Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

Congressional research reportMar 11, 2009

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Specialist in Military Aviation

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March 11, 2009

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RS22684

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

Summary

Japan has expressed interest in purchasing the F-22A Raptor aircraft from the United States.

Although the export of the plane is now prohibited by U.S. law, Congress has recently and may

again consider repealing this ban. Arguments for the sale include potential benefits to U.S.

industry, contribution to the defense of Japan and the region, and promotion of U.S.

interoperability with the Japanese military. Arguments against the transfer include concerns about

technology proliferation and the potential for undermining regional stability. This report will be

updated as warranted.

Congressional Research Service

Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

Contents

Background ................................................................................................................................1

Japan’s Defense Policy..........................................................................................................1

Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................................2

U.S. Industrial Base ..............................................................................................................2

Technology Transfer .............................................................................................................3

Interoperability and Interdependence.....................................................................................3

Regional Security..................................................................................................................4

Japanese Restraints ...............................................................................................................4

Potential Alternatives to the F-22 ................................................................................................5

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) ..............................................................................................5

F/A/18E/F Super Hornet .......................................................................................................6

F-15 Eagle ............................................................................................................................6

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV) .........................................................................6

European Options .................................................................................................................6

Contacts

Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................6

Congressional Research Service

Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

Background

The F-22A Raptor1 is the U.S. Air Force’s, and according to many observers, the world’s, most

advanced manned combat aircraft. Developed principally to defeat Soviet aircraft in air-to-air

combat, the F-22 exploits the latest developments in stealth technology to reduce detection by

enemy radar, as well as thrust-vectoring engines for more maneuverability, and avionics that fuse

and display information from on-board and off-board sensors in a single battlefield display.

Current plans call for the U.S. purchase of 183 F-22s, with the last aircraft being procured with

FY2009 funds. Air Force leaders say that they require 381 F-22s, but lack the funds to purchase

198 additional aircraft. The debate over the export of F-22s, though not new, has become more

pointed as the end of procurement funding (FY2009), and the closure of the assembly line, nears.

Whether to continue production of the F-22 is an issue that will confront the 111th Congress early

in its first session.

The Department of Defense (DoD) is officially neutral on whether the F-22 should be exported,

but senior leaders have suggested that they favor foreign sales of the F-22.2 However, since 1998,

Congress has prohibited the use of appropriated funds to approve or license the sale of the F-22 to

any foreign government. 3 This provision, known as the “Obey Amendment,” was debated in the

109th Congress. The House Defense Appropriations Bill for FY2007 proposed to repeal the law,

but export opponents in the House prevailed with the Senate in conference. 4

Japan’s Defense Policy

For the United States, its alliance with Japan provides a platform for U.S. military readiness in

Asia. About 53,000 U.S. troops are stationed in Japan and have the exclusive use of 89 facilities

throughout the archipelago. Okinawa, hosting 37 of the facilities, is the major U.S. forward

logistics base in the Asia-Pacific region. Echoing his predecessors, President Obama has labeled

the U.S.-Japan alliance the “cornerstone of East Asian security.” High-level U.S.-Japan bilateral

initiatives since 2001 declared an expanded commitment to security cooperation by outlining

major command changes and calling for greater interoperability between the two militaries.5

Several of the agreements have stalled, however, due to resistance to base realignment by local

host governments and political gridlock in Tokyo.

Japan faces a challenging regional context: both direct and potential security threats, as well as

suspicion from other states that changes to Tokyo’s defense policy indicate a return to its

militarist past. North Korea poses a particularly acute and proximate threat to Japan, heightened

by Pyongyang’s ballistic missile and nuclear explosive device tests in 2006. Historical enmity and

For more information, see CRS Report RL31673, F-22A Raptor, by (name redacted).

Frank Wolfe, “Aldridge JSF Letter Hints at Administration Favor Toward F-22 Foreign Sales,” Defense Daily,

October 5, 2001.

H.Rept. 105-265 (H.R. 2266), sec. 8118, p. 45; H.Rept. 106-754 (H.R. 4576), sec. 8087, p. 38; H.Rept. 108-662 (H.R.

4613), sec. 8074, p. 38; Explanatory Statement, Amendment of the House of Representatives to the Senate to H.R.

2638. p.441.

H.Rept. 109-676 (H.R. 5631) sec. 8058, p. 31.

See CRS Report RL33740, The Changing U.S.-Japan Alliance: Implications for U.S. Interests, by (name redacted

) and CRS Report RL33436,

Japan-U.S. Relations: Issues for Congress, coordinated by (name redacted).

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Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

contemporary competition for influence with China makes Beijing’s military modernization

worrisome for Japanese defense planners. The Japanese Self Defense Forces (SDF, the official

name for Japan’s military) has detected periodic Chinese military activities in areas surrounding

Japan’s outlying islands, including submarine incursions close to Okinawa and a fleet of warships

near a disputed gas field. Tokyo also faces difficult relations with South Korea because of Korean

distrust based on the memory of Japan’s 40-year annexation of the peninsula and some territorial

disputes.

Issues for Congress

The executive branch proposes and Congress reviews arms sales on a case-by-case basis.6 The

sale of F-22s to Japan raises both broad questions about the security environment in East Asia and

questions that are specific to domestic interests. Factors that argue for a transfer include potential

benefits to U.S. industry, contribution to the defense of allied countries, and promoting U.S.

interoperability with those countries. Factors that argue against a particular arms transfer include

the likelihood of technology proliferation and the potential for undermining regional stability.7

U.S. Industrial Base

Exporting F-22s to Japan is one way to keep the F-22 production line running after U.S. Air Force

procurement ends. Lockheed Martin, the F-22 prime contractor, estimates that it employs 3,351

F-22 workers at three plants (Marietta, GA; Fort Worth, TX; Palmdale, CA). Many others –

perhaps as many as 25,000 – are also employed by major subcontractors Pratt & Whitney and

Boeing, and by companies that produce F-22 parts and sub-components. Generally speaking,

promoting employment in the aerospace sector is beneficial to the U.S. economy. However, some

aerospace jobs are more important to promoting U.S. industrial competitiveness than others. At

this stage of production, more F-22 employees are involved in aircraft assembly, which is

relatively rote and unskilled compared to the design and engineering skills required earlier in the

aircraft’s development and initial production. Keeping the F-22 production line open by building

aircraft for Japan would also help the prime contractor reduce per-aircraft costs, because labor

and manufacturing processes become more efficient over time, and because sunk costs, such as

R&D or capital investment, would be amortized over a larger number of aircraft. DoD and U.S.

taxpayers would only benefit from reduced per-aircraft costs, however, if the Air Force were to

purchase more F-22s after those produced for Japan, and in addition to the 183 aircraft currently

planned.

A final industrial base issue pertains to the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). Although originally

intended to be complementary aircraft, F-22 and JSF capabilities, development, and production

have converged. Implicitly if not explicitly, these aircraft are competing for scarce procurement

funds. Extension of F-22 production would likely bring these aircraft into even sharper

For more information, see CRS Report RL33696, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1998-2005,

by (name redacted), and CRS Report RL33758,

U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major

Clients, 1998-2005, by (name redacted).

In the late 1980s, Congress debated and denied a DoD request to co-develop a fighter aircraft with Japan based on the

F-16 Falcon. Some of the issues weighed during that debate may be relevant today. CRS Report 90-986, Japanese FSX

Fighter Controversy, out of print; available upon request.

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Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

competition. On the other hand, F-22 supporters argue, keeping the F-22 production line alive

could serve as a useful hedge against any potential delay in JSF production.

Technology Transfer

Air Force leaders have consistently touted the F-22 as the world’s most technologically advanced

and capable fighter aircraft. Protecting U.S. intellectual property in these technologies and

denying access to adversaries are high national security priorities. It is unclear whether the United

States and Japan could agree on the capabilities to be offered in the export variant of the F-22.

Japan would likely want an aircraft the same as, or similar to, that flown by the U.S. Air Force,

and would also likely prefer to license or co-manufacture the aircraft, which gives them more

opportunity to acquire engineering and design knowledge, and technology transfer. Presumably,

DoD would desire to export a less capable aircraft, in part to protect key technologies, and would

have a strong aversion to license or co-production. Japan has traditionally placed great value on

developing industrial defense “autonomy,” that is, indigenous weapons production, although this

imperative has relaxed somewhat in recent years, in part to cooperate with the United States on

missile defense. 8

The potential for technology transfer touches upon both military and economic concerns. Unlike

some countries, Japan does not have a track record of re-exporting technology that it acquires

through import. However, an inadvertent leak of U.S. technology or knowledge could also be a

threat. The leak of secret data associated with the Aegis weapon system by Japanese military

personnel in 2002 is an example of this potential danger.9 Japan is a military ally, but also

considered by some to be an economic rival. Many of the F-22 technologies or industrial

processes could have commercial application. Some may be concerned that F-22 technology or

knowledge could find their way into a myriad of Japanese products, to the competitive detriment

of U.S. industry.

A second proliferation issue relates to the effect an F-22 sale could have on other countries. Other

countries in the region could perceive the F-22 as causing an imbalance of military power in favor

of Japan, and inciting them to seek their own advanced aircraft or defensive systems. Once Japan

sets the precedent of F-22 export, other countries might pressure U.S. policy makers to sell them

F-22s. Israel, for example, has reportedly expressed interest in the F-22.

Interoperability and Interdependence

Bilateral agreements aim to expand the benefits of the alliance by increasing the interoperability

of the U.S. and Japanese militaries, therefore multiplying their collective capability. Several joint

facilities are planned, including an air operations coordination center at Yokota Air Base, to be

operational by 2010. Japan’s acquisition of the F-22 would boost interoperability because both

militaries could use identical, state-of-the-art equipment. Because of the U.S. security guarantee

to Japan, Japan’s possession of the F-22s may allow the United States to rotate its own aircraft out

Richard J. Samuels, “Give & Take; The Outlook for U.S.-Japan Defense Industrial Cooperation,” Armed Forces

Journal. February 1, 2006.

“High Barriers for Introduction of F-22,” Asahi News. June 4, 2007. From the Daily Summary of Japanese Press, U.S.

Embassy Public Affairs Section.

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Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

of the region when necessary. Similarly, by fielding the F-22, Japan could make up for the deficit

of 198 Raptors the U.S. Air Force says it needs but cannot afford.

Despite these ambitions, however, achieving true interoperability is a difficult task.

Constitutional, legal, and normative constraints limit SDF participation in many of the operations

and training that traditionally integrate different national forces (see section below). Increasing

the sophistication of bilateral training requires funding and facilities, currently under pressure

because of SDF’s budget requirements. Language barriers and differences in military doctrine

also present challenges. In addition, localities affected by the noise of military bases, particularly

those hosting aircraft, have been vocally opposed to many of the U.S. troop realignment

proposals.

Regional Security

China and South Korea have voiced concern about Japan’s intention to upgrade its military

capabilities, largely grounded in suspicions that Japan will inch toward returning to its pre-1945

militarism. Some analysts caution that selling the F-22s to Japan could destabilize the region,

possibly even sparking an arms race, and contribute to an image of Japan becoming America’s

proxy in the region. The sale could complicate the U.S. effort to manage its relationship with

China. South Korea has already registered its unease at Japan acquiring F-22s, and at one point

suggested that it may seek a deal to purchase the aircraft in order to match Japan’s capabilities.10

Although the Lee Myung-bak government has made moves to strengthen U.S.-South Korean

alliance, the Seoul-Washington relationship has been strained at times over the past several years,

and some South Koreans chafe at indications that the United States prioritizes defense ties with

Japan above those with Korea.

Japanese defense officials have pointed to China’s acquisition of increasingly sophisticated air

capabilities to justify their request for the F-22s, asserting that China’s modern air fleet will soon

dwarf Japan’s. Despite the relatively strong state of relations between Tokyo and Beijing, the two

nations remain wary of each other’s intentions. Although the risk of military confrontation is

considered small, there is the potential that territorial disputes over outlying islands could escalate

into armed clashes, or that conflict could break out in the Taiwan Strait between the United States

and China, which could involve Japan. For this reason, some U.S. and Japanese commentators

have supported the sale of F-22s to Japan as necessary to maintain the “Taiwan balance.”

Japanese Restraints

Japan faces an array of legal and budgetary concerns about enhancing its military, raising

questions about whether Tokyo could follow through on an F-22 sale. Article 9 of the Japanese

constitution, drafted by American officials during the post-war occupation, outlaws war as a

“sovereign right” of Japan and prohibits “the right of belligerency.” Although Article 9 states that

“land, sea, and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintained,” the Japanese

SDF is in practice a well-funded and well-equipped military. Constitutional concerns do not

appear to be significant for the purchase of the F-22, but provide a sense of the overall context

and challenges to acquiring advanced weapons systems in a country with a strong pacifist

sentiment.

In 2008, South Korea purchased 39 F-15ks and plan to buy 21 F-15K level aircraft between 2010-2012.

Congressional Research Service

Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

Under a self-imposed ban on exporting arms, Japan cannot in principle participate in joint

development that requires it to export weapons parts and research data to other countries. This

ban has been loosened to allow Japan to work on missile defense with the United States, but the

issue remains contentious. Japan’s aversion to military export led to Tokyo’s decision not to

participate in the international consortium to co-develop the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.

A second legal issue that could generate debate in Japan, and therefore affect the sale, is the

question of whether the F-22 is an offensive weapon; under the current interpretation of the

Japanese constitution, the SDF is only allowed to possess defensive capability. Military aircraft

are almost inherently flexible weapon systems and can be difficult to classify as “offensive” or

“defensive.” They can be used in primarily defensive roles, such as defending indigenous

airspace from attack, or to attack an adversary’s homeland or air forces. When the F-22 program

was threatened by congressional budget cuts, advocates argued that its offensive capabilities

mandated its continuation. Consistent emphasis on the F-22s’ ability to penetrate contested

airspace and destroy enemy defenses could lead many to believe that the Raptor is primarily an

offensive weapon.

At $44 billion (2007), Japan’s defense budget is among the largest in the world.11 However,

Japanese leaders are under pressure to stem government spending, and many ministries face

budget cuts as part of ongoing fiscal reform. Overall, Japan’s defense budget has steadily if

modestly declined over the past several years. Defense spending in Japan has traditionally been

capped at 1% of GDP; most leaders are wary of surpassing that symbolic benchmark, although

the cap is not a law. Tokyo’s defense expenditures include ongoing host nation support for U.S.

forces stationed in Japan (totaling $110 billion from 1978-2007)12 and an estimated $20 billion

for the realignment of U.S. troops in the region. Based on these burdens, some analysts have

voiced concerns that the SDF runs the risk of becoming a “hollow force” because of its

insufficient procurement system. Budget pressure is likely to remain high in Japan due to the

demographic reality of an aging and shrinking population with a shortage of workers.

Potential Alternatives to the F-22

There appear to be at least four U.S. alternatives to the F-22 and several from Europe that Japan

might consider. Each alternatives presents strengths and weaknesses in terms of operational

capabilities, and also vis-a-vis the security, proliferation, and industrial base issues outlined in this

report.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

The JSF was designed from the beginning as a multinational aircraft. Technology transfer issues

remain, but their resolution will likely be far easier than those presented by the F-22. While the

JSF is not as fast or nimble as the F-22, its radar and avionics are more advanced. The JSF may be

well suited to Japan’s self-defense requirements while presenting a less offensive capability.

According to Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) data.

CIA World Factbook; Japan. CIA (2007-03-15).

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Potential F-22 Raptor Export to Japan

F/A/18E/F Super Hornet

The F/A-18/E/F Super Hornet is the most capable fighter aircraft flown by the U.S. Navy. It does

not offer stealth technology like the F-22 or JSF, but is expected to be in the active inventory

through at least 2020 and will retain its combat edge through upgrades and modifications. The

Super Hornet’s manufacturer, Boeing, recently signed its first export deal with Australia.

F-15 Eagle

The F-15 Eagle has been the U.S. Air Force’s top fighter aircraft since it was fielded in the 1970s.

Today, Japan operates 203 F-15 aircraft. By purchasing additional F-15 aircraft instead of

importing a new type of fighter, Japan could potentially realize economies of scale savings in

training, maintenance, and supplies by operating a larger fleet. The F-15 is not as capable as the

F-22 or JSF, but if upgraded, and operated in conjunction with support aircraft—such as AWACS

and electronic warfare aircraft—might be sufficiently capable to meet Japan’s needs.

Unmanned Combat Aerial Vehicles (UCAV)

Another alternative would be to develop or import a UCAV. UAVs such as the USAF Predator are

relatively well established weapons platforms, but limited compared to UAVs designed from the

beginning as combat platforms. While advocates believe that UCAVs represent the future of

combat aviation, true, dedicated combat UAVs have not yet been fielded. Pursuing UCAVs versus

manned aircraft could be perceived as either avant garde or premature.

European Options

Japan could import an advanced combat aircraft from Sweden (the JAS Gripen), Russia (Su-30

Flanker and MiG-29 Fulcrum series), or from a consortium of European countries (the

Eurofighter Typhoon). Japan has relied almost exclusively on U.S. military imports in the past,

and many believe it unlikely that it would import from non-U.S. sources. Purchasing European

aircraft, however, would allow Japan to establish a second source of technology, and thus some

autonomy from the United States, and European governments would be expected to offer very

attractive terms to penetrate the heretofore closed Japanese market.

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Specialist in Military Aviation

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

(name redacted)

Specialist in Asian Affairs

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

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