NASA's Space Shuttle Program: The Columbia Tragedy, the Discovery Mission, and the Future of the Shuttle

Order Code RS21408

Updated January 4, 2006

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

NASA’s Space Shuttle Program: The

Columbia Tragedy, the Discovery Mission,

and the Future of the Shuttle

name redacted

Resources, Science, and Industry Division

Summary

On August 9, 2005, the space shuttle Discovery successfully completed the first of

two “Return to Flight” (RTF) missions — STS-114. It was the first shuttle launch since

the February 1, 2003, Columbia tragedy. NASA announced on July 27, 2005, the day

after STS-114’s launch, that a second RTF mission would be indefinitely postponed

because of a problem that occurred during Discovery’s launch that is similar to what led

to the loss of Columbia. The next launch is currently expected some time in 2006. This

report discusses the Columbia tragedy, the Discovery mission, and issues for Congress

regarding the future of the shuttle. For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB93062,

Space Launce Vehicles: Government Activities, Commercial Competition, and Satellite

Exports, by (name redacted). This is the final edition of this report.

The Loss of the Space Shuttle Columbia

The space shuttle Columbia was launched on its STS-107 mission on January 16,

2003. After completing a 16-day scientific research mission, Columbia started its descent

to Earth on the morning of February 1, 2003. As it descended from orbit, approximately

16 minutes before its scheduled landing at Kennedy Space Center, FL, Columbia broke

apart over northeastern Texas. All seven astronauts aboard were killed: Commander Rick

Husband; Pilot William McCool; Mission Specialists Michael P. Anderson, David M.

Brown, Kalpana Chawla, and Laurel Clark; and payload specialist Ilan Ramon, an Israeli.

The last communication with Columbia was at about 09:00 EST. The shuttle was at an

altitude of 207,135 feet, traveling at a speed of Mach 18.3 (about 13,000 miles per hour).

The Space Shuttle Columbia and the STS-107 Mission

The Space Transportation System (STS) — the space shuttle — consists of an

airplane-like orbiter, two Solid Rocket Boosters (SRBs) on either side, and a large

cylindrical External Tank that holds the fuel for the orbiter’s main engines. The SRBs

detach from the orbiter 2½ minutes after launch when their fuel is spent, fall into the

ocean, and are recovered for refurbishment and reuse. The External Tank is not reused,

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CRS-2

but is jettisoned as the orbiter reaches Earth orbit, and disintegrates as it falls into the

Indian Ocean. At the beginning of 2003, all planned shuttle launches, other than STS-107

and two missions to the Hubble Space Telescope, were scheduled to support assembly and

operation of the International Space Station (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017).

Columbia was one of four spaceflight-worthy reusable space shuttle orbiters in

NASA’s fleet. The remaining orbiters are Discovery, Atlantis, and Endeavour. A fifth

orbiter, Challenger, was lost in a 1986 accident. Another orbiter, Enterprise, was used for

approach and landing tests in the 1970s and was not designed to travel in space.

Enterprise now belongs to the Smithsonian’s National Air and Space Museum.

Columbia was the first spaceflight-worthy orbiter built for NASA by Rockwell

International (the space division of Rockwell, which built the orbiters, was later bought

by Boeing ). It was used for the very first shuttle flight on April 12, 1981. The STS-107

mission was Columbia’s 28th flight. Although Columbia was the oldest orbiter, Discovery

has been used for more flights (30). NASA has conducted a total of 114 shuttle launches

to date. Orbiters are periodically taken out of service for maintenance and overhaul.

Columbia had lost undergone such an “orbiter major modification” (OMM) period in

1999-2001. STS-107 was Columbia’s second flight after the OMM. It was a scientific

research mission that, unlike most current shuttle launches, was not related to the

International Space Station (ISS) program (see CRS Issue Brief IB93017). The crew

conducted a research program involving 59 separate investigations. Some of the research

required analysis of specimens and data sets after the shuttle returned to Earth, and most

were destroyed along with the crew and orbiter. Other data, however, were transmitted

to ground-based researchers during the flight, and a few specimens were retrieved among

the debris, so some of the research survived. Quantifying the amount is difficult.

Previous Spaceflight-Related Crew Fatalities

The United States has suffered two other spaceflight-related accidents that caused

astronaut fatalities. On January 27, 1967, the crew of the first Apollo mission — Virgil

“Gus” Grissom, Edward White, and Roger Chaffee — died when electrical arcing in

spacecraft wiring caused a fire in their Apollo command module during a pre-launch test.

Apollo flights resumed after 21 months. On January 28, 1986, the space shuttle

Challenger (STS 51-L) exploded 73 seconds after launch, killing all seven astronauts

aboard: Francis “Dick” Scobee, Michael Smith, Judith Resnik, Ellison Onizuka, Ronald

McNair, Gregory Jarvis (a payload specialist from Hughes Aircraft), and schoolteacher

Christa McAuliffe. A commission chaired by former Secretary of State William Rogers

determined that cold weather at the launch site caused a rubber “O-ring” in one of the

SRBs to fail, allowing gases to escape, resulting in a catastrophic explosion. The shuttle

system was grounded for 32 months.

Four Soviet cosmonauts died during spaceflights. Cosmonaut Vladimir Komarov

died during the first Soyuz flight on April 24, 1967. The spacecraft’s parachutes did not

function properly and it struck the ground with great force, killing Colonel Komarov.

Soviet human spaceflights were suspended for 18 months. Three cosmonauts died on

Soyuz 11 on June 29, 1971 when an improperly sealed valve allowed the spacecraft’s

atmosphere to vent into space. The cosmonauts — Georgiy Dobrovolskiy, Vladislav

Volkov, and Viktor Patsayev — were not wearing spacesuits, and were asphyxiated.

There were no Soviet human spaceflights for 27 months.

CRS-3

The Columbia Accident Investigation Board (CAIB)

Then-NASA Administrator Sean O’Keefe established the Columbia Accident

Investigation Board (CAIB) within hours of the tragedy, and transitioned responsibility

for the investigation to it on February 6, 2003. Chaired by Adm. (Ret.) Harold Gehman,

former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic, CAIB had 12 other members (see

[http://www.caib.us]). All were appointed by Mr. O’Keefe, although some were added

to the initial roster upon the recommendation of Adm. Gehman. NASA revised the

Board’s charter three times to clarify its independence from NASA, primarily in response

to congressional concerns. However, the CAIB was created by NASA, included NASA

representatives, and the Board members were appointed by the NASA Administrator, so

concerns about its independence continued. Title VIII of the FY2007-2008 NASA

authorization act (P.L. 109-155) specifies how future human space flight accidents are to

be investigated. CAIB released the results of its investigation on August 26, 2003 in Vol.

1 of its report; Volumes II-VI were released in October 2003. All are available at CAIB’s

website. Board member Brig. Gen. Duane Deal wrote a 10-page supplement, published

in Vol. 2, providing additional recommendations and viewpoints.

The Causes of the Accident. The Board concluded that the tragedy was caused

by both technical and organizational failures. The technical cause was damage to

Columbia’s left wing by a 1.7 pound piece of insulating foam that separated from the

External Tank’s left “bipod ramp” and struck the orbiter’s left wing 81.9 seconds after

launch. The foam strike created a hole in a Reinforced Carbon-Carbon (RCC) panel on

the leading edge of the wing, allowing superheated air (perhaps exceeding 5,000oF) to

enter the wing during reentry. The extreme heat caused the wing to fail structurally,

creating aerodynamic forces that led to the disintegration of the orbiter. Organizationally,

the Board pointed to detrimental cultural traits and organizational practices that developed

over the institutional history of the program. Adm. Gehman cited a loss of “checks and

balances” in the program’s management that should have led to a recognition of the

danger posed by “foam shedding” from the External Tank, which had occurred on

previous shuttle missions. The Board also cited long term budget constraints, and

schedule pressure associated with assembly of the International Space Station, as factors.

CAIB’s Recommendations and the Stafford/Covey Task Group. The

CAIB made 29 recommendations, of which 23 were technical and six were

organizational. Of the 29 recommendations, the Board specified that 15 be completed

before the shuttle returned to flight status (see CRS Report RS21606 for a synopsis).

NASA created a task group chaired by two former astronauts — Thomas Stafford

and Richard Covey — to evaluate NASA’s compliance with the 15 CAIB

recommendations that were to be completed before Return to Flight (RTF). The

Stafford/Covey Task Group ([http://returntoflight.org]) did not address organizational or

cultural issues, and was not tasked to determine whether the shuttle was ready to fly. The

Task Group held its final public meeting on June 27, 2005, concluding that NASA had

met the intent of 12 of the 15 CAIB RTF recommendations, but not the other three —

preventing debris shedding from the External Tank, hardening the orbiter against damage

from debris, and developing inspection and repair techniques for the thermal protection

system. Some Task Group members indicated, however, that NASA had made

considerable improvements to shuttle safety, and considered the shuttle ready to fly.

CRS-4

Then-NASA Administrator O’Keefe said during 2003 and 2004 that not only would

NASA comply with the CAIB recommendations, but would “raise the bar” to ensure the

shuttle is as safe as possible. Dr. Michael Griffin became NASA Administrator in April

2005. At an April 18 press conference, he said he would listen carefully to advice from

the Stafford/Covey group, but that NASA and contractor personnel were those responsible

and accountable for determining if and when the shuttle is ready for RTF. He would not

commit to meeting every CAIB recommendation. In testimony to the House Science

Committee on June 28, 2005, he said that NASA had spent lot of money trying to meet

all the recommendations, but did not have the knowledge to do so in every case, such as

stopping all debris shedding from the External Tank.

The CAIB report also cited cultural issues (e.g., the safety culture) that could affect

shuttle safety. Those issues were addressed by an internal NASA study led by thenNASA Goddard Space Flight Center Director Al Diaz. NASA also hired an outside

consulting firm, BST, to assess NASA culture and make recommendations about what

changes were needed. A February 5, 2005 BST report concluded that there was

improvement, but a significant number of people at NASA’s field centers did not yet

perceive change. Dr. Griffin terminated the contract with BST soon after becoming

Administrator, saying that NASA could deal with these issues internally.

Return to Flight: The STS-114 (Discovery) Mission

NASA launched the space shuttle on its first Return to Flight (RTF) mission, STS114, on July 26, 2005, using the Discovery orbiter. The STS-114 crew was composed of

six NASA astronauts and one from the Japan Aerospace Exploration Agency (JAXA):

Commander Eileen Collins, Pilot James Kelly, and Mission Specialists Charles Camarda,

Wendy Lawrence, Soichi Noguchi (JAXA), Steve Robinson, and Andy Thomas. STS114 docked with the International Space Station (ISS) for most of its mission. STS-114

delivered supplies, repaired ISS components, and tested inspection and repair techniques

for the orbiter. The STS-114 mission was extended one day so the shuttle crew could

assist the ISS crew in stowing supplies. Inclement weather at Kennedy Space Center, FL

delayed landing until August 9, and diverted it to Edwards Air Force Base, CA.

The day after launch (July 27), NASA announced that further shuttle launches would

be indefinitely postponed after discovering that a comparatively large piece of foam broke

off from Discovery’s External Tank during launch, similar to what happened to Columbia.

In this case, NASA determined that it did not hit the orbiter. Subsequently, several smaller

pieces were found to have broken off and may have hit the orbiter’s wing. Cameras and

other sensors aboard Discovery and the ISS took detailed images to determine if there was

any damage and none was discovered. However, the images revealed that two

“gapfillers” — ceramic-coated fabric that fills gaps between the thermal protection tiles

— on the bottom of the orbiter were protruding, which could affect aerodynamic heating

during reentry. Astronaut Robinson removed them during a spacewalk.

The second RTF mission was scheduled for September 2005 with the mission of

continuing testing post-Columbia fixes and resupplying the ISS. NASA continues to

study why the foam loss on STS-114 occurred. That work was slowed by hurricane

damage to the Michoud Assembly Facility, in New Orleans, LA, where the External

Tanks are manufactured. It is operated for NASA by Lockheed Martin. NASA’s Stennis

CRS-5

Space Center, near Slidell, LA, which tests the space shuttle main engines, also suffered

hurricane damage. The next shuttle launch is expected no earlier than May 2006.

Issues for Congress

Cost. In July 2004, NASA released a cost estimate for RTF covering the years

FY2003-2009: $2.2 billion, double the previous estimate of $1.1 billion. For FY2005,

NASA requested $4.3 billion for the shuttle program. In November 2004, NASA

informed Congress it needed $762 million more than expected for FY2005. In the

FY2005 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 108-447), Congress approved the $4.3

billion requested, subject to an across-the-board 0.80% rescission, and said that NASA

could submit a request for supplemental appropriations, or reprogram funds from other

NASA programs. According to a May 10, 2005 update to its FY2005 operating plan,

NASA reprogrammed the following funds into RTF: $55 million from the Science

Mission Directorate ($20 million from space science, $35 million from earth science);

$375.8 million from the Exploration Systems Mission Directorate ($73 million from

biological and physical research, $204 million from human and robotic technology, and

$98 million from transportation systems); and $331.2 million from the Space Operations

Mission Directorate ($160 million from the space station, $170 million from space shuttle

upgrades, and $1.2 million from space flight support). Separately, Congress appropriated

$126 million to NASA in an FY2005 emergency supplemental (P.L. 108-324) for

damages at Kennedy Space Center, FL, from the 2004 Florida hurricanes. NASA officials

say those funds are not available for RTF.

The CAIB noted that long term budget constraints were a factor in the Columbia

tragedy. NASA requested and received $4.5 billion for the shuttle in the FY2006

appropriations bill that includes NASA (P.L. 109-108), subject to a 0.28% rescission in

that act, and a 1% rescission in another appropriations act (P.L. 109-148). The latter act

also included $350 million for NASA for recovery from Hurricane Katrina. The FY2006

request for the shuttle, developed by then-Administrator O’Keefe, included an “out-year

projection” that the shuttle budget would decline to $2.4 billion by FY2010. Many

observers considered that unrealistic, and at a November 3, 2005 House Science

Committee hearing, Dr. Griffin agreed that NASA will need $3-$5 billion more than that

for FY2008-FY2010. The source of those funds is unclear.

The Shuttle’s Future. The foam-shedding event during Discovery’s launch and

the resulting decision to suspend further shuttle launches, plus the funding shortfall in

NASA’s out-year projection, adds to the complexity of decisions about the shuttle’s

future. Prior to Discovery’s launch, discussion was focused on President Bush’s January

2004 directive that the shuttle be retired as part of his new “Vision for Space Exploration”

where NASA is to focus its attention on returning astronauts to the Moon by 2020 and

someday sending them to Mars (see CRS Report RS21720). Under the plan, the shuttle

— in its current form — would be terminated in 2010, primarily so that its funding can

be redirected towards achieving other aspects of the Vision. The 2010 date also coincides

with the CAIB’s recommendation that if the shuttle is to be flown longer, it should be

recertified. Two key issues raised by the decision to end shuttle flights by 2010 are the

extent to which the United States wants its own ability to launch astronauts into space,

and the importance of completing ISS construction and meeting U.S. commitments to

other ISS partners.

CRS-6

The shuttle is the only U.S. vehicle capable of taking astronauts to space today. As

part of the Vision, NASA is building a new “Crew Exploration Vehicle” (CEV). The

original schedule called for it to be available for launching crews to Earth orbit by 2014,

meaning there would be a multi-year gap between the end of the shuttle program and the

availability of CEV. During that time, NASA would be dependent on Russia for human

access to space. Dr. Griffin wants to accelerate CEV availability to reduce the gap as

much as possible in part because he believes the United States should not be dependent

on any other nation for human access to space. NASA’s current target is 2012. The

Senate adopted an amendment to the FY2006 Department of Defense authorization bill

(S. 1042) on November 15, 2005 expressing the sense of the Senate that it is in the

national security interest of the United States to maintain preeminence in human

spaceflight. Initial versions of the NASA authorization bill (H.R. 3070/S. 1281)

contained conflicting language about the future of the shuttle. The Senate bill originally

directed NASA not to terminate the shuttle until a replacement was available, while the

House version originally directed NASA not to fly the shuttle after December 31, 2010.

The final version of the act (P.L. 109-155) states that it is U.S. policy to have human

access to space on a continuous basis, and directs NASA to submit several related reports

to Congress.

The shuttle’s primary purpose today is assembly and servicing of the ISS. Dr.

Griffin also promised to reassess whether or not to use the shuttle for one more servicing

mission to the Hubble Space Telescope (see CRS Report RS21767). NASA’s current

target is to launch the shuttle 18 times to support the ISS, with one potential additional

launch to Hubble, by the end of 2010. The need to complete ISS assembly and meet U.S.

commitments to its ISS partners, and to service Hubble, is being weighed against the costs

operating the shuttle for that many more years, especially now that NASA has conceded

that it will need $3-5 billion more than was included in its out-year funding profile. One

consideration is that some of the ISS segments waiting to be launched are those built by

the other ISS partners, and President Bush said the United States would meet its

commitments to those partners. Another question is whether setting a firm deadline for

ending shuttle flights places undue schedule pressure on shuttle program managers to

complete as many launches as possible within whatever remaining time there is. CAIB

cited schedule pressure as a factor in the Columbia accident.

The effect on ISS utilization by NASA and its partners is another issue. ISS was

designed to be serviced by the shuttle, which can carry larger crews than the Russian

Soyuz spacecraft, and larger and heavier cargo than the Russian Progress cargo spacecraft.

In addition, the shuttle is the only cargo spacecraft that can return large amounts of

material to Earth (Russia’s Progress burns up as it reenters the atmosphere). Without the

shuttle, the results of scientific experiments, equipment needing repair, and other items

could only be returned if they fit within the small confines of the Soyuz capsule along

with whatever crew members were returning to Earth (unless new cargo spacecraft are

developed). How NASA can ensure that the shuttle system will remain safe as workers

and vendors move on to other projects as the shuttle program comes to an end is also

being discussed. NASA plans to develop two “shuttle-derived” launch vehicles (see CRS

Issue Brief IB93062), which could mitigate some of the shuttle workforce displacements.

EveryCRSReport.com

The Congressional Research Service (CRS) is a federal legislative branch agency, housed inside the

Library of Congress, charged with providing the United States Congress non-partisan advice on

issues that may come before Congress.

EveryCRSReport.com republishes CRS reports that are available to all Congressional staff. The

reports are not classified, and Members of Congress routinely make individual reports available to

the public.

Prior to our republication, we redacted names, phone numbers and email addresses of analysts

who produced the reports. We also added this page to the report. We have not intentionally made

any other changes to any report published on EveryCRSReport.com.

CRS reports, as a work of the United States government, are not subject to copyright protection in

the United States. Any CRS report may be reproduced and distributed in its entirety without

permission from CRS. However, as a CRS report may include copyrighted images or material from a

third party, you may need to obtain permission of the copyright holder if you wish to copy or

otherwise use copyrighted material.

Information in a CRS report should not be relied upon for purposes other than public

understanding of information that has been provided by CRS to members of Congress in

connection with CRS' institutional role.

EveryCRSReport.com is not a government website and is not affiliated with CRS. We do not claim

copyright on any CRS report we have republished.