Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

Congressional research reportNov 28, 2010

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Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and

U.S. Views

Carol Migdalovitz

Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs

November 28, 2010

Congressional Research Service

7-5700

www.crs.gov

RL34642

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

Summary

This report focuses on the foreign policy of Turkey, a long-time valued U.S. NATO ally, and

examines the ruling Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) recalculation of the country’s

approach to foreign affairs and its possible effects on relations with the United States. It begins

with a discussion of Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu’s theoretical framework for a

multidirectional outreach less firmly anchored in the West than in the past and his efforts to seek

“zero problems” with Turkey’s neighbors and new partners beyond. The AKP is able to follow

these guidelines because it has consolidated its political power domestically, exerted

unprecedented control over the formerly powerful military, and spurred robust economic growth.

The desire for export markets is a major motivator for the directional diversification, and the

growth in trade, in turn, contributes to the prosperity and growth of AKP’s middle class base

which is strengthening the party. Increasingly, the party’s Islamist origins also appear to be

determining policy. Moreover, the party’s foreign policy independence appeals to the traditionally

strong nationalism of the Turks and, therefore, contributes to its popularity at home.

This report surveys Turkish foreign policy issues that are of critical interest to U.S. officials and

Members of Congress. Three main categories of issues are: ones on which Turkish and U.S.

policies continue to coalesce, ones on which policies diverge, and ones which may be less than

completely harmonious but not adversarial. The United States and Turkey continue to find

common interest in their desire for the stability and territorial integrity of Iraq and to prevent the

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK), based in northern Iraq, from perpetrating violence in Turkey; for

peace and reconciliation in Afghanistan; and for the diversification of European energy resources.

In other areas, there has been divergence. Most prominently, Turkish and U.S. officials disagree

about whether Iran has a nuclear program solely intended for peaceful purposes or also to

produce nuclear weapons and, thereby, pose a threat to allied security. They also differ about the

deterioration in Turkish-Israeli relations, provoked largely by the 2009 conflict between Israel

and Hamas in the Gaza Strip and the May 2010 crisis over Israel’s seizure of a Turkish ship

bound for Gaza. The AKP government’s reaction to these events and sympathies for Hamas

complicate efforts to revive Turkish-Israeli ties. In addition, they affect U.S. efforts to find

common ground with Turkey about the peace process. The United States also sometimes seems to

support Turkey’s EU ambitions, normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations, and a settlement on

Cyprus more than the AKP.

Finally, the report discusses U.S. policymakers’ attempts to grapple with the complexity of

Turkish policies, the bilateral relationship, and emerging differences. Obama Administration

officials often appear publicly to gloss over disagreements as they reiterate longstanding U.S.

appreciation for Turkey’s contributions in areas of agreement. Completing the report and of

interest to Congress are discussions of U.S. use of the Turkish air base at Incirlik that is vital for

cargo deliveries to forces in Iraq and Afghanistan, Turkey’s role in NATO’s new missile defense

architecture, and overviews of bilateral trade and U.S. aid to Turkey.

For domestic context, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Politics of Identity and Power. See also

sections on Turkey in CRS Report R40849, Iran: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy; CRS

Report RL33793, Iraq: Regional Perspectives and U.S. Policy; and CRS Report R41275, Israel’s

Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara Incident, and Its Aftermath.

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Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

AKP’s Approach to Foreign Policy..............................................................................................2

Iraq.............................................................................................................................................6

Israel......................................................................................................................................... 10

The Palestinian Authority and Hamas........................................................................................ 15

Israeli-Syrian Talks ................................................................................................................... 15

Syria ......................................................................................................................................... 16

Iran........................................................................................................................................... 17

Overview ............................................................................................................................ 17

Nuclear Issue ...................................................................................................................... 18

Shared Concerns on Iraq ..................................................................................................... 23

Economic and Energy Relations .......................................................................................... 23

European Union ........................................................................................................................ 25

Cyprus ...................................................................................................................................... 29

Armenia.................................................................................................................................... 31

Bilateral Relations............................................................................................................... 31

Genocide Issue.................................................................................................................... 35

Afghanistan .............................................................................................................................. 37

Energy ...................................................................................................................................... 39

Oil and Gas Pipelines .......................................................................................................... 39

U.S. Energy Policy.............................................................................................................. 42

Nuclear Energy ................................................................................................................... 43

China ........................................................................................................................................ 43

U.S.-Turkish Relations .............................................................................................................. 44

Policy Overview ................................................................................................................. 44

Missile Defense .................................................................................................................. 48

Incirlik Air Base.................................................................................................................. 49

Trade .................................................................................................................................. 50

U.S. Aid.............................................................................................................................. 51

Conclusions .............................................................................................................................. 52

Figures

Figure 1. Turkey and Its Neighbors .............................................................................................5

Tables

Table 1. European Union Assistance to Turkey .......................................................................... 28

Table 2. U.S. Merchandise Trade with Turkey ........................................................................... 51

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Table 3. U.S. Foreign Assistance ............................................................................................... 51

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 53

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Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

Introduction

Turkey, a NATO ally, is situated amid the troubled Balkans, Caucasus, and Middle East regions

and is a critical energy and transit hub between Central Asia/the Caucasus and Europe. The ruling

Justice and Development Party (AKP) projects Turkey as a major regional power with ambitions

to be a global actor and power. Since the AKP was first elected in 2002,Turkey has assumed the

post of secretary-general of the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), taken observer

status at the Arab League, joined the G-20 group of the largest world economies, held a nonpermanent seat on the U.N. Security Council, appointed an Assistant Secretary-General of NATO,

and a Secretary-General of the Organization for Security Cooperation and Development (OECD),

and sought seats on the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank executive boards.

Turkish officials communicate their growing sense of power in a manner that Omer Taspinar of

the Brookings Institution has labeled “Turkish Gaullism.” They often adopt a moralistic tone in

describing their foreign policy approach, claiming that they represent the truth or what is right

and characterizing their positions as “fair,” “principled,” or “humanitarian,” sometimes

suggesting that others, including the United States, do not.1 They maintain that Turkey is serving

the cause of peace and stability in its neighborhood. Toward that end, the officials say that they

seek to facilitate the peaceful resolution of Israeli-Arab disputes and of problems the international

community has with Turkey’s neighbors, Iran and Syria. Turkish policymakers have been less

proactive regarding the Armenian-Azerbaijani dispute over the Azerbaijani region of NagornoKarabakh and the Cyprus issue.

Some of the AKP’s regional foreign policy initiatives appear at odds with U.S. goals. In

particular, the AKP’s engagement with Hamas, Iran, and Sudan has contradicted U.S. and much

of the international community’s policies of isolating those regimes and groups. Turkey’s

engagement policy appears unconditional as its officials do not publicly address abuses of human

rights or democratic deficiencies of other predominantly Muslim countries. This could undermine

the moral high ground to which AKP leaders aspire. The deterioration of Turkey’s relations with

Israel is of concern to the Administration and to Members of Congress.

Dealing with this evolving Turkish approach to foreign policy is challenging U.S. policymakers.

Some regional specialists advise them to prepare for an á la carte or issue focused relationship,

driven by both countries’ national interests. Others describe this as a “transactional” approach in

which the United States and Turkey have concrete exchanges in order to address common

interests.2 In this manner, the Administration may need to balance engagement with polite

confrontation, depending on the issue.

Turkey’s geostrategic importance to the United States is symbolized by the Incirlik Air Base.

Since the 1970s, Turkish governments of all political persuasions have granted the U.S. forces

permission to use the base under a bilateral defense cooperation agreement. In the past, the

United States tacitly granted Turkey considerable foreign aid in exchange for such access. Since

the first Gulf War, the United States has not provided significant assistance. U.S.-Turkish trade

Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, Foreign Minister Ahmet Davutoglu, and other foreign Turkish foreign policy

spokesmen often use such descriptions.

These are the views, respectively, of Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations and Ian Lesser of the German

Marshall Fund of the United States (hereafter GMFUS).

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also is not noteworthy despite the size of both economies. The following sections of this report

describe the AKP’s policies on selected issues and, as appropriate, U.S. Administration and

congressional views of Turkey in these contexts. The penultimate section addresses U.S. policy

toward Turkey.

AKP’s Approach to Foreign Policy

Historically, Turkey portrayed itself as isolated in its region, surrounded by troubles in the Middle

East, Balkans, and Caucasus and by hostile neighbors in Syria, Iraq, Iran, the former Soviet

Union, Greece, and Cyprus. Since taking power, the AKP has worked assiduously to alter the

environment that produced this self-assessment by changing Turkey’s regional posture, improving

relations with its neighbors, and, it claims, working to create a region of peace. The AKP

government has pursued a very active foreign policy agenda.

Even before becoming foreign minister in May 2009, Professor Ahmet Davutoglu was the

architect of this new approach. He was a key foreign policy advisor to and frequent traveling

companion of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President Abdullah Gul, and Ali Babacan,

his predecessor as foreign minister. In 2001, Davutoglu published Strategic Depth, a treatise

calling for a new Turkish foreign policy strategy based on a “multidirectional strategic vision.”3

He argued that Turkey should freely follow policies of its own making instead of following ones

that extend “global designs”—a phrase which some read as code for U.S. interests. He called on

Turkey to acknowledge and use its cultural and historical ties to its region in order to enhance its

geographic depth, which then would determine its strategic depth. He enunciated an approach to

the region based on four principles: security for everyone, political dialogue at the highest level,

economic interdependence, and cultural cohesion and diversity. 4 He has since unwaveringly

followed his own prescription.

Davutoglu’s professed goal is for Turkey to have “zero problems” with its neighbors. He

maintains that it is incumbent on Turkey to establish order in the region because it is much larger

geographically, militarily, and economically than its neighbors, and because of its geography and

history. To accomplish this, he says, Turkey should develop a long-term foreign policy vision that

enables it to resolve crises proactively and not allow crises to develop into deadlocks. 5 Davutoglu

views Turkey as a major regional power broker—a vision that complements Turkey’s traditionally

strong nationalistic bent.6 By following his guidelines, he believes, Turkey will maximize its

interests and become one of the most influential countries in the world. Longtime observers of

Turkey, such as former CIA and National Intelligence Council analyst Graham Fuller, suggest that

The book has not been translated into English. Ahmet Davutoglu, Stratejik Derinlik, Turkiye’nin Uluslarasrasi

Konumu, reviewed by Hasan T. Kosebalaban, in the Middle East Journal, Autumn 2001. Many Turkish specialists also

have analyzed the book. Davutoglu often gives interviews to the media. He spoke at a GMFUS event in Washington,

D.C., in February 2007, and at the SETA Foundation in Washington on December 8, 2009.

Bulent Aras, “From Cooperation to Integration in the Middle East,” Sabah Online, July 22, 2009, OSC Document

GMP20090722017006.

“Change of Guard at Foreign Ministry,” Anatolia News Agency (hereafter Anatolia), May 2, 2009, BBC Monitoring

European. May 4, 2009, “Davutoglu: Goal is Recognition of Borders,” Interview with NTV, September 1, 2009, Open

Source Center Document GMP20090901016001. Also, Ahmet Davutoglu, “Turkish Foreign Policy and the EU in

2010,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, February 10, 2010.

Sami Kohen, “The EU on the One Hand, the Middle East on the Other,” Milliyet, December 6, 2006, BBC Monitoring

European, December 7, 2006.

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“The foreign policy vision of Davutoglu is sweeping and likely to persist in one form or another

after the AK Party falls from power.”7

Davutoglu and other AKP officials dismiss the notion that their policies are “neo-Ottoman,”

claiming that NATO remains Turkey’s anchor and the EU remains its “strategic, historical

choice.” However, some observers suggest that the AKP’s foreign policy vocabulary “reflects a

growing attachment to third-world and non-aligned perspectives”8 and note, as discussed below,

relations with the EU are not progressing. These developments might have ramifications for

Turkey’s role in NATO as well as its relations with the United States.

The economic motivation for Davutoglu’s policies deserves emphasis. Since the 1980s, exports

have been the engine of Turkey’s economic growth and, since AKP came to power in 2002, they

have risen from $32 billion to $132 billion. While half of the trade still is with Europe and

Germany, Britain, and Italy remain the top recipients of Turkish exports, a growing quarter is with

Arab countries and Iran. Turkey has established visa-free regimes with many of its neighbors in

order to remove barriers to trade and tourism and it has announced plans to establish a regional

free trade zone with Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon. The government increasingly is reaching out

beyond traditional partners to Latin America, Asia, and Africa, where it has opened 18 new

embassies. Moreover, tourism revenue has grown from $8.5 billion to $22 billion annually, and

many new visitors are from Arab neighbors and from Russia.9

Some analysts suggest that Turkey’s increasing democratization is another engine driving foreign

policy changes. Professor Ilter Turan has observed,

In contrast to earlier times when external affairs were deemed to be only the concern of

the government and the state, today public opinion, organized interests, the media, and

even studies produced by think tanks significantly constrain governments. Foreign policy

questions are taken up both in the legislature and outside, and are debated among

politicians and the public with greater frequency and at greater length than ever before.10

Although Turan maintains that “economic considerations are more powerful determinants than

Islam,” the Islamic inclinations of the Turkish people may be a determinant of policy in many

instances, especially if democratization is viewed as a motivation because many AKP constituents

are devout and have a greater affinity for other Muslim countries and causes than AKP’s

secularist predecessor governments. They are especially sympathetic to the Palestinians and the

government’s anti-Israel statements resonate with them.

Today, Turkey enjoys better relations with Greece, close political and economic ties with Syria,

growing trade, energy, and other ties with Iran, and fraternal relations with the Central Asian

republics and Azerbaijan. Yet, improvements in relations with Armenia have stalled since being

set on a course toward normalization in 2009. Ties with Israel have been troubled since that

country’s military campaign against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009

and its interception of a Turkish ship seeking to break the blockade of Gaza in May 2010.

Meanwhile, Turkey has not taken a proactive stance regarding the dilatory Cyprus talks. As

“Turkey Takes Another Turn Eastward,” Global Post, June 11, 2010.

Ian Lesser, “The New Turkish Lexicon,” On Turkey, GMFUS, November 3, 2009.

Erdogan cited these figures in remarks in Rize on June 13, 2010, “Turkey Premier Denies Shift in Country’s Foreign

Policy,” Zaman website, June 14, 2010.

Ilter Turan, “Turkish Foreign Policy: Challenges to Turkey’s Western Calling,” On Turkey, GMFUS, July 30, 2010.

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Armenia, Israel, and Cyprus are notable policy exceptions and are not Muslim states, some AKP

critics suggest that it has followed an “Islamic” or Islamist foreign policy.11

Turkey’s almost relentless engagement with some of its neighbors puts it at odds with some

aspects of U.S. foreign policy. The AKP does not share the goal of isolating problematic regimes,

preferring engagement with all to advance problem-solving. Davutoglu believes that diplomacy is

the answer. Turkish officials suggest that their foreign policy serves to expand relations between

the West and the Middle East and adds value to U.S. and European policies by providing

additional avenues of approach. They maintain that there is no contradiction between their

policies and those of their Western allies. Thus, the AKP has welcomed visits to Turkey by

Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Palestinian Hamas Poliburo Chief Khalid Mish’al, and

Sudanese President Omar al Bashir.12 However, the United States and much of the international

community have policies of isolating these leaders: Ahmadinejad mainly because of Iran’s failure

to cooperate with international efforts to ensure that its nuclear program has peaceful purposes

and because of his regime’s human rights abuses, Mish’al because the United States and the EU

consider Hamas to be a terrorist group, and Bashir because of what the United States and others

consider the Sudanese government’s policy of genocide in Darfur and their support for the

International Criminal Court prosecutor’s efforts to have him arrested for genocide and war

crimes. 13 The U.S. State Department has criticized Turkey’s outreach to each of these men.

Although it portrays engagement as a way to change these leaders’ behavior, AKP’s efforts, at

least publicly, avoid their abuses of human rights and fail to hold these pariahs to international

standards—perhaps because they are Muslim—even as Ankara occasionally risks isolating

Turkey from the EU and its NATO partners. They also have not produced a discernible change in

their conduct.

Issues on Turkey’s foreign policy agenda of most concern to the U.S. Administration and to

Congress are discussed below.

The late former Ambassador and Nationalist Action Party (MHP) MP Gunduz Aktan at “Back to the Future: U.S.Turkish Relations after the Bush Presidency,” Brookings Institution panel, January 31, 2008, also Soner Cagaptay,

“The AKP’s Foreign Policy: The Misnomer of ‘Neo-Ottomanism,’” The Washington Institute for Near East Policy,

April 29, 2009.

Turkey’s relations with Hamas and Iran are discussed in this report. With regard to Sudan: President Bashir made a

three-day official visit to Turkey in January 2008 and, at the invitation of the Turkish government, attended a TurkishAfrican Summit in Istanbul that August. The latter visit occurred after the International Criminal Court had indicted

him for genocide. Turkish intermediaries dissuaded Bashir from attending another summit meeting in Turkey in

November 2009, reportedly after pressure from the European Union and the United States. Prime Minister Erdogan

asserted, however, that he did not believe that Sudanese paramilitary forces committed acts of genocide in Darfur,

arguing “It is not possible for those who belong to the Muslim faith to carry out genocide.” Asli Aydintasbas, “‘Axis’

Debate from Washington,” Milliyet, November 9, 2009, BBC Monitoring European, November 10, 2009, “Turkey PM:

Israel War Crimes Worse than Sudan,” Al-Manar TV, November 9, 2009, OSC Document GMP20091109966108.

Prime Minister Erdogan has expressed sympathy for the humanitarian situation in Darfur.

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Figure 1.Turkey and Its Neighbors

Source: Map Resources. Adapted by CRS.

CRS-5

Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

Iraq

After the 1991 Gulf war, Turkey allowed U.S. and British planes flying from Incirlik Air Base in

southeast Turkey to enforce a no-fly zone over northern Iraq (Operation Provide

Comfort/Operation Northern Watch) in order to protect Iraq’s Kurds from Saddam Hussein and to

monitor Iraq’s armed forces. This protective shield enabled an autonomous Iraqi Kurdish

administration to develop. Turkish leaders later expressed doubts about the Bush Administration’s

regime change plans for Iraq and, on March 1, 2003, the Turkish parliament refused to authorize

the deployment of U.S. forces to Turkey for the purpose of opening a northern front against Iraq.

Turkey has since sought a stable, democratic, and unified Iraq. Foremost, Turkish officials desire

an Iraq that retains its territorial integrity, without being dismembered or dominated by any ethnic

or sectarian group—an outcome they view as key to regional stability. In addition to their longstanding concern about the Iraqi Kurds’ goals, they are worried that Iran could exert excessive

influence over a Shiite-dominated Iraq. They also are apprehensive that a U.S. military

withdrawal will lead to chaos in Iraq and the region.

The high priority that Turkey puts on Iraq’s territorial integrity stems mainly from its desire to

thwart the emergence of an independent Iraqi Kurdish state that could serve as a model for

separatist Turkish Kurds and a staging site for anti-Turkish terror. From 1984 to 1999, Turkey

fought a war costing more than 30,000 lives against the separatist Kurdistan Workers Party

(PKK), mainly in southeast Turkey. The U.S. State Department lists the Kongra-Gel(KGK)/PKK

as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO). Of an estimated 4,000-5,000 PKK members, about

3,000-3,500 are believed to be in the Qandil (or Kandil) Mountains of northern Iraq.14 The PKK

took advantage of the chaos in Iraq after the 2003 war to gain this safe haven from which to

relaunch a campaign of violence against Turkey. 15 The Turkish government has occasionally

deployed military forces into northern Iraq to combat the threat, but also has engaged in

diplomacy with Iraqi and Iraqi Kurdish officials for that and for other reasons.

Ankara maintains that if Iraq is unable to stop terrorists from using its territory against Turkey,

then it is Turkey’s right under international law to defend itself. In the summer of 2006, Turkey

mobilized military forces on the border to signal impatience with the continuing PKK presence in

northern Iraq. The Bush Administration responded by appointing retired General Joseph Ralston,

former Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff and former NATO Supreme Allied Commander

Europe (SACEUR), as Special Envoy for Countering the PKK. His appointment succeeded only

in preventing Turkey from acting against the PKK for a year, which Turks believe was his

purpose, and his resignation was confirmed in October 2007.

Another Turkish military buildup occurred in spring 2007, but action then was limited to

increased operations within southeast Turkey and to “hot pursuit” raids and artillery shelling of

U.S. State Department, Country Reports on Terrorism 2009, released August 5, 2010, accessible at

http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2007/. In November 2003, the PKK began to call itself the People’s Congress of

Kurdistan (Kongra-Gel/KGK). The U.S. State Department uses both names, but the group still is commonly referred to

as the PKK. On June 27, 2007, then Turkish Land Forces Commander General Ilker Basbug reported somewhat

different figures: between 2,800 and 3,000 PKK terrorists in northern Iraq out of a total group strength of 5,150 to

5,650. “Live Press Briefing on War Against Terrorism,” CNN Turk, June 27, 2007, Open Source Center Document

GMP20070627734009.

The U.S. State Department designated the PKK as a Foreign Terrorist Organization (FTO) on October 8, 1997.

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alleged PKK camps in northern Iraq. After a spate of deadly PKK attacks in southeast Turkey in

September and October 2007, Turkish forces again massed on the border. Fearing that an invasion

would destabilize Iraq, President Bush invited Prime Minister Erdogan to the White House on

November 5. The President referred to the PKK as “our common enemy” and promised the Turks

“real time” or “actionable” intelligence. He also established consultations among thenCommander of the Multinational Force in Iraq General David Petraeus, Vice Chairman of the

U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff General James Cartwright, and then-Turkish Deputy Chief of the

General Staff General Ergin Saygun. Benefiting from this enhanced cooperation, Turkish forces

have launched targeted air and ground strikes against PKK camps and other facilities located in

the mountains of northern Iraq and expressed satisfaction with their results.

Turkey also had added strengthened diplomacy to its policy toward northern Iraq. On August 7, at

the invitation of Prime Minister Erdogan, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki visited Ankara to

sign a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on countering terrorism, including the PKK.

However, Maliki noted that the MOU needed parliamentary approval, and he was unable to

implement it without the cooperation of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) in northern

Iraq. At that time, Turkey would not engage the KRG because its president, Massoud Barzani,

had used inflammatory language regarding Turkey, said that PKK was not a terrorist organization,

and admitted that he supported the PKK.16

A new Special Envoy to Iraq, Murat Ozcelik, reinvigorated relations with all Iraqi factions and,

with Davutoglu, expanded that outreach to include the KRG. Although the KRG did not act

against the PKK as Turkey wanted, Ozcelik met with Barzani and other Iraqi leaders in Baghdad

in October 2008. Turkey’s diplomatic moves did not end the violence as its security forces suffer

casualties regularly and the PKK is blamed for acts of terrorism in Turkey. In response, the

Turkish parliament has annually extended the government’s authority to order cross-border

operations into northern Iraq, most recently in October 2010.

Another trilateral mechanism including Turkey, Iraq, and the United States began to operate to

counter terrorism with the participation of KRG representatives. In August 2009, Massoud

Barzani stated, “The PKK cannot maintain an armed struggle. The people will not support them.”

He encouraged (Turkish) Kurds to demand their rights in a peaceful way, not through violence. 17

Barzani has supported the (poorly managed) “Kurdish opening” that the Turkish government

announced in 2009 to resolve its Kurdish issue peacefully. He met Prime Minister Erdogan in

Istanbul in November 2009. Ankara remained engaged with Barzani when the PKK stopped

observing a unilateral cease-fire in June 2010. Barzani then described the PKK’s resumption of

fighting as “irresponsible.”18

It has been suggested that the relationship between Turkey and the KRG has evolved into mutual

dependence. With ongoing U.S. military drawdown from Iraq, the KRG must cooperate with

Turkey economically and politically and Turkey has its own interests in economic and political

In a March 2007 Al Arabiya TV interview broadcast on April 6, Barzani threatened to interfere in predominantly

Kurdish populated southeast Turkey if Turkey intervened in northern Iraq. Such comments may have been in response

to Turkish saber-rattling.

Interview with Massoud Barzani conducted by Nur Batur, “PKK will be Forces to Lay Down Its Arms,” Sabah, date

not given, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 3, 2009.

“Iraqi Kurdish Leader Urges Peaceful Solution to Kurdish Issue in Turkey,” Govari Gulan (Arbil), July 19 2010,

BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 26, 2010.

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cooperation with the KRG. 19 As Barzani said in June 2010, “We know that our future lies in

maintaining good relations with Turkey.”20 Meanwhile, Foreign Minister Davutoglu said that

Turkey’s goal was “total economic integration” with northern Iraq.

Turkey’s relations with Iraq are not singularly focused on the PKK, but have developed

multidimensionally. The Turkish government has relations with all major Iraqi ethnic groups and

has encouraged them to work together to develop a functioning democracy and to resolve

problems through reconciliation and negotiation. It wants the federal structure of Iraq to function

and the Kurds to play a constructive role in it.

Turkish President Abdullah Gul invited Iraqi President Jalal Talabani to visit Ankara on March 7,

2008, to begin a mutual effort to ease tensions. Prime Minister Erdogan then visited Iraq on July

10, 2008, the first such visit by a Turkish prime minister in 18 years. During the visit, the two

governments decided to set up a High-Level Strategic Cooperation Council with the prime

ministers as co-chairs to develop relations in the fields of energy, trade, economy, infrastructure,

water, border security, and counterterrorism. Then, in March 2009, President Gul became the first

Turkish president to visit Iraq in 33 years. He met with President Talabani and with KRG Prime

Minister Nechirvan Barzani. In August 2009, Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated that Iraq was a

strategic partner and friendly country for Turkey, adding that every development in Iraq would

affect Turkey, too. 21 Erdogan returned to Baghdad in October 2009. The two neighbors have

strengthened relations with numerous memoranda of understanding and other agreements.

Bilateral trade volume was $7 billion in 2009 and the two governments aim to increase it to $20

billion by 2014.22 Turkey is Iraq’s largest trading partner and Iraq is Turkey’s fifth largest trading

partner. Some 1,200 Turkish companies do business in Iraq, and Turkish contractors have a major

share of construction projects there. Some 400 of those companies do business in northern Iraq.

In addition, an estimated 50,000 Turks work in Iraq, many in the north.

Bilateral cooperation in the energy field also is growing. In the fall of 2008, the state-run Turkish

Petroleum Company (TPAO) and the Pipeline and Petroleum Transport Corporation (BOTAS)

signed an agreement with the Shell Oil Company to cooperate in the exploration, operation, and

transportation of oil in northern Iraq. TPAO has another partnership with the Chinese National

Offshore Oil Company (CNOOC) in Iraq. TPAO signed an agreement to rehabilitate oil fields in

Basra and is pursuing other sites as well. Despite occasional disruptions caused by the security

situation that have prevented the Kirkuk-Yumurtalik pipeline from working at full capacity,

350,000 barrels of oil flow daily from Iraq to Turkey mainly for international shipping. There are

plans to construct a twin pipeline parallel to it and increase capacity. Turkey and Iraq also plan to

link Iraqi natural gas to the planned Nabucco pipeline (See “Energy” below.)

The Iraqi Turkomen, ethnic kin of the Turks who reside alongside the Kurds in northern Iraq,

continue to be a policy concern for Turkey. 23 Ankara sympathizes with Turkomen complaints of

“Kurdish Affairs Expert Offers Regional Perspective on Growing Violence in Turkey,” Ron Synovitz interview with

Prof. Michael Gunter, http://www.rferl.org, June 24, 2010.

“Iraqi Leader Stresses Need for Good Relations with Turkey,” Anatolia, June 3, 2010.

“Turk FM Leaves for Iraq, Davutoglu: Turkey-Iraq Relations Develop Around a New Partnership Model,” Anatolia,

August 11, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090811737001.

Bayram Kaya, “Trade Volume with Northern Iraq to Reach $20 Billion,” Today’s Zaman Online, July 1, 2010.

Before the Iraq war, the Turkish government and Turkomen leaders claimed that there were 3 million Turkomen in

Iraq out of a total population of about 25 million. Sources suggest, however, that this number is highly inflated and

(continued...)

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being displaced and outnumbered by Iraqi Kurds returning to the north. (Saddam Hussein

suppressed Turkomen rights and forcibly removed Turkomen from the region.)24 Although the

Turkomen issue appeared less acute after 2005 Iraqi national elections in which the group’s

turnout was far lower than Turkey expected, it still is important because Ankara and the

Turkomen are concerned about Kirkuk, a multiethnic city claimed by the Iraqi Kurds situated in

the heart of an oil-producing region.25 Ankara advocates a consensus solution for the status of the

oil-rich city of Kirkuk, mainly in order to avoid it becoming the financial foundation for a

Kurdish state but also to ensure the rights of the Turkomen. Turkey advocates postponing a

referendum on the fate of Kirkuk, fearing that it could prove that the city is predominantly

Kurdish at the expense of Turkomen residents and that the oil resources on which the city sits

could be used to finance an independent Iraqi Kurdish state. Turkish officials argue that Kirkuk

and Iraq’s natural resources must be equitably shared by all Iraqis. Turkey remains watchful as

Iraqi officials have postponed both the referendum and a national census that also would affect

the fate of the city.

With an economic dimension due to their effect on agricultural production, bilateral water issues

often are problematic as Turkey is the controlling, upstream partner on the Tigris and Euphrates

Rivers and it and Syria have dams on the latter, while Iraq is the dependent, downstream riparian.

(The Tigris flows directly from Turkey into Iraq, while the Euphrates flows through Syria before

reaching Iraq.) The water levels of the rivers have fallen in all three countries due to severe

drought conditions since 2006, leading to desertification in Iraq which severely affects

agricultural production. However, Turkey insists that it has kept the 1987 agreement to provide

Iraq and Syria with 500 cubic meters per second from the river despite drought conditions that

lowered water levels. 26 Syria then releases 58% to Iraq, but Iraq says that it needs 500 cubic

meters for itself. All sides appear to want to address the issue in a cooperative, technological way.

On September 3, 2009, the Turkish Minister of Environment and Forestry, Iraqi Minister of Water

and Natural Resources, and Syrian Irrigation Minister signed a memorandum of understanding to

establish joint measurement stations on both the Tigris and Euphrates, and on related matters.

Turkey has increased the flow temporarily on occasion.

Reflecting Iraq’s importance, Turkey has an ambassador in Baghdad, an ambassador based in

Ankara responsible for reconstruction in Iraq and Afghanistan, and consulates in Mosul, Erbil,

and Basra.

Turkey supported Iyad al Allawi’s Al Iraqiyah bloc, which Iraqi Sunni and Turkomen also

supported, in the March 2010 Iraqi national elections. However, Turkey’s influence on the

(...continued)

estimate that Turkomen number about 330,000 and that they have assimilated with other Iraqi groups for years. See

Colbert C. Held, Middle East Patterns: Places, Peoples, and Politics, Boulder, Colorado, Westview Press, 2000;

according to the author, there are about 1.5 million Turkomen in the Middle East, residing in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey.

Minority Rights Group International, “World Directory of Minorities and Indigenous Peoples - Iraq : Turkomans,”

April 2008.

The electoral slate of the Iraqi Turkomen Front won 3 seats in the January 2005 Iraqi parliamentary election, but only

1 out of 275 total seats in the December 2005 election in which Sunnis also ran.

The commitment is in a section of a July 17, 1987 Protocol, which states, “The Turkish side undertakes to release a

yearly average of more than 500 cubic meters a second at the Turkish/Syrian border and in cases where the monthly

flow falls below the level of 500 cubic meters, the Turkish side agrees to make up the difference during the following

month.” Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.tr.

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formation of a new Iraqi government was minimal and, in November, Maliki was again

designated to from a government. The Turkish Foreign Ministry settled for stating that it was

“pleased with the start of the constitutional process.” While Turkey’s initial stand may have

offended President Talabani, who will serve another term, and Maliki, the two countries’

economic interests are now so intertwined that they probably will militate against a rift.

Turkish officials insist that multilateral contact groups concerning Iraq include all of Iraq’s

neighbors, meaning Syria and Iran, and meetings of neighbors have included Turkey, Syria, Iraq,

Iran, Jordan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and the Arab League. They consult Iranian

and Syrian counterparts regularly about Iraq. Kurdish media have reported that Turkish military

forces have operated with Iranians against the PKK and the Party for Freedom and Life in

Kurdistan (PJAK), a related Iranian Kurdish group, in northern Iraq. If it exists, such cooperation

is likely to continue.

Turkish public attitudes toward the United States are deeply affected by PKK violence, for which

many Turks blame the United States as “occupier” of Iraq. According to the 2010 Transatlantic

Trends report, only 6% of Turks thought that Turkey should act in “closest cooperation” with the

United States. After an upsurge in PKK violence in June 2010, then-U.S. Ambassador to Turkey

James Jeffrey said that the United States cleared air corridors over northern Iraq for use by

Turkey’s Israeli-made Heron unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) as part of ongoing military

cooperation.

Israel27

Turkey was the first predominantly Muslim country to recognize the independence of the State of

Israel in 1948. After several decades of discreet relations, the Israeli-Arab peace process made

public bilateral Israeli-Turkish ties more acceptable to Turks, who are predominantly Muslim and

sympathetic to the Palestinians. In 1991, Turkey sent its first ambassador to Israel since recalling

his predecessor during the Suez crisis of 1956. In the intervening years, Turkey was represented

in Israel by lower level diplomats. The two regional neighbors cemented closer ties in part due to

their common view of Syria, which at the time supported the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK)

insurgency in Turkey, with several military agreements and a free trade agreement in 1996.

Ankara sought to triangulate the relationship by using it to develop closer relations in

Washington, especially in Congress where Turkish officials took into consideration the influence

of pro-Israel groups to counter what they viewed as anti-Turkish ones advocating for Greece and

Armenia. In the ensuing years, relations blossomed with Israeli arms sales to Turkey, regular

military exercises, the exchange of high-level official visits, and booming trade and tourism.

Israel modernized U.S.-made fighter planes, tanks, and helicopters for Turkey, and Turkey

purchased Israeli unmanned aerial vehicles.

The Justice and Development Party’s (AKP) victory in Turkey’s 2002 national elections did not

disrupt that trend, although Turkey recalled its ambassador when Israel assassinated Hamas leader

Shaykh Yassin in 2004 and Prime Minister Erdogan charged that it was a “terrorist act.”28

Erdogan also criticized Israel’s conduct toward the Palestinians and its war against Hezbollah in

For additional background, see 98-633F (Archived), Israeli-Turkish Relations, July 17, 1998, by Carol Migdalovitz.

“Turkish PM Condemns Killing of Yassin as ‘Terrorist Act,’” Xinhua News Agency, March 24, 2004.

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Lebanon in 2006. Yet, Erdogan visited Israel in 2005, and Israeli President Shimon Peres

addressed the Turkish parliament in 2007.

Some in Israel became concerned when the AKP invited Khalid Mish’al, head of the Hamas

politburo, to Turkey after the group won the 2006 Palestinian legislative elections. Nevertheless,

bilateral relations remained steady and Israel still trusted Turkey enough to allow it to mediate

four rounds of indirect Israeli peace talks with Syria in 2008.

Relations soured, however, with Israeli’s military campaign—Operation Cast Lead—against

Hamas in Gaza in December 2008-January 2009. Massive street demonstrations against Israel

occurred in Turkey, where anti-Semitic sentiments were expressed openly. Four days before Israel

launched its offensive, Prime Minister Erdogan met Israeli Prime Minister Olmert to discuss the

Israeli-Syrian peace talks. Erdogan later charged that Olmert had disrespected him by not sharing

Israel’s military plans and causing (Turkey’s) suspension of the Israeli-Syrian talks. Erdogan’s

rhetoric escalated as he described Gaza as an “open-air prison” and asserted that “Allah will

punish those who violate the rights of the innocent.”29 Erdogan’s inflammatory condemnations of

Israel became unrelenting and he did not mention Hamas’s indiscriminate rocket attacks against

southern Israel, which Israel cited as the reason for its campaign.

After the Gaza conflict began, Erdogan traveled to Jordan, Syria, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia

ostensibly in search of peace, but he pointedly did not go to Israel with which peace was to be

made. 30 During his engagements, he accused Israel of “crimes against humanity.” Erdogan

claimed, “My emotionality is for those martyred children and women in Palestine. It is not

against Israel.”31 He also claimed that he was not anti-Semitic, but blamed “Jewish-supported

media for causing disinformation in the world.”32 A few days later, he questioned how Israel

could belong to the U.N. when it ignored Security Council resolutions. Some domestic critics

accused him of “blindly assuming the role of Hamas’s spokesman” and losing the possibility of

being its interlocutor with the world.33 After Erdogan said that he was taking a “Muslim

approach” to the humanitarian crisis, others questioned how he could mediate between Jews and

Muslims. 34

Later in January, Prime Minister Erdogan castigated President Peres for his defense of Israel’s

conduct of the war at the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, charging, “You killed

people.” Erdogan’s defense of the Palestinians boosted his domestic popularity just months before

nationwide municipal elections and earned him hero status with people in the Arab region.

During these times of heightened tension, the Turkish government did not sever military or

defense industry ties with Israel. Exercises and signed weapons contracts were unaffected.

However, observers noted that Israel’s defense sales to Turkey already had fallen from $1 billion

a year in the 1990s to $100 million a year from 2007 to 2009. Israelis reportedly complained that

“Turkey Hears Conflicting Calls of Europe and the Middle East,” Irish Times, January 10, 2009.

Later in the month, the Foreign Ministry dispatched a second rank diplomat, its deputy undersecretary, to Jerusalem.

“Erdogan: My Reaction is No Harsher than Phosphorus Bombs,” NTV, January 13, 2009, OSC Document

GMP200901013744003.

Ibid.

Ferai Tinc, “Turkey is Not’s Obama’s Interlocutor in the Middle East,” Hurriyet Online, January 25, 2009, OSC

Document GMP20090125017005.

Burak Bekdil, “Approaching the Middle East,” Hurriyet Daily News Online, January 16, 2009.

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Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

political tensions, demands to share work with Turkish subcontractors, and frequent changes to

technical specifications affected feasibility calculations for the arms deals. For their part, Turks

were said to complain about expensive solutions to problems that emerged during the work and

about late deliveries. Israel’s belated delivery of unmanned aerial vehicles was particularly

contentious, although some of the delay was attributed to the incompatibility of the system’s

Israeli and Turkish parts and resulting failures of performance tests.35

In September 2009, Foreign Minister Davutoglu cancelled a visit to Israel because it would not

allow him also to visit Gaza, which he could have entered via Egypt. In October, Turkey

“postponed” part of the annual NATO Anatolian Eagle air defense exercise that had been held

since 2001 and in which Israel was to participate. The Israeli military claimed that it was

postponed because Turkey had changed the list of participating countries to exclude Israel and the

United States and Italy then declined to participate.36 Prime Minister Erdogan said the drill was

cancelled due to public opinion. 37 Others suggested that Turkey was wary of allowing Israeli

planes to fly near the borders of Iran and Syria.38 The next day, Ankara invited Syria to joint

military exercises. Also in October, Turkish television aired an anti-Israeli television series

depicting Israeli soldiers deliberately murdering innocent children, prompting Israel to protest

“incitement” and “teaching to hate” which it said could endanger Turkish Jews and Israelis

visiting Turkey.39

Some Labor Party members of the Israeli government such as Defense Minister Ehud Barak and

Minister of Trade, Industry, and Labor Benjamin Ben Eliezer, both of whom are retired generals,

were deeply concerned about the deterioration in relations with Turkey which they considered of

strategic importance. In November 2009, Ben Eliezer was the first Israeli cabinet member to visit

Turkey since the Gaza operation, when he attended a meeting of the Turkish-Israeli Joint

Economic Committee and met with President Gul, Foreign Minister Davutoglu, and Defense

Minister Vecdi Gonul. Ben Eliezer is a member of a junior coalition partner and Foreign Minister

Avigdor Lieberman, his more powerful colleague, criticized the outreach to Turkey. It apparently

had been approved by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who did not comment. For its part,

Turkey conditioned improvement in bilateral relations on Israel’s better treatment of Palestinians

in Gaza and progress toward peace. Relations remained uneasy.

Then, in January 2010, Israeli Deputy Foreign Minister Danny Ayalon publicly humiliated the

Turkish ambassador while complaining about the television series, renewing tensions. Ayalon

formally apologized only after President Gul threatened to recall the ambassador. Later in the

month, Israeli Defense Minister Ehud Barak traveled to Ankara on a previously scheduled visit

whose purpose shifted to that of repairing relations. He only met with Gonul and Davutoglu, not

Gul, Erdogan, or then-Chief of Staff General Ilker Basbug.

As a result of Turkey’s growing strategic cooperation with Syria and closeness to Iran (see

below), Israeli officials reportedly became concerned about Turkey’s possible transfer of Israeli

Umit Enginsoy, “Turkish-Israeli Defense Deals on Hold,” Hurriyet Daily News Online, October 20, 2009.

“Turkey Excludes Israel from Military Air Exercise,” Al Arabiya, October 10, 2009.

Statement at news conference, October 15, 2009, NTV, BBC Monitoring European.

Erdal Safak, “Israel Operation,” Sabah, October 15, 2009, BBC Monitoring European, October 16, 2009.

“Netanyahu Joins Condemnation of Turkish TV Broadcast,” Jerusalem Post, October 16, 2009, Ben Kaspit, Merav

David, and Jackie Hugi, “The Finger Points to Erdogan,” Ma’ariv, October 16, 2009, OSC Document

GMP20091016741001.

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technology that Turkey had acquired as a result of Israel’s military sales.40 This concern was said

to have prompted a review of defense exports to Turkey.41

Meanwhile, Turkish officials developed a litany of criticisms of Israel. They repeatedly

condemned Israeli settlements and “provocative” actions intended to “change the demography,

character, and the status of Jerusalem,” maintaining that East Jerusalem must be the capital of an

independent Palestinian state.42

Turkish officials focus greatly on Israel’s reported nuclear status. Stating that they are against all

nuclear weapons, they criticize Israel for not joining the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT),

but never mention Pakistan and India, which have nuclear weapons and have not joined the treaty,

or Iran’s threats against Israel. In April 2010, Prime Minister Erdogan described Israel as “the

principal threat to peace” in the Middle East.43 After the Tehran Declaration of May 2010 (see

“Iran” below), Prime Minister Erdogan said, “since the issue of Iran has been resolved to some

extent, the international community should concentrate its efforts to find a solution to the

problems in Israel now. There is no nuclear weapon in Iran, but Israel has nuclear weapons. Israel

is a regional country too.”44

Turkey appears to be more disturbed about a possible Israeli military strike against Iran than

about Iran’s nuclear ambitions. In December 2009, Erdogan declared that any Israeli attempt to

use Turkish airspace against neighboring countries, e.g., Iran, would “receive a response equal to

that of an earthquake…,”and he cautioned Israel against using its relationship with Turkey to

wage aggression against a third party.45

Turkish-Israeli relations reached their lowest point as a result of Israel’s seizure in international

waters of a Turkish ship—the Mavi Marmara—that was part of a flotilla intending to break

Israel’s blockade of the Gaza Strip by delivering aid on May 31, 2010.46 Under circumstances that

are still being investigated, Israeli commandos killed eight Turks and one Turkish-American

while boarding the ship to divert it to the Israeli port of Ashkelon. Turkey recalled its ambassador

from Israel, cancelled joint military exercises as well as trilateral exercises in which U.S. forces

participate, and banned Israeli military planes from its airspace. It demanded an apology,

compensation for victims, and an international investigation. Israel withdrew its military advisers

from Turkey, warned Israeli tourists against traveling there, and refused to apologize after

maintaining that it had acted lawfully in self-defense and alleging that the flotilla’s planners had

terrorist links. The chairman of the Union of Chambers and Commodity Exchanges of Turkey

(TOBB), a major business group, called on Turkish companies to reconsider their relations with

Israel. However, there was no widespread boycott of Israeli goods; Israeli exports to Turkey rose

Ran Dagoni, “Future Military Equipment Sales to Turkey in Doubt,” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, February

24, 2009, citing Defense News.

Arye Egozi, “ Due to Tension: Defense Exports to Turkey in Great Doubt,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, April 13, 2010, OSC

Document GMP20100413741007.

“Turkish Premier Calls for Pressure on Israel for Mideast Peace,” Anatolia, March 9, 2010.

Marc Champion, “Erdogan Calls Israel ‘Threat’ to Peace; Turkish Premier’s Remarks Further Strain Countries’

Alliance as Analysts Ponder Nation’s Foreign-Policy Leanings,” Wall Street Journal, April 8, 2010.

“Turkish Premier Says that International Community Should Solve Problems in Israel Now,” Anatolia, May 18,

2010.

“Turkey Warns IAF Against Using Airspace,” Jerusalem Post, December 11, 2009.

For an in depth examination of the incident, see CRS Report R41275, Israel’s Blockade of Gaza, the Mavi Marmara

Incident, and Its Aftermath, by Carol Migdalovitz.

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Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

in June and July after the flotilla incident and overall exports were higher than in 2009.47 Erdogan

again accused Israel of “state terror” and he and politicians from other parties fed the

demonization of Israel by making unsupported references to alleged Israeli support for the PKK,

while some in the Turkish media reported it as a fact.48

Israel still was not willing to abandon ties to Turkey. Again with the knowledge of Prime Minister

Netanyahu, but not Foreign Minister Lieberman, Minister Ben Eliezer returned to action to

mollify the Turks, meeting Foreign Minister Davutoglu in Brussels in July. Davutoglu restated

Turkey’s demands from which, as of the date of this report, it has not retreated. However, Defense

Minister Barak expressed concern over the appointment of Hakan Fidan as new head of the

Turkish Intelligence Organization (MIT), describing him as a “friend of Iran” and anxiety that he

would share Israeli intelligence secrets with Iran.49

Relations have not revived. In September, Chinese planes flew with Turkish ones in the annual

Anatolian Eagle military exercise instead of U.S. and Israeli aircraft. Later in the month,

President Gul stated, “We will never forgive Israel even if it apologizes for the Mavi Marmara.”50

Turkey’s National Security Council’s new “Red Book,” a classified document listing perceived

threats to the country, reportedly eliminates several that that were in prior editions in line with

Davutoglu’s “zero problems” policy, such as Iran, Syria, and Greece. However, it is now said to

state that Israel’s policy is undermining stability in the region and thereby poses a threat.

The improved relations with Iran and Syria also means that Turkey no longer shares a common

threat or needs its “alliance” with Israel as in the 1990s. Moreover, AKP’s growing domination of

the domestic political scene overshadows the previously all-powerful Turkish military, which had

championed ties with Israel. The verbal onslaught against Israel, some suggest, may be part of its

domestic campaign to weaken the military and secularists who favor ties with Israel. 51 Aside from

being part of a domestic power play, strains with Israel have emerged as a key component in

Turkey’s neighborhood policy. As Foreign Minister Davutoglu told an Arab audience, “despite

the grave dimensions threatening peace and security, this incident (flotilla crisis) at the same time

constituted an opportunity in giving shape to regional order.” 52

The breach with Israel has affected Ankara’s relations with Washington. In the aftermath of the

flotilla crisis, Turkish officials appeared to suggest that Washington would have to choose

between Israel and Turkey. Some Members of Congress who had supported the Israeli-Turkish

relationship became highly critical of Turkey. In June, American Jewish organizations also

previously supportive of the Israeli-Turkish link and of Turkey reacted to Turkey’s anti-Israel

trend by declining to meet a Turkish parliamentary delegation. For its part, the Obama

Adi Ben-Israel, “Despite Tension, Exports to Turkey rise 8.5%; Trade with Turkey Still Higher than 2009, Even

After Flotilla Incident,” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, August 18, 2010, citing Globes.

Emre Uslu, “The Undeclared War Between Israel and Turkey?” Today’s Zaman Online, June 10, 2010.

“Turkey ‘Uneasy’ about Barak’s Comments on Intelligence Chief,” Anatolia, August 3, 2010.

Ilhan Tanir, “Turkey-Israel Relations Continue to Worsen in New York,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, September 25,

2010.

Gil Feiler, “Erdogan anti-Israel Outburst Part of Struggle Between Military, Islamists,” Jerusalem Post, February 5,

2009.

“Turkish FM: Turkish-Arab World has Most Strategic Zone,” Anatolia, June 10, 2010.

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Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

Administration circumspectly said that it recognizes the importance of the Israeli-Turkish

relationship and supports dialogue “to repair fractures.”53

The Palestinian Authority and Hamas

Turkish officials have had contacts with Hamas political bureau chief Khalid Mish’al. Davutoglu

met with Mish’al in Damascus, where he resides, and, Mish’al met with AKP officials in Ankara

in February 2006, shortly after Hamas won the Palestinian parliamentary election. However,

Mish’al was neither an elected nor an appointed official of the Palestinian Authority (PA)

government. Mish’al’s visit to Turkey appeared to some to give Hamas a boost and greater

international legitimacy at the expense of Western-favored PA President Mahmud Abbas. Abbas

later expressed “unease” with Prime Minister Erdogan’s defense of Hamas as it did not recognize

him and his administration.54 Nonetheless, the Prime Minister did not relent in the face of

criticism and openly admonished his “Western friends” that they would “get nowhere” by talking

only to Abbas.55 Erdogan denies Hamas is a terrorist group, maintaining that it is a reform party

that was democratically elected to the Palestinian government and that Israeli-Palestinian peace

cannot be achieved without it. Turkish leaders support reconciliation efforts between Hamas and

Fatah and for Palestinian unity.

Turkey’s outreach to Hamas disregarded the approach of the so-called Quartet—the United

States, European Union (EU), United Nations and Russia—which had set conditions for Hamas

to meet before the international community would engage with it. Those conditions include:

disavow violence, recognize Israel, and recognize prior agreements between Israel and the

Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). Hamas had not met any of the conditions at the time of

Mish’al’s visit to Ankara and still has not done so. The AKP and its leaders overlook this

deficiency. The United States and the EU, of which Turkey is a candidate for membership,

consider Hamas a terrorist organization. Some European officials also have met Hamas officials,

but U.S. law forbids U.S. government officials from having such meetings.

Israeli-Syrian Talks

For some time, Turkey had good relations with both Israel and Syria, which had suspended their

peace talks in 2000. During a February 2007 visit to Turkey, then-Israeli Prime Minister Ehud

Olmert reportedly discussed possible Turkish mediation between his country and Syria with

Prime Minister Erdogan. The Turkish leader may have seized on this overture to advance his

agenda of peace and to enhance Turkey’s image as a regional power. On May 21, 2008,

reportedly after considerable ground work by Professor Davutoglu, Israel, Syria, and Turkey

simultaneously announced that Israel and Syria had launched proximity or indirect peace talks in

Istanbul mediated by Turkey. Four rounds of talks took place before being suspended because of

Israeli domestic political turmoil in advance of the February 2009 national election and because

of Israel’s military campaign against Hamas in the Gaza Strip in December 2008-January 2009.

U.S. State Department, Daily Press Briefing, July 2, 2010.

Ferai Tinc, “Abbas: God is Capable of Working Miracles,” Hurriyet Online, February 9, 2009, OSC Document

GMP20090209725003.

Roger Cohen, “Turkey wants U.S. ‘Balance,’” International Herald Tribune, April 6, 2009.

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Turkey: Selected Foreign Policy Issues and U.S. Views

Turkey would like to resume its intermediary role, and Syrian officials have said that they prefer

talks to continue in that manner. However, Prime Minister Erdogan’s harsh criticism of Israel’s

conduct of the operation against Hamas, of its treatment of Palestinians in Gaza, and of its actions

during the May 2010 flotilla incident have made the Israeli government reluctant to use the

Turkish conduit.

The Turkish initiative to restart peace talks between Israel and Syria initially appeared contrary to

the Bush Administration policy of isolating Syria because of Syria’s destabilizing influence in

Lebanon, support for Hezbollah and Hamas, and ties with Iran, and contrary to that

Administration’s emphasis on achieving an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement. However, U.S.

officials did not object. Instead, they sought to frame Turkey’s actions within the context of the

efforts to achieve a comprehensive regional peace and as an opportunity to convey appropriate

messages to Damascus regarding support for Hamas and Hezbollah and relationship with Iran. 56

Syria

The foundation for better Turkish ties with Syria was laid before the AKP came to power. On

October 20, 1998, under the threat of Turkish military action, Damascus agreed to recognize the

Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) as a terrorist organization, to cease all aid to the PKK, and to

deport PKK leader Abdullah Ocalan, who was based in Damascus, from Syria.57 Syria completely

fulfilled its commitments under this accord (the Adana Agreement or Protocol) and bilateral

relations improved over the following years. The attendance of Turkish President Ahmet Necdet

Sezer at the funeral of President Hafez al Asad, father of current President Bashar al Asad, in

2000 was considered a milestone in relations. Since the AKP came to power in 2002, ties have

further strengthened. AKP leaders cultivate close personal relations with President Asad and the

two countries’ officials often exchange high level visits. Asad made his first visit to Turkey in

January 2004 and he has returned often. That December, Prime Minister Erdogan visited

Damascus.

President Asad cites three positions of the AKP government that have enhanced Turkey’s standing

in Syria and Syria’s trust in Turkey: its support for the Palestinians, its refusal to allow the U.S.

forces to invade Iraq via Turkish territory in 2003, and its steadfastness while many other

countries were trying to isolate Syria and exerting pressure on Turkey to do the same. 58

Trade is an important dimension of the bilateral relationship. Turkey and Syria concluded a free

trade agreement in January 2007; bilateral trade totaled $1.8 billion in 2009. Ankara and

Damascus are designing a gas pipeline and their national oil companies plan to establish a joint

oil company. In addition, Turkish companies are establishing factories in Syria to take advantage

of cheaper materials and labor. Turkish investment totals $400 million and is expected to increase

“USA Welcomes Turkey’s Mediation between Israel, Syria,” Anatolia, June 2, 2008, and “Amid Closure Case, Rice

Praises Ties with AKP Govt,” Turkish Daily News, June 7, 2008. Cam Simpson, “ Israel, Syria in Indirect Peace

Talks,” Wall Street Journal, May 22, 2008, “US Welcomes Syrian-Israeli Talks but Stresses Palestinian Track,” Yahoo!

News, May 21, 2008, “Rice: Israeli-Palestinian Track Most Likely to Produce Results,” Associated Press, May 22,

2008.

For background on these events, see Meliha Benli Altunisik and Ozlem Tur, “From Distant Neighbors to Partners?

Changing Syrian-Turkish Relations,” Security Dialogue, 2006, 37: 229.

“Turkish Television (TRT) Interviews Syrian President on Regional Issues,” BBC Monitoring Middle East, October

7, 2010.

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in the coming years. Turkey and Syria also have intensified defense ties, conducting their first

joint military exercises in April 2009 and holding additional ones since then. In October 2009, the

two neighbors signed agreements to lift visa requirements and held back-to-back joint ministerial

meetings in the Syrian city of Aleppo and the Turkish city of Gaziantep—attended by ten Turkish

cabinet ministers and their Syrian counterparts. The first meeting of a High Level Strategic

Cooperation Council took place in Damascus in December 2009, with the two countries’ prime

ministers acting as co-chairmen. As noted above, some Israeli officials have expressed fear that

Turkey may transfer Israeli technology to Syria.59 Turkey acquired the technology via IsraeliTurkish military cooperation.

On occasion, there are differences over water from the Euphrates River, which flows from Turkey

to Syria, which complains that its needs are not fulfilled. The neighbors indicate that they will

cooperate on a dam project on a Euphrates tributary. They do not discuss Hatay, a coastal

province in southeast Turkey that the French mandate over Syria ceded to Turkey in 1939 but that

still appears on some Syrian maps.60

Iran

Overview

Turkey and Iran share an almost 500 kilometer (310 mile) border that was established in the 17th

century, and they have not been to war since then. Over the years, however, their bilateral

relations have been characterized by both conflict and collaboration. 61 Tensions sometimes

surfaced from the neighbors’ competing regional ambitions and from their rival forms of Islam:

most Turks are Sunnis, while most Iranians are Shiites.62 After Iran declared itself an Islamic

Republic in 1979, some predicted a worsening of relations because the Turkish Republic

established in 1923 had abolished the caliphate, the office of the Prophet Muhammad’s

successors, and adopted a constitution that guaranteed secularism as a basic principle of the state.

However, Ankara’s pragmatic policy of accepting and officially recognizing the new Islamic

Republic speedily and focusing on economic relations proved the forecasters wrong.

Since it took office in 2002, the AKP government has continued the realistic pragmatism or

pronounced self-interest of its predecessors toward Iran, while adding an affinity for other

Muslim regimes. Thus, it has expanded bilateral relations markedly. The U.S. invasion of Iraq and

a mutual concern about possible instability in their region accelerated the rapprochement.

Officials exchanged numerous visits, culminating in Iranian President Mahmud Ahmadinejad’s

visit to Turkey in August 2008. The AKP government hosted him in Istanbul, thereby working

around Ahmadinejad’s antipathy to Turkish secularism by enabling him to avoid a usually

obligatory visit in the capital of Ankara to the mausoleum of Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the

Ron Ben-Yishai, “Turkish-Syrian Drill Raises Concerns in Israel,” ynetnews.com, April 27, 2010.

For Background on Hatay (Alexandretta), see Majid Khadduri, “The Alexandretta Dispute,” The American Journal

of International Law, Vol. 30, No. 3 (July 1945), pp. 406-425, among others.

See also Gokhan Cetinsaya, “Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: the Historic Roots of Turkish-Iranian

Relations,” Middle East Review of International Affairs, an online journal, Vol. 7. No. 3, September 2003.

For ore information about Sunni and Shi’a Islam, see CRS Report RS21745, Islam: Sunnis and Shiites, by

Christopher M. Blanchard.

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secularist founder of the Turkish Republic. President Gul reciprocated by visiting Iran for a

regional summit in March 2009, when he met both Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamene’i and

President Ahmadinejad.

Turkey’s pragmatism or realpolitik was evident in official reactions to Iran’s June 12, 2009,

presidential election as President Gul and Prime Minister Erdogan were among the first

international leaders to congratulate President Ahmadinejad on his re-election. Foreign Minister

Davutoglu later declared controversies over the outcome to be an internal Iranian affair, while

Erdogan described Turkey’s policy as a “necessity of bilateral relations.”63 Their continuing

unconditional support of the authoritarian Iranian president appeared out of step with NATO and

EU member states. AKP’s domestic critics charged that these “reflexive and premature” actions

may have undermined Turkey’s stature and credibility as an interest in stability embodied in the

status quo appeared to trump values.64 Turkish diplomats maintain that they have quietly

counseled Iranian officials without wanting to appear to be interfering in their neighbor’s

domestic affairs.65

Prior to visiting Iran in October 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan told the British newspaper, The

Guardian, “There is not doubt he (Ahmadinejad) is our friend…. As a friend, so far we have good

relations and have no difficulty at all.”66 The visit focused largely on energy and trade and a

delegation of 200 Turkish businessmen, Members of Parliament, and others accompanied

Erdogan. Erdogan also emphasized the need for Turkey and Iran to cooperate in counter-terrorism

and “specifically intelligence sharing.”67 The latter might trigger alarms among Turkey’s NATO

allies and in Israel.

Nuclear Issue68

On the most pressing international issue of the moment, Turkish officials state that Iran has the

right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes and has called on Iran to cooperate with the

International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) to demonstrate that its nuclear program has peaceful

intentions. The Turks also want to preserve their own right to develop nuclear energy for peaceful

purposes. However, they do not want Iran to develop weapons of mass destruction and thereby

upset the regional balance of power and supplant Turkey as the regional center that AKP declares

it to be. Foremost, the Turks seek to avoid another war in their region like the one the United

States launched in 2003 and failed to unearth Iraqi weapons of mass destruction.

Robert Tait, “Iran is our Friend, Says Turkish PM Alongside Swipe at Disdainful EU,” The Guardian, October 26,

2009.

“FM Urges Iranians to Accept Election,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, June 23, 2009, and Ilhan Tanir, “Davutoglu, the

Architect, Miserably Fails to Deliver,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, June 27, 2009.

For example, the Turks maintained that they had petitioned the Iranian regime for clemency on behalf of a woman

sentenced to be executed by stoning.

Tait, op. cit.

Dondu Sariisik, “Turkey Seeks Increased Cooperation in Energy, Security,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, October 9,

2009.

For overview, see CRS Report R40094, Iran’s Nuclear Program: Tehran’s Compliance with International

Obligations, by Paul K. Kerr. See also, Mustafa Kibaroglu and Baris Caglar, “Implications of a Nuclear Iran for

Turkey,” Middle East Policy, Vol. XV, No. 4, Winter 2008, and Sinan Ulgen, “Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons

of Mass Destruction: What Role for Turkey? Discussion Paper Series, Center for Economics and Foreign Policy

(EDAM), June 23, 2010, accessible via link in OSC Document GMP20100623737005.

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It is in this light that the AKP had hoped the United States and others would view Ahmadinejad’s

visit to Istanbul on August 14-15, 2008. Observers emphasized that it was Ahmadinejad’s first

visit to a NATO member state and a EU candidate country. Ankara suggested that the visit

provided an opportunity to pass messages at the highest level, but Tehran does not think that it

needs an intermediary with the international community. Ahmadinejad has said that he viewed

Turkey’s efforts to defuse tension and to further constructive dialogue positively.69 A Turkish

newspaper claimed that, during their meeting, President Gul urged Ahmadinejad to accept an

incentive package offered by the five permanent members of the U.N. Security Council and

Germany (P5+1) to freeze Iran’s enrichment program, but Ahmadinejad simply reiterated his

stance that the program is peaceful and that Iran would not accept a freeze. 70 There was no

official Turkish statement about the conversation and the AKP could not point to any

achievements on the nuclear issue resulting from the visit.

The Bush Administration was wary of Turkey’s warming of relations with Iran at the same time

that Washington was seeking to have the U.N. Security Council consider additional sanctions on

Iran because of Tehran’s failure to ensure that its uranium enrichment program has peaceful

purposes. Moreover, the Administration believed that a prospective agreement for Turkey to

develop natural gas resources in Iran and build a pipeline from Iran to Turkey would violate U.N.

sanctions intended to pressure Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment program and also violate

the U.S. Iran Sanctions Act, P.L. 104-172, August 5, 1996, as amended. The State Department

warned Turkey against finalizing the South Pars energy agreement, asserting,

such a deal by Turkey with Iran would send the wrong message at a time when the Iranian

regime has repeatedly failed to comply with its U.N. Security Council and IAEA

obligations.... This is not a time to do business with Iran. It is a time for the international

community, including our ally Turkey, to begin considering additional measures to pressure

Iran.71

U.S. officials expressed hope that Turkish officials would convey messages in line with those of

the international community regarding Iran’s nuclear program during Ahmadinejad’s visit. The

Bush Administration had supported Turkey’s bid for a nonpermanent seat on the U.N. Security

Council for 2009-2010 without apparent second thoughts about Ankara’s outreach to Tehran and

its possible effect on sanctions.

In October 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan described Iran’s nuclear program as “peaceful and

humanitarian.”72 He has criticized the international community for its “double standards” in

targeting Iran’s nuclear program while ignoring Israel’s purported nuclear arsenal. He almost

always mentions Israel (if not by name, then as “the country in the region with nuclear arms”)

when defending Iran, which he does frequently.73 In November 2008, Erdogan told a Brookings

Institution audience, “We do not find correct to tell just one country to scrap nuclear weapons. We

do not think this is an honest approach. Whoever has nuclear weapons should scrap them first

Ahmadinejad interview with CNN TURK, August 13, 2008, OSC Document FEA20080813751591.

“Turkey Urges Iran to Accept Incentives, Warns on U.S. Attack,” Hurriyet, August 16, 2008, OSC Document

GMP20080816734006.

Alex Barker and Andrew Ward, “US in Warning to Turkey over Terms of Energy Deal with Iran,” Financial Times,

August 14, 2008.

“Turkey’s Worrisome Approach to Iran, Israel,” Christian Science Monitor, October 29, 2009.

“PM Visits Iran, Receives Praise over Nuke Row, Israel,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, October 27, 2009; “Turkish

PM: West Treats Iran Unfairly,” Agence France Presse, October 26, 2009.

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then let us all be rid of them.”74 Erdogan also views others as unfair “because those who accuse

Iran of pursuing acquisition of nuclear weapons have very strong nuclear infrastructures.”75

Turkey seeks to have the dispute between Iran and the international community solved

diplomatically. Erdogan considers the idea of a military attack on Iran to be “an insanity” and has

warned Israel of “a response equal to an earthquake” if it used its relationship with Turkey,

referring to Turkish airspace, to “wage aggression on a third party,” i.e., Iran.76 In October 2009,

Turkey cancelled Israel’s participation in an annual NATO military exercise in Turkey ostensibly

because of public anti-Israel sentiment resulting from the December 2008-January 2009 Gaza

conflict. Some analysts suggested that, in addition, Turkey did not want to give Israel an

opportunity to fly in Turkish airspace near the Iranian border. Turkey also opposed the imposition

of sanctions on Iran which might harm Turkey’s interests as it had perceived economic losses

from U.N. sanctions on Iraq during Saddam Hussein’s tenure.

In October 2009, the P5+1 and the IAEA proposed that Iran exchange, with the participation of

Russia and France, 1,200 kg (2,640 pounds) of low-enriched uranium (about 75% of its stockpile)

for uranium for a research reactor used to produce medical isotopes. Turkey was not to be

involved. Iran did not accept the offer and later launched a program to enrich its uranium to 20%.

In November, then IAEA Director General Mohammed ElBaradei suggested that Iran send lowenriched uranium to Turkey for enrichment. Turkish officials expressed their willingness to

participate in an arrangement, but Iran again balked at sending the material outside of the country.

In November, Turkey abstained when the IAEA passed a resolution demanding that Iran

immediately freeze operations at a previously secret uranium enrichment plant. Its action may

have been an indication that Ankara’s “impartiality” has the effect of supporting Iran and

distancing itself from its allies.

After discussing Iran with President Obama at the White House on December 7, 2009, Prime

Minister Erdogan said, “We do not want to see a country in our region possessing nuclear

weapons and we want the countries in the region who have nuclear weapons to be rid of them.”

For his part, the President suggested that Turkey could be “an important player in trying to move

Iran” in the direction of pursuing peaceful nuclear energy, while providing “assurances that it will

abide by international rules and norms.”77

In April 2010, during the Nuclear Security Summit in Washington, Secretary of State Hillary

Rodham Clinton advised Turkish officials that the amount of uranium to be deposited had to

increase because Iran had increased its stockpile and had launched the new program to enrich

uranium to 20%. It now had sufficient uranium to make a nuclear bomb with the 1,200 kg.

President Obama reportedly did not raise the subject during a meeting with Prime Minister

Erdogan and a letter that he wrote to Prime Minister Erdogan and Brazilian President Luiz Inacio

Lula da Silva on April 20th referred only to 1,200 kg and did not mention the need for Iran to end

enriching uranium. The Turkish and Brazilian leaders later cited the letter as the point of

Transcript of speech accessible via http://www.brookings.edu.

Minhac Celik, “Turkish Foreign Policy’s Double-edged Sword: Iran,” Sunday’s Zaman Online, January 10, 2010.

“Turkish PM Warns Against Attack on Iran,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, September 27, 2009, “Turkey Warns IAF

Against Using Airspace,” Jerusalem Post, December 9, 2009.

“Obama Sees Role for Turkey in Iran Dispute,” Reuters, December 8, 2009.

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reference for their diplomats.78 The Obama Administration would respond that his letter was not

intended as negotiating instructions and dealt only with the Tehran nuclear reactor, not all

concerns about Iran’s nuclear activities. 79

In May 2010, as the permanent members of the U.N. Security Council were finalizing a

resolution to enhance sanctions on Iran for failing to ensure that its nuclear program would be

used solely for peaceful purposes, the Iranian government invited Foreign Minister Davutoglu to

Tehran. On May 17, Turkey, Brazil, and Iran announced the Tehran Declaration, in which Iran

agreed to deposit 1,200 kg of low-enriched uranium in Turkey in exchange for receiving 120 kg

(264 pounds) of 20% enriched uranium to fuel the reactor used for medical purposes from the

Vienna Group (United States, Russia, France, and the IAEA) within one year.80 The Declaration

did not require Iran to suspend enriching its remaining uranium to 20%, and Iran immediately

said that it would continue enrichment. Iran was believed to possess in excess of 2,000 kg of

uranium and would still have enough uranium to produce a bomb after the deposit in Turkey. The

Declaration also gave Iran the option to withdraw the uranium from Turkey if it determines that

the arrangements were not respected, i.e., it did not receive the medical grade uranium. Turkish

officials, who did not share the Declaration with U.S. or other P5+1 counterparts before the

announcement, referred to conflicting U.S. messages as justification for the contents of the

Tehran Declaration and their subsequent actions.

Immediately after the Declaration announcement, Foreign Minister Davutoglu stated, “There is

no ground left for more sanctions and pressure” and asserted that President Obama’s multilateral

diplomacy and policy of engagement had motivated his efforts.81 His ministry heralded the

Declaration for creating a “new and important opportunity” to resume dialogue between Iran and

the international community. Turkey’s Ambassador to Washington Namik Tan described it as a

“confidence-building measure.”82 On May 24, Iran wrote to the Vienna Group, stating that it

would accept the uranium swap via Turkey.

Despite Turkey’s claims, Obama Administration officials charged that Iran was only seeking to

slow the momentum for sanctions and that the Declaration failed to address core issues.83 On May

18, Secretary Clinton announced an agreement with the other permanent members of the Security

Council to proceed with strong new sanctions against Iran. On June 17, 2010, Turkey voted

against U.N. Security Council Resolution 1929 which imposed enhanced sanctions on Iran,

thereby voting against its NATO and EU cohort. Turkish officials claimed that the vote was

necessary to ensure their “credibility” and the diplomatic process that they hoped would continue.

They further claimed that they could not abstain and at the same time assure the “validity” of the

Tehran Declaration. Finally, the officials also contended that their U.S. counterparts had not

Kadri Gursel, “Iran Notes – 1,” Milliyet Online, June 27, 2010, OSC Document GMP20100627742002.

U.S. State Department, “Background Briefing on Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts with Regard to Iran and the

Brazil/Turkey Agreement, May 28, 2010, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142375.htm.

The text of the Declaration was published by Mehr News Agency (Tehran), May 17, 2010, BBC Monitoring Middle

East.

“Iran Nuclear Fuel Swap to Take Place in Turkey, Ambiguity Prevails,” Zaman website, May 18, 2010, BBC

Monitoring European, “Turk FM Says All Countries have Right for Nuclear Power for Peaceful Purposes,” Anatolia,

May 18, 2010, OSC Document,

David E. Sanger and Michael Slackman, “U.S. is Skeptical on Iranian Deal for Nuclear Fuel,” New York Times, May

18, 2010. GMP20100518788001.

U.S. State Department, “Background Briefing,” op. cit.

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discussed the details of the sanctions with them before the vote, although the Administration said

it had worked with the full Security Council. 84

Secretary Clinton said that the United States “disagreed with their vote,” but added understanding

that Turkey (and Brazil) wanted to keep “the door open between themselves and Iran.”85 She and

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates expressed “disappointment” with Turkey’s vote. Gates added,

“Allies don’t always agree on things, but we move forward from here.”86 U.S. officials

subsequently encouraged Turkey to help Iran understand that the IAEA is the only channel for

action with the P5+1 regarding its nuclear program. On July 12, Secretary Clinton called Minister

Davutoglu to discuss the Iranian nuclear program. Her spokesman said, “what we have made

clear in our conversations with many countries is that this cannot be a situation of business as

usual. This is about the future of the world. This is about the danger of a nuclear arms race in the

Middle East….”87 Sharp criticism of Turkey’s Security Council vote among its Western allies

may have prompted Foreign Minister Davutoglu to emphasize Turkey’s “facilitating role” and to

that it was “not taking sides in this problem. We are only trying to help.”88

The official Turkish view of the Iran nuclear issue is narrow. Neither Prime Minister Erdogan nor

President Gul have publicly addressed the implications of a nuclear-armed Iran for Turkey’s own

regional power ambitions or the regional balance of power. Nor have they spoken about the

potential threat it might pose to Turkey, which may not be surprising given that, according to one

recent poll, 48% of Turks are not concerned about a nuclear-armed Iran.89 Neither mentions

Pakistan or India, both of which have not signed the NPT and have nuclear weapons, or Iran’s

long-range missile program. In private, some Turkish officials have expressed security concerns

about a nuclear-armed Iran and about the impact that it would have on the regional balance of

power. They note that Turkey is Iran’s closest neighbor and easily within range of its missiles—

even though Iran has not threatened Turkey. These concerns may have prompted Turkey’s

possible purchase of U.S. PATRIOT advanced capability (PAC-3) air defense missiles and

launchers.90 A Turkish company already is partnering with Raytheon to produce PATRIOTs to sell

to the United Arab Emirates, which presumably also wants the missiles for protection against

Iran.

Turkish government officials have said that they would abide by the U.N. sanctions, but not the

more sweeping sanctions that the United States and EU imposed subsequently. Prime Minister

Erdogan asserted, “we think further sanctions based on allegations and speculations (that Iran is

pursuing nuclear arms despite its denials) are unfair and no one can expect Turkey, which has

trouble-free relations and a long border with its eastern neighbor, to apply such restrictions.”91

State Background Briefing, op. cit.

Mark Landler, “Clinton Says Opponents of Penalties can Still Aid Diplomacy,” New York Times, June 10, 2010.

James Canter, “U.S. ‘Disappointed’ in Turkish Vote on Sanctions,” International Herald Tribune, June 12,, 2010.

“Clinton Discusses Iranian Nuclear Program with Davutoglu,” KUNA Online, July 12, 2010.

Sedat Ergin, “Retuning Turkey’s Role in Iran,” Hurriyet Online, July 31, 2010, OSC Document

GMP20100731742006.

GMFUS, Transatlantic Trends 2010, op.cit.

The U.S. Defense Security and Cooperation Agency (SCA) notified Congress of the possible PATRIOT anti-missile

system sale worth $7.8 billion on September 9, 2009. See DSCA press release at

http://www.dsca.mil/PressReleases/36-b/2009/Turkey_09-44.pdf. Russia and China are competing to sell similar

systems.

“Erdogan Deems Iran Sanctions Unfair,” Al-Manar TV Online, September 11, 2010, OSC Document

GMP20100911966037.

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Yet, faced with U.S., and not U.N., sanctions for supplying Iran with refined petroleum products

valued more than $1 million, the Turkish Petroleum Refineries Corporation (TUPRAS) sharply

curtailed gasoline shipments to Iran in July 2010, when exports dropped 74% from their June

level, and then decided in October to discontinue all activities in Iran’s energy sector.92 (TUPRAS

has been privatized and is no longer state-owned.) The Turkish Petroleum Company’s (TPAO)

investment plans for Iran also are considered vulnerable to U.S. sanctions. Turkish private

companies and banks are expected to stay engaged in Iran, although banks with U.S. shareholders

reportedly have cut back on their dealings.93 On September 16, Prime Minister Erdogan and

Iranian Vice President Reza Rahimi presided over a meeting of the Turkish-Iranian Business

Council at which a large group of businessmen, including Turkish investors, sought to bilateral

boost trade. Some of the Turks seek to benefit from reluctance of Arab financial partners to deal

with Iran because of sanctions.

Shared Concerns on Iraq

Ankara has made common cause with Tehran in seeking to preserve the territorial integrity of Iraq

in order to prevent its division into ethnic states that might serve as a model for separatists. Both

Turkey and Iran have separatist/terrorist foes who attack them from safe havens in northern

Iraq—the Kurdistan Workers Party (PKK) and the Party for a Free Life in Kurdistan (PJAK),

respectively—and carry out coordinated operations against their mutual and related Kurdish

terrorist threats.94

At the same time, Turkish officials have encouraged Iraqi Kurds to play a greater role in Baghdad

to help counter what the Turks fear might become excessive Iranian influence over a Shiite-led

Iraqi government.95 Ankara also may believe that greater involvement in the central government

might moderate the Iraqi Kurds’ separatist inclinations. After the March 2010, Iraqi national

elections, it reportedly wanted Iyad al Allawi’s Al Iraqiyah list, which Sunni Turkomen and other

Sunnis support, to head a new government. Turkish officials presented this stance as in line with

their advocacy of inclusion as a means to prevent sectarian violence and ensure peace in the

neighborhood, but it also would have served to mitigate the power of Prime Minister Nuri al

Maliki’s Shiite bloc. In the end, Ankara’s influence was minimal as Maliki was designated to

form another government.

Economic and Energy Relations

Turkish-Iranian relations have a very strong economic component. About 1.5 million Iranian

tourists visit Turkey annually, visa-free. Trade is growing and reached $10 billion annually in

“Turkey Exports Less Gasoline to Iran in July – data,” Reuters, September 1, 2010.

Louis Charbonneau, “Special Report: Tracking Iran’s Nuclear Money Trail to Turkey,” Reuters, September 20, 2010,

claimed that Turkey was allowing Iranian banks with suspected links to Tehran’s nuclear program to do business

within its borders, thereby perhaps giving them a safe haven that would enable them to elude sanctions. For example,

the article reported that Iran’s second largest bank operates branches in Istanbul, Ankara, and Izmir, although it is the

subject of U.S. and EU sanctions. Jay Solomon, Marc Champion, “U.S. Approaches Turkey on Iran Sanctions – Nation

Emerges as Possible Weak Link in International Campaign to Punish Tehran for its Nuclear Efforts,” Wall Street

Journal, October 20, 2010.

In 2009, PJAK was listed as a Specially Designated Terrorist Group under Executive Order 13224, which blocks

property and prohibits transactions with persons who commit, threaten to commit, or support terrorism.

Anonymous comments of Turkish official, April 20, 2009.

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2008, with Iranian exports of oil, oil products, and gas to Turkey accounting for $7.2 million of

the total.96 Although trade volume dropped to $5.5 billion in 2009 with the global economic

downturn, Turkey aims to increase it to $20 billion in 2011.97 Officials of both governments have

said that they hope to increase trade to $30 billion a year in the next few years.98 However, some

Turkish businesses have complained about Iran’s high tariff barriers and difficult investment

climate, noting that the Iranian parliament (majlis) disqualified Turkish companies from airport

and mobile phone contracts in 2004.

In 2007, Turkey and Iran signed a memorandum of understanding (MOU) for the state-run

Turkish Petroleum Corporation (TPAO) to be granted the right to develop natural gas fields in

South Pars, to extract up to 20 billion cubic meters (bcm) annually of additional gas, and to

transport it via a new 1,850 kilometer pipeline to Turkey. Turkey was to invest an estimated $3.5

billion and receive 50% of the gas produced. TPAO never finalized the South Pars deal and it was

cancelled. In April 2010, Iran announced that a domestic consortium would develop the fields.

A pipeline commissioned in 2001 carries natural gas from Tabriz to Ankara. (See “Energy” below,

for more on Nabucco and other pipelines.) Turkey and Iran have formed a joint company to

transfer the gas to Europe. However, the European partners in Nabucco (Hungary, Bulgaria,

Romania, Germany, and Austria) have declared, “No Iranian gas will be accepted unless the

nuclear problem is solved,” and U.S. Special Envoy for Eurasian Energy Ambassador Richard

Morningstar has stated, “At present, we do not support Iran’s participation in the project.”99

The AKP opposes all energy-related sanctions on Iran mainly because of Turkey’s energy needs.

However, AKP’s critics charge that Iran has never lived up to a contract to provide Turkey with

10 bcm annually, and that the maximum that Turkey has received is 6 bcm. International Energy

Agency figures support this assertion. The 6 bcm is less than Turkey’s liquefied natural gas

imports. Moreover, the Turkish Petroleum Pipeline Corporations (BOTAS) has a 15-year-old

“take or pay” agreement with the National Iranian Gas Company (NIGC) and, for the year ending

in March 2010, BOTAS imported only 26 bcm of gas daily, instead of 30 bcm as agreed, and had

to pay Iran a penalty of $600 million as a result. The agreement is in effect for another eight

years.

Other plans of economic value include an MOU to build three natural gas-fired power plants in

Iran and to import 3 to 6 billion kilowatt hours of electricity annually and for an ambitious new

road and rail transportation network to link the Turkish Black Sea port of Trabzon and the Iranian

Persian Gulf port of Bandar Abbas, and to establish a free industrial zone on their border.

Barcin Yinanc and Mustafa Oguz, “Turkey Rolls its Diplomatic Dice,” Turkish Daily News, August 14, 2008.

“Turkey Willing to Increase Trade with Iran,” Anatolia, March 19, 2010.

“Iran, Turkey Keen to Boost Trade Exchange,” Xinhua News Agency, October 28, 2009.

.“Austria Says Turkey’s Position in Nabucco Limited,” Turkish Daily News, May 23, 2008 and “Turkish Minister, US

Envoy Discuss Gas Pipeline Project,” Anatolia, June 4, 2009.

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European Union100

Turkey first expressed its aspiration to join the European Union (actually, its predecessor, the

European Economic Community) in the 1960’s, when it concluded an association agreement. It

applied for membership in 1987. An EU-Turkey customs union was achieved in 1995. During its

first few years in power, the AKP pursued an ambitious agenda of reforms intended to prompt the

EU to begin accession negotiations, and it succeeded when Turkey officially became a candidate

for membership in 2005. The AKP appeared to view the EU as a means to prove that that party

was not Islamist and for protection against secularist forces seeking its possible closure. The EU’s

requirements for membership also served to justify AKP’s efforts to assert greater civilian control

over the military.

However, Turkey began accession talks with the EU in October 2005 under a framework that

does not ensure eventual full membership, although no country has heretofore gone through the

accession process without membership as a goal. The lack of clarity about the end game derived

from the long struggle over whether Turkey should be allowed to join the Union. Many EU

citizens and leaders remain wary of Turkey’s possible accession given its large population,

relatively poor economy (that is now improving rapidly), and Muslim culture. There has been a

parallel drop in enthusiasm for the EU in Turkey in part as a result of statements by European

leaders who strongly oppose Turkey’s eventual EU membership, notably German Chancellor

Angela Merkel and French President Nicolas Sarkozy.101 Sarkozy and Merkel have suggested

offering Turkey a “special relationship” or “privileged partnership” with the EU in lieu of

membership. They have not defined these terms, which may not mean much more than the

customs union Turkey has enjoyed with the EU since 1995.

For its part, the European Commission, the EU’s executive, champions Turkey’s membership

more than some member states and has emphasized why the EU is engaged in the accession

process with Turkey. It highlights Turkey’s role in regional conflict management, its importance

as an energy hub, and its significance to the dialogue among Western and Muslim civilizations.

Turkey and the EU have opened negotiations on 13 out of 35 chapters of the acquis

communautaire (body of EU laws and regulations) that candidates must conclude and implement

before accession, but provisionally closed (completed) only one. Negotiations continue. However,

in November 2006, the EU suspended negotiations on eight chapters due to Turkey’s refusal to

open its ports and airports to Cypriot ships and planes; the EU maintains this is required by the

2005 Ankara Protocol extending Turkey’s customs union with the EU to new members of the EU,

which included Cyprus. The EU also declared that no further chapters would be closed until

Turkey meets the requirements regarding Cyprus. The EU sees Turkey’s position as contravening

EU requirements for the free movement of goods, although some Turkish officials argue that the

airport/seaport issue involves services which are not part of the customs union. Mainly, Ankara

100

For a particularly cogent analysis, see Sinan Ulgen, “Turkish Politics and the Fading Magic of European

Enlargement,” Center for European Reform, September 2010.

101

Eurobarometer found 45% of Turks surveyed supported EU membership in December 2009, “Support for EU

Membership Drops in Turkey,” Anatolia, December 14, 2009. That figure is within the margin of error of a domestic

Turkish poll which reported 49.% support in January 2010, “Davutoglu Most Successful Turkish Minister, Says Poll,”

Hurriyet Daily News.com, January 14, 2010. However, the annual GMFUS Transatlantic Trends survey, released on

September 15, 2010, found that only 38% of Turks agreed that “Turkey Joining the EU Would be a Good Thing.”

Survey accessible via http://www.gmfus.org.

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insists that the EU keep its promise to end the “isolation” of predominantly Turkish Cypriot

northern Cyprus before Turkey takes actions benefitting Greek Cypriots, who control the

internationally recognized government of Cyprus but only the territory of the southern two-thirds

of the island. The European Commission insists that there is no linkage between the EU promise

and Turkey’s commitments under the Ankara Protocol, and notes that EU assistance to northern

Cyprus has increased and that the EU has facilitated trade between the north and south of Cyprus.

(More on “Cyprus,” below.) It is highly unlikely that Turkey would be able to join the EU without

a political settlement on the divided island of Cyprus.

Cyprus itself has put a hold on five additional chapters, including the critical energy chapter, and

France has put a hold on opening five chapters (one of which is the same as the EU hold) that it

views as most related to full membership in the EU, such as security and defense and energy,

because, as noted above, the current French government opposes membership for Turkey. Foreign

Minister Bernard Kouchner has indicated that France would support the opening of the remaining

three chapters that can still be negotiated. Nonetheless, a total of 18 chapters cannot be opened as

a result of EU, Cypriot, and French holds.

Aside from the Cyprus issue, the EU has demanded that Turkey carry out many reforms,

including constitutional changes to ensure an independent judiciary, tighter civilian control over

the military, greater guarantees of freedom of expression, and more protections and freedom for

religious and ethnic minorities. The so-called Ergenekon investigation102 into alleged coup plots

in Turkey led the European Commission to emphasize the need to follow due process and rule of

law. The Commission praises the reforms that Turkey has undertaken so far, but finds them

insufficient. EU Enlargement Commissioner Stefan Fule welcomed changes to the Turkish

constitution approved in a September 12, 2010 referendum as a “step in the right direction” and

said that he looked forward to a completely new constitution that would provide “a solid base for

a sustained development of democracy in Turkey, in line with European standards and the EU

accession criteria.”103 In its November 9, 2010, annual assessment of Turkey’s progress toward

membership, the Commission concluded that the constitutional amendments created “conditions

for progress in a number of areas,” but criticized the ruling party’s monopoly of and nonconsultative approach to the amendment process. It urged greater effort to improve fundamental

rights and freedoms for journalists, non-Muslim religious communities, the Alevi, Kurds, and

women. 104 To the Turkish Foreign Ministry’s displeasure, it also again emphasized the Cyprus

issue. The Commission noted that Turkey’s foreign policy had become more active in its wider

neighborhood and was an asset for the EU. Yet, it called on Turkey to coordinate its foreign

policy more with the EU, expressing concern about Turkey’s failure to support U.N. Security

Council sanctions on Iran and about its relations with Israel and Armenia.

Turkish supporters of EU membership have become dismayed since 2005, believing that the AKP

has given EU membership a lower priority after achieving the start of accession talks. The AKP’s

reform program lost momentum even as the government adopted a new national program and

revamped bureaucracies responsible for integrating with the EU. Some analysts attributed that

102

For a discussion of Ergenekon, see CRS Report R41368, Turkey: Politics of Identity and Power, by Carol

Migdalovitz.

103

Sebnem Arsu, “Turkey Sets Its Sights on a Whole New Constitution,” International Herald Tribune, September 14,

2010.

104

“Key Findings of the 2010 Progress Report on Turkey,”

http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=memo/10/562.

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presumed change to AKP’s disenchantment with the EU after the unrelated European Court of

Human Rights (ECHR) upheld a ban on wearing headscarves at Turkish universities on

November 10, 2005. (The AKP has Islamist roots.) The lack of consistent attention to the

membership issue was underscored when then-Foreign Minister Babacan decided not to give up

his portfolio as EU negotiator when he became foreign minister in 2007. Although technically he

played both roles, Turkey lacked a full-time EU negotiator for some time. In 2007, President Gul

indirectly criticized the government by urging it to “hasten” the reform process. He said,

“Integration with the EU is a state policy and a strategic decision. But it cannot run at an idle

speed.... The reform process cannot be in tatters.”105 In their defense, AKP officials note that

Turkey held four elections in 2007 and that the ruling party also had to fight a suit to ban it from

politics. So its priorities were perforce different. European Commission responded by criticizing

the government for failing to develop a comprehensive reform plan despite the strong mandate it

had won in the July 2007 national election. In its view, the delay engendered by the 2007

elections no longer justified the inattention.

In January 2009, in advance of a trip to Brussels, Belgium, where the EU is headquartered, Prime

Minister Erdogan finally appointed Egeman Bagis, a close associate, as EU negotiator. Yet, as one

astute observer suggests, the AKP no longer considers the EU anchor vital for its survival.106

Moreover, it has been selective in the political changes it has chosen to enact, focusing on those

that enhance the party’s power such as reducing the political role of the military and increasing

executive control over the judiciary. Meanwhile, the AKP has neglected reforms that the EU

requires for greater democratization such as revision of the political parties law, lowering the 10%

of the vote threshold for parties to enter parliament, and protecting press freedom.

The AKP government, at least rhetorically, portrays its EU vocation as part of its regional foreign

policy, suggesting that Turkey is the link between its region and Europe and that Europe should

be eager to exploit Turkey’s geostrategic position. Yet, under Foreign Minister Davutoglu, it has

paid more attention to regional affairs than to Brussels. Moreover, Turkey’s growing foreign

policy independence and ties to Iran have strained its relations with the EU, leading some in the

European Parliament to call on Ankara to further coordinate its foreign policy with the EU,

particularly regarding Iran, even before the November 2010 progress report.107

At the same time, prominent voices in the AKP have been questioning whether Turkey still needs

the EU. Deputy Chairman of parliament’s foreign affairs committee Suat Kiniklioglu has

suggested that Turkey’s “economy is strong enough to do without a union that is struggling with

its own financial problems” and claimed Turkey’s reforms would continue without outside

impetus because there are strong domestic forces behind them. 108 Turks who are not in the

government question why their dynamic, forward-looking homeland should “end up shackled to

an economy with severe debt, financial instability, and an uncompetitive workforce.”109 As one

scholar noted, “The Turkish wish to join the EU was always driven mainly by economic reasons

105

“EU Reforms are the Best Remedy for Post-Case Era,” Turkish Daily News, August 4, 2008, citing Hasan Cemal

interview with President Gul.

106

Ulgen, op. cit.

107

Dondu Sariisik, “EU to Ask Turkey to Adopt ‘More European Iran Policy,’” Hurriyet Daily News. com, November

25, 2009.

108

Joost Lagendik, “Is the EU Still Important to the AKP?” Hurriyet Daily News.com, June 16, 2010.

109

Colin Freeman, “Turkey Goes Cold on Joining EU,” Sunday Telegraph, July 11, 2010.

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rather than ideological reasons. Turks never cared about being European.”110 In November 2010,

President Gul, probably reflecting public sentiment, suggested that, “Maybe, when the time

comes, the Turks will say ‘we have fulfilled the reforms, we have upgraded the standards to EU

level, this is enough for us’ and maybe will not feel the need to become a member of the

union.”111

Some government officials feed popular discontent with the EU with complaints that European

countries are not providing sufficient assistance to the fight against the Kurdistan Workers Party

(PKK), whose major funding sources are in Europe. The German Marshall Fund’s 2010

Transatlantic Trends report found that only 38% of Turks still favored joining the EU, down from

73% in 2004, while European support for Turkey’s membership fell from 29% to 23%. The

mutual discontent with the protracted process is real.

While the accession process plays out toward its unknown end, Turkey continues to receive

considerable EU financial assistance that is programmed to rise in the coming years. The aid is

intended to prepare Turkey for membership. Major aid categories include transition assistance

and institution building, cross border cooperation, regional development, human resources

development, and rural development.

Table 1. European Union Assistance to Turkey

Year

2009

Amount (in Millions)

€566.4 or $753.2

2010

€653.7 or $869.3

2011

€781.9 or $1,039.7

2012

€899.5 or $1,196.1

2013

€935.5 or $1,244

Source: European Commission, http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/candidate-countries/turkey/financialassistance/index-en.htm.

Successive U.S. Administrations, of both political persuasions, have supported Turkey in its

efforts to achieve EU membership in order to anchor Turkey more firmly in the West and

encourage its democratization. Some Members of Congress seek to use Turkey’s EU ambitions as

a way to get it to meet EU standards as soon as possible. For example, S. Res. 615, introduced on

July 17, 2008, urged the government of Turkey to respect the religious freedoms of the

Ecumenical Patriarchate of the Orthodox Christian Church, who has his seat in Istanbul. It noted

that the EU requires candidates to guarantee the human rights of religious minorities, who in

Turkey include Greek Orthodox believers.

In June 2010, after Turkey voted against enhanced U.N. Security Council sanctions on Iran in

opposition to its NATO and EU cohort, Secretary of Defense Gates blamed “some in Europe

110

Prof. Birol Baskan, on Al Jazeera TV, quoted in David Poort, “Turks Cool to EU Membership,” McClatchy-Tribune

Business News, September 16, 2010. This may be a reinterpretation of history as Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, founder of

the modern Turkish Republic viewed being European as the same as modern and modeled his reforms on European

laws and actions.

111 “

Turkish President’s Exclusive Interview with BBC Turkish Service,” Anatolia, November 8, 2010.

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refusing to give Turkey the kind of organic link to the West that Turkey sought…. (W)e have to

think long and hard about what we might be able to do to … make the stronger linkages with the

West more apparently of interest and value to Turkey’s leaders.”112

AKP critics, however, argue that the European Union is not to blame for stalling the accession

process. Rather, they put the responsibility squarely on the AKP, which they maintain does not

“share the dream of a liberal, Western Turkey” and is only using the accession process to gain

legitimacy and curb the power of the secular military.113 Other scholars note that Turkey’s EU

entry is at least 10 to 20 years away, and the main impediments to Turkey’s accession are Cyprus,

the Kurdish question, and weak rule of law. Instead of blaming the EU, they suggest that U.S.

policymakers push the Turks to reform by aligning “itself with Turkish and European advocates

of change and help transform Turkey into a more tolerant and democratic society. Only then is

EU membership likely.”114

Cyprus115

Cyprus is divided between the internationally recognized Republic of Cyprus, which is

administered by Greek Cypriots and controls approximately the southern two-thirds of the island,

and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, which is administered by Turkish Cypriots and

controls the remaining third of the island. The ethnic division of the island occurred after

Turkey’s invasion in 1974 in response to a Greek-sponsored coup there. (Turkey maintains that it

legally intervened under the terms of 1960 treaties to protect the Turkish Cypriots, its ethnic kin.)

Since 1977, the U.N. has made many attempts to reunite Cyprus, but none has succeeded.

Prospects for a Cyprus settlement appeared to improve for the first time in years after March 21,

2008, when (Greek) Cypriot President Dimitris Christofias and Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet

Ali Talat met and agreed to establish working groups and technical committees to prepare for new

negotiations on a settlement that would reunify the island, which has been divided since 1974.

The two leaders subsequently decided to begin negotiations on September 3.

Many Greek Cypriots, however, believed that Talat would not be able to conclude a settlement

without the approval of Ankara, where key constituencies might not agree to the compromises

needed. The AKP strongly supported Talat in 2004, when Turkish Cypriots approved and the

Greek Cypriots rejected the last U.N. plan for reunifying Cyprus (the so-called Annan Plan). AKP

leaders may have been disillusioned by their failure to achieve positive results with the bold

moves they took in 2004, when they ceded considerable power to draft a settlement plan to the

United Nations. Meanwhile, entrenched foreign ministry bureaucrats and the Turkish military

oppose aspects of a settlement. For example, the Greek Cypriots call for the withdrawal of the

approximately 30,000 Turkish soldiers from the island and oppose renewing the 1960 treaties that

gave Turkey certain rights to intervene in Cyprus. On March 29, 2008, then-Chief of the Turkish

General Staff, General Yasar Buyukanit, visited northern Cyprus and stated, “Our soldiers are

here for the security of the Turkish Cypriots and they will continue to be here. Reaching an

112

“Gates Slams EU Over Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, June 10, 2010.

Soner Cagaptay, “Turkey Lost Turkey,” Wall Street Journal, July 13, 2010.

114

Henri Barkey, “Turkey Does an About-Face,” Los Angeles Times, July 20, 2010.

115

For history of the events leading to the division of the island and earlier efforts to achieve a settlement, see CRS

Report RL33497, Cyprus: Status of U.N. Negotiations and Related Issues, by Carol Migdalovitz.

113

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agreement is not enough alone for withdrawal of (Turkish) soldiers from Cyprus.... We should see

how safe Turkish Cypriots are. We should believe they are safe.”116 Then, on April 11, then-Land

Forces Commander General Ilker Basbug asserted that Cyprus is an issue concerning the security

of Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus. Therefore, he said, the 1960 Treaties of

Guarantee and Alliance, which grant Turkey rights regarding Cyprus, should not be diluted. 117.

After the Turkish Cypriot February 2010 election of right-wing nationalist “President” Dervis

Eroglu, who maintains that two founding states should create a new Cyprus as opposed to the

Greek Cypriot insistence that the current Republic of Cyprus would continue, the AKP

government convinced him to stay at the negotiating table with the Talat-Christofias framework.

Prime Minister Erdogan attempted to change the dynamic by influencing the views of the Greek

Cypriots in March 2010, when he gave his first interview to Greek Cypriot journalists. He said

that he had no hidden agendas and wanted to find a just and lasting solution to the Cyprus

problem. In answer to the question of whether he was prepared to withdraw Turkish troops from

the island, Erdogan responded that Turkey would honor any agreement agreed to by both

communities. However, the (Greek) Cypriot government dismissively called on him “to move

from words to deeds.”118 Eroglu and his Turkish brethren have called for a solution by the end of

the year and for an international conference to accelerate the talks. Turkey insists that Turkish

Cypriot leaders have status equal to Greek Cypriot leaders at any eventual conference, according

to Foreign Minister Davutoglu, but the Greek Cypriots reject that notion. 119

The lack of a resolution to the Cyprus dispute also has been a vexing impediment to closer EUNATO security cooperation. In 2003, the EU and NATO reached a comprehensive package of

agreements known as Berlin Plus to govern EU use of NATO planning support, assets, and other

capabilities.120 It stipulated that EU member states which are not NATO members must be

members of NATO’s Partnership for Peace (PfP) to participate in NATO-EU consultations.

Cyprus is not a member of NATO or of the PfP and became an EU member in 2004. Cyprus and

other EU members then argued that it should not be treated differently from other EU countries

and that should be allowed to participate in EU-NATO cooperation on issues such as terrorism.

Turkey has blocked Cyprus from reaching a security agreement with NATO that would allow

Cypriot participation, and it refuses to allow the sharing of NATO intelligence and resources with

the EU. Meanwhile, Cyprus has not allowed Turkey to participate in the fledgling European

Defense Agency (EDA). Some of Turkey’s European NATO partners, notably Germany, France,

and Britain, have expressed concern about the effect Turkey’s obstruction is having on

cooperation between NATO and the EU in Afghanistan.

The United States has had a long-standing policy of support for U.N. efforts to achieve a

settlement to reunify the island of Cyprus and at times has had a State Department Special

Coordinator for the issue. The Bush and Obama Administrations did not appoint a coordinator

and rely on a deputy assistant secretary of state and on the U.S. Ambassador in Nicosia. The Bush

116

“Military Gives Support for Cyprus Peace,” Turkish Daily News, March 27, 2008, and “Turkish Chief of Staff says

Agreement on Cyprus not Enough for Troops to Pull Out,” Anatolia, March 29, 2008, BBC Monitoring European.

117

“General Basbug Says Cyprus Issue is a Problem Concerning the Security of Turkey and the TRNC,” BRTK

(Bayrak Radio and Television Corporation (of northern Cyprus)), April 11, 2008, OSC Document

GMP20080411017006.

118

Stefanos Evripidou, “Politicians Dismiss Erdogan’s Friendship Offensive,” Cyprus Mail, March 3, 2010.

119

Serkan Demirtas, “Turkey Renews Call for Cyprus Conference,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, July 6, 2010.

120

For details of Berlin Plus, see www.nato.int/shape/news/2003/shape_eu/se030822a.htm.

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Administration praised the efforts of President Christofias and Mr. Talat to reach an agreement

and welcomes their “ownership” of the process. It did not comment on the caution voiced by

Turkish military and political leaders.

Some Members of Congress also support the Christofias-Talat talks, and have criticized Turkey’s

role on the island. For example, H.Res. 1631, agreed to by voice vote on September 28, 2010,

calls for the protection of religious sites and artifacts from and in Turkish-occupied areas of

northern Cyprus as well as general respect for religious freedom; and it urges Turkey to take

specified actions toward that end.

Armenia

Bilateral Relations

Turkey recognized Armenia’s independence from the former Soviet Union in 1991, but did not

establish diplomatic relations. It also supported Armenia’s integration in international

organizations. Armenia has a representative to the Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization

headquartered in Istanbul and has held the six-month rotating presidency of that organization.

However, Turkey closed its land border with Armenia in 1993 in response to an Armenian

military offensive against Azerbaijanis in and near the predominantly Armenian-populated region

of Nagorno Karabakh of Azerbaijan. 121 The Azerbaijanis are close ethnic kin of the Turks, and

Turkey has significant energy ties to Azerbaijan.122 Therefore, Ankara sympathizes with and pays

attention when Azerbaijan objects to any warming in relations between Turkey and Armenia

before the Nagorno Karabakh issue is resolved. 123

As preconditions for normalizing relations with Armenia, Ankara demanded that Yerevan

abandon efforts to gain international recognition of the 1915 “genocide,” renounce claims to

Turkish territory (areas that the Soviet Union ceded to Turkey in the 1921 Treaty of Kars), and

withdraw from Nagorno Karabakh. Despite the border closing, Turkey claims that it does not

impose an embargo on Armenia as Armenians charge because there are direct flights between

Turkish cities and Yerevan, and Armenia has open borders with Iran and Georgia. Illicit trade

between the two neighbors via Iran and Georgia is believed to be substantial. In addition, Turkish

officials note that more than 40,000 Armenians work (many illegally) in Turkey. The economic

harm of the border closure on Armenia is difficult to gauge. 124 Armenia seeks the establishment of

diplomatic relations and the opening of the border without preconditions.

In 2005, in a letter to then-Armenian President Robert Kochariyan, Prime Minister Erdogan

offered to set up a joint commission of historians to investigate the events of 1915. Armenians

refer to the 1915 events as their national genocide and reject investigations as questioning or

121

Azerbaijan may be Turkey’s closest ally. The Azerbaijanis are close ethnic kin of the Turks and lucrative gas and oil

pipelines from Azerbaijan transit Turkey.

122

The Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) oil pipeline and the Baku-Tblisi-Erzurum gas pipeline are major energy projects

benefiting both countries. The planned Nabucco gas pipeline would be another.

123

See CRS Report RL33453, Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia: Political Developments and Implications for U.S.

Interests, by Jim Nichol for more on the Nagorno Karabakh conflict.

124

Armenia registered an estimated gross domestic product growth rate of 13.8% in 2007 and 6.8% in 2008. The rate

fell an estimated -15% in 2009 as Armenia experienced a recession mainly due to the global financial crisis which

produced a sharp drop in remittances and in the construction sector. CIA, World Factbook, February 4, 2010.

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denying the genocide, but Armenian officials say that Turkish recognition of the genocide is not a

precondition for diplomatic relations. Some Armenians, particularly those in the diaspora, suggest

that an investigation implies doubt about or denial that there was a genocide and they oppose a

commission. The Turkish government has consistently denied that there was a genocide.

Beginning in 2008, hope for an improvement in relations developed. That April, Prime Minister

Erdogan sent a letter of congratulations to new Armenian Prime Minister Tigran Sargsyan on his

appointment. He said that “building good neighborly relations through a dialogue” is a top

priority. 125 Erdogan emphasized that earlier proposals remained on the table, referring to his 2005

offer to President Kochariyan to set up a joint commission and to accept any conclusion reached.

Sargsyan responded by expressing his government’s readiness for a dialogue.126

In July 2008, Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan called on Turkey to establish normal political

relations to enable the creation of “a commission to comprehensively discuss all of the complex

issues affecting Armenia and Turkey,” contending that only through structured relations and an

effective dialogue could the “most contentious historical issues” be dealt with. He invited

President Gul to attend a World Cup qualifying match between the Armenian and Turkish

national soccer teams in Yerevan on September 6. Armenia also established a visa-free regime for

the entry of Turkish fans for the match.

In the aftermath of the Russia-Georgia conflict of August 2008, Prime Minister Erdogan proposed

a Caucasian Stability and Cooperation Platform and discussed it with Russian, Georgian and

Azerbaijani leaders. Erdogan stated that the Platform would target regional peace and security,

economic cooperation and energy security, be based on the principles of the Organization for

Security Cooperation in Europe, and include a mechanism for problem-solving and management,

although the contours of the Platform remained vague and lacked substance. The Prime Minister

stated that talks also would be held with Armenia, and the Armenian foreign minister welcomed

this statement and declared that Yerevan would support the Platform. However, Azerbaijani

officials said that they would not cooperate with Armenia in any umbrella organization until its

troops withdraw from their territory.

Some analysts have suggested that Turkey sought the warming of Armenian-Turkish relations as a

message to Washington as well as Yerevan, with the intent of impeding congressional or

presidential recognition of the genocide. It also would bolster Turkey’s regional power ambitions.

The United States seeks a reconciliation between Armenia and Turkey in order to strengthen

stability in the Caucasus. Then-Assistant Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs

Daniel Fried called on Armenia to acknowledge the existing border with Turkey and disavow any

claim on its territory, while calling on Turkey “to come to terms with a dark chapter in its

history,” i.e., the period which the Armenian’s refer to as their genocide. 127 U.S. Democratic and

Republican administrations have never used the term genocide to describe the events of 1915 so

as not to offend Turkey.

125

“Armenia, Turkey Express Desire to Normalise Bilateral Relations,” ITAR-TASS, April 27, 2008.

126

Reports of secret bilateral Turkish-Armenian talks in Switzerland have not been confirmed, but such talks are noted

in Richard Giragosian, “Armenia and the New Turkish Proposal,” Turkish Daily News, August 22, 2008.

127

Testimony before the House Foreign Affairs Committee, “The Caucasus: Frozen Conflicts and Closed Borders,”

June 18, 2008.

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Washington was not informed before Prime Minister Erdogan proposed Caucasian Stability and

Cooperation Platform, although it had long urged Ankara and Yerevan to improve their relations.

While visiting Turkey, Senator Richard Lugar, ranking member of the Foreign Relations

Committee, said that he expected discussion of the proposed platform to be postponed until

Russian troops completely withdrew from Georgia.128 In the end, nothing appeared to develop

from the Platform proposal.

On April 22, 2009, apparently culminating two years of secret talks, the Turkish, Armenian, and

Swiss foreign ministries simultaneously issued a brief statement announcing that Turkey and

Armenia had agreed on a “comprehensive framework for the normalization of their bilateral

relations.”129 The agreement did not ameliorate the intractable issues that continue to prevent

normalization. President Sargsyan insisted that Azerbaijan and Nagorno Karabakh had not been

discussed with the Turks and that the establishment of relations with Turkey would not affect

international recognition of the genocide. 130 The Azerbaijani Foreign Ministry released a

statement saying that “the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations must proceed in parallel

with the withdrawal of Armenian troops from the occupied lands of Azerbaijan.” In particular,

Baku vehemently opposed Turkey’s opening of its border with Armenia before the Nagorno

Karabakh issue is resolved. Prime Minister Erdogan sympathetically asserted, “there is a need to

lift the occupation so that we can take our steps comfortably. Otherwise, we would do wrong to

our brothers in Azerbaijan.”131

Nonetheless, on August 31, 2009, the foreign ministries of Armenia, Turkey, and Switzerland

jointly announced a plan to guide the establishment and development of relations between

Armenia and Turkey. They stated that Turkey and Armenia had agreed, with the help of Swiss

mediators, to begin internal political consultations on a Protocol on the Establishment of

Diplomatic Relations and a Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations. 132 The

consultations were to be completed within six months; then the protocols would be signed and

submitted to the respective parliaments for ratification. Foreign Minister Davutoglu and

Armenian Foreign Minister Edward Nalbandian signed the protocols in Zurich on October 10,

2009, in the presence of Secretary of State Clinton and Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov.

The Protocol on the Development of Bilateral Relations called for the opening of the border

between Armenia and Turkey within two months after it enters into force. As noted, Turkey

closed the common land border in 1993 in response to what it viewed as a harsh Armenian

offensive against Azerbaijanis in the conflict over the Azerbaijani territory of Nagorno Karabakh.

Armenians eventually seized and still hold all of Nagorno Karabakh and seven surrounding

Azerbaijani provinces (rayons). Azerbaijan demands that Turkey not reopen the border until the

Karabakh issue is solved.

128

“US Senator Hopes for Turkish Caucasus Plan Postponement until Russian Pullout,” Anatolia, August 26, 2008,

BBC Monitoring European, August 27, 2008.

129

Text of statement available on the websites of the Armenian and Turkish Foreign Ministries.

130

“Armenian Leader Denies Accord with Turkey to Stop Genocide Recognition,” Public Television of Armenia, April

25, 2009, BBC Monitoring Central Asia, April 26, 2009.

131

Cansu Camlibel and Vercihan Ziflioglu, “Armenian FM Nalbandian Last-Minute Arrival Sign of ‘Discomfort,’”

Hurriyet Daily News.com, April 6, 2009.

132

The Protocols are available on the websites of the Armenian and Turkish Foreign Ministries foreign ministries.

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The signing ceremony had to be rescued after Nalbandian wanted to give a statement referring to

the Armenian genocide and Davutoglu wanted one to refer to Nagorno Karabakh. Minister

Lavrov and Secretary Clinton managed to have the ceremony proceed without statements.

President Sargsyan attended a soccer match in Turkey four days later. However, shortly after the

ceremony, he declared that relations with Turkey could not call into question the genocide and

Prime Minister Erdogan insisted that relations with Armenia could not develop without the end of

the occupation of Nagorno Karabakh and made it a precondition for ratification. Their views have

not changed as of the date of this report.

The Protocol on Developing Bilateral Relations also calls for “a dialogue on the historical

dimension with the aim to restore mutual confidence, including an impartial scientific

examination of the historical records and archives to define existing problems and formulate

recommendations.” Although this statement does not mention the genocide, it provoked the

withdrawal of the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF), an Armenian political party which

is related to the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA), an active U.S. lobby, from

the Armenian government and the launching of its campaign against ratification. ARF argues that

the protocols unacceptably undermine international recognition of the genocide, legitimize the

current border between Armenia and Turkey (thereby denying ARF’s territorial claims to eastern

Turkey, which it refers to as Western Armenia), and link the normalization of relations between

Armenian and Turkey with a resolution of the Nagorno Karabakh issue (for which ARF opposes

territorial concessions).

In January 2010, the Armenian Constitutional Court issued an opinion which reinforced Turkey’s

reluctance to ratify the protocols. The Court ruled that the obligations stipulated in the protocols

do conform to the Constitution of the Republic of Armenia.133 However, it also found that they

cannot be interpreted or applied in a way that would contradict the Preamble to the Constitution

of the Republic of Armenia or Paragraph 11 of the Declaration of Independence. The Preamble is

a general statement of values. Paragraph 11 states, “The Republic of Armenia stands in support of

the task of achieving international recognition of the 1915 Genocide in Ottoman Turkey and

Western Armenia.” This part of the opinion outraged Turkey. After heated official statements, the

Turkish parliament requested clarification from Yerevan about the effect of the Court’s opinion.

Turkish officials say that no clarification has been received. Foreign Minister Davutoglu claimed

that the Court interpretation contradicts the Protocols’ “essence and substance.”

The Obama Administration viewed the Court decision as a “positive step toward normalization”

because it permits the Protocols “to move forward toward parliamentary ratification and does not

appear to limit or qualify them in any way,” according to Assistant Secretary of State for

European and Eurasian Affairs Philip Gordon. 134

In February 2010, President Sargsyan submitted the Protocols to parliament for ratification, but

said that it would only act after Turkey’s legislators did so. Ten days later, the Armenian

parliament passed a bill to allow the suspension or termination of signed international

agreements, i.e., the Protocols, before they enter into force. The action was said to be in response

to Erdogan’s linking of the Protocols to the Karabakh issue. Ankara has not proceeded with

133

For text of the Constitution, see the website of the National Assembly of Armenia at

http://www.parliament.am/parliament.php?id=constitution&lang=eng.

134

“U.S. Praises Armenian High Court Ruling on Turkish Protocols,” Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty (hereafter

RFE/RL), January 25, 2010.

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ratification. According to Foreign Minister Nalbandian, negotiations “were finalized by the

signature of the protocols,” so no new round is needed and the final step in the normalization

process is ratification.135

On June 19, 2010, there was an unpleasant reminder of the instability of the regional situation due

to the unsettled Karabakh conflict. Despite the cease fire, a skirmish resulted in the deaths of four

Armenians and an Azerbaijani soldier. The incident did not spark a greater conflict. The

Organizations for Security Cooperation in Europe’s (OECD) Minsk Group, i.e., the United States,

France, and Russia, have unsuccessfully tried to resolve the Karabakh dispute since 1992. Turkey

is a member of the OECD, but not the Minsk Group. Additional unexpected incidents may occur

unless there is a settlement.

Genocide Issue

Turkish Foreign Davutoglu has stated that foreign, “third party,” efforts to recognize the genocide

“will make this normalization impossible” and it may be a complicating factor.136 Members of

Congress have repeatedly introduced resolutions to urge Administrations of both political parties

to recognize the Armenian genocide in some way. In the 110th Congress, H.Res. 106, introduced

on January 30, 2007, sought to have the President affirm the “U.S. record relating to the

Armenian Genocide.” The House Committee on Foreign Affairs approved the resolution by a

vote of 27-21 on October 10, 2007, with more than half of the Members of the House listed as cosponsors at some point. However, after officials of the Bush and past Administrations expressed

fear that the resolution might detrimentally affect U.S. forces in Iraq, who depend on cargo

transiting Turkey, about two dozen Members withdrew as co-sponsors and a possible majority in

support of the resolution may have been lost. On October 25, 2007, key supporters of the

resolution requested the Speaker not to bring it to a vote.137

The 111th Congress also took up the issue. On March 4, 2010, the House Foreign Affairs

Committee narrowly approved H.Res. 252 by a vote of 23-22.138 The resolution made a number

of historical “findings” about the Ottoman Empire’s actions against its Armenian citizens during

the period from 1915 to 1923 and about past U.S., U.N., and other statements about those actions.

It then called on the President to

(1) ensure that the foreign policy of the United States reflects appropriate understanding

and sensitivity concerning issues related to human rights, ethnic cleansing, and genocide

documented in the United States record relating to the Armenian Genocide and the

consequences of the failure to realize a just resolution; and

(2) accurately characterize the systematic and deliberate annihilation of 1,500,000

Armenians and genocide in his annual message commemorating the Armenian genocide

issued on or about April 24….

135

Edward Nalbandian, “Turkey has Gone Back on its Word: Armenia’s Foreign Minister Says Ankara Needs to Prove

its Good Intentions,” Wall Street Journal, October 11, 2010.

136

Sebnem Arsu and Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkey Criticizes House Committee Vote on Armenian Killings,” New York

Times, March 6, 2010.

137

Richard Simon, “Sponsors Delay Genocide Vote,” Los Angeles Times, October 25, 2007.

138

In the Senate, S. Res. 316, introduced on October 21, 2009, but not voted on in committee, would have the same

effect.

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S. Res. 316, a parallel measure, was introduced and referred to the Committee on Foreign

Relations on October 21, 2009. No further action was taken.

Turkish officials maintain that the Armenian deaths were the result of civil conflicts

accompanying the end of World War I and the demise of the Ottoman Empire. They note that

many Muslims died in those conflicts as well and adamantly deny that Armenians were victims of

a genocide. Members of a multiparty Turkish parliamentary delegation who visited Washington to

witness the vote said that they would not take up ratification of the Protocols or support opening

the border until the Karabakh issue is resolved. 139

In response to the Committee’s vote, the Turkish government took several actions. First, it

recalled Ambassador Namik Tan from Washington until, as the Prime Minister said, it got a “clear

sign” on the fate of the resolution. Ankara also monitored President Obama’s annual April 24

statement commemorating the Armenian tragedy for use of the word genocide. Foreign Minister

Davutoglu stated that it was “a matter of national honor for us.”140 In 2009, in order to maintain

working relations with Ankara, President Obama, who had promised to recognize the genocide

during his election campaign, used the Armenian words meds yeghern or “great calamity” to refer

to the atrocities. 141 Turkish officials were not satisfied at that time, with Prime Minister Erdogan

charging that the statement was “a nonfactual and unacceptable interpretation of history.”142 In

2010, the President used the same phrase. The Turkish government also discouraged business

groups, such as the powerful Turkish Industrialists’ and Businessmen’s Association (TUSIAD)

and others, from visiting the United States for some time. The prominent annual AmericanTurkish Council conference scheduled for April in Washington was postponed until October after

the group learned that no Turkish ministers or military officers would attend. While visiting Saudi

Arabia, Erdogan was quoted as controversially claiming “the Jewish lobby in the U.S. supported

this resolution.”143

Foreign Minister Davutoglu criticized the Administration for not doing enough to influence the

Committee vote by explaining the importance of relations with Turkey and said that it would set

back Turkish-Armenian reconciliation.144 U.S. State Department spokesman P. J. Crowley stated

that Secretary Clinton had spoken to congressional leaders about the White House’s desire that

the resolution not come to the floor of the House for a vote. He said that “further congressional

action would impede the normalization process between Turkey and Armenia.”145

Prime Minister Erdogan would like Yerevan to exert influence over diaspora communities which

seek genocide recognition resolutions in foreign countries. On March 16, 2010, he stated that the

status of 100,000 (sic) illegal Armenian immigrants in Turkey could be reassessed, implying that

139

Parliamentarians’ statements. Chatham House rules prevent attribution of the quote to a specific deputy.

140

Fulya Ozerkan, “Turkey Expects Stronger Action from Washington on ‘Genocide’ Issue,” Hurriyet Daily

News.com, March 9, 2010.

141

Statement accessible via http://www.whitehouse.gov.

142

“Turkish PM Criticizes Obama’s Message on ‘1915 Events,’” BBC Monitoring European, April 17, 2009.

143

“Turkish Minister Cancels U.S. Trip Following House Panel Vote,” Hurriyet Daily News.com, March 9, 2010. In

the past, several Jewish American groups who favor Israeli-Turkish relations urged Members of Congress not to

approve genocide resolutions. This year most of the groups abstained from engaging on the issue at all. Only the Jewish

Institute for National Security Affairs (JINSA) actively opposed the resolution.

144

Sebnem Arsu and Sabrina Tavernise, “Turkey Criticizes House Committee Vote on Armenian Killings,” New York

Times, March 6, 2010.

145

“Turkey Angry at U.S. Armenian ‘Genocide’ Vote,” RFE/RL, March 5, 2010.

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they could be deported. 146 He may have wanted to make Yerevan understand that it has other

interests at play in the genocide issue and in normalization of relations. His remarks were

criticized at home and abroad, and the Prime Minister then suggested that they had been

“distorted.”147

Afghanistan

Turkey has close ties with Afghanistan which date back several centuries and which intensified

during the time of the founder of the modern Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, in the

early 20th century. For this reason and others, it attaches great importance to the independence,

national unity, and territorial integrity of Afghanistan. Because Turkey is a predominantly Muslim

country and the only Muslim country in NATO, its participation in NATO’s military operation in

Afghanistan at whatever level is considered symbolically significant. However, Turkish officials

believe that, for what they refer to as historical, cultural, and religious reasons, Turks should not

disturb the trust that Afghans place in Turkey by fighting other Muslims. The Turkish General

Staff agrees with the civilian leadership’s opposition to committing combat forces.

Turkey has twice commanded the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): from June

2002-February 2003 and from February-August 2005. During each command period, Turkey

boosted its troop strength in Afghanistan. During its first command, the Turkish contribution

increased to a battalion-task force of approximately 1,300 troops. After ceding command, during

the period from February 2003-August 2004, Turkey reduced its ISAF contingent to 300 military

personnel and 3 helicopters for use in medical evacuation and reconnaissance. When Turkey took

command of ISAF a second time, it deployed a mechanized infantry brigade and ran the Kabul

International Airport with a total of 1,430 troops. Turkey again increased its forces to 1,220 troops

when it assumed joint leadership with France and Italy of the Regional Command Capital (RCC)

in Kabul in August 2006. In addition, former Speaker of the Turkish Grand National Assembly

(parliament) and former Foreign Minister Hikmet Cetin served as the NATO Secretary-General’s

Senior Civilian Representative for Afghanistan from November 2003-August 2006.

On November 1, 2009, Turkey reassumed the Regional Command of ISAF in Kabul and

increased its troop presence by 958 to 1,758. Turkey will hold the command for another year,

beginning November 2, 2010. Turkish forces in Kabul command Albanian, Croatian, Czech,

Azerbaijani, and Georgian troops. When the Turkish General Staff confirmed the takeover of the

Kabul command, it clarified that “the Turkish Armed Forces would not be used for fighting

terrorism, drug-trafficking, and mine-clearing missions.148 Turkish officials insist that, although

combat capable, their troops have no combat mission except for the protection of reconstruction

teams and contractors. In December, Defense Minister Gonul stated, Turkey has “not changed or

reduced the number of caveats” for the mission149 Moreover, judging from past behavior, troop

levels are likely to decrease when Turkey again cedes command .

146

“Premier Says Ankara May Reassess Status of Illegal Armenians in Turkey,” Anatolia, March 16, 2010.

“Turkish PM: Statement on Deportation of Illegal Armenians in Turkey Intended to Attract International

Community’s Attention,” Trend News (Baku), March 20, 2010.

148

Website of the Turkish General Staff, http://www.tsk.tr.

149

Abdullah Bozkurt, Ercan Yavuz, “Turkey Balks at Providing Afghan Combat Troops,” Today’s Zaman Online,

December 4, 2009.

147

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Turkey has had a civilian-led Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak province, about

40 kilometers west of Kabul, since November 2006. It is staffed by experts and trainers from

various Turkish institutions and protected by about 70 to 80 Turkish soldiers. The PRT’s mission

includes development of administrative and judicial systems, training police and increasing their

capabilities, and conducting activities to improve and support infrastructure, public works, and

social support to raise the quality of life of the local population. Turkish officials have established

another PRT in Jowzjan (alt. transliteration Javizjan) province. Turkish forces there will work on

development projects in that province and in Sar-e Pol province jointly with Swedish forces.

Turkey continues to train the Afghan National Police Force, and has trained approximately 1,100

policemen so far. It constructed and bears all costs of a Police Training and Education Center. In

2007, Afghan officials from the Afghanistan National Narcotics Interdiction Unit participated in a

drug unit commanders’ course conducted by experts from the U.S. Drug Enforcement

Administration at the Turkish International Academy Against Organized Crime (TADOC) in

Ankara, with funding from both TADOC and the U.S. State Department’s Bureau of International

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE). Follow-up training was held in Afghanistan in

2008. In October 2009, Turkey began one-week training courses for civilian Afghan officials at

the Public Administration Institute for Turkey and the Middle East (TODAIE) in Ankara.

With regard to military training, after meeting President Obama at the White House on December

7, 2009, Prime Minister Erdogan said that Turkey has offered to establish a military training

center in Afghanistan and to train an Afghan army battalion there in addition to training another

battalion in Turkey. In addition, approximately 120 Afghan military officers train in Isparta,

Turkey monthly. Turkey is a major sponsor of the National Military Academy in Afghanistan,

where 17 Turkish advisors are assigned, as well as of the Kabul Military High School, with 11

instructors/advisors. Smaller groups of Turkish military advisors are at other Afghan training

centers. In all, Turkey has trained approximately 5,000 Afghan soldiers so far. Turkey also has

donated arms and equipment for the Afghan military.

In response to President Obama’s December 1, 2009, remarks on Afghanistan, the Turkish

Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement saying, “Afghanistan’s future will be determined

under the leadership and ownership of the Afghans” and reiterating Turkey’s long-standing view

that “the problems in Afghanistan cannot be solved by military means alone.”150 To support other

means, Turkey has committed U.S.$300 million in non-military aid. In 2009 alone, the Turkish

International Cooperation and Development Agency (TIKA) contributed $96.4 million to

Afghanistan. Turkey has a special ambassador based at the Foreign Ministry in Ankara

responsible for reconstruction in Afghanistan (and Iraq) and TIKA implements all technical

assistance programs. Foreign Minister Davutoglu reported that Turkey has built 34 schools, 6

clinics, and a hospital. Other Turkish aid is being channeled for road construction, for a bridge

over the Kabul River, for the repair of mosques, and for potable water wells in rural areas.

Moreover, in 2008, Turkey provided 755 tons of humanitarian food assistance across Afghanistan.

Other means also includes encouraging the Afghan government and allies to talk to the Taliban,

which Davutoglu observed is not “the equivalent of Al Qaeda.”151

150

Statement accessible at Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.tr.

Interview by Natalie Nougayrede, “Sanctioning Iran only Exacerbates the Situation,” Le Monde, December 19,

2008, OSC Document EUP20081219029007.

151

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Finally, Turkey also has historically close relations with Pakistan and President Gul has hosted

annual trilateral summit meetings since April 2007 with his Afghan and Pakistani counterparts as

well as of their chiefs of staff to discuss relations to help them overcome problems. On each

occasion, the leaders have reiterated pledges to cooperate in many areas—from security and

counterterrorism to economic development and transportation.

After the announcement of the U.S. force surge in Afghanistan and the call for increased NATO

contributions in 2009, there was additional focus on Turkey because it has the second largest

military in NATO. Then-U.S. Ambassador to Turkey James Jeffrey requested Turkish officials to

make additional troops contributions, to show more “flexibility” in defining their mission (i.e., to

lift caveats constraining their service), and to allow more troops to serve outside of Kabul.152 The

Turkish government resisted these entreaties. 153 Some analysts suggest that the Obama

Administration may be reluctant to demand much more from Turkey for Afghanistan because of

its need for Turkish cooperation in stabilizing Iraq, dealing with Iran, and on other regional

issues.

Energy

Turkey has a very proactive energy policy and strategy. The Foreign Ministry notes that Turkey is

geographically close to 72% of the world proven gas and 73% of its oil reserves in the Middle

East and Caspian basin. Therefore, it views Turkey as a “natural energy bridge between the

source countries and consumer countries….”154 U.S. Undersecretary of Energy Daniel Poneman

also describes Turkey as an “essential energy corridor.”155 A number of significant pipeline

projects have been completed or are planned to transit Turkish territory. Turkey has limited

domestic energy resources. Aside from transit fees and access to hydrocarbons for its own use,

Turkey benefits by diminishing the threat of an environmental catastrophe as the pipelines bypass

the heavily trafficked Bosphorus (or Istanbul) Strait through which more tankers would otherwise

transit en route from the Black Sea to the Mediterranean. However, Russian tankers still use the

Bosphorus heavily. Energy pipelines also further Foreign Minister Davutoglu’s goal of increasing

economic interdependence and cooperation among neighboring countries and thereby providing a

stronger foundation for regional peace.

Oil and Gas Pipelines

The following are the major pipelines transiting Turkey:

The completed Baku-Tblisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline may be considered the first fulfillment of

Turkey’s modern vision. Since 2006, it has carried oil from Azerbaijani Caspian fields via

Georgia to the Turkish Mediterranean for shipment to international markets. In 2008, Kazakhstan

152

Ugur Ergan, “Everyone is ‘Combatant,’” Hurriyet Daily News.com, December 3, 2009, OSC Document

GMP20091203742003.

153

For example, Yasemin Congar, “Afghanistan Bargaining,” Taraf Online, December 3, 2009, OSC Document

GMP20091203742007.

154

Republic of Turkey, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Deputy Directorate General, for Energy, Water, and Environment,

Turkey’s Energy Strategy, January 2009.

155

Speech to American-Turkish Council annual conference, October 19, 2010.

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began shipping its oil across the Caspian for pumping via the BTC. A companion Baku-TblisiErzurum (BTE) natural gas pipeline became operational in 2007. (BTE also is known as the

South Caucasus Pipeline (SCP)). BTE may link to the long-planned Trans-Caspian Pipeline

(TCP) intended to transport gas from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan westward, but TCP has failed

to materialize because littoral states have not been able to delineate their borders.

The Turkish-Greek Interconnector (TGI), operational since 2007, carries Azerbaijani gas from

Turkey to Greece. A pipeline from Italy to Greece will connect to TGI, transforming it into the

IGTI. The ITGI, which will have a capacity of 12 bcm a year.

Turkey is the critical link in ambitious plans to construct the 3,300 kilometer (2,050 miles),

estimated €7.9 ($11 billion) Nabucco Natural Gas Pipeline to transport a maximum of 31 bcm of

gas annually via Turkey to Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and, finally, to Austria. It is being built

by a consortium of companies from participating countries and Germany, including the Turkish

state-owned Petroleum Pipeline Corporation (BOTAS), with each owning an equal 16.67% share.

Construction is scheduled to begin in 2012 and the pipeline may come on line in 2015 to begin to

supply about 5% of Europe’s needs. Nabucco is viewed as enabling European countries to lessen

their dependence on Russian gas and thereby enhance their energy security, although it has been

suggested that the pipeline would not ease Europe’s dependence and only fill growing demand

over a long term.156 Russia supplied almost 25% of Europe’s gas needs last year. In March 2010,

the European Commission pledged an initial €273 million ($379million) for Nabucco and, in

September 2010, the European Investment Bank (EIB), the European Bank for Reconstruction

and Development (EBRD), and the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC)

committed to providing up to $4 billion or half the cost of the project. Despite these showings of

confidence, some analysts questions the prospects for the pipeline and projections regarding

possible gas supplies.

Other Turkish foreign policy priorities have been ensnared in the Nabucco project. It has been

believed that the pipeline would not be viable without Azerbaijani gas supplies, but Baku was

upset with Turkey’s effort to improve ties with Armenia before the Nagorno Karabakh conflict

was resolved. (See “Armenia” above.) Shortly after Armenia and Turkey signed protocols on

establishing relations, Azerbaijan signaled its discontent by signing an agreement to supply a

small amount of gas to Russia and thereby suggesting that it had alternative outlets to Nabucco.

However, as the situation was evolving, representatives of the State Oil Company of the

Azerbaijani Republic (SOCAR) said that they were ready to supply 7.3 bcm of gas from the Shah

Deniz 2 field scheduled to come on line in 2016 to Nabucco, and President Ilham Aliyev has

voiced his interest in the pipeline on subsequent occasions.157 Moreover, Turkish officials have

repeatedly bowed to Azerbaijani concerns by making progress on the Nagorno Karabakh issue a

precondition for improving relations with Armenia. Turkey also maintains that progress on

Nabucco would be accelerated if the energy chapter in its accession negotiations with the EU

were opened, but it has not made that a precondition for moving forward. As noted above, Cyprus

is blocking the opening of that chapter.

156

Shang Xuqian, “Timely Investment Key to Success of Nabucco Pipeline Project,” Xinhua News Agency, May 14,

2009, OSC Document CCP20090514968220.

157

“Azerbaijan Set to Become Main Supplier of Nabucco, Gas Pipeline,” Turan News Agency (Baku), October 6,

2009, BBC Monitoring Central Asia.

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A Turkish link to the Arab Natural Gas Pipeline that transports Egyptian gas Jordan and Syria has

been discussed for some time. It probably will not be completed before 2012 and, eventually, it

also could connect to Nabucco.

The Kirkuk-Ceyhan (or Yurmurtalik) oil pipeline from Iraq is Turkey’s oldest pipeline and its

capacity is larger than the BTC. However, sabotage related to the insurgency in Iraq and the PKK

has intermittently interrupted the flow, and the pipeline has not operated at full capacity.

Nonetheless, Turkey and Iraq have plans for a parallel gas pipeline that would link to Nabucco. In

July 2009, Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri al Maliki attended the signing ceremony for Nabucco and

offered to supply it with 15 bcm of gas (half the capacity) annually by 2015. The offer was not a

formal commitment and probably depends on arrangements between the Baghdad government

and the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in the north. In August 2010, the German partner

in Nabucco signed a cooperation agreement with the KRG, which Baghdad denounced as illegal

as it does not recognize energy contracts signed by the KRG. The KRG’s Natural Resources

Minister has claimed, “I am confident we can supply more than 50% (of the gas supply for

Nabucco, identical to Al Maliki’s offer). In fact, if we can prove the full tcf (trillion cubic feet) of

rese

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