Certification of Screening Companies

SUMMARY: This document proposes to require that all companies that

perform aviation security screening be certificated by the FAA and meet

enhanced requirements. This proposal is in response to a recommendation

by the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and Security and to a

Congressional mandate in the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of

1996. The proposal is intended to improve the screening of passengers,

accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo and to provide

standards for consistent high performance and increased screening

company accountability.

DATES: Comments must be received on or before April 4, 2000.

ADDRESSES: Comments on this document should be mailed or delivered, in

duplicate, to: U.S. Department of Transportation Dockets, Docket No.

FAA-1999-6673, 400 Seventh Street SW., Room Plaza 401, Washington, DC

20590. Comments may be filed and examined in Room Plaza 401 between 10

a.m. and 5 p.m. weekdays, except Federal holidays. Comments also may be

sent electronically to the Dockets Management System (DMS) at the

following Internet address: http://dms.dot.gov/ at any time. Commenters

who wish to file comments electronically should follow the instructions

on the DMS web site.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: Karl Shrum, Manager, Civil Aviation

Security Division, Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and

Planning (ACP-100), Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence

Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, telephone (202)267-3946.

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Comments Invited

Interested persons are invited to participate in the making of the

proposed action by submitting such written data, views, or arguments as

they may desire. Comments relating to the environmental, energy,

federalism, or economic impact that might result from adopting the

proposals in this document are also invited. Substantive comments

should be accompanied by cost estimates. Comments must identify the

regulatory docket or notice number and be submitted in duplicate to the

DOT Rules Docket address specified above.

All comments received, as well as a report summarizing each

substantive public contact with FAA personnel concerning this proposed

rulemaking, will be filed in the docket. The docket is available for

public inspection before and after the comment closing date. All

comments received on or before the closing date will be considered by

the Administrator before taking action on this proposed rulemaking.

Comments filed late will be considered as far as possible without

incurring expense or delay. The proposals in this document may be

changed in light of the comments received.

Comments received on this proposal will be available both before

and after the closing date for comments in the Rules Docket for

examination by interested persons. However, the Assistant Administrator

for Civil Aviation Security has determined that the security programs

required by parts 108, 109, and 129 contain sensitive security

information. As such, the availability of information pertaining to

these security programs is governed by 14 CFR part 191. Carriers,

screening companies, and others who wish to comment on this document

should be cautious not to include in their comments any information

contained in any security program.

Commenters wishing the FAA to acknowledge receipt of their comments

submitted in response to this document must include a pre-addressed,

stamped postcard with those comments on which the following statement

is made: ``Comments to Docket No. FAA-1999-6673.'' The postcard will be

date stamped and mailed to the commenter.

To give the public an additional opportunity to comment on the

NPRM, the FAA anticipates planning public meetings. If the FAA

determines that it is appropriate to hold such meetings, a separate

notice announcing the times, locations, and procedures for public

meetings will be published in the Federal Register.

Availability of NPRMs

An electronic copy of this document may be downloaded using a modem

and suitable communications software from the FAA regulations section

of the Fedworld electronic bulletin board service (telephone: (703)

321-3339) or the Government Printing Office (GPO)'s electronic bulletin

board service (telephone: (202) 512-1661).

Internet users may reach the FAA's web page at http://www.faa.gov/

avr/arm/nprm/nprm.htm, or the GPO's web page at http://

www.access.gpo.gov/nara for access to recently published rulemaking

documents.

Any person may obtain a copy of this document by submitting a

request to the Federal Aviation Administration, Office of Rulemaking,

ARM-1, 800 Independence Avenue, SW., Washington, DC 20591, or by

calling (202) 267-9680. Communications must identify the notice number

or docket number of this NPRM.

Persons interested in being placed on the mailing list for future

rulemaking documents should request from the above office a copy of

Advisory Circular No. 11-2A, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking Distribution

System, which describes the application procedure.

Outline of Preamble

I. Introduction

A. Current Requirements.

B. History.

C. Aviation Security Screening.

D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM).

E. Related Rulemakings.

II. The Proposal: Overview

A. Summary.

B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening.

C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies.

D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues.

E. New Part 111.

F. Screening of Cargo.

G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP).

H. Screener Qualifications.

I. Performance Measurements and Standards.

III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion

Subpart A--General

A. 111.1 Applicability.

B. 111.3 Definitions.

C. 111.5 Inspection authority.

D. 111.7 Falsification.

E. 111.9 Prohibition against interference with screening personnel.

Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications

F. 111.101 Performance of screening.

G. 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107 Security programs.

H. 111.109 Screening company certificate.

I. 111.111; 111.113; and 111.115 Operations specifications

J. 111.117 Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers, or

indirect air carriers.

K. 111.119 Business office.

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Subpart C--Operations

L. 111.201 Screening of persons and property and acceptance of

cargo.

M. 111.203 Use of screening equipment.

N. 111.205 Employment standards for screening personnel.

O. 111.207 Disclosure of sensitive security information.

P. 111.209 Screening company management.

Q. 111.211 Screening company instructor qualifications.

R. 111.213 Training and knowledge of persons with screening-related

duties.

S. 111.215 Training tests: requirements.

T. 111.217 Training tests: cheating and other unauthorized conduct.

U. 111.219 Screener letter of completion of training.

V. 111.221 Screener and supervisor training records.

W. 111.223 Automated performance measurement and standards.

IV. Proposed Revisions to Parts 108, 109, and 129

A. 108.201(h); 109.203(a); and 129.25(k) Certification requirement.

B. 108.5 and 109.5 Inspection authority.

C. 108.103(b); 109.103(b); and 129.25(c) Security program form,

content, and availability.

D. 109.105 and 129.25(e) Approvals and amendments of security

programs.

E. 108.201(i), (j), and (k); 109.203(b), (c), and (d); and

129.25(l), (m), and (n) Responsibilities of carriers and screening

companies.

F. 108.201(l) and 129.25(o) Public notification regarding

additional security measures.

G. 108.205; 109.207; and 129.26 Use of X-ray systems.

H. 108.207 and 129.28 Use of explosives detection systems.

I. 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p) Monitoring of screener training

tests.

J. Additional proposed requirements to parts 108, 109, and 129.

V. Proposed Revisions to Part 191

A. Protection of sensitive security information (SSI).

B. 191.1 Applicability and definitions.

C. 191.5 Records and information protected by others.

D. 191.7 Description of SSI.

VI. Paperwork Reduction Act

VII. Compatibility With ICAO Standards

VIII. Regulatory Analyses

A. Regulatory evaluation summary.

B. Initial regulatory flexibility determination.

C. International trade impact statement.

D. Unfunded mandates.

E. Federalism implications.

I. Introduction

I.A. Current Requirements

The Administrator is required to prescribe regulations to protect

passengers and property on aircraft operating in air transportation or

intrastate air transportation against acts of criminal violence or

aircraft piracy. Such protections include searches of persons and

property that will be carried aboard an aircraft to ensure that they

have no unlawful dangerous weapons, explosives, or other destructive

substances (49 U.S.C. 44901-44903). Screening of all passengers and

property that will be carried in a cabin of an aircraft in air

transportation or intrastate air transportation must be done before the

aircraft is boarded, using weapon-detecting facilities or procedures

used or operated by employees or agents of the air carriers, intrastate

air carriers, or foreign air carriers (49 U.S.C. 44901).

Part 108 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules

in Secs. 108.9, 108.17, and 108.20 for air carrier screening

operations. These rules, which are available to the general public,

provide basic standards for the screeners, equipment, and procedures to

be used. In addition, each air carrier required to conduct screening

has a nonpublic security program (required under current Secs. 108.5

and 108.7) that contains detailed requirements for screening of

persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo. All air

carriers subject to part 108 have adopted the Air Carrier Standard

Security Program (ACSSP). The ACSSP provides identical measures for air

carriers. Individual air carriers may request alternate procedures in

specific situations if the required level of security can be

maintained.

Part 109 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations (14 CFR),

contains rules in Sec. 109.3 for conducting security procedures by

indirect air carriers. An indirect air carrier is any person or entity

within the United States, not in possession of an FAA air carrier

operating certificate, that undertakes to engage indirectly in the air

transportation of property, and uses, for all or any part of such

transportation, the services of a passenger air carrier. This does not

include the U.S. Postal Service (USPS) or its representative while

acting on behalf of the USPS. This definition does include freight

forwarders and air couriers. Each indirect air carrier has a nonpublic

security program (Sec. 109.5) that contains detailed requirements for

screening cargo. All indirect air carriers adopt the Indirect Air

Carrier Standard Security Program (IACSSP). The IACSSP provides

identical measures for indirect air carriers. IACSSP requirements are

essentially the same as the requirements in the ACSSP for screening

cargo.

Part 129 of Title 14, Code of Federal Regulations, contains rules

in Secs. 129.25, 129.26, and 129.27 for foreign air carrier screening.

Each foreign air carrier conducting screening has a nonpublic security

program (Sec. 129.25) that contains detailed requirements for screening

persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo. All foreign

air carriers conducting operations in the United States are subject to

part 129 and have adopted the Model Security Program (MSP) for their

security programs in the United States. The MSP provides identical

measures for foreign air carriers. MSP requirements applicable within

the United States are essentially the same as the requirements in the

ACSSP.

Throughout this notice, air carriers, indirect air carriers, and

foreign air carriers are collectively referred to as ``carriers.''

There are several means by which a carrier can conduct screening.

It can use its own employees. It can contract with another company to

conduct the screening in accordance with the carrier's security

program. It can contract with another carrier to conduct screening. In

each case, the carrier is required to provide oversight to ensure that

all FAA requirements are met.

I.B. History

Since 1985, at least 10 major international terrorist incidents

involving aviation have occurred worldwide, including the bombing of

Pan Am flight 103 on December 21, 1988, which killed 243 passengers, 16

crewmembers, and 11 people on the ground. While all of the attacks

against U.S. civil aviation in this period have taken place abroad, the

link between the February 1993 World Trade Center bombing and the

January 1995 plot to bomb several U.S. airliners in the Far East

suggests that civil aviation in the United States may have become a

more attractive target for terrorist attacks. Ramzi Ahmed Yousef was

convicted (along with different sets of co-conspirators) for his roles

in both plots as well as for the bombing of Philippine Airlines flight

434 in December 1994. Had Yousef's plot to bomb U.S. airliners

succeeded, hundreds if not thousands of passengers would almost

certainly have been killed.

These incidents have demonstrated the capabilities and intentions

of international terrorists to attack the United States and its

citizens as well as the ability of such terrorists to operate in the

United States. The threat posed by foreign terrorists in the United

States remains a serious concern, and the FAA believes that the threat

will continue for the foreseeable future.

The threat of terrorist acts against aircraft has led to several

actions by the United States Government to strengthen

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aviation security. These actions include two Presidential commissions,

the Aviation Security Improvement Act of 1990, the Federal Aviation

Reauthorization Act of 1996, and several FAA rulemakings to improve

security measures at airports. The action proposed in this notice

therefore is part of a broad, continuing effort to increase aviation

security.

Following the tragic crash of TWA flight 800 on July 17, 1996, the

President created the White House Commission on Aviation Safety and

Security (the White House Commission). The White House Commission

issued an initial report on September 9, 1996, with 20 specific

recommendations for improving security. One recommendation was for the

development of uniform performance standards for the selection,

training, certification, and recertification of screening companies and

their employees. The final report, issued on February 12, 1997,

reiterated this recommendation.

Before the crash of TWA flight 800, the FAA had become concerned as

well that there was a need to reevaluate the overall level of civil

aviation security. The FAA asked the Aviation Security Advisory

Committee (ASAC) to review the threat assessment of foreign terrorism

within the United States, consider the warning and interdiction

capabilities of intelligence and law enforcement, examine the

vulnerabilities of the domestic civil aviation system, and consider the

potential consequences of a successful attack. The ASAC, which consists

of representatives from the FAA and other Federal agencies, the

aviation industry, and public interest groups, formed a subgroup called

the Baseline Working Group (BWG) on July 17, 1996, to evaluate the

domestic aviation security ``baseline'' in light of the new threat

environment. The BWG released its Domestic Security Baseline Final

Report on December 12, 1996. The report presented multiple

recommendations for improving aviation security through certifications

of screeners and screening companies, rapid deployments of available

technologies, and institutional and procedural changes in the U.S.

aviation security system.

On October 9, 1996, the President signed the Federal Aviation

Reauthorization Act of 1996, Public Law 104-264. Section 302 (49 U.S.C.

44935 note) states:

The Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration is

directed to certify companies providing security screening and to

improve the training and testing of security screeners through

development of uniform performance standards for providing security

screening services.

I.C. Aviation Security Screening

Effective aviation security screening is critical to protecting

passengers in air transportation against acts of criminal violence and

aircraft piracy. It is the front line of defense against potential acts

of aviation terrorism. It is therefore imperative that airports,

carriers, screening companies, and the FAA work together to strengthen

continually the aviation security screening system.

The FAA first required domestic passenger screening in 1973 in

response to increasing numbers of hijackings. The focus at that time

was to detect weapons, such as handguns and knives, through the use of

X-ray and metal detector technologies at security checkpoints. The

introduction of screening greatly reduced hijackings in the United

States. Since then, the greater challenge to security has been the

prevention of aircraft bombings, a challenge that became particularly

urgent in the 1980's as various terrorist elements succeeded in

bringing down aircraft and causing mass casualties by means of on-board

bombs. Some of the bombs used against aircraft have been crude devices,

easily detectable by screeners utilizing X-ray machines, but the trend

has been toward smaller improvised explosive devices (IED's) and

plastic explosives that are more difficult to detect without explosives

detection systems (EDS). The threat of IED's has also expanded the

initial scope of screening from passengers and carry-on baggage only to

include checked baggage and cargo.

The FAA has conducted extensive research regarding how the United

States can best counter these evolving threats. The research has

centered around both technologies and human factors issues; each is

important to thorough, effective screening and poses unique challenges.

The traditional X-ray and metal detector technologies have been

supplemented since the mid-1990's with several new advanced screening

technologies. An advanced screening technology, as that term is used

here, is any technology that is capable of automatic threat

identification. These advanced screening technologies include

explosives detection systems, explosive trace detectors (ETD), and

advanced technology (AT) X-ray-based machines for automatic bulk

explosives detection, some of which employ screener assist

technologies. At this time EDS-type technologies certified by the FAA

apply medical computed axial tomography (CAT) scan technology, but

other types of technologies also may meet EDS criteria in the future.

The EDS are used to screen checked baggage and have the ability to

automatically detect threat types and quantities of bulk explosives at

FAA-specified detection and false alarm rates, up to the initial system

alarm and without human intervention. The AT systems also focus on

detecting bulk explosives in checked baggage and have automatic alarm

capabilities; however, AT systems do not meet the full EDS standards

required by the FAA for all categories of explosives, amounts,

detection rates, and false alarm rates. The AT's still have more

sophisticated detection capabilities than the standard X-ray systems

used for imaging only. The ETD's also detect explosives, but differ in

that they are used to analyze and detect minute amounts of explosive

residues or vapors, are much smaller in size and less costly than the

EDS's and AT's, and are primarily used at screening checkpoints to

screen items entering sterile areas.

The FAA currently is deploying several types of advanced screening

technologies in the Nation's airports. Each advanced screening

technology is capable of detecting specific items. The FAA believes

that the most effective approach to screening at this time is to use a

combination of these technologies at screening locations.

Some of the technologies being developed focus on the human element

of screening. The FAA currently is developing and deploying computer

based training (CBT) and threat image projection (TIP) systems that

provide initial and recurrent training and monitor screener

performance. The potential benefits of CBT are self-paced learning,

enhanced opportunities for realistic practice, combined training and

performance testing, and instruction that is uniform throughout the

country. CBT currently is being used to train screeners in many of the

Nation's busiest airports, and the FAA is evaluating its effectiveness

at these locations. The FAA anticipates making CBT available for use by

all of the carriers but does not anticipate requiring its use at this

time. Some private companies also are developing CBT systems that may

earn FAA acceptance and the FAA encourages this development.

TIP also has significant potential benefits and is a critical

component of this proposed rule. TIP systems currently are being

deployed and tested on both X-ray and explosives detection systems. The

TIP systems use two different methods of projection--fictional threat

image (FTI) and

[[Page 563]]

combined technology image (CTI). FTI superimposes a threat image from

an extensive library of images onto the X-ray image of actual passenger

baggage being screened. The image appears on the monitor as if a threat

object actually exists within the passenger's bag. The screener can

check whether the image is an actual threat image before requesting

that the bag be screened further. The CTI is a prefabricated image of

an entire threat bag and also can be electronically inserted onto a

display monitor. For both types of images, screeners are immediately

provided with feedback on their ability to detect each threat. TIP

exposes screeners to threats on a regular basis to train them to become

more adept at detecting threats and to enhance their vigilance. TIP

allows the FAA to expose screeners to the latest potential threats and

should allow the FAA and the industry to determine what elements make a

screener more effective, such as training methods and experience

levels. Future TIP data may affect requirements proposed in the

security programs.

The FAA also is validating a series of screener selection tests to

help screening companies identify applicants who may have natural

aptitudes to be effective screeners. Currently, the cognitive skills

and processes for optimal detection of threat objects are poorly

understood. The FAA sees an immediate need to identify valid tests to

select job applicants who should be able to become successful

screeners. The FAA currently is administering several screener

selection tests to groups of screener trainees as part of their CBT and

then measuring their subsequent job performance using TIP. If valid

selection tests are developed, the FAA may offer them to carriers and

screening companies for optional use but does not anticipate requiring

their use at this time.

The FAA will continue its human factors research. Although the new

technologies described are highly effective in detecting explosives,

the FAA realizes that each one is ultimately dependent on the human

operator. Screeners are critical to the screening process. Future human

factors research will focus on the attributes, skills, and abilities

that make for an effective screener. Such elements may include an

individual's cognitive ability, learned skills, education level,

quality and amount of training, and experience (i.e., time on the job).

Screener pay levels and the quality of supervision may also affect

screener performance (i.e., threat detection rates). Analyzing TIP data

will help the FAA to explore and confirm or refute many hypotheses

regarding the factors that affect screener performance.

What is known currently is that each type of screening and

screening technology is unique and requires different skills and

abilities. For example, monitoring a walk-through metal detector

requires a limited understanding of the technology involved and does

not involve image interpretations. Conversely, operating an EDS is much

more complex and requires operators to exercise independent judgment as

they interpret and make decisions regarding images that are all

distinctly different. The screening tasks described in these examples

require different types of skills and abilities and require training

designed to optimize performance for those particular tasks. The FAA's

human factors research will attempt to isolate these skills and

abilities and determine how they can best be recognized and developed.

With regard to compensation, wages for screeners in the United States

currently average $5.75 per hour and some screeners do not receive

fringe benefits. Average annual screener turnover rates exceed 100

percent in many locations. Screeners repeatedly state that low wages

and minimal benefits, along with infrequent supervisor feedback and

frustrating working conditions, cause them to seek employment

elsewhere.

Experience in other countries seems to indicate that higher

compensation, more training, and frequent testing of their screeners

may result in lower turnover rates and more effective screener

performance. The FAA has reports from many sources that screening,

particularly screening of checked baggage, is conducted more

effectively in many other countries than it is in the United States.

U.S. citizens traveling abroad also have expressed concern that

screening in the United States appears to be less thorough than it is

in other countries. While the FAA until recently did not have actual

performance data from other countries to substantiate these views, it

now has test results that are strongly indicative of better screener

performance by some European authorities than by some U.S. screening

operators. The test results were derived from joint testing of

screeners that the FAA conducted with a European country. FAA special

agents and government personnel from the European country tested

screeners in each country using the same methods. On average, screeners

in the European country were able to detect more than twice as many

test objects as screeners in the United States. Screeners in the

European country receive significantly more training and higher

salaries than screeners in the United States and receive comprehensive

benefits. Screeners in the European country also have more screening

experience on average than their United States counterparts. U.S. air

carriers and screening companies may want to pursue any and all of

these factors to achieve higher performance. The FAA will continue to

conduct research and examine operational data to determine how these

factors affect screener performance and retention, both domestically

and in conjunction with foreign governments.

It is clear that the United States can improve upon practices in

many of these human factors areas making its aviation screening

operations as strong and effective as its other aviation operations and

endeavors. Several issues related to human factors in screening, such

as performance and the environment in which screeners work, are

addressed in this NPRM. The FAA invites comments and supporting data

regarding human factors issues such as the potential affects of

increased wages, benefits, experience, and training on screener

performance.

I.D. The Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPRM)

In response to the Congressional mandate and to the White House

Commission report, the FAA published an ANPRM on March 17, 1997 (62 FR

12724), requesting comments on certification of companies providing

security screening. The FAA received 20 comments from the public on the

ANPRM, all of which were substantive.

Subsequent to the publication of the ANPRM, the FAA began field

testing threat image projection systems and evaluating their potential

for measuring screener performance. The FAA determined that the TIP

systems would be integral to proposing requirements for performance

measurements and standards. Therefore, the FAA published an ANPRM

withdrawal notice on May 13, 1998 (63 FR 26706), to allow TIP to be

adequately field tested and validated before the FAA proceeded with the

rulemaking. Although the ANPRM was withdrawn, the FAA considered and

incorporated many of the commenters' suggestions in this proposal. The

following is a brief summary of the overall comments.

While commenters disagreed on several issues, including the level

of oversight responsibility that air carriers should have over

certificated screening companies, commenters generally agreed that

national standards for security screening operations are

[[Page 564]]

needed. Approximately one-third of the commenters stated that

certificating individual screeners would have a greater impact on

improving security than certificating screening companies. Most of

these commenters also stated that certificating individual screeners

would improve screener professionalism and performance.

Approximately half of the commenters agreed that air carriers

conducting screening operations should be subject to the same standards

as certificated screening companies. A majority of commenters stated

that the same screening operation requirements that apply to U.S.

carriers should apply to foreign carriers providing services in this

country. Several commenters disagreed with any proposal by the FAA to

regulate joint-use checkpoints and checkpoint operational

configurations. More detailed discussions of the issues raised by

commenters are provided throughout the proposed rule section of this

preamble.

I.E. Related Rulemakings

On August 1, 1997, the FAA published two NPRM's. Notice No. 97-12

(62 FR 41730) proposes to revise 14 CFR part 108 to update the overall

regulatory structure for air carrier security. Notice No. 97-13 (62 FR

41760) proposes to revise 14 CFR part 107 to update the overall

regulatory structure for airport security. Notice No. 97-12 and notice

No. 97-13 are the result of several years of work by the FAA, airports

and air carriers, and the Aviation Security Advisory Committee (ASAC),

a committee formed under the Federal Advisory Committee Act (5 U.S.C.,

appendix II) in April 1989 by the Secretary of Transportation.

This document proposes to amend the proposed rule language of part

108 in Notice No. 97-12 rather than the current part 108. The numbering

system for part 108 of this NPRM is based on the numbering system for

Notice No. 97-12. The numbering systems for proposed part 111 and

revised part 109 are also closely aligned with the Notice No. 97-12

numbering system for clarity and consistency.

II. The Proposal: Overview

This document has two objectives: to propose procedures for

certification of screening companies; and to propose other requirements

to improve screening, such as performance measurements and new training

and FAA testing requirements for screeners. The FAA believes that this

proposal would improve performance, improve the consistency and quality

of screening, and meet the congressional mandate stated in the Federal

Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996 and the intent of the White House

Commission recommendations.

This overview contains a summary of the basic framework of the

proposed rule for certification of screening companies. It also

contains more detailed discussions of some of the approaches to

regulating screening that are implemented in the proposals and the

FAA's reasons for using these approaches.

II.A. Summary

The major proposals contained in part 111 and the changes and

additions proposed to parts 108, 109, and 129 are as follows:

(1) The proposed rule would require certification of all screening

companies that inspect persons or property for the presence of any

unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon in

the United States on behalf of air carriers, indirect air carriers, or

foreign air carriers required to adopt and carry out FAA-approved

security programs (proposed Secs. 111.1 and 111.109(a)).

(2) The certification requirement would include all persons

conducting screening within the United States under parts 108, 109, and

129. An air carrier, indirect air carrier, or foreign air carrier that

performs screening for itself or for other carriers would have to

obtain a screening company certificate (proposed Secs. 108.201(h),

109.203(a), and 129.25(k)).

(3) The proposed rule would provide for provisional certificates

for new screening companies and screening companies already performing

screening at the time of publication of the final rule. Before the end

of the provisional period, screening companies would apply for

screening company certificates, that would be valid for 5 years

(proposed Sec. 111.109(d) and (e)).

(4) Responsibility for the performance of a screening company would

be borne by the screening company and the relevant air carrier(s),

indirect air carrier(s), or foreign air carrier(s). Carrier oversight

would be required (proposed Secs. 111.117; 108.103(b); 108.201(i) and

(j); 109.103(b); 109.203(b) and (c); and 129.25(c), (l), and (m)).

(5) The proposed rule would require approvals of operations

specifications that would include locations of screening sites; types

of screening; equipment and methods used to screen; and screener

training curricula (proposed Secs. 111.113 and 111.115).

(6) The proposed rule would require that screening companies adopt

and implement FAA-approved screening company security programs that

would include procedures to perform screening functions, including

operating equipment; screener testing standards and test administration

requirements; threat image projection standards, operating

requirements, and data collection methods; and performance standards

(proposed Secs. 111.103, 111.105, and 111.107).

(7) The proposed rule would set forth requirements for screening

companies regarding the screening of persons and property and the use

of screening equipment (proposed Secs. 111.201 and 111.203).

(8) The proposed rule would add requirements for the use of X-ray

systems to part 109 and for the use of explosives detection systems to

part 129 (proposed Secs. 109.207 and 129.28).

(9) The proposed rule would provide consolidated employment

standards for all screening company personnel, including new training

requirements for screeners regarding courteous and efficient screening

and U.S. civil rights laws and for supervisors regarding leadership and

management subjects (proposed Sec. 111.205).

(10) The proposed rule would require that screening companies have

qualified management and technical personnel (proposed Sec. 111.209).

(11) The proposed rule would require that screening instructors

meet minimum experience and training standards (proposed Sec. 111.211).

(12) The proposed rule would specify training requirements for

screening companies regarding training programs and knowledge of

subject areas and would require that the training programs be submitted

to the FAA for approval (proposed Sec. 111.213).

(13) The proposed rule would require that all screening personnel

pass computerized FAA knowledge-based and X-ray interpretation tests

before and after their on-the-job training and at the conclusion of

their recurrent training and that the tests be monitored by carrier

personnel in accordance with the carriers' security programs. The

proposed rule would also describe and prohibit specific instances of

cheating and other unauthorized conduct (proposed Secs. 111.215,

111.217, 108.229, 109.205, and 129.25(p)).

(14) The proposed rule would require that all carriers install

threat image projection (TIP) systems on their X-ray systems and that

all air carriers and foreign air carriers install TIP systems on their

explosives detection systems unless otherwise authorized by the

Administrator. Screening companies would be required to use the TIP

systems as specified in their security

[[Page 565]]

programs, including collecting and analyzing the TIP data, and to meet

the performance measurements and standards set forth in their security

programs (proposed Secs. 108.205 and 108.207; 129.26 and 129.28;

109.207; and 111.223).

(15) The proposed rule would prohibit interference with screening

personnel in the course of their screening duties (proposed

Sec. 111.9).

In addition to the above proposed changes, the proposal would amend

part 191 to extend SSI requirements to certificated screening companies

and their employees.

The FAA is not proposing to require certifications for individual

screeners, as some commenters to the ANPRM recommended. The FAA does

not have the statutory authority under Title 49 or the Federal Aviation

Reauthorization Act of 1996 to require such certification. Other

requirements in this proposal would help to improve the professionalism

of screeners; e.g., by providing for mobility of screener records

(proposed Sec. 111.221) and by requiring letters of completion to be

issued to screeners and screener supervisors upon their successful

completion of initial, recurrent, and specialized courses of training

(proposed Sec. 111.219).

The FAA has also decided not to specifically address joint-use

screening locations in this rulemaking, although comments were invited

with respect to this issue in the ANPRM. A joint-use screening location

is a security location that is screening for multiple carriers. The FAA

received several comments to the ANPRM that stated that an agreement

should be required for all air carriers to sign with the managing air

carrier of a screening location. However, other commenters stated that

the concept of joint-use screening locations is an internal management

tool of the air carriers that allows flexibility. These commenters

believe that it is not appropriate for the FAA to place undue

restraints on the management process for joint-use screening locations.

After considering the ANPRM comments and reviewing representative

samples of joint-use screening location agreements, the FAA has

determined that rulemaking is not the best way to address these issues.

They would be better addressed in future security program amendments

and/or compliance and enforcement policies.

II.B. Certification of All Who Perform Screening

This proposal would require that all companies that perform

screening be certificated under part 111, even if they are air

carriers, foreign air carriers, or indirect air carriers. This approach

is consistent with several comments to the ANPRM that stated that air

carriers conducting screening should be subject to the same standards

as certificated screening companies.

Certifying all screening companies, including carriers that perform

screening, would:

Provide uniform standards for all companies that intend to

provide screening.

Ensure that all companies that conduct screening benefit

from the enhanced requirements imposed upon screening companies in part

111.

Clearly differentiate between the roles of the air

carriers, indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers as carriers

and as certificated screening companies.

Clarify the relationships among air carriers, indirect air

carriers, and foreign air carriers that contract with each other for

screening services.

Some commenters to the ANPRM questioned the need to certificate air

carriers for the purpose of screening since they are already

certificated by the FAA. Air carriers currently are certificated to

operate as air carriers under part 119. However, the certification

process in part 119 does not include an evaluation of whether an

applicant can adequately perform screening functions. The FAA has

determined that to fulfill the congressional mandate, all who perform

screening shall establish their ability to do so by qualifying for

screening company certificates. Any air carrier, indirect air carrier,

or foreign air carrier that does not choose to hold a screening company

certificate could contract with a certificated screening company to

perform its screening.

II.C. Roles of Carriers and Screening Companies

Currently, carriers have statutory and regulatory responsibilities

to conduct screening properly. The FAA cannot propose to relieve

carriers of these responsibilities. The responsibility of air carriers

and foreign air carriers to ensure that screening is conducted on

persons and property to be carried in the cabin of an aircraft is in

the statute (49 U.S.C. 44901(a)) and cannot be changed by the FAA. As

discussed previously, the requirement to certificate screening

companies also is in the statute. Issues arise, then, concerning the

relationships between the carriers and the screening companies and the

proper roles for each. The FAA interprets these statutory provisions as

leaving the ultimate responsibility for screening with the carriers and

providing for concurrent carrier and screening company responsibilities

for some tasks. This relationship is not unlike that between repair

stations and air carriers. Repair stations are certificated under part

145 and are responsible for performing maintenance in accordance with

regulations; however, the air carriers remain ultimately responsible

for the airworthiness of their aircraft. The FAA recognizes that this

relationship may be difficult to define, but proposes the following

general guidance.

The FAA envisions that the carriers would continue to be

responsible for providing proper screening equipment, such as X-ray

machines and metal detectors. The carriers would also have primary

responsibility to deal with the airport operators on issues regarding

the locations of screening equipment in the airports. Finally, and

perhaps most importantly, the carriers would be responsible for

overseeing the performance of the screening companies to ensure that

they carry out their duties.

The screening companies would be responsible for inspecting persons

and property for unauthorized explosives, incendiaries, and deadly or

dangerous weapons. They would be responsible for ensuring that they use

the equipment properly, staff the screening locations adequately, train

their screeners properly, and otherwise manage the screening locations

so as to enable them to meet the standards for screening in their

security programs.

II.D. Compliance and Enforcement Issues

As discussed previously, this proposed rule would not shift the

responsibility for screening from air carriers, indirect air carriers,

and foreign air carriers to screening companies. Rather, certificating

screening companies is a way to assist carriers in ensuring that those

who conduct screening are fully qualified to do so. Certification also

would make screening companies directly accountable to the FAA for

failures to carry out their screening duties. This rule would increase

the level of responsibility required of screening companies while

improving screening oversight by air carriers, indirect air carriers,

and foreign air carriers.

The FAA envisions that screening companies would be primarily

responsible for the day-to-day operation of the screening locations.

Screening companies generally would be held accountable for screening

location failures. The FAA intends to look to screening companies to

maintain the

[[Page 566]]

highest standards and to continuously monitor and improve their

capabilities.

The full range of actions would be available for use against

screening companies that failed to comply with the regulations, their

operations specifications, and their security program. These include

counseling, administrative action (warning notices and letters of

correction), civil penalties, and certificate actions (suspension or

revocation of a certificate). In addition, if the screening company was

unable to carry out its duties at a specific screening location, the

FAA could amend its operations specifications (see Sec. 111.111) to

withdraw its authority to screen at that location.

If a company was removed from a location because of its failure to

screen properly, the FAA would continue to monitor closely that

location as another company came in to conduct screening. The FAA is

concerned about situations in which incoming companies use the same

equipment and hire the same employees from the unsatisfactory companies

and make no real changes in the quality of screening. The FAA would

consider requiring incoming companies to take additional corrective

measures to ensure that the problems that affected the performance of

the previous companies do not recur.

Carriers would continue to be responsible for the overall proper

screening of persons and property. They would be directly accountable

for failing to carry out duties specifically assigned to them, such as

providing the proper screening equipment and carrying out specific

oversight functions (such as Ground Security Coordinator duties and

auditing functions). In addition, when a screening company failed to

screen properly or otherwise failed to carry out its duties, the FAA

would carefully evaluate all facts and circumstances to determine

whether the carrier should be the subject of enforcement action. In

general, repeated or systemic failures of a screening company to comply

with the regulations or fundamental failures of the screeners to comply

with security requirements might lead to the conclusion that the

carrier has failed to conduct screening properly or to oversee the

screening company's operations, even if the carrier had conducted the

required audits and did not discover problems. The audits would be one

tool for the carrier to use but would not limit its responsibility to

ensure proper screening. Carriers would be expected to identify

problems with the screening company and take corrective action in a

timely manner.

If the FAA determines that a screening company is performing

poorly, whether at a particular location or in its overall operations,

the FAA could require the screening company and/or the responsible air

carriers to implement additional security measures under this proposal

to maintain system performance. Such additional measures would vary

depending on the circumstances and might involve, for example,

additional training for screeners, redundant screening of property, or

increased management oversight. The measures could slow screening

operations at affected locations but would help ensure that thorough,

effective screening was being performed. If the additional measures

proved ineffective or if the circumstances were extreme, amendments of

the screening companies' operations specifications or suspensions or

revocations of certificates could result.

The proposal would require that each air carrier or foreign air

carrier required by the FAA to implement additional security measures

to maintain system performance notify the public of the increased

measures by posting signs at affected screening locations (see section

IV.F.). The signs would be required to state that the additional

security measures being implemented by the air carriers could slow

screening operations at those locations, but that the measures are

necessary to ensure the safety and security of flights. The proposal is

intended to ensure that the traveling public is informed and to

increase screening company and air carrier accountability for their

operations. The specific language and specifications to be required for

the signs would be included in the security programs.

II.E. New Part 111

The FAA proposes to create a new part 111, which would contain all

the requirements for screening companies. Part 111 would require

certification of all screening companies that perform screening for air

carriers under part 108, indirect air carriers under part 109, and

foreign air carriers under part 129.

The proposal would affect only the screening that is done by

inspecting persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized

explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under

parts 108, 109, and 129. These inspections currently are performed by a

variety of methods such as manual searches, metal detectors, X-ray

machines, explosives detection systems, explosives trace detection

systems, and advanced technology devices. The proposal would also amend

certain requirements in parts 108, 109, and 129 to accommodate the

proposed new part 111.

Forms of screening other than inspection, such as determining that

a person is a law enforcement officer with authority to carry a weapon

on board aircraft, would not be covered in part 111. These other forms

of screening would not have to be done by a certificated screening

company. These types of screening would continue to be the

responsibility of the carriers. They could be performed, as they are

now, by such methods as ticket agents checking the documentation of law

enforcement officers flying armed, local law enforcement officers at

the checkpoint checking the credentials of law enforcement officers

entering the sterile area, or checkpoint security supervisors checking

the law enforcement officer's credentials. The checkpoint security

supervisors checking these credentials would be doing so as

representatives of the carriers, rather than as part of their duties

for the certificated screening companies.

II.F. Screening of Cargo

Certain cargo carried on passenger air carriers must be screened.

The FAA considered whether this screening should be done only by

certificated screening companies and has decided to propose that it

should be. If unauthorized explosives or incendiaries are introduced

aboard passenger aircraft in cargo, it would be just as devastating as

if introduced in checked or carry-on baggage or on passengers. The FAA

believes that cargo also must be subjected to rigorous screening

controls to avoid such a result.

Accordingly, the FAA proposes that inspections of cargo for

unauthorized explosives and incendiaries be done only by certificated

screening companies, similar to the proposal for persons, accessible

property, and checked baggage. Under this proposal, air carriers and

foreign air carriers carrying passengers would be required to ensure

that cargo screening is conducted by certificated screening companies.

Indirect air carriers that elect to perform required screening (instead

of referring their cargo to air carriers or foreign air carriers for

required screening) also would be required to hold screening company

certificates or contract with certificated screening companies to

perform the screening. The FAA believes that a comprehensive approach

to certificating all screening companies, including companies that

screen cargo, is vital to having a safe, secure, and effective aviation

security system. The FAA requests public comments on the issues

[[Page 567]]

relating to certificating indirect air carriers in this NPRM.

II.G. Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP)

In addition to the regulatory requirements, the proposed rule would

establish a separate security program for screening companies that

would accompany the requirements in proposed part 111. The Screening

Standard Security Program (SSSP) would contain detailed and sensitive

requirements relating to screening that currently are contained in the

carrier security programs, as well as additional requirements related

to proposals in part 111. The carriers as well as the screening

companies would be required to ensure that their screening companies'

security programs are carried out.

The FAA considered proposing that screening companies be required

to comply with the standardized security programs for air carriers,

foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. Requiring screening

companies to comply with the ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP would emphasize

that the carriers are primarily responsible for ensuring that screening

is properly carried out. It would also prevent having to relocate the

screening-related language from the carrier security programs to the

screening standard security program. However, the FAA recognizes that

this system could result in confusion in some cases where screening

companies might have to observe portions of three different security

programs--the ACSSP, the MSP, and the IACSSP. Having a separate

security program for screening companies would also more clearly

delineate the responsibilities of screening companies and those of the

carriers, which would continue to be responsible for proper screening.

Both part 111 and the Screening Standard Security Program would state

that the requirements also are applicable to carriers that conduct

screening.

The FAA requests comments on consolidating all screening-related

program requirements into one screening standard security program. The

FAA has prepared a draft SSSP proposal to accompany the release of this

NPRM. Commenters with a need to know, as specified in 14 CFR part 191,

may request copies of the draft proposed SSSP from the Office of Civil

Aviation Security Policy and Planning as listed in the section titled

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT.

II.H. Screener Qualifications

As discussed in section I.C., it is critical that screeners be

highly qualified in order to counter the increasing sophistication of

the threats. This proposal contains a number of provisions to promote

improved qualifications of screeners. Most notable are the proposed

requirements to include FAA testing standards for screening personnel,

test administration requirements for carriers, and additional

monitoring of screener performance made possible by TIP as discussed in

section II.I.

Under this proposal, screeners would be required to pass knowledge-

based and X-ray interpretation tests developed by the FAA before

beginning on-the-job training. This would help to ensure that all

screeners have uniform understanding of their tasks and a consistent

high level of achievement. The FAA would provide the tests by amending

the screening companies' security programs through notice and comment

procedures and would expect the screening companies to train their

personnel to pass those tests. Screening companies would have

flexibility in designing their training programs and would submit them

to the FAA for approval. The FAA is not proposing that training

programs be designed in a specific manner, only that they thoroughly

and effectively address all of the testing standard subjects. The

proposal also would require that the carriers administer and monitor

the tests to promote carrier involvement in the training process and to

establish closer accountability for the administration of the training

tests.

II.I. Performance Measurements and Standards

For the FAA, carriers, and screening companies to monitor the

performance of screening companies and to track their level of

performance, a consistent means of regularly measuring performance is

needed. The FAA, carriers, and screening companies need to be able to

monitor how well screeners are detecting threat objects and must be

able to determine whether performance is decreasing and whether

corrective measures are needed. The FAA, carriers, and screening

companies need to be able to measure performance of a screening

location to determine what factors lead to better or worse detection

and what corrective measures are effective.

Factors that may lead to better or worse detection include the

amount of passenger traffic, the type of training that the screeners

receive, how often screener functions are rotated, and the conditions

under which screeners are working. The FAA, carriers, and screening

companies also need to determine which types of threat objects the

screeners can readily detect and which types they have difficulty

detecting. All of these factors can be analyzed along with other

elements that may affect screening ability, such as education level,

screening experience, and screener compensation levels. The analyses

would be used by the FAA to work more effectively with screening

companies and carriers to improve screening continuously. Further, it

appears that regular testing of screeners promotes vigilance. Frequent

testing can increase screeners' ability to recognize threats that they

rarely, if ever, encounter in reality but must be ready to detect

should the unlikely event occur.

In order to monitor screening performance and to examine the

effects of all of these factors, the means of measuring performance

must be consistent, reliable, cost effective, and frequent. The two

options for conducting testing are anonymous testing by individuals and

computer testing. The FAA and the carriers now rely on testing

conducted by individuals. Carriers currently are required to test each

screener periodically, as set forth in their security programs.

The FAA uses FAA employees to submit for screening items of baggage

that contain test objects that will appear on the X-ray screens to be

weapons or explosives. There are a number of limitations involved with

this method, however. For instance, the FAA tests cannot be conducted

frequently at many screening locations due to the large number of

airports in the United States and their diverse locations. The FAA must

arrange for different employees to travel to airports and have them

change their appearance after each test to prevent the screeners from

recognizing them as FAA testers. It is therefore very difficult,

costly, and labor-intensive to obtain a large number of tests that

accurately measure screeners' success rates and that provide a

continuous measure of the success of screening locations, either

overall or under specific conditions. Further, when screening personnel

realize that the FAA is conducting tests, they sometimes alert other

nearby screening locations to expect testing, which can skew the

testing results. Because FAA testing is infrequent at many locations,

it also can limit the number and variety of test objects that the

screeners are exposed to. Also, because the tests are

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conducted by individuals, there is the possibility that different FAA

employees will apply the test protocols differently, which also could

skew the testing results.

To deal with these problems, the FAA has developed TIP, discussed

previously in section I.C. This computer-based system is capable of

introducing test objects to screeners on the X-ray and EDS systems at

various rates set on the computers. The TIP program can be set to run

the entire time that a screening location is in use. Test items can be

easily added to or changed by simply loading new images or parameters

into the computers, providing an efficient means to regularly expose

screeners to the most recent and sophisticated threats. The success

rates can easily be recorded and later analyzed by the FAA, carriers,

and screening companies to monitor continuously how well the screening

locations are operating.

The FAA has conducted validation testing of TIP. In addition, at

one location one screening company conducted extensive testing of TIP

and provided its data to the FAA for analysis. The FAA determined that

the detailed results of the FAA and screening company testing should

not be made available to the general public because they could be used

to attempt to discover ways to defeat the screening system; therefore,

the FAA has determined that this information is sensitive security

information under 14 CFR part 191. Air carriers, foreign air carriers,

and indirect air carriers that have security programs under parts 108,

129, and 109, respectively, may obtain further information on these

tests and the FAA's analysis by contacting the Office of Civil Aviation

Security Policy and Planning as listed in the section titled FOR

FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT. Screening companies that are screening for

carriers may obtain copies of the testing results through their

carriers. Comments on the data and analyses should be submitted to the

Office of Civil Aviation Security Policy and Planning, rather than to

the public docket, because of the sensitivity of the information.

Based on all of the data gathered to date, the FAA has determined

that TIP is an effective and reliable means to measure screener

performance. Accordingly, the proposed rule would require the use of

threat image projection systems on all X-ray and explosives detection

systems. TIP would be installed over a period of time as specified in

the security programs. The specific TIP equipment requirements

acceptable to the Administrator would be set forth in the carriers'

security programs. The screening companies and carriers would be

required to download the data or allow the FAA to download the data in

accordance with standards that would be adopted in the security

programs through notice and comment procedures. The screening companies

and carriers would be able to download the data at any time to monitor

their own performance.

The results of TIP would be used to monitor the performance of

screening locations, screening companies, and individual screeners. TIP

operational data would be analyzed to focus resources on most

effectively improving screening to detect threats. TIP data can be used

to determine such things as what working conditions lead to better

performance, on which topics the screeners need further instruction,

and what corrective action or training programs prove to be most

successful. The FAA would look at the success rates of screeners

detecting various kinds of test objects, the success rates at different

times of day and during different traffic levels, and the other factors

that may affect screening effectiveness.

TIP also serves as a continuous means of on-the-job training for

screeners. Screeners report that being exposed to TIP images keeps them

alert and interested, supplements their classroom training, and fosters

healthy competition among them to continuously improve their detection

rates. The use of TIP provides screeners with immediate feedback

regarding their performance and indicates specific areas for

improvement.

The FAA anticipates that in the future, TIP data may provide a

basis not only to monitor the performance of screening locations but

also to establish performance standards. Under such a system, the

screening companies and carriers could be required to meet the

standards set forth in their security programs for the detection of

various threat objects. For instance, the FAA anticipates that it would

analyze TIP data to determine the range of screening company detection

rates in the United States. It might then set minimum detection

percentages that each screening company would have to meet based on the

higher detection rates within the range. The minimum detection

percentages could be incrementally raised as overall screener

performance in the United States rises. The performance standards might

vary depending on such factors as the screening system being used and

the type of threat object. Initially, however, the FAA could implement

overall performance measurement requirements whereby the FAA would

collect performance data from all TIP systems installed in the United

States and then require corrective action of the screening companies

with the lowest performance. These performance standards would be

developed based on extensive additional data from TIP systems.

The FAA would propose to add these performance measurement and

performance standard requirements as amendments to the security

programs through notice and comment procedures. Including these

requirements in the security programs would protect them as sensitive

security information and allow for flexibility in changing the

standards as screening company performance improves in the United

States. The use of TIP systems to establish performance measurements

and ultimately performance standards would allow the FAA to monitor

closely the performance of screening companies.

If performance standards were adopted in the security programs,

screening companies and carriers that the FAA determined were not

performing to specified standards could be held accountable in any

number of ways, as discussed in section II.D.

The FAA currently tests other forms of screening, such as walk-

through metal detectors and handwands, similar to the way it currently

tests X-ray screening. The FAA may in the future develop performance

standards for other screening equipment and proposed amendments to the

security programs would be issued.

III. Proposed Part 111: Section-by-Section Discussion

Proposed part 111 would prescribe the requirements for screening

company certifications and operations. Part 111 would apply to all

screening companies, whether they are performing screening under part

108, 109, or 129. Carriers would be required to ensure that their

screening operations, whether conducted by the carriers themselves or

by screening companies with which the carriers contract, are conducted

in accordance with part 111 requirements.

Subpart A would contain general information relating to

applicability, definitions, inspection authority, falsification, and

prohibition against interference with screening personnel and is

described in paragraphs III.A. through III.E. Subpart B would prescribe

requirements for security programs, screening company certificates,

operations specifications, and carrier oversight and is described in

paragraphs

[[Page 569]]

III.F. through III.K. Subpart C would prescribe requirements relating

to screening operations such as the screening of persons and property,

the use of screening equipment, employment standards, screening company

manager and instructor qualifications, training and testing, and

performance measurement and standards among others and is described in

paragraphs III.L. through III.W. The following discussion provides

details on each part 111 requirement.

Subpart A--General

III.A. Sec. 111.1 Applicability

Proposed Sec. 111.1 states that the part would prescribe the

requirements for the certification and operation of screening

companies. The requirements in proposed part 111 would apply to each

screening company that screens for an air carrier under part 108, for

an indirect air carrier under part 109, or for a foreign air carrier

under part 129. The proposed requirements would also apply to the air

carriers (including those air carriers voluntarily adopting aviation

security programs), indirect air carriers, and foreign air carriers

that are responsible for conducting, and therefore overseeing,

screening operations. Portions of proposed part 111 would also apply to

two groups of individuals: all persons conducting screening within the

United States under parts 111, 108, 109 and 129 and all persons who

interact with screening personnel during screening. ``Person'' as

defined in 14 CFR 1.1 means ``an individual, firm, partnership,

corporation, company, association, joint-stock association, or

governmental entity.''

The certification requirements in the proposed rule would apply

only to screening companies performing screening in the United States.

The FAA does not propose at this time to certify screening companies

that perform screening for air carriers at foreign airports. Screening

in other countries is performed either by the host governments or by

private sector screening companies, but under the authority and

operational control of the host governments. However, where air

carriers have operational control over screening outside of the United

States they would be required under this proposal to carry out and

comply with all relevant sections of part 111 to the extent allowable

by local law, with the exception of those requirements related to

screening company certification.

III.B. Sec. 111.3 Definitions

Proposed Sec. 111.3 would define for the purpose of part 111

``carrier,'' ``screening company,'' ``screening company security

program,'' and ``screening location.'' The proposed definitions are

needed to clarify the use of these terms in the proposed rule language.

The term ``carrier'' would be defined for the purposes of parts

108, 109, 111, and 129 to refer to an air carrier, an indirect air

carrier, or a foreign air carrier.

The term ``screening company'' would be defined to mean an air

carrier, indirect air carrier, foreign air carrier, or other entity

that inspects persons or property for the presence of any unauthorized

explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon, as required under

part 111 and 108, 109, or 129, before their entry into a sterile area

or carriage aboard an aircraft.

The term ``screening company security program'' would be defined to

mean the security program approved by the Administrator under this

part.

The term ``screening location'' would be defined to mean any site

at which persons or property are inspected for the presence of any

unauthorized explosive, incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon.

Examples of screening locations are checkpoints where persons and

accessible property are screened, ticket counters and baggage makeup

rooms where checked bags may be screened, and cargo areas where cargo

may be screened.

Additional terms to be defined in the part 108 final rule would

also apply to part 111, as would any other definitions contained in

parts 109 and 129 of the chapter. Of particular relevance to this rule

are the definitions for ``cargo'' and ``checked baggage.''

The term ``cargo'' would be defined in part 108 to mean property

tendered for air transportation accounted for on an air waybill. All

accompanied commercial courier consignments, whether or not accounted

for on an air waybill, are also classified as cargo. Security programs

further define the term cargo.

The term ``checked baggage'' would be defined in part 108 to mean

property tendered by or on behalf of a passenger and accepted by an air

carrier for transport, which will be inaccessible to passengers during

flight. Accompanied commercial courier consignments are not classified

as checked baggage.

III.C. Sec. 111.5 Inspection Authority

This proposed section would clarify that a screening company shall

allow FAA inspections and tests to determine its compliance with part

111, its security program, and its operations specifications. The

screening company shall also allow FAA inspections and tests of

equipment and procedures at screening locations that relate to carrier

compliance with their regulations. This proposed section would also

require screening companies to provide the FAA with evidence of

compliance. Both of these proposed requirements are similar to those in

proposed Sec. 108.5 of Notice No. 97-12.

III.D. Sec. 111.7 Falsification

This proposed section would apply falsification requirements to

screening companies that are similar to those that apply under current

Sec. 108.4. While the provisions of Sec. 108.4 apply to matters

involving screening, the inclusion of a falsification rule in part 111

would serve to emphasize the requirements. Under this rule, no person

would be permitted to make or cause to be made any fraudulent or

intentionally false statement in any application for any security

program, certificate, or operations specifications or any amendment

thereto under part 111. No person would be permitted to make or cause

to be made any fraudulent or intentionally false entry in any record or

report that would be kept, made, or used to show compliance with part

111 or to exercise any privileges under part 111. Also, any

reproduction or alteration for fraudulent purpose of any report,

record, security program, certificate, or operations specifications

issued under part 111 would be subject to civil penalties under this

proposed rule. There are also criminal statutes that might apply to

such activities.

III.E. Sec. 111.9 Prohibition Against Interference with Screening

Personnel

The proposed rule would include new requirements prohibiting any

person from interfering with, assaulting, threatening, or intimidating

screening personnel in the performance of their screening duties. The

proposed rule is intended to prohibit interference that might distract

or inhibit a screener from effectively performing his or her duties.

This rule is necessary to emphasize the importance to safety and

security of protecting screeners from undue distractions or attempts to

intimidate. Previous instances of such distractions have included

excessive verbal abuse of screeners by passengers and certain air

carrier employees. Screeners encountering these situations are taken

away from their normal duties to deal with the disruptive people, which

may affect the screening of other people. The

[[Page 570]]

disruptive persons may be attempting to discourage the screeners from

being as thorough as required. Screeners may also need to summon

checkpoint screening supervisors and law enforcement officers, taking

them away from other duties. Checkpoint disruptions can be potentially

dangerous in these situations. This proposal would help support

screeners' efforts to be thorough and would help prevent persons from

unduly interfering with the screening process. This proposed rule is

similar to 14 CFR Sec. 91.11, which prohibits interference with

crewmembers aboard aircraft and which also is essential to passenger

safety and security. Note that this proposed rule is not intended to

prevent good-faith questions from persons seeking to understand the

screening of their persons or property. But abusive, distractive

behavior and attempts to prevent screeners from performing required

screening would be subject to civil penalties under this proposed rule.

Subpart B--Security Program, Certificate, and Operations Specifications

III.F. Sec. 111.101 Performance of Screening

Proposed Sec. 111.101 states that each screening company shall

conduct screening and screener training in compliance with the

requirements of part 111, its approved screening company security

program (see section III.G.), its approved operations specifications,

and applicable portions of security directives (SD) and emergency

amendments (EA) to security programs. When a response to an imminent

threat is required, the FAA issues SD's to air carriers under current

Sec. 108.18, and EA's to foreign air carriers and indirect air carriers

under Secs. 129.25 and 109.5, to require immediate action and response

to the threat.

SD's and EA's may be issued to carriers to help them respond to

threats that require quick responses. SD's and EA's typically involve a

range of differing requirements, only a portion of which may pertain to

how the screening companies shall perform their duties. Currently,

carriers are required to provide to their screening companies any

screening-related information from SD's and EA's and any other

applicable information pertaining to threats. Carriers extract the

screening-related requirements from the SD's and EA's and forward them

to the screening companies.

It appears that the most efficient means for the FAA to issue the

SD and EA requirements to screening companies would be to continue the

practice of issuing them to the carriers, who then provide appropriate

information to their screening companies. It would be inefficient for

the FAA to attempt to issue two different SD or EA documents, one with

the requirements solely applicable to screening companies and one with

all of the requirements for the carriers. Moreover, this emphasizes the

ultimate statutory and regulatory responsibilities of the carriers to

perform aviation security screening and to ensure that screening

companies carry out the requirements in the SD's and EA's.

III.G. Secs. 111.103; 111.105; and 111.107 Security Programs

As discussed in II.G., the FAA is proposing to establish a separate

security program to accompany proposed part 111. The Screening Standard

Security Program (SSSP) would contain requirements for screening

persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo for air

carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. This would

consolidate all of the screening-related requirements into a single

source that screening companies could use to carry out their duties.

The ACSSP would continue to contain the nonpublic details regarding the

air carriers' responsibility to conduct screening under part 108, as

would the MSP for foreign air carriers and the IACSSP for indirect air

carriers. However, much of the screening information to be contained in

the Screening Standard Security Program would be relocated from the

ACSSP, MSP, and IACSSP.

Under the proposal, screening companies would be directly

responsible for compliance with their security programs and might be

subject to enforcement actions if they fail to comply. Screening

companies would therefore have a strong interest in complying with the

program requirements. Carriers would continue to have an interest in

the screening requirements in the security programs, because they would

remain responsible for their implementation and oversight by statute

and in the case of air carriers and foreign air carriers would be

transporting the persons and property being screened. As part of their

oversight responsibilities, carriers would be required to have access

to, understand, and make available to the FAA upon request copies of

the security programs of the companies with which they contract.

Under the proposal, the sections pertaining to security program

requirements are organized in the same format that is used in Notice

No. 97-12 for part 108. Proposed Sec. 111.103 would be titled

``Security program: adoption and implementation'' and would require

that each screening company adopt and carry out an FAA-approved

screening company security program that meets the requirements of

proposed Sec. 111.105. Proposed Sec. 111.105 would be titled ``Security

program: form, content, and availability'' and would provide specific

requirements for security programs. Proposed Sec. 111.107 would be

titled ``Security program: approval and amendments'' and would describe

the procedures for approvals of and amendments to security programs.

Proposed Sec. 111.105 would be divided into three paragraphs.

Paragraph (a) would state that a security program shall provide for the

safety of persons and property traveling on flights provided by the air

carriers and/or foreign air carriers for which a screening company

screens against acts of criminal violence and air piracy and the

introduction of explosives, incendiaries, or deadly or dangerous

weapons. This same wording appears under proposed Sec. 108.103 of

Notice No. 97-12 for air carriers, as both parties are responsible for

passenger safety. Paragraph (a) would also require that screening

company screening performance coordinators (see section III.P.)

acknowledge receipt of amendments to their programs in signed, written

statements to the FAA within 72 hours. The security programs would have

to contain the items listed under paragraph (b) of Sec. 111.105 and be

approved by the Administrator.

Proposed Sec. 111.105(b) would list three items that a screening

company's security program shall include at a minimum. The security

program shall include the following: the procedures used to perform the

screening functions specified in proposed Sec. 111.201; the testing

standards and training guidelines for screening personnel and

instructors; and the performance standards and operating requirements

for threat image projection systems. These requirements are further

explained in the detailed discussions of the sections.

Proposed Sec. 111.105(c) would describe logistical and availability

requirements related to a security program. A screening company would

be required to maintain at least one complete copy of its security

program at its principal business office and at each airport served and

to make a copy of the program available for inspection upon the request

of an FAA special agent. All screening companies and applicants for

screening company certificates,

[[Page 571]]

regardless of type, would be required to restrict the availability of

information in their security programs to those persons with an

operational need to know in accordance with Sec. 191.5 and refer

requests for such information by other persons to the Administrator.

All of these requirements are similar to the requirements for air

carriers under proposed Sec. 108.105.

Proposed Sec. 111.107 would be divided into four sections:

``Approval of security program,'' ``Amendment requested by a screening

company,'' Amendment by the FAA,'' and ``Emergency amendments.'' The

proposed language is based on the language in proposed Sec. 108.105

(Notice No. 97-12) with the exception of the following changes unique

to screening companies.

Proposed Sec. 111.107(a) would differ from proposed Sec. 108.105

(Notice No. 97-12) in several ways due to the proposed application

process for screening company certifications. The language would state

that unless otherwise authorized by the Assistant Administrator, each

screening company required to have a security program under this part

would be required to submit a signed, written statement to the

Assistant Administrator within 30 days of receiving the SSSP from the

FAA indicating what its intentions are for adopting and carrying out a

security program. A screening company could choose to adopt the SSSP as

is or adopt the SSSP after making amendments to it. If a screening

company chooses to adopt the SSSP without changing it, the granting of

a screening company certificate by the Assistant Administrator would

serve as FAA approval of the SSSP. If the screening company chooses to

adopt the SSSP after making amendments to it, the Assistant

Administrator would either approve the proposed security program within

30 days or give the screening company written notice to modify its

program to comply with the applicable security program requirements.

The remaining procedures for accepting a notice to modify or petition

the notice would be the same as the procedures in proposed Sec. 108.105

of Notice No. 97-12. In this case as well, the Assistant

Administrator's granting a screening company certificate to the

screening company would serve as FAA approval of the screening

company's security program.

Under proposed Sec. 111.107(b), once a screening company is

employed by one or more carriers, it would be required to include in

any application for amendment to its security program a statement that

all carriers for which it screens have been advised of the proposed

amendment and have no objection to it. The screening company would also

be required to include the name and phone number for each individual

who was advised at each carrier. This would ensure that screening

companies would have the opportunity to apply to amend their security

programs, and also would ensure that carriers would be aware of the

applications and have no objections to them. Because carriers would

retain primary responsibility for screening, it would be essential that

they concur with any changes requested by screening companies that

screen on their behalf.

Under proposed Sec. 111.107(c) and (d), if the FAA were to seek to

amend a portion of a security program that covers the activities of

screening companies, it would provide to screening companies notice and

opportunity to comment. Carriers would also be notified and provided

opportunities to comment regarding proposed changes to the SSSP that

apply to their operations. In the case of an emergency, there would be

no prior notice or opportunity to comment.

III.H. Sec. 111.109 Screening Company Certificate

Certificate required. Proposed Sec. 111.109(a) states that a

screening company may not perform required screening except under the

authority of and in accordance with the provisions of a screening

company certificate.

Section 302 of the Federal Aviation Reauthorization Act of 1996

(Public Law 104-264, 49 U.S.C. 44935 note) requires the Administrator

to certificate companies providing security screening. The FAA proposes

to certificate screening companies under 49 U.S.C. 44707, which

provides for examinations and ratings of air agencies. Under that

section, certain pilot schools (14 CFR part 141) and repair stations

(14 CFR part 145) hold air agency certificates. That section also

permits certifications of ``other air agencies the Administrator

decides are necessary in the public interest'' (49 U.S.C. 44707(3)).

By certificating screening companies under section 44707 as air

agencies, the companies would be under the requirements of 49 U.S.C.

44709. That section makes clear that the Administrator may re-inspect

an air agency at any time. Section 44709 also contains the procedure by

which the Administrator may amend, modify, suspend, or revoke a

certificate. This procedure includes an air agency's right to appeal to

the National Transportation Safety Board an order amending, modifying,

suspending, or revoking its certificate. The Board's procedure for

hearing such appeals, found at 49 CFR part 821, includes a hearing

before an administrative law judge and an appeal to the full Board. A

party may petition the U.S. Court of Appeals to review a decision of

the Board. In this way, a screening company would receive full due

process if the FAA were to take action against its certificate.

Application for a screening company certificate. Under proposed

Sec. 111.109(b), an application for a screening company certificate

shall be made in a form and manner prescribed by the Administrator. The

FAA anticipates a two-phase application process as follows. A company

interested in applying for certification as a screening company would

write to the FAA to request application instructions. The application

instructions would require the applicant to submit several items in

writing in a standard format. This same application package would

eventually become the screening company's operations specifications if

the company is approved for certification. (See next preamble section

for discussion of operations specifications.) The completed application

package would be submitted to the FAA as part of phase one and would

contain the following items: the name of the applicant's company; the

company's address; incorporation and tax identification information; a

letter of intent; an organization chart; a description of the company's

ability to perform and comply with regulations; the name of the

company's chief executive officer; the names, titles, qualifications,

and references for the screening performance coordinators; and the

company's procedures for safeguarding and distributing sensitive

security information under part 191.

Upon receiving an application package, the FAA would review and

verify all relevant information. This review might include verifying

past employment and training references for the company's screening

performance coordinator. Once the FAA completes its review, it would

notify the applicant and provide the applicant with a copy of the

Screening Standard Security Program (SSSP). The applicant would need

the security program to complete phase two of the application process.

After obtaining a copy of the SSSP, the applicant would review it

to determine whether the company wants to adopt the SSSP as is or amend

it to incorporate additional company-specific information. The

applicant would be instructed to inform the FAA of its decision

regarding the SSSP in writing within 30 days of receipt of the SSSP. At

that time or soon thereafter the

[[Page 572]]

applicant would prepare and submit to the FAA a copy of its training

curriculum and any FAA-requested changes to its original application.

(See later discussions regarding these requirements in this notice.)

The FAA would provide guidance to the applicant in preparing these

documents, as needed. The applicant would submit the documents as part

of phase two, and the FAA would review them. If the FAA finds that the

documents from phase two meet all requirements, they would be combined

with the phase one documents and signed by the Administrator as the

company's operations specifications. The Administrator would then issue

the company a screening company certificate. If changes are needed, the

FAA would request that the applicant make the specific amendments and

resubmit them before the Administrator would issue a certificate.

Issuance and renewal-general. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(c), an

applicant would be entitled to a certificate if the applicant applies

not less than 90 days before the applicant intends to begin screening

or the applicant's certificate expires; the Administrator determines

that the applicant has met the requirements of this part for the type

of screening certificate requested; the issuance would not be contrary

to public safety and security; and, unless otherwise authorized by the

Administrator, the applicant has not had a screening company

certificate revoked within the past 12 months.

Under proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(2), the applicant would have to be

able to meet the requirements of this part, to include adopting and

carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved operations

specifications for it to be issued a provisional screening company

certificate. Proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(3) would describe the

requirements that a screening company would have to meet for issuance

or renewal of its 5-year screening company certificate. Failure to meet

the performance standards set forth in its security program would be

grounds for denial of the screening company certificate. Under proposed

Sec. 111.109(c)(5), if the FAA revokes a screening company's

certificate, the company would have to wait 1 year before a new

certificate could be issued unless otherwise authorized by the FAA.

This would ensure that the company that had proven unqualified to hold

its certificate could not immediately seek a new certificate. This

provision is similar to a provision in 49 U.S.C. 44703(c), which

relates to airmen certificates.

Provisional Certificates. Under proposed paragraph (d), companies

that do not hold screening company certificates would be able to apply

for provisional screening company certificates. The FAA would issue a

provisional certificate to an applicant if the Administrator finds that

the applicant is able to meet the requirements of this part, to include

adopting and carrying out an FAA-approved security program and approved

operations specifications (proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(2)). The applicant

for the provisional screening certificate would be subject to FAA

investigation and required to show that it has met the requirements of

this part. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(g)(1), a provisional screening

company certificate would expire at the end of the 12th month after the

month in which it was issued.

The purpose of the proposed provisional certificate would be to

provide a probationary period for the FAA to monitor a company's

screening performance. During that year, a new screening company would

undergo rigorous scrutiny by the FAA, during which time the company

would have to demonstrate that it has met the requirements for FAA

certification. If before the end of the 12-month period the new

screening company has met the requirements of this part, and had

adopted and carried out an FAA-approved security program and approved

operations specifications, the company would be able to apply for and

may be granted a certificate. In accordance with Sec. 111.109(c)(1),

the screening company would be required to apply for a screening

certificate not less than 60 days before the expiration of the

provisional certificate. Companies that cannot demonstrate that they

are qualified during the year or that do not meet the performance

standards specified in the security program would be denied

certification.

The proposed requirements for using a provisional certificate are

consistent with several comments to the Advanced Notice of Proposed

Rulemaking that stated that new companies should have to operate in a

provisional status during which time the FAA would perform compliance

and records audits.

Under proposed Sec. 111.109(d)(2), the holder of a provisional

certificate would not begin screening at a screening location without

first giving the Administrator 7 days' notice, unless otherwise

authorized by the Administrator. This notice would allow the FAA to

monitor the startup of new company operations at each location. The FAA

anticipates that this requirement for 7 days' notice would not result

in any start-up delays should a new company replace a company whose

operations are decertified at a location. The FAA anticipates that it

usually would notify the responsible carriers in advance that they must

replace their existing screening company with a different company if

performance does not improve within a certain amount of time. This

advance notification to the carriers would allow them ample time to

make arrangements with a new company, if necessary, and to provide the

required 7 days' notice to the FAA. If for some reason the FAA was

unable to notify carriers in advance, it would have the authority to

waive the 7 days' notice to keep the screening location in operation.

Screening company certificate. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(e), the

holder of a provisional screening company certificate could be issued a

screening company certificate. The certificate would expire at the end

of the 60th month after the month in which it is issued (proposed

Sec. 111.109(g)(2)). To issue or renew a screening company certificate,

the Administrator would have to determine that the applicant has met

the requirements of part 111, to include adopting and carrying out an

FAA-approved security program and approved operations specifications,

and has implemented applicable portions of the security directives

(proposed Sec. 111.109(c)(3)).

As part of its renewal procedures, the FAA would consider the

company's performance under the performance standards that could be

added to the company's security program. As discussed in section II.I.,

the FAA anticipates using threat image projection (TIP) data to measure

a screening company's overall performance for X-ray and EDS machines

and eventually amending the SSSP to include performance standards. This

data would then be used to help evaluate whether a screening company

certificate should be issued or renewed.

The FAA is proposing that a certificate be valid for 60 months. The

screening company would be required to apply for a renewal at least 60

days before the expiration date in order to continue screening

operations. The 60-month (5-year) renewal would allow the benefits of

renewal without creating an undue burden on the screening company. As

with carriers, the FAA would inspect screening companies regularly and

would continually monitor operations and tests to determine that each

screening company is in compliance with the regulations, its security

program, and its operations

[[Page 573]]

specifications. This would result in consistent and close monitoring of

screening operations. If significant deficiencies are found during the

5-year period, the FAA would take appropriate action to require

correction of those deficiencies or if necessary would revoke the

screening company's certificate. In addition, requiring a 5-year

renewal of a screening company's certificate would create a more in-

depth review than that conducted during periodic inspections. Before

the FAA would renew a certificate, it would review the company's

operations specifications (including the training curriculum), required

records, the results of FAA inspections and any enforcement actions

that were taken, performance data, and any other relevant information.

There are several precedents in the FAA regulations for periodic

renewals of certificates and approvals. For example, exemptions from

certain Federal Aviation Regulations are typically issued for 3 years,

and Special Federal Aviation Regulations (SFAR) rarely are issued for

longer than 5 years. The duration of pilot school certificates in part

145 is 24 months. Having a specific duration encourages a thorough

review of any changes in the environment of a company, such as the

addition of new equipment or an increase in the size of operations, as

well as a review of past performance and an evaluation of what should

be done to improve performance if necessary.

The FAA considered proposing a shorter duration for the screening

company certificates but decided to propose the 60-month duration as a

reasonable option for obtaining the most benefits with the least

burden. The FAA invites comments on the costs and benefits of the

proposed duration and of a shorter duration such as 2 or 3 years.

Certificate contents. Proposed paragraph Sec. 111.109(f) lists the

information that would be contained on a certificate, such as the name

of a company and a certificate number, certificate issuance date, and

expiration date.

Proposed compliance. The FAA is considering how much time after the

publication of the final rule should be given for carriers and

screening companies to come into compliance. The FAA proposes in

paragraph Sec. 111.109(k) that the effective date for the final rule be

60 days after its publication in the Federal Register. As of that date,

no company could begin screening under part 108, 109, or 129 unless it

holds a screening company certificate.

The FAA also proposes, however, to provide some accommodation for

existing screening companies. There are many companies that have been

providing required screening services for years. The FAA has observed

their operations and is familiar with these companies. The FAA proposes

in Sec. 111.109(k) that companies actively screening at any time during

the year before the date of publication of the final rule be able to

continue screening after the effective date if they submit applications

for provisional certificates within 60 days after publication of the

final rule. The FAA would review the applications and issue provisional

certificates to those qualified. A company that applied on time and

that submitted complete and accurate documentation as required would be

able to continue screening unless and until it is issued a denial of

its application.

After an existing screening company receives its provisional

certificate, it would be subject to a rigorous application process to

achieve certification. The company would be required to achieve

certification before the expiration of its provisional certificate in

order to continue screening. Existing screening companies could apply

for certificates any time after they receive provisional certificates

but not later than 60 days before the expiration of their provisional

certificates.

Duration. In addition to establishing a 12-month provisional

certificate and a 60-month certificate (discussed previously), proposed

Sec. 111.109(g)(3) would provide that a certificate would expire if a

screening company has not provided required screening during the

previous 12 months. Under this provision, a company not actively

screening and maintaining its proficiency could lose its authority to

screen. If the company intends to screen again, it would need to apply

for a provisional certificate.

A screening company would have the responsibility for keeping track

of its compliance with this requirement and for returning its

certificate, as required in Sec. 111.109(h), if it has automatically

expired. During the FAA's yearly inspections of screening locations, it

intends to compare its list of screening companies with those companies

that are performing screening at locations. If a screening company does

not appear to have a screening location, the FAA would check with the

company to determine when it last conducted screening for a carrier.

Proposed paragraph (h) would require the holder of a screening

company certificate that is expired, suspended, or revoked to return

the certificate to the Administrator within 7 days. Suspension or

revocation of a certificate would follow established procedures for

certificates issued by the FAA such as airport, air carrier, and airmen

certificates (see earlier discussion of this issue in ``Certificate

required'').

Amendment. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(i), a screening company

would be required to apply for an amendment to its certificate to

change any of the information listed on the certificate, such as the

name of the screening company, and/or any names under which it would do

business.

Inspection. Under proposed Sec. 111.109(j), screening company

certificates would be made available for inspection upon request of the

Administrator.

III.I. Secs. 111.111; 111.113; and 111.115 Operations specifications

Under proposed Sec. 111.111, screening companies would be required

to have approved operations specifications before they could perform

screening. Screening companies would prepare operations specifications

with FAA guidance. Under proposed Sec. 111.115, during the application

process for a provisional certificate, a company would submit its

operations specifications to the FAA for approval. Once the operations

specifications have been approved, the screening company would not need

to obtain subsequent approval when it applies for a certificate or

renews its certificate. However, the FAA would review the operations

specifications to consider whether changes are needed. Further FAA

approval of operations specifications would only be necessary if the

screening company seeks to amend its operations specifications. The

proposed requirements for approvals and amendments of operations

specifications would follow the same process as is currently provided

for air carrier security programs.

Under proposed Sec. 111.113, operations specifications would list

the following items: the locations at which a company may conduct

screening; the types of screening that the company is authorized to

perform (persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo); the

equipment and methods of screening that the company may employ; the

name of the company's screening performance coordinator (SPC) (see

discussion in the next section of this preamble); the procedures for

notifying the Administrator and any carrier for which the company is

performing screening if an equipment or

[[Page 574]]

facility failure makes the performance of adequate screening

impracticable; and the curriculum used to train persons performing

screening functions. The operations specifications would also be

required to contain a statement signed by the person required by

Sec. 111.209(b) on behalf of the company, confirming that the

information is true and correct. The operations specifications would

also contain any other information that the Administrator would deem

necessary. Portions of the above items and the format may be provided

by the Administrator as standard operations specifications.

Screening companies in most cases would be authorized to screen at

all locations in the United States. However, where a special

circumstance occurs, the FAA would have the ability to amend a

screening company's operations specifications to limit the company's

authority to screen at a particular location in accordance with the

procedure in Sec. 108.105(c). One example would be where the FAA is

deploying new technology that required a high degree of oversight, such

as the recent deployments of explosives detection systems. In such a

case, the FAA might limit the locations at which a screening company

could operate the new technology. Another example would be where a

company demonstrates an inability or unwillingness to comply with

required procedures at one location, but at other locations is in

compliance. The FAA could amend the company's operations specifications

to remove the company's authority to operate at the one location. If

the company later comes into compliance at that location the operations

specifications could be amended to restore its authority to screen

there.

Operations specifications would list the types of screening that

companies are authorized to perform. This requirement would emphasize

the different capabilities and needs of the various companies that

perform screening. For instance, cargo screening involves procedures

different from those for screening persons. A company's required

operations specifications, including its training program, would

reflect the type(s) of screening that it would be authorized to

perform.

The operations specifications would include the equipment and

methods of screening that the Administrator has authorized the company

to operate and carry out. Examples include manual searches of items,

metal detector inspections of persons, and X-ray inspections. The

operations specifications would also include procedures for notifying

the Administrator and the carrier(s) for which the company is

performing screening in the event that the procedures, facilities, or

equipment that the company is using are not adequate for it to perform

screening. Each company's operations specifications, including its

training program, would specify the methods and equipment on which it

was authorized. There shall be a training curriculum for each type of

equipment that a company operates in performing screening. The training

program curriculum would have to be approved as part of the operations

specifications before the company would be certificated as a screening

company.

Proposed Sec. 111.113(c) would require a screening company to

maintain a complete copy of its operations specifications at its

principal business office and at each airport where it conducts

security screening. The screening company would also have to ensure

that the operations specifications are amended to remain current and

made available to the Administrator upon request. The screening company

would be required to provide a current copy of its operations

specifications to the carrier(s) for which it screens. The screening

company would also be required to restrict the availability of

information in its operations specifications to those persons with an

operational need to know. Persons with an operational need to know are

specified in Sec. 191.5(b). The screening company would be required to

direct to the Administrator requests for information that is in

operations specifications if the requests are from persons other than

persons with an operational need to know. These proposed requirements

would be necessary to ensure that operations specifications are

available to persons who need to know them and at the same time to

protect security sensitive information in the operations

specifications. Furthermore, these requirements would ensure that

carriers have current copies of screening companies' operations

specifications for monitoring and auditing purposes.

III.J. Sec. 111.117 Oversight by air carriers, foreign air carriers,

or indirect air carriers

Proposed Sec. 111.117(a) would make clear that each screening

company holding a certificate under part 111 would be required to allow

any air carrier, indirect air carrier, or foreign air carrier for which

it performs screening to inspect its facilities, equipment, and records

to determine its compliance with part 111, its security program, and

operations specifications. The proposed regulation would also require

that a screening company allow any carrier for which the company is

performing screening to test the screening company's screening

personnel using the procedures specified in the applicable security

program. This is a natural consequence of the fact that carriers are

ultimately responsible for proper screening and must be able to ensure

that their screening companies are in compliance and that screening

personnel are performing adequately.

Because the carriers are ultimately responsible for screening and

contract with screening companies to perform the service on their

behalf, the FAA does not consider it essential from a legal standpoint

to include proposed Sec. 111.117. However, it appears that inclusion of

this section may avoid confusion concerning the roles of the carriers

and screening companies. The FAA requests comments on whether to

include this section in the final rule.

If a carrier chooses to hold a screening company certificate and to

conduct screening at a particular location on its own behalf, it would

still have to perform oversight functions. In its capacity as a

screening company, it would be responsible for day-to-day operations;

in its capacity as a carrier, it would have to audit and test the

performance of its screening functions. Any other carrier using that

screening location also would be responsible for auditing and testing

the carrier in its capacity as a screening company.

In performing oversight responsibilities, the carriers need to know

when the FAA discovers significant compliance problems with the

screening companies. Currently, when the FAA discovers an alleged

violation, it typically brings it to the attention of the appropriate

carrier(s) to initiate corrective action as soon as possible. This

often is done in a discussion with the station manager or other carrier

official at the time of the inspection. Depending on the circumstances,

enforcement action may be taken later. The FAA envisions that if it

finds an alleged violation committed by a screening company, it would

discuss the matter not only with the screening company, but also with

the relevant carrier(s).

The FAA also proposes in Sec. 111.117(b) that each screening

company shall provide a copy of each letter of investigation and final

enforcement action to each carrier using the screening location where

the alleged violation occurred. Final enforcement actions include

warning letters, letters

[[Page 575]]

of correction, orders assessing civil penalties, and orders of

suspension and revocation. The screening company would be required to

provide a copy to each applicable carrier's corporate security officer

within 3 business days of receipt of the letter of correction or final

enforcement action. This proposed requirement would assist the

carriers(s) in evaluating the performance of the screening company.

Such enforcement actions could include warning notices and letters of

correction, civil penalty actions, suspensions or revocations of

certificates, cease and desist orders, or other actions. The FAA

proposes that a screening company would have to provide copies of these

documents to only those carriers for which it conducted screening at

the location of an alleged violation, rather than to all carriers for

which it conducted screening nationwide. The proposed requirement to

provide the copies within 3 business days of receipt would ensure that

the carrier(s) receive(s) timely notice.

The FAA considered proposing that the FAA would provide copies

directly to the carriers involved. However, the FAA believes that this

responsibility more correctly belongs with the screening companies. A

screening company should keep the carriers for which it is performing

screening informed of the company's compliance status. During its

regular inspections of screening companies, the FAA would check to make

certain that the screening companies are keeping carriers informed. The

FAA requests comments on any alternative means for keeping the carriers

informed of their screening companies' compliance.

III.K. Sec. 111.119 Business office

Under the proposal, each certificated security screening company

would be required to have a principal business office with mailing

address and would be required to notify the Administrator of any

address changes. The FAA would not expect all files to be maintained at

the business office. Most files would be retained onsite and be

available for inspection.

Subpart C--Operations

III.L. Sec. 111.201 Screening of persons and property and acceptance

of cargo

The language in proposed Sec. 111.201 is similar to the proposed

language contained in Sec. 108.201 for air carriers (Notice No. 97-12).

The FAA is not proposing to remove any of the language from proposed

Sec. 108.201 or from similar language in Sec. 129.25, because the

carriers will remain responsible under statute for screening persons

and property. This proposal does, however, include similar provisions

under proposed Sec. 111.201, because screening companies are the

primary screeners of persons and property in most situations, and they

must be aware of and be held accountable for their screening

responsibilities.

Under proposed Sec. 111.201(a), each screening company would be

required to use the procedures included in its approved screening

company security program to inspect each person and his or her

accessible property entering a sterile area. Under proposed

Sec. 111.201(a), each screening company would also be required to deter

and prevent the introduction into a sterile area of any explosive,

incendiary, or deadly or dangerous weapon on or about each person or

the person's accessible property.

Note that this NPRM also proposes to change the wording in

Sec. 108.201(a) and (b) to indicate that the screening procedures,

facilities, and equipment may also be described in the screening

companies' approved security programs as well as in the air carriers'

approved security programs. The FAA expects that differing requirements

would appear in one or the other of the programs, depending on the

requirement. Similar requirements also appear in proposed Sec. 109.201

for indirect air carriers and in existing Sec. 129.25 for foreign air

carriers. These changes are further explained in the detailed proposed

rule discussion for parts 108, 109, and 129.

Under proposed Sec. 111.201(b), each screening company would be

required to deny entry into a sterile area at a checkpoint to the

following: any person who does not consent to a search of his or her

person in accordance with the screening system prescribed in paragraph

(a) of this section; and any property of any person who does not

consent to a search or inspection of that property in accordance with

the screening system prescribed by paragraph (a) of this section.

Proposed Sec. 111.201(c) would state that the provisions of

paragraph (a) of Sec. 111.201, with respect to firearms and weapons,

would not apply to law enforcement personnel required to carry firearms

or other weapons while in the performance of their duties at the

airport; persons authorized to carry firearms in accordance with

Sec. 108.213, 108.215, 108.217, or 129.27 of the chapter; and persons

authorized to carry firearms in sterile areas under FAA-approved or

FAA-accepted security programs.

Under proposed Sec. 111.201(d), each screening company would be

required to staff the screening locations that it operates with

supervisory and nonsupervisory personnel in accordance with the

standards specified in its security program. This language is similar

to the language contained in proposed Sec. 108.201(g) of Notice No. 97-

12; however, it would be relocated to part 111 because screening

companies are responsible for their own staffing. Also, the words

``security screening checkpoints'' would be replaced with the words

``screening locations'' to include screening that is conducted at

checkpoints and at other locations.

Under proposed Sec. 111.201(e), each screening company would be

required to use the procedures included in its approved security

program to inspect checked baggage, or cargo presented for inspection

by a carrier, and therefore prevent or deter the carriage of explosives

or incendiaries in checked baggage or cargo onboard passenger aircraft.

This language is similar to the language contained in proposed

Sec. 108.201(h) of Notice No. 97-12; however, it has been amended to

more clearly indicate this requirement's applicability to checked

baggage and cargo.

III.M. Sec. 111.203 Use of screening equipment

Under proposed Sec. 111.203(a), each screening company would be

required to operate all screening equipment in accordance with its

approved security program. This equipment would include metal

detectors, X-ray systems, explosives detection systems, explosives

trace detectors, and any other screening equipment that is approved for

use by the FAA. In most cases, the carriers that contract with the

screening companies for their screening services own and maintain the

equipment and provide it to the screening companies for their use.

While screening companies would be responsible for the day-to-day

operational testing and operation of the equipment, the carriers would

still retain responsibility for the calibration and maintenance of the

equipment.

Proposed Sec. 111.203(b)-(d) would contain several X-ray-related

requirements that were originally included as part of Sec. 108.205 (see

Notice No. 97-12) but which the FAA is proposing to relocate to

proposed part 111, because they are functions that screening companies

typically carry out. Specifically, some of the language from proposed

Sec. 108.205 would be repeated in Sec. 111.203 and amended to apply to

screening companies. Proposed Sec. 111.203(b) would state that the

[[Page 576]]

Administrator authorizes certificated screening companies to use X-ray

systems for inspecting property under approved screening company

security programs if several items are met. A screening company would

be required to show that it has established a mandatory program for the

initial and recurrent training of operators of the X-ray systems, which

includes training in radiation safety, the efficient use of X-ray

systems, and the identification of unauthorized weapons, explosives,

incendiaries, and other dangerous articles. The screening company also

would be required to show that the X-ray systems that it operates meet

the imaging requirements set forth in its approved security program.

These requirements are currently contained in the carrier standard

security programs but would be relocated to the screening standard

security program to accompany the relocation of these requirements.

Under proposed Sec. 111.203(c), screening companies would be

required to inspect individuals' photographic equipment and film

packages without exposure to X-ray or explosives detection systems if

requested by the individuals. Proposed Sec. 111.203(d) would require

that each screening company comply with any X-ray operator duty time

limitations specified in its approved security program.

As will be explained in the detailed proposed rule discussion for

parts 108, 109, and 129, all requirements related to the use of X-ray

systems would also be extended to indirect air carriers and their

screening companies. The proposed Sec. 111.203 requirements above would

also apply to indirect air carriers. All remaining requirements related

to the use of X-ray systems would remain in parts 108 and 129 and be

included in part 109 as carrier responsibilities. These requirements

involve conducting radiation surveys, meeting imaging requirements,

meeting Food and Drug Administration (FDA) standards and compliance

standards regarding FDA defect notices or modification orders, and

meeting other equipment-related requirements.

III.N. Sec. 111.205 Employment standards for screening personnel

Under existing regulations, employment standards for screening

personnel are provided as requirements for air carriers under

Sec. 108.31 (proposed Sec. 108.209), for foreign air carriers under

their model security program (MSP), and for indirect air carriers under

their security program. Since these requirements include standards

regarding the screening personnel to be hired by screening companies,

the FAA proposes to relocate them from part 108, the MSP, and the

IACSSP to part 111, and assign responsibility for them to screening

companies. This would establish one consolidated list of employment

standards for all screeners performing screening in the United States.

The consolidation of all employment standards would impose some

additional requirements on screeners performing screening for air

carriers, foreign air carriers, and indirect air carriers. Under

proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(2), two additional requirements would be added

for screeners performing screening for air carriers and foreign air

carriers, which were incorporated in recent cargo-related security

program amendments. First, under proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(2)(i),

screeners would have to be able to identify the components that might

constitute an explosive or an incendiary. Second, under proposed

Sec. 111.205(a)(2)(ii), screeners would have to be able to identify

objects that appear to match those items described in all current

security directives and emergency amendments. The addition of these

proposals and other proposals below would result in the rearrangement

of the numbering structure of proposed Sec. 108.209(a)(2) (Notice No.

97-12).

Another proposal under Sec. 111.205(a)(2)(iii) would require that

screeners operating both X-ray and explosives detection system

equipment be able to distinguish on the equipment monitors the

appropriate imaging standards specified in the screening companies'

approved security programs. The FAA is proposing to amend this

requirement that already exists in part 108 to include explosives

detection systems and to change the location of all screener employment

standards from the carrier programs to the screening companies'

security programs.

Screeners performing screening for foreign air carriers operating

their own screening checkpoints in the United States theoretically

would have to meet additional standards under this proposal that

currently are not required of them. Specific differences from the

current MSP standards and this proposal are that these proposed rule

requirements would expand the English language requirements, add

education requirements, add specific screener evaluation requirements,

and provide allowances for special circumstances. Most foreign air

carriers, however, use screening checkpoints operated by U.S. air

carriers, and all of these foreign air carriers already voluntarily

comply with the existing 14 CFR part 108 employment standards to be

consistent and to allow for screener shift rotations with screening

checkpoints operated by domestic air carriers.

Screeners performing cargo screening may also have to meet an

additional standard under this proposal that is not currently required

of them. Under proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(1), these screeners would be

required to have high school diplomas, general equivalency diplomas, or

combinations of education and experience that the screening companies

have determined to have equipped the persons to perform the duties of

their positions. No other new standards would be required of screeners

performing cargo screening.

The FAA may revisit the current screener education requirements

after threat image projection (TIP) data becomes available regarding

education level as it relates to screener performance. If it appears

from the data that different employment standards are appropriate, the

FAA would propose such standards for comment and make the supporting

data available to the carriers and screening companies.

In addition to relocating the standards, a proposed requirement

would be added to Sec. 111.205(a)(4) stating that initial and recurrent

training for all screeners shall include screening persons in a

courteous and efficient manner and in compliance with the applicable

civil rights laws of the United States. The statute requires that FAA

rules for passenger screening ensure the courteous and efficient

treatment of passengers by air carriers or foreign air carriers or

agents or employees of air carriers or foreign air carriers (49 U.S.C.

44903(b)(3)(B)). Further, there are a number of laws requiring air

carriers to observe the civil rights of persons (e.g., see 42 U.S.C.

1981, 2000a, and 2000d; and 49 U.S.C. 41310 and 41702). The FAA and the

DOT's Office of the Secretary have received reports that some screeners

were discourteous and might have discriminated against certain

individuals. The FAA proposes to require that in initial and recurrent

training, screeners receive instruction in screening in a courteous and

efficient manner and in compliance with the civil rights laws. For

instance, it would not be appropriate for a screener to subject a

person to increased inspection based on the screener's view that the

person appears to be of an ethnic group that the screener considers of

a higher threat to air transportation. Further, while different methods

are required to screen persons in wheelchairs, persons with implanted

medical devices that

[[Page 577]]

may alarm the metal detector, and other persons with certain

disabilities, screeners are required to be courteous and to avoid

violating the civil rights laws while they conduct the screening. (See,

e.g., 49 U.S.C. 41705 and 14 CFR part 382, and Sec. 382.49 in

particular.) Training would help ensure that screeners are aware of

their duties in this regard.

Proposed Sec. 111.205(a)(5) would require persons with supervisory

screening duties to have initial and recurrent training that includes

leadership and management subjects. In response to noted deficiencies

in training for checkpoint security supervisory personnel and a

determination that they lacked communication skills training,

leadership development, and general supervisory skills training, the

FAA developed the Supervisor Effectiveness Training (SET) Program which

focuses on communication and leadership skills. While the SET program

is intended to serve as a model for teaching these supervisory

subjects, it is not required at this time. However, the FAA intends to

propose for comment specific standards that the leadership and

management training for checkpoint supervisors shall meet in the SSSP,

and the SET Program would meet those standards.

The FAA is seeking comments on whether additional or different

selection and employment standards are appropriate to improve the

screening companies' ability to hire qualified, effective screeners.

III.O. Sec. 111.207 Disclosure of sensitive security information

Certain information related to civil aviation security must be

protected from unauthorized disclosure because it could be used to

attempt to defeat the security system if it falls into the wrong hands.

In Sec. 191.7 the FAA has designated this information as sensitive

security information (SSI). SSI includes information about security

programs, technical specifications of certain screening equipment and

objects used to test screening equipment, and other information. Under

Sec. 191.3, the FAA does not disclose such information. Under

Sec. 191.5, carriers are required to protect SSI from disclosure,

including disclosing it to only those with a need to know.

Some SSI must be revealed to persons being trained to be screeners.

There is a high rate of turnover among screener trainees, however. A

large portion of the trainees do not complete training. It is advisable

to avoid providing SSI to those who will never need it to perform

security duties. The FAA therefore is proposing that the appropriate

steps of the employment history, verification, and criminal history

records checks that air carriers or airport operators are required to

conduct are carried out before trainees are given SSI during training.

Airport operators are required to ensure that persons with

unescorted access to security identification display areas (SIDA) have

their checks completed beforehand (see Sec. 107.31). The checks may be

carried out by the airport operators or the air carriers. Air carriers

are required to ensure that checks are completed on certain persons,

including persons who screen passengers or property that will be

carried into the cabins of aircraft (see Sec. 108.33; to appear as

Sec. 108.221 under Notice No. 97-12). Most persons who screen cargo and

checked baggage are either also qualified to screen persons and

property that will be carried into aircraft cabins, and/or have

unescorted access to SIDA's and therefore will be subject to the checks

in Sec. 107.31 or 108.33.

The checks required under current Sec. 107.31 or 108.33 are in two

parts. In most cases, only part 1 is required. Part 1 includes the

individuals providing certain information on applications, with the air

carriers or airport operators verifying selected parts of that

information. If certain conditions (triggers) are discovered during

part 1 (such as an individual is unable to support statements made on

his or her application form), the air carriers or airport operators

shall accomplish part 2 of the checks, which involves criminal history

records checks based on fingerprints.

The FAA proposes under Sec. 111.207 that each screening company

would be required to ensure that no SSI is provided to a screener

trainee who will be required to have an employment history verification

until part 1 of the trainee's check is completed. If the individual has

a history of a disqualifying crime set forth in Sec. 107.31 or 108.33,

that individual would not be permitted to screen persons or property to

be carried into aircraft cabins and thus would not be eligible to be a

screener. Under the statute, if a part 2 criminal history records check

is needed, an individual may be employed as a screener until his or her

check is completed if the person is subject to supervision (see 49

U.S.C. 44936(a)(1)(D)). This means that the person would be permitted

to receive SSI unless or until his or her records check reveals a

disqualifying crime.

The FAA considered duplicating these employment history and

verification requirements in proposed part 111 for screening companies

but did not because the statute makes the air carriers responsible for

the checks; only the air carriers, not the screening companies, can

obtain the criminal histories that may be called for under proposed

Sec. 108.221 (current Sec. 108.33). If an airport operator or an air

carrier completes part 1, the screening company would have to receive

confirmation from one of them indicating that it has been completed.

Many airport operators or air carriers authorize screening companies to

obtain applicants' part 1 employment history information and verify the

applicants' most recent 5 years of employment history. In these

situations, the airport operators or air carriers are responsible for

ensuring that the screening companies are complying with these

requirements.

III.P. Sec. 111.209 Screening company management

This proposed section would require that each screening company

have sufficient qualified management and technical personnel to ensure

the highest degree of safety in its screening. This is based on a

requirement in Sec. 119.65(a) that applies to air carriers operating

under part 121.

Proposed Sec. 111.209(b) would require that each screening company

have a screening performance coordinator (SPC). The SPC would, at a

minimum, be responsible for monitoring the quality and performance of

screening at each screening location and ensuring that corrective

action is taken to remedy any performance deficiencies. The SPC would

also serve as the primary point of contact for the company for FAA and

carrier communications regarding security-related issues. In most cases

the FAA anticipates that the SPC's would be responsible for managing

the screening operations for their companies. Management experience,

technical training, and knowledge of screening-related information

would be critical to SPC's effectiveness in their positions.

Under the proposed rule, an SPC would be required to have

successfully completed the initial security screener training course,

including the X-ray interpretation portion of the course and the end-

of-course FAA exam. The SPC's completion of initial security screener

training would ensure that he or she would have formal training in the

screener's job. The SPC would not be required to complete the on-the-

job portion of the training, because he or she would not actually

perform required

[[Page 578]]

screening, and it would not be necessary for the SPC to accomplish the

same level of proficiency as that required of a screener. The FAA

requests comments regarding which portions of the training that the

SPC's should be required to successfully complete in order to manage

screening operations effectively.

Furthermore, to ensure that the SPC's have management skills and

practical experience in the aviation security environment necessary to

act as SPC's, proposed Sec. 111.209(b)(1)(i) would require that each

SPC have at least 1 year of supervisory or managerial experience within

the last 3 years in a position that exercised control over any aviation

security screening required under part 108, 109 or 129. This

requirement is intended to provide SPC's with solid experience and

knowledge bases regarding managing and coordinating aviation screening

operations, including knowledge to apply new procedures and

technologies. The proposal would include exceptions in Sec. 111.209(d)

for those who screen only cargo for indirect air carriers (IAC's) under

part 109. During the 3-year period following the publication of the

final rule, a person who does not satisfy the experience requirements

of Sec. 111.209(b)(1)(i) would be able to serve as SPC for IAC

screening operations if authorized to do so by the Administrator. IAC's

have not been involved in screening for very long, and there might be

few individuals who could meet this standard at first. In deciding to

grant exceptions, the FAA would consider such factors as individuals'

other management experience, nonmanagement screening experience or

training, and security experience other than aviation screening.

The name and business address of an SPC would be listed in the

screening company's operations specifications. If a change in SPC's or

a vacancy occurs, the screening company would be required to notify the

Administrator within 10 days of the change under proposed

Sec. 111.209(b)(2).

Under proposed Sec. 111.209(c), each SPC would be required to have

a working knowledge of parts 111 and 191 and part 108, 109, or 129, as

applicable; his or her screening company's security program; his or her

screening company's operations specifications; relevant statutes; and

relevant technical information or manuals regarding screening

equipment, security directives, advisory circulars, and information

circulars on aviation security. This proposed requirement would help to

ensure that each SPC has a satisfactory understanding of the

fundamental regulatory and statutory requirements for screening

operations and that he or she understands the challenges involved with

screening. Well-trained, experienced SPC's would be better able to

manage safe, effective, professional screening operations. These

requirements are based on the management requirements in

Sec. Sec. 119.65-119.71 for air carriers. The requirements are

consistent with comments received on the ANPRM that stated that

management personnel should be required to have aviation screening

experience, training, and knowledge.

III.Q. Sec. 111.211 Screening company instructor qualifications

As discussed in II.H., it is increasingly important that screeners

be well qualified and receive proper training from qualified

instructors. Under proposed Sec. 111.211, screening company instructors

would have to have a minimum of 40 hours of actual experience as

security screeners making independent judgments and pass the FAA

screener knowledge-based and performance tests for each type of

screening to be taught and for the procedures and equipment for which

the instructors would be providing training. Each instructor would also

have to be briefed regarding the objectives and standards of each

course taught.

The emphasis with this proposal is to ensure that screening

companies employ instructors with important minimum qualifications.

Requiring screening instructors to have actual experience as screeners

would allow them to better understand the challenges involved in

screening and to relay helpful, realistic advice and information to

screener trainees. Requiring instructors to pass the FAA screener

knowledge-based and performance tests in each area of screening taught

would help ensure that the instructors have attained the knowledge and,

as applicable, the skills and abilities needed to be effective as

instructors. The FAA expects that screening companies would hire

instructors who are knowledgeable about the screening process, who are

able to demonstrate correctly screening procedures to trainees, and who

can effectively and thoroughly communicate screening-related objectives

and lesson plans to trainees. Conducting on-the-job training would keep

instructors proficient regarding screening technologies and procedures.

III.R. Sec. 111.213 Training and knowledge of persons with screening-

related duties

The language in proposed Sec. 111.213 mirrors parts of the proposed

language contained in Sec. 108.227 for air carriers (Notice No. 97-12).

Under proposed Sec. 111.213(a), no screening company would be permitted

to use any screener, screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security

supervisor unless that person had received training as specified in its

approved screening company security program, including the

responsibilities in Sec. 111.105. Under Sec. 111.213(c), each screening

company would be required to ensure that screeners, screeners-in-

charge, or checkpoint security supervisors have knowledge of the

provisions of part 111, the screening company's security program, and

any applicable security directive (SD), emergency amendment (EA), and

information circular (IC) information to the extent that such

individuals need to know this information to perform their duties.

Proposed Secs. 111.213(b) would require that each screening company

submit its training program for screeners, screeners in charge, and

checkpoint security supervisors to the Administrator for approval. Each

training program should address the subject material contained in the

security program's training and testing standards. The FAA proposes to

create a performance-based training environment where screening

companies would be expected to train their screening personnel to pass

specific tests developed by the FAA. The FAA proposes to do away with

the hourly training requirements for initial and recurrent training and

give screening companies the flexibility to train their screeners using

their own FAA-approved training programs. Screening companies would be

responsible for ensuring that their trainees are able to pass an FAA

knowledge-based and, if applicable, X-ray interpretation test at the

end of their initial training and that their screening personnel are

meeting performance standards thereafter (see proposed Sec. 111.215 for

discussion regarding FAA tests). The FAA testing standards would

encompass the subjects currently outlined in the Air Carrier Standard

Security Program and might include additional standards regarding, for

example, operating new screening technologies. The testing standards

would differ for tests of persons who will screen persons and

accessible property, checked baggage, and cargo, because each type of

screening has some different features. As discussed above,

[[Page 579]]

the FAA is developing computer-based instruction and has made this

available for use by the industry.

In addition to the testing standards, the Screening Standard

Security Program also would contain a list of subjects and types of

training that the FAA would require that screening companies brief and

demonstrate to their trainees. Trainees might not be tested on all of

the subjects, but the information would be critical to their positions

and performance. Examples of training standards would be demonstrating

effective handwanding and manual search techniques, demonstrating a

variety of improvised explosive device configurations, and briefing

trainees on the definition of sensitive security information (SSI) and

why SSI must be protected.

III.S. Sec. 111.215 Training tests: requirements

This proposed section would introduce several new requirements all

related to testing screeners at the completion of their classroom

training sessions. The provisions would impose more control and

consistency in the training environment, emphasize the importance of

proper training and testing, and promote professionalism by both

trainees and instructors. The proposals under this section are similar

to other FAA regulations related to testing, such as those required for

pilots and flight instructors under 14 CFR part 61. They are designed

to help ensure that screener trainees have attained the knowledge and

skills that they need to perform their jobs effectively.

Currently, air carriers can design and administer their own written

tests for screeners. The tests usually consist of approximately 20

basic multiple-choice questions (the knowledge-based portion), and the

air carriers have latitude in choosing the subject matter to be

addressed and in designing the questions. The performance-based portion

of the tests often consists of X-ray interpretation scenarios using

overhead slides.

Proposed Sec. 111.215(a) would require that each screener trainee

pass one standardized FAA screener readiness test for each type of

screening to be performed (persons, accessible property, checked

baggage, and cargo) and for the procedures and equipment to be used

prior to beginning on-the-job training. Since most screeners conduct

screening of persons, accessible property, and checked baggage, the FAA

envisions designing one test to address all of these types of

screening. Since cargo screening involves some unique factors and does

not involve screening persons, the FAA would most likely develop a

separate test for cargo screeners. These standardized tests would

address the traditional methods of screening and equipment used to

conduct screening, such as metal detector devices, hand wand devices,

and X-ray systems. The standardized tests might also encompass such

explosives detection devices as explosives trace detection (ETD)

devices. For more complex explosives detection equipment, such as

explosives detection systems (EDS), an additional FAA knowledge-based

and performance test would be required before the screeners could

operate that equipment.

Proposed Sec. 111.215(b) would require that each screening company

ensure that each screener trainee completes 40 hours of on-the-job

training and passes an FAA on-the-job training test before exercising

independent judgment as a screener. Screeners would have to

successfully pass that test before qualified supervisory-level

individuals could sign the certification statements in the screeners'

training and qualification records. The FAA envisions that this on-the-

job training test would be a computer-based test that is similar to the

image interpretation portion of the FAA screener readiness test, but

that it might require a higher score. The test would supplement all

realistic carrier testing required before screeners are permitted to

make independent judgments. Applicants for pilot certificates under

part 61 and mechanic certificates under part 65 must also pass FAA

knowledge and performance tests.

Under proposed Sec. 111.215(c), each screening company would be

required to ensure that each screener passes an FAA review test at the

conclusion of his or her recurrent training. The written tests that are

currently administered at the conclusion of recurrent training are

required by the FAA and are designed by the carriers or screening

companies; screening companies would now be required to provide their

screeners with FAA recurrent tests, and carriers would be required to

monitor the testing and grading process.

The specific requirements and guidelines for the tests proposed

under Sec. 111.215(a), (b), and (c) would be outlined in the screening

companies' security programs. Using the same tests and grading them the

same way throughout the country would ensure that trainees all meet the

same, appropriate standards before making independent judgments and

would promote uniformity among all screeners.

Currently, many screening companies administer end-of-course

knowledge-based tests to screener trainees in a paper format and

administer the performance tests to trainees using overhead slides.

This increases opportunities for cheating, because many screener

trainees receive the same versions of the tests and because classes as

a whole are usually interpreting the X-ray images at the same time.

Instances have occurred where trainees or instructors have helped other

trainees answer test questions or interpret X-ray images.

Proposed Sec. 111.215(d) would address this issue by requiring that

each screening company use an FAA computer-based test to administer the

FAA tests for screener readiness, on-the-job training, and recurrent

training unless otherwise authorized by the Administrator. This

proposal would standardize the screener testing process, provide a

unique mix of challenging and relevant test questions for each

screener, discourage the sharing of test information, provide X-ray

images for the X-ray interpretation portion of the test that are more

like those on an actual X-ray machine, and automatically score the

trainees' responses. The questions and interpretation images would be

varied for each trainee (making it impossible to copy from one

another), but would always address the key subjects contained in the

testing standards. The FAA is currently developing these automated

tests based on existing requirements for screeners. The tests are being

designed to be user friendly and easily loaded onto standard personal

computers to minimize costs and maximize flexibility.

Proposed Sec. 111.215(e) would require each screening company to

ensure that each test that it administers under Sec. 111.215(a) and (c)

is monitored by an employee of the carrier for which it screens. When

the screening company plans to administer a test to screener trainees

it would be responsible for requesting that the applicable carrier(s)

provide a test monitor during the entire testing and grading process.

Each applicable carrier would be responsible for providing a test

monitor upon request and ensuring that the test monitor meets the

qualifications contained in proposed Sec. 108.229, 109.205, or

129.25(p) and the supporting requirements in the screening company's

security program. (See section IV.I. regarding monitoring of screener

training tests and sharing of carrier responsibilities.)

III.T. Sec. 111.217 Training tests: cheating and other unauthorized

conduct

Proposed Sec. 111.217 is included to emphasize that cheating is not

permitted on any training test

[[Page 580]]

administered to or taken by screening personnel, to include test

monitors, screeners, screeners-in-charge, checkpoint security

supervisors, and screening performance coordinators. Under proposed

Sec. 111.217, no person may copy or intentionally remove a knowledge-

based or performance test under this part; give to another or receive

from another any part or copy of that test; or give help on that test

to or receive help on that test from any person during the period that

test is being given. In addition, no person may take any part of that

test on behalf of another person; use any material or aid during the

period that test is being given; or intentionally cause, assist, or

participate in any act prohibited by this paragraph except as

authorized by the Administrator. These requirements are similar to the

testing regulations set forth in Sec. 61.37 for pilots. These

prohibitions apply ``except as authorized'' by the FAA, to provide for

the possibility that in the future the FAA would authorize such conduct

as the use of certain outside materials. For instance, in pilot exams,

the applicants may bring flight computers to perform required

calculations.

Any instances reported to the FAA involving allegations that

screening companies or screening company employees are permitting

cheating on tests would be investigated, and those companies or

individuals involved in the incidents could be held accountable. It

would be particularly important that the test monitors explain the

consequences of cheating on tests to their trainees and be alert to any

occurrences of cheating. If an instance of cheating occurs, a test

monitor would be required to declare the test invalid and inform

appropriate screening company and carrier management officials of the

incident. FAA special agents also would regularly monitor screening

company testing.

III.U. Sec. 111.219 Screener letter of completion of training

Throughout this proposal, the FAA has sought ways to more

effectively train, challenge, and motivate screeners and their

supervisors. The following proposal would provide screeners and

supervisors with verification of their training, and may provide a

modest means of motivation by encouraging pride in the employees

regarding their accomplishments. Under proposed Sec. 111.219, each

screening company would issue letters of completion of training to

screeners, screeners-in-charge (SIC), and checkpoint security

supervisors (CSS) upon each successful completion of approved initial,

recurrent, or specialized courses of training. Specialized training

would encompass, for example, training for explosives detection

equipment. These letters of completion would not serve as certification

for screeners, CSS's, and SIC's, but would provide them with records of

their specific training accomplishments. The FAA believes that

requiring screening companies to issue letters of completion to

screeners and screener supervisors for their successful completion of

training would help enhance the professionalism of this critical

security job.

Each letter of completion of training would be required to contain

the trainee's name, course of training completed and date of

completion, name of the screening company providing the training, and a

statement signed by a GSC, CSS, or SIC indicating that the trainee has

satisfactorily completed each required stage of the approved course of

training and the associated tests. Each letter of completion would also

be required to indicate the types of screening that the screener was

trained to perform (persons, accessible property, checked baggage, and/

or cargo) and the equipment and methods of screening that the screener

was trained to operate and carry out. Examples of equipment would be X-

ray systems and EDS. An example of a method of screening would be a

manual search.

Screening companies could include letters of completion of training

as part of their required screener and screener supervisor training and

qualification records, but the letters would not serve as substitutes

for the remaining records requirements.

III.V. Sec. 111.221 Screener and supervisor training records

Under proposed Sec. 111.221, a screening company would be required

to forward training records for a screener, screener-in-charge, or

checkpoint security supervisor to another screening company upon the

request of the employee. The other screening company would be able to

use the employee without fully retraining him or her if it provides

training on the procedures that differ from those of the previous

company. In the event that a screening company ceases operations at a

site, it would also be required to return its original screener records

to the carrier for which it was conducting screening. These

improvements would increase mobility for screeners, screeners-in-

charge, and checkpoint security supervisors. They would also ensure

that training documentation would not be lost if a screening company

leaves a location. These proposed requirements are consistent with

several comments received on the ANPRM which stated that making

screener personnel and training files transferable would enhance

professionalism.

Proposed Sec. 111.221(f), in particular, would require that

training, testing, and certification records be made available promptly

to FAA special agents upon request and be maintained for a period of at

least 180 days following the termination of duty for a screener,

screener-in-charge, or checkpoint security supervisor. Test records

would include all tests to which the employee was subjected, not just

those satisfactorily completed. Carriers currently are required to

maintain these records under their security programs. Including this

requirement as part of proposed part 111 would result in transferring

the responsibility to maintain the records to screening companies, who

often already maintain the records, and would standardize the length of

time that records have to be maintained.

III.W. Sec. 111.223 Automated performance measurement and standards

As discussed in section II.I., the FAA is proposing to enhance the

FAA's, carriers', and screening companies' abilities to measure the

performance of screening locations and to set FAA standards for their

operation. Under proposed Sec. 111.223(a), each screening company would

be required to use a threat image projection (TIP) system for each X-

ray and explosives detection system that it uses as specified in its

security program to measure the performance of individual screeners,

screening locations, and screening companies. It is important to note

that this requirement would not require screening companies to install

physically the TIP systems on the X-ray systems that they operate.

Rather, it would require screening companies to operate the TIP systems

that the carriers have installed in accordance with the procedures

contained in their screening company security programs. The security

program procedures would specify usage procedures, log on/log off

procedures for each screener, and any data collection requirements.

Proper operation of the TIP units and collection of data would be

critical to measuring accurately the performance of screening

companies.

Under proposed Sec. 111.223(b), each screening company would be

required to meet the performance standards set forth in its security

program. These

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performance standards would be established through the notice and

comment procedures for amending security programs. The FAA envisions

establishing a range of performance that all screening companies would

be required to fall within to be considered effective at detecting

possible threats. If a screening company falls short of the minimum

performance standards, it may be required to carry out additional

security measures to maintain the required level of security, depending

on the circumstances involved, and could ultimately lose its FAA

certification if its performance does not improve (see discussion of

possible additional security measures in section II.I.).

The FAA expects that each screening company would regularly monitor

its overall performance as well as its individual screeners'

performance and take corrective actions as necessary. The FAA also

expects that each carrier that contracts with a screening company would

regularly monitor that screening company's performance. These oversight

responsibilities would be outlined in the carriers' security programs,

and the carriers would be responsible for working with their screening

companies to remedy any performance problems.

The FAA would collect and analyze screening company performance

data regularly to monitor performance and to determine whether

screening companies and carriers are in compliance with the required

performance standards. The FAA would also closely review data regarding

screening companies' performance at the time of initial certification

(if historical performance data are available) and before each

subsequent certification renewal.

The FAA proposes to require that TIP systems be installed on X-ray

and explosives detection systems at the U.S. screening locations

specified in the carriers' security programs. The FAA proposes to

require that TIP systems be installed initially at the busiest

screening locations. The specific screening locations affected by this

requirement would be described in the carriers' security programs. The

FAA then would phase in requirements to install TIP systems at the

remaining U.S. screening locations where property is screened. The

process of phasing in requirements for TIP systems would allow the FAA

to address promptly the higher threat airports and would allow

realistic timeframes for updating older equipment to make it TIP-

compatible. The FAA already has installed TIP systems at many of the

Nation's major airports and will advocate additional installations at

other airports and cargo facilities. During the phase-in process, the

FAA will continue to measure screening companies' performance through

testing and assessments.

IV. Proposed Revisions to Parts 108, 109, and 129

The following section discusses the detailed rule proposals for

parts 108, 109, and 129. The proposed additions for part 109 have been

organized in a new regulatory format similar to that of Notice No. 97-

12 for part 108, for clarity and consistency.

IV.A. Secs. 108.201(h); 109.203(a); and 129.25(k) Certification

requirement

Proposed new Sec. 108.201(h) would require that each carrier

required to conduct screening of persons and property under a security

program hold a screening company certificate issued under part 111 if

the carrier will conduct the screening or use another screening company

certificated under part 111 to conduct such screening.

Proposed new Sec. 109.203(a) would require that each indirect air

carrier that elects to conduct screening of property under a security

program hold a screening company certificate issued under part 111 or

use another screening company certificated under part 111 to conduct

such screening.

Proposed Sec. 129.25(k) would require that each foreign air carrier

required to conduct screening of persons and property under a security

program either hold a screening company certificate issued under part

111 or use a screening company certificated under that part for

screening locations within the United States.

Proposed Sec. 108.201(h), 109.203(a), and 129.25(k) would all state

that FAA-certified canine teams are not required to be operated by

certificated screening companies. This statement is included to provide

clarification for situations where FAA-certified canine teams are used

to conduct screening.

IV.B. Secs. 108.5 and 109.5 Inspection authority

Proposed Sec. 108.5, Inspection authority, would be amended to

require that each air carrier also allow the Administrator, including

FAA special agents, to make any inspections or tests at any time or

place to determine screening company compliance with the new part 111

of this chapter and the carrier's screening company security

program(s). Proposed Sec. 108.5 also would be amended to require that

an air carrier provide evidence of compliance with the new part 111 of

this chapter and its screening company security program(s) at the

request of the Administrator.

Similar inspection authority language would also be proposed as

Sec. 109.5 to be consistent with the requirements in Secs. 108.5 and

119.59. This proposed parallel section would not be a new requirement,

because it is already required by statute. Rather, the proposed section

is intended to resolve any confusion regarding the FAA's statutory

authority to conduct inspect

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