Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Congressional research reportAug 21, 2013

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and

U.S. Interests

-name redactedSpecialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs

August 21, 2013

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

RS21238

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Summary

Uzbekistan gained independence at the end of 1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union. The

landlocked country is a potential Central Asian regional power by virtue of its population, the

largest in the region, its substantial energy and other resources, and its location at the heart of

regional trade and transport networks. The existing president, Islam Karimov, retained his post

following the country’s independence, and was reelected in 2000 and 2007. He has pursued a

policy of caution in economic and political reforms, and many observers have criticized

Uzbekistan’s human rights record.

The United States pursued close ties with Uzbekistan following its independence. After the

terrorist attacks on the United States in September 2001, Uzbekistan offered over-flight and

basing rights to U.S. and coalition forces. However, U.S. basing rights at Karshi-Khanabad were

terminated in 2005 following U.S. criticism and other actions related to the Karimov

government’s allegedly violent crackdown on unrest in the southern city of Andijon. Since then,

the United States has attempted to improve relations, particularly in support of operations in

Afghanistan. In 2009, Uzbekistan began to participate in the Northern Distribution Network of

land, sea, and air transit routes from Europe through Eurasia for U.S. and NATO military supplies

entering and exiting Afghanistan.

Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2010 was $971.36 million (all

agencies and programs). Of this aid, about two-fifths was budgeted for combating weapons of

mass destruction (including Comprehensive Threat Reduction aid), Foreign Military Financing,

counter-narcotics, Partnership for Peace, and anti-crime support. Food, health, and other social

welfare and humanitarian aid accounted for nearly one-fourth, and democratization aid accounted

for nearly one-fifth. Budgeted assistance was $11.3 million in FY2011 and $16.7 million in

FY2012, and the Administration has requested $11.6 million for FY2014 (these latter amounts

include foreign assistance listed in the Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign

Operations, and exclude Defense and Energy Department funding; country data for FY2013 are

not yet available).

In FY2003 foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 108-7) and thereafter, Congress prohibited

foreign assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and

reported that Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect

human rights; establish a multiparty system; and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of

expression, and the independence of the media. In FY2008, Congress added a provision blocking

Uzbek government officials from entering the United States if they were deemed to have been

responsible for events in Andijon or to have violated other human rights. Consolidated

Appropriations for FY2012 (P.L. 112-74) provides for the Secretary of State to waive conditions

on assistance to Uzbekistan for a period of not more than six months and every six months

thereafter until September 30, 2013, on national security grounds and as necessary to facilitate

U.S. access to and from Afghanistan. Such waivers have been issued.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Contents

Political Background ....................................................................................................................... 1

Human Rights ............................................................................................................................ 4

Economic Developments ................................................................................................................. 8

Oil and Gas .............................................................................................................................. 10

Foreign Policy and Defense ........................................................................................................... 11

Terrorism and Unrest ..................................................................................................................... 15

The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan ............................................................................. 16

U.S. Relations ................................................................................................................................ 17

Contributions to Counter-Terrorism .............................................................................................. 21

Figures

Figure 1. Map of Uzbekistan ......................................................................................................... 26

Tables

Table 1. U.S. Budgeted Assistance to Uzbekistan by Objective and Year, FY1992FY2001 ....................................................................................................................................... 24

Table 2. US Budgeted Assistance to Uzbekistan by Objective and Year, FY2002-FY2010

(and Totals, FY1992-FY2010).................................................................................................... 25

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 26

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Political Background

Uzbekistan gained independence at the end of

1991 with the breakup of the Soviet Union.

The landlocked country is the largest in

Central Asia in terms of population and the

third-largest in territory (behind Kazakhstan

and Turkmenistan; see box and Figure 1). The

existing president, Islam Karimov, retained his

post following the country’s independence,

and was reelected in 2000 and 2007. He has

pursued a policy of cautiously opening the

country to global economic and other

influences.

In January 2002, Karimov orchestrated a

referendum on a new constitution that created

a bicameral legislature. A constitutional

provision extended the presidential term to

seven years. The legislature (termed the Oliy

Majlis or Supreme Assembly) consists of a

120-member (later expanded, see below),

directly elected lower chamber, the Legislative

Chamber, and a 100-member upper chamber,

the Senate. The Senate is composed of 16

members appointed by the president, with the

rest selected by local legislatures. The

Legislative Chamber has formal responsibility

for drafting laws. Constitutional amendments

approved in April 2003 established that—after

the presidential election at the end of 2007—

the prime minister would exercise greater

power. In January 2005, Karimov explained

that he aimed to create three powerful

branches of government, to correct a situation

where “everything now depends on me.”

Uzbekistan Basic Facts

Area and Population: Land area is 172,742 sq. mi.,

slightly larger than California. The population is 28.7

million (World Factbook, July 2013 est.). Administrative

subdivisions include the Karakalpak Republic.

Ethnicity and Religion: 80% are Uzbek, 5.5% Russian,

5% Tajik, 3% Kazakh, 2.5% Karakalpak, 1.5% Tatar, and

others (World Factbook, 1996 est.). More than 1.2

million Uzbeks reside in Afghanistan, 1 million in

Tajikistan, and 500,000 in Kyrgyzstan. Most Uzbeks

follow Sunni Islam of the Hanafi school, although Sufiism

is influential.

Gross Domestic Product: $106.4 billion; per capita

GDP is about $3,600 (World Factbook, 2012 est.,

purchasing power parity).

Political Leaders: President: Islam Karimov; Prime

Minister: Shavkat Mirziyoyev; Speaker of the Legislative

Chamber: Diloram Tashmukhamedova; Speaker of the

Senate: Ilgizar Sobirov; Foreign Minister: Abdulaziz

Komilov; Defense Minister: Major-General Qobil

Berdiyev.

Biography: Karimov, born in 1938, worked in Uzbek

state planning and finance for much of his early career. In

1989, he became First Secretary of the Uzbek

Communist Party. In 1990, the Uzbek Supreme Soviet

elected him to the newly created post of president, and

he also became a member of the Soviet Communist

Party Politburo. In December 1991, he was popularly

elected president of Uzbekistan, winning 86% of the vote

against opposition Erk Party candidate Mohammad Solikh

(Salih). In 1995, Karimov orchestrated a popular

referendum to extend his presidency until 2000, won

reelection, and in 2002 orchestrated another referendum

to extend his term until 2007. He was reelected in

December 2007.

Only government-controlled parties operate legally: the People’s Democratic Party (PDP),

formerly the communist party headed by Karimov; the Adolat (Justice) Social Democratic Party;

the Liberal-Democratic Party (LDP), consisting of government-connected businessmen; the

Milliy Tiklanish (National Revival) Party, consisting of state-supported intellectuals; and the

Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan. Opposition parties such as Birdamlik, Birlik, Erk, Free

Farmers, and the Sunshine Coalition are illegal. The former Fidokorlar (Self-Sacrifice) National

Democracy Party, created by Karimov as a youth party, merged with the National Revival Party

in June 2008, and the enlarged party joined the “Democratic Bloc” of Legislative Chamber

factions (including Adolat and the Liberal Democratic Party) in August 2008. A constitutional law

on parties and democratization came into effect in 2008 that permits “opposition” party deputies

in the Legislative Chamber to offer alternative bills and take part in debates. The law also calls

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

for the president to “consult” with Legislative Chamber factions before nominating a candidate

for prime minister.

In December 2008, President Karimov signed electoral legislation that eliminated the nomination

of candidates for legislative and presidential elections by independent initiative groups, leaving

only parties as eligible to nominate candidates.1 The law also expanded the size of the Legislative

Chamber from 120 to 150. Fifteen of the members of the Chamber are to be elected by delegates

to a conference of the Ecological Movement of Uzbekistan (EMU), registered as a political party

in September 2008. The EMU proclaims that it is not like green parties in other countries, so that

it can focus on environmental issues rather than grasping for political power.

The Uzbek Central Election Commission (CEC) in mid-November 2007 approved four

candidates to run in the prospective December 23, 2007, presidential election. Incumbent

President Karimov was nominated by the LDP. The party which Karimov once headed, the PDP,

nominated its current head, Asliddin Rustamov. The Adolat Social Democratic Party nominated

its head, Dilorom Toshmuhammadova. A citizen’s initiative committee nominated Akmal Saidov.

The CEC disqualified the candidates nominated by the Milliy Taklanish and Fidokorlar parties at

their conventions (the latter party had sponsored Karimov during his 2000 election), saying they

had not gathered enough signatures. Although the Uzbek constitution bars a president from more

than two terms, the CEC argued that since the most recent constitution was approved in 2002,

Karimov’s “first term” followed his election in January 2000, and that he was eligible to run for a

“second term” in December 2007.

According to the report of a small election observation mission sponsored by the OSCE’s Office

of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), the Uzbek CEC and local electoral

commissions controlled public appearances and spending by the candidates. There were no

campaign debates and media coverage was minimal, according to ODIHR. Each presidential

candidate used similar language to laud economic development and democratization under the

incumbent president. State-owned media urged the electorate to vote for Karimov. According to

the CEC, Karimov received 88% of 14.8 million votes with a 90.6% turnout. The OHIDR

election mission issued a press statement assessing the election as “generally fail[ing] to meet

many OSCE commitments for democratic elections.” Besides the problems noted above, others

included lax rules regarding early voting, frequent voting by one member of a household for all

members, and an observed low turnout.2

Elections to the Legislative Chamber were held on December 27, 2009. Over 500 candidates from

the four approved parties ran for 135 seats, and an additional 15 seats were filled by voting at a

conference of the EMU. Turnout reportedly was almost 88% of 17.2 million registered voters.

The Central Electoral Commission reported that in 39 districts no candidate had received over

50% of the vote, so that run-offs would be held on January 10, 2010. Following these run-offs,

The chairman of the Legislative Chamber’s Committee on Legislation, Nurdinjon Ismoilov hailed the elimination of

this nomination process as “preventing various troublemakers from getting into parliament, including members of

organized crime groups, and their acquiring deputy immunity. This measure also prevents a parliament post from being

used to pursue clannishness and promote parochial and corporate interests.” National Word, 6 December, 2008, quoted

in Sukhrobjon Ismoilov and Sanzhar Saidov, “On the Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan,” Central

Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2010.

OSCE, ODIHR, Press Release: Strictly Controlled Uzbek Elections Did Not Offer a Genuine Choice, ODIHR

Observers Conclude, December 24, 2007; Republic Of Uzbekistan, Presidential Election, 23 December 2007,

OSCE/ODIHR Limited Election Observation Mission: Final Report, April 23, 2008.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

the Liberal Democratic Party had won 53 seats, the People’s Democratic Party had won 32 seats,

the Milliy Tiklanish Party had won 31 seats, and the Adolat Social Democratic Party had won 19

seats. The OSCE declined to send observers, stating that the electoral environment did not permit

a free and fair contest. Some U.S. embassy personnel observed some of the voting, and the

embassy stated afterward that the election campaign failed to reflect diverse viewpoints, since

candidates from only pro-Karimov parties were permitted to run.3 Indirect elections to the Senate

were held on January 20-22, 2010. The president’s 16 appointees to the Senate included deputy

prime ministers, the chairman of the Supreme Court, and the foreign minister, making the Senate

an amalgam of the three branches of government.

Perhaps to create the appearance of diversity, the Liberal Democratic Party, the Milliy Tiklanish

Party, and the Adolat Social Democratic Party have declared that they form a “majority

democratic bloc” in the Legislative Chamber. The People’s Democratic Party has declared that it

is the “minority opposition” party. Opening a joint session of the newly elected legislature in late

January 2010, President Karimov called for studying the activities of the U.S. Congress in order

to boost the role of budgeting and oversight in the Uzbek legislature.4

In a speech in November 2010, President Karimov called for several constitutional changes which

were approved by the legislature and signed into law by the president in April 2011. One of the

changes provides for the political party that controls a majority of seats in the lower legislative

chamber to have the right to nominate a candidate for prime minister (all existing political parties

are pro-Karimov). Procedures also are outlined for the legislature to hold a vote of no confidence

in the prime minister. The prime minister is given responsibility for appointing regional

administrators, a power formerly lodged with the president. Another amendment specifies that in

the event the president is incapacitated, the chairman of the Senate will serve as the interim head

of state pending the holding of a presidential election within three months. Some skeptics have

linked the constitutional changes to government concerns that civil discontent could become

manifest as it did in several Middle Eastern countries in early 2011. Others suggest that since

some of the ostensible reform efforts predate the “Arab Spring,” they are linked to infighting

within the elite. Perhaps supporting the latter view, in mid-July 2011 the legislature passed a joint

resolution criticizing an economic report delivered by the prime minister.5

On December 5, 2011, the legislature approved amendments to the constitution reducing the

presidential term from seven to five years. The change was hailed as advancing democratization,

but was a reversion to the pre-2002 term in office. In March 2012, the legislature approved

holding legislative elections on December 28, 2014, and the presidential election in March or

April 2015. Some observers suggest that President Karimov might consider succession

contingencies at that time, such as designating a possible heir.

OSCE. ODIHR. Republic of Uzbekistan Parliamentary Elections 27 December 2009: OSCE/ODIHR Needs

Assessment Mission Report, October 21-22, 2009; Deirdre Tynan, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent Holds Parliamentary

Elections,” Eurasia Insight, December 28, 2009. Uzbek analysts Sukhrobjon Ismoilov and Sanzhar Saidov claim that

turnout was actually around 50% or less and that candidates were pre-designated to win seats. They argue that even

though “the political parties of Uzbekistan are incapable of rallying people around them and governing the state,” the

parties are gaining experience and eventually may be permitted to freely and effectively aggregate interests. “On the

Results of the Parliamentary Elections in Uzbekistan,” Central Asia and the Caucasus, Vol. 11, Issue 1, 2010.

Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter CEDR), January 28, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-950069.

CEDR, July 22, 2011, Doc. No. CEP-950121.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

In April 2012, Uzbek legislators and officials visiting the United States reported that bills had

been introduced to provide for the legislature to hold hearings to question the prime minister, to

hold a vote of non-confidence in the government, and to strengthen the rights of NGOs.6

Displaying a guarded attitude toward democratization, President Karimov stated in June 2012 that

“we should live in an evolutionary way ... not in a revolution or coup.... Tell me if it is possible to

say a people happy, if they live in uncertainties: how will life change tomorrow, how will prices

change, what sort of calamities are awaiting us.... Only peace, tranquility and unity make ... the

Uzbek people [happy].... This is the Uzbek people’s biggest demand from life.”7 U.S. analyst

Martha Olcott has argued that Uzbek society is becoming more religiously traditional (although

not radical), and that politics will probably be influenced by these societal views, so that a secular

liberal democratic political system may not soon emerge.8

In December 2012, President Karimov stressed that the country was following a path of

“evolutionary” democratization, including by increasing the checks and balances among the three

branches of power and strengthening political parties. At the same time, he stated that the

government’s power would continue to increase in the “transitional period” in order for it to

direct the reforms, and cautioned that the process of democratization was lengthy and neverending.9

Human Rights

The NGO Freedom House repeatedly has included Uzbekistan among nine countries such as

North Korea, Sudan, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan ranked as “the world’s worst human rights

abusers” in terms of human rights and civil liberties.10

According to the State Department’s Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012,

police routinely beat and otherwise mistreated detainees to obtain confessions, and torture

reportedly was common in prisons and detention facilities. The government frequently harassed,

arrested, and prosecuted human rights activists and political oppositionists. Most human rights

organizations estimated that authorities held hundreds or even thousands of political prisoners.

There were no jury trials. In the vast majority of criminal cases brought to court, the defendant

was found guilty. Judges often based their verdicts solely on confessions and witness testimony

extracted through abuse and threats to family members. In mid-2012, Gulnaza Yuldasheva, a

human rights activist, was convicted of charges of extortion viewed by many observers as

politically motivated; she had earlier accused a number of local officials of complicity in human

trafficking. Officials released some high-profile prisoners during the year, and a few police

officers were convicted on charges of torture or other abuse. In late 2012, legislation was

approved that ostensibly expanded the use of habeas corpus in criminal cases.

Carnegie Endowment, Current Developments in Uzbekistan’s Parliament, April 26, 2012, at

http://carnegieendowment.org/2012/04/26/current-developments-in-uzbekistan-s-parliament/acih.

CEDR, June 18, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950118.

Martha Olcott, In the Whirlwind of Jihad (Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment, 2012).

CEDR, December 8, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950005.

The Worst of the Worst 2012, Freedom House, 2012; Freedom in the World 2013, Freedom House, 2013; Nations in

Transit, Freedom House, June 18, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

The government severely limited freedom of expression. The law imposed significant fines for

libel and defamation, and insulting the president was punishable by up to five years in prison. The

government used such charges as well as other methods to arrest, harass, and intimidate

journalists. The government allowed publication of a few private newspapers with limited

circulation that included infrequent stories critical of government socio-economic policies. Four

state-run television channels dominated broadcasting. Regional television outlets sometimes

broadcast some moderately critical stories on local issues. In late 2012, the government

reportedly issued new regulations widening control over media, including the power to block or

ban media that threaten the integrity of the “national information space.” The government

regularly gave explicit instructions about the types of stories permitted for publication.

The government often restricted freedom of assembly. Authorities dispersed and occasionally

detained persons who were involved in peaceful protests. The law requires that all nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) be registered formally with the government. The government

compelled most NGOs to join a state-controlled NGO association that enabled close oversight

over their funding and activities. The government limited freedom of travel and emigration, in

particular through the continued requirement for citizens and permanent residents to obtain exit

visas, although it generally granted the visas. There were reports that the government delayed exit

visas for human rights activists and independent journalists. Government-compelled forced labor

occurred during the cotton harvest, including 15- to 18-year-old students, teachers, medical

workers, government and military personnel, retirees, and persons receiving welfare. Credible

reporting suggested that the expanded use of forced mobilization of adult state workers was to

compensate for reductions in labor by children younger than 15.11

Since November 2006, the State Department has designated Uzbekistan a “country of particular

concern” (CPC), for severe religious and other human rights violations that could lead to U.S.

sanctions. However, since 2009, the State Department has issued waivers for Uzbekistan, so that

no U.S. sanctions have been taken. According to the State Department, the Uzbek government

“engaged in or tolerated particularly severe violations of religious freedom,” including

restrictions on unregistered groups and the prohibition of many activities, such as proselytizing.

Many members of registered and unregistered minority religious groups faced heavy fines and

short jail terms. The government continued to deal harshly with Muslims who practiced outside

of sanctioned mosques, but permitted the regular activities of religious groups deemed

traditionally present in the country, including the Muslim, Jewish, Catholic, and Russian

Orthodox communities. The State Department followed the recommendation of the U.S.

Commission on International Religious Freedom in again designating Uzbekistan as a CPC.12

In June 2013, the State Department reported that Uzbekistan is a source country for human

trafficking for forced labor and sex, and that while the government greatly reduced the number of

children under 15 years of age involved in the 2012 cotton harvest, the government continued to

subject older children and adults to forced labor in the harvest. Also, Uzbekistan has not

demonstratively investigated or prosecuted government officials suspected to be complicit in

forced labor. The State Department estimates that there are over 1 million individuals subject to

state-imposed internal forced labor in Uzbekistan. Since designations began in 2003, Uzbekistan

has ranked as a Tier 2, Tier 2 Watch List, or Tier 3 country (a Tier 2 country does not fully

U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2012, April 19, 2013.

U.S. Commission on International Religious Freedom, Annual Report, April 2013; U.S. Department of State, Annual

Report on International Religious Freedom, May 20, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

comply with the minimum standards for the elimination of trafficking but is making significant

efforts to comply; a Watch List country does not fully comply, the number of victims may be

increasing, and efforts to comply are slipping; a Tier 3 country does not fully comply and is not

making significant efforts to do so). In the 2003, 2006, and 2007 reports, Uzbekistan was listed as

a Tier 3 country, but in the 2008-2012 reports, Uzbekistan was on the Tier 2 Watch List. In the

2011-2012 reports, Uzbekistan was granted waivers from an otherwise required downgrade to

Tier 3 because the government had written plans to comply, according to the State Department.

However, the government plans were not realized, and since Uzbekistan had exhausted its

maximum of two consecutive waivers, it was placed on Tier 3 in the 2013 report. Countries

placed on Tier 3 are subject to certain sanctions, including the withholding of non-humanitarian,

non-trade-related foreign assistance. However, Uzbekistan has received partial or full waivers.13

The U.S. Department of Labor has listed Uzbekistan as among countries that use child labor to

pick cotton. This list is meant to inform the choices made by the buying public.14 In addition, on

July 23, 2013, cotton from Tajikistan and Uzbekistan again was included on a list that requires

U.S. government contractors to certify that they have made a good faith effort to determine

whether forced or indentured child labor was used to produce the cotton.15

In testimony to Congress in April 2013, an official of the U.S. International Labor Rights Forum

(IRLF), an NGO, reported that as a member of the Cotton Campaign, an international coalition of

NGOs, industries, and trade unions, the IRLF had supported diplomatic and economic pressure on

Uzbekistan to end forced child and adult labor in cotton production. He reported that forced child

and adult labor continued to be used in the autumn 2012 cotton harvest, and that security

personnel were deployed on the farms to enforce production quotas and to prevent pickers from

taking pictures or otherwise documenting the use of forced labor. Ostensibly, the pickers were

“volunteers” recruited from government agencies, private firms, colleges, and high schools, the

latter including a majority of all faculty members. Children under age 15 were officially excused

from the harvest, although many aged 11-15 were observed in the fields. Individuals could pay a

fee in lieu of participating in the harvest, but most reportedly were afraid of repercussions such as

dismissal from a job or university if they did not participate, according to the ILRF official. He

also reported that the use of forced labor throughout the economy was increasing. The IRLF has

called for the U.S. Customs Service to enforce the Tariff Act of 1930 to block the importation of

Uzbek cotton materials produced by forced labor 16

The U.N. Children’s Fund (UNICEF) was permitted to monitor the autumn 2011 cotton harvest in

Uzbekistan, but not the 2012 harvest, and the country continues to bar monitors from the U.N.’s

International Labor Organization. The Uzbek Ministry of Labor asserted in early September 2012

U.S. Department of State, Trafficking in Persons Report, June 19, 2013. See also Uzbekistan: Forced Labor

Widespread in Cotton Harvest, Human Rights Watch, January 25, 2013.

U.S. Department of Labor, List of Goods Produced by Child Labor or Forced Labor, September 26, 2012; For an

assessment of the 2011 harvest, see Department of Labor, Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor, September 30,

2011.

U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of International Labor Affairs. Executive Order 13126, Prohibition of Acquisition

of Products Produced by Forced or Indentured Child Labor, at http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/regs/eo13126/.

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Africa, Global Health, Global

Human Rights, and International Organizations, Hearing on Tier Rankings in the Fight Against Human Trafficking,

Testimony of Brian Campbell, Director of Policy and Legal Programs, International Labor Rights Forum, April 18,

2013; ILRF, Press Release: Leading Labor Rights Watchdog Calls on U.S. Customs Service to Halt Imports of Forced

Labor Cotton from Uzbekistan, May 15, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

that the use of forced child labor in the agricultural sector was not permitted in Uzbekistan. It

stated that all cotton in the country is produced on private “family farms,” where international

legal norms permit children who are members of farmers’ families to assist in chores. Observers

have pointed out that the Uzbek government owns the land and sets production quotas and prices,

and that the farmers are tenants under contract.17

At his confirmation hearing on May 15, 2011, Ambassador-designate to Uzbekistan George Krol

reportedly stated that the United States will “relentlessly raise individual cases of [human rights]

repression both privately and publicly at all levels of the Uzbekistani government and will seek to

identify opportunities to support and expand space for civil society and human rights activists.”

He also pledged that the United States would continue to support “embattled civil society and

independent media.”18

In June 2013, Hasan Choriyev—the 71-year old father of oppositionist Bahodyr Choriyev, who

fled Uzbekistan in 2004 and resides in the United States—was arrested on rape charges the day

after a report that his son might be interested in eventually running for president. Observers

deemed the charges politically motivated, given the elder Choriyev’s ill health and the fact that he

had been detained for questioning on another matter at the time of the alleged rape.

On June 26, 2013, 12 U.S. Senators sent a letter to President Karimov urging him to release

human rights lawyer Agzam Turgenov and journalists Dilmurod Saidov and Salijon

Abdurakhmanov, whom had been imprisoned in 2008-2009 and were termed political prisoners

by the Senators.

In July 2013, the U.N. Human Rights Council issued a working group report on Uzbekistan that

contained recommendations by the member states on improving human rights conditions in

Uzbekistan. The United States urged that forced labor and hazardous child labor be eliminated,

that all torture allegations be independently investigated, that politically motivated prosecutions

be ended, and that the harassment and detention of persons who exercise their rights to freedoms

of expression, assembly, association, and religion be ended and that those held on such grounds

be released. Uzbekistan rejected all the U.S. recommendations, as well as all others as factually

incorrect or un-germane. The Uzbek delegation asserted that there are no political prisoners in

Uzbekistan, and that so-called journalists and human rights defenders who were imprisoned had

been sentenced for criminal actions. They stated that all allegations of torture are investigated and

that as a result, five law enforcement officers had been brought to justice in 2012 and that

religious freedom is recognized, except for proselytism, missionary activities, and the operation

of unregistered religious groups. Missionary activities and proselytism, it warned, could upset the

majority Muslim population and inter-faith relations. The delegation asserted that Uzbekistan

does not use forced child labor during the cotton harvest, and rejected calls for an ILO special

mission to inspect the harvest on the grounds that such requests were the “result of competition

for economic markets [by] a number of Western cotton companies.” They claimed that an April

2013 decision by the ICRC to halt visits to prisons in Uzbekistan was not due to lack of

cooperation by Uzbekistan, as averred by the ICRC. They also stated that male homosexual

relations would continue to be outlawed in accordance with tradition.19

CEDR, September 7, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950095.

U.S. Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Nomination Hearing, Statement by George Krol, Nominee for

Ambassador to Uzbekistan, May 17, 2011.

U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Commission, Report of the Working Group on the Universal Periodic

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Economic Developments

After economic dislocations associated with the breakup of the Soviet Union, the Uzbek economy

ceased to decline and began to turn around in 1996. In 2003, Uzbekistan announced that it would

permit full currency convertibility, but vitiated the reform by reducing money in circulation,

closing borders, and placing punitive tariffs on imports. These restrictions helped fuel organized

crime, corruption, and consumer shortages. Uzbekistan is the world’s third-largest cotton

exporter. The agricultural sector accounts for about one-fifth of the country’s GDP, and nearly

one-half of the population depends on agriculture and related activities for their livelihoods. The

largest portion of foreign currency earnings is based on cotton exports, followed by exports of

gold and natural gas. Most exports in 2011 went to China, Kazakhstan, Turkey, Russia, Ukraine,

and Bangladesh. The government closely controls export earning sectors. The government claims

that 16% of the population remains in poverty, based on calories of food consumption per day. A

sizeable portion of the working-age population has migrated abroad for work. Some international

companies have boycotted purchases of Uzbek cotton and finished goods on the grounds that

forced child and adult labor is used in harvesting.

In response to the global economic downturn in 2008, the Uzbek government launched an anticrisis program to increase budgetary expenditures on infrastructure modernization, extend credit

to export industries, restructure bank debts, boost investment in small-sized businesses, and

augment public-sector wages and social welfare. Transfers from the Fund for Reconstruction and

Development (FRD; a pool of export and portfolio earnings launched in 2006, currently said to

hold $15 billion) were used for some of these expenditures, although the Economist Intelligence

Unit (EIU) firm alleges that mainly state-owned companies received the funds. A new industrial

and infrastructure modernization program set at $47 billion was launched for 2011-2015, which

the government hopes to finance partly with FRD funds and increased domestic and foreign direct

investment (FDI). A new program of privatization has been announced to attract FDI. However,

since 2010, dozens of foreign investors have had their businesses seized by the Uzbek

government. Some Turkish businessmen whose stores were seized in 2011 alleged that they were

tortured until they signed confessions of tax evasion and illegal activities.20 In January 2013, a

Russian telecom firm filed for bankruptcy in Uzbekistan, accusing Uzbek government officials of

seeking to destroy the firm and seize its assets. These confiscations of foreign assets reportedly

have contributed to a sizeable falloff in FDI since 2011.

The EIU states that the Uzbek government’s economic data are untrustworthy, so that the true

state of the economy is hard to ascertain. The EIU estimates that GDP increased by 8.0% in 2012.

Economic growth was supported by increasing remittances by migrant workers and robust growth

in the service, construction, and agricultural sectors, but was hampered somewhat by stalling

world prices for gold and falling prices for cotton. These problems may continue to impede GDP

growth in 2013, which the EIU estimates may slow to 7.3%. In July 2013, Uzbekistan reported a

near-record grain harvest.

(...continued)

Review: Uzbekistan, A/HRC/24/7, July 5, 2013.

Joanna Lillis, “Uzbekistan: Tashkent’s Sticky Fingers Spoiling Foreign Investors’ Appetites,” Eurasianet, August 1,

2012; “Businessman Files Torture Case Against Uzbekistan,” IWPR, April 30, 2012; Ashley Cleek, “Uzbekistan:

Foreign Business Exodus Continues,” Choihona—Eurasianet, June 19, 2012; ‘No One Left to Witness’: Torture, the

Failure of Habeas Corpus, and the Silencing of Lawyers in Uzbekistan, Human Rights Watch, December 2011.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Migrant workers remitted $2.3 billion in 2012, according to the World Bank (Russia’s Central

Bank reported remittances of $5.7 billion in 2012). By some accounts, up to one-fourth or more

of Uzbekistan’s labor force may be employed abroad. Appearing to discount the pressures driving

Uzbeks to seek work abroad, on June 20, 2013, President Karimov stated that “I describe as lazy

those who go to Moscow and sweep its streets and squares. One feels disgusted with Uzbeks

going there for a slice of bread. Nobody is starving to death in Uzbekistan.... I call such people

lazy because they go there in order to make big money fast, and they are a disgrace to us all.”21

The EIU estimates that inflation was 14.3% at the end of 2012. The Uzbek government has tried

to limit inflation through price controls on food and energy, but also has contributed to inflation

by increasing public sector wages, pensions, and educational stipends at an average rate of about

20% per year since 2006, according to the World Bank.22 Added restrictions in early 2013 on the

purchase of foreign exchange by residents may increase the import costs for private businesses

forced to obtain foreign currency on the black market.

In late 2008, Tashkent suspended its membership in the Eurasian Economic Community (a

Russia-led group including Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan that promotes

unified customs tariffs and free trade). Some observers linked this action to Uzbekistan’s

opposition to Russian leader Vladimir Putin’s neo-imperialist initiatives (other moves include

suspending participation in the Collective Security Treaty Organizaton; see below). However,

during his June 4, 2012, visit to Uzbekistan, President Putin and President Karimov signed a

memorandum of understanding pledging Russian support for Uzbekistan joining the CIS Free

Trade Zone, launched in 2011.Uzbekistan was formally admitted as a member of the Free Trade

Zone at the end of May 2013. Uzbekistan’s strict border controls and corruption stifle regional

trade, according to observers.

The United States and Uzbekistan have minimal trade. U.S. exports to Uzbekistan were about

$285 million in 2012 (mainly aircraft; see below), and imports were about $26 million, according

to the U.S. Commerce Department. Among major trade initiatives, Uzbekistan purchased four

Boeing 767s in late 2008, of which three were delivered by mid-2012. A joint venture between

General Motors and the Uzbek state automobile firm UzAvtosanoat, termed GM Uzbekistan, was

formed in 2008 and assembles over 200,000 automobiles annually for the Uzbek domestic market

and for export to Russia and elsewhere. Another joint venture between the two firms opened a

factory in November 2011 to assemble engines for GM Uzbekistan.

Tajikistan has alleged that Uzbekistan delays rail freight shipments, purportedly to pressure

Tajikistan to halt construction of the Rogun hydro-electric power dam on the Vakhsh River, which

Uzbekistan fears could limit the flow of water into the country. In November 2011, Uzbekistan

closed a rail link to southern Tajikistan, reporting that a bridge was damaged, but since then

allegedly has dismantled the span. In early April 2012, Tajikistan’s prime minister and its foreign

ministry denounced the rail restriction as part of an “economic blockade” aiming to destabilize

Tajikistan. The Uzbek prime minister responded that all Uzbek actions were in accordance with

bilateral agreements or responses to Tajik actions, so that the accusations were “groundless.”23

CEDR, June 21, 2013, Doc. No. CEN-50969548; David Trilling, “Uzbekistan’s President Attacks “Lazy” Labor

Migrants,” Eurasianet, June 21, 2013.

Uzbekistan: Country Report, Economist Intelligence Unit, August 2013; Uzbekistan Partnership: Country Program

Snapshot, The World Bank Group, March 2013.

Yulia Goryaynova, Galim Faskhutdinov, and Saule Mukhametrakhimov, “A Gas Row Highlights Tajik-Uzbek

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

In July 2013, Tajikistan claimed that it had released water from its Qayroqqum reservoir into the

Syr Darya River, which flows into Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Tajik officials stated that they

acted to avert water shortages downstream, and blamed the lowered river flow on upsteam

Kyrgyzstan, which was impounding virtually all water in its Toktogul reservoir for winter power

generation.

Oil and Gas

British Petroleum’s (BP’s) Statistical Review of World Energy reports that Uzbekistan has about

600 million barrels of proven oil reserves and an estimated 39.7 trillion cubic feet of proven

natural gas reserves as of 2012 (negligible in terms of world oil reserves but about 0.6% of world

gas reserves).24 Uzbekistan is a net importer of oil. Uzbek oil production has been declining for

many years, attributable to lack of investment. The country consumes the bulk of its gas

production domestically, but has used its network of Soviet-era gas pipelines to export some gas

to Russia and to other Central Asian states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan). According

to BP, Uzbekistan exported about 479 bcf of gas in 2010 (since then, BP’s Statistical Review has

not reported exports for Uzbekistan). According to some reports, gas exports declined to 424 bcf

in 2011 but rebounded slightly to 441.4 bcf in 2012. Gas is provided to Russia and Kazakhstan

through the Russian-owned Central Asia-Center Pipeline system. Uzbekistan began to export

some gas through this pipeline system to Ukraine in 2011. Reportedly, Uzbekistan has been an

unreliable gas exporter to other Central Asian states in recent winters, diverting exports to meet

urgent cold-weather domestic needs. At the end of 2012, Uzbekistan suddenly ended gas

shipments to Tajikistan, and these had not resumed as of August 2013.

Uzbekistan largely has been closed to Western energy investment, although efforts to attract

international energy firms have appeared to increase in recent years. Russian firms Gazprom and

Lukoil are the largest investors in Uzbek gas development and production. Reportedly, Gazprom

pays European-pegged gas prices for only a fraction of imports from Uzbekistan. In 2005, CNPC

and Uzbekistan’s state-owned Uzbekneftegaz firm announced that they would form a joint

venture to develop oil and gas resources. In 2007, Uzbekistan and China signed an agreement on

building a 326-mile section of the Central Asia-China Pipeline, and a joint venture between

Uzbekneftegaz and CNPC launched construction in 2008. Two side-by-side pipelines were

completed in 2009-2010, and the third is under construction. In October 2011, Uztransgaz (Uzbek

gas transportation firm) and a subsidiary of CNPC signed a contract to supply gas though this

pipeline beginning in 2012. In April 2012, China announced it would spend $15 billion for oil

and gas exploration in Uzbekistan. A production sharing consortium composed of Uzbekneftegaz,

Lukoil, the Korea National Oil Corporation, and CNPC is exploring for gas in the Aral Sea

region.

In August 2012, Uzbekistan began to export gas to China through the Central Asia-China

pipeline. The Uzbek State Statistics Committee reported that energy exports in 2012 had nearly

doubled over those of the previous year, from $2.78 billion to $5.03 billion, with exports to China

probably accounting for much of the increase. Reportedly, the exports constrained domestic

supplies, which were under further pressure from the declining output of Uzbekistan’s oil and gas

(...continued)

Tensions,” IWPR, April 24, 2012; CEDR, April 3, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950105; April 4, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950127.

BP Statistical Review of World Energy, British Petroleum, June 2013.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

fields. Uzbekistan reportedly exported 141 bcf of gas to China in the latter part of 2012 and plans

to supply 353 bcf of gas to China in 2013. In May 2013, Shokir Fayzullayev, the chairman of the

board of the state holding company Uzbekneftegaz (Uzbek Oil and Gas), denied that gas exports

were to blame for shortages. He claimed that the domestic gas distribution system was

inadequate, particularly in the winter, but that it was being upgraded.

Foreign Policy and Defense

Home to more than half of the population of Central Asia, Uzbekistan seeks to play a leading role

in regional affairs. Foreign policy is highly dependent on presidential decision-making. A new

foreign policy concept was submitted to the legislature by President Karimov and quickly

approved in early August 2012. It states that the main goals of Uzbekistan’s foreign policy are

strengthening the state’s independence and sovereignty; ensuring a role in international affairs;

joining the ranks of democratic and developed countries; and creating security, stability, and

cooperative ties with neighboring states. Relations with Central Asian states are deemed the

highest foreign policy priority because the vital interests of the country are connected with the

region, including water sharing. The concept states that “Uzbekistan has always remained

committed to conducting an open, friendly, and pragmatic policy towards its neighbors [and] is

taking political, economic and other measures to prevent its involvement in armed conflicts and

tensions in neighboring countries.” The concept calls for regional problems to be solved without

the interference of external forces. It proclaims that Uzbekistan “reserves the right to conclude

unions, join commonwealths and other interstate groups, and also leave them.” At the same time,

however, the concept appears to embrace neutrality in security relations, specifying that

“Uzbekistan pursues a peace-loving policy and does not take part in military-political blocs,” and

that the country “reserves the right of exit from any interstate group in the case of its

transformation into a military-political bloc” (these provisions appear to reflect Uzbekistan’s

limited or non-participation in military exercises; see below). The concept also states that

Uzbekistan neither will permit the stationing of foreign military bases on its soil—ostensibly

referring to new bases—nor will participate in peacekeeping operations abroad.25

From the late 1990s until mid-2005, Karimov’s priority was to seek closer ties with the United

States, the European Union, and NATO while maintaining working relations with Russia and

China. However, after the mid-2005 events in Andijon (see below), he shifted to closer ties with

the latter two states. In 2001, Uzbekistan joined the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and in

2003 insisted on hosting its Regional Anti-Terrorism Center. During his early June 2012 visit to

China to attend a SCO summit, President Karimov and Chinese President Hu Jintao had a side

meeting and signed a declaration on strategic partnership to herald closer ties. Uzbekistan will

host a meeting of the SCO prime ministers in September 2013.

Uzbekistan has ongoing tensions with other Central Asian states over its mining of borders,

water-sharing, border delineation, and other issues.

•

Tajikistan’s relations with Uzbekistan have been problematic, including

disagreements about water-sharing, Uzbek gas supplies, the mining of borders,

“Uzbekistan to adopt Concept of Foreign Policy Activities,” UzDaily News Service, July 31, 2012; “Legislative

Chamber Approves Concept of Foreign Political Activities,” UzDaily News Service, August 1, 2012; Joanna Lillis,

“Uzbekistan: Tashkent Says No to Foreign Military Bases and Blocs,” Choihona—Eurasianet, August 3, 2012.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

border demarcation, and environmental pollution. In July 2008, the head of the

Tajik Supreme Court asserted that Uzbek security forces had bombed the

Supreme Court building the previous summer as part of efforts to topple the

government. In late 2010, Uzbekistan began a transit slowdown and other

economic measures to pressure Tajikistan to halt building the Rogun dam (see

above).

•

Turkmenistan’s relations with Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan have been tense.

Azerbaijan and Turkmenistan have rival claims to some Caspian Sea oil and gas

fields. Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan have vied for regional influence and argued

over water-sharing. In 2002, the Turkmen government accused Uzbek officials of

conspiring to overthrow it. Uzbekistan also objected to the treatment of ethnic

Uzbeks in Turkmenistan under the previous president.

•

The Kyrgyz premier rejected claims by Karimov in 2005 that Kyrgyzstan had

provided training facilities and other support for the Andijon militants. Karimov

again accused Kyrgyzstan in late May 2009 of harboring terrorists whom had

attacked across the border. After the April 2010 coup in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan

tightened border controls with this country, greatly harming its economy. Conflict

between ethnic Uzbeks and ethnic Kyrgyz in southern Kyrgyzstan in June 2010

further strained relations between the two countries. Up to 100,000 ethnic

Uzbeks fled fighting in southern Kyrgyzstan to refugee camps in Uzbekistan.

Although critical of the Kyrgyz government, Uzbekistan did not intervene

militarily or permit its citizens to enter Kyrgyzstan to join in the fighting.26

•

On July 17, 2012, border guards exchanged gunfire at a Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan

border post, reportedly killing a guard on each side. Uzbekistan responded by

restricting border crossings at this post. In January 2013, Kyrgyz border guards

wounded five Uzbeks in the Uzbek enclave of Sokh in Kyrgyzstan’s Batken

Region, bordering Uzbekistan. The Uzbeks allegedly had attempted to block an

incursion into Sokh by the Kyrgyz border guards. Up to 1,000 local Uzbeks then

temporarily took over three dozen Kyrgyz hostage.27 Uzbekistan in retaliation

closed a road from Kyrgyzstan to a Kyrgyz enclave in Uzbekistan, and this road

remains closed. In July 2013, Kyrgyzstan began building a fence around the Sokh

enclave. That same month, Kyrgyz guards allegedly killed two Uzbek guards

along the Namangan-Jalalabad regional border during a reported shoot-out.28

On the other hand, there have been some contacts between Karimov and other Central Asian

leaders:

•

In early September 2012, President Karimov visited Kazakhstan for a bilateral

summit. One observer suggested that this summit was an effort by the two major

According to Assistant Secretary of State Eric Schwartz, “the Government of Uzbekistan acted quickly and

constructively in response to the humanitarian crisis, [and] cooperated closely with U.N. agencies, the International

Committee of the Red Cross and non-governmental organizations. These efforts helped many people in a time of dire

need.” U.S. Department of State. Opening Statement of Assistant Secretary Schwartz, June 29, 2010. See also

“Tashkent’s Response to Kyrgyz Crisis Boosts Karimov’s Image,” Eurasianet, July 15, 2010.

Open Source Center, Central Eurasia: Daily Report (hereafter, CEDR), January 7, 2013, Doc. Nos. CEP-7950026,

CEP-950027, CEP-950043, CEP-950025, CEP-950014, and CEP-950005; January 9, 2012, Doc. No. CEP-950134;

Interfax, January 6 and January 9, 2013.

CEDR, July 29, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-57040555.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

regional powers to join together to spur greater region-wide integration,

including common responses to security threats such as terrorism and instability

in Afghanistan. The two leaders also aimed to bolster significant trade ties and

issued a joint statement on regional water-sharing.29

•

In mid-June 2013, President Nazarbayev visited Uzbekistan. The two presidents

signed a strategic partnership treaty, stressing that their two countries were the

most strategically important in Central Asia and the necessity of holding

“constant” bilateral consultations. Karimov stated that closer bilateral ties were

needed to address the drawdown of International Security Assistance Force

(ISAF) operations in Afghanistan and to buttress economic development and

trade. Both leaders stated that each country was economically complementary to

the other. Both also emphasized that regional water issues should be resolved

peacefully and equitably with an internationally mediated independent

examination of environmental hazards. However, President Karimov also

suggested that the Kambarata and Rogun dams should not be constructed because

of the danger of earthquakes, and rejected the idea that water was a commodity

that could be traded.30

•

Since Berdimuhamedow came to power, relations between Turkmenistan and

Uzbekistan have improved. In early October 2012, President Karimov visited

Turkmenistan and met with President Berdimuhamedow, and the two leaders

discussed boosting trade and other cooperation. They also called for region-wide

talks before Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan build dams that could affect watersharing. In February 2013, President Karimov phoned Berdimuhamedow to

invite him to visit to discuss joint projects.

Uzbekistan has developed some ties with post-Taliban Afghanistan. In August 2011, Uzbekistan

completed a 50-mile railroad linking its border town of Hairatan with the city of Mazar-e-Sharif

in Afghanistan. The railway is part of the Northern Distribution Network (NDN) of U.S. and

NATO-developed land, air, and sea routes from Europe through Eurasia to Afghanistan. Since

2002, Uzbekistan has provided some electricity to northern Afghanistan. Since early 2008,

President Karimov has advocated the opening of U.N.-sponsored “6+3” Afghan peace talks

(participants would include regional powers Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Pakistan,

China, and Iran and outside powers NATO, the United States, and Russia), similar to the “6+2”

Afghan peace talks he had helped originate and which were held from 1999 to 2001 (NATO was

not included at that time). The United States has stressed an Afghan-led reconciliation process

(see also below, “Contributions to Counter-Terrorism”).

The Uzbek armed forces is the largest in the region in terms of manpower, but some observers

have argued that Kazakhstan’s military modernization efforts are challenging Uzbekistan’s

security dominance. The armed forces consist of about 24,500 ground force troops, 7,500 air

force troops, and 16,000 joint troops. There are also up to 19,000 internal security (police) troops

and 1,000 national guard troops.31 Uzbekistan spent about 3.1% (about $1.4 billion) of its GDP in

2011 on the defense sector, which would be about 10% of the budget. One report stated that much

Richard Weitz, “Nazarbayev-Karimov Summit Imparts New Momentum to Kazakhstani-Uzbekistani Relations,”

Eurasia Daily Monitor, September 14, 2012.

CEDR, June 16, 2013, Doc. No. CEN-70043496.

International Institute of Strategic Studies. The Military Balance, March 14, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

of this spending was on officer and servicemen’s benefits, and that this high level of defense

spending was straining the budget.32 Uzbekistan’s military doctrine proclaims that it makes no

territorial claims on other states and adheres to nuclear non-proliferation. President Karimov has

stated that he strongly opposes military hazing and supports adequate social support for the

troops. Military cooperation between Russia and Uzbekistan is ensured through a 1992

Friendship Treaty, a 1994 military treaty, a 1999 accord on combating terrorism and Islamic

extremism, and a November 2005 Treaty of Alliance. The latter accord calls for mutual

consultations in case of a security threat to either party.

After withdrawing in 1999, Uzbekistan rejoined the Collective Security Treaty Organization in

December 2006 (CSTO; members have included Russia, Belarus, Armenia, and the Central Asian

states except Turkmenistan). However, Uzbekistan declined to participate in rapid reaction forces

established in June 2009 because of concerns that the forces could become involved in disputes

within the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS; a grouping of Soviet successor states) on

the basis of decisions made by the affected parties (rather than solely upon the agreement of all

CSTO members). At CSTO summits in December 2010 and December 2011, the members

reportedly agreed on procedures for intervening in domestic “emergency” situations within a

member state at the behest of the member. At the latter meeting, they also agreed that no member

could host a foreign military base without the permission of the CSTO. Uzbekistan reportedly

raised concerns about these measures.33 On June 20, 2012, Uzbekistan informed the CSTO that it

was suspending its membership in the organization, including because the CSTO was ignoring its

concerns. However, Uzbek officials stated that the country would continue to participate in the

CIS air defense system and other military affairs. According to some observers, the withdrawal of

Central Asia’s largest military from the CSTO highlighted the organization’s ineffectiveness.34

During President Putin’s early June 2012 visit to Uzbekistan, the two sides concluded a

Declaration on Deepening the Strategic Partnership, building on a 2004 agreement, which called

for mutual consultations in the event of a threat to either party. Uzbekistan signed a strategic

partnership accord with China within a few days and with Kazakhstan in June 2013 (see above).

According to some observers, these accords have been pursued by Uzbekistan as preferable to the

CSTO as a means to buttress cooperation on stability in Central Asia as ISAF draws down its

forces in Afghanistan.35 President Karimov highlighted his concerns about Afghanistan in early

May 2013 when he stated that “the main threat for not only Uzbekistan but also for all countries

surrounding Afghanistan is the cruel war that has been continuing in Afghanistan for over 30

years.... Unfortunately, when [ISAF] leaves, conflicts will intensify between the forces which are

opposing each other.... Terrorism, drug addiction, drug trafficking, and various religious and

ethnic conflicts ... will escalate.... Tension will definitely increase in the Central Asian countries

after they pull out without having settled the problem of Afghanistan.”36

Although the SCO Regional Anti-Terrorism Center is in Tashkent, Uzbek troops have not

participated in SCO exercises, although its officers have been observers. Uzbek officers were

observers at SCO military exercises held in Kazakhstan in June 2013 (Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik

“Uzbekistan: Where Conscripts Are Eager to Serve,” EurasiaNet, May 16, 2012 .

Interfax, December 21, 2011.

“Interview: Analyst Says Uzbekistan’s Suspension Shows CSTO Is ‘Irrelevant,’” RFE/RL, June 29, 2012.

CEDR, June 19, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-34596495.

CEDR, May 10, 2013, Doc. No. CEL-52388391.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

troops took part, while Russian and Chinese troops held separate SCO Peace Mission 2013

exercises in Russia in August 2013).

Terrorism and Unrest

On February 16, 1999, six bomb blasts in Tashkent’s governmental area by various reports killed

16-28 and wounded 100-351. Karimov termed the bombing an assassination attempt. He alleged

that exiled Erk Party leader Mohammad Solikh (Salih) led the plot, assisted by Afghanistan’s

Taliban and IMU co-leaders Tahir Yuldashev and Juma Namanganiy. Solikh denied any role in

the bombings. In November 2000, Yuldashev and Namanganiy received death sentences and

Solikh 15.5 years in prison. Another defendant, Najmiddin Jalolov (see below), received 18 years

(all in absentia). Other security threats included the invasion of neighboring Kyrgyzstan in JulyAugust 1999 by several hundred IMU and other guerrillas. They were rumored to be aiming to

create an Islamic state in south Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. By midOctober 1999, they had been forced out of Kyrgyzstan with Uzbek aid. In August 2000, dozens of

IMU and other guerrillas again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan, but were expelled by late

October.

A series of bombings and armed attacks took place in Uzbekistan in late March-early April 2004,

reportedly killing 47 individuals. President Karimov asserted that the attacks were aimed to

“cause panic among our people, [and] to make them lose their trust” in the government. The thenCombined Forces Commander for Afghanistan, Lieutenant General David Barno, visited

Uzbekistan in April 2004 and stressed that “we stand with Uzbekistan in facing down this

terrorist menace.” The obscure Islamic Jihad Union of Uzbekistan (IJU; reportedly a breakaway

faction of the IMU) claimed responsibility. Suspected terrorists testified at a trial in mid-2004 that

Jalolov was the leader of IJU, that they were trained by Arabs and others at camps in Kazakhstan

and Pakistan, and that the IJU was linked to Hizb ut-Tahrir, the Taliban, Uighur extremists, and Al

Qaeda. During this trial, explosions occurred on July 30, 2004, at the U.S. and Israeli embassies

and the Uzbek Prosecutor-General’s Office in Tashkent. The IMU and IJU claimed responsibility.

On May 25-26, 2009, a police checkpoint was attacked on the Kyrgyz-Uzbek border, attacks took

place in the border town of Khanabad, and four bombings occurred in Andijon in the commercial

district, including at least one by suicide bombers. Several deaths and injuries were alleged,

although reporting was suppressed. Uzbek officials blamed the IMU, although the IJU allegedly

claimed responsibility. President Karimov flew to Andijon on May 31. In late August 2009,

shootings took place in Tashkent that resulted in the deaths of three alleged IMU members and

the apprehension of other group members. The Uzbek government alleged that the group had

been involved in the 1999 explosions and in recent assassinations in Tashkent.

In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization,

stating that the IMU, aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by Osama bin Laden, resorts to

terrorism, actively threatens U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the

IMU is to topple the current government in Uzbekistan,” the State Department warned, and it

linked the IMU to bombings and attacks on Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. IMU forces assisting the

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Taliban and Al Qaeda suffered major losses during coalition actions in Afghanistan, and IMU cohead Namanganiy was probably killed.37

Former CIA Director Porter Goss testified in March 2005 that the IJG/IJU “has become a more

virulent threat to U.S. interests and local governments.”38 In May 2005, the State Department

designated the IJG/IJU as a Foreign Terrorist Organization and Specially Designated Global

Terrorist, and in June, the U.N. Security Council added the IJG/IJU to its terrorism list.39 In June

2008, IJG head Jalolov and his associate Suhayl Fatilloevich Buranov were added to the U.N.

1267 Sanctions Committee’s Consolidated List of individuals and entities associated with bin

Laden, al Qaeda, and the Taliban. Also, the U.S. Treasury Department ordered that any of their

assets under U.S. jurisdiction be frozen and prohibited U.S. citizens from financial dealings with

the terrorists.40 IMU head Yuldashev reportedly was killed in late August 2009 in Pakistan by a

U.S. predator drone missile, and Jalalov allegedly similarly was killed in late September 2009.

Yuldashev’s deputy, Abu Usmon Odil, became the head of the IMU.

In July 2011, an Uzbek citizen on an expired student visa was arrested on charges of being

directed by IMU terrorists to assassinate President Obama. He confessed and was sentenced in

2012. Two other ethnic Uzbeks were arrested in the United States in early 2012 on charges of

collaborating with the IJU. One of the Uzbeks had been granted refugee status after he fled the

Uzbek government crackdown in Andijon in 2005. He was arrested at a U.S. airport while

allegedly planning to join IJU terrorists abroad. In May 2013, an ethnic Uzbek was arrested in

Idaho on charges of providing money and computer support to the IMU for an unspecified attack.

The 2005 Violence in Andijon, Uzbekistan

Dozens or perhaps hundreds of civilians were killed or wounded on May 13, 2005, after Uzbek

troops fired on demonstrators in the eastern town of Andijon. The protestors had gathered to

demand the end of a trial of local businessmen charged with belonging to an Islamic terrorist

group. The night before, a group stormed a prison where those on trial were held and released

hundreds of inmates.41 Many freed inmates then joined others in storming government buildings.

President Karimov flew to the city to direct operations, and reportedly had restored order by late

on May 13.42 On July 29, 439 people who had fled from Uzbekistan to Kyrgyzstan were airlifted

U.S. Department of State, Patterns of Global Terrorism 2003, April 2004.

U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Testimony of the Director of Central Intelligence, The Honorable Porter

J. Goss, March 17, 2005.

U.S. Department of State, Press Statement: U.S. Department of State Designates the Islamic Jihad Group Under

Executive Order 13224, May 26, 2005; U.N. Security Council, The Al-Qaida and Taliban Sanctions Committee, Press

Release: Security Council Committee Adds One Entity to Al-Qaida Section of Consolidated List, SC/8405, June 3,

2005.

U.S. Department of the Treasury, Press Release: Treasury Designates Leadership of the IJU Terrorist Group, June

18, 2008.

There is a great deal of controversy about whether this group contained foreign-trained terrorists or was composed

mainly of the friends and families of the accused. See U.S. Congress. Commission on Security and Cooperation In

Europe. Briefing: The Uzbekistan Crisis. Testimony of Galima Bukharbayeva, Correspondent. Institute for War and

Peace Reporting, June 29, 2005. For a contrasting assessment, see Shirin Akiner, Violence in Andijon, 13 May 2005:

An Independent Assessment, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, July 2005; and AbduMannob Polat, Reassessing Andijan:

The Road to Restoring U.S.-Uzbek Relations, Jamestown Foundation, June 2007.

Analyst Adeeb Khalid draws a parallel between the Uzbek government’s actions at Andijon and at a large student

demonstration in Tashkent in January 1992. In the latter case, Karimov allegedly ordered troops to fire on the marchers,

(continued...)

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

to Romania for resettlement processing, after the United States and others raised concerns that

they might be tortured if returned to Uzbekistan.43

The United States and others in the international community repeatedly called for an international

inquiry into events in Andijon, which the Uzbek government rejected as violating its sovereignty.

In November 2005, the EU Council approved a visa ban on 12 Uzbek officials it stated were

“directly responsible for the indiscriminate and disproportionate use of force in Andijon and for

the obstruction of an independent inquiry.” The Council also embargoed exports of “arms,

military equipment, and other equipment that might be used for internal repression.”44 In October

2007 and April 2008, the EU Council suspended the visa ban for six months but left the arms

embargo in place. In October 2008, the EU Council praised what it viewed as some positive

trends in human rights in Uzbekistan and lifted the visa ban, although it left the arms embargo in

place.45 In October 2009, it lifted the arms embargo.

At the first major trial of 15 alleged perpetrators of the Andijon unrest in late 2005, the accused

all confessed and asked for death penalties. They testified that they were members of Akramiya, a

branch of Hizb ut-Tahrira (HT), a banned Islamic political organization launched in 1994 by

Akram Yuldashev that allegedly aimed to use force to create a caliphate in the area of the Fergana

Valley located in Uzbekistan. Besides receiving assistance from HT, Akramiya was alleged to

receive financial aid and arms training from the IMU. The defendants also claimed that the U.S.

and Kyrgyz governments helped finance and support their effort to overthrow the government,

and that international media colluded with local human rights groups and non-governmental

organizations (NGOs) in this effort. The U.S. and Kyrgyz governments denied involvement, and

many observers criticized the trial as appearing stage-managed. Reportedly, 100 or more

individuals were arrested and sentenced, including some Uzbek opposition party members and

media and NGO representatives.46 Partly in response, the U.S. Congress tightened conditions on

aid to Uzbekistan at that time (see below).

U.S. Relations

According to testimony to Congress in 2012 by Assistant Secretary of State Robert Blake,

“Uzbekistan has been a critical part of regional support for Afghanistan, building a rail line

connecting Afghanistan to Central Asia and providing electricity that benefits the Afghan people.

In addition, Uzbekistan has a central role in the NDN, with the majority of supplies transiting

through the Uzbek-Afghan border.” He also stated that U.S. officials continue to raise human

rights concerns and that “we continually advocate for those who seek peaceful democratic

(...continued)

resulting in up to six deaths and two dozen or more injuries. Islam After Communism (Berkeley, CA: University of

California Press, 2007), p. 155. See also Reuters, January 17, 1992.

See also CRS Report RS22161, Unrest in Andijon, Uzbekistan: Context and Implications, by (name redacted).

Council of the European Union, Uzbekistan: Council Adopts Restrictive Measures, Press Release 14392/05,

November 14, 2005. U.S. officials argued that the United States already had been limiting military assistance—at

congressional request—because of human rights abuses.

Council of the European Union, 2824th General Affairs Council Meeting, Press Release, October 15-16, 2007; 2864th

and 2865th General Affairs and External Relations Council Meetings, Press Release, April 29, 2008; 2897th General

Affairs and External Relations Council Meeting, Press Release, October 13, 2008.

OSCE, Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), Report from the OSCE/ODIHR Trial

Monitoring in Uzbekistan, April 21, 2006; Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Uzbekistan, Comments on the

Report Prepared by the OSCE ODIHR, April 19, 2006.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

reforms. In particular, we ask the government to take steps to eliminate the forced labor of

children and adults during the cotton harvest.... We are also working with the Government of

Uzbekistan to increase religious freedom by addressing its overly restrictive religious registration

policies and allegations of arbitrary arrests and detentions of peaceful religious leaders.” He

raised hopes that Uzbekistan would address restrictive currency conversion law and pervasive

corruption, so that U.S. investment could increase. He also called for Uzbekistan to facilitate

scientific and educational exchanges.47

During President Karimov’s March 2002 U.S. visit, former Uzbek Foreign Minister Abdulaziz

Komilov and former Secretary of State Colin Powell signed a Declaration on Strategic

Partnership and Cooperation that set forth broad-scale goals for political, economic, security, and

humanitarian cooperation. The accord pledged the United States to “urgent consultations” in the

case of external security threats to Uzbekistan and pledged Uzbekistan “to further intensify the

democratic transformation of society in the political, economic and spiritual areas,” and to

“ensure the effective exercise and protection of human rights.”48 U.S. relations with Uzbekistan

were set back in 2005 after the United States joined others in the international community to

criticize an Uzbek government crackdown in the town of Andijon (see above). The criticism

contributed to Uzbekistan’s closure of over a dozen U.S.-based or U.S.-supported nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), the termination of U.S. basing rights at Karshi-Khanabad

(see below), a fall-off in official and diplomatic contacts, and the strengthening of U.S.

congressional restrictions on aid to the Uzbek government (see directly below).

U.S.-Uzbek relations recently have improved, according to the Administration. Assistant

Secretary Blake visited Uzbekistan in November 2009 and stated that his meetings there were “a

reflection of the determination of President Obama and Secretary Clinton to strengthen ties

between the United States and Uzbekistan.” He proposed that the two countries set up high-level

annual consultations to “build our partnership across a wide range of areas. These include trade

and development, border security, cooperation on narcotics, the development of civil society, and

individual rights.”49 The first Annual Bilateral Consultation (ABC) took place in late December

2009 with a U.S. visit by an Uzbek delegation led by Foreign Minister Vladimir Norov. The two

sides drew up a plan for cooperation for 2010 that involved diplomatic visits, increased militaryto-military contacts, and investment and trade overtures.50

In November 2010, Assistant Secretary Blake testified to Congress that

the Obama Administration has increased its engagement with Uzbekistan on a full agenda of

security, economic and human rights issues. In the regional security field, Uzbekistan has

become a key partner for the United States’ effort in Afghanistan…. It has facilitated transit

for essential supplies to Coalition forces and constructed an important railroad line inside of

Afghanistan.... We have seen an improved relationship with Uzbekistan, but many

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Europe and Eurasia, Hearing on

U.S. Engagement in Central Asia, Testimony by Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central

Asian Affairs, July 24, 2012.

U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan, Press Release: United States-Uzbekistan Declaration on the Strategic

Partnership and Cooperation Framework, March 12, 2002, at http://uzbekistan.usembassy.gov/pr031203.html.

U.S. Embassy in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. Press Conference of Assistant Secretary for South and Central Asian Affairs

Robert Blake, October 14, 2009.

CEDR, January 29, 2010, Doc. No. CEP-4019.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

challenges remain. We continue to encourage the Uzbek authorities to address significant

human rights concerns.51

During her December 2010 visit to Uzbekistan, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stated that an

improved bilateral relationship was “crucial” to U.S. interests. She reportedly thanked President

Islam Karimov for Uzbekistan’s support for the Northern Distribution Network (transport routes

supporting military operations in Afghanistan) and for other assistance to Afghanistan. She stated

that issues of human rights also had been discussed. She hailed the signing of a bilateral science

and technology cooperation agreement as an effort “to try to find other ways to connect with and

promote positive cooperation between our two countries.”52

The second U.S.-Uzbek ABC took place in February 2011 with a visit to Uzbekistan led by

Assistant Secretary Blake. The talks reportedly included security cooperation, trade and

development, science and technology, counter-narcotics, civil society development, and human

rights. A U.S. business delegation discussed means to increase trade ties. Blake reported that the

United States had purchased $23 million in Uzbek goods for transit to Afghanistan in FY2010

(see below).

President Obama telephoned President Karimov on September 28, 2011, to thank him for

Uzbekistan’s cooperation in stabilization efforts in Afghanistan, and reportedly to urge him to

facilitate the transit of U.S. and NATO cargoes into and out of Afghanistan. During her October

22-23, 2011, visit to Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, Secretary Clinton discussed the U.S. “New Silk

Road Vision” to turn Afghanistan into a regional transportation, trade, and energy hub linked to

Central Asia. She also warned the presidents of both countries that restrictions on religious

freedom could contribute to rising religious discontent. A congressional delegation led by

Representative Dan Burton visited Uzbekistan in early July 2012 and met with President

Karimov, who called for closer Uzbek-U.S. ties.

The third ABC was held in August 2012, and like the second involved a visit to Tashkent by a

U.S. delegation led by Assistant Secretary Blake. He reported that the meeting covered

Uzbekistan’s support for U.S. operations in Afghanistan, energy, agriculture, health,

parliamentary exchanges, education, science and technology, counter-narcotics, border security,

counter-terrorism, religious freedom, trafficking in persons, and human rights. At an associated

U.S.-Uzbek business forum, Assistant Secretary of State Blake raised concerns about currency

convertibility and contract sanctity that hamper foreign investment.53

In a speech in October 2012, Blake stated that because of Uzbekistan’s poor human rights record,

the United States provided it only non-lethal security assistance.54

U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific, and the Global

Environment, Hearing on the Emerging Importance of the U.S.-Central Asia Partnership, Testimony of Robert O.

Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian Affairs, November 17, 2010.

U.S. Department of State, Meeting With Staff and Their Families of Embassy Tashkent, December 2, 2010.

U.S. Department of State, Press Availability Following the U.S.-Uzbekistan Annual Bilateral Consultations, August

17, 2012; Daniil Kislov, “U.S. Ambassador in Uzbekistan George Krol: ‘We Recognize Democracy May Develop and

Look Differently in Uzbekistan,’” Journal of Turkish Weekly, September 25, 2012.

U.S. Department of State, Remarks, Robert O. Blake, Jr., Assistant Secretary, Bureau of South and Central Asian

Affairs, [at] Indiana University’s Inner Asian and Uralic Natural Resource Center, October 18, 2012.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

Indicative of U.S. interest in Uzbekistan, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Jane Zimmerman

visited Uzbekistan in mid-July 2013, reportedly to discuss human rights issues, and Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Commerce Matthew Murray visited in May to discuss trade and investment

(U.S. businesses discussed projects in Uzbekistan at a business round table in Washington D.C.

later that month). Assistant Secretary Blake visited Uzbekistan in late April 2013. He reported

that human trafficking and civil society problems were among human rights issues that were

discussed. He indicated that discussions were beginning on providing Uzbekistan with possible

excess defense articles from Afghanistan. He also stated that trade and investment issues were

discussed, including U.S. concerns about added restrictions on currency convertibility and

repatriation. Assistant Secretary of State Mike Hammer visited Uzbekistan in April 2013. He

discussed U.S. concerns about freedom of the press, while praising some Uzbek open government

initiatives. In March 2013, Secretary Kerry met with visiting Uzbek Foreign Minister Kamilov.

Secretary Kerry stated that U.S.-Uzbek relations were continuing to improve, and to expand

beyond mutual concerns about Afghanistan. In February 2013, a Congressional delegation headed

by Representative Dana Rohrabacher visited Uzbekistan.

Cumulative U.S. assistance budgeted for Uzbekistan in FY1992-FY2010 was $971.36 million (all

agencies and programs), according to the data compiled by the State Department’s Office of the

Coordinator of U.S. Assistance to Europe and Eurasia. Of this aid, $393.0 million (about twofifths) was budgeted for combating weapons of mass destruction (including Comprehensive

Threat Reduction aid), Foreign Military Financing, counter-narcotics, Partnership for Peace, and

anti-crime support.55 Food, health, and other social welfare and humanitarian aid accounted for

$222.4 million (nearly one-fourth), and democratization aid accounted for $174.1 million (nearly

one-fifth). See Table 1 and Table 2.

Budgeted assistance was $11.34 million in FY2011 and $16.7 million in FY2012, and the

Administration has requested $11.6 million for FY2014 (numbers include funds from the

Economic Support Fund and other “Function 150” foreign aid, and exclude Defense and Energy

Department funds). Country totals are not yet available for FY2013. The main priorities of U.S.

assistance requested for FY2014 are technical advice for Uzbekistan’s planned accession to WTO

($3 million); training for judges and defense lawyers on habeas corpus, funding to improve the

legal environment for NGOs, and other support for local NGOs and independent media ($1.8

million); and funding for health programs ($3 million).56

In FY2003 foreign operations appropriations (P.L. 108-7) and thereafter, Congress prohibited

assistance to the government of Uzbekistan unless the Secretary of State determined and reported

that Uzbekistan was making substantial progress in meeting commitments to respect human

rights; establish a multiparty system; and ensure free and fair elections, freedom of expression,

and the independence of the media. Congress received a determination of progress in FY2003. In

FY2004 and thereafter, however, some aid to Uzbekistan was withheld because of lack of

In addition to this peace and security assistance reported by the Coordinator’s Office, the Defense Department

provided some coalition support payments to Uzbekistan, including a payment of $15.7 million for use of the KarshiKhanabad airbase and associated services, and the Defense Department in September 2005 announced an intention to

pay another $23 million owed for such services. On October 5, 2005, an amendment to Defense Appropriations for

FY2006 (H.R. 2863) was approved in the Senate to place a one-year hold on the payment. Despite congressional

concern, the Defense Department transferred the payment in November 2005. The conferees on H.R. 2863 later

dropped the amendment (H.Rept. 109-360; P.L. 109-359).

U.S. Department of State. Congressional Budget Justification for Foreign Operations, Annex: Regional Perspectives,

FY2014, May 17, 2013.

Congressional Research Service

Uzbekistan: Recent Developments and U.S. Interests

progress on democratic reforms. In FY2008, Congress added a provision blocking Uzbek

government officials from entering the United States if they were deemed to have been

responsible for events in Andijon or to have violated other human rights.

In late 2009, Congress permitted (P.L. 111-84, §801)—for the first time since restrictions were

put in place—the provision of some assistance on national security grounds to facilitate the

acquisition of supplies for U.S. and NATO operations in Afghanistan from countries along the

Northern Distribution Network. In 2010, Congress permitted (P.L. 111-117) an expanded IMET

program for training Uzbek military officers on human rights, civilian control of the military, and