North Korean Crisis: Possible Military Options

Order Code RS21582

July 29, 2003

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

North Korean Crisis:

Possible Military Options

nae redacted

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Summary

North Korea has confronted the United States with its decision, failing other

security accommodations, to pursue production of nuclear weapons. The Bush

Administration has stated that, although the situation is unacceptable, it will pursue its

resolution through diplomatic means. Military means, however, could be considered at

some point and become a serious issue for Congress. This short report discusses the

geography and military balance on the Korean Peninsula, presents the range of military

options that might be applied there to specific U.S. political objectives, and assesses

possible consequences. Military options discussed are: status quo, improved defensive

posture, enforce sanctions, preemptive strike against nuclear facilities, and preemptive

war. Also see CRS Issue Brief IB98045 on U.S.-Korean relations and CRS Issue Brief

IB91141 on North Korea’s nuclear weapons. This report will be updated if major

changes occur.

Background: Geography and Military Balance

The Korean peninsula lies at a nexus of military, economic, and political concerns

with global implications. From North Korea’s perspective, it is surrounded by world

powers: to the west and north are China and Russia, to the East is Japan, and to the South

is South Korea and military forces of the United States. Since the Korean War began in

1950, the North Korean dictatorship has presented continuous military and economic

challenges to its neighbors. Recent challenges have included a specter of economic

collapse and a threat to develop a nuclear arsenal.

North Korea, with a population of 22 million, maintains a large military force of

over 1 million active soldiers and 4.7 million reservists. Its force structure includes some

20 army corps with armor, mechanized infantry, and infantry units; notable enhancements

include 88,000 special purpose forces and a range of artillery, rocket, and missile forces

(some reportedly capable of delivering chemical and biological agents)1. Naval forces

1

Military force statistics from The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CRS-2

include some 300 patrol and coastal combatants, 26 submarines, and 66 inshore/coastal

submarines for inserting special forces. Air forces deploy over 500 Russian fighter and

attack aircraft and some 300 utility helicopters. Detracting from the potency of this large

force are the age and obsolescence of many combat systems and low training hours

afforded to their crews. Many draftees may reflect weakness stemming from ten years of

malnutrition.

Directly facing the North Korean threat is South Korea with some 48 million people.

It has 686,000 personnel on active military duty and can muster 4.5 million reservists.

The South Korean Army is organized into some 10 corps, with equipment generally better

than that found to the North – for example, half of its tanks are comparable to the U.S.

Abrams tank. Its fleet of over 350 helicopters includes U.S. AH-1 Cobras, CH-47

Chinooks, and UH-60 Blackhawks. The Navy deploys 26 submarines, 39 principal

surface combatants, 84 patrol and coastal combatants, and a 2-division force of 28,000

Marines. The Air Force flies over 530 combat aircraft, including the F-16C/D. The

South Korean level of training is considered generally higher than that of North Korea.

Integral to the defense of South Korea is the direct presence of some 37,000 U.S.

military personnel. Major units are two brigades of the 2d Infantry Division, combat and

support units of the Eighth Army (including Patriot missile batteries), and U.S. Air Force

units deploying 90 combat aircraft. Dedicated reinforcement and supporting forces are

considerable, including a new Stryker Brigade2 and a corps headquarters in Fort Lewis,

Washington and the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii. Powerful Air Force, Marine Corps,

and Navy forces (totaling 48,000 personnel) are nearby in Japan, including the Seventh

Fleet. Availability of additional Army forces in the near term, however, would be limited

by ongoing commitments in Iraq, Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other places.3

A unique strength of the defense of South Korea resides in the command

arrangements, both joint and combined. A U.S. officer, General Leon J. LaPorte, as

Commander of the Combined Forces Command, would command all allied forces in

South Korea during wartime, as well as all U.S. forces. A South Korean general would

be the ground component commander and have operational control of U.S. ground forces

assigned to him by General LaPorte. Higher headquarters integrate both U.S. and South

Korean intelligence and operational planning, an area of frequent testing and exercise.

Major military action on the Korean Peninsula could create a challenge exceeding

that recently met by the United States and its allies in Iraq. Some 80% of the peninsula,

1

(...continued)

Balance, 2002-2003, London, October 2002. A discussion of missile programs and their

potential to carry WMD warheads can be found in (name redacted), North Korean Ballistic

Missile Threat to the United States. See CRS Report RS21473.

2

Newly constituted as part of the U.S. Army’s transformation initiative. See (name redacted),

Army Transformation and Modernization: Status and Issues for Congress, CRS Report RS20787.

3

Michael O’Hanlon. “Breaking the Army,” The Washington Post, July 3, 2003, p.A23. It appears

that U.S. contingency plans for a North Korean invasion have called for more divisions than the

active Army can provide today. See unclassified extracts of Operation Plan 5027 published in

Tokyo SAPIO, 28 Feb 96, pp. 17-22.

CRS-3

about the size of Utah, is covered by rugged hills and mountains.4 The winters are bitterly

cold, while the summers are hot and humid with periodic torrential rains and flooding.

Much of the North Korean force is protected by a system of underground caves and

tunnels. About two-thirds of the North Korean force is forward deployed along the

Demilitarized Zone (DMZ), the northern boundary of South Korea. Complicating

military defensive planning is the location of Seoul, the capital of South Korea. Seoul,

a metropolis of some 10 million people, sits astride the major trafficable corridor between

North and South Korea, as close as 25 miles to the DMZ. In a surprise attack, the North

could inflict artillery and missile devastation upon Seoul – referred to by the North as a

“sea of fire”5 – and possibly reach the city with a coordinated ground and special

operations attack.

U.S. Military Alternatives

Should resort to force be deemed necessary, there are several military actions that

the United States could contemplate to achieve policy objectives on the Korean Peninsula.

North Korea, unfortunately, has a history of unpredictable, and often violent, reactions to

even slight provocations. Therefore, even the most modest U.S. military action risks

escalation to higher levels of conflict and most analysts agree that no military option

should be chosen without full recognition of such danger. Also, a combination of options

could be chosen or even anticipated to ensue. U.S. allies and other nations in Northeast

Asia are aware of these dangers and the United States would likely undertake some form

of consultation with them – their active or passive cooperation could be needed. Some

suggest that, in light of potentially large casualties, proceeding without South Korean

agreement “would be immoral as well as ill-advised.”6

Status Quo. Current U.S. policy involves maintaining a stable military situation

while diplomacy proceeds to solve the North Korean nuclear crisis. South Korea and the

United States maintain strong defenses along the DMZ. Periodic military exercises elicit

complaints from North Korean officials, but, over time, they generally seem accustomed

to and respect the existing military situation.7 Some have suggested withdrawal or

drawdown of U.S. forces, but other analysts believe this could, in a time of tensions, send

unintended messages to North Korea or even to one or more of its powerful neighbors.

Ongoing studies and negotiations propose to relocate U.S. ground forces and

headquarters, primarily by moving the U.S. 2d Infantry Division from the north to the

south of Seoul.8 Such a move would give U.S. forces greater flexibility to maneuver and

4

For a more detailed treatment, see John M. Collins, Korean Crisis, 1994 Military Geography,

Military Balance, Military Options, CRS Report 94-311, April 11, 1994, (archived, available on

request from (name redacted)) 21pp.

5

Doug Struck, “U.S. Focuses On N. Korea’s Hidden Arms,” Washington Post, June 23, 2003,

p. 16.

6

John M. Collins. “Nuclear Bees in North Korea,” Army Magazine, August, 2003.

7

Conducted annually, the large Ulchi Focus Lens exercise will take place August 18-29, 2003.

“U.S.-S.Korea exercise slated for next month,” Associated Press, July 21, 2003.

8

Robert Karniol. “Seoul, US to realign basing of troops,” Jane’s Defense Weekly, June 11, 2003.

Non-military reasons include responding to nationalistic and environmental concerns of the South

(continued...)

CRS-4

make them less vulnerable to a surprise attack – essentially lessening the “tripwire” effect

of having U.S. forces close to the DMZ. Whether such an action will make the military

situation more or less stable could be argued either way,9 but the overall effect should not

unduly change the military status quo on the Korean Peninsula.

Improve Defensive Posture. Recognizing that the current situation is unusually

tense, the United States and South Korea could adopt a policy of temporarily increasing

military preparedness to deter a North Korean military strike,10 improve allied odds to

defeat such a strike, or reinforce diplomatic firmness. The least provocative action might

be to add more robust intelligence and warning activities, both those based in South Korea

and those using space assets and adjoining air and sea access. Other options include:

upgrading and testing alternate command headquarters, including those underground, as

well as information and communications networks; adding more air and missile defense

assets to protect additional key government and military facilities in South Korea and

Japan; and, strengthening unit reception plans and facilities for reinforcements. In so far

as the North Korean crisis is recognized as a priority military challenge to the United

States, the measures above are, in some cases, underway, according to recent press

reports.11 Although possible, it is unlikely that North Korea would attack solely in

response to such gradual, defensive measures. It might, however, feel greater pressure to

either reach a diplomatic solution or expend more resources on its own military

establishment.

Calling up South Korean reservists or moving additional U.S. combat forces into the

Peninsula might also be considered. Unless done in response to overtly hostile North

Korean actions or intentions, such actions would most likely be construed as a serious

provocation or possibly a prelude to an allied attack. North Korean sensitivity is

illustrated by statements of concern even when temporary U.S. buildups and exercises are

held in Okinawa.12

Military Enforcement of Sanctions. Should North Korea attempt to export

weapons of mass destruction, longer range missiles, or the materials to create such things,

interception on the high seas or in the air by military forces might be considered.13 U.S.

and international policy objectives would be to enforce nonproliferation goals and,

perhaps secondarily, to restrict hard currency gains from such transactions. Such a

“blockade,” “quarantine,” or “containment,” to be effective, would require large,

8

(...continued)

Korean public.

9

Sang-hun Choe. “Redeployment from DMZ would alter Korean political climate,” Associated

Press, June 6, 2003.

10

Admiral Fargo, Commander of U.S. Pacific Command, recently told the House International

Relations Committee that, “I believe the chances of war are low, but the consequences would be

very high.” Associated Press, June 26, 2003.

11

Hans Greimel. “Wolfowitz: More mobile force needed to counter N. Korea threat,” Associated

Press, Tokyo, June 3, 2003.

12

13

“N.K. Concerned About U.S. Military Build Up in Japan,” Seoul Yonhap, May 30, 2003.

Steven R. Weisman. “Plan To Block North Korean Nuclear Shipments Gains Support,” New

York Times, June 18, 2003, p A5. Note. Discovering or proving such activity is difficult.

CRS-5

dedicated U.S. Navy and Air Force participation, and at least some Coast Guard assets.

It would require the cooperation of other nations and international organizations, not least

being a commitment from China and Russia to actively seal their land, sea, and air

borders from penetration by North Korean conveyances and those of their customers.

Risks for such an operation are that innocent trade and other activities of many

nations could be inconvenienced; North Korea might circumvent even sophisticated

intelligence and interception operations; and, since a blockade is considered an act of war,

North Korea might respond with military action.14

Preemptive Strike on Nuclear Facilities. The Administration’s National

Security Strategy reserves the option for the President to order a preemptive strike to

forestall a weapons of mass destruction attack against the United States, its military

forces, or its allies.15 In this case, the possession of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles

could threaten, now or in the short term, U.S. forces and allied populations in South Korea

and Japan. In the longer term, a few observers are concerned that North Korea could

threaten more distant targets, to include parts of the U.S. homeland.16 There is also the

possibility that North Korean nuclear materials and weapons could be exported to third

parties – terrorist groups or rogue states – that might wish to harm the United States. In

any event, a policy option would be to destroy identified weapons and materials and

associated production facilities in North Korea; it would be complicated by the North

Korean’s ability to hide or protect such targets, often deeply underground.

The United States has the ability to deliver both conventional and nuclear weapons

against some underground targets, and is studying “robust nuclear earth penetrators.”17

Some targets could presumably also be neutralized with special forces operations. A risk

with a preemptive strike option is that all identified targets, if they do exist, might not be

accurately located and that some may be deeply or effectively protected against U.S.

weapons.18 Surviving capabilities might be used in retaliatory strikes, possibly creating

calamities that U.S. policy was trying to prevent. U.S. strikes would undoubtedly be

considered acts of war, and North Korea could attempt to launch selective or massive

conventional attacks against South Korea in response.19 It is, therefore, unlikely that

South Korea would support a preemptive strike option under most circumstances.

14

Doug Struck. “N. Korea Vows to Fight Any Blockade,” Washington Post, June 18, 2003, p.

A21.

15

The White House. The National Security Strategy of the United States of America,

Washington, D.C., September 17, 2002, p. 15.

16

See (name redacted), op. cit.

17

See Jonathan Medalia, Nuclear Earth Penetrator Weapons, CRS Report RS20834.

18

CIA. “We continue to monitor and assess North Korea’s nuclear weapons efforts which, given

the North’s closed society and the obvious covert nature of the program, remains a difficult

intelligence collection target.” Report to Congress on the Acquiring of Technology Related to

Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional Weapons, January-June 2002.

19

See Doug Bandow. “Wrong War, Wrong Place, Wrong Time: Why Military Action Should

Not Be Used to Resolve the North Korean Nuclear Crisis,” CATO Institute Foreign Policy

Briefing, May 12, 2003, 13 pp.

CRS-6

Preemptive War. Initiating general war with North Korea is an unlikely option

for the United States, as South Korea would be unwilling to sustain the resultant, huge

costs on its population without extreme provocation. In theory, however, two policy

objectives might be met. First, should regime change in North Korea become a priority

policy objective, a military march to Pyongyang might be the only sure means available.

Second, should a major North Korean attack south appear imminent, the policy of

preemptive attack might offer advantages: the initial allied targeting and assaults could

reduce North Korean capabilities to destroy Seoul, WMD could be destroyed or captured,

and allied commanders would be able to execute their plan with nonattritted forces – a

particular advantage if the United States followed a doctrine of rapid, joint, and

coordinated attacks throughout the depth of North Korea.

In considering a war option, certain assumptions and risks would need to be

assessed. First, international support for the war would be desirable, given U.S. reliance

on global communications and transport; China’s reaction would be key – at the minimum

it would have to be neutral. Next, it would be difficult to mask attack preparations by

U.S. and South Korean forces. North Korea could launch its own preemptive attack,

possibly creating some of the adverse consequences U.S. policy was trying to circumvent.

Also, timing is a problem – due to heavy commitments in Iraq and many other places, the

U.S. Army is currently stretched very thin, and would find it difficult to contribute the

major ground forces needed.20 To sustain such an operation, it is likely that many Army

National Guard and Army Reserve units not already on active duty would have to be

mobilized, as well as considerable numbers of individual reservists to fill out units and

replace casualties. It is likely that much of any post-war occupation of North Korea

required could be accomplished by South Korea.

Finally, American public acceptance of a more difficult and protracted war than it

might expect based on recent, quick U.S. military victories in Southwest Asia and the

Balkans may be a requisite. In addition to geographic problems highlighted above and

a larger enemy force that has possibly learned through observation how the United States

fights, the North Korean soldier may not surrender easily. The Korean War of 1950-1953

is a cautionary example: one U.S. veteran of that conflict said, “I’d rather fight the

Chinese any day than the North Koreans, who were more tenacious, more fanatical, and

more disciplined.”21 Others would point out that today’s North Korean soldier is

physically weaker, may resent state oppression, is severely outclassed in weaponry and

experience with modern warfare – and the current limits of his tenacity are not known.

Should a military option be deemed necessary, the Executive would be expected to

consult with appropriate congressional bodies.

20

21

O’Hanlon, op. cit. Note. In extremis, both sides retain the option to resort to nuclear warfare.

General Robert Kingston, U.S. Army, Retired, Oral History, U.S. Army War College, Carlisle

Barracks, PA, 1995. In context, it must be noted that Chinese soldiers were also tough opponents.

EveryCRSReport.com

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the

Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on

issues that may come before Congress.

EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The

reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to

the public.

Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts

who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made

any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.

CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in

the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without

permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a

third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or

otherwise use copyrighted material.

Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public

understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in

connection with CRS' institutional role.

EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim

copyright on any CRS report we have republished.