Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Congressional research reportJan 29, 2010
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Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background,
Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
(name redacted)
Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs
January 29, 2010
Congressional Research Service
7-....
www.crs.gov
RL33530
CRS Report for Congress
Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Summary
After the first Gulf war, in 1991, a new peace process consisting of bilateral negotiations between
Israel and the Palestinians, Jordan, Syria, and Lebanon achieved mixed results. Milestones
included the Israeli-Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) Declaration of Principles (DOP) of
September 13, 1993, providing for Palestinian empowerment and some territorial control, the
Israeli-Jordanian peace treaty of October 26, 1994, and the Interim Self-Rule in the West Bank or
Oslo II accord of September 28, 1995, which led to the formation of the Palestinian Authority
(PA) to govern the West Bank and Gaza Strip. However, Israeli-Syrian negotiations were
intermittent and difficult, and postponed indefinitely in 2000. Israeli-Lebanese negotiations also
were unsuccessful, leading Israel to withdraw unilaterally from south Lebanon on May 24, 2000.
President Clinton held a summit with Israeli and Palestinian leaders at Camp David on final status
issues that July, but they did not produce an accord. A Palestinian uprising or intifadah began in
September. On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel, and rejected
steps taken at Camp David and afterwards.
On April 30, 2003, the United States, the U.N., European Union, and Russia (known as the
“Quartet”) presented a “Road Map” to Palestinian statehood. It has not been implemented. Israel
unilaterally disengaged (withdrew) from the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the West
Bank in August 2005. On January 9, 2005, Mahmud Abbas had become President of the PA. The
victory of Hamas, which Israel and the United States consider a terrorist group, in the January
2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections complicated prospects for peace as the United States,
Israel, and the Quartet would not deal with a Hamas-led government until it disavowed violence,
recognized Israel, and accepted prior Israeli-Palestinian accords. President Abbas’s dissolution of
the Hamas-led government in response to the June 2007 Hamas forcible takeover of the Gaza
Strip led to resumed international contacts with the PA. On November 27, at an international
conference in Annapolis, MD, President Bush read a Joint Understanding in which Abbas and
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert agreed to simultaneously resume bilateral negotiations on
core issues and implement the Road Map. On May 21, 2008, Israel, Syria, and Turkey announced
that Syria and Israel had begun indirect peace talks in Istanbul via Turkish mediators. Later in the
year, Israeli and U.S. elections appeared to disrupt negotiations on all tracks and the end of the
Israeli-Hamas cease-fire in December and the subsequent outbreak of violence in Gaza led to the
official suspension of peace talks. President Obama has affirmed U.S. support for a two-state
solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and named former Senator George Mitchell as his
Special Envoy for Middle East Peace, but negotiations have not resumed.
Congress is interested in issues related to Middle East peace because of its oversight role in the
conduct of U.S. foreign policy, its support for Israel, and keen constituent interest. It is especially
concerned about U.S. financial and other commitments to the parties, and the 111th Congress is
engaged in these matters. Congress also has endorsed Jerusalem as the undivided capital of Israel,
although U.S. Administrations have consistently maintained that the fate of the city is the subject
of final status negotiations. See also CRS Report R40101, Israel and Hamas: Conflict in Gaza
(2008-2009) , coordinated by (name redacted), CRS Report RS22768,
Israeli-Palestinian Peace
Process: The Annapolis Conference, by (name redacted), CRS Report RL33566, Lebanon: The
Israel-Hamas-Hezbollah Conflict, coordinated by (name redacted), and CRS Report RS22967,
U.S. Foreign Aid to the Palestinians, by (name redacted).
Congressional Research Service
Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Contents
Most Recent Developments.........................................................................................................1
Israel-Palestinians .................................................................................................................1
Israel-Syria ...........................................................................................................................4
Israel-Lebanon ......................................................................................................................4
Background ................................................................................................................................5
U.S. Role ..............................................................................................................................5
1991-2008.......................................................................................................................5
Obama Administration ....................................................................................................6
Madrid Conference ...............................................................................................................8
Bilateral Talks and Developments .........................................................................................9
Israel-Palestinians ...........................................................................................................9
2009 ............................................................................................................................. 25
Israel-Syria ................................................................................................................... 36
Israel-Lebanon .............................................................................................................. 42
Israel-Jordan ................................................................................................................. 48
Significant Agreements and Documents .................................................................................... 48
Israel-PLO Mutual Recognition........................................................................................... 48
Declaration of Principles ..................................................................................................... 49
Agreement on the Gaza Strip and the Jericho Area .............................................................. 49
Israel-Jordan Peace Treaty................................................................................................... 49
Israeli-Palestinian Interim Agreement, West Bank-Gaza Strip.............................................. 49
Protocol Concerning the Redeployment in Hebron .............................................................. 49
Wye River Memorandum .................................................................................................... 50
Sharm al Shaykh Memorandum .......................................................................................... 50
A Performance-Based Road Map to a Permanent Two-State Solution to the IsraeliPalestinian Conflict .......................................................................................................... 50
Agreement on Movement and Access .................................................................................. 50
Joint Understanding ............................................................................................................ 51
Role of Congress....................................................................................................................... 51
Aid ..................................................................................................................................... 51
Jerusalem............................................................................................................................ 51
Compliance/Sanctions......................................................................................................... 52
Israeli Raid on Suspected Syrian Nuclear Site ..................................................................... 52
Gaza Fact-Finding Mission (“Goldstone Report”) ............................................................... 53
Other .................................................................................................................................. 54
Contacts
Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 55
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................... 55
Congressional Research Service
Israeli-Arab Negotiations: Background, Conflicts, and U.S. Policy
Most Recent Developments
Israel-Palestinians
On November 25, 2009, to help “launch meaningful negotiations,” Israeli Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu proposed “a policy of restraint regarding a suspension of new permits and
new construction in Judea and Samaria (West Bank) for a period of ten months.” The “freeze” or
“moratorium” does not apply to 3,000 housing units under construction, to schools, synagogues,
and public buildings, to infrastructure needed for national security, or to Jerusalem. He later said
that Israel would “revert to the policies of previous governments in relation to construction” at the
end of the ten months. Secretary Clinton said that the proposal “helps move forward” the peace
process and that through “good faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome
which ends the conflict and reconciles the Palestinian goal of a independent and viable state
based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps, and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and
recognized borders that reflect subsequent developments and meet Israeli security requirements.”1
Special Middle East Envoy George Mitchell said that the Israeli step “falls short of a full
settlement freeze, but it is more than any Israeli government has done before…”2 He noted that
“the number of buildings under construction will decline since, as each new building is
completed, there will be no new building started. So implementation of the moratorium could
mean much less settlement construction than would occur if there is no moratorium.” He also
expressed a desire to get a “resolution of the issue of borders, so that there will no longer be any
question about settlement construction, so that Israelis will be able to build what they want in
Israel, and the Palestinians will be able to build what they want in Palestine.”3 The Palestinians
criticized Israel for not freezing all settlement activity or including Jerusalem. President Abbas
described it as “insufficient” and “unacceptable.”
On December 28, Israel underscored that a “unified” Jerusalem is its capital and excluded from
the freeze when it announced plans to build 692 news housing units in East Jerusalem. The White
House Press Secretary responded, saying
The United States opposes new Israeli construction in East Jerusalem. The status of
Jerusalem is a permanent status issue that must be resolved by the parties through
negotiations…. Neither party should engage in efforts or take actions that could
unilaterally preempt, or appear to preempt, negotiations. Rather, both parties should
return to negotiations without preconditions as soon as possible…. We believe that
through good faith negotiations the parties can mutually agree on an outcome that
realizes the aspirations of both parties for Jerusalem, and safeguards its status for people
around the world.4
1
The Secretary’s November 25, 2009 statement on Israel’s Announcement Regarding Settlements is accessible at
http://www.state.gov.
2
Richard Boudreaux, “Israel Halts Building Permits,” Chicago Tribune, November 26, 2009.
3
Briefing by Special Envoy for Middle East Peace George Mitchell, November 25, 2009, accessible at
http://www.state.gov.
4
Statement by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on Construction in East Jerusalem, December 28, 2009,
accessible at http://www.whitehouse.gov.
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In December, President Abbas pledged that, as long as he is in office, he “will not allow anybody
to start a new intifadah.” At the same time, he called on the international community and on the
United States to pressure the Israeli government.5
The Obama Administration began 2010 with a renewed effort to restart negotiations. Media
reports suggested that it was preparing “letters of guarantee” that would assure the Palestinians
that the 1967 borders would form the basis of the negotiations and the Israelis that post-1967
demographic changes (some settlements) would be taken in to account. 6 Secretary Clinton said
that the Administration was working “to take the steps needed to relaunch the negotiations as
soon as possible and without preconditions.” She again stated that a solution would reconcile “the
Palestinian goal of an independent and viable state based on the 1967 lines, with agreed swaps,
and the Israeli goal of a Jewish state with secure and recognized borders.” Later, on January 8,
she may have attempted to blur the 2009 U.S. focus on Israeli settlements, saying “resolving
borders resolves settlements, resolving Jerusalem resolves settlements….”7
On January 6, Mitchell was interviewed on the Public Broadcasting System’s Charlie Rose Show,
and expressed hope for progress on three tracks: political negotiations, security, and Palestinian
economic growth and institution building. (These tracks are identical to those suggested by
Netanyahu in his March 31, 2009 address to the Knesset.8) Mitchell claimed that Netanyahu’s
10-month moratorium is “more significant than any action taken by any previous government of
Israel for the 40 years that the settlement enterprise has existed.” He stated that Israeli security
and the establishment of a Palestinian state are “mutually reinforcing” in that “Palestinians are not
going to get a state until the people of Israel have a reasonable sense of sustainable security. The
Israelis … are not going to get that reasonable sense of sustainable security until there is a
Palestinian state.” Mitchell also said that negotiations should last no more than two years and “it
can be done within that period of time” or a shorter period of time.
Mitchell also said that the United States is seeking a “parallel process” in which “as the Israelis
and Palestinians talk in negotiations, Israel, the Palestinians, and all the surrounding countries
would meet to deal with regional issues, energy, water, trade, communications, transport….” He
seemed to discourage an Israeli-Hamas prisoner exchange because it “will not build confidence in
the Palestinian Authority because it will, in fact, be seen as a validation of Hamas’s tactics, which
is violent resistance.” When Rose asked if the United States had any “sticks,” Mitchell responded,
“the United States can withhold support on loan guarantees to Israel.” Some media outlets
interpreted this as a threat; so the State Department later clarified that he was not signaling a
course of action. Mitchell himself had added, “we think the way to approach this is to try to
persuade the parties what is in their self interests.”9
On January 8, a Palestinian newspaper summarized Palestinian ideas about peace negotiations,
reportedly formulated by Saeb Erekat, head of the PLO Negotiations Department and Umar
Suleiman, Egypt’s intelligence chief. First, the goal should be a Palestinian state with Jerusalem
5
Charles Levinson, “Abbas Says Palestinians Won’t Rise Up, for Now,” Wall Street Journal, December 22, 2009.
Matthew Lee, “US Readies New Mideast Peace Push,” Associated Press, January 7, 2010.
7
Remarks with Jordanian Foreign Minister Nasser Judeh after their Meeting, January 8, 2010,
http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/134972.htm.
8
Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister-designate Binyamin Netanyahu introducing Israel’s 32nd Government,
Channel 10 Television, March 31, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090331738004.
9
Text at http://thepage.time.com/transcript-george-mitchell-on-charlie-rose/.
6
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as its capital based on the 1967 borders. This could include exchanges of land of similar value.
Second, Israeli settlement activity, including natural growth and in Jerusalem, should stop
completely for six months. Third, negotiations should resume from the point reached in
December 2008 with former Israeli Prime Minister Olmert and include all final status issues.10 On
January 12, President Abbas said for the first time that he might restart negotiations if Israel froze
settlement expansions for “a fixed period.”11 He also said, “We don’t want (U.S.) guarantees. We
want (the United States) to tell Israel to fully freeze settlements for a period of time and then we
will resume negotiations.”12
Prior to Mitchell’s arrival in Israel, on January 20, Netanyahu asserted that in order “to effectively
stop the infiltration of rockets and other weaponry … will require an Israeli presence on the
eastern side of the future state,” i.e., in the Jordan Valley.13 An Abbas spokesman replied, “We
will not accept anything less than a completely sovereign Palestinian state on all the territories
with its own borders, resources and airspace, and we will not accept any Israeli presence, either
military or civilian, on our land.”14
Mitchell made his ninth visit to the region from January 21-25. The State Department issued a
statement on January 27 that he had continued a “two-pronged approach … (1) To encourage the
parties to enter negotiations to reach an agreement on all permanent status issues; and (2) to help
the Palestinians build the economy and institutions that will be necessary when a Palestinian state
is established. The two objectives are mutually reinforcing. Each is essential. Neither can be
attained without the other.” Earlier, Netanyahu had said that Mitchell presented “interesting
ideas” on how to restart negotiations. Reportedly, the ideas included confidence-building
measures such as the withdrawal of Israel forces from more territory in the West Bank, release of
prisoners, preliminary talks on a low level, and/or proximity talks, with Mitchell shuttling
between Jerusalem and Ramallah to convey messages on core issues of borders, Jerusalem,
security, and refugees. A Palestinian official said that Abbas did not favor resuming negotiations
at any level before a complete cessation of settlement activity, including in east Jerusalem.
After meeting the envoy, Netanyahu visited settlements. On January 24, at Etzyon, he proclaimed,
“This place will be an inseparable part of the state of Israel for eternity,” and at Ma’ale Adumim,
he affirmed, “We are here, and we will stay here and build here as part of sovereign Jerusalem.”15
On January 29, in Ari’el, he declared, “Here is where our forefathers dwelled and here is where
we will stay and build…. Ari’el … will be an integral, inseparable part of the state of Israel in any
future arrangement.”16 While his statements appeared provocative, it has long been assumed that
Israel would retain those large settlements in a final agreement in exchange for other land being
given to the new Palestinian state.
10
“PLO Figure Urayqat Comments on Initiative to Resume Talks with Israel,” Al-Jazeera TV, January 8, 2010, also
quoting Al-Ayyam newspaper, BBC Monitoring Middle East, January 9, 2010.
11
“Abbas Calls for Settlement Freeze ‘For a Fixed Period,’” Al-Manar TV (Beirut), January 12, 2010.
12
“Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas Said he will Resist U.S. Pressure to resume Peace Talks,” Reuters, January
14, 2010.
13
“PM Netanyahu Addresses the Foreign Press Association in Israel,” January 20, 2010, accessible via Israeli Ministry
of Foreign Affairs website http://www.mfa.gov.il.
14
“US Envoy in Israel in Bid to Relaunch Peace Process,” AFP, January 21, 2010.
15
Mark Lavie, “Netanyahu’s Claim Riles Palestinians,” Boston Globe, January 25, 2010, Amy Teibel, “Parts of West
Bank Israel’s, says Premier,” Associated Press, January 25, 2010.
16
Barak Ravid, “Benjamin Netanyahu: Israel to Retain Key West Bank Settlement in any Peace Deal,”
http://www.haaretz.com
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In a January interview with Time magazine, President Obama assessed the first year of his
Administration’s involvement in the Israel-Palestinian peace process. He said, “This is as
intractable problem as you get. Both sides … have found that the political environment, the
nature of their coalitions or the divisions within their societies, were such that it was very hard for
them to start engaging in a meaningful conversation. And I think that we overestimated our ability
to persuade them to do so when their politics ran contrary to that…. (I)f we had anticipated some
of these problems … earlier, we might not have raised expectations as high.”17
On January 28, President Abbas told Russian television that Jerusalem should not be divided and
that there should be free passage for people of various faiths. He added that it must be made clear
what belongs to the Palestinians and what belongs to Israel. Abbas also said that he could only
recognize Israel as a Jewish state in the framework of a conclusive peace agreement that leads to
the establishment of a Palestinian state. He could not resume negotiations as long as construction
in West Bank settlements and East Jerusalem continues. “If Israel says… that it will not accept
the 1967 borders and that it is not prepared to discuss Jerusalem and the refugee situation, what is
there to talk about?” Abbas reported that the United States had asked Israel to make gestures to
the Palestinians, including transferring additional territories in the West Bank to Palestinian
control, halting Israeli military incursions, releasing prisoners, dismantling checkpoints and
allowing building materials to enter the Gaza Strip. Israel had not yet responded.18
Israel-Syria
On November 15, Prime Minister Netanyahu said that Israel would be willing to have France
serve as a mediator with Israel, even though he would prefer direct talks. He said, “The Turkish
prime minister (Recep Tayyip Erdogan) has not strengthened his image as an objective, fair
mediator.” Erdogan repeatedly criticized Israel for launching its offensive against Hamas in Gaza
in December 2008, for its conduct of that war, and for its treatment of Gazans since the conflict
ended. Meanwhile, Syrian President Bashar al Asad called on France to support Turkey as
mediator.19 He rejected direct talks and urged Netanyahu to join him in sending teams of experts
to Turkey to resume the process. Asad also called on the United States to present an “action plan”
to renew negotiations.
Israel-Lebanon
On November 4, Israeli naval commandos seized a cargo vessel in waters near Cyprus which
Israeli authorities claimed was carrying anti-tank missiles, rockets, and other weapons from Iran
to Hezbollah in violation of the U.N. embargo of Iranian arms exports and of the U.N. prohibition
on arms supplies to non-state actors in Lebanon. The ship was taken to Ashdod for further
inspection. Syria maintained that it was carrying commercial goods from Syria to Iran and
accused Israel of “piracy.”20 Hezbollah denied “any link to the weapons….”
17
Transcript of interview by Joe Klein conducted January 15, 2010, accessible via http://www.time.com., excerpted in
Time, January 21, 2010.
18
Reported in “Abbas: Palestinians will Accept Only Jerusalem as Our Capital,” http://www.haaretz.com, January 28,
2010.
19
“PM: We Would Accept France as a Mediator in Talks with Syria,” Jerusalem Post, November 15, 2009.
20
Mark Weiss, “Israel Seizes Vessel with Cargo of Weapons Believed from Iran,” Irish Times, November 5, 2009.
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On November 25, Lebanon’s new cabinet agreed to a statement on the “right of Lebanon, its
government, its people, its arm, and its resistance” to liberate all Lebanese territory, thereby
recognizing Hezbollah’s right to engage in armed conflict with Israel.
Background
Before the first Gulf war in 1991, Arab-Israeli conflict marked every decade since the founding of
Israel. With each clash, issues separating the parties multiplied and became more intractable. The
creation of the State of Israel in 1948 provided a home for the Jewish people, but the ensuing
conflict made refugees of hundreds of thousands of Arab residents of formerly British Palestine,
with consequences troubling for Arabs and Israelis alike. It also led to a mass movement of
Jewish citizens of Arab states to Israel. The 1967 war ended with Israel occupying territory of
Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Egypt and Syria fought the 1973 war, in part, to regain their lands. In
1982, Israel invaded southern Lebanon to prevent terrorist incursions; it withdrew in 1985, but
retained a 9-mile “security zone” that Lebanon sought to reclaim. Middle East peace has been a
U.S. and international diplomatic goal throughout the years of conflict. The 1978 Camp David
talks, the only previous direct Arab-Israeli negotiations, brought about the 1979 Israel-Egypt
Peace Treaty.21
U.S. Role
1991-2008
At the beginning of the Gulf war in 1991, President George H.W. Bush declared solving the ArabIsraeli conflict among his postwar goals. On March 6, 1991, he outlined a framework for peace
based on U.N. Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338 and the principle of “land for peace.”
Secretary of State James Baker organized a peace conference in Madrid in October 1991 that
launched almost a decade of the “Oslo process” to achieve peace. It continued under President
William Clinton, who asserted that only the region’s leaders can make peace and vowed to be
their partner. With the Hebron Protocol of 1997, however, the United States seemed to become an
indispensable and expected party to Israeli-Palestinian talks. Clinton mediated the 1998 Wye
River Memorandum and personally led negotiations at Camp David in 2000.
The George W. Bush Administration initially sought a less prominent role, and Secretary of State
Colin Powell did not appoint a special Middle East envoy. After the September 11, 2001, terrorist
attacks, the Administration focused on the peace process mainly as part of the war on terrorism.
Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice also did not name a special envoy, asserting, “Not every
effort has to be an American effort. It is extremely important that the parties themselves are taking
responsibility.”22 She encouraged Israelis and Palestinians to act, but personally mediated a
21
For additional background, see William B. Quandt, Peace Process, American Diplomacy and the Arab-Israeli
Conflict since 1967, Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, Revised Edition 2001; Charles Enderlin, Shattered
Dreams: The Failure of the Peace Process in the Middle East, New York, Other Press, 2003; Anton La Guardia, War
Without End: Israelis Palestinians and the Struggle for a Promised Land, New York, St. Martin’s Griffin, Revised and
Updated, 2003; Alan Dowty, Israel/Palestine, Cambridge, UK, Polity Press, 2005; and Dennis Ross, The Missing
Peace: The Inside Story of the Fight for Middle East Peace, New York, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, 2004.
22
Anne Gearan, “Rice Blasts Way Iran Treats Its Own People,” Associated Press, February 4, 2005.
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November 2005 accord to reopen the border crossing between Gaza and Egypt after Israel’s
withdrawal from Gaza. In 2007, she engaged again partly in order to elicit the support of
moderate Sunni Arab governments to thwart the rise of Iranian influence. Those governments see
resolution of the Palestinian issue as a key to regional stability and to denying Iran opportunities
for destabilizing actions.
The Joint Understanding presented at the November 2007 Annapolis Conference created a new
role for the United States as “judge” of the parties’ fulfillment of their commitments under the
2003 international Road Map to a two-state solution. In January 2008, President Bush appointed
(Air Force) Lt. Gen. William Fraser III, assistant to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to
monitor compliance with commitments. Gen. Fraser, who has been replaced by Lt. Gen. Paul J.
Selva, was not to mediate or enforce compliance, but bring to their actions to the attention of the
parties and encourage them to move forward on their obligations.23 Fraser was to visit the region
“from time to time,” but the trilateral mechanism barely functioned.
Obama Administration
At her January 13, 2009, confirmation hearing, Secretary of State-designate Hillary Rodham
Clinton said that the Gaza conflict of December 2008 to January 2009 “must only increase our
determination to seek a just and lasting peace agreement that brings real security to Israel—
normal and positive relations with its neighbors, independence, economic progress, and security
to the Palestinians in their own state. We will exert every effort to support the work of Israelis and
Palestinians who seek that result....” She added that the United States would not negotiate with
Hamas until it recognizes Israel, renounces violence, and abides by previous agreements. “That is
just an absolute for me. That is the United States’ position and the president-elect’s position.”
On his first full day in office, January 21, President Obama telephoned PA President Mahmud
Abbas, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, and Jordanian
King Abdullah II “to communicate his commitment to active engagement in pursuit of ArabIsraeli peace from the beginning of his term.” The next day, the President and Secretary Clinton
jointly announced the appointment of former Senator George Mitchell as their Special Envoy for
Middle East Peace. The President emphasized that Mitchell was “fully empowered” to speak for
the White House and State Department, thereby boosting his emissary’s clout.
On January 27, President Obama gave his first television interview to Al Arabiyah television. He
said, “I think it is possible for us to see a Palestinian state ... that is contiguous, that allows
freedom of movement for its people, that allows for trade with other countries, that allows the
creation of businesses and commerce so that people have a better life.”
During his first trip to the region in January, Senator Mitchell visited Israel, the West Bank,
Jordan, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, but not the Gaza Strip or Syria. Among his goals was listening
to the region’s leaders’ views on an Israeli-Palestinian settlement. In a conference call with
Jewish leaders on February 19, Mitchell is said to have expressed support for Egyptian efforts to
forge a Palestinian unity government with Fatah and Hamas because divisions among the
Palestinians have been an obstacle to bringing peace to the region. He said that Hamas still would
23
National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley in a press Briefing, January 10, 2008, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080110-7.html.
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need to fulfill the demands that it halt violence, recognize Israel, and accept previous IsraeliPalestinian agreements, and that the chances of Hamas doing that were not good. 24
In Israel on March 3, Secretary Clinton expressed understanding of Israel’s need not “to stand
idly by while its territory and people are subjected to rocket attacks.” The next day, in Ramallah,
she described Israel’s plans to demolish 88 Palestinian homes in East Jerusalem as “unhelpful and
not in keeping with the obligations entered into under the Road Map,” and with far-reaching
implications.25 Throughout her visit, perhaps due to a widespread belief that the Israeli
government elected in February would not agree, Secretary Clinton emphasized the
Administration’s commitment to the two-state solution, saying that it was in Israel’s best interests.
On April 22, after meeting King Abdullah II of Jordan, President Obama expressed hope that
“over the next several months that you start seeing gestures of good faith on all sides.... And we
will be doing everything we can to encourage” those measures. The President described a U.S.
role as helping to “create the conditions and the atmosphere and provide the help and assistance
that facilitate an agreement.”26
On April 23, Secretary Clinton told a House committee that “for Israel to get the kind of strong
support it is looking for vis-à-vis Iran, it can’t stay on the sidelines with respect to the Palestinians
and the peace efforts. They go hand in hand.” She added that Arab governments “believe that
Israel’s willingness to reenter into discussions with the Palestinian Authority strengthens them in
being able to deal with Iran.” Israel generally rejects linkage between the peace process and Iran.
In a speech to the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC) on May 5, Vice President
Joe Biden called on Israel to work toward a two-state solution, not build more settlements,
dismantle outposts, and allow the Palestinians freedom of movement. Chairman of the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee John Kerry told the same gathering that settlements “don’t just
fragment a future Palestinian state. They also fragment what the Israeli Defense Forces must
defend, they undercut Abbas, and strengthen Hamas by convincing the Palestinians that there is
no reward for moderation.” He warned that the “window of opportunity is fast closing.”
Disagreement between Israeli and U.S. officials developed over alleged informal agreements
regarding a definition of “settlement freeze” that Israelis claim was reached in May 2003 between
then Prime Minister Ariel Sharon and then U.S. National Security Council officials Elliott
Abrams and Stephen Hadley. Sharon’s (and now Netanyahu’s) advisor Dov Weissglas says that
they defined a settlement freeze as “no new communities were to be built; no Palestinian lands
were to be appropriated for settlement purposes; building will not take place beyond existing
community outlines; and no ‘settlement encouraging’ budgets (incentives) were to be allocated.”27
Weissglas insists an oral agreement was recorded. 28 Yet, he also admitted that settlements were to
be allowed within a “construction line” to be demarcated after a joint U.S.-Israeli survey, but the
survey was never conducted nor the line demarcated.29 Abrams wrote that the guidelines were
24
Hilary Leila Krieger, “Mitchell could Support PA Unity Gov’t,” Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2009.
Paul Richter, “In West Bank, Clinton Criticizes Israel,” Los Angeles Times, March 5, 2009.
26
Paul Richter, “Obama Gets Ball Rolling on Mideast,” Los Angeles Times, April 22, 2009.
27
Ethan Bronner, “Bush Deal over ‘Freeze” Splits Israel and Obama,” New York Times, June 4, 2009.
28
Dov Weissglas, “Agreements Need to be Kept,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, June 28, 2009.
29
Eli Lake, “U.S., Israel at Odds over 2003 Settlement Accord,” Washington Times, July 22, 2009.
25
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discussed, “but never formally adopted.”30 Secretary Clinton said, “We have the negotiating
record, that is the official record, that was turned over to the Obama Administration by the
outgoing Bush Administration. There is no memorialization of any informal and oral
agreements.” If such understandings were reached, she noted, “they did not become part of the
official position of the United States government. And there are contrary documents that suggest
that they were not to be viewed as in any way contradicting the obligations that Israel undertook
pursuant to the Road Map. (See “Significant Agreements and Documents.”) And those obligations
are clear.”31 Abrams responded that Israel had totally withdrawn from the Gaza Strip and some
West Bank settlements in exchange for a U.S. agreement not to demand a total settlement freeze
in the West Bank and acceptance of the principles noted above and in the a letter from Weissglas
to Secretary of State Rice in April 2004.32
In his June 4, speech in Cairo, President Obama said that “just as Israel’s right to exist cannot be
denied, neither can Palestine’s.” On settlements, he stated, “The United States does not accept the
legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements. This construction violates previous agreements and
undermines efforts to achieve peace. It is time for these settlements to stop.” The only resolution
(to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict) is for the aspirations of both sides to be met through two states,
where Israelis and Palestinians each live in peace and security.” He declared, “(T)he situation for
the Palestinian people is intolerable. America will not turn our backs on the legitimate Palestinian
aspiration for dignity, opportunity, and a state of their own.” 33
In Israel on June 9, Senator Mitchell noted the controversy over settlements and said, “These are
not disagreements among adversaries. The United States and Israel will remain close allies and
friends.” He added, “focusing on a single issue ill serves the wider diplomatic process” and
expressed his desire “to create conditions for the prompt resumption and early conclusion of
negotiations.” 34
Madrid Conference
The peace conference opened on October 30, 1991. Parties were represented by 14-member
delegations. A combined Jordanian/Palestinian delegation had 14 representatives from each. An
unofficial Palestinian advisory team coordinated with the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO). The United States, the Soviet Union, Syria, Palestinians/Jordan, the European
Community, Egypt, Israel, and Lebanon sat at the table. The U.N., the Gulf Cooperation
Council, 35 and the Arab Maghreb Union36 were observers.
30
Elliott Abrams, “The Settlement Freeze Fallacy,” Washington Post, April 8, 2009.
Glenn Kessler, “Clinton Rejects Israeli Claims of Accord on Settlements,” Washington Post, June 6, 2009.
32
Elliott Abrams, “Hillary is Wrong About the Settlements,” Wall Street Journal, June 25, 2009.
33
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_pre ss_office/Remarks-by-the President-at-Cairo-University-6-04-09/
34
Barak Ravid, “U.S. Envoy Assures Israel Policy Rift Won’t Break Alliance,” http://www.haaretz.com, June 9, 2009.
31
35
The Gulf Cooperation Council is comprised of Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab
Emirates.
36
The Arab Maghreb Union is comprised of Algeria, Libya, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia.
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Bilateral Talks and Developments
Israel-Palestinians
2000-2001
(Incidents of violence are noted selectively.) In November 1991, Israel and the
Jordanian/Palestinian delegation agreed to separate Israeli-Jordanian and Israeli-Palestinian
negotiating tracks, the latter to address a five-year period of interim Palestinian self-rule in the
West Bank and Gaza Strip. In the third year, permanent status negotiations were to begin. On
August 9, 1993, Palestinian negotiators were appointed to a PLO coordination committee, ending
efforts to make it appear as though the PLO was not part of the talks. Secret talks in Oslo,
Norway produced a Declaration of Principles (DOP), signed by Israel and the PLO on September
13, 1993. Through the end of the decade, incremental advances were made, including Israel’s
withdrawal from major cities and towns and Palestinian self-government as the Palestinian
Authority (PA), but no final agreement was reached. (See “Significant Agreements,” below, for
summaries of and links to accords reached between 1993 and 2000. This narrative resumes with
the Camp David summit.)
President Clinton, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak, and PA Chairman Yasir Arafat held a
summit at Camp David, from July 11 to July 24, 2000, to forge a framework accord on final
status issues. They did not succeed. The parties had agreed that there would be no agreement
unless all issues were resolved. Jerusalem was the major obstacle. Israel proposed that it remain
united under its sovereignty, leaving the Palestinians control, not sovereignty, over East Jerusalem
and Muslim holy sites. Israel was willing to cede more than 90% of the West Bank, wanted to
annex settlements where about 130,000 settlers lived, and offered to admit thousands of
Palestinian refugees in a family unification program. An international fund would compensate
other refugees as well as Israelis from Arab countries. The Palestinians reportedly were willing to
accept Israeli control over the Jewish quarter of Jerusalem and the Western Wall, but sought
sovereignty over East Jerusalem, particularly the Haram al Sharif/Temple Mount, a site holy to
Jews and Muslims.
On September 28, Israeli opposition leader Ariel Sharon, with 1,000 security forces, visited the
Temple Mount/Haram al Sharif. Palestinians protested, and Israel responded forcefully. The
second Palestinian intifadah or uprising against the Israeli occupation began as a mob in
Ramallah killed two Israeli soldiers, provoking Israeli helicopter gunship attacks on Palestinian
official sites on October 12.
Barak resigned on December 10, triggering an early election for Prime Minister in Israel. Further
negotiations were held at Bolling Air Force Base, in Washington, D.C., December 19-23. On
December 23, President Clinton suggested that Israel cede sovereignty over the Temple
Mount/Haram al Sharif and Arab neighborhoods in Jerusalem, 96% of the West Bank, all of the
Gaza Strip, and annex settlement blocs in exchange for giving the Palestinians Israeli land near
Gaza. Jerusalem would be the capital of two countries. The Palestinians would cede the right of
refugees to return to Israel and accept a Jewish “connection” to the Temple Mount and
sovereignty over the Western Wall and holy sites beneath it. The agreement would declare “an
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end to conflict.”37 Barak said he would accept the plan as a basis for further talks if Arafat did so.
Arafat sought clarifications on contiguity of Palestinian state territory, the division of East
Jerusalem, and refugees’ right of return, among other issues. The Israeli-Palestinian talks
concluded at Taba, Egypt.
2001-2005
On February 6, 2001, Ariel Sharon was elected Prime Minister of Israel and vowed to retain
united Jerusalem as Israel’s capital, the Jordan Valley, and other areas for security. Sharon’s
associates asserted that the results of negotiations at and after Camp David were “null and
void.”38 At the same time, the Bush Administration said that Clinton’s proposals were no longer
U.S. proposals.39 Sharon sought an interim agreement, not dealing with Jerusalem, Palestinian
refugees, or a Palestinian state and, in an interview published on April 13, said that he could
accept a disarmed Palestinian state on 42% of the West Bank.40
On September 24, Sharon declared, “Israel wants to give the Palestinians what no one else gave
them before, the possibility of a state.” On October 2, President Bush said, for the first time, “The
idea of a Palestinian state has always been part of a vision, so long as the right of Israel to exist is
respected.”41 On November 10, he declared that the United States is “working toward the day
when two states—Israel and Palestine—live peacefully together within secure and recognized
borders....”
Secretary Powell sent General Anthony Zinni, USMC (Ret.) to work on a cease-fire, but violence
impeded his mission. Israel confined Arafat to his headquarters in Ramallah on December 3. On
December 7, Sharon doubted that an accord could be reached with Arafat, “who is a real
terrorist.”42 On December 12, Hamas ambushed an Israeli bus in the West Bank and perpetrated
two simultaneous suicide bombings in Gaza. The Israeli cabinet charged that Arafat was “directly
responsible” for the attacks “and therefore is no longer relevant.”43
On January 3, 2002, Israeli forces seized the Karine A, a Palestinian-commanded freighter,
carrying 50 tons of Iranian-supplied arms. Secretary Powell stated that Arafat “cannot engage
with us and others in the pursuit of peace, and at the same time permit or tolerate continued
violence and terror.” At the White House on February 7, Sharon said that he believed that
pressure should be put on Arafat so that an alternative Palestinian leadership could emerge.
37
Remarks at Israeli Policy Forum, January 7, 2001, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, vol. 37, no. 2,
January 15, 2001, p. 32. The Clinton proposal also is known as “the Clinton Plan” or “Clinton Parameters.”
38
Lee Hockstader, “Jerusalem is ‘Indivisible,’ Sharon Says; Camp David Concessions are Called ‘Null and Void,’”
Washington Post, February 8, 2001.
39
Jane Perlez, “Bush Officials Pronounce Clinton Mideast Plan Dead,” New York Times, February 9, 2001.
40
Interview by Ari Shavit, Haaretz, April 13, 2001, Foreign Broadcast Information Service (FBIS) Document
GMP200110413000070.
41
See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov.
42
Newsweek interview, quoted by Ibrahim Barzak, “Jewish Settlements Mortared in Gaza; Israel Leader Raps Arafat in
Interview, Associated Press, December 9, 2001.
43
“Israeli Cabinet Decision on Cutting Contacts with Arafat,” Government Press Office, December 13, 2001, FBIS
Document GMP200111213000010.
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On February 17, Saudi Crown Prince (later King) Abdullah unprecedentedly called for “full
withdrawal from all occupied territories, in accord with U.N. resolutions, including Jerusalem, in
exchange for full normalization of relations.” On March 28, the Arab League endorsed the idea
with some revisions; it is known as the “Arab Peace Initiative.”44 Sharon said that he was willing
to explore the idea, but it would be a “mistake” to replace U.N. resolutions affirming Israel’s right
to “secure and recognized borders” with total withdrawal to pre-1967 borders.
On March 27, Hamas perpetrated a suicide bombing at a hotel in Netanya, killing 27 and
wounding 130. Israel declared Arafat “an enemy” and Israeli forces besieged his compound in
Ramallah; they soon controlled all major Palestinian-ruled West Bank cities.
On June 24, President Bush called on the Palestinians to elect new leaders “not compromised by
terror” and to build a practicing democracy. Then, he said, the United States will support the
creation of a Palestinian state, whose borders and certain aspects of sovereignty will be
provisional until a final settlement. He added, “as we make progress toward security, Israeli
forces need to withdraw fully to positions they held prior to September 28, 2000 ... and (Israeli)
settlement activity must stop.” The President foresaw a final peace accord within three years.45
On September 17, the Quartet (U.S., European Union (EU), U.N., and Russian officials) outlined
a preliminary “Road Map” to peace based on the President’s ideas. (See “Significant
Agreements,” below for summary and link.)
On March 7, 2003, in what was seen as a gesture to appeal to the Quartet, Arafat named Mahmud
Abbas (aka Abu Mazen) Prime Minister. On April 14, Prime Minister Sharon acknowledged that
Israel would have to part with some places bound up in the history of the Jewish people, but
insisted that the Palestinians recognize the Jewish people’s right to its homeland and abandon
their claim of a right of refugees to return to Israel. 46 On April 14, Israel submitted 14 reservations
on the Road Map.47 On April 30, the Quartet officially presented the Road Map. Abbas accepted
it. On May 23, the Bush Administration stated that Israel had explained its concerns and that the
United States shares the view “that these are real concerns and will address them fully and
seriously in the implementation of the Road Map,” leading Sharon and his cabinet to accept
“steps defined” in the Road Map “with reservations” on May 25. The next day, Sharon declared,
“to keep 3.5 million people under occupation is bad for us and them,” using the word occupation
for the first time.
On June 4, President Bush met Abbas and Sharon in Aqaba, Jordan. Abbas vowed to achieve the
Palestinians’ goals by peaceful means, while Sharon expressed understanding of “the importance
of territorial contiguity” for a viable Palestinian state and promised to “remove unauthorized
outposts” in the West Bank. Abbas said that he would use dialogue, not force, to convince
Palestinian groups. On June 29, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) suspended military
operations against Israel for three months, while Fatah declared a six-month truce. Israel was not
a party to the accord, but began withdrawing forces from Gaza. Abbas asked Sharon to release
Palestinian prisoners, remove roadblocks, withdraw from more Palestinian cities, allow Arafat
free movement, and end construction of a security barrier that Israeli is building in the West
44
45
For “Arab Peace Initiative,” see http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm.
For text of the speech, see http://geogewbush-whtehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020624-3.html.
46
“Sharon, ‘Certain’ of Passing ‘Painful Concessions’ in Knesset,” Ma’ariv, April 15, 2003, FBIS Document
GMP20030415000091.
47
For text of Israel’s reservations, see Israel’s Response to the Road Map, online via http://www.knesset.gov.il/
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Bank. Israel demanded that the Palestinians dismantle terrorist infrastructures and act against
terrorists. Neither fulfilled the other’s request.
On August 6, Israel released 339 prisoners. On August 19, a Hamas suicide bomber exploded in
Jerusalem, killing 22, including 5 Americans, and injuring more than 130. Abbas cut contacts
with Hamas and the PIJ, and unsuccessfully sought Arafat’s support to act against terrorists. Israel
suspended talks with the Palestinians, halted plans to transfer cities to their control, and resumed
“targeted killings” of terrorist leaders, among other actions. On September 6, Abbas resigned
because of what he charged was lack of support from Arafat, the United States, and Israel.
On October 15, a bomb detonated under an official U.S. vehicle in Gaza, killing three U.S.
security guards and wounding a fourth. Palestinian authorities arrested members of Popular
Resistance Committees, who would be freed in April 2004.
Sounds of discontent with government policy were heard in Israel, culminating in the signing of
the Geneva Accord, a Draft Permanent Status Agreement by Israeli opposition politicians and
prominent Palestinians on December 1.48 Perhaps partly to defuse these efforts, on December 18,
Sharon declared that, “to ensure a Jewish and democratic Israel,” he would unilaterally disengage
from the Palestinians by redeploying Israeli forces and relocating settlements in the Gaza Strip
and intensifying construction of the security fence in the West Bank.49 On February 13, 2004, the
White House said that an Israeli pullback “could reduce friction,” but that a final settlement “must
be achieved through negotiations.” After an upsurge in violence, Israeli missiles killed Hamas
leader Shaykh Ahmed Yassin on March 22.
On April 14, President Bush and Sharon met and exchanged letters.50 The President welcomed
Israel’s plan to disengage from Gaza and restated the U.S. commitment to the Road Map. He
noted the need to take into account changed “realities on the ground, including already existing
major Israeli population centers,” (i.e., settlements), asserting “it is unrealistic to expect that the
outcome of final status negotiations will be full and complete return to the armistice lines of
1949.” The President stated that a solution to the refugee issue will be found by settling
Palestinian refugees in a Palestinian state, “rather than in Israel,” thereby rejecting a “right of
return.” He called for a Palestinian state that is “viable, contiguous, sovereign, and independent.”
Sharon presented his disengagement plan as independent of but “not inconsistent with the Road
Map.” He said that the “temporary” security fence that Israel is constructing in the West Bank
would not prejudice final status issues including borders. A day before, he had identified five
large West Bank settlements and an area in Hebron that Israel intends to retain and strengthen.
Palestinians denounced the President’s “legitimization” of settlements and prejudgment of final
status. On April 18, Sharon’s chief of staff Dov Weissglas gave National Security Adviser
Condoleezza Rice a written commitment to dismantle settlement outposts that Israel itself
considers illegal. 51 However, other outposts later sprang up and, as of 2010, Israel has not
fulfilled this commitment.
48
For text, see the Geneva Initiative website at http://www.heskem.org.il.
For text, see “Sharon Outlines Disengagement Plan from Palestinians in Herzliyya Speech,” Parts 1 and 2, Voice of
Israel, December 18, 2003, Open Source Center Documents GMP20031218000215 and GMP200312180002167.
50
For text of letters, see Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/
Reference+Documents/Exchange+of+letters+Sharon-Bush+14-Apr-2004.htm.
51
For text, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Peace+Process/Reference+Documents/Letter+Weissglas-Rice+18-Apr2004.htm.
49
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On June 6, 2004, Israel’s cabinet approved a compromise disengagement plan whereby Israel
would evacuate all 21 settlements in the Gaza Strip and 4 settlements in the northern West Bank.
On June 30, the Israeli High Court of Justice upheld the government’s right to build a security
fence in the West Bank, but struck down some land confiscation orders for violating Palestinian
rights and ordered the route to be changed. In subsequent rulings, the Israeli Court attempted to
balance Israel’s security needs and the humanitarian claims of Palestinians and sometimes
required that the barrier be rerouted. On July 9, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) issued a
non-binding, advisory opinion that the wall violates international law.52
On October 6, Weissglas claimed that disengagement was aimed at freezing the political process
in order to “prevent the establishment of a Palestinian state and a debate regarding refugees,
borders, and Jerusalem.”53
Yasir Arafat died on November 11. Mahmud Abbas became Chairman of the PLO and, on
January 9, 2005, was elected President of the PA. He called for implementing the Road Map
while beginning discussion of final status issues and cautioned against interim solutions to delay
reaching a comprehensive solution.
Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA on February 7. She praised the Israelis’ “historic”
disengagement decision, discussed the need to carry out obligations concerning settlements and
outposts, and warned them not to undermine Abbas. She appointed Lt. Gen. William Ward as
Middle East Security Coordinator and emphasized the importance of Israeli-Palestinian security
cooperation for the disengagement. (Lt. Gen. Keith W. Dayton succeeded Ward in November
2005 and still serves.)
On February 20, Israel’s cabinet adopted a revised route for the security fence closer to the pre1967 border in some areas, taking about 7% to 8% of the West Bank that includes major
settlement blocs. On March 20, it was reported that Israel’s defense minister had approved the
building of 3,500 new housing units between the Ma’ale Adumim settlement and East Jerusalem,
in the E-1 corridor. Critics charge that the construction would cut East Jerusalem off from
Palestinian territory, impose a barrier between the northern and southern West Bank, and prevent
a future contiguous Palestinian state. Secretary Rice asserted that the plan was “at odds with
American policy.” On April 11, President Bush conveyed to Sharon his “concern that Israel not
undertake any activity that contravenes Road Map obligations or prejudices final status
negotiations.” Sharon responded, “It is the position of Israel that the major Israeli population
centers will remain in Israel’s hands under any final status agreement,” declared that Ma’ale
Adumim is a major population center, and, therefore, Israel is interested in contiguity between it
and Jerusalem.
On May 26, President Bush met Abbas and said that “changes to the 1949 armistice lines must be
mutually agreed to.” Bush reaffirmed, “A viable two-state solution must ensure contiguity of the
West Bank, and a state of scattered territories will not work. There must also be meaningful
linkages between the West Bank and Gaza. This is the position of the United States today, it will
be the position of the United States at the time of final status negotiations.” He also said, “The
barrier being erected by Israel ... must be a security, rather than political, barrier.” Abbas stated
52
For text, see http://www.icj-cij.org. Note, Israel refers to the barrier as a “fence” and the Palestinians and other critics
refer to it as a “wall.” Neutral observers often use the word “barrier.”
53
Interview by Ari Shavit, “The Big Freeze,” Haaretz, October 8, 2004, FBIS Document GMP20041008000026.
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that the boundaries of a future state should be those of before the 1967 war and that “there is no
justification for the wall and it is illegitimate.”
Palestine Islamic Jihad (PIJ) claimed responsibility for a suicide bombing in Netanya on July 12,
killing 5 and injuring more than 90. Meanwhile, Hamas increased rocket and mortar fire against
settlements in Gaza and towns in southern Israel in order to show that Hamas was responsible for
Israel’s withdrawal from the Strip.
On August 15, Defense Minister Shaul Mofaz said that Israel would keep the settlement blocs of
Ma’ale Adumim, the Etzyon Bloc, Efrat, Ari’el, Qedumim-Qarney Shomrom, and Rehan
Shaqed—all are within or expected to be on Israel’s side of the security barrier. Mofaz added that
Israel would retain the Jordan Rift Valley to guarantee Israel’s eastern border.54
Israel evacuated all settlements in the Gaza Strip and four small settlements in the northern West
Bank between August 17 and August 23. On August 29, Sharon declared that there would be no
further disengagements and that the next step must be negotiations under the Road Map. He noted
that while large settlement blocs would remain in Israeli hands and linked territorially to Israel,
not all West Bank settlements would remain. This would be decided in the final stage of
negotiations.
On September 27, Hamas claimed responsibility for kidnapping and killing an Israeli settler in the
West Bank. Israel responded with air and artillery strikes, closure of charities linked to terror
groups, mass arrests including likely Hamas candidates in Palestinian parliamentary elections,
and targeted killings of terrorists. On October 20, President Bush pressed Abbas to “confront the
threat armed gangs pose to a genuinely democratic Palestine,” but did not urge him to prevent
Hamas from participating in parliamentary elections or to request that candidates renounce
violence. Abbas said that they would be asked to renounce violence after election.
On October 26, a PIJ suicide bomber killed 6 and wounded more than 20 in Hadera, on the Israeli
coast. Sharon announced an offensive against terrorism. He ruled out talks with Abbas until
Abbas takes “serious action” against armed groups.
On November 14-15, Secretary Rice visited Israel and the PA. Sharon told her that Israel would
not interfere if Hamas participated in the January 2006 Palestinian legislative elections, but
warned that if an armed terrorist organization is a partner in the Palestinian administration it
could lead to the end of the Road Map. Rice asserted that it would be easier to compel Hamas to
disarm after the elections because the entire international community would then exert pressure.
Rice vowed not to have contacts with an armed Hamas even if it were part of the Palestinian
administration.55 On November 15, she announced that Israel and the PA had reached an
Agreement on Movement and Access from the Gaza Strip. After PIJ perpetrated another suicide
bombing in Netanya on December 5, Israel did not hold scheduled talks with the PA about West
Bank-Gaza bus convoys foreseen in the agreement, which was not implemented.
After Hamas’s victories in December 2005 Palestinian municipal elections, speculation increased
about possible effects on the peace process if Hamas were similarly successful in January 25,
54
Interview by Golan Yokhpaz, IDF Radio, August 15, 2005, FBIS Document GMP20050815621002.
55
“Israel: ‘Sharp’ Sharon-Rice ‘Dispute” over Hamas Election Participation Reported,” Haaretz,
November 14, 2005, Open Source Center Document GMP20051114614002.
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2006, parliamentary elections. On December 28, the Quartet stated that a future Palestinian
cabinet “should include no member who has not committed to the principles of Israel’s right to
exist in peace and security and an unequivocal end to violence and terrorism.”56 On January 11,
2006, Secretary Rice declared, “It remains the view of the United States that there should be no
place in the political process for groups or individuals who refuse to renounce terror and violence,
recognize Israel’s right to exist, and disarm.”
2006-2008
On January 4, 2006, Prime Minister Sharon suffered an incapacitating stroke and Deputy Prime
Minister Ehud Olmert became Acting Prime Minister. On January 12, Olmert told President Bush
that peace efforts could not progress if Hamas joined the Palestinian government.
Hamas won the January 25 Palestinian parliamentary elections. It is a U.S.-designated Foreign
Terrorist Organization (FTO), claims the entire land of Palestine, including Israel, “from the
[Jordan] river to the [Mediterranean] sea” as an Islamic trust, rejects the Oslo agreements of the
1990s, insists on the right of Palestinian refugees to return to Israel, and on the right to
“resistance.”57 Olmert declared that Israel would not negotiate with a Palestinian administration
that included an armed terrorist organization calling for its destruction and demanded that Hamas
disarm, annul its Covenant that calls for the destruction of Israel, and accept all prior agreements.
President Bush stated that the United States would not deal with a political party “that articulates
the destruction of Israel as part of its platform.”
On January 30, the Quartet stated that “future assistance to any new (Palestinian) government
would be reviewed by donors against the government’s commitment to the principles of nonviolence, recognition of Israel, and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations, including
the Road Map.”58 Hamas countered that it would never recognize Israel, would consider
negotiating a “long-term truce” if Israel withdrew to its 1967 borders, released all prisoners,
destroyed all settlements, and recognized the Palestinian refugees’ right to return (to Israel), and
would create a state on “any inch” of Palestinian territory without ceding another.
On February 8, Olmert said that Israel was moving toward a separation from the Palestinians and
permanent borders that would include a united Jerusalem, major settlement blocs, and the Jordan
Valley. Palestinian Prime Minister-designate Ismail Haniyah of Hamas declared, “Let them
withdraw. We will make the Authority stronger on every inch of liberated land....” Damascusbased Hamas Political Bureau Chairman Khalid Mish’al said that his group would make no
concessions and would “practice resistance side by side with politics as long as the occupation
continued.”
After his Kadima party placed first in the March 28 Israeli parliamentary elections, Olmert said
that he aspired to demarcate permanent borders for a Jewish state with a permanent Jewish
majority and a democracy. He called for negotiations based on mutual recognition, agreements
already signed, the principles of the Road Map, a halt to violence, and the disarming of terrorist
organizations. Haniyah said that Hamas would not object to Abbas negotiating with Israel. In an
op-ed in (the British newspaper) The Guardian on March 31, Haniyah appealed for no more talk
56
57
58
This and subsequent Quartet statements cited may be found at http://2001-2009.state.gov.
For Hamas Covenant text, see http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/avalon/mideast/hamas.htm.
“UN: Statement by Middle East Quartet,” M2 Presswire, January 31, 2006.
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about recognizing Israel’s “right to exist” or ending resistance until Israel commits to withdraw
from the Palestinians’ lands and recognizes their rights.
On April 9, the Israeli security cabinet recommended severing all ties with the Hamas-led PA,
which it called a “hostile entity.” Because it viewed the PA as “one authority and not as having
two heads,” the cabinet declared that there could be personal contacts, but not negotiations, with
President Abbas. On April 17, PIJ carried out a suicide bombing in Tel Aviv, killing 11 and
wounding 60, including an American teenager. Abbas condemned the attack as “despicable” and
counter to Palestinian interests, while Hamas officials called it an act of “self-defense.”
On April 26, Abbas called for an immediate international peace conference with himself as the
Palestinian negotiator. He claimed that the Hamas-led government was not an obstacle to
negotiations because the PLO, which he heads, had the mandate to negotiate as it had all previous
agreements and he was empowered as the democratically elected leader of the Palestinians.
On May 4, a new Israeli government took office, with guidelines vowing to strive to shape the
permanent borders of the State of Israel as a democratic state, with a Jewish majority. Prime
Minister Olmert asserted that the security fence would be adapted to conform to borders. The
PLO rejected the Olmert plan as aimed at undermining the Palestinian people’s right to a state on
all territories occupied in 1967, with Jerusalem as its capital.
On May 10, imprisoned Fatah, Hamas, and other officials drafted a “National Accord Document”
calling for a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, the right of the return of refugees, and
the release of all prisoners. It also called for renewing the PLO and for Hamas and PIJ to join it,
supported the right to resist the occupation in lands occupied in 1967, and stated that the PLO is
responsible for negotiations and that any agreement should be put to a vote by the Palestinian
National Council or a referendum. 59 Abbas accepted the document, but Hamas rejected its implied
recognition of pre-1967 Israel.
On May 23, at the White House, President Bush accepted that Olmert’s ideas for removing Israeli
settlements could lead to a two-state solution if a pathway to progress on the Road Map is not
open in the period ahead. Olmert said that he had presented ideas for a “realignment” in the West
Bank to “reduce friction between Israelis and Palestinians, ensure territorial contiguity for the
Palestinians, and guarantee Israel’s security as a Jewish state with the borders it desires.”60
Violence increased between Gaza and Israel. The Hamas military wing and other groups
repeatedly launched rockets at Sderot in southern Israel, and Israel responded with artillery fire
and air strikes. On June 10, Hamas called off its 16-month truce in response to the deaths of
Palestinian civilians on a Gaza beach from Israeli artillery fire on June 9. Israel denied
responsibility for the deaths, but Israeli strikes caused other Palestinian civilian casualties as well.
On June 13, Olmert told a group of British parliamentarians that, even with negotiations, “Israel
will never agree to withdraw from the entire West Bank because the pre-1967 borders are not
59
For text of a later, final version of the National Accord Document (also known as the Palestinian Prisoners’s
Agreement), see Palestine Liberation Organization Negotiations Affairs Department website http://www.nad-plo.org/
inner.php?view=news-updates_pre.
60
See http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2006/05/20060523-9.html for text of joint news
conference.
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defensible.” He asserted that Israel would withdraw from approximately 90% of the West Bank
and that not all of Jerusalem’s Arab neighborhoods would be part of the future Jewish capital.61
On June 28, Palestinian factions agreed on a revised National Accord Document. The Document
stated that the PLO and the President of the PA will be responsible for negotiations to create a
state on territories occupied by Israel in 1967. It changed the May draft to say that, in tandem
with political action, resistance will be concentrated in (but not limited to) territories occupied in
1967. Signers vowed to work toward establishing a national unity government.62 PIJ rejected the
Document, while Hamas officials insisted that it did not require them to recognize Israel or to
accept two states. Israel’s Foreign Ministry noted that the Document did not mention recognizing
Israel’s right to exist or ending the conflict with Israel and argued that the return of all refugees is
a formula for the destruction of Israel, contradicting a two-state solution. 63
On June 25, members of the Hamas military wing, the Popular Resistance Committees, and the
previously unknown Army of Islam had attacked Israeli forces in Israel, just outside of Gaza,
killing two soldiers, wounding four, and kidnapping Corporal Gilad Shalit. (He has been
promoted to sergeant while in captivity.) On June 27, after unsuccessful diplomatic efforts to
secure Shalit’s release, Israel forces began a major operation to rescue him, to deter attacks, and
to weaken, bring down, or change the conduct of the Hamas-led government. Israeli officials
claimed that Hamas had crossed a “red line” with the kidnapping and attack within pre-1967
Israel.
On June 29, Israel forces arrested 64 Palestinian (Hamas) cabinet ministers, parliamentarians, and
other Hamas officials in the West Bank and Jerusalem. On July 1, the kidnappers demanded 1,000
prisoners in exchange for the Israeli soldier. The next day, Israeli missiles destroyed the offices of
the Palestinian prime minister. Israeli troops and tanks began sweeping northern Gaza to locate
tunnels and explosives near the border and continued targeting Hamas offices in the West Bank.
Hamas fired an upgraded rocket at the Israeli port city of Ashkelon, prompting the Israeli cabinet
to approve “prolonged” activities against Hamas.
Diplomatic efforts were undertaken to resolve the crisis. On July 10, Hamas official Mish’al
insisted on the mutual release (“swap”) of prisoners. Olmert rejected “trading prisoners with a
terrorist bloody organization such as Hamas,” adding that to negotiate with Hamas would signal
that moderates such as President Abbas are not needed. The White House spokesman said that
Hamas had been “complicit in perpetrating violence” and that Israel had a right to defend itself.
On October 31, Israeli forces began a six-day incursion into Beit Hanoun in the northern Gaza
Strip to stop Palestinian rocket fire; it resulted in heavy Palestinian casualties and did not stop
rockets. After it ended, on November 8, an errant Israeli artillery barrage killed 20 and wounded
many more, prompting international outcries. On November 25, Olmert and Abbas agreed to a
cease-fire in Gaza. Hamas said that it would respect the accord, but other groups would not. The
cease-fire nonetheless produced less rocket fire and shooting along the border.
61
Gil Hoffman, “Olmert Bids to Enlist Chirac Support for Realignment; PM tells British MPS: Israel Would Never
Agree to Withdraw to Pre-1967 Borders,” Jerusalem Post, June 14, 2006.
62
“Text of National Consensus Document signed by the Palestinian factions, except the Islamic Jihad Movement,” AlAyyam, Open Source Center Document GMP20060628253002.
63
For text of Foreign Ministry comments, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/mfa.
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On November 27, Olmert said if the Palestinians established a new government committed to
carrying out the Quartet’s principles, one that would implement the Road Map and bring about
the release of the kidnapped soldier, then he would enter a dialogue with Abbas to establish an
independent, viable Palestinian state with territorial contiguity and borders outlined by President
Bush in his April 14, 2004, letter to Prime Minister Sharon. He listed other gestures Israel would
make if the Palestinians recognized Israel’s right to live in peace and security alongside them and
renounced their demand for the right of return.”64
Although Abbas could not meet Olmert’s preconditions, the Israeli government and Bush
Administration viewed him as the only partner for a peace process and took steps to bolster him
in his contest with Hamas for control of the PA.
On January 9, 2007, the Egyptian Foreign Minister asserted that there was a common Egyptian,
Jordanian, Arab, and Palestinian position that an agreement on the “end game” was needed before
resuming the Road Map. Secretary Rice said that she would discuss “the broad issues on the
horizon, so that we can work on the Road Map” with Olmert and Abbas. (The Administration
reportedly had promised the “moderate” Arab regimes that it would become more engaged in the
peace process in exchange for their support in countering Iranian influence in the region.)65
On February 8, Abbas designated Haniyah to form a new unity government and called on him to
“respect international resolutions and agreements” signed by the PLO, that is, prior accords
reached with Israel (italics added because it is not accept). Abbas’s letter of designation resulted
from the Mecca Accord reached at a meeting of Abbas and Hamas Political Bureau Chief Mish’al
hosted by Saudi King Abdullah. The Accord aimed mainly to stop Palestinian factions’ infighting
and unite them in a new government; it did not refer to Israel or to the Quartet’s demands.66
On February 19, Secretary Rice met Olmert and Abbas in Jerusalem to discuss the Mecca Accord.
Afterwards, Olmert said Israel would continue to boycott the Palestinian government until it met
the Quartet’s demands, ended rocket attacks from Gaza, and released Shalit. It would not have
contact with moderates in a government that does not meet the Quartet’s conditions, but would
with Abbas in order to limit terror and ease Palestinian daily life. Olmert rejected negotiating with
Abbas because doing so, he said, would free Hamas of the requirement to recognize Israel.
The 2002 Arab Peace Initiative was revived. 67 Following his reported meeting with Saudi
National Security Advisor Prince Bandar in September 2006, Olmert had noted in November
2006 that “some parts of the Saudi Peace Initiative are positive.”68 On March 11, Olmert again
64
For text Olmert’s speech, see Israel’s MFA at http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/
Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/PM+Olmert+reaches+out+to+Palestinians+at+Ben-Gurion+memorial+27-Nov2006.htm. For what Olmert called the “Saudi Peace Initiative, also called the “Beirut Declaration” or “Arab Peace
Initiative,” see http://www.saudiembassy.net/2002News/Statements/StateDetail.asp?cIndex=142.
65
Cam Simpson, “Dangerous Territory: With Aid, U.S. Widens Role in Palestinian Crisis; To Undercut Hamas And
Iran, Bush Pushes $86 Million Plan” Wall Street Journal, January 12, 2007.
66
Text of the Mecca Accord was published on http://www.middle-east-online.com February 9, 2007.
67
For “Arab Peace Initiative,” see http://www.al-bab.com/arab/docs/league/peace02.htm.
68
It has been widely reported that Olmert met Saudi National Security Advisor Prince Bandar in September 2006 in
Jordan. Barbara Slavin, “Arabs try Outreach to Israel, U.S. Jews....” USA Today, February 12, 2007, quotes former
Israeli Ambassador to the United States Danny Ayalon confirming the meeting. For Olmert’s speech referring to the
Saudi peace initiative, see http://www.mfa.gov.il/MFA/Government/Speeches+by+Israeli+leaders/2006/
PM+Olmert+reaches+out+to+Palestinians+at+Ben-Gurion+memorial+27-Nov-2006.htm.
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stated that the Saudi Initiative, on which the Arab Peace Initiative is based, is “a plan that we are
ready to address seriously” and has “positive elements.”
On March 15, a Palestinian unity government was formed, with a program confirming the
Palestinian people’s “legitimate” right of resistance, insisting that halting resistance depends on
ending the occupation, the right of refugees to return, and independence. The government
asserted that it respects international resolutions and agreements signed by the PLO. At the same
time, it said that it would work to consolidate the calm in Gaza, extend it to the West Bank, and
transform it into a comprehensive and mutual truce. On March 17, Prime Minister Haniyah
vowed to work to establish an independent Palestinian state, with Jerusalem as its capital, along
the 1967 borders.69 Hamas said that it would not recognize Israel’s right to exist alongside that
state. The government program authorized President Abbas to negotiate with Israel.
However, the Israeli cabinet voted to shun the new Palestinian government until it met the
Quartet’s demands that it renounce violence, recognize Israel, and accept all prior accords, and
called on the international community to maintain the aid embargo. The Bush Administration
decided to deal with individuals in the PA government on a case-by-case basis, and a State
Department spokesman said that the aid embargo would continue.
The Arab summit in Saudi Arabia, March 28-29, reiterated adherence, without changes, to the
Arab Peace Initiative and called for direct negotiations on all tracks. Abbas voted in favor, while
Haniyah abstained. The Israeli Foreign Ministry stated, “Israel is sincerely interested in pursuing
dialogue with those Arab states that desire peace with Israel” in order to promote a process of
normalization. Prime Minister Olmert welcomed the Arabs’ “revolutionary change in outlook”
that represented “a new way of thinking, the willingness to recognize Israel as an established fact
and to debate the conditions of the future solution” and invited all Arab heads of state to meet.70
In April, an Arab League working group designated Egypt and Jordan to contact Israel. Israel
expressed disappointment that League members with no formal ties to Israel would be not
involved, but a spokeswoman said that Israel would be “happy to hear the ideas.”
In May, factional fighting in Gaza between Fatah and Hamas escalated. Later, six days of intense
infighting ended with Hamas in complete control of the Gaza Strip by June 14, 2007. President
Abbas declared a state of emergency, dissolved the unity government, dismissed Haniyah, and
named technocrat Salam Fayyad prime minister. Hamas claimed that the decrees were illegitimate
and that Haniyah was still head of government. Each side accused the other of perpetrating a
coup. Secretary Rice endorsed Abbas’s actions.
On June 18, President Bush told Abbas that he was open to restarting peace talks to stabilize the
situation, and Israeli officials agreed that the elimination of Hamas from the Palestinian
government opened “new possibilities for cooperation” and a diplomatic process. On June 25,
Olmert, Abbas, Egypt’s President Mubarak, and Jordan’s King Abdullah II met in Sharm al
Shaykh, Egypt. Abbas called on Olmert to start serious negotiations. Olmert only agreed to
resume biweekly meetings with Abbas to create conditions leading to discussions on a Palestinian
state and to take other actions to support the PA government in the West Bank.
69
Some commentators suggest that Hamas’s acceptance of a state withing the 1967 borders constitutes “implicit”
recognition of Israel and that the demand for explicit recognition is “unreasonable” due to Israel’s continuing
occupation and failure to define its borders. Daoud Kuttab, “Obstacle or Opportunity? How the Palestinian Unity
Government Offers a Path to Peace,” Washington Post, March 26, 2007.
70
“Israeli PM Offers Dialogue to Arabs,” Associated Press, April 2, 2007.
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On June 27, the Quartet announced the appointment of former British Prime Minister Tony Blair
as their Representative to help the Palestinians build the institutions and economy of a viable state
in Gaza and the West Bank.
Olmert and Abbas met in Jerusalem on July 16. On July 25, Olmert confirmed that they would
work on an “agreement on principles” to include the characteristics of a state, its official
institutions, its economy, and customs arrangements with Israel. Olmert favored leaving “final
status” issues for the end. Abbas preferred putting all final status issues first. Olmert warned
Abbas that a revived Fatah-Hamas unity government would end the diplomatic process.
New Palestinian Prime Minister Fayyad presented his government’s program on July 27. It stated
that the government would seek to establish a state on all lands occupied by Israel in 1967, with
Jerusalem as its capital and a just and agreed solution for Palestinian refugees, but did not refer to
armed struggle or resistance, rather to “popular struggle against the Israeli occupation.”71
The Bush Administration tried to show the Palestinian people that they have a choice between
chaos under Hamas in Gaza and the prospect under Abbas and Fayyad for an effective,
democratic Palestinian state, according to National Security Advisor Stephen Hadley. 72 On July
16, President Bush promised to support PA reforms in order to lay the foundations for serious
negotiations for a Palestinian state. He called for an “international meeting this fall of
representatives from nations that support a two-state solution, reject violence, recognize Israel’s
right to exist, and commit to all previous agreements between the parties.” 73
Olmert and Abbas worked for several months on principles to present to a U.S.-initiated
international meeting in Annapolis, MD, on November 27, 2007, but never succeeded. On
September 10, they agreed to set up negotiating teams for a two-state solution and ministerial
committees to work on security, communications, economic cooperation, water rights,
environmental issues, and the like, and later appointed Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni and former
Prime Minister Ahmad Quray (aka Abu Ala) to head the teams.
Secretary Rice described Annapolis as a meeting at which regional actors and the international
community would rally around a bilateral vision of a two-state solution as well as help support
the development of Palestinian institutions, economic development, and so forth.74 Rice excluded
Hamas from the process, saying “If you’re going to have a two-state solution, you have to accept
the right of the other party to exist ... you’re going to have to renounce violence.”
On September 24, Olmert described Annapolis as a “short international meeting intended to give
international encouragement to the process that we initiated with the Palestinians.” He said that
the goal was to increase support for Abbas and deepen Israel’s ties with moderate Arab countries.
On October 15, Olmert suggested that it is legitimate to question whether Israel should retain
outlying Palestinian neighborhoods in Jerusalem, seeming to prepare the Israeli public for
71
Program of Fayyad’s Government, Ma’an News Agency, July 27, 2007, BBC Monitoring Middle East, July 28,
2007.
72
Statement on “This Week” television show, July 15, 2007, quoted in Robin Wright, “U.S. Bet on Abbas for Middle
East Peace Meets Skepticism,” Washington Post, July 16, 2007.
73
For President’s speech, see http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/07/
20070716-7.html.
74
FM Livni’s Press Conference with US Secretary of State Rice, (Israeli) Government Press Office, October 18, 2007,
Open Source Center Document GMP20071018738002.
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concessions and raising the politically sensitive question of “dividing” Jerusalem, which many
Israelis and other Jews refer to as their “eternal, undivided capital.” On November 12, Olmert told
his cabinet that he did not view a freeze on all building on the West Bank to be part of the Road
Map’s requirements, but that Israel would not build new settlements or expropriate land and
would raze illegal outposts.75 This appeared to conform to Israel’s policy on so-called “natural
growth,” whereby settlers would be allowed to build within the borders of existing settlements.
The Palestinians demand a 100% settlement freeze, including ending natural growth, and others
in the international community agree with their stance.
At the Annapolis Conference on November 27, President Bush read a “Joint Understanding” that
dealt with the process of negotiations, not their substance.76 In it, Olmert and Abbas expressed
determination to “immediately launch bilateral negotiations in order to conclude a peace treaty to
resolve all core issues without exception, as specified in previous agreements” and to engage in
continuous bilateral negotiations in an effort to conclude an agreement before the end of 2008.
The parties also committed to immediately implement their respective obligations under the Road
Map and to continue implementing the Road Map until they reach a peace treaty. Implementation
of the future peace treaty would be subject to the implementation of the Road Map, as judged by
the United States. The United States would monitor and judge fulfillment of Road Map
commitments and lead a tripartite U.S.-Israeli-Palestinian mechanism to follow up on
implementation.
Both sides were able to appear successful at Annapolis. Israel succeeded in making
implementation of any peace treaty dependent upon implementation of the Road Map and in
avoiding a rigid timetable and deadline. It was pleased that President Bush called for Israel to be a
homeland for the Jewish people, which the Palestinians have been reluctant to acknowledge
because of its possible effect on the refugee issue and Israeli Arabs, and for ending settlement
expansion, but not for a freeze. 77 Palestinians were able to remove Road Map implementation as a
precondition for final status negotiations, obtained a one-year target date, and involved United
States as “judge” of the parties’ fulfillment of their commitments.
General James L. Jones (Ret.) was named special envoy for Middle East security to oversee the
full range of security issues for the Israelis and Palestinians and security cooperation with
neighboring countries. He was tasked to design and implement a new U.S. plan for security
assistance to the PA, and not to monitor compliance with the Road Map nor to replace Lt. Gen.
Keith Dayton, the U.S. Middle East Security Coordinator, who had been assisting the Palestinians
with improving their security forces.
On December 2, Israel published tenders for the construction of 307 new housing units in the
settlement of Har Homa (Jabal abu Ghneim) in East Jerusalem. Israel maintained that, unlike the
West Bank, Jerusalem is not part of the Road Map’s requirements, and that Israel would retain
75
Noam Shelef, Peace Now, informed CRS on January 30, 2008, that there are 105 illegal outposts.
For text, see http://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/print/20071127.html. For more on
the conference, seeCRS Report RS22768, Israeli-Palestinian Peace Process: The Annapolis Conference, by (name
redacted).
77
For text of President Bush’s remarks, see http://georgewbush.whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2007/11/
20071127-2.html.
76
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Har Homa in any peace accord. The PA condemned the decision and Secretary Rice criticized it.78
Because of the Har Homa controversy, formal peace talks that began on December 12 were brief.
On December 30, Prime Minister Olmert directed his ministers to seek authorization from him
and Defense Minister Barak for “construction, new building, expansion, preparation of plans,
publication of residency tenders, and confiscation of land stemming from settlement activities in
the West Bank.”79 The order did not apply to construction that had already been approved, to
Jerusalem, or major settlement blocs. On February 12, 2008, the Israeli Housing Minister
unveiled plans to build 1,120 new apartments in East Jerusalem. The Palestinians, who claim East
Jerusalem as their future capital, condemned the action.
On January 9-10, President Bush visited Israel and the PA. He said that any peace agreement
“will require mutually agreed adjustments to the armistice lines of 1949 to reflect current realities
and to ensure that the Palestinian state is viable and contiguous.” He added that new international
mechanisms, including compensation, are needed to resolve the refugee issue. He observed that
Jerusalem is “one of the most difficult challenges on the road to peace,” but did not offer a
remedy. 80 National Security Advisor Hadley emphasized the importance of a vision of a
Palestinian state and moving toward it so that, at a “moment of clarity,” the Palestinian people
will choose whether they want to be part of an emerging state or under the rule of Hamas.
Olmert emphasized that “as long as there will be terror from Gaza it will be very, very hard to
reach any peaceful understanding between us and the Palestinians.”81 He opposed establishing
two Palestinian states—a Hamas state in the Gaza Strip and a Fatah state in the West Bank.82
On January 3, 2008, militants had fired a long range Katyusha rocket from Gaza into northern
Ashkelon, an Israeli coastal city. On January 15, Israeli forces killed 19 Palestinians, including
three civilians, in operations in Gaza. President Abbas denounced the raid as “a massacre,” and,
for the first time in seven months, Hamas took credit for launching rockets into Israel.
On January 17, in an effort to pressure Hamas to stop the rocket fire, Defense Minister Barak
ordered the closing of border crossings from Israel into Gaza, halting supplies of fuel, leading to a
major cut in electricity production from the Gaza power plant which affected water and sewage
systems, hospitals, and food deliveries. Electricity deliveries from Egypt and Israel continued,
and Israel said it would provide for emergency humanitarian needs. There was widespread
international condemnation of Israel’s action and Hamas vowed not to stop firing rockets.
On January 23, tens of thousands of Palestinians poured out of Gaza into Egypt after Hamas
militants blew holes in the border wall. Israeli officials expressed concern that more weapons
would enter the Strip and called on Egypt to reestablish control over the border. The Egyptian
Foreign Minister said that his country wanted to reinstate arrangements for the Rafah crossing
78
“James Blitz and Tobias Buck, “Israelis Criticized Over Plan to Build on Occupied Land,” Financial Times,
December 8, 2007.
79
Barak Ravid, “PM: No West Bank Construction without my Prior Approval, http://www.haaretz.com, December 31,
2007.
80
Steven Lee Myers, “Bush Outlines Mideast Peace Plan,” New York Times, January 11, 2008.
81
Remarks by President Bush and Prime Minister Olmert in Joint Press Availability, http://georgewbushwhitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2008/01/20080110.html.
82
Shahar Ilan, “Olmert Rules Out Gaza Ground Operation,” http://haaretz.com, January 15, 2008.
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established under a 2005 agreement among Israel, Egypt, the PA, and the European Union (EU).
Abbas offered to deploy his Presidential Guards to the border, but Hamas, which is physically in
control of the Palestinian side of the border, insisted on participating in a new, purely PalestinianEgyptian arrangement without an Israeli presence. 83 Abbas ruled out talks with Hamas until it
gives up control of Gaza and accepts early elections. Egypt refused to cede control of the crossing
to Hamas and resealed the border on February 3. It remains closed.
A suicide bombing killed one and injured 23 in the Israeli town of Dimona on February 4. The
Hamas military wing took credit and named perpetrators from the West Bank, intending to refute
Israeli allegations that the bombers had crossed from Gaza into Egypt via the open border and
then infiltrated from Egypt into Israel. It was the first suicide bombing in Israel in more than a
year. Israel retaliated with air strikes that killed nine Hamas militants.84
On February 13, Olmert suggested that, in order to avoid an impasse, it might be best to begin
negotiating over borders, not Jerusalem or refugees, because there are prior understandings and
President Bush’s April 14, 2004-letter to former Prime Minister Ariel Sharon to offer direction.
Controversially, Olmert claimed an understanding with the Palestinians to delay talks on
Jerusalem until the end of negotiations.85 Palestinian official Saeb Erekat responded, “The border
issue cannot advance without addressing Jerusalem’s borders.” Meanwhile, Foreign Minister
Livni said that the talks were proceeding according the principle that “until everything is agreed
on—nothing is agreed on.”86
Violence continued. On March 6, an Arab resident of East Jerusalem killed eight students and
wounded nine at a rabbinical seminary in West Jerusalem. Police attributed the attack to a lone
gunman. Hamas “blessed the operation,” while President Abbas condemned it.
Several Palestinian groups, including the Hamas military wing, claimed responsibility for a sniper
attack near the Israel-Gaza border that wounded an aide to the Israeli Public Security Minister on
April 4. On April 9, Palestinian gunmen killed two Israeli civilian employees at the Nahal Oz fuel
depot, from which fuel is piped into Gaza. Israeli forces killed two of the perpetrators and an
Israeli tank fired at two more, but killed three civilians and others. Israel again suspended fuel
shipments to Gaza and, later, Israeli missiles struck a Hamas training site, killing two. On April
16, Hamas claimed responsibility for ambushing and killing three Israeli soldiers in the Gaza
Strip as well as firing more than 20 rockets into southern Israel; Israeli retaliatory strikes,
including missiles, killed 19 Palestinians.
The Hamas military wing claimed responsibility for an April 19th suicide car bombing and mortar
ambush at the Kerem Shalom crossing between Israel and Gaza in which 13 Israeli soldiers were
injured. Israel retaliated with airstrikes, killing seven Hamas militants. Five Palestinian groups
claimed responsibility for killing two Israeli security guards in Tulkarem on the West Bank on
April 25. Israel suspected that PIJ was responsible. On April 28, an Israeli operation against
militants resulted in the deaths of a Palestinian mother and four children and the wounding of two
83
Joel Greenberg, “Egypt Works to Restore Breached Gaza Border,” McClatchy-Tribune Service, January 27, 2008.
84
Isabel Kershner and Taghreed El-Khodary, “Hamas Says Military Wing is Responsible for Bombing,” New York
Times, February 6, 2008.
85
Barak Ravid and Shmuel Rosner, “Olmert: Significant Progress Possible on Borders of Palestinian State,”
http://haaretz.com, February 13, 2008.
86
Akiva Eldar, “Israel, PA Negotiators Oppose PM’s Bid to Delay Talks on Jerusalem,” http://www.haaretz.com,
February 15, 2008.
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other children. Palestinians charged that an Israeli tank shell or missile had struck the home, but
an Israeli investigation suggested that explosions caused by Palestinian ammunition were the
cause, not an Israeli hit.
As President Bush arrived in Israel to help celebrate its 60th anniversary on May 14, a rocket
landed on a shopping mall in Ashkelon, injuring more than 30 people. PIJ and the Popular
Resistance Committees claimed responsibility.
Although the two sides agreed not to make public statements about the status of negotiations,
their officials occasionally made remarks. On February 26, Abbas reported that committees on
core issues of water, borders, settlements, refugees, Jerusalem, and security had been formed. On
April 18, Olmert maintained that no great gaps exist between him and Abbas “with the exception
of the subject of Jerusalem, which from the outset and by agreement was deferred to a later
stage.”87 On May 6, however, the PLO Executive Committee (which Abbas chairs) claimed that
the gap between the two sides was “very wide” on all issues.88
On May 14, Olmert spoke of the need to reach an “understanding” that would define the
parameters of a two-state solution, mentioning only the issues of borders, refugees, and security,
and again suggested that it would only include “a framework for how to deal later with the issue
of Jerusalem.”89
The United States encouraged Egypt’s efforts to achieve a tahdiyah (temporary truce, cease-fire,
or calm) between Israel and Hamas. Egyptian General Omar Suleiman (alt: Umar Sulayman),
who is in charge of intelligence services, mediated indirect talks. The issues involved were
Palestinian rocket fire from the Gaza Strip into Israel, Israel’s military operations in the Gaza
Strip and West Bank and its blockade of Gaza; the border crossing at Rafah between Gaza and
Egypt; Hamas’s release of Cpl. Shalit; and Israel’s release of Palestinian prisoners. A cease-fire to
last for six months took effect on June 19. While Olmert insisted that “Shalit’s release is
inseparable” from those the understandings, Hamas maintained that it was not and that separate
talks on a prisoner exchange continued. Negotiations on the prisoner exchange stalled.
On June 24, in the first breach of the truce, the PIJ fired three rockets from Gaza into Israel after
Israeli troops killed a PIJ leader in Nablus on the West Bank; Israel responded by closing the
commercial crossings into Gaza. That pattern continued, with smaller groups, but not Hamas,
firing rockets and Israel responding with short-term closures of the crossings.
On July 28, Olmert told a Knesset committee that it was impossible to reach a comprehensive
agreement in 2008 due to difficulty with and lack of negotiations on Jerusalem. He added that
agreement on other issues was within reach and that a clause defining a mechanism for dealing
with Jerusalem in 2009 could be included. A spokesman for Abbas again responded that an
agreement excluding Jerusalem was unacceptable.
In a September 29 interview, Olmert admitted that Israel would have to give up “almost all” of
the West Bank and accept the division of Jerusalem for peace. He also said that the Palestinians
87
David Landau and Yosi Verter, “An Island of Political Stability,” http://www.haaretz.com, April 18, 2008.
88
“PLO Executive Committee Denies Progress made in Negotiations with Israel,” WAFA, May 6, 2008, BBC
Monitoring Middle East, May 7, 2008.
89
Herb Keinon, “PM Touts Plan that Postpones J’lem Talks,” Jerusalem Post, May 15, 2008.
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must receive an equal amount of Israeli territory for any West Bank land that Israel retains. Abbas
disclosed that the Israeli land swap offer is 6.8% in return for 5.5% and that he rejected “offers
that lead to discontinuous land areas and loss of control over water resources.”90
On October 26, Foreign Minister and Olmert’s replacement as Kadima Party leader Tzipi Livni
reported that she had been unable to form a new coalition government, triggering early national
elections in Israel on February 10, 2009.
On November 4, Israeli troops entered Gaza to blow up a tunnel that officials said was intended
for kidnapping Israeli soldiers, and killed seven Palestinian militants. Officials said that the action
was to eliminate a threat to the cease-fire that had begun in June and not to end it. Hamas
responded by firing dozens of rockets into Israel daily and Israel reacted by closing the borders of
Gaza for extended periods of time. On December 15, Hamas leaders announced that the truce
would not be extended after it expired on December 19. The expiration date was followed by a
barrage of rocket fire into Israel and Israeli airstrikes.
On December 27, Israel launched Operation Cast Lead with an air offensive against Hamas
facilities in Gaza. The stated goal of the operation was to strike at Hamas’s terrorist infrastructure
and to improve security for residents of southern Israel. Israeli officials also said that they
intended to regain deterrence that was widely perceived as weakened by the 2006 war against
Hezbollah in Lebanon. Israel broadened the Gaza campaign rapidly to target any site considered
part of the Hamas terrorism support network, including mosques, universities, schools, factories,
homes of Hamas political and military leaders, and weapons caches. Tunnels under the GazaEgypt border used to smuggle arms, materiel, and goods were prime targets throughout the 22day military campaign.
2009
On January 4, Prime Minister Olmert set out conditions for a cease-fire: a halt to rocket attacks
and terror, international supervision of the cease-fire, and an end to Hamas’s military build-up
(via smuggling). Israel would not open its borders with Gaza unless Hamas released Gilad Shalit.
On January 10, Hamas politburo chief Mish’al stated his group’s counter-demands: a halt to
Israel’s “aggression,” the immediate withdrawal of its forces from Gaza, lifting of the siege on
Gaza, and opening all the crossings, foremost that between Gaza and Egypt.
The Bush Administration supported Israel. From the outset, Secretary Rice held “Hamas
responsible for breaking the cease-fire and for the renewal of violence.”91 President Bush called
the Hamas rocket attacks on Israel “an act of terror,” and added that no peace deal would be
acceptable without monitoring to halt the flow of smuggled weapons to the group.92
On January 8, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1860 by a vote of 14-0, with 1
abstention—the United States. Secretary Rice said that the United States first wanted to see the
outcome of Egyptian mediation for a cease-fire. The resolution called for “an immediate, durable,
90
Abd-al-Ra’uf Arna’ut, “President Abbas says: We are Ready to Call Simultaneous Legislative and Presidential
Elections,” Al-Ayyam, October 20, 2008, Open Source Center Document GMP20081020762002.
91
U.S. State Department, http://2001-2009.state.gov, December 29, 2008.
92
Margaret Coker, “Israel Ground-Invasion Threat Looms in Gaza,” Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2009, quoting
President Bush’s weekly radio address.
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and fully respected cease-fire.” While emphasizing the need to alleviate the humanitarian and
economic situation in Gaza, it also called for intensified efforts to sustain the cease-fire, including
preventing illicit trafficking in arms and ammunition and the sustained reopening of crossing
points on the basis of the 2005 Agreement on Movement and Access. Prime Minister Olmert said
that the Gaza operation would continue despite the resolution because “Israel has never agreed
that any outside body would determine its right to defend the security of its citizens” and because
the Palestinian groups were continuing to fire rockets into southern Israel and would not honor
the resolution.93 Hamas said that that the resolution had nothing to do with it because it did not
meet the Palestinian people’s demands and Hamas was not consulted.94
On January 16, Secretary Rice and Foreign Minister Livni signed a memorandum of
understanding (MOU) in which they agreed to work with neighbors and others in the international
community to prevent the supply of arms and related materiel to terrorist organizations. The
United States vowed to work with regional and NATO partners to address the supply of arms to
Hamas and others in Gaza through the Mediterranean, Gulf of Aden, Red Sea, and eastern
Africa.95 It also agreed to enhance security and intelligence cooperation to counter arms
smuggling. Egyptian officials said they were was not bound by the MOU and would not allow
foreign troops on their soil. Britain, France, Italy, and Germany jointly wrote to Olmert and
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, offering to help end smuggling by all technical, military,
naval, and diplomatic means, including patrols off Gaza’s coast.
On January 17, Israel unilaterally declared a cease-fire, effective January 18. Hamas soon
followed with its own one-week cease-fire. According to the U.N., which used figures provided
by the Palestinian Center for Human Rights, the conflict resulted in over 1,300 Palestinian deaths
and 5,400 injured, and 13 Israeli deaths (including three civilians and five soldiers from friendly
fire).96
Israeli and Palestinian peace negotiators had said that they would continue meeting until the new
U.S. Administration took office and the February 10, 2009 Israeli elections were over. However,
talks were suspended several weeks before Israel launched its operation against Hamas in
December 2008, and formally by Palestinian chief negotiator Quray on December 29.
Outgoing Prime Minister Olmert informed the Obama Administration’s Special Envoy for Middle
East Peace Mitchell of “understandings” he claimed he had reached with Abbas. They included
the uprooting of 60,000 settlers out of 250,000 and Israel’s withdrawal to its 1967 borders, with
adjustments that would allow it to retain large settlement blocs. In return for the blocs, Israel
would transfer an equal amount of territory in southern Israel to a Palestinian state. Olmert agreed
93
“Olmert Says Israeli Army to Continue Gaza Operation Despite UN Ceasefire Resolution,” Xinhua News Agency,
January 9, 2009.
94
“Hamas Says ‘Has Nothing to do with UN Resolution 1860,’Says was not Consulted,” Palestine Information Center,
January 9, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090109761004.
95
Text of Memorandum of Understanding signed by US Secretary of State Rice and Israeli Foreign Minister Livni, see
http://www.mfa.gov.il.
96
Palestinian figures are from U.N. Security Council, Update Report No. 3, Israel/Palestine: Gaza, January 26, 2009.
The IDF reported that, according to the Research Department of the Israeli Defense Intelligence, 1,166 Palestinians
were killed, of whom 709 were terror operatives, as well as 295 “uninvolved Palestinians,” of whom 89 were under the
age of 16 and 49 women. “Majority of Palestinians Killed in Operation Cast Lead: Terror Operatives,” Official website
of the IDF Spokesman’s Office, http://dover.idf.il/IDF/English, Open Source Center Document, GMP2009032739004,
March 26, 2009.
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that Jerusalem would be divided, with eastern neighborhood transferred to Palestinian
sovereignty, and holy sites administered by an international authority to include Saudi Arabia,
Jordan, the PA, Israel, and the United States, while Israel would retain formal sovereignty over
them. 97 Israel would not absorb Palestinian refugees from 1948, but would accept a limited
number in a reunification program. On January 27, Palestinian negotiator Erekat said that
Olmert’s proposal was never written down and its details were vague. Abbas declared, “Our
stance on the peace process is clear. We want back all the territories occupied in 1967, a fair
solution to the refugee issue in accordance with UN General Assembly Resolution 194, and
removal of settlements. We accept an international presence in the Palestinian territories provided
the Israeli army does not participate in it.”98
After the Israeli elections, Benjamin Netanyahu was named to form a new government. On
February 28, PA President Abbas said, “...we ask the Israeli government to adhere to previous
agreements, not to restart from scratch, to be committed to the two-state vision, to stop settlement
activity, to remove barriers, and to redeploy to the lines held prior to 28 September 2001, as
stipulated in the Road Map.” 99
On March 12, Hamas issued a rare criticism of smaller groups’ rocket attacks on Israel, saying
that their timing was wrong—perhaps because ongoing truce talks with Israel via Egypt.100
(Israel acknowledges that Hamas has restrained smaller groups’ actions.)
On March 27, the New York Times reported that Israeli planes had bombed a convoy of trucks
near the Egyptian border in Sudan in January that was believed to be carry arms to be smuggled
into Gaza and that Iran may have sent the weapons.101
A new Israeli government took office on March 31. In his maiden address to the Knesset
(parliament), Prime Minister Netanyahu vowed that his government would seek to attain peace
with the Palestinian Authority on
three parallel channels: economic, security and diplomatic. We aspire to assist the
accelerated development of the Palestinian economy, as well as of its economic ties with
Israel. We will support a Palestinian security apparatus that will fight terror and we will
conduct continuous peace negotiations with the Palestinian Authority with the aim of
reaching a permanent arrangement.... (W)e don’t want to rule over the Palestinians. Under
the permanent arrangement, the Palestinians will have all the authorities to govern
themselves, except those threatening the existence and security of the State of Israel.102
Netanyahu avoided reference to a Palestinian state.
97
Shim’on Schiffer, “Expose: Olmert’s Legacy,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, “January 29, 2009, Open Source Center Document
GMP20090129754001, Richard Boudreaux, “Olmert’s Peace Bid puts Livni in a Bind,” Los Angeles Times, February
4, 2009.
98
“President Abbas Says: It is the Palestinian People who have Triumphed and Israel does not want Peace,” WAFA,
January 27, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090127751006.
99
“President Abbas says: We are Moving in Steady Steps towards National Reconciliation,” WAFA, February 28,
2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, March 1, 2009.
100
Ibrahim Barzak, “Hamas, in Rare Move, Condemns Gaza Rocket Fire,” Associated Press, March 12, 2009.
101
Michael R. Gordon and Jeffrey Gettleman, “U.S. Officials Say Israel Struck in Sudan,” New York Times, March 27,
2009.
102
Address to the Knesset by Prime Minister-designate Binyamin Netanyahu introducing Israel’s 32nd Government,
Channel 10 Television, March 31, 2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090331738004.
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New Israeli Foreign Minister Avigdor Lieberman raised eyebrows on April 1, when he said that
the Joint Declaration presented at the Annapolis conference in 2007 is not binding because neither
the Israeli government nor the Knesset ratified it. He said that Israel is bound to follow the multistage 2003 Road Map. (See Significant Agreements, below.) The Joint Declaration called for the
parties to simultaneously implement the Road Map and conduct final status negotiations.
Lieberman wants to return to an incremental process, in which negotiations would be conducted
in a final stage, after the Palestinians confront terror, take control of Gaza, and demilitarize
Hamas.103 While Lieberman often comments on the peace process often, most decisions regarding
it reportedly are made by Prime Minister Netanyahu in collaboration with Defense Minister Ehud
Barak.
The Israeli Government Press Office said that, at a meeting in April, Prime Minister Netanyahu
told envoy Mitchell that it would not be possible to advance the diplomatic process and reach a
peace settlement without recognition of Israel as the national state of the Jewish People.
Netanyahu did not set this as a precondition for opening negotiations with the Palestinians. 104
Mitchell said that U.S. policy on a two-state solution “would have a Palestinian state living in
peace along the Jewish state of Israel.”105 Palestinians contend that recognition of Israel as a
Jewish state would negate Palestinian refugees’ “right of return” and be detrimental to the status
of Israel’s Arab citizens. On April 27, President Abbas said, “It’s not my job to give a description
to the state. Name yourself the Hebrew Socialist Republic—it is none of my business.”106
According to his spokesman, Abbas stressed to Mitchell the commitment of the Palestinians to a
two-state solution and signed agreements and obligations, particularly freezing settlement
activities, including natural growth, stopping house demolitions, and not building in E-1 (a
corridor of land between Israel and the Ma’ale Adumim West Bank settlement), and demanded
that the same criteria be applied to Israel. 107
On in a May 4 speech to AIPAC, Prime Minister Netanyahu restated his positions, which he
described as a “ fresh approach”—a triple track towards peace between Israel and the
Palestinians—a political track, a security track, and an economic track. The political track means
the resumption of negotiations without delay and without preconditions. The security track means
continued cooperation with the U.S. program to strengthen the Palestinian security apparatus.
Finally, the economic track would lead to the removal of obstacles to the advancement of the
Palestinian economy. Netanyahu inserted two provisos: “peace will not come without security,”
and for a final peace settlement to be achieved, “the Palestinians must recognize Israel as a
Jewish state,”—the nation-state of the Jewish people.108
President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu met at the White House on May 18, 2009.
Afterwards, the President said, “It is in the interests not only of the Palestinians but also the
Israelis, the United States, and the international community to achieve a two-state solution in
103
Barak Ravid, “ Lieberman to Haaretz: Israel Ready for Mutual Peace Moves, http://www. haaretz.com, April 2,
2009.
104
“Netanyahu Drops Demand for Jewish State Recognition,” Open Source Center Summary, April 20, 2009,
Document GMP20090420738011.
105
Isabel Kershner, “Israel: Netanyahu Demands Recognition of Israel First,” New York Times, April 17, 2009.
106
Isabel Kershner, “Abbas Rejects Calling Israel a Jewish State,” New York Times, April 28, 2009.
107
“PLO Negotiator Holds Joint Conference with US Envoy Mitchell in West Bank,” Palestinian News Agency Wafa,
April 17, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, April 18, 2009.
108
“Prime Minister Netanyahu’s Speech at AIPAC,” (Israeli) Government Press Office, May 5, 2009.
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which Israel and the Palestinians are living side by side in peace and security.” He also stated,
“The Palestinians are going to have to do a better job of providing the kinds of security
assurances that Israelis would need to achieve a two-state solution ... the other Arab states have to
be more supportive and be bolder in seeking potential normalization with Israel.” The President
declared, “Settlements have to be stopped in order for us to move forward,” and “the
humanitarian situation in Gaza has to be addressed.” Netanyahu said that he wanted “to start
peace negotiations with the Palestinians immediately and to broaden the circle of peace to include
others in the Arab world,” but that the Palestinians “will have to recognize Israel as a Jewish
state” and “enable Israel to have the means to defend itself.” If these conditions are met, then he
could envision an “arrangement where Palestinians and Israelis live side by side....” He said that
Israel wanted the Palestinians to govern themselves, but he did not endorse the goal of a
Palestinian state. The President asserted that “To the extent that we can make peace ...between the
Palestinians and Israelis, then I actually think it strengthens our hands in dealing with a potential
Iranian threat,” whereas the Prime Minister heard the President say “there isn’t a policy of
linkage.”109
On May 21, Secretary Clinton told Al-Jazeera, “We want to see a stop to settlement
construction—additions, natural growth, any kind of settlement activity—that is what the
President has called for.” Netanyahu’s spokesman responded, “normal life” in settlements “must
be allowed to continue,” using a new phrase instead of natural growth.110
On May 21, on the anniversary of Israel’s 1967 the annexation of East Jerusalem, Netanyahu
vowed “United Jerusalem is Israel’s capital. Jerusalem was always ours and will always be ours.
It will never again be partitioned and divided.”111 The Palestinians consider East Jerusalem to be
occupied Palestinian territory and, according the parameters of the 1990’s peace process, the fate
of Jerusalem is to be decided in negotiations between Israel and the Palestinians. On June 1,
Netanyahu told a Knesset committee that halting construction in settlements would be equal to
“freezing life,’ and therefore, “unreasonable.”112
President Obama restated his position regarding settlements at his May 28 White House meeting
with President Abbas.
On June 14, Netanyahu delivered a major address at Bar Ilan University in which he stated for the
first time that Israel would accept the establishment of a Palestinian state.113 First, however, he
said that the Palestinians must publicly recognize Israel as the state of the Jewish people. This is
because, he maintained, the root cause of the conflict is the refusal to recognize that right, and not
Israel’s presence in Judea and Samaria (as Israelis refer to the West Bank) and the Gaza Strip. The
Prime Minister claimed that a solution would be based on the establishment of a demilitarized
Palestinian state—without an army, without control of its air space, and with effective measures
to prevent weapons from being smuggled into its territory—and he asked for international
guarantees of this principle. He also declared that Jerusalem must remain undivided as the capital
of Israel, and that the Palestinian refugee problem must be solved outside of Israel, thereby
109
Remarks by President Obama and Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel in press availability, May 18, 2009, accessible
via http://www.whitehouse.gov.
110
Amy Teibel, “Israel Rejects Demand for Halt on Settlements,” Associated Press, May 29, 2009.
111
Mark Lavie, “Netanyahu Takes Hard Line on Jerusalem,” Pittsburgh Post-Gazette, May 22, 2009.
112
Helene Cooper, “Obama Talks of Being ‘Honest’ with Israel,” New York Times, June 2, 2009.
113
For text of speech, see http://www.pmo.gov.il.
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rejecting a “right of return.” Netanyahu insisted that “the claim that territorial withdrawals will
bring peace with the Palestinians ... simply does not square with the facts.” He stated that he
would not build new settlements or confiscate land for that purpose, but rejected a settlement
freeze, insisting that settlers must be allowed to have “normal lives.” At the same time,
Netanyahu called for the immediate resumption of peace talks without preconditions. He later
summarized five principles to provide “clear foundations for a successful completion of peace
talks,” but said they are not preconditions for those talks. They are recognition of the nation-state
of the Jewish people, the problem of the refugees solved outside the State of Israel, effective
demilitarization of the Palestinian state, the peace treaty must end the conflict, and be guaranteed
by the international community led by the United States.114
President Obama welcomed Netanyahu’s endorsement of the goal of a Palestinian state, saw
“some positive movement” in the speech, and said that Netanyahu’s conditions were “what
negotiations are supposed to be about.” He added, “What we are seeing is at least the possibility
we can restart serious talks.115 Special Envoy Mitchell stated that since both Israel and the
Palestinians are now both on the record in support of a two-state solution, “There now is a
common objective, which was not the case before the speech was made.”116 However, Palestinian
negotiator Erekat charged that Netanyahu “systematically took nearly every permanent status
issue off the table,” referring to borders, Jerusalem, settlements, refugees, and resources. 117
Egyptian President Mubarak said that Israel’s demand that Palestinians recognize Israel as the
state of the Jewish people “scuttles changes for peace.... You won’t find anyone to answer that
call in Egypt or in any other place” in the region.118 Later, Hamas Political Bureau Chief Mish’al
described Netanyahu’s offer of a demilitarized state as “a big prison, not a country fit for a great
people....The minimum we accept is a Palestinian state with Jerusalem as its capital, full
sovereignty, removal of settlements, and the refugees’ right of return.” Mish’al concluded that he
saw no alternative to continued armed struggle. 119 President Abbas would later reiterate his
demand that Israel recognize the principle of a two-state solution and halt all settlement activities
before negotiations on final status issues, including Jerusalem. 120
On July 1, Senator Mitchell met Israeli Defense Minister Barak in New York. Their joint
statement did not restate the U.S. demand for a freeze on Israeli settlement activity or provide an
Israeli response. Barak told the New York Times, “For us, it is very important that the Palestinians
commit to seeking an end to the conflict and a finality of any claims. We should not isolate this
issue of settlements and make it the most important one.” He said that Israel was eager for a
regional agreement that would lead to a state for the Palestinians and security for Israel.121 On
114
“PM Netanyahu’s Conference Call with Conference of Presidents of Major American Jewish Organizations,”
http://www.pmo.gov.il, July 1, 2009.
115
Howard Schneider, “E.U. Defers Upgrade of Israel Trade Ties,” Washington Post, June 16, 2009.
116
Matthew Lee, “AP Sources: Obama Envoy to Meet Israeli Leader,” Associated Press, June 16, 2009.
117
Michael Jansen, “Palestinians say Israeli Speech ‘Closes Door to Permanent Status Negotiations,’” Irish Times, June
16, 2009.
118
Ibid.
119
Khaled Yacoub Oweis, “Hamas Leader Rejects ‘Freak’ Israel Offer of State,” Reuters, June 25, 2009.
120
Saud Abu Ramadan, “Abbas Challenges Netanyahu with More Hard-Line Stances,” Xinhua News Agency, July 12,
2009.
121
Ethan Bronner, “As U.S Applies Pressure, Israel Willing to Freeze Settlements, Officials Say Any Offer is
Contingent on Progress in Broader Peace Efforts,” New York Times, June 30, 2009.
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July 6, Barak told Mitchell that Israel is committed to evacuating 23 illegal settlement outposts
within weeks or months. (As of January 2010, it had not occurred.)
Israel reportedly wants to link agreements to evacuate illegal outposts and a carefully defined,
short-term settlement freeze to Arab moves toward normalization. The Obama Administration has
worked to fulfill this request. On July 16, Secretary Clinton said,
We have been working with the Israelis to deal with the issues of settlements, to ease the
living conditions of Palestinians, and create circumstances that can lead to the
establishment of a viable Palestinian state....(W)hile we expect action from Israel, we
recognize those decisions are politically challenging.” She added, “progress toward peace
cannot be the responsibility of the United States or Israel alone.... The Palestinians have
the responsibility to improve and extend positive actions already taken on security, to act
forcefully against incitement and to refrain from any action that would make meaningful
negotiations less likely. And Arab states have a responsibility to support the Palestinian
Authority with words and deeds, to take steps to improve relations with Israel, and to
prepare their publics to embrace peace and accept Israel’s place in the region.122
Mitchell also reported that he is urging Arab leaders “to take steps towards normalization as
gestures of their own to demonstrate that everyone in the region shares the vision of
comprehensive peace that we share.”123 He said that Washington is not asking any Arab
government to normalize ties immediately.
The Arab League Secretary General responded, “There will be no Arab steps before Israel stops
its policy of settlement building.”124 On July 31, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Saud al Faisal
stated, “The question is not what the Arab world will offer. The question really is: what will Israel
give in exchange for this comprehensive offer (referring to the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative).”125
“Incrementalism and the step-by-step approach have not, and we believe will not achieve peace.
Temporary security, confidence-building measures, will also not bring peace.”126 He called for a
comprehensive approach that “defines the final outcome at the outset and launches into
negotiations over final status issues: borders, Jerusalem, water, refugees, and security.” Saudi
officials maintain that normalization should follow resolution of the major issues of the conflict
and Israel’s withdrawal from the West Bank, Gaza Strip, Golan Heights, and Sheba’a Farms in
Lebanon. Further, they say that gestures or “concessions” in return for a partial withdrawal would
reward Israel for the return of land that does not belong to it.127
The Administration is reaching out to Arab states which previously had low-level relations with
Israel and reportedly requested Oman, Qatar, Morocco, and Tunisia to reopen their commercial
interest offices in Israel and the Gulf States to permit Israeli commercial airliners’ flyovers.128
122
For Clinton speech at Council on Foreign Relations, see http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2009a/july/126071.htm.
Jeffrey Heller, “US Diplomats try to Revive Mideast Peace Talks,” Boston Globe, July 27, 2009.
124
Amos Harel and Avi Issacharoff, “Obama Envoy: Peace Process will bring Arab-Israeli Normalization,”
http://www.haaretz.com, July 27, 2009.
125
“Saudi Arabia Rebuffs US Calls to Normalize Relations with Israel,” Daily Star (Beirut), August 3, 2009, Turki alFaisal, “Land First, then Peace,” New York Times, September 13, 2009.
126
Mark Lander, “Mideast Envoy Says Misconceptions Cloud View of Peace Efforts,” New York Times, August 3,
2009.
127
“Saudi Rejects Israel Recognition Without Withdrawal,” Arabianbusiness.com, July 30, 2009, quoting Foreign
Ministry spokesman Osama Nugali.
128
Nathan Guttman, “Obama Begins Pressuring Arab Leaders on Deal with Israel,” www. haaretz.com, July 29, 2009.
123
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President Obama sent a letter to Moroccan King Mohammed VI, asking him to “be a leader in
bridging gaps between Israel and the Arab world.”129 Although none has responded, the
Administration continued to favor this approach. On August 10, the Deputy State Department
spokesman said, “confidence-building measures are a critical element of getting the parties to the
next step, which is negotiations.”130 On August 18, President Mubarak told President Obama that
the Arabs are unwilling to make gestures until Israel does something they believe merits such
reciprocity, and a temporary settlement freeze would not suffice.131
The Netanyahu government says that it is proceeding with its “bottom up” approach of working
to improve the living conditions for Palestinians in the West Bank as a foundation for future
peace. To that end, it reports removing roadblocks, check points, and dirt barriers and expanding
the hours that the Allenby Bridge crossing (between the West Bank and Jordan) is open for
commercial goods. 132 Abbas charged that Netanyahu is seeking “to divert the world’s attention by
easing economic restrictions on the Palestinians as a substitute for political rights.”
In a speech to the Fatah General Congress on August 4, 2009, President Abbas reaffirmed that the
Palestinians’ main aim is the establishment of an independent state and solving all issues,
especially refugees and settlements. He declared, “Although peace is our choice, we reserve the
right to resistance, legitimate under international law.”133 The Fatah Congress adopted a political
program affirming “the continuation of the negotiations without achieving real progress within a
defined time frame endangers our rights and becomes futile because it enables Israel to use the
negotiations as a cover for continuing its settlement activity and entrenching the occupation.” Its
11 principles for proceeding include:
129
•
Linking negotiations to real progress on the ground, specifically a complete halt to
settlement activity, especially in Jerusalem. In addition, Israel must stop incursions, lift
the siege of Gaza, remove barriers in the West Bank, and withdraw to the borders of
September 28, 2000 (before the outbreak of the second intifadah or uprising);
•
Negotiations based on U.N. resolutions and the 2002 Arab Peace Initiative;
•
Setting a clear agenda and a time cap for negotiations;
•
Rejecting postponement of negotiations on any final status issue, particularly Jerusalem
and refugees;
•
Rejecting a state with temporary borders;
•
Refusing to recognize Israel as a “Jewish state” in order to protect the rights of refugees
and of Israeli Arabs;
•
Insisting on international participation in negotiations and on a mechanism for binding
arbitration of impasses;
Herb Keinon, “J’Lem Expects Arab Gestures Soon,” Jerusalem Post, July 28, 2009.
130
“US Says Mideast Peace Cannot Move Forward Without Confidence Building,” KUNA online, August 10, 2009,
Open Source Center Document GMP20090810966033.
131
Natasha Mozgovaya, “Mubarak: U.S. Will Unveil First Draft of Mideast Plan Next Month,”
http://www.haaretz.com, August 19, 2009, citing Mubarak spokesman Suleiman Awad.
132
Speech to Knesset, op cit.
133
“Palestinian President Addresses Fatah Sixth General Congress Opening Session,” Palestinian Satellite Channel TV,
August 4, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
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•
Insisting on international monitoring and peace-keeping to guarantee implementation of
an agreement;
•
Holding a referendum on a peace agreement.134
The program refers ambiguously to “popular struggle,” and does not explicitly endorse
armed resistance.
At the first meeting of the new Fatah Central Committee on August 6, Abbas stated that
negotiations would only resume if Israel halted “all forms of settlement activity without
exception in Jerusalem and the rest of the occupied territories” and he welcomed
President Obama’s efforts on this matter. On August 17, he told the PA cabinet, “The
main and the only path is the path of peace and negotiations. We don’t have any other
path and we do not wish to use any other path.”135
Palestinian Prime Minister Salam Fayyad announced a Palestine Document: Ending the
Occupation, Establishing the State on August 25. It calls for establishing a “de facto state” to
“expedite the ending of the occupation” with or without a final peace agreement with Israel.136
The plan calls for building both institutions and infrastructure.
On August 26, Mitchell and Netanyahu met in London. The State Department reported simply
that they had “made good progress” and had “agreed on the importance of restarting
negotiations.” The State Department signaled flexibility on Israeli settlements on August 27,
when a spokesman said, “We put forward our ideas ... about what it will take for negotiations to
be restarted, but ultimately it’ll be up to the parties themselves, with our help, to determine
whether that threshold has been met.... Ultimately, this is not a process by which the United States
will impose conditions…..”137
On September 6, Israeli Defense Minister Barak approved the construction of 455 pre-planned
housing units, most to be built in major West Bank settlement blocs. Israel also plans to complete
an additional 2,500 units under construction. Barak said that the action was part of a dialogue
with the United States and was aimed at creating the foundation for an agreement that will
include the suspension of construction in the West Bank.138 Most of the approvals were
reapprovals of plans advanced during the prior Israeli government and the move was generally
depicted as an attempt to placate domestic opponents in advance of a temporary freeze on
settlement activity. Netanyahu later said that he was trying to balance the will to make a gesture
to promote negotiations and “the need to enable normal living for the residents of Judea and
Samaria.” Furthermore, he declared “Jerusalem is not a settlement and construction will go on as
planned.”139 The White House regretted Israel’s decision, saying “The United States does not
134
Abd-al-Ra’uf Arna’ut, “Fatah: 11 Principles for Negotiations, Five Options for the Failure of Dialogue; Four Steps
to Confront the Siege, and Seven Forms of Struggle,” Al-Ayyam (Ramallah), August 11, 2009, Open Source Center
Document GMP20090811745009. Ali Sawafta, “Abbas Stresses Talks, not ‘Resistance,’” McClatchy-Tribune Business
News, August 18, 2009,
135
Ali Sawafta, “Abbas Stresses Talks, not ‘Resistance,’” McClatchy-Tribune Business News, August 18, 2009.
136
“’Full Text’ of Fayyad Gov’t ‘Palestine Document’ on Palestinian State by 2011,” WAFA (Ramallah), August 25,
2009, Open Source Center Document GMP20090827751004, also “Fayyad Unveils Plan for De Facto State by 2011,”
Ma’an News Agency, August 25, 2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, August 26, 2009.
137
U.S. State Department, Daily Press Briefing, August 27, 2009.
138
“Construction Approval is Part of Dialogue with US – Israeli Defense Minister,” Voice of Israel, September 7,
2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East.
139
“Attila Somfalvi, “Netanyahu: Jerusalem is not a Settlement,” Ynetnews, September 14, 2009, quoting Netanyahu’s
(continued...)
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accept the legitimacy of continued settlement expansion, and we urge that it stop. We are working
to create a climate in which negotiations can take place, and such actions make it harder to create
such a climate.” 140
President Obama, Prime Minister Netanyahu, and President Abbas met on September 22 on the
sidelines of the U.N. General Assembly opening session, even though the two sides had not
wavered in their views. The Palestinians argued that there was no point in starting negotiations
without a settlement freeze and unless Israel agreed to negotiate on Jerusalem and refugees, while
Netanyahu would not compromise on settlements and borders before negotiations. President
Obama stated, “Permanent negotiation must begin, and begin soon.” He called on the Palestinians
to build on progress in halting terrorism and to do more to stop incitement. He praised Israel’s
actions to improve the Palestinians’ freedom of movement, and called on it to move beyond
discussions of restraining settlement construction to action. Palestinians noted his use of the word
“restrain” instead of “freeze.”
President Obama told the General Assembly that he would continue to seek a just and lasting
peace between Israel, Palestine, and the Arab world. He said that he would continue to call on the
Palestinians to end incitement against Israel and to emphasize that “America does not accept the
legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements.” He declared, “the time has come to re-launch
negotiations without preconditions that address the permanent status issues: security for Israelis
and Palestinians, borders, refugees, and Jerusalem. And the goal is clear: Two states living side by
side in peace and security – a Jewish state of Israel … and a viable, independent Palestinian state
with contiguous territory that ends the occupation that began in 1967….”141
In late September, the PLO outlined three conditions for resuming talks: negotiations must be
based on international resolutions calling for an independent Palestinian state within a two-state
solution, a time limit must be established, and a complete halt to settlement activity must be in
place.
President Abbas has said that negotiations with Israel should resume from the agreement on
“terms of reference” that he says were reached with former Israeli Prime Minister Olmert, i.e., the
Palestinian state would have the 1967 borders with reciprocal land adjustments. He admitted that
no agreement was reached on borders or exchanging land. Abbas said that he would push for
delineation of borders because it would solve, borders, settlements, water, and Jerusalem. He also
reported that the Palestinian dialogue with Israel continues on security, economic issues, and
daily life. 142
In late October, Netanyahu offered to exercise restraint in construction in the West Bank, while
continuing the completion of 3,000 housing units for which permits already have been given or
construction begun. The “freeze” or “moratorium” would not apply to East Jerusalem, public
(...continued)
discussion with the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee that day.
140
Joshua Mitnick, “Israel Says it Will Allow More Settlements – Netanyahu’s Plan Gains Support Among
Conservative Backers, but Draws Rebukes from the U.S. and Others,” Christian Science Monitor, September 7, 2009.
141
Remarks by the President to the United Nations General Assembly, September 23, 2009,
http://www.whitehouse.gov/the_press_office/Remarks-by-the-President-to-the-United-Nations-General-Assembly.
142
Interview by Raghidah Dirgham, “Abbas to Al-Hayah: Netanyahu’s Government is a Problem and There is no
Common Ground for Negotiations with it,” Al-Hayah, September 24, 2009, Open Source Center Document
GMP200090924825001.
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buildings, or infrastructure projects. Secretary Clinton described “what the prime minister has
offered in specifics of a restraint on policy of settlements … no new starts, for example, is
unprecedented (italics added) in the context of prior negotiations. It’s also the fact that for 40
years, presidents of both parties have questioned the legitimacy of settlements….”143 The
Palestinians rejected Netanyahu’s proposal and, after they and Arab governments expressed
disappointment with her remarks, the Secretary conceded that “it is nowhere near enough” and
reiterated that “the United States does not accept the legitimacy of continued Israeli settlements”
and wanted more from Netanyahu. 144
On November 3, the State Department spokesman said, “We recognize that things have stalled….
We’re looking at a variety of ways to increase interaction between the parties in some form.” He
described the proposals as “baby steps” that would eventually “create a momentum of their
own….”145
In a November 5 speech in which he repeated his known terms of reference for negotiations,
President Abbas told his people that he was “not interested” being a candidate in presidential
elections then scheduled for January 2010.146Abbas would remain Chairman of the Palestine
Liberation Organization (PLO), in which capacity he has negotiated with Israel. On December 16,
the PLO Central Council (PCC) said that Abbas would stay on as PA president after his tenure
ends on January 25, 2010 and until elections are held. No date has been set for elections; the PCC
called for them to be held not later than July 1.
The Palestinians began to talk of asking the Security Council to recognize an independent
Palestinian state in the 1967 borders. Netanyahu warned that it would provoke responding
unilateral Israeli steps, while, on November 16, the State Department said that the United States
supports “a Palestinian state that arises as a result of a process between the two parties.”147 The
EU Presidency said that the move was “premature.” Hamas rejected the idea as meaningless.
On November 17, the White House Press Secretary expressed dismay that the city of Jerusalem
Planning Committee had decided to expand -- by about 900 housing units -- the settlement of
Gilo, which Israel considers to be within the borders of Jerusalem (that it enlarged after the 1967
war). He stated that neither party should unilaterally pre-empt negotiations, and that the status of
Jerusalem is an issue that “must be resolved through negotiations.” He added, “The U.S. also
objects to other Israeli practices in Jerusalem related to housing , including the continuing pattern
of evictions and demolitions of Palestinian homes.”148
143
Press Conference with Prime Minister Binyamin Netanyahu and US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton in Jerusalem,
on October 31, accessible at Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs website, http://www.mfa.gov.il.
144
Mark Landler, “Clinton Denies Easing Pressure on Israel,” and “Short-Term Fixes Sought in Mideast,” New York
Times, November 3 and 4, 2009, respectively.
145
Karen DeYoung and Howard Schneider, “U.S. Hope Dims for High-Level Israeli-Palestinian Talks over State,”
Washington Post, November 4, 2009.
146
Speech by Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas from Ramallah, Palestinian Satellite Channel TV, November 5,
2009, BBC Monitoring Middle East, November 6, 2009.
147
Isabel Kershner, “Israel Moves Ahead with Plan to Expand Settlement in Disputed Part of Jerusalem,” New York
Times, November 17, 2009.
148
Statement by White House Press Secretary Robert Gibbs on Jerusalem, November 17, 2009, accessible at
http://www.whitehouse.gov.
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Israel-Syria
Syria seeks to regain sovereignty over the Golan Heights, 450 square miles of land along the
border that Israel seized in 1967. Israel applied its law and administration to the region in
December 1981, an act other governments do not recognize. Approximately 20,000 Israeli settlers
reside in 33 settlements on the Golan. In 1991, Syria referred to its goal in the peace conference
as an end to the state of belligerency, not a peace treaty, preferred a comprehensive Arab-Israeli
peace, and rejected separate agreements between Israel and Arab states. Israel emphasized peace,
defined as open borders, diplomatic, cultural, and commercial relations, security, and access to
water resources.
In 1992, Israel agreed that U.N. Security Council Resolution 242 (after the 1967 war) applies to
all fronts, meaning that “land for peace” includes the Golan. Syria submitted a draft declaration of
principles, reportedly referring to a “peace agreement,” not simply an end to belligerency. Israeli
Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin accepted an undefined withdrawal on the Golan, pending Syria’s
definition of “peace.” On September 23, 1992, the Syrian Foreign Minister promised “total peace
in exchange for total withdrawal.” Israel offered “withdrawal.” In 1993, Syrian President Hafez al
Asad announced interest in peace and suggested that bilateral tracks might progress at different
speeds. In June, U.S. Secretary of State Warren Christopher said that the United States might be
willing to guarantee security arrangements in the context of a sound agreement on the Golan.
On January 16, 1994, President Clinton reported that Asad had told him that Syria was ready to
talk about “normal peaceful relations” with Israel. The sides inched toward each other on a
withdrawal and normalization timetable. Asad again told President Clinton on October 27 that he
was committed to normal peaceful relations in return for full withdrawal. Asad never expressed
his ideas publicly, leaving it to Clinton to convey them.
On May 24, 1994, Israel and Syria announced terms of reference for military talks under U.S.
auspices. Syria reportedly conceded that demilitarized and thinned-out zones may take
topographical features into account and be unequal, if security arrangements were equal. Israel
offered Syria an early-warning ground station in northern Israel in exchange for Israeli stations on
the Golan Heights, but Syria insisted instead on aerial surveillance only and that each country
monitor the other from its own territory and receive U.S. satellite photographs. It was proposed
that Syria demilitarize 6 miles for every 3.6 miles Israel demilitarizes. Rabin insisted that Israeli
troops stay on the Golan after its return to Syria. Syria said that this would infringe on its
sovereignty, but Syrian government-controlled media accepted international or friendly forces in
the stations. Talks resumed at the Wye Plantation in Maryland in December 1995, but were
suspended when Israeli negotiators went home after terrorist attacks in February/March 1996.
A new Israeli government led by Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu called for negotiations, but
said that the Golan is essential to Israel’s security and water needs and that retaining Israeli
sovereignty over the Golan would be the basis for an arrangement with Syria. Asad would not
agree to talks unless Israel honored prior understandings, claiming that Rabin had promised total
withdrawal to the June 4, 1967-border, which gives Syria access to the northern shore of the Sea
of Galilee (also known as Lake Tiberias or Lake Kinneret). That border differs from the
international border of 1923 and the armistice line of 1949, which Damascus views as the results
of colonialist or imperialist decisions.149 Israeli negotiators say that Rabin had suggested possible
149
Shlomo Avineri, “Only the June 4, 1967 Lines,” http://www.haaretz.com, August 6, 2008.
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full withdrawal if Syria met Israel’s security and normalization needs, which Syria did not do. An
Israeli law passed on January 26, 1999, requires a 61-member majority in the Knesset
(parliament) and a national referendum to approve the return of any part of the Golan Heights.
However, holding a referendum would depend on a passage of a Basic Law for Public Referenda,
which has not been accomplished. (In July 2009, the Knesset began considering a referendum
law, with the support of Prime Minister Netanyahu. In November, it approved the bill, but
additional votes are required before it becomes law.)
In June 1999, Israeli Prime Minister-elect Ehud Barak and Asad exchanged compliments via a
British writer. Israel and Syria later agreed to restart talks from “the point where they left off,”
with each side defining the point to its satisfaction. Barak and the Syrian Foreign Minister met in
Washington on December 15-16, 1999, and in Shepherdstown, WV, from January 3-10, 2000.
President Clinton intervened. On January 7, a reported U.S. summary revealed Israeli success in
delaying discussion of borders and winning concessions on normal relations and an early-warning
station. Reportedly because of Syrian anger over this leak, talks scheduled to resume on January
19, 2000 were “postponed indefinitely.”
On March 26, President Clinton met Asad in Geneva. A White House spokesman reported
“significant differences remain” and that it would not be productive for talks to resume. Barak
indicated that disagreements centered on Israel’s reluctance to withdraw to the June 1967 border
and cede access to the Sea of Galilee, on security arrangements, and on the early-warning station.
Syria agreed that the border/Sea issue had been the main obstacle. Asad died on June 10; his son,
Bashar, succeeded him. Ariel Sharon became Prime Minister of Israel in February 2001 and
vowed to retain the Golan. In a December 1 New York Times interview, Bashar al Asad said that
he was ready to resume negotiations from where they broke off. Sharon responded that Syria first
must stop supporting Hezbollah and Palestinian terror organizations. 150
On August 29, 2005, Sharon said that it was not the time to begin negotiations with Syria because
it is collaborating with Iran, building up Hezbollah, and maintaining Palestinian terrorist
organizations’ headquarters in Damascus from which terrorist attacks against Israel are ordered.
Moreover, he observed that there was no reason for Israel to relieve the pressure that France and
the United States were putting on Syria (over its alleged complicity in the February 2005
assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafik Hariri).
On June 28, 2006, Israeli warplanes caused sonic booms over President Asad’s summer residence
in Latakia to warn him to discontinue support for the Damascus-based head of the Hamas
political bureau, Khalid Mish’al, whom Israel considered responsible for a June 25 attack in
Israel, and for other Palestinian terrorists. On July 3, Syrian Foreign Minister Walid al Muallem
denied that Mish’al had a role in the attack and said that Syria would never force him to leave the
country.
In a speech on August 15 to mark the end of the war in Lebanon, President Asad declared that the
peace process had failed since its inception and that he did not expect peace in the near future.151
Subsequently, he said that Shib’a Farms (an area near where the Israeli, Syrian, and Lebanese
150
See also CRS Report RL33487, Syria: Background and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted).
For text of speech, see “Syria’s Asad Addresses ‘New Middle East,’ Arab ‘Failure’ to Secure Peace,” Syrian Arab
Television TV1, Open Source Center Document GMP200608156070001.
151
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borders meet) are Lebanese, but that the border between Lebanon and Syria there cannot be
demarcated as long as it is occupied by Israel. The priority, he said, must be liberation.152
Responding to speculation about reopening peace talks with Syria, Israeli Prime Minister Olmert
said on August 21 that Syria must stop supporting terrorist organizations before negotiations
resume. In September, he declared, “As long as I am prime minister, the Golan Heights will
remain in our hands because it is an integral part of the State of Israel.”153 He also indicated that
he did not want to differ from the Bush Administration, which viewed Syria as a supporter of
terror that should not be rewarded. On November 28, U.S. National Security Advisor Hadley
concurred that as long as Syria is “a supporter of terror, is both provisioning and supporting
Hezbollah and facilitating Iran in its efforts to support Hezbollah, and is supporting Hamas,” then
it is “not on the agenda to bring peace and security to the region.” Hadley agreed that you cannot
talk about negotiating with that Syria.154
On December 6, the Iraq Study Group released a report that included recommendations for
changing U.S. policy toward the Arab-Israeli conflict because “Iraq cannot be addressed
effectively in isolation from other major regional issues.” It stated that the United States will not
be able to achieve its goals in the Middle East unless it has a “renewed and sustained
commitment” to a comprehensive, negotiated peace on all fronts, including “direct talks with, by,
and between Israel, Lebanon, Palestinians (those who accept Israel’s right to exist), and
particularly Syria....” The report recommended that Israel return the Golan Heights, with a U.S.
security guarantee that could include an international force on the border, including U.S. troops if
requested by both parties, in exchange for Syria’s taking actions regarding Lebanon and
Palestinian groups.155 Olmert rejected any linkage to the situation in Iraq and believed that
President Bush shared his view.
In December, Asad and his Foreign Minister expressed interest in unconditional negotiations with
Israel. Their statements deepened a debate in Israel over Syria’s intentions. Olmert was skeptical
of Asad’s motives and demanded that Syria first end support for Hamas and Hezbollah and sever
ties with Iran.156 On January 17, 2007, Secretary Rice asserted that “this isn’t the time to engage
Syria,” blaming Damascus for allowing terrorists to cross its territory to enter Iraq, failing to
support Palestinians who believe in peace with Israel, and trying to bring down the Lebanese
government.157
On May 4, 2007, on the sidelines of a meeting on Iraq in Egypt, Secretary Rice met Foreign
Minister Muallem. U.S. officials said that the meeting focused exclusively on Iraq. Some Israelis
asked why they should not have contacts with Syrians if U.S. officials could do so. On June 8,
Israeli officials confirmed that Israel had sent messages to Syria signaling willingness to engage
152
In interview by Hamdi Qandil on Dubai TV, August 23, 2006, Open Source Center Document
GMP20060823650015.
153
“Olmert Tells Israeli Paper: Golan ‘An Integral Part of the State of Israel’,” Yedi’ot Aharonot, September 26, 2006,
citing a Mishpaha newspaper interview, Open Source Center Document GMP20060926746002.
154
Shmuel Rosner, “Chirac: France, U.S. Agree There is No Point Talking to Syria,” http://www.haaretz.com,
November 29, 2006.
155
For text of Iraq Study Group report, see http://www.usip.org/isg/.
156
Gideon Alon, “Olmert, Peretz Spar over Syrian Overtures,” http://www.haaretz.com/, December 18, 2006.
157
Interview with Andrea Mitchell of NBC News, January 17, 2007.
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in talks based on the principle of land for peace and attempting to discern whether Damascus
might be willing to gradually end its relations with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas in exchange.
In a July 10 interview, Olmert said that he was willing to discuss peace with Asad, but
complained that the Syrian only wants negotiations to be conducted via Americans, who do not
want to talk to Asad.158 On July 17, Asad called on Israel to make an “unambiguous and official
announcement” about its desire for peace and “offer guarantees about the return of the land in
full,” opening “channels via a third party, but not direct negotiations.” This, he said, would lead to
direct talks in the presence of an “honest broker.” Those talks would be on security arrangements
and relations, and not land. Asad asserted that he cannot negotiate with Israel because “we do not
trust them.”159 On July 20, Olmert called on Asad to drop preconditions which Israel cannot
accept.
On September 6, the Israeli Air Force carried out an air raid against a site in northeastern Syria.
On September 12, a New York Times report alleged that the target may have been a nuclear
weapons installation under construction with North Korean-supplied materials. Syrian and North
Korean officials denied this allegation and, on October 1, President Asad claimed that an
unoccupied military compound had been hit. On October 25, the International Institute for
Science and International Security released satellite photos showing that a suspected reactor
building had been razed and the site scraped, raising suspicions about its purpose. Syria has not
retaliated for the air raid. On January 8, 2008, International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
Director General Mohamed El Baradei initially told a pan-Arab newspaper that, “Based on
satellite photographs, experts believe it is unlikely that the targeted construction was a nuclear
facility.”160 On January 12, 2008, it was reported that new satellite photos show construction at
the site resembling the former building, which would cover the remains of the old one and
possibly conceal its past.161 Syria did not allow inspectors to visit the site until May. In
November, the IAEA reported that it had features resembling a reactor and finding traces of
uranium amid the ruins, but did not come to any conclusions. On February 24, 2009, a Syrian
scientist told the IAEA that the site has been converted into a military installation for firing
missiles. Syria has not allowed any further IAEA visits. (See “Role of Congress” “Israeli Raid on
Suspected Syrian Nuclear Site,” below, for additional information on this issue.)
On September 23, 2007, Secretary Rice had expressed hope that participants in the Annapolis
meeting would include the members of the Arab League Follow Up Committee—12 Arab
governments, including Syria. On October 1, President Asad responded that his government
would not attend unless the Golan Heights were discussed. 162 Syria’s Deputy Minister of Foreign
Affairs attended the conference and explained that his presence resulted from the inclusion of the
return of the Golan on the agenda. In December, Secretary Rice declared that “Annapolis was a
chance we gave Syria and its test was the (presidential) elections in Lebanon. So far, the Syrians
have failed completely.”
158
“Israeli PM Discusses Interest in Arab Initiative, Syria Talks,” Al Arabiya TV, Dubai, July 10, 2007, BBC
Monitoring Middle East, July 11, 2007.
159
Speech to People’s Assembly, Syrian Arab Television, July 17, 2007, Open Source Center Document
GMP20070717607001.
160
“Report: New Satellite Photo Shows Construction at Syrian Site Bombed by Israel,” Associated Press, January 12,
2008.
161
William J. Broad, “Syria Rebuilding on Site Destroyed by Israeli Bombs,” New York Times, January 12, 2008.
162
“Assad Casts Doubt on Syrian Participation in Peace Summit,” Associated Press, October 11, 2007, citing an
interview with Tunisian newspapers.
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For months, there was speculation about a revived Israel-Syria peace track as Professor Ahmet
Davutoglu, a close foreign policy advisor to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan, was
reported to be carrying messages between Damascus and Jerusalem. Israeli officials repeatedly
hinted that talks were afoot, acknowledging that the price of peace for Israeli would be the Golan
Heights and hoping that it might be a way to distance Syria from Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas.163
On April 17, Prime Minister Olmert confirmed that the two sides had been in contact and, on
April 24,
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