability to qualify for the participation model or to provide certain services using it, despite the technical capabilities of the resource.

See supra

note 5.

18. The Commission previously has allowed flexibility for each RTO/ISO to approach the integration of electric storage resources in its organized wholesale electric markets differently. RTOs/ISOs developed most of their participation models before electric storage resources achieved their current technical capability and commercial viability, so some markets rely on these existing models for the participation of electric storage resources. For example, ISO-NE indicates that, for an electric storage resource to be eligible to provide all wholesale services, it must register as a Generator Asset,

which is a participation model designed for traditional generation and which may not reflect the distinct operational characteristics or capabilities of electric storage resources. Alternatively, some RTOs/ISOs have created participation models for electric storage resources that limit the participation of those resources to the regulation market or are designed for electric storage resources with very specific characteristics, such as pumped-hydro facilities or resources with less than a one-hour maximum run time.

However, other RTOs/ISOs have created participation models for electric storage resources to provide a wider variety of services in the organized wholesale electric markets (such as PJM's Energy Storage Resource model

and CAISO's Non-Generator Resource model

). Establishing a robust participation model for electric storage resources will help remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in the organized wholesale electric markets and ensure that electric storage resources can provide the services that they are technically capable of providing.

ISO-NE Response at 3-5.

MISO Response at 2 (stating that MISO's Stored Energy Resource model is limited to regulation service); and NYISO Response at 3-4 (stating that NYISO limits Limited Energy Storage Resources to providing regulation service only).

An Energy Storage Resource is defined as a “flywheel or battery storage facility solely used for short term storage and injection of energy at a later time to participate in the PJM energy and/or Ancillary Services markets as a Market Seller.” PJM Response at 6 (citing PJM Tariff, Att. K, section 1.3.).

See supra

note 7.

ii. Current Rules

19. In their responses to the Data Requests, the RTOs/ISOs describe opportunities for electric storage resources to provide various energy and ancillary service market services. For example, in CAISO, electric storage resources are eligible to participate in the energy and ancillary service markets as Participating Generators, Non-Generator Resources, Pumped Storage Hydro Units, or Demand Response Resources, even as part of distributed energy resource aggregations.

Under ISO-NE's market rules, electric storage resources can provide all services when they qualify as a generator, provide all services except 10-minute spinning and 10-minute non-spinning reserves when they qualify as demand response, and provide regulation as an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource.

CAISO Response at 2-8.

See California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.,

155 FERC ¶ 61,229.

ISO-NE Response at 3-5.

20. In MISO, electric storage resources are eligible to participate as a Stored Energy Resource (which is only eligible to provide regulation), a Generation Resource, a Use-Limited Resource that is unable to operate continuously on a daily basis, and several types of demand response resources (some of which are limited in the products that they are eligible to provide).

NYISO allows electric storage resources to qualify as Energy Limited Resources, Limited Energy Storage Resources (which are eligible to provide regulation service only), or demand response resources.

PJM allows electric storage resources to participate as generation resources or demand-side resources (which are not eligible to provide non-synchronized reserves).

Finally, SPP allows electric storage resources to qualify as Demand Response Resources, Dispatchable Resources, External Resources, External Dynamic Resources, and Quick-Start Resources, if they can sustain output for 60 minutes.

MISO Response at 7-8.

NYISO Response at 1-6.

PJM Response at 4.

SPP Response at 3-4.

21. Some RTOs/ISOs concede that their existing participation models may fail to address the characteristics of certain electric storage resources.

CAISO urges the Commission to preserve some flexibility for the RTOs/ISOs to develop market rules and participation models that respond to electric storage developments.

MISO Response at 3; NYISO Response at 17.

CAISO Response at 1-2.

iii. Comments

22. Numerous commenters argue that the lack of a participation model that accommodates the participation of electric storage resources creates barriers to their participation in organized wholesale electric markets. For example, Alevo asserts that the lack of a defined asset class for electric storage resources poses a barrier to their participation, limiting market efficiency and competition and increasing costs.

Advanced Energy Economy claims that the failure to account for the unique attributes, characteristics, and benefits of advanced energy technologies prevents projects from obtaining financing.

More specifically, Energy Storage Association asserts that NYISO's Behind-the-Meter Net Generator design still effectively excludes participation of electric storage resources because it does not account for electric storage functionality.

Alevo Comments at 4, 7-17 (pointing to its analyses of the benefits that electric storage resource participation could provide to energy, capacity, and ancillary service markets).

Advanced Energy Economy Comments at 7.

Energy Storage Association Comments at 29-30.

23. Many commenters request that the Commission require the RTOs/ISOs to establish a participation model for electric storage resources that allows them to provide all services.

Alevo argues that such a participation model should not limit duration of discharge or services provided,

while NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium states that it should utilize appropriate bidding parameters and resource modeling for electric storage resources.

California Energy Storage Alliance asks the Commission to direct the RTOs/ISOs to develop a market model specific to behind-the-meter electric storage resources, which would allow them to respond to market signals to provide any wholesale market service (

e.g.,

frequency regulation, demand response, spinning reserve) without restrictions, with its market participation governed by minimum performance requirements.

Electric Vehicle R&D Group supports the creation of a separate participation model for electric storage resources that

allows for bidirectional power flow.

Duke Energy also encourages modifications to market rules to facilitate electric storage resource deployment, subject to reliability requirements and non-preferential treatment.

Id.

at 8-9, 24; NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium Comments at 5; Ormat Comments at 2-3; Electric Vehicle R&D Group Comments at 3.

Alevo Comments at 8.

NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium Comments at 5.

California Energy Storage Alliance Comments at 4-5.

Electric Vehicle R&D Group Comments at 3.

Duke Energy Comments at 4.

Other commenters explain how the existing participation models for demand response resources, under which electric storage resources sometimes participate in the organized wholesale electric markets, do not adequately accommodate electric storage resource participation. Advanced Microgrid Solutions asserts that the compensation methods under demand response resource participation models should not be applied to electric storage resources because, unlike the demand reductions that demand response resources provide, the energy that electric storage resources deliver is purchased in the form of energy consumed during another time such that any net-benefit test is unnecessary.

Energy Storage Association, SolarCity, and California Energy Storage Alliance contend that the baselines used to measure demand response resource deliveries present a barrier to electric storage resource participation under demand response participation models and can limit the ability of behind-the-meter electric storage resources to provide their full capability into wholesale markets.

SolarCity further argues that requiring behind-the-meter electric storage resources to participate as demand response creates a barrier for these resources, as they are physically and economically capable of providing electricity beyond the customer's load.

Tesla contends that customer-sited resources (such as electric storage resources) are interactive grid resources that are often relegated to act as less flexible demand response resources when participating in organized wholesale electric markets.

Energy Storage Association argues that wholesale demand response constructs can prohibit behind-the-meter electric storage resources from offering other services.

Advanced Microgrid Solutions Comments at 5.

Energy Storage Association Comments at 28; SolarCity Comments at 8; California Energy Storage Alliance Comments at 4.

SolarCity Comments at 4.

Tesla Comments at 4.

Energy Storage Association Comments at 28.

24. Many commenters also state that behind-the-meter electric storage resources should be permitted to inject power beyond the retail meter. Energy Storage Association and NextEra argue that no RTO/ISO allows behind-the-meter storage to net inject power to provide wholesale generator services.

Similarly, Advanced Energy Economy and Solar Grid Storage argue that PJM's restriction on the injection of energy past a customer's retail meter during operations for providing ancillary services in their markets is a barrier to storage.

Solar Grid Storage argues that PJM's “no injection” barrier effectively excludes all residential customers with storage from participation in the PJM ancillary service markets, despite the growing potential of this customer segment to provide meaningful resources to that organized market.

Id.

at 29; NextEra Comments at 11. NextEra explains that a net injection is when the output of an electric storage resource exceeds the customer's load that it is sited with and the electric storage resource exports power back to the grid.

Advanced Energy Economy Comments at 16-17; Solar Grid Storage Comments at 2.

Solar Grid Storage Comments at 3.

25. Some commenters call for the creation of a “load increase” participation model for electric storage resources that allows electric storage resources to be dispatched to receive electricity from the grid. For example, National Hydropower Association states that pumped-storage projects are not adequately valued because they are regarded as either a generator or a load, which results in the undervaluation of these projects and no new major plants being built in the last 30 years.

National Hydropower Association asks the Commission to consider adding pumped-storage as a dispatchable “load increase” demand response resource.

National Hydropower Association Comments at 5-6.

Id.

at 6.

iv. Proposed Reforms

26. As numerous commenters state, existing RTO/ISO rules that govern participation of electric storage resources in some organized wholesale electric markets fail to ensure that electric storage resources that are technically capable of providing specific services are permitted to do so. Providing a participation model that recognizes the unique characteristics of electric storage resources will help eliminate barriers to their participation in the organized wholesale electric markets and promote competition and economic efficiency. We therefore propose to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to include a participation model consisting of market rules that, recognizing the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, accommodates their participation in organized wholesale electric markets.

27. As the costs of electric storage resources continue to decline and their technical potential expands, the ability of these resources to provide operational and economic benefits to the organized wholesale electric markets will increase. We preliminarily find that it is important to remove barriers to participation now so that the competitive benefits are realized without delay.

28. We thus preliminarily find that it is necessary to take action to remove barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in organized wholesale electric markets by requiring that the RTOs/ISOs revise their tariffs to establish a participation model consisting of market rules that, recognizing the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, accommodates their participation in the organized wholesale electric markets. In addition, to accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, we propose to require that this participation model satisfy each of the following requirements (as discussed in detail in Section III.A.2 of this NOPR):

a. Electric storage resources must be eligible to provide all capacity, energy and ancillary services that they are technically capable of providing in the organized wholesale electric markets;

b. The bidding parameters incorporated in the participation model must reflect and account for the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources;

c. Electric storage resources can be dispatched and can set the wholesale market clearing price as both a wholesale seller and a wholesale buyer consistent with existing rules that govern when a resource can set the wholesale price;

d. The minimum size requirement for electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets must not exceed 100 kW; and

e. The sale of energy from the organized wholesale electric markets to an electric storage resource that the resource then resells back to those markets must be at the wholesale LMP.

29. To further ensure that the proposed participation model for electric storage resources will accommodate both existing and future electric storage resource technologies, we propose that each RTO/ISO define the criteria in its tariff that a resource must meet to qualify to use this participation model based on the physical and operational attributes of electric storage resources, namely their ability to both charge and discharge energy. As such, the qualification

criteria for the proposed participation model must not limit participation to any particular type of electric storage resource or other technology. In addition, those qualification criteria should ensure that the RTO/ISO is able to dispatch the resource in a way that recognizes its physical constraints and optimizes its benefits to the RTO/ISO. We do not at this time propose to define the qualification criteria that each RTO/ISO use but rather propose to provide the RTOs/ISOs with flexibility to propose qualification criteria that best suit their proposed participation models. However, we invite comment on whether the Commission should establish the qualification criteria and, if so, what specific qualification criteria the Commission should require.

30. We are not proposing to limit the use of this participation model exclusively to electric storage resources as defined herein. While the requirements for the proposed participation model set forth here are designed to accommodate the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources, we acknowledge that there may be other types of resources whose physical or operational characteristics could qualify under the proposed participation model. This may be particularly true for the distributed energy resource aggregations considered in Section III.B below.

For example, resources such as thermal storage that can both increase and decrease their energy consumption could aggregate with other distributed energy resources with common physical or operational characteristics and qualify as a market participant using the participation model proposed here.

31. In addition to including a participation model for electric storage resources in its tariff, we propose that each RTO/ISO propose any necessary additions or modifications to its existing tariff provisions to specify: (1) Whether resources that qualify to use the participation model for electric storage resources will participate in the organized wholesale electric markets through existing or new market participation agreements; and (2) whether particular existing market rules apply to resources participating under the electric storage resource participation model. CAISO, for example, has adopted numerous tariff revisions for its Non-Generator Resource participation model.

See, e.g.,

CAISO Tariff, sections 4.6 (Relationship Between CAISO and supply resources), 4.7 (Relationship between CAISO and participating loads), 8.4.1.2 (availability of Regulation Energy Management to Scheduling Coordinators for Non-Generator Resources), 8.10.8.4 (Rescission of Ancillary Service Capacity Payments for Non-Generator Resources), 8.10.8.6 (Rescission of Payments for Regulation Up and Regulation Down Capacity), 11.8 (Bid cost recovery for scheduling coordinators for Non-Generator Resources), 27.9 (MWh Constraints for Non-Generator Resources), 30.5.6 (bid components of Non-Generator Resource bids), 31.2 (Day-ahead market power mitigation process), 34.1.5 (Mitigating of Bids in the real time market), 40.10.3.2 Flexible Capacity Category—Base Ramping Resources (addressing inclusion of Non-Generator Resources), 40.10.3.3 Flexible Capacity Category—Peak Ramping Resources (addressing inclusion of Non-Generator Resources), 40.10.3.4 Flexible Capacity Category—Super-Peak Ramping Resources (addressing inclusion of Non-Generator Resources), 40.10.6.1 (Day-Ahead and Real-Time Availability providing for certain Non-Generator Resources bidding requirements).

32. Finally, we recognize that there are implementation costs for creating a new participation model for electric storage resources. While we believe the participation model and its characteristics described below will benefit the participation of electric storage resources in the organized wholesale electric markets, we acknowledge that the RTOs/ISOs will need to develop rules that govern the participation model as well as make software changes to reflect how these resources will be modeled and dispatched when they participate in the markets. We therefore seek comment from the RTOs/ISOs on the changes that would be required to implement the proposed participation model for electric storage resources as well as the associated costs and how those costs could be minimized.

2. Requirements for the Participation Model for Electric Storage Resources

a. Eligibility To Participate in Organized Wholesale Electric Markets

i. Introduction

33. Electric storage resources have the potential to provide a diverse array of services to the organized wholesale electric markets and to be designed to meet various technical requirements. However, in many cases, the existing participation models that electric storage resources are eligible to use in the RTOs/ISOs preclude electric storage resources from providing all of the services that they are technically capable of providing. In other instances, barriers may emerge as a result of the existing technical requirements for providing certain services that may not be appropriate for fast and controllable technologies such as electric storage resources. Market rules that were designed for traditional generation technologies or that otherwise prevent new technologies from providing services that they are technically capable of providing can have detrimental impacts on the competitiveness of the organized wholesale electric markets.

ii. Current Rules

34. Several of the RTOs/ISOs identify limitations on the services that electric storage resources may provide, depending on the participation model an electric storage resource elects to use. ISO-NE states that the non-dispatchability of Settlement Only Resources and non-dispatchable generators prohibits such resources from providing operating reserves. In addition, resources that cannot provide energy within 10 minutes cannot provide 10-minute spinning or 10-minute non-spinning reserves.

ISO-NE also states that demand response resources with one or more controllable generators, including storage resources, are not eligible to provide 10-minute spinning reserve. In ISO-NE, electric storage resources can only provide regulation as an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource.

ISO-NE Response at 11.

Id.

at 3-5.

35. MISO states that a Stored Energy Resource is not qualified for capacity, energy, ramp capability and contingency reserves.

MISO states that Demand Response Resource—Type I is not eligible for regulating reserve and ramp capability products and that Dispatchable Intermittent Resources are a subset of Generation Resources that are not eligible to provide regulating reserves and contingency reserves. MISO states that the Load Modifying Resource category is designed to provide energy in emergency conditions and is only intended for the provision of capacity. MISO also states that Emergency Demand Response can only provide emergency energy, on a voluntary basis.

MISO Response at 7-8.

36. NYISO states that Limited Energy Storage Resources are limited to selling only regulation service in the ancillary service market.

NYISO further states that Emergency Demand Response Program resources are only eligible to provide energy, Special Case Resources are only eligible to provide energy and capacity, and Demand Side Ancillary Services Program Resources are only eligible to provide ancillary services. PJM states that demand response resources, including electric storage resources, are ineligible to provide non-synchronized reserves because demand response resources are already synchronized to the grid when consuming power, and so would always

be classified as sync reserves when curtailing.

NYISO Response at 6-7.

PJM Response at 4.

iii. Comments

37. Many commenters point to organized wholesale electric markets where electric storage resources cannot participate, or cannot participate fully, because market rules are either designed for traditional generation or they place unnecessary limitations on electric storage resources. Both Advanced Energy Economy and NextEra argue that a resource's eligibility to provide a particular service should be based on whether it has the technical attributes necessary to provide that service rather than on its participation model.

EEI argues that RTOs/ISOs may need to modify their tariffs to account for electric storage resources because many existing market rules went into place prior to the relatively recent advances in electric storage technology.

Likewise, Alevo contends that applying market rules to electric storage resources that were designed for transmission, generation, and demand assets unfairly disadvantages electric storage resources.

SolarCity claims that market rules that prevent the participation of electric storage resources in multiple markets, particularly for ancillary services, discriminate against behind-the-meter electric storage resources that can provide multiple services concurrently by preventing them from stacking multiple value streams.

SolarCity suggests that the provision of one wholesale market product should not preclude provision of other wholesale market products when resources are technically capable of providing multiple services.

Advanced Energy Economy Comments at 10-11; NextEra Comments at 5.

EEI Comments at 4.

Alevo Comments at 8.

SolarCity Comments at 5.

38. Some commenters note concerns with the eligibility of electric storage resources to provide services in specific markets. According to AES Companies, Indianapolis Power & Light Company's Harding Street Battery Energy Storage System, a fully-developed grid-scale battery, cannot participate in MISO's markets because of the limitations placed on the services Stored Energy Resources are eligible to provide and the way they are dispatched.

AES Companies further note that MISO's Stored Energy Resource definition specifically disallows capacity accreditation, even though some electric storage resources have sufficient discharge duration to provide capacity and ancillary services.

Similarly, Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance contends that none of the participation models that allow electric storage resources to participate in MISO's capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets facilitate participation of battery storage technologies and, in some cases, they limit the products an electric storage resource can provide.

In contrast, Manitoba Hydro, which operates hydroelectric facilities with reservoir storage that participate in the MISO market as Use-Limited Resources, states that MISO's current market rules are not barriers to electric storage resource participation.

AES Companies Comments at 9-10 (citing MISO Response at 3).

Id.

at 2, 14.

Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance Comments at 2, 4. For example, Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance contends that MISO's Demand Response Resource—Type I classification is inappropriate for advanced electric storage resources because it is designed for resources that respond as a single block, on or off, and cannot provide regulating reserve and ramping products.

Manitoba Hydro Comments at 4.

39. NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium asserts that NYISO's market rules prevent electric storage resources from fully participating in NYISO's markets, noting that electric storage resources with less than 60 minutes of output duration can only participate as Limited Energy Storage Resources and can only provide regulation.

NY Transmission Owners also argue that NYISO's rules do not reflect the ability of certain electric storage resources to provide their maximum output for regulation service over a multi-hour period and do not allow them to participate in the energy and ancillary service markets.

NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium Comments at 5.

NY Transmission Owners Comments at 3.

40. According to Energy Storage Association, resources that participate under CAISO's Proxy Demand Response participation model are prohibited from providing frequency regulation, even though they may be technically capable of doing so.

Finally, NextEra notes that ISO-NE, NYISO, and MISO prohibit an electric storage resource offering regulation from offering any other service, even though a longer-duration electric storage resource could provide regulation from a portion of its capacity while providing other reserve services or energy from the remainder of its capacity.

Energy Storage Association Comments at 28.

NextEra Comments at 5 (citing MISO Response at 7; ISO NE Response at 3; NYISO Response at 7).

41. Other commenters focus on technical requirements that limit the ability of electric storage resource to provide certain services. NRECA states that minimum technical requirements should not create undue barriers to resources capable of performing a service.

Similarly, APPA states that RTOs/ISOs should establish reasonable qualification criteria on a resource-specific basis.

NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium argues that distributed electric storage resources, both grid-connected and customer-sited, face barriers to market participation due to eligibility rules and qualification/performance requirements that should be eliminated.

NRECA Comments at 6-7.

APPA Comments at 10-11.

NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium Comments at 6.

42. Some commenters focus on the technical requirements in the regulation markets. Viridity explains that, while the rapid ramp rates of electric storage resources allow them to provide regulation service, their discharge is of limited duration, so RTOs/ISOs should utilize these resources for short periods.

According to Viridity, requiring such resources to provide regulation service over longer periods is inconsistent with the nature of frequency response and is detrimental to the life span and effectiveness of these resources. NextEra contends that, despite implementation of Order No. 755 (which removed certain barriers to the ability of fast-acting resources to provide frequency regulation service), MISO and SPP continue to rely on the slow ramping automatic generation control signal developed for traditional generation resources for regulation service.

NextEra notes that advanced electric storage technologies can respond faster than these slower regulation signals allow. NextEra points out that, in contrast, NYISO matches the dispatch of regulation resources to the specific ramping capabilities of each resource.

Viridity Comments at 3-4.

NextEra Comments at 9 (citing

https://www.misoenergy.org/Library/Repository/Communication%20Material/Market%20Enhancements/Market%20Roadmap/Market%20Roadmap%20Priorities.pdf

) (noting that MISO is pursuing an automatic generation control enhancement that would implement a faster signal similar to those used by other RTOs/ISOs).

Id.

at 9.

43. Other commenters contend that reliability standards may preclude electric storage resources from providing certain ancillary services. Specifically, Energy Storage Association states that NYISO suggested that the Northeast Power Coordinating Council's (NPCC) qualification criteria may prohibit grid-connected electric storage

resources from providing synchronized reserves because inverter-based resources like electric storage cannot comply with the required settings inherent to synchronous generators.

Similarly, ISO-NE states that demand response resources are precluded from providing 10-minute spinning reserve per the ISO-NE tariff definition, which is based on the NPCC requirement that loads cannot provide synchronized reserve if the reduction in load is dependent on starting a generator.

Energy Storage Association Comments at 14, 27.

ISO-NE Response at 11.

44. National Electrical Manufacturers Association argues that, in ancillary service markets, spinning reserves are limited to online, synchronized spinning generation resources. According to National Electrical Manufacturers Association, electric storage systems capable of providing fast-reacting, synchronized electricity should be allowed to compete fully to provide spinning reserves.

Wellhead asks the Commission to require changes to NERC definitions so that non-synchronous resources are not categorically excluded from providing reserves. Wellhead notes that, under the NERC definition of “Spinning Reserves,” the phrase “unloaded generation that is synchronized” does not clearly allow electric storage resources to participate as spinning reserves. Wellhead also notes that NERC's definition of “Operating Reserves—Spinning” also does not clearly allow for market participation of electric storage resources because they are not generation synchronized to the system.

National Electrical Manufacturers Association Comments at 3.

Wellhead Comments at 3-4.

45. Commenters also note that the requirement in some RTOs and ISOs to have an energy schedule to provide ancillary services is a barrier to electric storage resource participation in ancillary service markets. Commenting on MISO's market rules, Energy Storage Association argues that electric storage resources should not have to offer energy to participate in certain ancillary service markets because, unlike traditional generators, electric storage resources are able to ramp immediately to provide spinning reserve and ramping service without having to provide energy to do so.

Energy Storage Association explains that requiring an electric storage resource to offer energy greatly diminishes its capability to provide services in the ancillary service markets because storage resources are energy-limited.

Energy Storage Association Comments at 13-14 (citing MISO Response at 11, n.9 (referring to Business Practice Manual sections that describe requirements for these products, which state “Committed Generation Resources” are eligible to provide these products), 14, 27).

46. For the capacity markets, commenters ask the Commission to clarify that an electric storage resource should be allowed to de-rate its capacity (

i.e.,

offer a quantity less than its nameplate capacity) to ensure it can satisfy the minimum run-time requirement.

Energy Storage Association states, for example, that, in the NYISO and MISO capacity markets, an electric storage resource with a run-time duration of less than four hours relative to its nameplate capacity should be able to qualify for capacity at a lower power level than it would be able to sustain for four hours at nameplate output. More specifically, NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium states that a 10 MW/2-hour storage resource should be able to qualify for 5 MW of capacity as long as it can sustain 5 MW for 4 hours.

Id.

at 22-23; NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium Comments at 6; RES Americas Comments at 4.

47. In contrast, some commenters, such as APPA, state that eligibility is not a significant problem for electric storage resources.

Similarly, Electric Power Supply Association argues that the RTO/ISO responses to the Data Requests show that electric storage resources can fully participate in the organized wholesale electric markets.

The PJM Market Monitor also claims there are no market rules that artificially preclude participation by electric storage resources in any of PJM's markets.

The PJM Market Monitor states that electric storage resources can make offers directly into PJM's wholesale markets to provide energy, capacity, and ancillary services or can participate as demand response resources.

APPA Comments at 10.

Electric Power Supply Association Comments at 9.

PJM Market Monitor Comments at 4.

iv. Proposed Reforms

48. We propose to require RTOs/ISOs to modify their tariffs to establish a participation model consisting of market rules for electric storage resources under which a participating resource is eligible to provide any capacity, energy, and ancillary service that it is technically capable of providing in the organized wholesale electric markets. In addition, we propose that electric storage resources should be able, as part of the participation model, to be eligible to provide services that the RTOs/ISOs do not procure through a market mechanism, such as blackstart, primary frequency response, and reactive power, if they are technically capable. Where compensation for these services exists, electric storage resources should also receive such compensation commensurate with the service provided.

49. We also propose to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to clarify that an electric storage resource may de-rate its capacity to meet minimum run-time requirements to provide capacity or other services. This proposed requirement will help ensure that electric storage resources are able to provide all services that they are technically capable of providing by accommodating their physical and operational characteristics, while still maintaining the quality and reliability of services they seek to provide. In RTOs/ISOs with capacity markets, we propose that the de-rated capacity value for electric storage resources be consistent with the quantity of energy that must be offered into the day-ahead energy market for resources with capacity obligations. We preliminarily find that this reform will remove a barrier to the participation of electric storage resources in the organized wholesale electric markets related to minimum run-time requirements and help ensure that the resources that do de-rate their capacity will be able to meet their capacity supply obligations if called upon.

50. We preliminarily conclude that a market participant's eligibility to provide a particular reserve service should not be conditioned on requirements that were designed for synchronous generators, specifically the requirement to be online and synchronized to the grid to be eligible to provide ancillary services. Newer technologies, particularly electric storage resources, tend to be capable of faster start-up times and higher ramp rates than traditional synchronous generators and are therefore able to provide ramping, spinning, and regulating reserve services without already being online and running. Therefore, we preliminarily find that participation in ancillary service markets should be based on a resource's ability to provide services when it is called upon rather than on the real-time operating status of the resource.

51. However, we acknowledge that all of the RTOs/ISOs co-optimize energy and ancillary services dispatch and pricing and therefore may condition eligibility to provide ancillary services on having an energy schedule. As a result, it is not clear whether

eliminating the requirement for a resource to be online and synchronized to the grid would be impactful given the continued need to have an energy schedule. Therefore we seek comment on whether the requirement to have an energy schedule to provide ancillary services could be adjusted so that electric storage resources and other technically-capable resources could participate in the ancillary service markets independent of offering energy to the RTO/ISO. Specifically, we seek comment on whether dispatch and pricing of energy and ancillary services would continue to be internally consistent if a resource were not required to offer to provide energy in order to offer to provide ancillary services. Further, we seek comment on whether the capability of resources to provide an ancillary service absent an energy schedule can be determined in the regular performance tests that the RTO/ISO conducts and whether a resource's start-up time and ramp capability are generally represented in bidding parameters and would adequately guarantee the resource's ability to provide other services absent energy market participation. Additionally, we seek comment on the extent of software changes necessary to factor the elimination of such an energy schedule requirement into the RTO/ISO co-optimization models.

52. Several commenters also identified concerns with how definitions in the Glossary of Terms used in NERC reliability standards could potentially limit participation of electric storage resources and other non-synchronous resources in the reserve markets. While it appears that some of the Glossary of Terms definitions were created for synchronous generation, it is unclear the extent to which these definitions could potentially limit participation of non-synchronous resources in the organized wholesale electric markets. Therefore, we seek comment on whether and to what extent the Commission-approved NERC Glossary of Terms and associated Reliability Standards or regional reliability requirements may create barriers to the participation of electric storage resources or other non-synchronous technologies in the organized wholesale electric markets.

b. Bidding Parameters for Electric Storage Resources

i. Introduction

53. Bidding parameters allow resources participating in the organized wholesale markets to identify their physical and operational characteristics so that the RTO/ISO can model and dispatch the resource consistent with its operational constraints. Due to an electric storage resource's ability to both receive and provide electricity at varying speeds and duration and to transition between operating modes, it may be more efficient for the RTOs/ISOs to model, optimize, and dispatch electric storage resources differently than they do traditional generation. By requiring electric storage resources to use bidding parameters developed for traditional generators or other supply resources, RTOs/ISOs may fail to effectively utilize these resources, possibly precluding electric storage resources from providing all of the services that they are physically and technically capable of providing in a way that optimizes their operational capabilities and maximizes the benefits they provide. This barrier to electric storage resource participation in organized wholesale electric markets could lead to over-procurement of less efficient resources and increased cost to load.

ii. Current Rules

54. Under current market rules, resource bidding parameters vary greatly between the RTOs/ISOs. Some RTOs/ISOs require the same bidding parameters from all resources offering into a specific market, regardless of the participation model under which these resources participate, while others tie bidding parameters to specific participation models. For example, ISO-NE requires the same bidding parameters from all resources, including electric storage resources, participating in its capacity, forward reserve, and regulation markets.

100

In ISO-NE's energy market, bidding parameters reflect the physical characteristics of each participation model such as maximum daily starts, maximum consumption for dispatch asset related demand, and minimum time between reduction for demand response resources. Similarly, SPP requires all resources participating in its day-ahead and real-time markets under any participation model to provide a specific set of bidding parameters to validate their offers.

101

100

ISO-NE Response at 24-25.

101

SPP Response at 5-6.

55. CAISO's market rules also require a defined list of parameters for all bids. In addition, however, CAISO requires supplemental parameters depending on the participation model under which a resource is participating in its market (

i.e.,

Participating Generator, Participating Load, or Non-Generator Resource).

102

Specifically, CAISO explains that bids for participating loads, which include pumping load or Pumped-Storage Hydro Units, may include pumping level (in megawatts (MW)), minimum load bid (generation mode of a pumped-storage hydro unit), load distribution factor, ramp rate, energy limit, pumping cost, and pump shut-down costs.

103

CAISO notes that, unlike under the generator resource model, these resources must submit lower and upper charge limits. Moreover, the Commission recently accepted revisions to CAISO's tariff to allow scheduling coordinators representing non-generator resources to include state-of-charge as a bidding parameter.

104

102

CAISO Response at 13-14 (citing CAISO Tariff, section 30).

103

Id.

at 13-14 (citing CAISO Tariff, section 30.5.2.3).

104

California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.,

156 FERC ¶ 61,110.

56. Electric storage resources participating in NYISO's markets must generally submit the same bidding parameters as other resources, with some exceptions.

105

Limited Energy Storage Resources providing regulation service exchange a “state of charge management” signal with the NYISO to facilitate the efficient use of their capabilities. NYISO does not require Limited Energy Storage Resources, unlike other generators, to provide regulation capacity response rates, normal response rates, or emergency response rates with their regulation service bids. In addition, in NYISO, electric storage resources acting as a component of a Demand Side Ancillary Services Program resource may only submit one normal response rate equaling the electric storage resource's emergency response rate, while traditional generators may submit up to three normal response rates.

105

NYISO Response at 12 (citing NYISO's Market Participant User's Guide (Dec. 2015)).

57. In MISO, bidding parameters vary between markets and participation models. MISO's market rules allow common bidding parameters for each participation model, with a few exceptions.

106

For example, since MISO manages the state of charge for Stored Energy Resources, it requires the following additional bidding parameters for these resources: Hourly maximum energy storage level; hourly maximum energy charge rate; hourly maximum energy discharge rate; hourly energy

storage loss rate; and hourly full charge energy withdrawal rate.

106

MISO Response at 14-15 (citing MISO FERC Electric Tariff, section 4.2.6 (Stored Energy Resource Offer)).

58. Bidding parameters in PJM also vary between markets and participation models.

107

Additionally, pumped storage resources offering into the PJM energy markets may either self-schedule or have PJM dispatch their unit pursuant to the pumped storage optimization tool. In either case, the resource must submit the following parameters: initial storage; final storage; maximum storage; minimum storage; pumping efficiency factor; and min/max generating and pumping limits.

108

107

PJM Response at 18 (citing PJM Operating Agreement, Schedule 1, section 6.6(f)).

108

Id.

(citing PJM Manual 11, Attachment B).

iii. Comments

59. Some commenters focus on the current bidding parameters for electric storage resources. NRECA states that the Commission should not mandate bidding parameters for specific electric storage resources.

109

APPA states that, at this early stage of electric storage resource development, the required bidding parameters should not be so prescriptive as to determine the technologies allowed to deploy, which may constrain the ability of load-serving entities to adopt the least-cost solution.

110

109

NRECA Comments at 7.

110

APPA Comments at 11.

60. In contrast, NextEra suggests that each RTO/ISO evaluate how bidding parameters could allow electric storage resources to participate fully in the energy, ancillary service, and capacity markets.

111

NextEra states that the specific bidding parameters developed for pumped hydro are inadequate for batteries and other advanced electric storage technologies. California Energy Storage Alliance also urges evaluation of existing market bidding parameters to identify revisions focused on the unique characteristics of electric storage resources and their ability to act as both generation and load.

112

Energy Storage Association and NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium agree, recommending that RTOs/ISOs establish a participation model that incorporates appropriate bidding parameters and resource modeling for electric storage resources.

113

111

NextEra Comments at 10-11.

112

California Energy Storage Alliance Comments at 1-2.

113

Energy Storage Association Comments at 8-12; NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium Comments at 5.

61. Some commenters address the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources that create a need for bidding parameters in a participation model for electric storage resources that may differ from those required under participation models for more traditional resources. For example, Alevo argues that electric storage resources are not certain that they can participate in RTO/ISO markets given modeling and bidding parameter limitations in the current RTO/ISO market clearing and dispatch engines.

114

Alevo and Energy Storage Association state that the RTOs'/ISOs' market modeling, which Alevo argues is based on traditional resource types that only withdraw electricity from or inject electricity to the grid, does not accommodate electric storage resources' charge and discharge cycles.

115

Alevo further contends that no current bidding parameters offer charge and discharge signals that would allow electric storage resources to provide peaking services.

116

Similarly, RES Americas contends that accounting for injections and withdrawals of energy to and from the grid in bidding parameters would improve optimization and dispatch across all asset classes.

117

114

Alevo Comments at 20.

115

Id.;

Energy Storage Association Comments at 9.

116

Alevo Comments at 20.

117

RES Americas Comments at 4.

62. A few commenters address bidding parameters in specific organized wholesale electric markets. Energy Storage Association states that MISO's Stored Energy Resource, ISO-NE's Alternative Technology Regulation Resource, and NYISO's Limited Energy Storage Resource participation models explicitly allow electric storage resource participation.

118

According to Energy Storage Association, these participation models offer the bidding parameters and modeling mechanisms (such as energy-neutral signal or state-of-charge management) necessary for electric storage resource participation. Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance and AES Companies, however, believe that MISO's current dispatch algorithms do not effectively use electric storage resources because they were designed for flywheels, while advanced battery systems have the ability to continuously charge and discharge.

119

118

Energy Storage Association Comments at 9-10.

119

Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance Comments at 4; AES Companies Comments at 21.

63. Other commenters discuss bidding parameters that relate to specific services in the organized wholesale electric markets. National Hydropower Association states that bidding parameters should reflect electric storage resources' ability to respond to transients with automatic voltage regulation, power system stability, and generator droop.

120

National Hydropower Association claims that the NERC standards often require these services, but RTOs/ISOs do not include them in any bid evaluation parameters.

120

National Hydropower Association Comments at 4.

64. Some commenters focus on state of charge as a bidding parameter for electric storage resources. Alevo, NextEra, SolarCity, and Energy Storage Association agree that bidding parameters need to reflect an electric storage resource's state of charge.

121

Alevo states that the inability of the RTOs'/ISOs' dispatch and clearing engines to manage hourly and sub-hourly dispatch and consider electric storage resources' states of charge is a barrier to electric storage resource participation.

122

Alevo and Energy Storage Association recommend including a state of charge bidding parameter in market engine optimization and dispatch modeling because an electric storage resource's energy level at any given moment affects the services it is capable of providing in the subsequent interval.

123

NextEra asserts that, although some RTOs/ISOs manage batteries' state of charge when providing regulation service, it is unclear how electric storage resources (or the RTOs/ISOs) can reflect their state of charge in the unit commitment and dispatch algorithms when providing other services.

124

121

Alevo Comments at 20; NextEra Comments at 10; SolarCity Comments at 9; Energy Storage Association Comments at 11.

122

Alevo Comments at 20.

123

Id.;

Energy Storage Association Comments at 11.

124

NextEra Comments at 10-11. NextEra points to CAISO's proposal to allow energy storage resources to submit their state of charge as a bid parameter in the day-ahead market. This proposal was accepted by the Commission.

See California Indep. Sys. Operator Corp.,

156 FERC ¶ 61,110 at P 10.

65. Some commenters focus on the ability of electric storage resources to manage their own state of charge. SolarCity states that RTOs/ISOs should allow electric storage resources to manage their state of charge rather than relying on RTO/ISO accounting estimates of their state of charge, which could lead to faulty dispatch instructions.

125

Likewise, NextEra recommends that the RTOs/ISOs should allow electric storage resources to choose between RTO/ISO-management and self-management of state of charge.

126

Energy Storage Association asks that RTOs/ISOs clarify how they would model, optimize, dispatch, and settle electric storage resources using

negative generation and state of charge parameters so that electric storage resources understand how they will bid into the market, receive dispatch signals, respond to those signals, and be compensated.

127

AES Companies state that electric storage resources should be permitted to optimize their own state of charge because MISO's operating software ignores the benefits of constant charge and availability.

128

125

SolarCity Comments at 9.

126

NextEra Comments at 10-11.

See also

Ormat Comments at 3.

127

Energy Storage Association Comments at 7.

128

AES Companies Comments at 21.

iv. Proposed Reforms

66. We propose to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to include a participation model for electric storage resources that incorporates bidding parameters that reflect and account for the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources. The lack of a state-of-charge bidding parameter and the lack of ability for electric storage resources to identify their maximum energy charge rate and maximum energy discharge rate could result in electric storage resources being dispatched in a manner that limits their operational effectiveness. While some existing bidding parameters were developed for older electric storage technologies (such as pumped-hydro facilities), newer storage technologies (such as battery storage) have greater flexibility to transition between charging and discharging. Therefore, bidding parameters designed for slower storage technologies or other types of generation resources that are not capable of charging and discharging energy may limit the opportunity for faster electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets. Appropriate bidding parameters will allow electric storage resources to provide all services they are technically capable of providing and allow the RTOs/ISOs to procure these services more efficiently.

67. Specifically, we propose that the RTOs/ISOs establish state of charge, upper charge limit, lower charge limit, maximum energy charge rate, and maximum energy discharge rate as bidding parameters for the participation model for electric storage resources that participating resources must submit, as applicable. The state of charge will allow resources using the participation model for electric storage resources to identify their forecasted state of charge at the end of a market interval,

129

as defined by the RTO/ISO, while the upper and lower charge limits will prevent the operator from trying to give or take too much energy from the resource. We expect that the state of charge would be telemetered in real time when the RTO/ISO is managing the state of charge, as discussed further below, so that the upper and lower charge limits are not exceeded, but do not propose any specific telemetry requirements. The maximum energy charge rate and maximum energy discharge rate will be used to indicate how quickly the resource can receive electricity from or inject it back to the grid. We preliminarily find that these are the minimum bidding parameters necessary for RTOs/ISOs to effectively dispatch electric storage resources because they provide the RTOs/ISOs with the information about the physical and operational characteristics of electric storage resources that allow these resources to provide the services that they are technically capable of providing.

129

See, e.g.,

CAISO Tariff, Att. A, section 30.5.6 (stating that scheduling coordinators representing Non-Generator Resources may submit bids including the state of charge for the day-ahead market to indicate the forecasted starting physical position of the Non-Generator Resource.).

68. We also propose to require that the participation models for electric storage resources include the following bidding parameters that market participants may submit, at their discretion, for their resource based on its physical constraints or desired operation: minimum charge time, maximum charge time, minimum run time, and maximum run time.

130

We preliminarily conclude that these optional bidding parameters are necessary to reflect the wide range of physical and operational characteristics of existing and future electric storage technologies. Specifically, electric storage technologies such as pumped-hydro facilities that seek to provide energy in the organized wholesale electric markets have some physical and operational characteristics that are closer to those of traditional generation than those of small electric storage resources designed primarily to provide regulation service. The optional bidding parameters that we propose here would allow electric storage resources to indicate their operational constraints to the RTO/ISO and would help these resources to manage any costs or operational constraints that they incur when transitioning between charging and discharging electricity. For example, the opportunity to submit these optional bidding parameters could allow an electric storage resource to prevent excessive variability in its operations to help optimize the services that it is available to provide and to preserve the life of the electric storage resource.

130

We acknowledge that some of these optional bidding parameters may not be necessary for resources participating under the proposed participation model for electric storage resources that provide certain information to the RTO/ISO through telemetry.

69. Also, where the RTO/ISO has reserved for itself the right to manage the state of charge of an electric storage resource, we propose to require that the RTOs/ISOs allow electric storage resources to self-manage their state of charge and upper and lower charge limits. An electric storage resource that opts to self-manage its state of charge and upper and lower charge limits would keep its state of charge at an optimal level through its own bidding strategy, rather than the RTO/ISO market processes ensuring that dispatch does not violate its physical constraints. The Commission recently accepted revisions to the CAISO tariff that allow non-generator resources to self-manage their energy limits and state-of-charge in real-time.

131

California Indep. Sys. Operator, Corp.,

156 FERC ¶ 61,110 at P 10.

70. Of course, an electric storage resource that self-manages its state of charge is subject to any penalties for deviating from a dispatch schedule to the extent the resource manages its state of charge by deviating from the dispatch schedule. While RTOs/ISOs may be in a better position to effectively manage the state of charge for an electric storage resource that, for example, exclusively provides regulation service in the organized wholesale electric markets, some electric storage resources may be interested in providing multiple service or providing services to another party, such as to a load with which it is co-located. Affording electric storage resources the option to manage their state of charge would allow these resources to optimize their operations to provide all of the services that they are technically capable of providing, similar to the operational flexibility that traditional generators have to manage the wholesale services that they offer. However, we seek comment on whether there are conditions under which an RTO/ISO should not allow an electric storage resource to manage its state of charge and upper and lower charge limits.

71. While the inclusion of these bidding parameters would allow for more efficient use of electric storage resources, their implementation also requires the RTOs/ISOs to program these bidding parameters into their modeling and dispatch software. The difficulty of implementing these bidding parameters would likely vary from RTO/ISO to RTO/ISO. Therefore, we seek

comment on the time and resources that would be necessary for the RTOs/ISOs to incorporate these bidding parameters, including the optional bidding parameters, into their modeling and dispatch software.

c. Eligibility To Participate as a Wholesale Seller and Wholesale Buyer

i. Introduction

72. The ability of electric storage resources to receive and provide electricity positions them to be both buyers and sellers in the organized wholesale electric markets. As the Commission has previously recognized, a market functions effectively only when both supply and demand can meaningfully participate.

132

Improving electric storage resources' opportunity to participate as both wholesale sellers of services and wholesale buyers of energy could improve market efficiency by allowing the RTO/ISO to dispatch these resources in accordance with their most economically efficient use (

i.e.,

as supply when the market clearing price for energy is higher than their offer and as demand when the market clearing price is lower than their bid). Moreover, allowing electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets as dispatchable load would allow these resources, under certain circumstances, to set the price in these markets, better reflecting the value of the marginal resource and ensuring that electric storage resources are dispatched in accordance with the highest value service that they are capable of providing during a set market interval.

132

Demand Response Compensation in Organized Wholesale Energy Markets,

Order No. 745, FERC Stats. & Regs. ¶ 31,322, at P 1,

order on reh'g,

Order No. 745-A, 137 FERC ¶ 61,215 (2011).

ii. Current Rules

73. Each RTO's/ISO's market rules that govern the eligibility of electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets as a demand resource are different. For example, CAISO explains that an electric storage resource interconnected to the CAISO grid with a participating generator agreement and participating load agreement can submit offers to sell and bids to buy energy in the wholesale market.

133

According to SPP, submitting bids to purchase energy in its market is within the resource owner's discretion.

134

SPP notes that electric storage resources may submit virtual bids in the day-ahead market at any location and a fixed or price-sensitive bid at their registered load. In contrast, PJM explains that electric storage resources do not submit wholesale bids to buy electricity.

135

133

CAISO Response at 16.

134

SPP Response at 7.

135

PJM Response at 22.

74. ISO-NE states that, because it is dispatchable, an electric storage resource participating as a Dispatchable Asset Related Demand resource may submit bids to buy energy in both the day-ahead and real-time energy markets; however, if it is participating as a load asset or an Asset Related Demand, it may submit bids to buy energy in the day-ahead market but would be a price taker in real-time.

136

ISO-NE Response at 28 (citing ISO-NE Tariff, section I.2.2).

75. MISO explains that, in the day-ahead market, electric storage resources may submit bids to buy energy at the LMP when they need to recharge as dispatchable demand or may submit virtual bids.

137

MISO further explains that in the real-time market, most load buys energy as fixed demand and only Demand Response Resources—Type II can submit demand response offers to buy energy.

137

MISO Response at 16.

76. NYISO states that Energy Limited Resources obtain charging energy through negative MW value generation offers, rather than a bid to buy energy.

138

NYISO explains that demand-side resources participating in the Special Case Resource Program, Emergency Demand Response Program, Demand Side Ancillary Services Program, or Day-Ahead Demand Response Program do not submit bids to buy energy in the wholesale markets unless the resource is a load-serving entity, in which case it purchases its entire load. NYISO states that a demand-side resource may submit price-responsive load bids to take advantage of off-peak prices to charge its electric storage resource. NYISO adds that electric storage resources are not required to bid to buy electricity from the NYISO market, but, like any load, may bid into the day-ahead market as a price cap load bid.

139

138

NYISO Response at 14-15.

139

Id.

at 15 (citing NYISO Services Tariff, section 21.1).

77. The eligibility for an electric storage resource to set the price in the organized wholesale electric markets also varies among the RTOs/ISOs. For example, CAISO states that an electric storage resource that is the marginal resource may set the price of energy and ancillary services in CAISO's markets based on its economic bid.

140

PJM states that, with the exception of demand-side resources in the non-synchronized reserve market, electric storage resources may set the price as either a generation or as a demand-side resource in the capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets.

141

SPP states that any resource, including an electric storage resource, qualified to participate in an SPP market may set the price for the relevant market.

142

140

CAISO Response at 10.

141

PJM Response at 10.

142

SPP Response at 4.

78. ISO-NE states that, in each of its markets, electric storage resources may be able to set the clearing price, depending on the participation model that they are using to participate.

143

ISO-NE explains that only dispatchable resources (

i.e.,

dispatchable generator assets and dispatchable asset related demand) may set the clearing price in the real-time energy market. ISO-NE explains that, in the day-ahead energy market, an electric storage resource may set the price by offering into the market as a generator resource, Asset Related Demand, or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand. ISO-NE adds that, by qualifying as a new generator resource or as a demand resource, an electric storage resource may bid its qualified MWs into the capacity market and set the clearing price. ISO-NE notes that an electric storage resource or aggregation of electric storage resources may set the regulation market clearing prices by offering as an Alternative Technology Regulation Resource. ISO-NE states that an electric storage resource may also set the market-clearing regulation price by offering into the regulation market as a generator resource or Dispatchable Asset Related Demand.

143

ISO-NE Response at 12-13. ISO-NE explains that, today, Real-Time Demand Response assets are price-takers in the real-time energy market but that, with the full integration of demand response into the energy market scheduled for June 1, 2018, demand response resources will have the potential to set market clearing prices.

79. MISO states that electric storage resources may set prices for products in the market(s) in which they are eligible to participate. MISO explains that, for example, an electric storage resource registered as a Load Modifying Resource may set the price in the capacity market. MISO states that an electric storage resource registered as a Stored Energy Resource may set the price for regulating reserve.

144

MISO Response at 10.

80. NYISO explains that supply offers of electric storage resources that participate as Energy Limited Resources may set the price for capacity, energy, and ancillary services; Limited Energy Storage Resources may set the price for regulation service. NYISO explains that Special Case Resources and Emergency

Demand Response Program resource energy offers do not directly set the price; rather, when these resources are dispatched, the NYISO's scarcity pricing rules are triggered in the zone(s) in which they are activated and may alter energy and certain ancillary services prices.

145

NYISO Response at 8.

iii. Proposed Reforms

81. We propose to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to ensure that electric storage resources can be dispatched and can set the wholesale market clearing price as both a wholesale seller and wholesale buyer consistent with existing rules that govern when a resource can set the wholesale price. This proposal includes the requirements that the RTOs/ISOs accept wholesale bids from electric storage resources to buy energy so that the economic preferences of the electric storage resources are fully integrated into the market, the electric storage resource can set the price as a load resource where market rules allow, and the electric storage resource can be available to the RTO/ISO as a dispatchable demand asset. However, we note that these requirements must not prohibit electric storage resources from participating in organized wholesale electric markets as price takers, consistent with the existing rules for self-scheduled load resources. We also clarify that, while resources are not dispatched when they clear the capacity markets, we are proposing that resources using the participation model for electric storage resources be able to set the price in the capacity markets, where applicable.

82. To optimize the capabilities of electric storage resources and for the RTOs/ISOs to use them efficiently, it is important for the RTOs/ISOs to be able to symmetrically utilize the capabilities of these resources to both receive electricity from the grid and inject it back to the grid. In other words, they must be able to dispatch electric storage resources as supply when the market clearing price exceeds their offers to sell and to dispatch electric storage resources as demand when their bids to buy exceed the market clearing price. The bidirectional capabilities of electric storage resources are what make them unique, and allowing electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets as both wholesale sellers and wholesale buyers will help optimize the value that they provide and enhance price formation, as they will be dispatched in accordance with their most economic use.

83. We preliminarily conclude that the proposed requirement to participate as a supply and demand resource simultaneously (

i.e.,

submit bids to buy and offers to sell during the same market interval) is necessary to maximize the value that electric storage resources can provide in the organized wholesale electric markets, allowing the markets to identify whether it is more economic to dispatch an electric storage resource as supply or demand during a given market interval. We expect that, through its bidding strategy, a resource using the electric storage resource participation model would be able to prevent any conflicting dispatch signals to itself. However, we seek comment on whether there should be a mechanism that identifies bids and offers coming from the same resource that ensures the price for the offer to sell is not lower than the price for the bid to buy during the same market interval so that an RTO/ISO does not accept both the offer and bid of a resource using the electric storage resource participation model for that interval.

84. Generally, in the organized wholesale electric markets, resources that cannot be dispatched by the RTO/ISO do not set wholesale prices. This is because the marginal clearing prices are based on the shadow price of the next unit of incremental production, and a resource that cannot be dispatched by the RTO/ISO cannot provide that incremental unit of production. Therefore, we propose that, for a resource using the proposed participation model for electric storage resources to be able to set prices in the organized wholesale electric markets as either a wholesale seller or a wholesale buyer, it must be available to the RTO/ISO as a dispatchable resource. We believe this proposal is consistent with RTO/ISO rules on price setting and are further proposing that the ability for resources using the participation model for electric storage resources to set the price be consistent with existing rules that govern when a resource can set the wholesale price. However, we seek comment on whether any existing RTO/ISO rules may unnecessarily limit the ability of resources using the participation model for electric storage resources to set prices in the organized wholesale electric markets.

85. We note that resources using the proposed participation model for electric storage resources that elect to submit economic bids as a wholesale buyer and participate as dispatchable demand resources would still be able to self-schedule their charging and be price takers. However, it is also possible that the RTO/ISO could dispatch an electric storage resource as load when the wholesale price for energy is above the price of their bid to buy (a circumstance under which they would lose the opportunity to earn greater revenues as a supply resource). Therefore, to help alleviate any potential financial risk to these resources when being dispatched as a demand resource, we seek comments on whether the proposed participation model for electric storage resources should allow make-whole payments when a resource participating under this participation model is dispatched as load and the price of energy is higher than the resource's bid price.

d. Minimum Size Requirement

i. Introduction

86. Depending on the technology, electric storage resources range in size from 1 kW to 1 GW,

146

and most of them tend to be under 1 MW.

147

RTO/ISO market rules may restrict electric storage resources from participating in the organized wholesale electric markets based on minimum size requirements

148

that may have been designed for different types of resources. This is particularly true for smaller electric storage resources, which may be limited to participating in the organized wholesale electric markets as demand response resources. Such restrictions can limit these resources' ability to employ their full operational range because they are prohibited from injecting electricity into the grid in excess of their host load and preclude them from providing services such as reserves.

146

Sandia Report at 29, Figure 19 (Positioning of Energy Storage Technologies).

147

U.S. Department of Energy,

Grid Energy Storage

at 12 (Dec. 2013) (stating that most storage systems are in the 10 kW to 10 MW range, with the largest proportion of those resources in the 100 kW to 1 MW range).

148

We use the term “minimum size requirement” to collectively describe minimum capacity requirements to qualify to use a given participation model, “minimum offer requirements” for offers to sell services in the organized wholesale electric markets, and “minimum bid requirements” for bids to buy energy in these markets. When we are referring to a specific category of minimum size requirement, we will use that specific term.

ii. Current Rules

87. Under existing market rules, minimum capacity, minimum offer and minimum bid requirements for electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets vary across the RTOs/ISOs, with minimum size requirements ranging from 100 kW to 5 MW. PJM and SPP have minimum offer requirements of 100 kW for all resources, with other

RTO/ISO minimum size requirements varying across participation models and markets.

149

PJM Response at 10 (citing PJM Tariff, Att. DD, section 5.6); SPP Response at 5 (citing SPP Tariff, Att. AE section 1.1 (definition of “Offer”)).

88. CAISO states that the minimum capacity requirement for demand response resources is 100 kW and that all resources other than demand response have minimum capacity requirements of 500 kW. Resources can meet these minimum capacity requirements through aggregation.

150

Alternatively, ISO-NE minimum capacity requirements range from 100 kW for demand response resources, to 1 MW for Alternative Technology Regulation Resources, to 5 MW for generators seeking to provide demand response in the regulation market.

151

Under MISO tariff rules, minimum capacity requirements vary from 100 kW for Load Modifying Resources, to 1 MW for demand response resources, to 5 MW for generators.

152

MISO states that it has not determined a minimum size for Stored Energy Resources but believes a minimum of 1 MW is appropriate.

153

In NYISO, the minimum size requirement is 100 kW for demand response resources and 1 MW for Energy Limited Resources and Limited Energy Storage Resources.

154

150

CAISO Response at 10-11 (citing CAISO Tariff, App. K, Part A 1.1.1; Part B1.1; Part C1.1).

151

ISO-NE Response at 13-14 (citing ISO-NE Tariff, App. E2, section I-III).

152

MISO Response at 10.

153

Id.

at 16-17.

154

NYISO Response at 9.

89. The RTOs/ISOs also define minimum bid requirements for load resources to buy energy from the organized wholesale electric markets. In CAISO, the minimum bid requirement is 10 kW, the same as for traditional generators.

155

In MISO and SPP, the minimum bid requirements are 100 kW.

156

In ISO-NE, energy market bids cannot be smaller than 100 kW.

157

In NYISO, the minimum bid requirement is 1 MW, with the option to aggregate to meet that requirement.

158

Electric storage resources do not submit bids to buy energy in the PJM wholesale markets.

159

155

CAISO Response at 16.

156

MISO Response at 17; SPP Response at 8.

157

ISO-NE Response at 29.

158

NYISO Response at 15.

159

PJM Response at 22.

iii. Comments

90. Several commenters address the minimum size requirements to participate in the RTO/ISO markets, questioning whether the RTOs/ISOs based those standards on technological requirements and system needs. For example, NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium argues that the minimum size requirement for participation in organized wholesale electric markets should be lowered.

160

Public Interest Organizations claim that minimum size requirements for electric storage resources to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets may be a barrier to distributed electric storage resources, especially those that are small. Public Interest Organizations contend that, while the opportunity to offer distributed energy resource aggregations into the markets could help mitigate this concern, that opportunity is lacking or unclear in some RTOs/ISOs.

161

160

NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium Comments at 6.

161

Public Interest Organizations Comments at 5.

91. Several commenters specifically cite the variability in the minimum size requirements of the various RTO/ISO market participation models as a barrier to electric storage resource participation. Energy Storage Association contends that minimum size requirements for electric storage resources may prohibit storage participation and lead to inconsistencies across regions.

162

Advanced Energy Economy argues that it is not clear why the minimum size requirements for providing services should vary from RTO/ISO to RTO/ISO and that these market rule variations are a barrier to electric storage resource participation in the organized wholesale electric markets.

163

Public Interest Organizations assert that disparate requirements in the RTO/ISO reports indicate that some of these minimum limits may be arbitrary.

164

162

Energy Storage Association Comments at 29.

163

Advanced Energy Economy Comments at 10-11.

164

Public Interest Organizations Comments at 5.

92. Other commenters identify specific minimum size requirements in certain RTO/ISO markets as barriers to the participation of electric storage resources in those markets. Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance claims that MISO's 1 MW minimum size requirement for demand response resources is not appropriate due to the lower minimum size requirements in other RTOs/ISOs.

165

Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance further states that removing this requirement would allow electric storage resources to more readily participate, providing economic justification for project development and increasing MISO's operational flexibility. NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium asserts that NYISO's 1 MW size requirement limits behind-the-meter electric storage resources from participating in NYISO's day-ahead market, despite having the technical capability to perform.

166

165

Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance notes that size restrictions do not apply to the load-modifying resource classification, but such resources are only eligible to provide capacity for MISO-declared emergency events and cannot provide energy or ancillary services. Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance Comments at 3-4.

166

NY Battery and Energy Storage Consortium Comments at 5-6.

93. Solar City and Viridity ask the Commission to consider requiring all RTOs/ISOs to set a minimum requirement of 100 kW for electric storage resource participation in their markets.

167

Solar City argues that a 100 kW minimum size requirement will ensure that electric storage resources can provide value to markets at relatively modest levels of penetration and participate in organized wholesale energy markets even when locational requirements reduce the area over which resources can be aggregated.

168

167

SolarCity Comments at 9; Viridity Comments at 3.

168

SolarCity Comments at 9.

iv. Proposed Reforms

94. We propose that the minimum size requirement to participate in the organized wholesale electric markets under the proposed electric storage resource participation model must not exceed 100 kW. While we acknowledge that minimum size requirements may be necessary to ensure that the RTOs/ISOs can effectively model and dispatch the resources participating in their markets, large minimum size requirements create a barrier to the participation of smaller electric storage resources. We preliminarily conclude that requiring that the minimum size requirement not exceed 100 kW balances the benefits of increased competition with the ability of RTO/ISO market clearing software to effectively model and dispatch smaller resources often located on the distribution system. Thus, we propose to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariffs to include a participation model for electric storage resources that establishes a minimum size requirement for participation in the organized wholesale electric markets that does not exceed 100 kW. This would include any minimum capacity requirements, minimum offer requirements, and minimum bid requirements for resources participating in these markets under the electric storage resource participation model.

e. Energy Used To Charge Electric Storage Resources

i. Introduction

95. Electric storage resources must absorb electricity (

i.e.,

charge) to sell that electricity, net of losses, back to an RTO/ISO as energy or ancillary services. The manner in which an electric storage resource charges (consumes) energy and discharges (produces) energy will determine whether the electric storage resource is engaging in a sale for resale subject to our jurisdiction.

ii. Current Rules

96. For the most part, the RTOs/ISOs indicate that electric storage resources that are charging to later provide wholesale services in their markets already pay LMP for that electricity. CAISO states that all electric storage resources participating in its wholesale markets pay LMP for their charging energy.

169

ISO-NE states that electric storage resources purchasing energy directly from the wholesale market pay the LMP for the electricity they receive.

170

MISO states that any resources eligible to participate in MISO's capacity, energy, and ancillary service markets pay LMP for the electricity they receive.

171

NYISO states that Energy Limited Resources using electric storage resource technology and Limited Energy Storage Resources will pay the wholesale price for the electricity they consume to meet a regulation service schedule or to charge the resource if the resource is either in front-of-the-meter (a generator) or a direct NYISO customer (a load-serving entity). NYISO notes that, if the resource is behind-the-meter and served by a separate load-serving entity, then it would pay the load-serving entity's retail rate.

172

PJM states that an electric storage resource would pay wholesale LMP if the resource is taking power off the system solely to inject into the energy or ancillary service markets at a later time.

173

SPP states that, in its real-time market, electric storage resources pay the real-time LMP for their load consumption, although they may also be subject to retail rules for electric consumption.

174

169

CAISO Response at 17.

170

ISO-NE Response at 29-30.

171

MISO Response at 17.

172

NYISO Response at 16.

173

PJM Response at 23.

174

SPP Response at 7.

iii. Comments

97. Several commenters address the issue of the price that electric storage resources should pay for charging electricity when that electricity is for later use in the organized wholesale electric markets. For example, Alevo argues that it is not clear whether an electric storage resource connected at the distribution level will pay the LMP for its charging electricity, even if it is charging to provide a wholesale service.

175

Electric Vehicle R&D Group and NextEra contend that current RTO/ISO tariffs do not provide enough clarity on the price that storage pays for electricity,

176

and that the RTOs/ISOs should revise their tariffs to settle discharging and recharging resources at LMP.

177

Similarly, Tesla asks the Commission to clarify that electricity stored for resale is not a retail sale and thus should be settled at the wholesale LMP.

178

175

Alevo Comments at 29.

176

Electric Vehicle R&D Group Comments at 13.

177

NextEra Comments at 13.

178

Tesla Comments at 5-6.

98. In contrast, Manitoba Hydro asserts that dispatchable electric storage resources should either pay a lower LMP than non-dispatchable resources or should receive a storage capacity credit for their services because a MWh received by a storage resource for later injection is different than a MWh consumed by traditional load.

179

Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance similarly requests that dispatchable electric storage resources pay a lower LMP or be compensated for the service.

180

AES Companies contend that it is inappropriate for an electric storage resource to pay LMP when it is directed to charge and that such a payment is a disincentive to new storage installation.

181

179

Manitoba Hydro Comments at 10-12.

180

Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance Comments at 5.

181

AES Companies Comments at 23.

99. SoCal Edison argues that behind-the-meter electric storage resources should not be allowed to charge at a wholesale rate and discharge to serve a retail customer to allow the retail customer to avoid paying the retail rate for its consumption.

182

Addressing this concern, some commenters suggest that metering and accounting practices can be designed to delineate between wholesale and retail activities.

183

182

SoCal Edison Comments at 8.

183

Independent Energy Producers Association Comments, Att. at 7; Minnesota Energy Storage Alliance Comments at 5.

iv. Proposed Reforms

100. The Commission has found that the sale of energy from the grid that is used to charge electric storage resources for later resale into the energy or ancillary service markets constitutes a sale for resale.

184

As such, the just and reasonable rate for that wholesale sale of energy used to charge the electric storage resource is the RTO/ISO market's wholesale price for energy or LMP. We thus propose to require each RTO/ISO to revise its tariff to specify that the sale of energy from the organized wholesale electric markets to an electric storage resource that the resource then resells back to those markets must be at the wholesale LMP.

184

See Norton Energy Storage, L.L.C.,

95 FERC ¶ 61,476, at 62,701-02 (2001) (citations omitted) (“[T]he use of compressed air as a medium for the storage of energy in an energy storage facility is a new technology. However, we find that a compressed air energy storage facility is analogous to a pumped storage hydroelectric facility, in that compressed air is used in a conversion/storage cycle just as water is used in a pumped storage hydroelectric facility in the conversion/storage cycle. . . . [T]he Commission views the pumping energy not as being consumed, but rather as being converted and stored, as water in the upper reservoir, for later re-conversion . . . back to electric energy. It is this conversion/storage cycle that distinguishes energy storage facilities, whether pumped storage hydroelectric facilities or compressed air energy storage facilities, from facilities that consume electricity (in the form of station power or otherwise). The fact that pumping energy or compression energy is not consumed means that the provision of such energy is

not

a sale for end use that this Commission cannot regulate. Rather, based on Norton's representations in its petition, we find that deliveries of compression energy to the Norton energy storage facility as part of energy exchange transactions employing the conversion/storage cycle are wholesale transactions subject to our exclusive authority under the FPA.”).