Outer Continental Shelf: Debate Over Oil and Gas Leasing and Revenue Sharing
Congressional research reportApr 3, 2009
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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress
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Oil and gas leasing in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) has been an important issue in the
debate over energy security and domestic energy resources. The Department of the Interior (DOI)
released a comprehensive inventory of OCS resources in February 2006 that estimated reserves of
8.5 billion barrels of oil and 29.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas. Another 86 billion barrels
of oil and 420 tcf of natural gas are classified as undiscovered resources. Congress had imposed
moratoria on much of the OCS since 1982 through the annual Interior appropriation bills. A
Presidential Directive issued by President George H.W. Bush in 1990 (and extended by President
Clinton until 2012) also banned offshore oil and gas development in much of the OCS.
Proponents of the moratoria contend that offshore drilling would pose unacceptable
environmental risks and threaten coastal tourism industries. However, on June 18, 2008, President
Bush announced his support for lifting the moratoria on offshore oil and gas development.
However, President Bush said that he would not lift the executive ban until Congress acted to lift
its ban first. But, on July 14, 2008, President Bush reversed his position and lifted the executive
ban on the OCS before Congress acted.
Congressional action approving the Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329,
enacted September 30, 2008), continued the funding of government activities through March 6,
2009, or until a regular appropriations bill is enacted, omitted language that provided for the
congressional OCS moratoria along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The permanent appropriations
law (P.L. 111-8) does not contain the OCS moratoria. Those areas may now be made available for
preleasing, leasing, and related activity that could lead to oil and gas development. The
moratorium, however, is still in place for most of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico which was placed
off-limits statutorily until 2022 under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006
(GOMESA) (P.L. 109-432). There are some indications in the 111th Congress that a total OCS ban
is unlikely, but the question may be, how much of the OCS remains open and available for oil and
gas drilling. Separate legislation (H.R. 1696) has been introduced to place MMS planning areas in
the North Atlantic and Mid-Atlantic permanently off-limits to oil and gas leasing and
development.
Further, the Administration began planning its next five-year leasing program in August 2008 that
would, if approved, be implemented as early as 2010 - two years ahead of schedule. The proposed
new five-year program, introduced in January 2009, would supersede the current five-year leasing
program from 2007-2012. A new five-year lease program, beginning in 2010, would allow the
newly opened OCS areas to be offered in a lease sale sooner than if the MMS remained on their
current schedule. The Obama Administration extended the comment period on the proposed fiveyear leasing program 180 days beyond its required 60 days to assess the information they have on
the OCS for energy development, including renewable energy development.
Royalty relief, particularly for deep-water projects, has come under closer scrutiny since it was
revealed in a February 2006 New York Times article that leases issued during 1998 and 1999 did
not contain price thresholds for royalty relief (above which royalties apply) as part of the Deep
Water Royalty Relief Act (DWRRA) of 1995 (leases issued between 1996-2000). However, Kerr
McGee Oil and Gas Corp. (now Anadarko Petroleum Corp.) filed a lawsuit challenging the
Minerals Management Service’s (MMS) authority to impose price thresholds in the DWRRA
leases. A recent U.S. District Court decision, which was upheld by a 3-member panel in the U.S.
Court of Appeals, ruled that the Secretary of the Interior had no authority to impose price
thresholds for oil and gas leases held under the DWRRA .
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Most Recent Developments............................................................................................................. 1
Background and Analysis ................................................................................................................ 2
Offshore Leasing System ................................................................................................................ 2
Federal Distribution of OCS Revenues..................................................................................... 5
Coastal Impact Assistance ............................................................................................................... 6
Offshore Leasing Moratoria ............................................................................................................ 7
California Leases....................................................................................................................... 9
Royalty Relief ..........................................................................................................................11
Lease Development in the Gulf of Mexico ................................................................................... 12
Barriers to Development ......................................................................................................... 13
Natural Gas-Only Proposals.................................................................................................... 14
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111 Congress Legislation ............................................................................................................ 14
110th Congress Legislation ............................................................................................................ 14
109th Congress......................................................................................................................... 17
109th Congress Legislation (Enacted) ..................................................................................... 17
Lease Sale 181: Revisited ....................................................................................................... 18
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Figure 1. MMS Five-Year Program Areas....................................................................................... 4
Figure 2. Distribution of Revenue from Federal and Indian Leases, FY2008 ................................ 9
Figure A-1. Lease Sale Area in S. 3711......................................................................................... 20
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Appendix. Legislation in the 109th Congress................................................................................. 17
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Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 21
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President Bush announced on June 18, 2008, that he would like to open areas of the Outer
Continental Shelf (OCS) for oil and gas development currently under presidential and
congressional moratoria (discussed in more detail below). However, the President stated that he
would lift the executive branch moratoria only after Congress did so legislatively. But, on July 14,
2008, President Bush reversed his position and lifted the executive ban on the OCS imposed in
1990 by President George H.W. Bush.
Congressional action approving the Continuing Appropriations Act for FY2009 (P.L. 110-329,
enacted September 30, 2008), continued the funding of government activities through March 6,
2009, or until a regular appropriations bill is enacted, omitted language that provided for the
congressional OCS moratoria along the Atlantic and Pacific coasts. The permanent appropriations
law (P.L. 111-8) does not contain the OCS moratoria. Those areas may now be made available for
preleasing, leasing, and related activity that could lead to oil and gas development. The
moratorium, however, is still in place for most of the Eastern Gulf of Mexico which was placed
off-limits statutorily until 2022 under the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006
(GOMESA) (P.L. 109-432). There are some indications in the 111th Congress that a total OCS ban
is unlikely, but the question may be, how much of the OCS remains open and available for oil and
gas drilling. Separate legislation (H.R. 1696) has been introduced to place MMS planning areas in
the North Atlantic and Mid-Atlantic permanently off-limits to oil and gas leasing and
development.
Further, the Administration began planning its next five-year leasing program in August 2008 that
would, if approved, be implemented as early as 2010 - two years ahead of schedule. The proposed
new five-year program, introduced in January 2009, would supersede the current five-year leasing
program from 2007-2012. A new five-year lease program, beginning in 2010, would allow the
newly opened OCS areas to be offered in a lease sale sooner than if they remained on their
current schedule. The Obama Administration extended the comment period on the proposed fiveyear leasing program 180 days beyond its required 60 days to assess the information they have on
the OCS for energy development, including renewable energy development.
There are some in Congress, along with interest groups (e.g., environmentalists), however, that
oppose keeping open many of the offshore areas previously offlimits. They argue that there are
still several million acres leased onshore and offshore but not yet producing and that production
from these areas could increase U.S. oil and gas supply. How much oil or gas that could be
brought into production in the short-term (from non-producing leased lands or those under the
moratoria) and its impact on price is uncertain.
Since the President lifted the executive ban and during the 110th Congress, members of Congress
had introduced legislation, also in the 110th Congress, that would have lifted the congressional
prohibition (in part or completely) against leasing and development of oil and natural gas in the
OCS. The legislation section of this report summarizes several of those bills and proposals,
including House-passed H.R. 6899.
Other action in the 110th Congress included an attempt to lift the offshore moratoria with an
amendment to the FY2009 Interior, Environment, and Related Agencies Appropriations bill but
was defeated during the House subcommittee markup by a vote of 6-9. Another measure (H.R.
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6251) that would have increased rental fees on non-producing oil and gas leases, and denied new
federal leases to those not diligently developing the leases they have was defeated in the House.
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Oil and gas leasing has been prohibited on most of the outer continental shelf (OCS) since the
1980s. Congress has enacted OCS leasing moratoria for each of fiscal years 1982-2008 in the
annual Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations bill (now the Interior and Environment and
Related Agencies Appropriations bill), allowing leasing only in the Gulf of Mexico (except near
Florida) and parts of Alaska. President George H.W. Bush in 1990 issued a presidential directive
ordering the Department of the Interior (DOI) not to conduct offshore leasing or preleasing
activity in areas covered by the annual legislative moratoria until 2000. In 1998, President Clinton
extended the offshore leasing prohibition until 2012. President George W. Bush lifted the
executive branch moratoria on July 14, 2008. Congress allowed the ban to expire by not including
it in the FY2009 appropriation law. Both branches of government had to remove the ban in order
for oil and gas leasing and development to occur in the moratoria areas.
Proponents of the moratoria contend that offshore drilling would pose unacceptable
environmental risks and threaten coastal tourism industries, whereas supporters of expanded
offshore leasing counter that more domestic oil and gas production is vital for the nation’s energy
security.
The possibility of oil and gas production in offshore areas covered by the moratoria has sparked
sharp debate in Congress. A proposal to require the DOI to conduct a comprehensive inventory of
OCS oil and natural gas resources drew heated opposition, although it was ultimately included in
the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58, Section 357). The Department of the Interior’s
Minerals Management Service (MMS) completed the OCS inventory Report to Congress in
February 2006 as requested but without the authorized three-dimensional (3-D) seismic study.
Congress has yet to fund the 3-D seismic study.
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The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OCSLA) of 1953, as amended, provides for the leasing
of OCS lands in a manner that protects the environment and returns revenues to the federal
government in the form of bonus bids, rents, and royalties.1 OCSLA requires the Secretary of the
Interior to submit five-year leasing programs that specify the time, location, and size of the areas
to be offered. Each five-year leasing program entails a lengthy multistep process that includes
environmental impact statements. After a public comment period, a final proposed plan is
submitted to the President and Congress.
The offshore leasing program is administered by the Minerals Management Service (MMS), an
agency within the DOI. The MMS conducted 16 OCS oil and natural gas lease sales during its
previous five-year program from 2002-2007. Nine of those sales were in the western or central
Gulf of Mexico (GOM), two in the Eastern GOM and the remainder were around Alaska.
1
43 U.S.C. 1331 et seq.
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Alaska’s lease sales were held in the Beaufort Sea, Norton Basin, Cook Inlet, and the Chukchi
Sea/Hope Basin (see Figure 1). Two Alaskan lease sales that were not held in the scheduled
2002-2007 leasing program (sales 193 and 203) will be superseded by lease sales in the 20072012 leasing program. Sale 193 (Chukchi Sea, Alaska) took place on February 6, 2008.
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Figure 1. MMS Five-Year Program Areas
Minerals Management Service, 2002-2007-Year Leasing Program. MMS defines the OCS as submerged lands, subsoil, and seabed between the seaward extent of
states’ jurisdiction and the seaward extent of federal jurisdiction.
Source:
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During the summer of 2005, the MMS introduced its proposed five-year leasing program for
2007-2012. Public hearings on the leasing program have been held, and states and interest groups
are filing comments on future lease sale areas for the 2007-2012 leasing program.2 On April 30,
2007, the Secretary of the Interior announced its Proposed Final Program. Areas along the
Atlantic coast (i.e., Virginia, currently covered by OCS moratoria), the North Aleutian Basin
(Alaska), and the central GOM are included in the final leasing program. A small area would be
offered for lease in the eastern GOM planning area, which has been redrawn to provide for more
accuracy in boundaries between states and planning areas.3 The new five-year leasing program
began July 1, 2007.
Nineteen lease sales are scheduled for the 2007-2012 leasing program. Seven lease sales have
occurred to date. Two lease sales were held in 2007 (sales 204 and 205), lease sale 193 in
February 2008, lease sales 206 and 224 took place in March 2008. Lease sale 207 was held in
August 2008 and lease sale 208 was held in March 2009. Revenues from lease sale 224 will be
shared with coastal states (Mississippi, Alabama, Texas and Louisiana) as required by the Gulf of
Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA) (P.L. 109-432) (discussed further in the
Appendix of this report). Thirteen of the 348 tracts bid on in lease sale 207 (located in sale area
“181 South”) also fall under the revenue sharing agreement in GOMESA.
Lease sales are conducted through a competitive, sealed bonus bidding process, and leases are
awarded to the highest bidder. Successful bidders make an up-front cash payment, called a bonus
bid, to secure a lease. A minimum acceptable bonus bid is determined for each tract offered.
During the past 13 years, annual bonus revenues have ranged from $85 million in 1992 to $1.4
billion in 1997. Bidding on deepwater tracts in the mid-1990s led to a surge in bonus revenue.4
Offshore bonus bids totaled $374 million in FY2007. But as a result of high oil and natural gas
prices and the significant possible resources in the Central Gulf of Mexico, record setting bonus
bids of $3.7 billion were accepted by the MMS at leases sale 206 held in March 2008. In addition
to the cash bonus bid, a royalty rate of 12.5% or 16.7% is imposed on the value of production,
depending on location factors, or the royalty is received “in-kind.”5 The rate could be higher than
16.7% depending on the lease sale. For instance, lease sale 224 will require a royalty rate of
18.75% in all water depths. According to MMS Congressional Affairs representatives, this higher
rate (18.75%) is likely to remain in place for future lease sales. Annual rents are $5-$9.50 per
acre, with lease sizes generally ranging from 2,500-5,760 acres. However, annual rental rates for
the March 2009 sale in the Central Gulf of Mexico begin at $11 per acre for leases in water
depths over 200 meters. Initial lease terms of 5-10 years are standard, and leases continue as long
as commercial quantities of hydrocarbons are being produced. Bonding requirements are $50,000
per lease and as much as $3 million for an entire area. The Secretary of the Interior may reduce or
eliminate the royalty established by the lease in order to promote increased recovery.
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Federal revenues from offshore leases were estimated at $18.0 billion in FY2008 by the MMS.
During the previous 10 years (1998-2007), revenues from federal OCS leases reached as high as
2
Federal Register Notice, 70 FR 49669.
Federal Register, vol. 71, no. 1, January 3, 2006, Notices, p. 127.
4
Department of the Interior, FY2002 Budget Justifications, p. 63.
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A royalty-in-kind payment would be in the form of barrels of oil or cubic feet of natural gas.
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$7.6 billion in FY2006. Revenues were as low as $3.2 billion in 1999. Higher prices for oil and
gas are the most significant factors in the revenue swings. Of the $18.0 billion offshore revenue in
FY2008, $8.3 billion was from royalties and $9.5 billion came from bonus bids.
These revenues are split among various government accounts. Revenues from the offshore leases
are statutorily allocated among the coastal states, the Land and Water Conservation Fund, the
National Historic Preservation Fund,6 and the U.S. Treasury. For distribution of all revenue from
federal leases, see Figure 2. States receive 27% of OCS receipts closest to state offshore lands
(drainage tracts) under section 8(g)7of the OCSLA amendments of 1985 (P.L. 99-272). In
FY2008, this share was over $100 million compared with the $2.5 billion in total state on-shore
receipts. A dispute over what was meant by a “fair and equitable” division of the 8(g) receipts was
settled by the 1985 OCSLA amendments.8 Revenue-sharing provisions in S. 3711 (P.L. 109-432)
allow selected Gulf States to receive 37.5% of the revenue generated from specified federal oil
and gas leases off their coasts. Most of the proposed legislation in the 110th Congress that would
have opened moratoria areas of the OCS included similar revenue sharing provisions for the
states. On April 2, 2009, in the 111th Congress, the Senate defeated (37-60) an OCS revenue
sharing amendment to the Senate Budget resolution (S.Con.Res. 13). The amendment (#931)
would have provided up to 50% of OCS leasing revenues to be either distributed among the
coastal states producing energy and/or allocated for alternative energy research and development;
and parks and wildlife.
For onshore public domain leases, states generally receive 50% of rents, bonuses, and royalties
collected. Alaska, however, receives 90% of all revenues collected on public domain leases.9
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States with energy development off their shores in federal waters10 have been seeking a larger
portion of the federal revenues generated in those areas. They particularly want more assistance
6
Under the National Historic Preservation Act (16 U.S.C. 470 et.seq.) The National Historic Preservation Fund is
authorized to receive $150 million annually from OCS receipts. Authorization for this act expired at the end of
FY2005, thus no funds were disbursed from OCS receipts in FY2006. After reauthorization in December 2006, funding
from OCS receipts resumed in FY2007.
7
The 8(g) revenue stream is the result of a 1978 OCSLA amendment that provides for a “fair and equitable” sharing of
revenues from section 8(g) common pool lands. These lands are defined in the amendments as submerged acreage lying
outside the three-nautical mile state-federal demarcation line, typically extending to a total of six nautical miles
offshore but that include a pool of oil common to both federal and state jurisdiction. The states’ share of the revenue
(27%) was established by the OCSLA amendments of 1985 (P.L. 99-272) and is paid directly to the states. Payments to
the states previously had been placed in escrow, which were then paid out between 1986 and 2001.
8
Department of the Interior, Minerals Management Service, Mineral Revenues 2000, p. 95.
9
However, the manner is which royalties are split between states and the federal government differs. For all states
except Alaska, direct royalties under the Mineral Leasing Act (MLA) are divided equally (50-50) between the state in
which the deposits are located and the federal government. The MLA also provides that all states except Alaska get
back 40% from the Reclamation Fund (established by the Reclamation Act of 1902), in effect giving each state 90% of
the royalties and the federal government 10%. Alaska does not receive allocations from the Reclamation Fund, so to
equalize royalty treatment among the states, the Alaska Statehood Act and the Federal Land Policy and Management
Act provide that Alaska’s royalty share is 90% of the direct royalties (rather than 50%).
10
State jurisdiction is typically limited to three nautical miles seaward of the baseline from which the breadth of the
territorial sea is measured. However, the state jurisdiction off the Gulf Coast of Florida and Texas extends nine nautical
miles and for Louisiana, three imperial nautical miles. Federal jurisdiction extends, typically, 200 nautical miles
seaward of the baseline from which the breadth of the territorial sea is measured.
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for coastal areas that may be most affected by onshore and near-shore activities that support
offshore energy development. Proponents of these proposals look to the rates at which funds are
given to jurisdictions where onshore energy development occurs within those jurisdictions on
federal lands. Coastal destruction has received more attention in Louisiana, where many square
miles of wetlands are being lost to the ocean each year. One of the causes of this loss is thought to
be widespread energy-related development. Currently, the affected states receive revenue
indirectly from offshore oil and gas leases in federal waters. This is in contrast to the direct
revenues to states that have onshore federal leases within their boundaries, as noted above. On the
other hand, opponents point out the budget implications as a result of the loss of federal revenues.
There are two fundamental purposes for revenue sharing programs, according to the Coastal
Impact Assistance Working Group (an MMS advisory group): (1) to fund projects that will
mitigate the environmental and economic impact of OCS energy development, including the need
for infrastructure and public services, and (2) to help sustain development of nonrenewable
energy sources.11
Two federal revenue sharing programs addressed coastal impacts from OCS energy development:
(1) the now-expired Coastal Energy Impact Program (CEIP), established as an amendment to the
Coastal Zone Management Act, and (2) the Section “8(g)” zone program, established under
OCSLA. A third program, the Land and Water Conservation Fund, has also provided state
funding from the OCS revenue stream, but the distribution of those revenues has no connection
with OCS activities. Even the CEIP program was not considered a true revenue-sharing program
because its funding levels were not based on the amount of leasing activity in the OCS.
A new Coastal Impact Assistance Program (CIAP) is established under section 384 of the Energy
Policy Act of 2005 (EPAct ‘05) (P.L. 109-58) as an amendment to Section 31 of the OCSLA (43
U.S.C. 1356a). Under this program, the Secretary of the Interior is to disburse (revenue from OCS
lease activity), without further appropriation, $250 million per year during FY2007-FY2010 to
producing states and political subdivisions according to specified allocations. The states must
submit plans on how they will spend these funds for approval by the Secretary of the Interior.
Among other things, the funds are designated for the restoration of coastal areas, mitigation of
damage to natural resources, the implementation of federally approved conservation management
plans, and for infrastructure projects. Eligible oil- and gas-producing coastal states include
Alabama, Mississippi, Texas, Louisiana, California, and Alaska.
On April 16, 2007, MMS announced allocation amounts available to eligible states for fiscal
years 2007 and 2008. Before allocations are disbursed, states were required to submit a plan to
MMS for approval not later than July 1, 2008, according to the MMS. Based on the allocation
formula, Louisiana would receive 52.6% of the CIAP funds; Texas, 20.04%; Mississippi, 12.76%;
Alabama, 10.54%; California, 3.07%; and Alaska, 1%.
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The offshore leasing moratoria began with the FY1982 Interior Appropriations Act (P.L. 97-100),
which prohibited new leases off the shore of California. The imposition of other moratoria came
11
Coastal Impact Assistance, Report to the OCS Policy Committee from the Coastal Impact Assistance Working
Group, October 1997.
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about after many coastal states and environmental groups contended that leasing tracts in
environmentally sensitive areas might lead to activities that could cause economic or irreversible
environmental damage. Eventually, the moratoria were expanded to include New England, the
Georges Bank, the mid-Atlantic, the Pacific Northwest, a portion of Alaska, and much of the
eastern Gulf of Mexico. Because of environmental and economic concerns, Congress for the past
two decades has supported annual moratoria on leasing and drilling in the OCS. Congress enacted
the moratoria for each of fiscal years 1982-2008 through the annual Interior Appropriations bill.
The most recent Continuing Appropriation Act of 2009 (P.L. 110-339) omitted language that had
kept the annual moratoria in place. This law is in effect until March 6, 2009, or until a regular
appropriation bill is passed. The permanent appropriations law (P.L. 111-8) does not contain the
OCS moratoria.
President George H.W. Bush, in 1990, responding to pressure from the states of Florida and
California and others concerned about protecting the ocean and coastal environments, issued a
presidential directive ordering the Department of the Interior (DOI) not to conduct offshore
leasing or preleasing activity in places other than Texas, Louisiana, Alabama, and parts of Alaska
until 2000—prohibiting leasing in the same areas covered by the annual moratoria. In 1998,
President Clinton extended the presidential offshore leasing prohibition until 2012. President
George W. Bush lifted the executive ban on July 14, 2008, but in order for oil and gas leasing and
development activity to occur, the congressional ban must also be repealed.
There have been attempts to lift the congressional moratoria through the appropriations process.
The FY2006 Interior and Environment Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-54) continued the leasing
moratoria in other areas, including the Atlantic and Pacific Coasts. An amendment to lift the
moratorium in the eastern Gulf of Mexico was offered (H.Amdt. 174, Representative Istook) on
the House floor during debate but was rejected on a point of order. An amendment
(Representative Peterson) that would have lifted the moratoria on offshore natural gas was
defeated (see Roll Call vote no. 192, May 19, 2005). Congress extended the offshore leasing
moratoria through FY2007 and FY2008.
However, the FY2006 and FY2007 Interior Appropriations Act did not include language to
prohibit oil and gas leasing in the North Aleutian Basin Planning Area, previously in the
moratoria. The FY2004 law (P.L. 108-108) and FY2005 law (P.L. 108-447) similarly omitted this
language. There is reportedly some industry interest in eventually opening the area to oil and gas
development as an offset to the depressed fishing industry in the Bristol Bay area.
Environmentalists and others oppose this effort. The North Aleutian Basin Planning Area,
containing Bristol Bay, is contained in MMS’s current leasing program for 2007-2012.
The Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA ) placed nearly all of the Eastern
Gulf of Mexico (EGoM) Planning Area under a leasing and development ban until 2022. Once
this ban was enacted statutorily, it was no longer a part of the executive ban. Thus, when
President Bush lifted the executive ban, it did not include the EGoM.
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Figure 2. Distribution of Revenue from Federal and Indian Leases, FY2008
(millions of dollars)
American Indian Tribes
& Allottees, $533.9
U.S. Treasury,
$17,312.5
Historic Preservation
Fund, $150.0
Land & Water
Conservation Fund,
$896.9
Reclamation Fund,
$1,961.6
State Share: Offshore
8(g), $103.5
State Share: Onshore,
$2,490.2
Source:
MMS, Minerals Revenues Management, 2009.
Also, GOMESA (P.L. 109-432) contained provisions (discussed in the Appendix below - S.
3711) that opened 5.8 million acres in the Gulf of Mexico previously under the moratoria.
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Congress has banned additional drilling in the Santa Maria Basin and Santa Barbara Channel
areas where there are leased tracts. Companies unable to develop their existing California lease
holdings are seeking compensation from the federal government. The companies contend that
more than a billion dollars has already been spent to obtain the leases.12 In previous buyback
settlements, firms have recouped their bonus bid payments but lost possible future returns that
would have been earned if commercial production were achieved.13 In the case of the offshore
California leases, the Clinton Administration continued to extend the leases (through suspensions)
that were granted between 17-33 years ago, before the moratoria were imposed.
12
Inside Energy with Federal Lands, September 3, 2001.
Estimating future revenues with limited drilling is difficult at best because it is not possible to determine the extent
(if any) or quality of hydrocarbons. According to the MMS, the leased area contains an estimated 1 billion barrels of oil
and 500 billion cubic feet of unproved reserves.
13
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The last suspension by MMS, in 1999, extended 36 of the 40 existing offshore California leases at
issue. This action was taken to give lease holders more time to “prove up” oil reserves and for
MMS to show consistency with state coastal zone management plans, as required by 1990
amendments to the Coastal Zone Management Act (P.L. 92-583). A state’s objection could
prevent development of the oil and gas leases.
On June 20, 2001, the U.S. District Court for the Northern District of California struck down the
MMS suspensions, potentially allowing the leases to expire, because it held that MMS failed to
show consistency with the state’s coastal zone management plan. The Bush Administration
appealed this decision to a three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit of Appeals in San Francisco on
January 9, 2002, and has proposed a more limited lease development plan that involves 20 leases,
using existing platforms and other necessary infrastructure. However, on December 2, 2002, the
Ninth Circuit panel upheld the District Court decision.14 The Department of the Interior did not
appeal this decision and is currently working with lessees to resolve the issue. A breach-ofcontract lawsuit was filed in the U.S. Federal Court of Claims against MMS on January 9, 2002,
by nine oil companies seeking $1.2 billion in compensation for their undeveloped leases (Amber
Resources et al. v. United States).
After the lawsuit was filed, several oil and gas lessees involved in the dispute submitted a new
round of suspension applications to prevent lease termination and loss of development rights. In
response, the MMS prepared six environmental assessments and found no significant impact for
processing the applications. However, under the Coastal Zone Management Act, a consistency
review by MMS and the state’s response to that review must occur before a decision is made to
grant or deny the requests. The State Coastal Commission ruled unanimously on August 11, 2005,
that the lease suspensions should not be renewed. Following that decision, on August 12, a U.S.
District Court ordered the MMS to conduct additional studies under the National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) of the 36 leases under suspension. MMS argued that it had presented
sufficient evidence for the judge to reach a decision on whether to allow MMS to grant further
suspensions. Senator Diane Feinstein of California has urged that the MMS conduct additional
studies or, if not, allow the leases to terminate.15
In the meantime, on November 17, 2005, the U.S. Federal Court of Claims made a determination
in the Amber Resources lawsuit that the federal government breached its contract with the lessees
regarding the 36 offshore California leases. Although the government was ordered to repay the
lessees $1.1 billion, the judge deferred a final judgment until additional claims (such as recovery
of sunk costs) are resolved. If a settlement is reached, the MMS would automatically terminate
the leases. This action would then negate any further action on the consistency determinations.
Thus, no further action will be taken by the Department of the Interior to address the concerns of
the California Coastal Commission until a final judgment is reached. The Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit reached a final judgement that would pay the lessees $1.1 billion. The companies
were unsuccessful in their claim that they should be compensated for additional exploration and
development costs of about $727 million.
14
15
Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, California v. Norton, 01-16637.
Inside Energy, August 22, 2005
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Royalty relief is commonly granted to assure full production of offshore oil and gas. OCSLA
authorizes the Secretary of the Interior to grant royalty relief in order to promote increased oil and
gas production. There are generally four royalty relief categories in the GOM: Deepwater,
Shallow Water Deep Gas, End-of-Life, and Special Case. Royalty relief under the End-of-Life
and Special Case categories was already in place under OCSLA before the Deep Water Royalty
Relief Act of 1995 (DWRRA). The DWRRA expands the Secretary’s authority to use royalty
relief as an incentive for leasing federal OCS Gulf of Mexico deepwater. Under DWRRA, the
Secretary of the Interior may reduce royalties if production would otherwise be uneconomic.16
Threshold price levels were established in 1995, above which the relief is discontinued. In 2008,
the threshold price (with some exceptions) was $37.18 per barrel for deepwater oil and $4.65 per
million BTUs for deepwater natural gas. The threshold price levels are adjusted annually for
inflation.17
Congressional debate over royalty relief for OCS oil and gas producers has been ongoing. On
February 13, 2006, the New York Times reported that the MMS would not collect royalties on
leases awarded in 1998 and 1999 because no price threshold was included in the lease agreements
during those two years. Without the price thresholds, lease holders may produce oil and gas up to
specified volumes without paying royalties no matter what the price. The MMS asserts that
placing price thresholds in the lease agreements is at the discretion of the Secretary of the Interior.
However, according to the MMS, the price thresholds were omitted by mistake from 576 offshore
leases during 1998 and 1999.18 An Interior Department Inspector General investigation
acknowledged that mistakes were made but were considered to be “blunders” and not intentional
omissions.19 The total value of foregone royalties over the six-year period is estimated by MMS
at about $10 billion.
The FY2009 Interior Appropriations bill, as passed by the subcommittee, contains a provision
that would deny new Gulf of Mexico leases to lessees holding leases without price thresholds.
Details of recent legislative activity related to the price threshold/royalty relief issues are below.
Under the new majority leadership in the 110th Congress, the House passed legislation (H.R. 6)
that would offer a remedy for the offshore leases without price thresholds. Under Title II, the bill
would, among other things, deny new Gulf of Mexico oil and gas leases to lessees holding leases
without price thresholds or payment or agreement to pay newly established “conservation of
resources” fees. The bill would also repeal royalty relief provisions (sections 344 and 345) of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005. Opponents of H.R. 6 argue that the companies with valid leases, even
though without price thresholds, should not be penalized and that the provision could result in
breach-of-contracts lawsuits by the companies. On July 30, 2007, the House introduced H.R.
16
A brief description of royalty relief programs offered by the MMS can be found on its website at
http://www.gomr.mms.gov/homepg/offshore/royrelef.html. A more detailed analysis of the royalty relief programs is
contained in the following report: Department of the Interior, MMS, Guidelines for the Application, Review, Approval,
and Administration of the Deepwater Royalty Relief Program for Pre-Act Leases and Post-2000 Leases, appendix 1 to
NTL no. 2002-No2, February 2002.
17
Price threshold levels for deepwater oil and gas can be found on the MMS website at the Offshore Energy and
Minerals Management (OEMM) link.
18
This information is from discussions with Walter Cruickshank, Deputy Director of MMS, during April, 2006.
19
Testimony of the Honorable Earl E. Devaney, Inspector General for the Department of the Interior before the United
States Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources, January 18, 2007.
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3221, containing language on offshore royalties (under Title VII) nearly identical to Title II of
H.R. 6. The House approved H.R. 3221 on August 4, 2007, by a vote of 241-170. In a recent
development, the House amended and passed the Senate-passed version of energy policy
legislation (H.R. 6) on December 6, 2007, but without the royalty relief remedy in the earlier
House-passed bills. The royalty relief remedy provisions were subsequently not enacted in the
final version of energy policy legislation (Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, P.L.
110-140). Royalty relief provisions are, however, contained in H.R. 6899, discussed below.
Kerr McGee Oil and Gas Corp. (acquired by Anadarko Petroleum Corp. in August 2006)
challenged MMS’s assertion in a lawsuit that it had authority to place price thresholds in the
DWRRA leases (1996-2000).20 A recent U.S. District Court decision21, however, which was
upheld by a 3-member panel in the U.S. Court of Appeals, ruled22 that the Secretary of the
Interior had no authority to impose price thresholds for oil and gas leases held under the
DWRRA.. Based on the court ruling, the lessees, therefore, should have the right to produce up to
the specified volume of oil and gas in the lease, regardless of the price. This ruling could cost the
federal treasury as much as $1.8 billion in refunds according to the MMS23 and between $21-$53
billion over 25 years according to the Government Accountability Office (GAO),24 but may not
affect congressional efforts to impose new fees or establish new lease eligibility criteria.25
(For details on Title II of H.R. 6, see CRS Report RS22567, Royalty Relief for U.S. Deepwater
Oil and Gas Leases, by (name redacted).)
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The MMS reports that there is great potential in the central and western Gulf of Mexico (GOM)
deepwater regions (> 400 meters).26 Spurred by the Royalty Relief Act of 1995, significant
investment has been made, including bonus bids and annual rents by major and independent oil
and gas companies. Overall, since 1995, deepwater production of oil has increased from 16% of
total GOM production to nearly 75% in 2006. Deepwater natural gas has risen from 3.8% of total
GOM production to about 38% during the same period. The deepwater production in the GOM is
expected to continue growing over the next 20 years. There are, however, a limited number of
rigs available to drill, and there are prospects elsewhere that could make any area available for
20
For more details on this case, see CRS Report RL33404, Offshore Oil and Gas Development: Legal Framework, by
(name redacted).
21
Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Corp. v. Allred, No. 2:06-CV-0439 (W.D. La. October 30, 2007).
22
U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, No. 08-30069, January 12, 2009.
23
Personal communication with MMS Office of Congressional Affairs, Lyn Herdt, February 4, 2008.
24
U.S. Government Accountability Office, Oil and Gas Royalties: Litigation over Royalty Relief Could Cost the
Federal Government Billions of Dollars, June 8, 2008.
25
See CRS Report RL33974, Legal Issues Raised by Provision in House Energy Bill (H.R. 6) Creating Incentives for
Certain OCS Leaseholders to Accept Price Thresholds, by (name redacted) and (name redacted) and CRS General
Distribution Memorandum: Impact of the Kerr-McGee Oil and Gas Corp. v. Allred Ruling on the Proposed Royalty
Relief for America Consumers Act of 2007, by (name redacted).
26
Department of the Interior, MMS, Deepwater Gulf of Mexico 2008: America’s Offshore Energy Future, OCS Report,
MMS2008-013.
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leasing less likely to get developed in the short-term.27 Moreover, very little exploration and
development have yet to occur within some of the deepwater regions that were leased since 1995.
The amount of development of leases is significantly different in shallow and deep regions. In the
West and Central Gulf region, at less than 400 meters deep, about 40% of the leased tracts have
been producing since the 1990s, whereas a small and declining fraction of currently leased tracts
have been explored but did not produce. About 40% of the active leases at this depth have not
been explored.
In the narrow region between 400 and 800 meters, most of the relatively few leases have not been
explored, but a small and increasing number have begun production. This pattern is even clearer
in the region deeper than 800 meters, where a large number of leases have been let, especially
since 1995, and only a small fraction of them have been explored.
A major stimulus to exploration and development of a promising lease is the approach of the end
of the lease term. MMS officials contend they are allowing leases to expire and putting them up
for reletting. MMS officials point out that, with a 10-year lease period, the many deepwater leases
let in the mid-1990s will be running out in the next few years, which may stimulate increased
activity in that region.
The Department of the Interior (DOI) conducted a comprehensive inventory of OCS oil and
natural gas resources, as required by the Energy Policy Act of 2005 (P.L. 109-58, Section 357). In
the inventory, the DOI provided mean estimates of 8.5 billion barrels of known oil reserves and
29.3 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of natural gas; 82% of the oil and 95% of the gas is in the Gulf of
Mexico (GOM). In the undiscovered resource category, the DOI estimated about 86 billion
barrels (51% in the GOM) and 420 tcf of natural gas (55% in the GOM).
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The high proportion of deepwater leases that have not been explored, in light of the high
productivity of those that have been developed, raises questions of barriers that may be impeding
full development of the region’s potential. Although even developed regions have many leases
that are not explored, the fact that more than 90% of deepwater leases have not been explored
stands out.
According to MMS officials interviewed by CRS,28 the major factor in determining exploration is
the high cost of activity in the deepwater region, and also the relatively few rigs that are available
to operate there. Financing oil exploration and development is an extremely complex process,
frequently involving secondary markets for leases and farming out development to obtain
financing. According to MMS, no barriers exist to discourage or penalize innovative and flexible
financing schemes.
27
Ibid, p. 107.
CRS analysts held frequent telephone conversations with MMS officials and, on January 18, 2005, met in person for
a conference of several hours.
28
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Under current law, all OCS lease sales include both oil and gas, and a lessee is required to
develop the gas or the oil once it is discovered. Natural gas-only leases have been met with much
skepticism by many experts in geology, who note that most of these offshore fields are likely to
contain both oil and gas. Further, industry might be reluctant to bid on leases that did not transfer
ownership of all discovered resources. Proponents argue that production of natural gas only
would lessen states’ concerns.
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The summaries below only include the titles relevant to OCS oil and gas leasing.
H.R. 1696 (Pallone)
Clean Ocean and Safe Tourism Anti-Drilling Act or the COAST Anti-Drilling Act. This proposal
would permanently ban oil and gas leasing and development within the MMS’s North Atlantic
and Mid-Atlantic Planning Areas of the OCS.
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H.R. 6899 (Rahall)
Comprehensive American Energy Security and Consumer Protection Act. The section of this
proposal to expand domestic energy supply would allow states to “opt-in” to oil and gas
development 50-100 miles off their coasts if a state legislature enacts a state law authorizing oil
and gas development. Beyond 100 miles offshore in areas now under the congressional moratoria
would be open to oil and gas development. The Eastern Gulf of Mexico placed under moratoria
until 2022 in the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA) (P.L. 109-432) would
remain law. National marine sanctuaries, national marine monuments, and the Georges Bank in
the North Atlantic Planning Area would be withdrawn permanently from oil and natural gas
leasing and development. Annual lease sales would be mandated in the National Petroleum
Reserve in Alaska.
Lessees without price thresholds in their leases would not be eligible for future leases in the Gulf
of Mexico unless they amended lease to include price threshold levels, paid conservation of
resources fees, or agreed to pay fees. A conservation of resources fee would be established at
$9.00 per barrel of oil and $1.25 per million Btu of natural gas (in 2005 dollars). An annual fee of
$3.75 per acre would be established on all nonproducing offshore leases. The Secretary of the
Interior shall establish what constitutes diligent development. The Secretary shall provide
resource estimates for onshore and offshore oil and natural gas (on lease and unleased acreage).
The Secretary may take royalty payments in-kind and work to ensure that royalty payments are
accurate and timely. Ethics training and a gift ban would be implemented at the Minerals
Management Service.
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H.R. 6566 (Boehner)
American Energy Act. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act would be amended by this bill.
Title I of this act would repeal GOMESA of 2006 (section 122 of P.L. 109-432) and repeal the
funding prohibition placed on finalizing rules for commercial oil shale leasing on federal land.
The Secretary of the Interior would establish rules for natural gas-only leases in the OCS. The
value of the leases for bidding purposes would exclude the value of any potential crude oil.
However, oil could be produced if the adjacent state government did not object. Royalty relief
incentives would be available for those lessees who would relinquish any part of a lease they have
no intent in producing and the Secretary finds to be geologically promising. A phased-in revenue
sharing plan for the adjacent states would be established for tracts within 100 miles of their
coastlines and for those that lie beyond 100 miles of their coastlines. Revenue sharing would give
adjacent states up to 75% of revenues generated from areas within 4 marine leagues of the state’s
coastline and up to 50% from areas beyond 4 marine leagues of the state’s coastline. Areas within
50 miles of the state’s coastline would be unavailable for leasing without a state request (petition).
The Secretary of the Interior may accept or deny a petition. Areas between 50-100 miles would be
open for oil and gas leasing unless a state petitions the Secretary of the Interior to prohibit leasing
in that area. If the petition is granted, the state may extend the withdrawal for additional five-year
periods. Areas in the Gulf of Mexico OCS east of the military mission line may be offered for oil
and gas leasing unless a waiver is granted by the Secretary of Defense. If leases are allowed
62.5% of the revenue generated from that area would be would be shared with the National Guard
of all states within 1,000 miles of the lease.
H.R. 6709 (Peterson)
National Conservation, Environment, and Energy Act. Title I of this bill would lift the
congressional moratoria placed on the OCS through annual appropriations legislation and repeal
the Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006 (GOMESA). The proposal would prohibit
leasing within 25 miles of the state’s coastline but allow leasing beyond 25 miles. A state may
enact laws disapproving leasing between 25-50 miles off its coastline. The Secretary of the
Interior shall consult with the Secretary of Defense in areas east of the military mission line. In
the eastern Gulf of Mexico. Several “reserve” accounts would be established including the
Renewable Energy Reserve Account.
H.R. 6529 (Calvert)
Maximize Offshore Resource Exploration Act of 2008. This proposal would repeal the
congressional and executive branch moratoria but continue to prohibit oil and gas leasing and
development within 25 miles of a state’s coastline unless the state passed a law approving oil and
gas leasing. Twenty-five percent of the revenue generated from leases beyond 25 miles of the
state’s coastline would go to the general treasury and 75% would go to the states producing oil or
gas. If production were to occur within 25 miles of the state’s coastline, the state would then
receive 90% of the revenues and the general treasury would receive 10%.
New ERA Senate Draft Proposal (no bill number)
New Energy Reform Act of 2008. Title I of this proposal would establish a National Commission
on Energy Independence that would examine technical and policy obstacles to achieving U.S.
energy independence and make recommendations to Congress and the President. Title IV, Subtitle
A (Outer Continental Shelf) of this proposal would target domestic energy production and would
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open up part of the OCS Mid-Atlantic Planning Area (Virginia, North Carolina) and part of the
South Atlantic Planning Area (South Carolina, Georgia) currently under a congressional
moratoria for oil and gas leasing. The states listed above would have the option to “opt-in” a
leasing program beyond 50 miles off their coastline. States would receive 37.5% of the revenues
generated from leasing activity between 50-100 miles off their coasts. If two or more neighboring
states opt-in then the revenues share would increase to 50% of the revenue generated off each
state’s coastline. The Eastern Gulf of Mexico (EGoM) would be open for leasing but only after
consultation with the Secretary of Defense because much of the EGoM is located within a
military mission zone. The New Era legislation would fund 3-D seismic testing of the OCS,
would require that all production from the newly opened areas be consumed in the United States,
and would create a National Commission on Offshore Oil and Gas Leasing that would, among
other things, make recommendations to Congress on which areas of the OCS should be
considered for oil and gas leasing in the future. An Alternative Fuel Trust Fund would be
established and funded from specified OCS revenues.
S. 3202 (McConnell)
Gas Price Reduction Act of 2008. Title I of this act would open areas of the OCS beyond 50 miles
(“new producing areas”) of a state’s coastline. States could petition to lease in new producing
areas off its coast. Revenue sharing provisions would provide 50% to the General Treasury and
50% to a special account for the state’s share.
S. 3126 (Coleman)
Energy Resource Development Act of 2008. Title I of this bill would revoke the executive and
congressional moratoria and allow oil and gas leasing in those areas. The Secretary would be
required to submit to the Governor a notice of proposed lease sale. The Governor’s response can
accept, accept with modifications, or reject the proposed sale. If the Secretary of the Interior is
presented with a counterproposal, in consultation with the Secretary of Defense, they can accept,
modify or deny the counterproposal. Upon approval of a proposed lease sale by the new
producing state the Secretary of the Interior shall conduct the lease sale. A revenue sharing
provision would provide 50% of the “qualified” revenues to a newly established Energy
Independence Trust Fund (this Fund would be established in Title II of this act), and 50% in a
special account that would be established to administer the state’s share.
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Oil and gas leasing in the outer continental shelf (OCS) was a major energy issue in the 109th
Congress. On June 29, 2006, the House approved H.R. 4761 the Deep Ocean Energy Resources
Act of 2006, by a vote of 232-187. The bill would have allowed states, using specified criteria, to
petition the Secretary of the Interior to lease the OCS adjacent to state waters.
The Senate proposed an offshore leasing bill (S. 3711) that was much more narrow in scope. The
bill would make available about 8.3 million acres (see Figure A-1 below), provide coastal states
with a share of the revenues generated from offshore leases (37.5%), extend the buffer zone
within which drilling will not be allowed to 125 miles from parts of Florida, and provide a share
of the revenues (12.5%) to the Land and Water Conservation Fund state-run programs. On August
1, 2006, the Senate approved S. 3711 by a vote of 71-25. The bill, S. 3711, is described in more
detail below. (For further discussion of the bill, see the Senate Committee on Energy and Natural
Resources news release July 21, 2006, at http://energy.senate.gov/public/, and see
http://energy.senate.gov/public/
index.cfm?FuseAction=PressReleases.Detail&PressRelease_id=235040&Month=7&Year=2006.
A conference agreement on the two very different OCS bills (H.R. 4761 and S. 3711) did not take
place. Instead, at the end of the 109th Congress, the House leadership attached S. 3711 to a broad
tax relief measure, H.R. 6111 (P.L. 109-432), that passed the House on December 8, 2006, and the
Senate on December 9. Prior to its passage, Representative Ed Markey and others offered an
amendment related to royalty relief for deepwater oil and gas lessees that would have, among
other things, denied new oil and gas leases on federal lands to lessees that did not have price
thresholds in their current oil and gas leases. That amendment was defeated by a vote of 207-205.
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P.L. 109-432 (S. 3711)
Gulf of Mexico Energy Security Act of 2006. S. 3711 directs the Secretary of the Interior to offer
lease sales within the 181 Area, primarily in the Central Gulf of Mexico as defined in the bill,
within one year after enactment of this legislation. The 181 Area (defined in the bill) is part of the
original Lease Sale 181 contained in the Outer Continental Shelf (OCS) 1996-2001 5-Year
Leasing Program before the area was scaled back by the Secretary of the Interior. The 181 Area,
as defined in the bill, covers about 2.5 million acres. In addition, the bill directs the Secretary to
offer for lease, as soon as practicable, an area south of the 181 Area known as 181 South Area.
This area covers about 5.8 million acres. 181 South Area is in its 2007-2012 5-Year Leasing
Program. The MMS estimates that together, these two areas covered by the bill contain 5.8 trillion
cubic feet of natural gas and 1.26 billion barrels of recoverable oil. The Senate passed S. 3711 on
August 1, 2006, by a vote of 71-25. At the end of the 109th Congress, provisions contained in S.
3711 were attached to a broad tax relief measure (H.R. 6111), which passed the House and Senate
and was signed into law (P.L. 109-432).
Areas where preleasing and leasing activity would be excluded under the bill and placed under
moratorium until 2022, would be east of the Military Mission Line (about 230 miles from
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Florida’s west coast), within 125 miles of Florida in the New Eastern Gulf of Mexico Planning
Area, and within 100 miles of the State of Florida in the New Central Gulf of Mexico Planning
Area. Current lessees within the prohibited areas in the New Eastern and Central Gulf of Mexico
Planning Areas could exchange those leases for bonus or royalty credits (valued at the amount
paid in bonuses and rents on existing leases) for another lease in the Gulf of Mexico.
Revenue sharing provisions in the bill would allow for Gulf producing states (defined as
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, and Texas) to receive 37.5% of revenues generated from leases
held in the 181 Area and 181 South Area beginning FY2007. Beginning in FY2017 and thereafter,
the Gulf producing states would also receive 37.5% of the revenues generated from leases
awarded within the 2002-2007 planning area, including historical leases (described in Sec.
5(b)(2)(C) of the bill). Distribution among the Gulf producing states would be determined by the
Secretary of the Interior according to a formula to be developed that would accomplish a
distribution inversely proportional to the respective distances from the coastlines to the center of
the lease tracts. The minimum amount available to any of the Gulf producing states would be
10% of the qualified revenues. The Secretary would pay 20% of the state’s share to its coastal
political subdivisions. The Land and Water Conservation Fund (currently funded from OCS
revenues) would receive 12.5% of the qualified revenues for state programs and the Federal
General Treasury would receive 50% of those revenues. An annual net spending cap of $500
million (on revenues shared with the states) above receipts in the newly opened areas is included
in this bill. The MMS estimates that the state’s share would total $3.1 billion through 2022 and
increase to a total of $59.6 billion through 2067.
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Sales in the eastern Gulf of Mexico (GOM) have been especially controversial. A Bush
Administration plan (originating in the Clinton Administration) to lease 5.9 million acres in the
eastern GOM (Lease Sale 181) sparked considerable debate, although the area was not under a
leasing moratorium. No eastern GOM lease sale had taken place since 1988. The Lease Sale 181
area was considered by opponents to be too close to the shore and to environmentally sensitive
areas. Some tracts were as close as 17 miles from the Florida and Alabama coastline. The major
concern of those in Florida opposing the sale was impairing the value of tourism to the state. If an
accident were to occur, causing an oil spill, it could damage the state’s beaches and thus the
tourist industry. It also could severely affect the marine environment, opponents contended.
The original area of 5.9 million acres, estimated to contain nearly 8 trillion cubic feet (tcf) of
natural gas and 396 million barrels of oil, was reduced to 1.47 million acres after intense pressure
from environmentalists and state officials. The reduced Lease Sale 181 offered 256 blocks
containing an estimated 1.25 tcf of natural gas and 185 million barrels of oil. The sale took place
December 5, 2001.
Toward the end of the first session of the 109th Congress, Senator Pete Domenici, Chairman of the
Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee, expressed an interest in opening up offshore
areas now under the moratoria in a push to ease the “natural gas crisis.”29 The legislation he
introduced (S. 2253) was limited to offering for lease a portion (3.6 million acres) of Lease Sale
Area 181 within a year of enactment. Based on revised MMS estimates provided to the
29
Inside Energy Extra, October 6, 2005.
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committee, there are about 6 tcf of natural gas and 930 million barrels of oil (mbo) in the area that
would have been leased under S. 2253. An alternative bill (S. 2239/Martinez) would have
extended a buffer zone around Florida’s coast out 150 miles and would thus make available a
much smaller area for Lease Sale Area 181—about 740,000 acres. The Senate eventually passed a
bill (S. 3711, discussed below) that included 8.3 million acres and revenue sharing provisions for
selected Gulf states.
The MMS’s five-year leasing program (2007-2012) includes a Lease Sale 181 area that is smaller
than the Domenici version but larger than the Martinez proposal. The area recommended by the
MMS is 2 million acres and estimated to contain 3.4 tcf of natural gas and 530 mbo. Industry
groups contend that eastern GOM sales are too limited, given what they say is an enormous
resource potential, whereas environmental groups and some state officials argue that the risks of
development to the environment and local economies are too great.
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Figure A-1. Lease Sale Area in S. 3711
Source:
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Minerals Management Service (MMS).
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(name redacted)
Analyst in Energy Policy
#redacted#@crs.loc.gov, 7-....
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