U.S. Military Overseas Basing: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress

Order Code RS21975

November 17, 2004

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

U.S. Military Overseas Basing:

Background and Oversight

Issues for Congress

Jon D. Klaus

National Defense Fellow

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Summary

On August 16, 2004, the Bush Administration announced a proposal to

significantly alter the U.S. overseas military basing posture. The proposal would, if

implemented, establish new overseas operating sites, and transfer up to 70,000 U.S.

troops, plus 100,000 family members and civilians, from Europe and Asia back to the

United States. The Administration argues that current U.S. global basing arrangements

are a product of World War II and the Korean War. With the end of the Cold War, these

basing arrangements need to be updated to ensure that U.S. forces are optimally

positioned to respond to potential 21st-Century military threats. The Administration’s

proposal has received mixed reactions from non-DOD observers. A May 2004

Congressional Budget Office report raises questions concerning the potential cost

effectiveness of changing the current Army overseas basing posture. The

Administration’s proposal raises several potential oversight issues for Congress. This

report will be updated as necessary.

Introduction and Issue for Congress

On August 16, 2004, President Bush announced a proposal to significantly alter the

U.S. overseas military basing posture. The proposal would establish new overseas

operating sites, and transfer up to 70,000 U.S. troops, plus 100,000 family members and

civilians, from Europe and Asia back to the continental United States (CONUS). The

issue for Congress is whether to approve, modify, or reject the Bush Administration’s

proposal. Budget and oversight decisions that Congress makes on this issue could have

significant political and diplomatic implications. Decisions could also significantly affect

U.S. military capabilities, Department of Defense (DOD) funding requirements, and the

upcoming 2005 round of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process.1

1

For more on the 2005 BRAC round, see CRS Report RS21822, Military Base Closures: DOD’s

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Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Background

The Administration’s Proposal. Implementing the Administration’s proposal

would bring about the most profound reordering of U.S. military troops overseas in about

50 years. The proposal calls for the transfer of up to 70,000 U.S. troops, plus 100,000

family members and civilians, from a number of overseas main operating bases in

Germany, Japan, and South Korea. The Administration would then establish new

secondary and tertiary facilities — called forward operating sites and cooperative security

locations, respectively — in various new locations around the world. In contrast to main

operating bases, which have permanently stationed forces and family support structures,

forward operating sites would be maintained by a limited number of military personnel

and might have some stored equipment. These sites would host rotational forces and be

a focus for bilateral and regional training. Cooperative security locations, would be “bare

bones” sites maintained by contractors or host-nation personnel, with little or no

permanent U.S. presence. These locations would provide contingency access and be a

focal point for regional access. Forward operating sites and cooperative security locations

would supplement main operating bases and act as “lily pads” to facilitate the rapid

deployment of U.S. forces to various parts of the world.

Examples of main operating bases include Ramstein Air Base Germany and Camp

Humphreys in South Korea. Examples of forward operating sites include Soto Cano Air

Base in Honduras and Thumrait and Masirah Island air bases in Oman. Examples of

cooperative security locations include the air base at Dakar, Senegal, and the airport at

Entebbe, Uganda. U.S. officials have reportedly held talks on establishing new operating

sites with Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Turkey, Azerbaijan, Uzbekistan, Sao Tome and

Principe (off the coast of Africa), Thailand, the Philippines, and Singapore.2

At a September 23, 2004, hearing before the Senate Armed Services Committee,

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld said that the proposed transfer of 70,000 troops

back to CONUS would be completed over a period of six to eight years. To date,

Administration officials have proposed regional plans for Europe, Asia and the Pacific,

and the Western Hemisphere and Africa.

Europe. The Administration’s proposal would transfer up to 40,000 Europeanbased U.S. troops, mostly from the Army, to CONUS. The U.S. Army Commander in

Europe, General B. B. Bell, has stated that he envisions most of the 40,000 troops coming

from the 1st Infantry Division and the 1st Armored Division, which are currently based in

Germany. Additional troops to be withdrawn would come from Corps and Theater-level

support units. Bell stated that he wants to transfer a new Army Stryker brigade to the

Army’s training center at Grafenwöhr, Germany, where new barracks and family housing

are being built. Under the Administration’s proposal, U.S. units permanently based in the

United States would periodically deploy for training to forward operating sites in Eastern

Europe.

1

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2005 Internal Selection Process, by Daniel Else and David Lockwood, and CRS Report

RL32216, Military Base Closures: Implementing the 2005 Round, by David E. Lockwood.

2

Robert Burns, “U.S. To Close 35 Percent Of Overseas Bases,” Associated Press Newswires,

September 23, 2004.

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Asia and the Pacific. In addition to consolidating headquarters and facilities in

Japan and Korea, the Administration’s basing proposal would involve creating new

“nodes” for U.S. special operations forces and “multiple access avenues” for deploying

U.S. troops in to contingencies in the region. DOD officials have stated that 12,500

troops would be withdrawn from South Korea, with the first 5,000 to be withdrawn by the

end of 2004, another 3,000 in 2005, another 2,000 in 2006, and the final 2,500 in 20072008.3 Of the 5,000 to be withdrawn this year, 3,700 of the Army troops will come from

the 2nd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division, which have already been deployed to Iraq. DOD

reportedly is also considering transferring additional U.S. military forces to non-CONUS

bases in the Pacific region. Navy Admiral Thomas Fargo, chief of U.S. Pacific

Command, has proposed that Army Stryker brigades, along with Air Force C-17 transport

aircraft and high-speed transport ships, may be transferred to Alaska and Hawaii. He also

stated that an aircraft carrier strike group may be transferred forward in the Pacific, as

well as, Air Force bombers and Navy submarines being transferred to Guam, which is a

U.S. territory.4

Western Hemisphere and Africa. DOD’s proposal envisions a diverse array

of smaller cooperative locations for contingency access. These locations could be

important to an increased U.S. presence due to the spread of radical Islam, an AIDS

epidemic, a tenuous transition of power in Guinea, and the potential instability in oil-rich

Nigeria. In addition to Sao Tome and Principe (off the coast of Africa), potential host

nations in Africa that have been mentioned include Gabon, Ghana, Namibia, Senegal,

South Africa, and Uganda.5

Administration Rationale. The Administration’s proposal is the result of a

review of U.S. global military basing arrangements that began in mid-2001, preceding the

attack of September 11. Administration officials say that the global posture review can

trace its origins to the 2001 Report of the statutory Quadrennial Defense Review, as well

as the National Security Strategy of 2002. Administration officials began the review out

of a concern that current U.S. basing arrangements are pre-dominantly a legacy of the U.S.

involvement in World War II and the Korean War. They believe these basing

arrangements are not optimal for responding to future military challenges in other

geographical regions. They further believe that changes that have been made in U.S.

global military basing arrangements since the end of the Cold War have simply reduced

the numbers of U.S. military forces stationed at principal overseas locations, while not

adequately reviewing whether these locations are still appropriate.

Reactions To Administration Proposal. The Administration’s proposal has

received mixed reactions from Congress and outside observers. Congress has held several

hearings to examine the Administration’s proposal. Congressional hearings have been

held by the House Armed Services Committee, the most recent being held on June 23,

3

Vince Crawley, “Troops Withdraw From South Korea, First of 3 Phases To Be Completed This

Year,” Air Force Times, October 18, 2004, p. 24.

4

See, for example, Vince Crawley, “Pentagon Gives Congress Plan For Overseas Basing,” Air

Force Times, October 11, 2004, p. 12.

5

DOD In Talks With South, West African Nations About Basing Rights,” Inside the Pentagon,

October 21, 2004, p. 1.

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2004, and the Senate Armed Services Committee, the most recent being held on

September 23, 2004. Congress also established the Overseas Basing Commission, which

has held three meetings thus far, the most recent being held on November 9, 2004.6

Though global posture review was not the Commission’s intended task, this Commission

has held two hearings to discuss the Administration’s proposal and its impact on the

overseas basing structure. It has become apparent that some analysts agree with the

Administration’s logic and support the overall proposal, while others have expressed

concerns.

Michael O’Hanlon, of the Brookings Institute, expressed some concerns about the

proposal, stating that DOD consultations with the State Department, Congress, and U.S.

allies have been belated and insufficient, allowing misperceptions about the proposal to

grow. He stated that some of the Administration’s proposed changes for the basing of

Army units, if taken too far, could worsen the current deployment strains being

experienced by the Army as it sustains deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere.

The Administration’s proposal, he stated, does not sufficiently reduce Marine Corps

forces on Okinawa, where 20,000 Marines are based on a densely populated island — a

situation that has led to local political opposition and put the broader U.S. military base

network in Japan at some risk. A reduced presence of 5,000 to 7,000 Marines in

Okinawa, he said, would be more appropriate.

Lawrence Korb, of the Center for American Progress, stated that developing new

global basing arrangements should be part of an overall process for developing a national

security strategy. In most cases, he stated, it is less expensive to base troops overseas than

in the United States, particularly when host countries underwrite some of the costs

involved, and that closing overseas bases will not save money unless the troops serving

overseas are demobilized. He also stated that U.S. troops serving overseas as a group act

as excellent ambassadors for the values we are trying to promote around the world, and

that when closing bases overseas, it is important that it be done in concert with our allies

and host nations.

Dr. John Hamre, former Deputy Secretary of Defense and now president of the

Center for Strategic and International Studies, stated that the DOD has not adequately

studied how realigning the forces abroad can be used to strategically shape the

international environment in the coming decades. “It appears to me that the kinds of

changes to U.S. military posture that DOD is contemplating today are driven by

operational expediency, rather than strategy.” He continued his testimony by stating:

“The problem with this is that, in order to be sustainable over the long-term, U.S. bases

overseas must be part of an overall political, diplomatic, and strategic framework.”7 Dr.

6

The Overseas Basing Commission, formally known as the Commission on the Review of

Overseas Military Facility Structure of the United States, was established by the FY2004 Military

Construction Appropriations Act (H.R. 2559/P.L. 108-132 of November 22, 2003). The

commissioned is tasked to independently assess whether the current overseas basing structure is

adequate to execute current missions, and to assess the feasibility of closures, realignments, or

establishment of new installations overseas to meet emerging defense requirements. It has been

active since May 2004.

7

Chris Strohm, “Effort to Realign Military Bases Abroad Seen as Short-Sighted,” GovExec.com,

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Hamre also expressed concern that status of forces agreements (SOFAs) can take up to

five years to negotiate. He thought these SOFAs would be challenging, especially until

the U.S. has reached an understanding with the new hosts on the nature of the relationship

and the rights and responsibilities of each party.

Ambassador Hunter, former U.S. Ambassador to NATO, advised the Overseas

Basing Commission to examine several criteria in making recommendations on the

overseas basing, such as the efficiency and effectiveness of supporting foreign military

operations from the U.S., the value of contingency basing overseas, the cost and needs of

forces deployed abroad, and the ability of political and military organizations to work

together to prevent conflicts. He asked the commission to also evaluate the “total

mission” requirements of the U.S., as opposed to the “total force” needs of the military.

CBO Report On Army Overseas Basing. The Congressional Budget Office

study, Options for Changing the Army’s Overseas Basing, dated May 2004, examined

seven alternatives for changing the Army’s overseas basing arrangements in Europe and

South Korea. The report concluded the following:

Because the United States has invested heavily over the past 50 years in base

infrastructure for its troops stationed overseas, any major shifting of forces — either

between overseas locations or to the United States — would require significant

spending to provide that infrastructure somewhere else.

There would be limited annual savings to offset the large initial investment

needed to restation U.S. forces, unless U.S. presence overseas was greatly reduced.

In that case, annual savings could exceed $1 billion, but the net up-front investment

would be substantial — on the order of $7 billion.

Restationing Army forces would produce, at best, only small improvements in

the United States’ ability to respond to far-flung conflicts. The reason is that

deploying Army units to many potential trouble spots from the likely locations of new

bases would not be significantly faster than deploying them from current bases.

Bringing forces that are permanently stationed in Europe and South Korea back

to the continental United States (CONUS) and maintaining a presence in those regions

through unit rotations would reduce the need for infrastructure overseas. It would also

reduce instability in Army units by lessening the extent to which soldiers come and

go, thus potentially enhancing unit cohesion. But maintaining the current level of

overseas presence with unit rotations would limit the forces available for other

operations — including the occupation of Iraq — and could hurt retention in the Army

by increasing family separation.

If large numbers of forces were relocated from overseas, the need for additional

basing in CONUS for tens of thousands of personnel could preclude some of the

closings that might otherwise occur as part of the 2005 round of base realignments and

closures (BRAC).

7

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November 9, 2004

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Potential Oversight Issues for Congress

Potential oversight issues for Congress concerning the Administration’s proposal to

alter U.S. global military basing arrangements include the following:

Deployment Flexibility. What effect would implementing the Administration’s

proposal have on the ability of U.S. forces to respond to potential contingencies in various

parts of the world? Would the Administration’s proposed combination of main

consolidated operating bases, forward operating sites, and cooperative security locations

improve U.S. military deployment flexibility, reduce it, or result in no net change? Are

the Administration’s assumptions regarding the locations and utility of some of its

proposed new basing locations reasonable?

Cost. How would implementing the Administration’s proposal affect DOD costs,

both in the near term and long term? Are the Administration’s estimates regarding the

potential costs of the proposal accurate? Has the Administration adequately taken into

account the potential costs for increased airlift and sealift assets that might result from

transferring troops from Europe and Asia back to the United States?

2005 BRAC Round. How might implementing the Administration’s proposal

affect the 2005 round of the Base Realignment and Closure (BRAC) process? Would

transferring 70,000 troops from Europe and Asia to the continental United States reduce

the need for closing domestic U.S. military bases? Is DOD, in identifying candidate

domestic bases to be closed or realigned under BRAC, adequately taking into account the

potential effect on domestic base capacity requirements of transferring these troops back

to the United States?

Army Personnel. How would implementing the Administration’s proposal affect

the Army’s ability to sustain current deployments in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere?

Would it reduce current deployment strains on Army personnel, increase them, or produce

no net change? What effect might the Administration’s proposal have on Army recruiting

and retention? Has the Administration adequately taken current Army deployment strains

into account in considering the timetable for implementing its proposal?

Relations With Allies. What effect would implementing the Administration’s

proposals have on relations with allies, particularly Germany and South Korea? To what

extent, if any, might allied reaction be influenced by the amount of consultation that DOD

conducted with allies before the plan was publicly announced?

Local Legal Arrangements. Would sufficient legal arrangements — such as

Status of Forces agreements, cross-servicing agreements, and agreements under the

International Criminal Court treaty — be in place for new basing locations that would be

established under the Administration’s proposal? If these arrangements are not in place,

how would this affect the legal status of U.S. forces serving in these locations and the

DOD’s ability to use these bases?

Arms Control. How is the Administration’s proposal affected by the Conventional

Forces in Europe arms control treaty, which limits the amount of NATO equipment that

can be stationed in Eastern European countries?