Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress

Congressional research reportNov 25, 2009

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Tactical Aircraft Modernization:

Issues for Congress

Jeremiah J. Gertler

Specialist in Military Aviation

November 25, 2009

Congressional Research Service

7-....

www.crs.gov

RL33543

CRS Report for Congress

Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress

Summary

Tactical aircraft are a major component of U.S. military capability, and account for a significant

portion of U.S. defense spending. In early 2009, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps

collectively had an inventory of about 3,500 tactical aircraft. Current efforts for modernizing U.S.

tactical aircraft center on three aircraft acquisition programs—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

program, the Air Force F-22 fighter program, and the Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighter program. For

discussions of issues relating specifically to these three programs, see CRS Reports RL30563,

RL31673, and RL30624, respectively.

Air Force officials in 2008 testimony projected an Air Force fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft

by 2024. Navy officials have projected a Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall peaking at

more than 100 aircraft, and possibly more than 200 aircraft, by about 2018. On May 18, 2009, the

Air Force announced a combat air forces restructuring plan that would accelerate the retirement

of 249 older Air Force tactical aircraft, including 112 F-15s, 134 F-16s, and three A-10s, so as to

generate savings that can be applied to other Air Force program needs.

A key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft is the overall affordability of DOD’s plans for

modernizing the tactical aircraft force. The issue has been a concern in Congress and elsewhere

for many years, with some observers predicting that tactical aircraft modernization is heading for

an eventual budget “train wreck” as tactical aircraft acquisition plans collide with insufficient

amounts of funding available for tactical aircraft acquisition. A May 2009 Congressional Budget

Office (CBO) report examines several potential options for modernizing the U.S. tactical aircraft

force. A second key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft concerns the future of the U.S.

industrial base for designing and manufacturing tactical aircraft.

FY2010 defense authorization bill: The conference version (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7,

2009) of the FY2010 defense authorization act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of October 28, 2009)

contains a provision (Section 131) that requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to submit a

report to Congress on the procurement of “4.5”-generation fighter aircraft. Section 1052 would

require a report on the force structure findings of the 2009 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR).

The House report on H.R. 2647 (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) stated that the report on 4.5generation fighter aircraft is to include, among other things, a description of the factors that

informed decisions regarding the fighter force structure for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine

Corps. Section 1075 of H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 prohibits the Air Force from retiring fighter aircraft

in accordance with the combat air forces restructuring plan until 30 days after the Air Force

submits to Congress a report on various aspects of the plan. Section 1076 expresses the sense of

Congress regarding Navy carrier air wing force structure.

FY2010 DOD appropriations bill: The House and Senate Appropriations Committees, in their

reports (H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24, 2009, and S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009,

respectively) on the FY2010 DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 3326), include report language

discussing the combat air forces restructuring plan and the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike

fighter shortfall. On October 6, the Senate approved, by a vote of 91-7 (Record Vote Number

309), an amendment (S.Amdt. 2596) that prohibits the Air Force from retiring any tactical aircraft

as announced in the Combat Air Forces restructuring plan announced on May 18, 2009, until the

Air Force submits to the congressional defense committees the report that provides, among other

things, a detailed plan for how the Air Force will fill the force structure and capability gaps

resulting from the retirement of those aircraft.

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Contents

Introduction ................................................................................................................................1

Background ................................................................................................................................2

Tactical Aircraft In General ...................................................................................................2

Terminology ...................................................................................................................2

Missions .........................................................................................................................2

U.S. Tactical Aircraft.............................................................................................................3

Types ..............................................................................................................................3

Numbers .........................................................................................................................3

Current Acquisition Programs ...............................................................................................4

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) ........................................................................................4

F-22 Fighter ....................................................................................................................4

F/A-18E/F Strike Fighter.................................................................................................5

Projected Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls .....................................................................................5

Combat Air Forces Restructuring Plan...................................................................................5

Issues for Congress .....................................................................................................................7

Affordability of Tactical Aircraft Modernization Plans ..........................................................7

A Longstanding Concern.................................................................................................7

Potential Tradeoffs ..........................................................................................................8

Assessing Potential Tradeoffs..........................................................................................9

April 2007 GAO Report................................................................................................ 10

May 2009 CBO Report ................................................................................................. 11

Aircraft Industrial Base ....................................................................................................... 12

Legislative Activity for FY2010 ................................................................................................ 13

FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84) ............................................... 13

House ........................................................................................................................... 13

Senate........................................................................................................................... 18

Conference.................................................................................................................... 19

FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326).................................................................... 23

House ........................................................................................................................... 23

Senate (Committee Report) ........................................................................................... 24

Senate (Floor Consideration)......................................................................................... 25

Tables

Table 1. Approximate U.S. Tactical Aircraft Inventory in Early 2009 ...........................................3

Appendixes

Appendix. Air Force Briefing on Combat Air Forces Restructuring Plan.................................... 26

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Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 35

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Introduction

This report provides an overview discussion on the modernization of U.S. military tactical

aircraft, meaning fighter aircraft, strike fighters, and attack planes. Tactical aircraft are a major

component of U.S. military capability, and account for a significant portion of U.S. defense

spending. In early 2009, the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps collectively had an inventory of

about 3,500 tactical aircraft.

Current efforts for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft center on three aircraft acquisition

programs—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Air Force F-22 fighter program, and

the Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighter program. Program-specific issues for Congress in FY2010

relating to the F-35, F-22, and F/A-18E/F include the following:

•

Whether to approve or reject the administration’s proposal to terminate program

for developing an alternate engine for the F-35.

•

Whether to whether to approve the administration’s request to end F-22

procurement at the 187 aircraft that have been procured through FY2009, or

reject that proposal and provide funding in FY2010 for the procurement of

additional F-22s in FY2010 and/or subsequent years.

•

Whether to approve, reject, or modify the Navy’s FY2010 funding request for

procurement of nine F/A-18E/Fs, and whether to approve a multiyear

procurement (MYP) arrangement for FY2010-FY2014 for procuring F/A-18E/Fs

(and also EA-18Gs, which are electronic attack versions of the F/A-18E/F).

These program-specific issues, as well as FY2010 legislative activity relating specifically to the

F-35, F-22, and F/A-18E/F programs, are covered in detail in the following CRS reports:

•

CRS Report RL30563 on the F-35 program.1

•

CRS Report RL31673 on the F-22 program.2

•

CRS Report RL30624 on the F/A-18E/F program.3

This CRS report discusses and presents FY2010 legislative activity on issues relating to U.S.

tactical aircraft in general. For several years now, a central issue relating to tactical aircraft in

general has been the overall affordability of the Department of Defense’s (DOD’s) plans for

modernizing the tactical aircraft force. A second key issue concerns the future of the U.S.

industrial base for designing and manufacturing tactical aircraft.

CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name r

edacted).

CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background

and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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Background

Tactical Aircraft In General

Terminology

In general, the term tactical aircraft refers to shorter-ranged combat aircraft that can conduct

missions up to several hundred miles away from their home bases without need for in-flight

refueling. Tactical aircraft tend to perform their missions within a single regional theater of

operations, which is why they are also sometimes called theater-ranged aircraft or simply theater

aircraft. The term strategic aircraft, in contrast, usually refers to larger and longer-ranged Air

Force B-52, B-1, and B-2 bombers that are designed to conduct missions involving very long

(including intercontinental) flights to their intended areas of operations (though they can also be

used for missions that take place within a single theater of operations). 4

Although the above distinction between tactical and strategic aircraft can suggest that the term

tactical aircraft refers to virtually all types of shorter-ranged aircraft, in practice the term is used

primarily to refer to fighters, strike fighters, and attack planes. Fighters, which usually have an

“F” designation (e.g., F-22), are designed primarily for air-to-air combat, though they can have

some air-to-ground combat capability as well. Strike fighters, which can have either an “F”

designation (e.g., F-35) or an “F/A” designation (e.g., F/A-18E/F), are dual-role aircraft that are

designed to have a substantial capability in both air-to-ground (strike) and air-to-air (fighter)

operations.5 Attack planes, which usually have an “A” designation (e.g., A-10) are designed

primarily for air-to-ground operations.6 The term tactical aircraft is often shortened to tac air (also

spelled tacair).

Air Force tactical aircraft operate from land bases and are conventional takeoff and landing

(CTOL) aircraft. Navy tactical aircraft are CTOL aircraft that have features permitting them to

operate from aircraft carriers.7 Marine Corps aircraft are operated from both Navy ships and land

bases, including expeditionary land bases with short runways. Some Marine Corps tactical

aircraft are vertical/short takeoff and landing (VSTOL) or short takeoff, vertical landing

(STOVL) aircraft.

Missions

Tactical aircraft are used to perform a variety of missions. Fighters engage primarily in air-to-air

combat so as to establish and maintain air superiority in a theater of operations. Attack planes

The Air Force in 1992 implemented a reorganization that replaced its Strategic Air Command (SAC) and Tactical Air

Command (TAC) with a combined new Air Combat Command (ACC).

In earlier years, strike fighters were called fighter-bombers.

Although DOD uses letter designations (e.g., F, F/A, and A) to identify an aircraft’s primary intended mission, the

designations can be confusing because they are applied somewhat loosely (e.g., the F-35 is a strike fighter, suggesting

that it should have been designated the F/A-35) and because aircraft can be modified over time to perform additional

missions.

Examples of such features include strengthened landing gear, a strengthened airframe, and an arresting hook so as to

permit catapult launches and arrested-wire landings, as well as folding wing tips for more compact storage aboard ship.

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focus on air-to-ground combat operations, including close air support (CAS) for friendly ground

forces engaged in battle, battlefield air interdiction (BAI) against enemy forces that are behind the

front lines, and deep interdiction (also known as “deep strike”) against the enemy’s military,

political, and industrial infrastructure. Strike fighters engage in both air-to-air and air-to-ground

operations. Tactical aircraft can also be used for other operations, including surveillance and

reconnaissance operations.

U.S. Tactical Aircraft

Types

The Air Force currently operates new F-22 fighters and the following older aircraft types: F-15

fighters, F-15E strike fighters (a version of the F-15 with enhanced air-to-ground capabilities), F16 fighters (which are actually strike fighters), and A-10 attack aircraft. The Navy currently

operates older F/A-18A through D strike fighters and newer and more capable F/A-18E/F strike

fighters. The Marine Corps’ operates two older types of aircraft: F/A-18 A-D strike fighters and

AV-8B VSTOL attack planes.

Numbers

Table 1, which presents figures from a May 2009 Congressional Budget Office (CBO) report,

shows approximate numbers of U.S. tactical aircraft in early 2009. As can be seen in the table,

DOD in early 2009 had a total inventory of about 3,500 tactical aircraft, of which about 2,375

were in the Air Force and about 1,125 were in the Navy and Marine Corps.

Table 1. Approximate U.S.Tactical Aircraft Inventory in Early 2009

Service and aircraft type

Number in

inventory

Air Force

F-22 fighter

135

F-15 fighter

470

F-15E strike fighter

220

F-16 strike fighter

1,200

A-10 attack plane

350

Subtotal Air Force

2,375

Navy and Marine Corps

F/A-18E/F strike fighter (Navy)

380

F/A-18A/B/C/D strike fighter (Navy and Marine Corps)

620

AV-8B VSTOL attack plane (Marine Corps)

125

Subtotal Navy and Marine Corps

1,125

TOTAL all services

3,500

Source: Source: Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces, May 2009,

Tables 1-1 and 1-2 on pages 2 and 3, which the CBO report states are based on DOD data. CBO states in a

note to the tables that the inventory figures are approximate and may not reflect recent deliveries or

retirements.

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Current Acquisition Programs

Current efforts for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft center on three aircraft acquisition

programs—the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program, the Air Force F-22 fighter program, and

the Navy F/A-18E/F strike fighter program.

F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)

The F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), also called the Lighting II, is a new strike fighter being

procured in different versions for the Air Force, Marine Corps, and Navy. The F-35 was

conceived as a relatively affordable fifth-generation strike fighter8 that could be procured in three

highly common versions for the three services, so that the services could avoid the higher costs of

developing, procuring, and operating and supporting three separate tactical aircraft designs to

meet their similar but not identical operational needs. The F-35 program is DOD’s largest weapon

procurement program in terms of total estimated acquisition cost. Current DOD plans call for

acquiring a total of 2,456 JSFs for the three services9 at an estimated total acquisition cost (as of

December 31, 2007) of about $246 billion in constant (i.e., inflation-adjusted) FY2009 dollars.

Procurement of F-35s began in FY2007.

The Air Force is procuring the F-35A, a conventional takeoff and landing (CTOL) version of the

F-35, as the replacement for the service’s F-16s and A-10s. The F-35A is intended to be a more

affordable complement to the Air Force’s new F-22s. The Marine Corps is procuring the F-35B, a

STOVL version of the F-35, as the replacement for the service’s F/A-18A-D strike fighters and

AV-8B Harrier VSTOL attack planes. The Navy is procuring the F-35C, a carrier-capable CTOL

version of the aircraft, and plans to operate carrier air wings in the future featuring a combination

of F/A-18E/F and F-35C strike fighters. The administration’s proposed FY2010 budget requested

funding for the procurement of 30 F-35s, including 10 F-35As for the Air Force, 16 F-35Bs for

the Marine Corps, and four F-35Cs for the Navy.

F-22 Fighter

The Air Force F-22 fighter, also known as the Raptor, is the world’s most capable air-to-air

combat aircraft. The F-22 is a fifth-generation aircraft that incorporates a high degree of stealth,

supercruise,10 thrust-vectoring for high maneuverability, 11 and integrated avionics that fuse

information from on-board and off-board sensors. Procurement of F-22s began in FY1999, and a

total of 187 have been procured through FY2009, including 24 in FY2009. The administration

Fifth-generation aircraft incorporate the most modern technology, and are considered to be generally more capable

than earlier-generation (e.g., 4th-generation and below) aircraft. Currently, only the F-22 and the F-35 are considered

fifth-generation aircraft. Russia reportedly has a fifth-generation fighter under development.

As of December 31, 2007, the F-35 program included a planned total of 2,456 aircraft—13 research and development

aircraft and a planned total of 2,443 production aircraft. The 2,443 production aircraft include 1,763 F-35As for the Air

Force and 680 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy, with exact numbers of Bs and Cs to be determined.

These planned production totals are subject to review in the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) that is to be reported

to Congress with the submission of the proposed FY2011 defense budget in February 2010. Hundreds of additional F35s are to be purchased by several U.S. allies.

Supercruise is the ability to cruise at supersonic speeds without using engine afterburners. The F-22 is expected to

have a level speed of about Mach 1.7 using afterburners and a cruise speed of about Mach 1.5 without afterburners.

The F-22’s two Pratt & Whitney F-119 turbofan engines are equipped with thrust-vectoring nozzles.

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wants to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft, and the administration’s proposed FY2010 budget

did not request funding for the procurement of additional F-22s in FY2010. Supporters of the F22 want to continue procuring the aircraft in FY2010 and/or subsequent years, toward an eventual

goal of 243 to 250 (or more).

F/A-18E/F Strike Fighter

The F/A-18E/F, also known as the Super Hornet, is a Navy strike fighter. It is larger, more

modern, and more capable than the earlier F/A-18A-Ds, which are known as Hornets. The F/A18E/F is generally considered a fourth-generation aircraft. (Some F/A-18E/F supporters argue

that it is a “fourth-plus” or “4.5”-generation aircraft because it incorporates some fifth-generation

technology, particularly in its sensors.) Hornets and Super Hornets currently form the core of the

Navy’s aircraft carrier air wings—of the 70 or so aircraft in each carrier air wing, more than 40

typically are Hornets and Super Hornets. The Navy has been procuring F/A-18E/F Super Hornets

since FY1997, and has procured a total of 449 through FY2009. The administration’s proposed

FY2010 budget requested funding for the procurement of nine F/A-18E/Fs.

Projected Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls

Air Force officials in 2008 testimony projected an Air Force fighter shortfall of up to 800 aircraft

by 2024.12 Navy officials have projected a Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall peaking at

more than 100 aircraft, and possibly more than 200 aircraft, by about 2018.13 Some observers

have questioned the Air Force’s projection of an 800-aircraft shortfall, arguing that such

projections are strongly influenced by assumptions concerning military threats posed by other

countries and on whether the United States will fight alone or as part of a coalition, and that Air

Force demands for more fighter aircraft are driven partly by organizational constraints rather than

warfighting needs.14 The peak size of the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall

depends in part on assumptions one makes about service life extensions for Hornets and

procurement rates of F-35Cs and F-35Bs for the Navy and Marine Corps.

Combat Air Forces Restructuring Plan

On May 18, 2009—11 days after the submission to Congress of the proposed FY2010 defense

budget—the Air Force announced a combat air forces restructuring plan that would accelerate the

retirement of 249 older Air Force tactical aircraft, including 112 F-15s, 134 F-16s, and three A10s, so as to generate savings that can be applied to other Air Force program needs. The plan does

not include the retirements of five fighters proposed as part of the FY2010 Air Force budget

submission. Briefing slides on the plan are presented in the Appendix.

See, for example, the testimony of Lieutenant General Daniel Darnell, Deputy Chief of Staff Air, Space and

Information Operations, Plans and Requirements, at an April 9, 2008, hearing before the Airland subcommittee of the

Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on the FY2009 Budget for Air Force and Navy aviation programs.

(Source: Transcript of hearing.)

For additional discussion of the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall, see CRS Report RL30624,

Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background and Issues for Congress,

by (name redacted).

William Matthews, “Coming up short; Is the Air Force’s ‘Fighter-gap’ truth or spin?” Armed Forces Journal

International, July 2008, p.26.

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An Air Force News Service story on the restructuring plan stated:

Following the May 7 roll-out of the fiscal year 2010 budget proposal for the Department of

Defense, Air Force officials announced plans to retire legacy fighters to fund a smaller and

more capable force and redistribute people for higher priority missions.

The Combat Air Forces restructuring plan would accelerate the retirement of approximately

250 aircraft, which includes 112 F-15 Eagles, 134 F-16 fighting Falcons and three A-10

Thunderbolt IIs. This does not include the five fighters previously scheduled for retirement

in FY10.

“We have a strategic window of opportunity to do some important things with fighter aircraft

restructuring,” said Secretary of the Air Force Michael Donley. “By accepting some shortterm risk, we can convert our inventory of legacy fighters and F-22 (Raptors) into a smaller,

more flexible and lethal bridge to fifth-generation fighters like the F-35 (Lightning II Joint

Strike Fighter). We'll also add manpower to capabilities needed now for operations across

the spectrum of conflict.”

Under the plan, cost savings of $355 million in FY10 and $3.5 billion over the next five

fiscal years would be used to reduce current capability gaps. Air Force officials would invest

most of the funds in advanced capability modifications to remaining fighters and bombers.

Some would go toward procuring munitions for joint warfighters, including the small

diameter bomb, hard-target weapons and the AIM-120D and AIM-9X missiles. The

remainder would be dedicated to the procurement or sustainment of critical intelligence

capabilities such as the advanced targeting pod as well as enabling technologies for tactical

air controllers and special operations forces.

“We've taken this major step only after a careful assessment of the current threat

environment and our current capabilities,” said Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton

Schwartz. “Make no mistake, we can't stand still on modernizing our fighter force. The Air

Force’s advantage over potential adversaries is eroding, and this endangers both air and

ground forces alike unless there is a very significant investment in bridge capabilities and

fifth-generation aircraft. CAF restructuring gets us there.”

The CAF restructuring plan, which will require appropriate environmental analyses, would

enable Air Force officials to use reassignment and retraining programs to move

approximately 4,000 manpower authorizations to emerging and priority missions such as

manned and unmanned surveillance operations and nuclear deterrence operations.

This realignment would include the expansion of MQ-1 Predator, MQ-9 Reaper and MC-12

Liberty aircrews; the addition of a fourth active-duty B-52 Stratofortress squadron; and the

expansion of Distributed Common Ground System and information processing, exploitation

and dissemination capabilities for continued combatant commander support in Afghanistan

and Iraq, among other adjustments.

Secretary Donley and General Schwartz have committed the Air Force to initiatives that will

reinvigorate its nuclear enterprise and field 50 unmanned combat air patrols for ongoing

operations by FY11.

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“What we're looking for is a force mix that meets the current mission requirements of

combatant commanders while providing a capable force to meet tomorrow’s challenges,”

Secretary Donley said.15

Issues for Congress

Affordability of Tactical Aircraft Modernization Plans

A Longstanding Concern

A key issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft in general is the overall affordability of

DOD’s plans for modernizing the tactical aircraft force. The issue has been a concern in Congress

and elsewhere for many years, with some observers predicting that tactical aircraft modernization

is heading for an eventual budget “train wreck” as tactical aircraft acquisition plans collide with

insufficient amounts of funding available for tactical aircraft acquisition.

In earlier years, the issue of tactical aircraft modernization affordability was characterized in

terms of the collective affordability of the F-35, F-22, and F/A-18E/F programs. In coming years,

as production of the F-22 and F/A-18E/F winds down, the issue may increasingly be

characterized in terms of the affordability of the F-35 program as DOD seeks to ramp F-35

procurement up to higher annual rates. Past DOD plans have envisaged increasing F-35

procurement to 130 aircraft per year by 2014-2015, including 80 F-35As per year for the Air

Force by 2015 and 50 F-35Bs and Cs for the Marine Corps and Navy by 2014.

Since the early 1990s, DOD has substantially lowered the potential cost of its tactical aircraft

modernization plans by significantly reducing the planned number of new aircraft to be acquired.

Much of the reduction in the planned number of new aircraft to be acquired resulted from postCold War reductions in planned numbers of Air Force and Navy air wings. Additional reductions

in the planned number of new aircraft to be acquired were accomplished through the NavyMarine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan, which more closely integrated the Navy and Marine

Corps strike fighter inventories, permitting a reduction in planned procurements of Navy and

Marine Corps strike fighters.16 Another major DOD initiative for limiting tactical aircraft

modernization costs is the F-35 program, which seeks to reduce costs for developing, procuring,

and operating U.S. tactical aircraft through the acquisition of a strike fighter that can be procured

in three highly common versions for the three services.

Even with initiatives such as these, it is not clear whether DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization

plan will be affordable, particularly in the context of future defense budgets that might feature

little or no real (i.e., inflation-adjusted) growth over current levels, or possibly some amount of

“AF Officials Announce Combat Air Forces Restructure Plan,” Air Force News Service, May 20, 2009, available

online at http://www.af.mil/news/story.asp?id=123150197.

The Department of the Navy (DON), which includes the Navy and Marine Corps, stated that the integration plan

would permit DON to reduce procurement of F/A-18E/Fs to 460 from 548 (a reduction of 88 aircraft, or about 16%)

and procurement of JSFs to 680 from 1,089 (a reduction of 409 aircraft, or about 38%). The combined F/A-18E/F and

JSF buy would thus be reduced to 1,140 aircraft from 1,637, a reduction of 497 aircraft, or about 30%. See CRS Report

RS21488, Navy-Marine Corps Tactical Air Integration Plan: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redact

ed) and Ronald O’Rourke.

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real decline. The projected Air Force fighter shortfall and the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike

fighter shortfall (see “Projected Tactical Aircraft Shortfalls” above) might be viewed as

indications of a continuing challenge regarding the affordability of tactical aircraft modernization.

Potential Tradeoffs

If DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization plans cannot be fully funded without reducing funding

for other DOD programs below acceptable levels, policymakers may face one or more of the

following series of potential funding tradeoffs:

•

Funding for tactical aircraft acquisition programs vs. funding for nonaircraft systems that might be able to perform certain missions performed

by tactical aircraft. Examples of such non-aircraft systems include Army and

Navy surface-to-air missile systems, Army and Marine Corps surface-to-surface

missiles, rockets, and artillery, and Navy ship-based guns and land-attack cruise

missiles.

•

Funding for tactical aircraft acquisition programs vs. funding for other

aircraft, such as long-range bombers or helicopters, that can perform

certain air-to-ground missions performed by tactical aircraft. Some observers

argue that in light of recent and projected improvements in the regional antiaccess capabilities of China and other countries, 17 DOD should place less funding

emphasis on tactical aircraft and more funding emphasis on long-range aircraft

that can operate effectively outside the range of anti-access systems.

•

Funding for tactical aircraft acquisition programs against funding for

aircraft intended to perform different missions, such as airlift aircraft, aerial

refueling tankers, electronic attack (aka electronic warfare) aircraft, airborne

warning and control aircraft, and surveillance aircraft. For some observers, the

affordability of DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization plans is a subset of a larger

issue concerning the affordability of DOD’s plans for procuring new aircraft of

all types.

•

Funding for tactical aircraft acquisition programs against funding for

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and unmanned combat aerial vehicles

(UCAVs), which are armed UAVs. UAVs have played an increasing role in recent

years in surveillance and reconnaissance operations, and UCAVs are now playing

a substantial role in ground-attack operations, particularly for purposes such as

conducting precision attacks on terrorist targets. DOD intends to place an

increased emphasis on UAVs and UCAVs in coming years, particularly as a

means of improving U.S. capabilities for conducting irregular warfare operations

(such as counterinsurgency operations).

•

Funding for land-based Air Force tactical aircraft acquisition programs (i.e.,

F-22 an F-35A) vs. funding for sea-based Navy and Marine Corps sea-based

tactical aircraft acquisition programs (i.e., F/A-18E/F and F-35 Bs and Cs).

Anti-access systems are military systems that are designed to keep opposing military forces outside a certain

defensive perimeter. For a discussion of emerging Chinese maritime anti-access systems, see CRS Report RL33153,

China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress, by (name r

edacted).

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Observers have long discussed and debated the relative capabilities and costs of

land- and sea-based aircraft for performing missions under various

circumstances.

•

Funding for one land-based tactical aircraft (the F-22) against funding for

another (the F-35A), or funding for one sea-based tactical aircraft (the F/A18E/F) against funding for another (the F-35B/C). The administration’s

proposal to end F-22 procurement at 187 aircraft (rather than continuing F-22

procurement until a total of 243 to 250 is reached) and to concentrate future Air

Force tactical aircraft procurement on the F-35A might be viewed as an example

of DOD proposing such a tradeoff.

•

Funding for procurement of F-35s, F-22s, and F/A-18E/Fs vs. funding for

service life extensions of existing tactical aircraft or for procuring new and

perhaps upgraded models of older-design tactical aircraft. Potential examples

include upgraded F-15s in lieu of additional F-22s, upgraded F-16s in lieu of

some currently planned F-35As, additional F/A-18E/Fs in lieu of some currently

planned F-35Cs and Bs, and service life extensions of F/A-18A-Ds in lieu of

procuring new F/A-18E/Fs or F-35Cs and Bs.

Assessing Potential Tradeoffs

Each of the above potential tradeoffs poses complex questions of comparative costs, capabilities,

and (for service life extensions of older aircraft) technical feasibility. These questions have been

studied and debated in depth for years by various parties in the context of U.S. military goals and

objectives. U.S. military goals and objectives are currently being reviewed in the Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR), the final report on which is to be submitted to Congress with the

proposed FY2011 budget in early-February 2010. One key issue in the QDR is how much

emphasis to place on preparing for irregular warfare operations (such as counterinsurgency

operations) vs. preparing for conventional interstate conflict, and how various force elements

(such as tactical aircraft) relate to those two potential areas of planning emphasis.

In the post-Cold War era, some observers have questioned the need to procure and operate large

quantities of high-capability tactical aircraft, arguing among other things that such aircraft are not

the most cost-effective forms of airpower for conducting the kinds of counterinsurgency and antiterrorism operations that have occupied U.S. military forces in recent years. These observers

would reduce planned procurement of high-capability tactical aircraft in favor of increased

investments in UAVs and UCAVs, special operations helicopters, medical evacuation aircraft, and

training and equipping forward air controllers.18

Most observers who question DOD’s tactical aircraft modernization plan acknowledge that proliferation of advanced

aircraft and air-defense equipment to potential adversaries will require the United States to field some new-generation

high-capability aircraft. They argue, however, that the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq showed that the United States has a

formidable advantage in air-to-air combat. They argue that the stealthy F-117 attack planes used in the Gulf War

constituted a tiny percentage of all tactical aircraft employed against Iraq, and that only a few non-stealthy planes were

shot down, even in the early days of the war. They also argue that cruise missiles and stealthy B-2 bombers and nonstealthy B-1s equipped with adequate standoff munitions can be used against heavily defended targets, and that

successful development of longer-range and more-accurate and lethal standoff munitions would significantly increase

the combat effectiveness of earlier-generation tactical aircraft.

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Other observers argue that large numbers of high-capability tactical aircraft are still necessary

because Russian aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are available to potential adversaries,

and because some European and Asian companies may soon be able to market advanced aircraft

and SAMs to potential adversaries. In this view, the end of the Cold War did not mean the end of

potential high-threat areas requiring advanced aircraft. Recent acquisitions of advanced fighter

aircraft and surface-to-air missiles by China, and to a lesser degree India, have added to some

observers’ concerns that these countries may effectively challenge U.S. airpower in the future.

Having large numbers of such advanced aircraft, it is argued, will help ensure operational success

in future conflicts with well-armed adversaries.

April 2007 GAO Report

At the request of Representative Neil Abercrombie, the chairman of the Air and Land Forces

subcommittee of the House Armed Services Committee, the Government Accountability Office

(GAO) examined “DOD’s investment planning for recapitalizing and modernizing its tactical

fighter and attack aircraft force portfolio.” GAO’s report, issued in April 2007, stated:

During the next 7 years, the military services plan to spend about $109.3 billion to acquire

about 570 new tactical aircraft and to modernize hundreds of operational aircraft. Substantial

cost increases, schedule delays, and changes in requirements have significantly reduced

procurement quantities of new aircraft. For example, since its start, the development period

for the F-22A doubled, threat conditions changed, new ground attack and intelligencegathering requirements were added, and its unit costs more than doubled, resulting in a

steady decline in the number of aircraft the Air Force can now procure. Similar conditions

and risk of poor outcomes seem to be emerging for the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF). The JSF is

the linchpin for future modernization efforts because of its sheer size and plans to replace

hundreds of operational systems in all three services. However, its development costs have

increased by $31.6 billion since 2004, and procurement and delivery schedules are slipping.

Funding needs and plans for new and legacy aircraft are by nature interdependent. Legacy

systems must be sustained and kept operationally relevant until new systems complete

development and are ready to replace them. If quantities of new aircraft are reduced and/or

deliveries slip further into future years, significantly more as yet unplanned money will be

required to sustain, modernize, and extend the life of legacy systems to ensure that the total

force is both capable and sufficient in numbers. Uncertainty about new systems costs and

deliveries makes it challenging to effectively plan and efficiently implement modernization

efforts and legacy retirement schedules. Over the next seven years, the services are investing

an average of about $1.7 billion per year on legacy modifications, but there are large pent up

demands—billions more—for unfunded requirements and potential life extension programs

identified by program officials. Officials said the time is approaching when hard decisions on

retiring or extending the life of legacy aircraft must be made.

Looking forward, DOD does not have a single, comprehensive, and integrated investment

plan for recapitalizing and modernizing fighter and attack aircraft. Lacking an integrated

DOD-wide view of requirements, it is difficult to determine the extent of capability gaps and

shortfalls, or, alternatively, duplication of capability. Rather, each military service operates

largely within its own stovepipe to plan and acquire the resources needed to fill its individual

force structure construct. In the Air Force’s case, it is the forces deemed necessary to fill its

air and space expeditionary wings; for the Navy, its carrier strike forces; and for the Marines,

its expeditionary forces. Collectively, the services have underperformed to date in terms of

delivering aircraft within desired costs and quantities, and future plans are likely

unaffordable within projected funding levels. Individual service plans are largely dependent

on favorable assumptions about the cost, quantity, and delivery schedules for new

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acquisitions and the ability to increase and sustain future funding levels substantially above

current levels. These favorable assumptions are not realistic when juxtaposed with projected

decline in future federal discretionary spending (including defense investment accounts),

continued operational support requirements for the global war on terror, and looming startups of other big-ticket defense items, such as a strategic tanker aircraft and next generation

long-range strike systems, competing for the same funds. Recent efforts to examine joint

requirements on an integrated, DOD-wide basis have not significantly affected service plans

and investments.

In order to recapitalize and sustain capable and sufficient tactical air forces that reflect what

is needed and affordable from a joint service perspective and that has high confidence of

being executed as planned, GAO is recommending that DOD (1) take decisive actions to

shorten cycle times in developing and delivering new tactical aircraft and (2) develop an

integrated enterprise-level investment strategy for tactical air forces. 19

May 2009 CBO Report

At the direction of the Senate Armed Services Committee,20 the Congressional Budget Office

(CBO) conducted “a study examining the capabilities and costs of the fighter [i.e., tactical

aircraft] force that would be fielded under the Department of Defense’s fiscal year 2009 plans and

the potential implications for DoD’s long-term budget and inventory levels if planned purchases

Government Accountability Office, Tactical Aircraft[:] DOD Needs a Joint and Integrated Investment Strategy,

GAO-07-415, April 2007, pp. 2-3.

The committee’s report (S.Rept. 110-77 of June 5, 2007) on the FY2009 defense authorization bill (S. 1547) stated:

The committee is concerned that the Department of Defense (DOD) has not adequately studied the

potential risks associated with shortages in U.S. strike fighter aircraft over the next decade. Last

year, Navy witnesses testified before the committee about a potential gap in strike fighters that

might develop toward the end of the next decade, and could reach as high as 50 aircraft. While the

uncertainties of the service life of the current F–18s and the production schedules for the future F–

35 were mentioned then, the potential gap now under discussion could be as high as 220 Navy

aircraft by the middle of the next decade. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) recently

released a study entitled ‘‘Tactical Aircraft: DOD Needs a Joint Integrated Investment Strategy,’’

that reached several interesting conclusions. The report concluded that DOD does not have a single,

integrated investment plan for recapitalizing and modernizing its tactical air forces, and without a

joint, integrated investment strategy, it is difficult to evaluate the efficacy and severity of capability

gaps or, alternatively, areas of redundancy. The GAO report additionally asserts, ‘‘[l]ooking

forward over the next 20 years, the Department’s collective tactical aircraft recapitalization plans

are likely not affordable as currently planned.’’

Under the Department’s current plans, the DOD would spend, on average, about $13 billion

annually through 2020 developing and purchasing tactical combat aircraft. Over the long-term, that

demand for funding will coincide with increases needed to execute other major Air Force and Navy

acquisitions, including space systems, cargo aircraft, and surface combatants. In the near-term, it

will coincide with the funding needed to ‘‘reset’’ and replace equipment worn out and lost during

operations conducted in Iraq and Afghanistan.

To better understand the challenges DOD faces as it modernizes its fleets of tactical combat

aircraft, the committee directs the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) to conduct a study of

alternative approaches to structuring and investing in our Nation’s tactical air forces. The CBO

analysis should include alternatives that address shortfalls in the size and composition of tactical

aircraft forces relative to the services’ current and past stated requirements. CBO should also

develop other alternatives that, while not necessarily satisfying all current requirements, could

require less funding to execute than the Department’s current plans. Such options should include,

but not be limited to, the potential for unmanned air systems to bridge part of the looming gap in

strike fighter capability. CBO should provide the committee with a briefing describing interim

results by April 2008, and a final report no later than October 2008. (Pages 135-136)

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of new aircraft are insufficient to maintain fighter inventories at levels called for by current

service requirements.” CBO stated that the study “also compares the advantages, disadvantages,

and costs of seven alternative approaches that DoD might adopt to modernize its fighter forces—

three that satisfy today’s inventory requirements, two that maintain aggregate weapons capacity

with fewer aircraft, and two that replace portions of the fighter force with longer-range aircraft.”21

The report, which was issued in May 2009 and uses the term “fighter force” to refer to the tactical

aircraft force, states:

If realized, the services’ goals for modernizing their fighter forces over the next several

decades would result in a significant increase in capability over that offered by today’s

forces. Inventories would remain about the same, but the modernized fleets would be

equipped with state-of-the-art aircraft that offer substantial technological advances over

today’s fighters, including increased payload capacity and greater stealth capabilities (and, as

a result, enhanced survivability). Notwithstanding DoD’s emphasis on fielding aviation

forces with greater flight endurance, the distance that newer aircraft could fly without

requiring refueling (“unrefueled ranges”) would not increase to the same extent.

Under DoD’s fiscal year 2009 procurement plans, fighter inventories are likely to fall below

the services’ stated goals in the coming years. Nevertheless, many aggregate capabilities

would remain equal to or improve relative to today’s force because of the enhanced lethality

and survivability that is expected from the new fighters. Some of those improvements might

be offset by the increased capabilities of potential adversaries, however.

Alternative approaches that included purchasing additional F/A-18E/F Super Hornets or

purchasing upgraded versions of so-called legacy aircraft—such as the F-16 Fighting Falcon

and F-15E Strike Eagle, which are still in production but based on older designs—would

offer an opportunity for short-term inventory relief, long-term cost savings, or both, albeit

with lesser capability improvements (especially in terms of survivability) than would be

realized by purchasing JSFs.

Compared with forces equipped solely with fighter aircraft, forces equipped with a mix of

fighters (which are designed for supersonic speed and high maneuverability) and subsonic

attack aircraft (designed, instead, to carry large payloads over long distances) would offer

improved basing flexibility and persistence over the battlefield during air-to-ground

missions. Force structures that replaced some fighters with smaller numbers of attack aircraft

could provide air-to-ground weapons capacities comparable to those of today’s forces and be

fielded at costs similar to those projected for DoD’s plans. Such forces would have fewer

aircraft capable of air-to-air combat, however.22

Aircraft Industrial Base

Another issue for Congress regarding tactical aircraft modernization in general concerns the

implications that decisions on tactical aircraft acquisition programs can have for workloads,

revenues, and employments levels in the U.S. military aircraft manufacturing industry, which

employs thousands of aircraft designers, engineers, and production workers at both major aircraft

manufacturing firms and supporting supplier firms. In addition to affecting employment levels,

decisions on tactical aircraft acquisition programs can have implications for the structure of the

Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces, May 2009, preface page.

Congressional Budget Office, Alternatives for Modernizing U.S. Fighter Forces, May 2009, p. xi. Italics as in

original.

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industry. The United States currently has two active prime contractors for the production of

tactical aircraft—Lockheed, the prime contractor for the F-22 and F-35, and Boeing, the prime

contractor for the F/A-18E/F. When F/A-18E/F (and F-22) production winds down, the number of

active U.S. prime contractors for the production of tactical aircraft might be reduced to one

(Lockheed). Some observers have expressed concern about this prospective development on the

grounds that it could reduce the potential for using competition between prime contractors in the

future to spur innovation, constrain prices, and ensure schedule adherence and production quality

in the development and procurement of future U.S. tactical aircraft.

Potential questions for Congress include the following: How many tactical aircraft prime

contractors are needed to support U.S. military needs in the future? What is the value of

competition at the prime contractor level in the development and procurement of tactical aircraft?

What is the potential for a firm such as Boeing to use its work designing and building other types

of aircraft to preserve key skills that would be needed to compete effectively in the future against

a firm such as Lockheed for the role of prime contractor for the design and production of future

tactical aircraft? How might decisions on tactical aircraft programs affect U.S. export earnings

and the international competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry?

Legislative Activity for FY2010

This section presents legislative activity for FY2010 relating to tactical aircraft modernization in

general. For legislative activity relating specifically to the F-35, F-22, or F/A-18E/F programs,

see CRS Reports RL30563,23 RL31673,24 or RL30624, respectively.25

FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84)

House

Section 133 of H.R. 2647 as passed by the House would require DOD to submit a report to

Congress on the procurement of “4.5”-generation aircraft, which the provision defines as F-15s,

F-16s, and F/A-18s that include certain upgrades. The text of the provision states:

SEC. 133. REPORT ON 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER PROCUREMENT.

(a) In General- Not later than 90 days after the enactment of this Act, the Secretary of

Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on 4.5 generation

fighter aircraft procurement. The report shall include the following:

(1) The number of 4.5 generation fighter aircraft for procurement for fiscal years 2011

through 2025 necessary to fulfill the requirement of the Air Force to maintain not less than

2,200 tactical fighter aircraft.

CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name r

edacted).

CRS Report RL31673, Air Force F-22 Fighter Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

CRS Report RL30624, Navy F/A-18E/F and EA-18G Aircraft Procurement and Strike Fighter Shortfall: Background

and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

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(2) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through single year

procurement contracts.

(3) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through multiyear

procurement contracts.

(4) The estimated savings that could be derived from the procurement of those aircraft

through a multiyear procurement contract, and whether the Secretary determines the amount

of those savings to be substantial.

(5) A discussion comparing the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through annual

procurement contracts with the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through a

multiyear procurement contract.

(6) A discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of F-35s in fiscal years 2015

through fiscal year 2025 to proportionally and concurrently recapitalize the Air National

Guard.

(7) The recommendations of the Secretary regarding whether Congress should authorize a

multiyear procurement contract for 4.5 generation fighter aircraft.

(b) Certifications- If the Secretary recommends under subsection (a)(7) that Congress

authorize a multiyear procurement contract for 4.5 generation fighter aircraft, the Secretary

shall submit to Congress the certifications required by section 2306b of title 10, United

States Code, at the same time that the budget is submitted under section 1105(a) of title 31,

United States Code, for fiscal year 2011.

aircraft’ means current fighter aircraft, including the F-15, F-16, and F-18 [sic: F/A-18],

that—

(1) have advanced capabilities, including—

(A) AESA radar;26

(B) high capacity data-link; and

(2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments.

Section 1032 would require a report on the force structure findings of the 2009 Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR). Regarding this section, the committee’s report states:

The committee expects that the analyses submitted [under Section 1032] will include details

on all elements of the force structure discussed in the QDR report, and particularly the

following:

(1) A description of the factors that informed decisions regarding the fighter force structure

for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps, including: the assumed threat capabilities to

include fighter force capabilities as well as air defense capabilities; the modeling simulations

AESA stands for active electronically scanned array.

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and analysis used to determine fighter force structure for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine

Corps; the extent to which unmanned aerial vehicle inventories compensate for manned

fighter aircraft inventory; and the quantifiable operational risks associated with the planned

fighter fleets, based on requirements of combatant commanders, and measures planned to

address those risks;... (Pages 387-388)

Section 1047 would prohibit the Air Force from retiring fighter aircraft in accordance with the

combat air forces restructuring plan announced by the Air Force on May 18, 2009, until 90 days

after the Air Force submits to Congress a report on various aspects of the plan. The text of the

provision states:

SEC. 1047. COMBAT AIR FORCES RESTRUCTURING.

(a) Limitations Relating to Legacy Aircraft- Until the expiration of the 90-day period

beginning on the date the Secretary of the Air Force submits a report in accordance with

subsection (b), the following provisions apply:

(1) PROHIBITION ON RETIREMENT OF AIRCRAFT- The Secretary of the Air Force

may not retire any fighter aircraft pursuant to the Combat Air Forces restructuring plan

announced by the Secretary on May 18, 2009.

(2) PROHIBITION ON PERSONNEL REASSIGNMENTS- The Secretary of the Air Force

may not reassign any Air Force personnel (whether on active duty or a member of a reserve

component, including the National Guard) associated with such restructuring plan.

(3) REQUIREMENTS TO CONTINUE FUNDING(A) Of the funds authorized to be appropriated in title III of this Act for operations and

maintenance for the Air Force, at least $344,600,000 shall be expended for continued

operation and maintenance of the 249 fighter aircraft scheduled for retirement in fiscal year

2010 pursuant to such restructuring plan.

(B) Of the funds authorized to be appropriated in title I of this Act for procurement for the

Air Force, at least $10,500,000 shall be available for obligation to provide for any

modifications necessary to sustain the 249 fighter aircraft.

(b) Report- The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted to the Committees on Armed

Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate and shall include the following

information:

(1) A detailed plan of how the force structure and capability gaps resulting from the

retirement actions will be addressed.

(2) An explanation of the assessment conducted of the current threat environment and current

capabilities.

(3) A description of the follow-on mission assignments for each affected base.

(4) An explanation of the criteria used for selecting the affected bases and the particular

fighters chosen for retirement.

(5) A description of the environmental analyses being conducted.

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(6) An identification of the reassignment and manpower authorizations necessary for the Air

Force personnel (both active duty and reserve component) affected by the retirements if such

retirements are accomplished.

(7) A description of the funding needed in fiscal years 2010 through 2015 to cover operation

and maintenance costs, personnel, and aircraft procurement, if the restructuring plan is not

carried out.

(8) An estimate of the cost avoidance should the restructuring plan more forward and a

description of how such funds would be invested during the future-years defense plan to

ensure the remaining fighter force achieves the desired service life and is sufficiently

modernized to outpace the threat.

five fighter aircraft scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 2010, as announced when the

budget for fiscal year 2009 was submitted to Congress.

Section 1051 expresses the sense of Congress regarding Navy carrier air wing force structure.

The text of the provision states:

SEC. 1051. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CARRIER AIR WING FORCE

STRUCTURE.

(a) Findings- Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The requirement of section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, for the Navy to

maintain not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers, means that the naval combat forces of

the Navy also include not less than 10 carrier air wings.

(2) The Department of the Navy currently requires a carrier air wing to include not less than

44 strike fighter aircraft.

(3) In spite of the potential warfighting benefits that may result in the deployment of fifthgeneration strike fighter aircraft, for the foreseeable future the majority of the strike fighter

aircraft assigned to a carrier air wing will not be fifth-generation assets.

(b) Sense of Congress- It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) in addition to the forces described in section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, the

naval combat forces of the Navy should include not less than 10 carrier air wings (even if the

number of aircraft carriers is temporarily reduced) that are comprised of, in addition to any

other aircraft, not less than 44 strike fighter aircraft; and

(2) the Secretary of the Navy should take all appropriate actions necessary to make resources

available in order to include such number of strike fighter aircraft in each carrier air wing.

The House Armed Services Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009) on H.R.

2647, summarizes Section 133 on page 125 and Section 1051 on page 393. The report

summarizes Section 1047 on page 392, and states further in connection with Section 1047 that:

The committee is concerned about Air Force plans to accelerate the retirement of 249 legacy

fighter aircraft in fiscal year 2010, in addition to the five fighter aircraft previously scheduled

for retirement. The additional aircraft scheduled for retirement are 112 F-15s, 134 F-15s and

3 A-10s. The committee notes that such actions could lead to serious gaps in force structure

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and capability since these actions are being taken while replacement aircraft are still being

tested and are not yet available for fielding. Additionally, the committee is concerned that the

Air Force has not identified, for all of the affected bases, the follow-on missions that will

serve to fill force structure and capability gaps.

The committee has identified $143.7 million in unjustified program growth in the Air Force

operation and maintenance administrative budget, specifically service-wide technical

support, service-wide administration, and service-wide other activities. Additionally, the

committee has identified $200.9 million in unexecutable peacetime operations due to

deployments in the Air Force operating forces, air operations budget activity. The committee

recommends that these funds totaling $344.6 be used for the continued operation and

maintenance of the 249 legacy fighters that were slated for retirement during fiscal year 2010

until such time as the reporting requirement above is met. In addition, the committee

recommends that $10.5 million of funds for aircraft procurement be available for obligations

for modifications necessary to sustain the 249 fighter aircraft. (Pages 392-393)

The report states the following regarding the projected Air Force fighter shortfall:

The committee notes that for the past year, the Department of the Air Force has informed

Congress that it requires 2,200 fighter aircraft, and that the Department projects a shortfall in

its fighter aircraft inventory that would begin in fiscal year 2017 and grow to approximately

800 aircraft by 2024. The committee believes that such a shortfall will adversely affect the

ability of the active duty forces and air reserve forces to meet future requirements for both air

expeditionary forces and for the air sovereignty alert mission in the United States.

Accordingly, the committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force, in consultation with the

Chief of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air Force Reserve, to provide a report

to the congressional defense committees by March 1, 2010. The report should include

statements from both the Chief of the Air National Guard and the Chief of the Air Force

Reserve describing their separate and independent views to Congress, as applicable. The

report should address the so-called ‘‘fighter gap’’ issue in the long- and short-term with

alternative solutions including but not limited to: accelerated procurement of fifth generation

fighters such as the F-22 and F-35; an interim procurement of so-called ‘‘4.5 generation’’

fighters; and fleet management options such as service life extension programs. The report

must include a detailed analysis of the effect that any shortfalls will have on the Air National

Guard and the air sovereignty alert mission specifically, including the loss of Air National

Guard flying missions throughout the United States and the resultant loss of Air National

Guard pilot and maintenance capability. (Page 101)

The report states the following regarding the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter

shortfall:

The committee is concerned regarding the current and forecasted strike-fighter aircraft

inventory of the Department of the Navy. The committee understands that the Department of

the Navy has a fiscal year 2009 strike-fighter inventory shortfall of 110 aircraft and predicts

a fiscal year 2010 shortfall of 152 aircraft, with a potential peak strike-fighter shortfall of 312

aircraft by fiscal year 2018. The committee believes such drastic shortfalls in strike fighterinventory are unacceptable.

The committee understands that a variety of factors cause the current and projected strikefighter shortfall. Those factors include a fiscal year 2002 decision to reduce F/A-18A

through D inventory by 88 aircraft, a reduction in the program of record quantity for F35B/C by 409 aircraft, delays in development of the F-35B/C program, and F/A 18A through

D aircraft reaching forecasted service life sooner than expected.

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The committee remains unconvinced that naval strike-fighter shortfalls should be viewed

against the totality of Department of Defense strike-fighter inventory. The capabilities of the

naval strike-fighter force are inherent in the capability of the aircraft carrier as a strike

platform and, as such, force structure requirements for naval aviation must be viewed as

those required to support sufficient carrier air wings (CVW) to match the number of

statutorily mandated aircraft carriers.

The committee supports procurement of additional F/A-18E/F aircraft to mitigate the naval

strike-fighter inventory shortfall and believes that procurement of additional F/A-18E/F

aircraft through a multi-year procurement contract is more cost effective and prudent than

procuring new aircraft through an annual contract or applying $25.6 million of additional

fiscal resources per aircraft to extend the service life of the F/A-18A through D fleet.

Therefore, the committee includes a provision in title I of this Act that would authorize the

Secretary of the Navy to enter into a multi-year procurement contract for the purchase of

additional F/A-18E/F and EA-18G aircraft and also includes a provision in title X of this Act

[Section 1051] that expresses a sense of Congress that the Department of the Navy should

maintain no less than ten carrier air wings with no less than 44 strike-fighters each.

Additionally, the committee directs the Director of the Congressional Budget Office to

submit a report to the congressional defense committees by February 2, 2010, that evaluates

the operational effectiveness and costs of extending and modernizing the service-life of F/A18A through D aircraft to 10,000 flight hours versus procuring, either through an annual or

multi-year procurement contract, additional F/A-18E/F aircraft beyond the current program

of record. (Page 61)

Senate

The Senate Armed Services Committee’s report (S.Rept. 111-35 of July 2, 2009) on the Senatereported version of the FY2010 defense authorization bill (S. 1390) includes a section on the F/A18E/F program that states the following regarding the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter

shortfall:

The committee has expressed concern that the Navy is facing a sizeable gap in aircraft

inventory as older F/A-18A-D Hornets retire before the aircraft carrier variant (F-35C) of the

Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is available. The committee raised this issue in the committee

reports accompanying S. 1547 (S.Rept. 110-77) of the National Defense Authorization Act

for Fiscal Year 2008 and accompanying S. 3001 (S.Rept. 110-335) of the National Defense

Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2009. The committee is disappointed that the Navy has

failed to provide the report comparing single versus multiyear procurement costs mandated

by the second of those committee reports.

Last year, the committee received testimony from the Navy of a projected shortfall in Navy

tactical aviation. The Navy indicated that, under assumptions current at that time, it would

experience a shortfall of 69 tactical aircraft in the year 2017, a number that swells to 125

when requirements of the United States Marine Corps are included. The committee believes

that the Navy’s projection of this shortfall was, however, based on a series of questionable

assumptions.

This year, the Chief of Naval Operations said that the projected gap may be as high as 250

aircraft total for the Department of the Navy. The committee believes that the Navy has

failed to present a budget in fiscal year 2010 that takes effective action to deal with this

substantially increased projected shortfall in the Department of the Navy’s tactical air fleet

and is concerned about the potential risk such a shortfall could pose to national security. The

committee also notes that this shortfall figure is still predicated on an initial operation

capability of the F–35C in 2015 but that achieving this is considered optimistic by many

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observers. The Navy’s delay in taking action causes concern that it: (1) is continuing to

accept the substantial security risks associated with the projected shortfall; (2) remains

overly reliant on a potentially costly service life extension program (SLEP) for legacy F/A18s as a means to mitigate the gap until the Joint Strike Fighter achieves full operational

capability; and (3) is not adequately considering realistic, fiscally responsible long-range

procurement plans to address the carrier strike aircraft shortfall, such as a multiyear

procurement of F/A-18E/F aircraft as opposed to a series of single year purchases.

The committee is concerned that, in response to possible further delays, expanding costs and

technological immaturity with the JSF, the Navy appears increasingly reliant on its proposal

to extend the life of select legacy F/A-18’s from 8,600 to 10,000 flight hours through a SLEP

currently estimated to cost on average $26.0 million per plane. This life extension would be

in addition to the 2,600-hour service life extension that the Navy already plans for most

legacy F/A-18s. By the Navy’s own testimony, it is unclear how many of the planes are

capable of reaching 10,000 flight hours even with a SLEP. The committee is concerned that

the cost uncertainties of a SLEP achieving an additional 1,400 flight hours make such a plan

risky. In any case, the committee believes such SLEP may be inefficient when compared

with the benefits of procuring new F/A–18E/F’s, which might cost less than $50.0 million

each in 2009 constant dollars under a multiyear procurement acquisition strategy.

Normalizing costs for the expected return in additional service life, a SLEP to achieve the

additional 1,400 hours would cost approximately $18,571 per flight hour gained, versus

$8,333 per flight hour provided by a new F/A–18E/F (at a 6,000 flight hour life, the cost per

flight hour of a new F/A-18E/F would fall even further to $5,814 if those planes are similarly

extended to 8,600 flight hours as have legacy F/A-18s). In light of such costs, the committee

believes the Navy must more carefully evaluate costs and benefits of new F/A–18E/F

procurements, compared to investing in a SLEP of legacy aircraft.

The committee further notes that new F/A-18E/F models come equipped with improved

technological capabilities over the legacy F/A-18’s, including active electronically scanned

array radar, modernized avionics, advanced aerial refueling system capability, and added

weapon hard points, among other features that would not be part of a SLEP upgrade package

for the older aircraft. These factors would tend to increase the benefit of purchasing new

F/A-18E/Fs compared to conducting a SLEP on legacy aircraft. The Navy projects that the

F/A-18E/F will remain in the fleet until at least 2040, and should be able to use most or all of

the full service life of any newly purchased aircraft.

The committee understands that the Department of Defense intends to review the whole

issue of tactical aircraft forces in the pending Quadrennial Defense Review. The committee

expects the Department to conduct and submit the analysis of multiyear procurement for the

F/A-18 as directed in the committee report last year to include cost differentials between

single year and multiyear procurement strategies and tradeoffs between a SLEP and new

procurements of the F/A-18E/F. The Department should include such information derived

from that analysis in deciding how to implement the results on the ongoing Quadrennial

Defense Review regarding tactical aviation.

The committee expects that the Department’s tactical aviation procurement strategies will be

informed by the Quadrennial Defense Review. In light of the significant increase in the

strike-fighter shortfall testified to before the committee this year, additional actions to

address that shortfall cannot be delayed too long. (Pages 20-22)

Conference

The conference version (H.Rept. 111-288 of October 7, 2009) of H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84 of

October 28, 2009, contains a provision (Section 131) that requires the Department of Defense

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(DOD) to submit a report to Congress on the procurement of “4.5”-generation fighter aircraft.

Section 1052 would require a report on the force structure findings of the 2009 Quadrennial

Defense Review (QDR). The House report on H.R. 2647 (H.Rept. 111-166 of June 18, 2009—see

discussion above) stated that the report on 4.5-generation fighter aircraft is to include, among

other things, a description of the factors that informed decisions regarding the fighter force

structure for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. Section 1075 of H.R. 2647/P.L. 111-84

prohibits the Air Force from retiring fighter aircraft in accordance with the combat air forces

restructuring plan until 30 days after the Air Force submits to Congress a report on various

aspects of the plan. Section 1076 expresses the sense of Congress regarding Navy carrier air wing

force structure.

Section 131 states:

SEC. 131. REPORT ON THE PROCUREMENT OF 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER

AIRCRAFT.

(a) IN GENERAL.—Not later than 90 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the

Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report on the

procurement of 4.5 generation fighter aircraft. The report shall include the following:

(1) The number of 4.5 generation fighter aircraft needed to be procured during fiscal years

2011 through 2025 to fulfill the requirement of the Air Force to maintain not less than 2,200

tactical fighter aircraft.

(2) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through annual

procurement contracts.

(3) The estimated procurement costs for those aircraft if procured through multiyear

procurement contracts.

(4) The estimated savings that could be derived from the procurement of those aircraft

through a multiyear procurement contract, and whether the Secretary determines the amount

of those savings to be substantial.

(5) A discussion comparing the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through annual

procurement contracts with the costs and benefits of obtaining those aircraft through a

multiyear procurement contract.

(6) A discussion regarding the availability and feasibility of procuring F–35 aircraft to

proportionally and concurrently re capitalize the Air National Guard during fiscal years 2015

through fiscal year 2025.

(b) 4.5 GENERATION FIGHTER AIRCRAFT DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘4.5

generation fighter aircraft’’ means current fighter aircraft, including the F–15, F–16, and F–

18, that—

(1) have advanced capabilities, including—

(A) AESA radar;

(B) high capacity data-link; and

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(2) have the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced armaments.

Section 1052 states:

SEC. 1052. REPORT ON THE FORCE STRUCTURE FINDINGS OF THE 2009

QUADRENNIAL DEFENSE REVIEW.

(a) REPORT REQUIREMENT.—Concurrent with the delivery of the report on the 2009

quadrennial defense review required by section 118 of title 10, United States Code, the

Secretary of Defense shall submit to the congressional defense committees a report with a

classified annex containing—

(1) the analyses used to determine and support the findings on force structure required by

such section; and

(2) a description of any changes from the previous quadrennial defense review to the

minimum military requirements for major military capabilities.

(b) MAJOR MILITARY CAPABILITIES DEFINED.—In this section, the term ‘‘major

military capabilities’’ includes any capability the Secretary determines to be a major military

capability, any capability discussed in the report of the 2006 quadrennial defense review, and

any capability described in paragraph (9) or (10) of section 118(d) of title 10, United States

Code.

Section 1075 states:

SEC. 1075. COMBAT AIR FORCES RESTRUCTURING.

(a) LIMITATIONS RELATING TO LEGACY AIRCRAFT.—Until the expiration of the 30day period beginning on the date the Secretary of the Air Force submits a report in

accordance with subsection (b), the following provisions apply:

(1) PROHIBITION ON RETIREMENT OF AIRCRAFT.—The Secretary of the Air Force

may not retire any fighter aircraft pursuant to the Combat Air Forces restructuring plan

announced by the Secretary on May 18, 2009.

(2) PROHIBITION ON PERSONNEL REASSIGNMENTS.—The Secretary of the Air

Force may not reassign any Air Force personnel (whether on active duty or a member of a

reserve component, including the National Guard) associated with such restructuring plan.

(b) REPORT.—The report under subsection (a) shall be submitted to the Committees on

Armed Services of the House of Representatives and the Senate and shall include the

following information:

(1) A detailed plan of how the force structure and capability gaps resulting from the

retirement actions will be addressed.

(2) An explanation of the assessment conducted of the current threat environment and current

capabilities.

(3) A description of the follow-on mission assignments for each affected base.

(4) An explanation of the criteria used for selecting the affected bases and the particular

fighters chosen for retirement.

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(5) A description of the environmental analyses being conducted.

(6) An identification of the reassignment and manpower authorizations necessary for the Air

Force personnel (both active duty and reserve component) affected by the retirements if such

retirements are accomplished.

(7) A description of the funding needed in fiscal years 2010 through 2015 to cover operation

and maintenance costs, personnel, and aircraft procurement, if the restructuring plan is not

carried out.

(8) An estimate of the cost avoidance should the restructuring plan more forward and a

description of how such funds would be invested during the future-years defense plan to

ensure the remaining fighter force achieves the desired service life and is sufficiently

modernized to outpace the threat.

not apply to the five fighter aircraft scheduled for retirement in fiscal year 2010, as

announced when the budget for fiscal year 2009 was submitted to Congress.

Section 1076 states:

SEC. 1076. SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING CARRIER AIR WING FORCE

STRUCTURE.

(a) FINDINGS.—Congress makes the following findings:

(1) Section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, requires the Department of the Navy to

maintain not less than 11 operational aircraft carriers.

(2) In repeated testimony before Congress, the Navy has pledged its long-term commitment

to naval combat forces that include 11 operational aircraft carriers and 10 carrier air wings,

composed of 44 strike-fighter aircraft per wing.

(b) SENSE OF CONGRESS.—It is the sense of Congress that—

(1) in addition to the forces described in section 5062(b) of title 10, United States Code, the

Navy should meet its current requirement for 10 carrier air wings (even if the number of

aircraft carriers is temporarily reduced) that are comprised of not less than 44 strike-fighter

aircraft, in addition to any other aircraft associated with the air wing; and

(2) the Congress and the Secretary of the Navy should take all appropriate actions necessary

to achieve the current requirement for such carrier air wings until such time that

modifications to the carrier air wing force structure are warranted and the Secretary of the

Navy provides Congress with a justification of any proposed modifications, supported by

rigorous and sufficient warfighting analysis.

Regarding Section 131, the conference report states:

The conferees agree that the investment strategy that the Department of the Air Force intends

to help the Department of Defense transition from, the capability provided by the current

tactical fighter force to a smaller but more flexible, lethal and capable strike fighter force,

will be challenging. As the Air Force implements that strategy but where circumstances

warrant, the conferees expect the Air Force will analyze the viability of procuring additional

4.5 generation fighter aircraft under a multiyear contract and, where those conditions

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required to be present under Section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, as amended,

exist, submit a multiyear procurement proposal to Congress, accompanied with certifications

required under Section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, as amended.

With this provision, the conferees merely intend for the Air Force to conduct, and provide

the congressional defense committees with, the analysis necessary to support, where

warranted, a multiyear purchase of additional 4.5 generation fighter aircraft, specifically

defined under this provision to capture the F–15, F–16, and F–18 that have advanced radar,

data-link and avionics capabilities and the capability to deploy advanced armaments. The

conferees do not intend that this provision will modify in any way the requirements of

Section 2306b of title 10, United States Code, as amended, by section 811 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (Public Law 110–181), and the statement of

managers accompanying those amendments (H. Rept. 110–477). (Page 682)

FY2010 DOD Appropriations Bill (H.R. 3326)

House

The House Appropriations Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 111-230 of July 24 2009) on H.R.

3326, states the following regarding the Air Force’s proposed combat forces restructuring plan:

COMBAT AIR FORCE RESTRUCTURE

The Committee is concerned with the lack of detail and analysis provided to the Congress

regarding the Air Force’s Combat Air Force restructure plan that would retire 248 legacy F–

15, F–16 and A–10 aircraft. Many of these same concerns regarding the proposed

restructuring plan were expressed by the House-passed version of the fiscal year 2010

National Defense Authorization Act. The Committee directs that the reports stipulated in the

House-passed version of the Fiscal Year 2010 Defense Authorization Act also be transmitted

to the Defense Appropriations Committees. Particularly given these outstanding reports and

the expected publication of the Quadrennial Defense Review in the coming year, the

Committee is concerned that full implementation of the restructure may be premature.

Additionally, the Committee is concerned with the personnel costs and potential acquisition

costs associated with the Air Force proposal to remove the training of F–15 pilots and related

personnel from Tyndall Air Force Base. The Committee directs the Department to provide a

cost benefit analysis of this proposal regarding Tyndall Air Force Base and Kingsley Field in

Klamath Falls, Oregon no later than 180 days after enactment of this Act. The report shall

include an analysis of factors impacting F–15 training quantity and quality at each location,

to include training synergies, airspace access and availability. The report shall identify and

explain the justification for where F–15 Basic Crew Chief Training, Air Control Squadron

Training and Intelligence Formal Training will be established and maintained. The report

shall include analysis on simulator and ancillary training access, expected effect on the

quality and experience of the instructor base, future military construction requirements and

special considerations and costs required due to the differing training environments and

climatology at each base.

Moreover, the Committee requests that the Department identify airfields that share runways

for both Air Force and commercial operations within the continental United States. The

Committee requests that the Department include air force policy on and analysis of the

training and operational mission impacts at bases with shared runways.

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Additionally, the Committee directs an independent review by a Federally Funded Research

and Development Center (FFRDC) on the impact of the restructure on the Nation’s combat

air forces.

The Committee directs the Secretary of the Air Force to provide the described reports no

sooner than 180 days after enactment of this Act. The Committee further directs that no

funds may be obligated on executing the Combat Air Force restructure until 180 days after

submission to the congressional defense committees of all directed reports. (Pages 62-63)

The report states the following regarding the project Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall:

STRIKE FIGHTER SHORTFALL

Sustained, continued operations in overseas contingencies have resulted in the Department of

the Navy’s tactical aircraft fleet (primarily the F–18 variant aircraft) being flown at an

extremely high operational tempo. This has caused the aircraft to age at a faster rate than the

Navy had planned when determining the introduction of the follow on aircraft, the F–35

Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter. The net result of these sustained operations is that the Navy

is forecasting critical shortfalls in its strike fighter inventory. Delays in the introduction of

the F–35 from the original forecast have exacerbated this shortfall. Last year, the Department

of the Navy predicted that the shortfall would peak at 125 aircraft in fiscal year 2017.

Although the Department of the Navy has not provided an updated shortfall prediction with

the submission of this year’s budget, the Committee understands it is now over 200 aircraft.

This is due to the fact that a key assumption in last year’s prediction, the life extension of the

older variant F–18 aircraft, is proving to be more problematic than anticipated. Additionally,

the Navy has reduced the number of F–18 aircraft being purchased in fiscal year 2010 from

what was predicted last year. This reduction is confusing, since it moves the tactical aircraft

inventory in the exact opposite direction one would expect when faced with a shortage of

aircraft.

Fortunately for the Navy, the production line for the F/A–18E/F variant aircraft is still open

and producing aircraft. For the last ten years this program has produced cost effective aircraft

under the umbrella of a multi-year procurement strategy, however the fiscal year 2010

aircraft are being purchased as a standalone, annually priced procurement. The unit price

difference between an annual procurement and a multi-year procurement is substantial. Since

the F–35 will not begin to deliver in significant quantities for several years, the Committee

believes the Navy is letting a golden opportunity slip away by not entering into another

multi-year procurement for F/A–18E/F aircraft. In addition to mitigating the strike fighter

shortfall, the Navy would achieve significant savings by purchasing aircraft under a multiyear procurement. Therefore, the recommendation provides $108,000,000 above the request

for the procurement of long lead equipment in an economic order quantity and cost reduction

initiatives for a five year, 150 aircraft multi-year procurement for the F/A–18E/F and EA–

18G programs. Additionally, in an attempt to further mitigate the strike fighter shortfall, the

recommendation provides $495,000,000 for the procurement of an additional nine F/A–

18E/F Aircraft. (Page 153)

Senate (Committee Report)

The Senate Appropriations Committee, in its report (S.Rept. 111-74 of September 10, 2009) on

H.R. 3326 states the following regarding the projected Navy-Marine Corps strike fighter shortfall:

F/A–18 Super Hornet.—The Committee is concerned about the shortfall in the Navy’s

strikefighter inventory created by the aging of the older F/A–18 models and the fact that the

F–35 Joint Strike Fighter program will not start delivering carrier aircraft in significant

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numbers for several years. The shortfall is currently estimated to be at least 129 aircraft; it

could be well above that level if it extending the life of the F/A–18 out to 10,000 hours is

cost prohibitive. To ensure that Navy has sufficient aircraft for the fleet, the Committee

provides an increase of $512,280,000 to procure an additional nine 9 F/A–18s in fiscal year

2010. The Committee again encourages the Navy to pursue a multi-year procurement

contract for these aircraft. (Page 257)

Senate (Floor Consideration)

On October 6, during its consideration of H.R. 3326, the Senate approved, by a vote of 91-7

(Record Vote Number 309), an amendment (S.Amdt. 2596) that prohibits the Air Force from

retiring any tactical aircraft as announced in the Combat Air Forces restructuring plan announced

on May 18, 2009, until the Air Force submits to the congressional defense committees the report

that provides, among other things, a detailed plan for how the Air Force will fill the force

structure and capability gaps resulting from the retirement of those aircraft. The text of the

amendment is as follows:

AMENDMENT NO. 2596

(Purpose: To limit the early retirement of tactical aircraft)

At the appropriate place, insert the following:

Sec. __. (a) Limitation on Early Retirement of Tactical Aircraft.—The Secretary of the Air

Force may not retire any tactical aircraft as announced in the Combat Air Forces structuring

plan announced on May 18, 2009, until the Secretary submits to the congressional defense

committees the report described in subsection (b).

(b) Report.—The report described in this subsection is a report that sets forth the following:

(1) A detailed plan for how the Secretary of the Air Force will fill the force structure and

capability gaps resulting from the retirement of tactical aircraft under the structuring plan

described in subsection (a).

(2) A description of the follow-on missions for each base affected by the structuring plan.

(3) An explanation of the criteria used for selecting the bases referred to in paragraph (2) and

for the selection of tactical aircraft for retirement under the structuring plan.

(4) A plan for the reassignment of the regular and reserve Air Force personnel affected by

the retirement of tactical aircraft under the structuring plan.

(5) An estimate of the cost avoidance to be achieved by the retirement of such tactical

aircraft, and a description how such funds would be invested under the period covered by the

most current future-years defense program.

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Appendix. Air Force Briefing on Combat Air Forces

Restructuring Plan

This appendix presents Air Force briefing slides on the Air Force’s proposed combat air forces

restructuring plan.

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Author Contact Information

Jeremiah J. Gertler

Specialist in Military Aviation

[redacted]@crs.loc.g

ov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

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