Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress

Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key

Programs and Issues for Congress

Ronald O’Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

April 12, 2007

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

RS20557

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress

Summary

Programs for implementing network-centric warfare (NCW) in the Navy include the Cooperative

Engagement Capability (CEC) and Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA)

systems, the IT-21 program, and FORCEnet. A related program is the Navy-Marine Corps

Intranet (NMCI). Congress has expressed concern for some of these programs, particularly

NMCI. This report will be updated as events warrant.

Congressional Research Service

Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress

Contents

Network-Centric Warfare ............................................................................................................1

Examples of Navy NCW Programs .............................................................................................1

CEC And NIFC-CA ..............................................................................................................1

IT-21.....................................................................................................................................2

FORCEnet ............................................................................................................................3

NMCI ...................................................................................................................................3

Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................................5

Contacts

Author Contact Information ........................................................................................................5

Congressional Research Service

Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress

Network-Centric Warfare

Network-centric warfare (NCW), also known as network-centric operations (NCO), is a key

element of defense transformation. NCW focuses on using computers, high-speed data links, and

networking software to link military personnel, platforms, and formations into highly integrated

local and wide-area networks. Within these networks, personnel are to share large amounts of

information on a rapid and continuous basis. The Department of Defense (DOD) and the Navy

view NCW as a key element of defense transformation that will dramatically improve combat

capability and efficiency. 1

Examples of Navy NCW Programs

CEC And NIFC-CA

The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system links Navy ships and aircraft operating

in a particular area into a single, integrated air-defense network in which radar data collected by

each platform is transmitted on a real-time (i.e., instantaneous) basis to the other units in the

network. Units in the network share a common, composite, real-time air-defense picture. CEC

will permit a ship to shoot air-defense missiles at incoming anti-ship missiles that the ship itself

cannot see, using radar targeting data gathered by other units in the network. It will also permit

air-defense missiles fired by one ship to be guided by other ships or aircraft. The Navy wants to

install the system on aircraft carriers, Aegis-equipped cruisers and destroyers, selected

amphibious ships, and E-2C Hawkeye carrier-based airborne early warning aircraft over the next

several years. The system has potential for being extended to include Army and Air Force

systems.

Tests of CEC aboard Navy ships in 1998 revealed significant interoperability (i.e., compatibility)

problems between CEC’s software and the software of the air-defense systems on some ships. In

response, the Navy undertook a major effort to identify, understand, and fix the problems. The

CEC system, with the new fixes, passed its technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) testing in

February and March 2001 and final operational evaluation (OPEVAL) testing in April and May

2001.

In 2002, the primary CEC contractor, Raytheon, faced potential competition from two firms—

Lockheed and a small firm called Solipsys—for developing the next version of CEC, called CEC

Block II. Solipsys had devised an alternative technical approach to CEC, called the Tactical

Component Network (TCN). Solipsys entered into a teaming arrangement with Lockheed to offer

TCN to the Navy as the technical approach for Block II. In late-December 2002, Raytheon

announced that it had agreed to purchase Solipsys. In early-February 2003, Raytheon and

Lockheed announced that they had formed a team to compete for the development of Block II.

1

For more on NCW, see CRS Report RL32411, Network Centric Operations: Background and Oversight Issues for

Congress, by (name redacted). For more on defense transformation and naval transformation, see CRS Report RL32238,

Defense Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress, by (name redacted), Defense

Transformation: Background and Oversight Issues for Congress; and CRS Report RS20851, Naval Transformation:

Background and Issues for Congress, both by Ronald O’Rourke.

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Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress

Some observers expressed concern that these developments would reduce the Navy’s ability to

use competition in its acquisition strategy for Block II. As an apparent means of preserving

competition, the Navy in mid-2003 announced that it would incorporate open-architecture

standards into Block II divide the Block II development effort into a series of smaller contracts

for which various firms might be able to submit bids. In December 2003, however, the Navy

canceled plans for developing Block II in favor of a new plan for developing a joint-service

successor to Block I.

The conference report (H.Rept. 108-283, page 290) on the FY2004 defense appropriations act

(H.R. 2658/P.L. 108-87) directed the Navy to keep the Appropriations committees informed on

potential changes to the CEC Block II acquisition strategy and stated that, if the Navy adopts a

new acquisition strategy, “the additional funds provided in this act for CEC Block 2 may be

merged with and be available for purposes similar to the purposes for which appropriated.” The

House and Senate Armed Services Committees, in their reports (H.Rept. 109-89, page 178, and

S.Rept. 109-69, pages 108-109, respectively) on the FY2006 defense authorization bill (H.R.

1815/S. 1042), expressed satisfaction with the Navy’s efforts to improve interoperability between

the CEC system and other combat direction systems and ended a requirement established in the

conference report (H.Rept. 105-736) on the FY1999 defense authorization act (P.L. 105-261) for

the Navy to report to Congress on these efforts on a quarterly basis.

The Naval Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA) system is to combine the CEC

system with the E-2D Advanced Hawkeye carrier-based airborne radar and control system

(AWACS) aircraft and the SM-6 version of the ship-based Standard air defense missile (both now

in development) to expand the Navy’s networked air-defense capabilities out to the full range of

the SM-6 missile. Among other things, NIFC-CA will enable Navy forces at sea to provide

overland defense against enemy cruise missiles. Current Navy plans call for NIFC-CA to be

partially deployed in FY2011 and fully deployed in 2014.2

IT-21

IT-21, which stands for Information Technology for the 21st Century, is the Navy’s investment

strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed to

establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and between Navy

ships. The IT-21 network uses commercial, off-the-shelf (COTS) desktop computers and

networking software that provide a multimedia organizational intranet. The Navy believes IT-21

will improve U.S. naval warfighting capability and achieve substantial cost reductions by

significantly reducing the time and number of people required to carry out various tactical and

administrative functions. FY2008 funding requested for IT-21 “continues to provide Integrated

Shipboard Network Systems (Increment 1) procurement and installation to achieve a Full

Operational Capability (FOC) for all platforms by FY2011.”3

2

For discussions of NIFC-CA, see Amy Klamper, “Fire Control,” Sea Power, March 2006, available online at

http://www.navyleague.org/sea_power/mar06-19.php, and John Ailes, presentation entitled “Introduction to Naval

Integrated Fire Control-Counter Air (NIFC-CA),” available online at http://enterprise.spawar.navy.mil/

getfile.cfm?contentId=359&type=C.

3

U.S. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2008 Budget, p. 3-15 (i.e., Section 3, page

15).

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Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress

FORCEnet

FORCEnet is the Navy’s overall approach for linking various networks that contribute to naval

NCW into a single capstone information network for U.S. naval forces. The Navy has highlighted

FORCEnet as being at the center of Sea Power 21, the Navy’s vision statement for the future. The

Navy states that “Undersea FORCEnet Satellite Communications (SATCOM) FY2008 funding

provides the Internet Protocol (IP) connectivity between Anti-Submarine Warfare (ASW)

platforms to conduct collaborative ASW. Connecting the platforms for collaborative ASW enables

sharing of time critical queuing, classification, and targeting data, provides a means for

precluding blue-on-blue engagement, and ensures rapid positioning of ASW platforms into the

best attack posture to prosecute the threat submarine.”4

Some observers have criticized FORCEnet for being insufficiently defined. 5 The Naval Network

Warfare Command issued a functional concept document for FORCEnet in February 2005, but

Navy officials acknowledged at the time that the concept was not yet adequately defined and

stated that an improved version of the document would be published in 2006.6

The conference report (H.Rept. 107-732) on the FY2003 defense appropriations bill (H.R.

5010/P.L. 107-248) expressed concern about “the lack of specificity and documentation on the

program,” and directed the Navy to submit a detailed report on it by May 1, 2003 (page 279). The

Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 108-87, page 156) on the FY2004

defense appropriations bill (S. 1382), expressed support for the FORCEnet program but also said

it “is concerned that no requirements have been approved or implemented and that there is

duplication of effort, especially in the areas of experimentation and demonstrations. The

Committee directs that the FORCEnet program establish these requirements, test them within the

Navy Warfighting Experimentations and Demonstrations line (PE0603758N), and release the

approved requirements changes as quickly as possible.”

NMCI

A significant program related to NCW is the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), which is a

corporate-style intranet linking more than 300 Navy and Marine Corps shore installations. NMCI

is to include a total 344,000 computer work stations, or “seats.” As of January 2006, the Navy had

ordered 341,000 seats and fully implemented about 264,000. The Navy planned to achieve

steady-state operation of all NMCI seats during FY2007. In October 2000, the Navy awarded an

industry team led by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation an $6.9-billion, five-year

contract for installing, supporting, and periodically upgrading the NMCI. In October 2002,

Congress, through P.L. 107-254, authorized a two-year extension to this contract, which is now

worth $8.9 billion. Congress has closely followed the program for several years.

4

U.S. Department of the Navy, Highlights of the Department of the Navy FY 2008 Budget, p. 3-15 (i.e., Section 3, page

15).

5

See, for example, Malina Brown, “Van Riper: Navy’s ForceNet Too Broad, Mysterious To Be Meaningful,” Inside

the Navy, Apr. 7, 2003. See also Malina Brown, “Mullen Acknowledges ForceNet Concept Not Clearly Understood,”

Inside the Navy, July 5, 2004.

6

Jason Ma, “Naval Network Warfare Command Issues FORCEnet Concept Document,” Inside the Navy, Feb. 14,

2005.

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Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress

The NMCI implementation effort has experienced a number of challenges and delays. A 2005

report from DOD’s weapons-testing office identified problems found with the program in 2003.7

On September 30, 2004, the Navy and EDS restructured the terms of the NMCI contract to

consolidate the number of performance measures and focus on measuring results rather than

implementation steps. User reaction to the system reportedly has been mixed. 8 A December 2006

Government Accountability office (GAO) report on NMCI stated:

NMCI has not met its two strategic goals—to provide information superiority and to foster

innovation via interoperability and shared services. Navy developed a performance plan in

2000 to measure and report progress towards these goals, but did not implement it because

the program was more focused on deploying seats and measuring contractor performance

against contractually specified incentives than determining whether the strategic mission

outcomes used to justify the program were met. GAO’s analysis of available performance

data, however, showed that the Navy had met only 3 of 20 performance targets (15 percent)

associated with the program’s goals and nine related performance categories. By not

implementing its performance plan, the Navy has invested, and risks continuing to invest

heavily, in a program that is not subject to effective performance management and has yet to

produce expected results.

GAO’s analysis also showed that the contractor’s satisfaction of NMCI service level

agreements (contractually specified performance expectations) has been mixed. Since

September 2004, while a significant percentage of agreements have been met for all types of

seats, others have not consistently been met, and still others have generally not been met.

Navy measurement of agreement satisfaction shows that performance needed to receive

contractual incentive payments for the most recent 5-month period was attained for about 55

to 59 percent of all eligible seats, which represents a significant drop from the previous 9month period. GAO’s analysis and the Navy’s measurement of agreement satisfaction

illustrate the need for effective performance management, to include examining agreement

satisfaction from multiple perspectives to target needed corrective actions and program

changes.

GAO analysis further showed that NMCI’s three customer groups (end users, commanders,

and network operators) vary in their satisfaction with the program. More specifically, end

user satisfaction surveys indicated that the percent of end users that met the Navy’s

definition of a satisfied user has remained consistently below the target of 85 percent (latest

survey results categorize 74 percent as satisfied). Given that the Navy’s definition of the term

“satisfied” includes many marginally satisfied and arguably somewhat dissatisfied users, this

percentage represents the best case depiction of end user satisfaction. Survey responses from

the other two customer groups show that both were not satisfied. GAO interviews with

customers at shipyards and air depots also revealed dissatisfaction with NMCI. Without

satisfied customers, the Navy will be challenged in meeting program goals.

To improve customer satisfaction, the Navy identified various initiatives that it described as

completed, under way, or planned. However, the initiatives are not being guided by a

documented plan(s), thus limiting their potential effectiveness. This means that after

7

Jason Ma, “DOT&E Report Identifies NMCI Problem Areas Found During 2003 Test,” Inside the Navy, Feb. 7, 2005.

Navy Marine Corps Intranet Public Affairs, “Eight Percent of Customers Surveyed Satisfied With NMCI,” Navy

Newsstand, Mar. 6, 2007; John Hoellwarth, “After Five Years, NMCI Still Frustrates,” Defense News, July 17, 2006:

48; John Hoellwarth, “NMCI ‘Unfriendly’—And Running Late,” Navy Times, Mar. 27, 2006: 24; Christopher J.

Castelli, “Lawmaker With Reserve Experience Rips ‘Customer Unfriendly’ NMCI,” Inside the Navy, Mar. 20, 2006.

8

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Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept: Key Programs and Issues for Congress

investing about 6 years and $3.7 billion, NMCI has yet to meet expectations, and whether it

will is still unclear.9

Department of Defense officials conceded problems with the implementation of NMCI at a

March 28, 2007, hearing before the Terrorism and Unconventional Threats and Capabilities

subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee.10

Issues for Congress

Potential issues for Congress include the following:

•

Is the Navy’s implementation of NMCI adequate? To what degree is the system

achieving its goals?

•

Does the Navy have a clear and adequate acquisition strategy for developing a

successor to CEC Block I?

•

Is the FORCEnet concept adequately defined?

•

Is the Navy taking sufficient actions for preventing, detecting, and responding to

attacks on NCW computer networks?

•

Is the Navy taking sufficient steps to provide adequate satellite bandwidth

capacity to support NCW?

•

Are Navy efforts to develop new tactics, doctrine, and organizations to take full

advantage of NCW sufficient?

•

Has the Navy taken the concept of NCW adequately into account in planning its

future fleet architecture?11

•

What effect will implementation of NCW in U.S. and allied navies have on U.S.allied naval interoperability?

Author Contact Information

Ronald O’Rourke

Specialist in Naval Affairs

/redacted/@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

9

Government Accountability Office, Information Technology[:] DOD Needs to Ensure That Navy Marine Corps

Intranet Program Is Meeting Goals and Satisfying Customers, GAO-07-051, Dec. 8, 2006.

10

See Mark A. Kellner, “Top DoD Officials Concede NMCI Woes On Hill,” NavyTimes.com, Mar. 28, 2007.

11

For additional discussion of Navy force-structure planning, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and

Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress.

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