U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023
Congressional research reportMay 28, 2025
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and
Developments since October 7, 2023
Updated May 28, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL33222
SUMMARY
U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and
Developments since October 7, 2023
Israel is the largest cumulative recipient of U.S. foreign assistance since World War II.
Successive Administrations, working with Congress, have provided Israel with assistance
reflective of robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared strategic goals in the
Middle East; and historical ties dating from U.S. support for the creation of Israel in 1948. To
date, the United States has provided Israel $174 billion (current, or non-inflation-adjusted,
dollars) in bilateral assistance and missile defense funding.
RL33222
May 28, 2025
Jeremy M. Sharp
Specialist in Middle
Eastern Affairs
Over the last two decades, including during Israel’s ongoing conflict with Hamas, American public attitudes toward Israel as
expressed in public-opinion polling have shifted somewhat when compared to previous eras. Though lawmakers continue to
vote in favor of U.S. assistance to Israel, there have been calls from some political and ideological groups to reevaluate the
long-standing U.S.-Israeli assistance relationship.
In 2016, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed their third 10-year Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) on military aid,
covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of the MOU, the United States pledged to provide—subject to congressional
appropriation—$38 billion in military aid ($33 billion in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) grants plus $5 billion in missile
defense appropriations) to Israel. While negotiations over the next MOU have yet to start, U.S. and Israeli experts and
government officials have already started to formulate proposals to shape future U.S.-Israeli military cooperation.
Since the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023 and Israel’s subsequent conflicts in Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran, Congress has
provided emergency supplemental military assistance to Israel and appropriated funding beyond the annual MOU terms for
joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs. In April 2024, Congress passed P.L. 118-50 (Making emergency supplemental
appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other purposes). That act included, among other things,
$3.5 billion in FMF for Israel. The act also included $5.2 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense ($4 billion) and
Israel’s new laser defense system, Iron Beam ($1.2 billion).
P.L. 119-4, the Full-Year Continuing Appropriations and Extensions Act, 2025, provides FMF to Israel at the FY2024 base
level ($3.3 billion). The act also contains several Israel-specific provisions or anomalies, such as: Section 11206(1) specifies
FY2025 FMF for Off-Shore Procurement for Israel (per the terms of the MOU) at $450.3 million; Section 11208(c)
reauthorizes loan guarantees to Israel through 2030; and Section 11208(d) reauthorizes annual monetary caps for U.S.
additions to the War Reserve Stockpile for Allies program, including the stockpile in Israel, through FY2027 (at $500 million
per year). P.L. 119-4 did not include an accompanying explanatory statement specifying defense funding allocations at the
line-item level. Section 1422 of the Act required the Department of Defense, after consulting the Defense Appropriations
subcommittees, to submit within 45 days “a spending, expenditure, or operating plan” for FY2025 at the same level of detail
required for a department report known as Base for Reprogramming Actions. In spring 2025, the Department of Defense
released the Base for Reprogramming Actions report, which contained, among other things, $500 million in missile defense
for Israel, $47.5 million for the U.S.-Israeli anti-tunneling program, $55 million for the U.S.-Israeli counter-unmanned aerial
systems program, and $20 million for “emerging technologies” cooperation.
In the 119th Congress, lawmakers have proposed The United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025 (H.R. 1229 & S.
554), which would, among other things, authorize additional defense funding for U.S.-Israeli counter-unmanned aerial
systems cooperation and anti-tunnel cooperation, and would mandate that the Secretary of Defense engage the “Minister of
Defense of Israel in a discussion of the process of the ascension of Israel into the national technology and industrial base (as
defined in Section 4801 of Title 10, United States Code).” In the Senate, Senator Bernie Sanders has proposed multiple
resolutions disapproving various U.S. arms sales to Israel. As of May 2025, the Senate has voted against discharging the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of two resolutions (S.J.Res. 26 and S.J.Res. 33) by votes of
15-83 and 15-82, respectively.
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023
Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Background and Recent Trends ....................................................................................................... 1
U.S. Military Aid Policy to Israel During Wartime: 2023-2025...................................................... 2
President Biden’s Immediate Response .............................................................................. 3
The United States “Leases” Its Own Iron Dome Batteries Back to Israel .......................... 3
Early Congressional Attempts to Condition Aid ................................................................. 4
Biden Administration uses Emergency Authorities for Arms Sales to Israel ...................... 4
Biden Administration’s National Security Memorandum 20 .............................................. 4
Congress Passes Supplemental Appropriations for Israel ................................................... 5
Biden Administration Reviews Sales of Aerial Munitions to Israel ................................... 6
International Restrictions on Arms Sales to/from Israel ..................................................... 7
Congressional Opposition to Biden’s “Arms Embargo” ..................................................... 8
Biden Administration and Key Members of Congress Approve F-15 Sale ........................ 8
Biden Administration Warning to Israel over Gaza Humanitarian Aid............................... 9
Senate Considers Resolutions of Disapproval .................................................................... 9
Biden Administration Pre-Notifies Congress of Major Sales to Israel ............................... 9
Israel Opts to Produce More Armaments Domestically.................................................... 10
President Trump Releases Bomb Shipment and Exempts Israel from Aid Freeze ........... 10
Trump Administration Bypasses House Foreign Affairs Committee Review and
Notifies Congress of over $8 billion in Arms Sales to Israel ......................................... 10
Lawmakers Introduce the United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025 ............. 11
Trump Administration Rescinds NSM-20 ......................................................................... 11
Trump Administration Circumvents Congressional Review of Arms Sales to
Israel ............................................................................................................................... 11
Trump Administration Notifies Congress of Rifle Sales to the Israeli National
Police ............................................................................................................................. 12
Second Round of Senate Voting on JRDs since October 7 ............................................... 13
U.S. Arms Deliveries to Israel since October 2023 .......................................................... 13
U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology ................................................................... 13
Qualitative Military Edge (QME) ................................................................................................. 16
U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel .............................................................................................. 19
The Current 10-Year Security Assistance Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) .............. 19
Considerations for the Next MOU .................................................................................... 20
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales ................................................................ 22
Cash Flow Financing ........................................................................................................ 23
Early Transfer and Interest-Bearing Account.................................................................... 26
Shorter Congressional Review Period of Arms Sales ....................................................... 26
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter ................................................................................................... 26
F-15IA............................................................................................................................... 28
KC-46A Pegasus ............................................................................................................... 29
CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters ....................................................................................... 31
Excess Defense Articles .......................................................................................................... 32
Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Programs ................................ 33
Iron Dome ............................................................................................................................... 34
David’s Sling ........................................................................................................................... 36
The Arrow and Arrow II .......................................................................................................... 36
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023
High Altitude Missile Defense System (Arrow III) ................................................................ 37
Iron Beam ................................................................................................................................ 38
U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Cooperation During Wartime: 2023-2025................................. 41
Emergency U.S. Stockpile in Israel ............................................................................................... 44
Background ....................................................................................................................... 44
Legal Authority and Legislative History ........................................................................... 45
Defense Budget Appropriations for Anti-Tunnel Defense ............................................................ 47
Defense Budget Appropriations for Countering Unmanned Aerial Systems (C-UAS) and
Supporting Directed Energy Capabilities ................................................................................... 49
Aid Restrictions and Possible Violations....................................................................................... 50
Arms Sales and Use of U.S.-Supplied Equipment .................................................................. 51
End-Use Monitoring ......................................................................................................... 51
Human Rights-Related Prohibitions in Legislation................................................................. 52
Section 502B of the Foreign Assistance Act ..................................................................... 52
Human Rights Vetting (Leahy Law) ................................................................................. 52
Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act ...................................................................... 54
Use of U.S. Funds Within Israel’s Pre-June 1967 Borders ..................................................... 54
Israeli Arms Transfers to Third Parties.................................................................................... 55
Israel and China....................................................................................................................... 56
Other Ongoing Assistance and Cooperative Programs.................................................................. 58
Migration and Refugee Assistance .......................................................................................... 58
Loan Guarantees...................................................................................................................... 59
American Schools and Hospitals Abroad Program (ASHA)................................................... 60
The U.S.-Israeli Binational Foundations (BIRD, BARD, and BSF) ....................................... 61
U.S.-Israeli Energy Cooperation (BIRD Energy) ............................................................. 63
U.S.-Israel Center of Excellence in Energy, Engineering and Water Technology
(Energy Center).............................................................................................................. 63
BIRD Homeland Security (BIRD HLS) ........................................................................... 64
BIRD Cyber ...................................................................................................................... 64
Other Congressionally Authorized Cooperative Endeavors .................................................... 65
Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Military Equipment Arrives in Israel ....................................................................... 3
Figure 2. Who Supplies Arms to Israel? .......................................................................................... 8
Figure 3. Israel’s Annual Arms Exports: 2012-2024 ..................................................................... 14
Figure 4. Phasing Out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) Under the MOU ....................................... 21
Figure 5. U.S. Foreign Military Financing to Israel over Decades................................................ 22
Figure 6. FMF as a Percentage of Israel’s Defense Budget........................................................... 23
Figure 7. U.S. and Israeli F-35s Fly in Formation......................................................................... 27
Figure 8. F-35 Helmet Mounted Display ...................................................................................... 28
Figure 9. The KC-46A Pegasus ..................................................................................................... 29
Figure 10. CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopter for Israel .................................................................... 32
Figure 11. Locations of U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Co-Production ........................................... 34
Figure 12. How Iron Dome works ................................................................................................. 35
Figure 13. Israel Launches Arrow Interceptor ............................................................................... 42
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023
Figure 14. Israel-China Bilateral Trade ......................................................................................... 58
Tables
Table 1. Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2025 .................................................. 1
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel During the Gaza War ............................................................... 6
Table 3. Selected Notified U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Israel .................................................. 25
Table 4. U.S. Contributions to the Arrow Program (Arrow, Arrow II, and Arrow III) .................. 38
Table 5. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense: FY2006FY2023 ....................................................................................................................................... 40
Table 6. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Tunnel Cooperation .............................................................................. 48
Table 7. U.S.-Israeli Anti-Drone Cooperation ............................................................................... 49
Table 8. Migration and Refugee Assistance Funding Levels for Israel ......................................... 59
Table 9. Recent ASHA Grants to Israeli Institutions ..................................................................... 61
Table A-1. P.L. 119-4, the FY2025 Continuing Resolution ........................................................... 67
Table A-2. P.L.118-159, the FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act ................................... 67
Table A-3. P.L.118-50, Making emergency supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year
ending September 30, 2024 ........................................................................................................ 68
Table A-4. P.L.118-47, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, FY2024 ............................ 69
Table B-1. Emergency or Supplemental Aid to Israel ................................................................... 71
Appendixes
Appendix A. Israel and Recent Legislation ................................................................................... 67
Appendix B. Emergency or Supplemental Aid to Israel................................................................ 71
Appendix C. Common Acronyms and Abbreviations used in this Report .................................... 73
Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 73
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023
Introduction
This report provides an overview of U.S. foreign assistance to Israel. It includes a review of past
aid programs, data on annual assistance, and analysis of current issues, including a description of
key events since the October 7, 2023 Hamas-led attacks against Israel and the ensuing conflicts in
Gaza and beyond. The information and foreign aid data in this report are compiled by the
Congressional Research Service from a number of resources, including CRS communications
with various U.S. government agencies, Foreignassistance.gov, and annual State Department
Congressional Budget Justifications. For terminology and abbreviations used in this report, see
Appendix A. For general information on Israel, see Israel: Background and U.S. Relations in
Brief, by Jim Zanotti.
Background and Recent Trends
For over half a century, the United States and Israel have maintained strong bilateral ties, based
on a number of factors, including robust domestic U.S. support for Israel and its security; shared
strategic goals in the Middle East; an avowed mutual commitment to democratic values; and
historical ties dating from U.S. support for the creation of the state of Israel in 1948. U.S. foreign
aid has been a major component in cementing and reinforcing these ties. U.S. officials and many
lawmakers have long considered Israel to be a vital partner in the region, and U.S. aid packages
for Israel have reflected this calculation. Some U.S. citizens have worked to cultivate U.S.
support for Israel since its creation in 1948. Since the 1973 Yom Kippur War, advocates for Israel
have engaged in organized, broad-based domestic efforts to foster bipartisan support in Congress
for the bilateral relationship, including for U.S. aid to Israel.
Table 1. Total U.S. Foreign Aid Obligations to Israel: 1946-2025
current, or non-inflation-adjusted, U.S. dollars in millions
Fiscal Year
1946-2020
Military
Economic
Missile Defense
Total
104,506.200
34,347.500
7,411.409
146,265.110
2021
3,300.000
-
500.000
3,800.000
2022
3,300.000
-
1,500.000
4,800.000
2023
3,300.000
-
500.000
3,800.000
2024
6,800.000
-
5,700.000
12,500.000
2025
3,300.000
-
500.000
3,800.000
Total
124,506.200
34,347.500
16,111.409
174,965.110
Sources: U.S. Overseas Loans and Grants (Greenbook), Foreign Assistance.gov, the U.S. State Department, and
the Missile Defense Agency.
Notes: The Greenbook figures do not include missile defense funding provided by the Department of Defense.
According to State Department/USAID Data Services as of January 2025, in constant 2024 U.S. dollars (inflationadjusted), total U.S. aid to Israel obligated from 1946-2024 is an estimated $298 billion.
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U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel: Overview and Developments since October 7, 2023
Over the past few years, some Members of Congress have become more openly critical1 of U.S.
military aid to Israel and have focused more on issues of Palestinian human rights.2 This trend has
accelerated since the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023 and the ensuing war in Gaza, with its
associated humanitarian crisis.3 At the same time, many other Members of Congress have
continued to voice support of continued U.S. support for Israel.4 Congressional majorities have
continued to vote consistently in favor of U.S. military aid to Israel through the appropriations
process,5 though some Members have expressed opposition to unconditional U.S. security
assistance by, for example, more frequently voting for resolutions of disapproval aimed at halting
certain U.S. arms sales to Israel (see below).6
U.S. Military Aid Policy to Israel During Wartime:
2023-2025
Israel and Hamas’s ongoing war in Gaza following the Hamas-led attacks of October 7, 2023 will
likely be a subject of contested scholarly research for decades within the larger ambit of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict. One possible subtopic may be how U.S. officials and lawmakers
treated U.S. military aid to Israel during the war. In contrast to routinely publishing U.S. security
cooperation “fact sheets” that summarized assistance for Ukraine in its war with Russia,7 the
Department of State’s Bureau of Political-Military Affairs under the Biden Administration did not
publish a summary regarding conflict-related assistance for Israel until January 20, 2025.8 The
following is a narrative description based on open sources of important events that have
1 The issue of what constitutes legitimate criticism of Israel (or U.S. policy toward Israel) and its actions toward the
Palestinians, and what qualifies as the de-legitimization of Israel or even anti-Semitism, is legally and politically
contested. The U.S. Department of State’s working definition of anti-Semitism is drawn from the “non-legally binding
working definition” adopted by the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA) in 2016. According to the
IHRA, contemporary examples of anti-Semitism include, among other things, “Denying the Jewish people their right to
self-determination, e.g., by claiming that the existence of a State of Israel is a racist endeavor,” and “Holding Jews
collectively responsible for actions of the state of Israel.” See, International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, “IHRA
non-legally binding working definition of antisemitism,” May 26, 2016. In the 118th Congress, H.R. 6090, the
Antisemitism Awareness Act of 2023 (passed by the House 390-21 and received in the Senate), would have adopted
the IHRA’s definition of anti-Semitism for the purposes of the act. Some lawmakers who voted against the bill claimed
that it would suppress “valid criticism of the state of Israel.” See, Representative Jerry Nadler, “I’m Jewish. Here’s why
I voted against the Antisemitism Awareness Act,” Washington Post, May 8, 2024.
2 Jonathan Weisman, “Democratic Primaries Are Embroiled in Debate Over Support for Israel,” New York Times, July
15, 2022; Alex Kane, “The New Debate Over Aid to Israel,” Jewish Currents, August 8, 2023; and Ross Barkan, “How
Oct. 7 Drove a Wedge into the Democratic Party,” New York Times, February 7, 2024.
3 Kayla Guo, “Liberal Democrats Urge ‘No’ Vote on Israel Aid to Pressure Biden on Gaza,” New York Times, April 19,
2024 and Senator Bernie Sanders, “Sen. Bernie Sanders Has Become a Leading Critic of Israel’s War in Gaza,” May
29, 2024.
4 House Majority Leader Steve Scalise, “Scalise’s End-of-Congress Recap: House Republicans Delivered Wins Despite
Slim Majority,” December 22, 2024 and Michelle Boorstein, “Huckabee pick as Israel ambassador reflects long
evangelical alliance,” Washington Post, December 2, 2024.
5 See CRS Report R48289, Fact Sheet: Congressional Votes Relating to the Israel-Hamas Conflict.
6 Representative Pramila Jayapal, “Jayapal Introduces Legislation to Block Offensive Weapons Sales to Israel,” March
31, 2025.
7 For example, see U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Ukraine, Fact Sheet,” May 10, 2024.
8 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Israel,” October 19, 2023; “U.S. Security Cooperation
with Israel: Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2025.
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transpired throughout the war pertaining to U.S. assistance to Israel within the Biden and Trump
Administrations and Congress.9
President Biden’s Immediate Response
In the immediate aftermath of the Hamas-led October 7, 2023 attacks against Israel, President Joe
Biden announced that his Administration would surge “additional military assistance, including
ammunition and interceptors to replenish Iron Dome” so that “Israel does not run out of these
critical assets to defend its cities and its citizens.”10 President Biden’s order resulted in hundreds
of aircraft deliveries and sea shipments to Israel of tens of thousands of tons of munitions and
weapons systems.11 When U.S. resupply operations began in October 2023, President Biden
emphasized “the critical need for Israel to operate by the laws of war. That means protecting
civilians in combat as best as they can.”12 In an October 2023 Oval Office speech, President
Biden announced an emergency supplemental budget request to support U.S. partners, including
Ukraine and Israel; the President sought over $14 billion in Israel-related funding.13
The United States “Leases” Its Own
Iron Dome Batteries Back to Israel
After receiving two bipartisan congressional
letters14 calling on the Biden Administration
to provide Israel with two Iron Dome
batteries previously purchased by the U.S.
Army, the Administration announced on
October 24, 2023 that it would transfer the
batteries to Israel; the Pentagon did not
publicly indicate the terms and legal
authorities underpinning the planned
transfer.15 According to one U.S. defense
official, the Iron Dome agreement was
conducted as a “cost to lease under an FMS
[foreign military sales] case: [It] was the
Figure 1. U.S. Military Equipment Arrives
in Israel
December 2023
Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense.
9 For additional background, see CRS Report R47754, Israel and Hamas October 2023 Conflict: Frequently Asked
Questions (FAQs) and CRS Report R47828, Israel and Hamas Conflict In Brief: Overview, U.S. Policy, and Options
for Congress.
10 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the Terrorist Attacks in Israel,” October 10, 2023.
11 Yonah Jeremy Bob, “US sends 500th aircraft to Israel as airlifts of weapons, equipment continue,” Jerusalem Post,
August 26, 2024.
12 The White House, “Remarks by President Biden on the United States’ Response to Hamas’s Terrorist Attacks
Against Israel and Russia’s Ongoing Brutal War Against Ukraine,” October 20, 2024.
13 The White House, “FACT SHEET: White House Calls on Congress to Advance Critical National Security
Priorities,” October 20, 2023.
14 See, Senator Jacky Rosen, “Rosen Leads Bipartisan Group of Senate Armed Services Committee Members in
Requesting Additional Iron Dome Batteries for Israel,” October 11, 2023; and Representative Brian Mast, “Mast,
Moskowitz, Bipartisan Coalition Urge DoD to Send Additional Iron Dome System to Israel,” October 16, 2023.
15 Noah Robertson, Bryant Harris, and Jen Judson, “US agrees to send two Iron Dome batteries to Israel,” Defense
News, October 24, 2023.
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fastest way to get Israel the Iron Dome batteries and the missiles.”16
Early Congressional Attempts to Condition Aid
Several months into the war, as Palestinian civilian casualties mounted, some Members of
Congress began to call for conditioning aid to Israel. In December 2023, Senator Bernie Sanders
introduced S.Res. 504, a privileged resolution, which would have mandated that the State
Department provide Congress with information on Israel’s human rights practices within 30 days
of passage, pursuant to Section 502B(c) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961. After receiving
any such report, Congress, by joint resolution, may act to terminate, restrict, or continue security
assistance to Israel. On January 16, 2024, the Senate voted 72-11 to table a motion to discharge
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee from further consideration of S.Res. 504.17 In addition,
Senator Chris Van Hollen introduced an amendment to a Senate supplemental appropriations bill
(S.Amdt. 1389 to H.R. 815) which would have, prior to the disbursement of defense articles to a
recipient of U.S. security assistance, required the President to obtain assurances that “the recipient
country will cooperate fully with any United States efforts and United States-supported
international efforts to provide humanitarian assistance to civilians in an area of conflict where
United States defense articles or defense services are being used by the recipient.”
Biden Administration uses Emergency Authorities for Arms Sales to Israel
For the first six months of the war, most U.S. Foreign Military Sales (FMS) and Direct
Commercial Sales (DCS) to Israel were previously approved for delivery and accelerated, taken
from the U.S. stockpile in Israel (known as War Reserve Stocks for Allies-Israel, or WRSA-I),
and/or were not notified to Congress because their dollar value fell below the prior notice
threshold for transfers to Israel.18 Between October and December 2023, there were two FMS
cases notified to Congress under emergency circumstances that therefore bypassed congressional
review.19
Biden Administration’s National Security Memorandum 20
Amidst continued international scrutiny of Israel’s conduct during the war, the Biden
Administration took additional steps aimed at promoting adherence to international law and
accountability for U.S. arms deliveries to Israel. In February 2024, President Biden issued NSM20, a National Security Memorandum (an executive branch policy document, not standing U.S.
law) requiring that prior to the transfer of any U.S. defense article, the Departments of State and
Defense must obtain “credible and reliable” written assurances from the recipient country that it
will use any such defense articles in accordance with international humanitarian law and, as
applicable, other international law. It also required that in any area where such defense articles are
used, the “recipient country will facilitate and not arbitrarily deny, restrict, or otherwise impede
16 Ashley Roque, “Army’s Iron Dome batteries on 11-month lease with Israel, which could be extended,” Breaking
Defense, November 7, 2023.
17 Roll Call Vote 118th Cong. - 2nd sess., available at https://www.congress.gov/bill/118th-congress/senate-resolution/
504/actions?s=1&r=1&q=%7B%22search%22%3A%22s.res.504%22%7D.
18 See, Jared Malsin and Nancy A. Youssef, “How the U.S. Arms Pipeline to Israel Avoids Public Disclosure,” Wall
Street Journal, March 6, 2024.
19 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel—M830a1 120mm Tank Cartridges,” December 9, 2023, and “Israel –
155mm Artillery Ammunition,” December 29, 2023.
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the transport or delivery” of humanitarian assistance.20 NSM-20 also required the Secretaries of
State and Defense to assess for Congress whether U.S. defense articles have been used after the
memorandum’s issuance in a manner not consistent with international law. In March, Israel
provided its recipient country assurances to the United States.
Following the issuance of NSM-20, there was continued scrutiny from some lawmakers,21 in the
context of additional reports of U.S. munitions used in airstrikes which resulted in civilian
casualties of Palestinians and others,22 and Israel’s errant April 1, 2024 targeting of World Central
Kitchen aid workers. That month, President Biden reportedly toughened his calls for increased
humanitarian access and protection of aid workers.23 During his April 4 phone call with Prime
Minister Netanyahu, according to the White House readout, President Biden “made clear that
U.S. policy with respect to Gaza will be determined by our assessment of Israel’s immediate
action” on steps to address civilian harm, humanitarian suffering, and the safety of aid workers.24
Some analysts assessed that President Biden had implicitly threatened “to slow U.S. arms
transfers to Israel or to temper U.S. support at the U.N.” if Israel did not take certain steps.25
In May 2024, the Biden Administration released its report to Congress under Section 2 of NSM20, concluding (according to a document released online by an advocacy group stating that it is a
copy of that report) that “given Israel’s significant reliance on U.S.-made defense articles, it is
reasonable to assess that defense articles covered under NSM-20 have been used by Israeli
security forces since October 7 in instances inconsistent with its IHL [International Humanitarian
Law] obligations or with established best practices for mitigating civilian harm.”26 Despite the
concerns raised, the report, as it appeared online, assessed Israel’s March assurances (along with
those of the other countries covered in the report) to be “credible and reliable so as to allow the
provision of defense articles covered under NSM-20 to continue.”
Congress Passes Supplemental Appropriations for Israel
Between 2023 and 2024, Congress considered and passed multiple versions of supplemental
legislation amidst a broader public debate over conditioning aid and restricting U.S. arms sales to
Israel, in the context of continued reports of some Israeli air strikes resulting in civilian casualties
as well as a deteriorating humanitarian situation in Gaza.27 In March 2024, Congress also passed
P.L. 118-47, the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024, which includes $3.3 billion in
FMF for Israel and $500 million in missile defense funding, per the terms of the MOU.
20 The White House, “National Security Memorandum on Safeguards and Accountability with Respect to Transferred
Defense Articles and Defense Services,” February 8, 2024. Section 620I of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended (22 U.S.C. 2378-1) says that “[n]o assistance shall be furnished under this chapter or the Arms Export Control
Act [22 U.S.C. 2751 et seq.] to any country when it is made known to the President that the government of such
country prohibits or otherwise restricts, directly or indirectly, the transport or delivery of United States humanitarian
assistance.”
21 Senator Chris Van Hollen, “Van Hollen, Schatz, Colleagues Press Administration on Concerns with New Arms Sales
to Netanyahu Government, Request Assurances Prior to Proceeding,” February 23, 2024.
22 Stephen Semler, “Gaza breakdown: 20 times Israel used US arms in likely war crimes,” Responsible Statecraft,
Quincy Institute for Responsible Statecraft, August 25, 2024.
23 Yasmeen Abutaleb, “Biden cease-fire push falters again after new demand by Hamas,” Washington Post, September
7, 2024.
24 The White House, “Readout of President Joe Biden’s Call with Prime Minister Netanyahu of Israel,” April 4, 2024.
25 “Biden ultimatum to Netanyahu: protect Gaza civilians, or else,” Reuters, April 5, 2024.
26 Just Security, “State Department Submits Key Report to Congress on Israel’s Use of US Weapons,” May 10, 2024.
27 See CRS Report R48289, Fact Sheet: Congressional Votes Relating to the Israel-Hamas Conflict.
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On April 13, 2024 Iran initiated the first-ever direct military action against Israel from Iranian
territory in the form of aerial attacks (drones and ballistic and cruise missiles). Iran stated that the
attacks were in retaliation for an April 1 strike reportedly by Israel against a building within the
Iranian embassy compound in Damascus, Syria. Eleven days after Iran’s direct attack on Israel,
and four days after an apparent Israeli strike in Iran that may have been sufficiently narrow in
scope to avoid additional immediate escalation, Congress passed P.L. 118-50 (Making emergency
supplemental appropriations for the fiscal year ending September 30, 2024, and for other
purposes). That act included, among other things (see Table 2), $3.5 billion in FMF for Israel28
($769.3 million or more of which may be spent on Israeli equipment) to remain available through
FY2025.29 The act also included $5.2 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense ($4
billion) and Israel’s new laser defense system, Iron Beam ($1.2 billion)—the first dedicated U.S.
funding for this system.30
Table 2. U.S. Foreign Aid to Israel During the Gaza War
(in millions of current U.S. dollars)
Foreign Military
Financing
Missile Defense
Missile Defense
- Iron Beam
P.L. 118-50, Division A—Israel
Security Supplemental
Appropriations Act, 2024
$3,500.00
$4,000.00
$1,200.00
n/a
P.L. 118-47, Further
Consolidated Appropriations
Act, 2024
$3,300.00
$500.00
n/a
$95.50
n/a
n/a
n/a
$13.00
Law
P.L. 118-42, Consolidated
Appropriations Act, 2024
Total
$6,800.00
$4,500.00
$1,200.00
Other
$108.50
Source: congress.gov.
Notes: The “Other” column includes Department of Defense appropriations for counter-tunnel and counterdrone programs, U.S. contributions to binational foundations, and support for migrants.
Biden Administration Reviews Sales of Aerial Munitions to Israel
In spring 2024, as Israel prepared for a ground offensive in southern Gaza (Rafah), U.S. officials
pressed Israel not to proceed with an offensive in Rafah without clearly planning for civilian
safety and welfare.31 Some lawmakers also warned against an Israeli military operation in Rafah,
saying that they would vote to condition aid to Israel if such an operation ensued without making
28 Unlike regular FMF appropriations for Israel, which Congress annually mandates be apportioned within 30 days of
passage, the FY2024 supplemental FMF for Israel was treated like all other global FMF allocations. The Office of
Management and Budget (OMB) notified the relevant congressional committees of the Administration’s intent to
obligate FMF for Israel (August 2024); when that notification cleared, it apportioned the funds. See, “US releases $3.5
billion to Israel to spend on US weapons, military equipment,” Reuters, August 9, 2025.
29 The Biden Administration notified Congress of its intent to obligate the $3.5 billion in FMF in August 2024. See,
“US releases $3.5 billion to Israel to spend on US weapons, military equipment,” Reuters, August 9, 2024.
30 In January 2025, sources noted that Israel had used $5.2 billion in supplemental appropriations to reach a contract
with Rafael Advanced Defense Systems to fund procurement of Iron Dome, David’s Sling, and Iron Beam components
and systems. See, Lara Korte, “US aid package funds $5.2 billion deal to bolster Israeli air defenses,” Stars & Stripes,
January 16, 2025.
31 U.S. Department of State, “Department of State Press Briefing,” March 25, 2024.
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provisions for the safety and welfare of Gaza’s civilian population.32 In early May, as Israeli
forces approached Rafah, President Biden said in a CNN interview that “I have made it clear to
Bibi [Netanyahu] and the war cabinet they’re not going to get our support [weapons and artillery
shells] if, in fact, they’re going into these population centers.”33
After Israel launched major ground operations in Rafah, U.S. officials confirmed reports that the
Biden Administration was “reviewing some near-term security assistance” for Israel and had
paused a shipment of 2,000-pound and 500-pound bombs, based on concern about their potential
use in Rafah.34 Though the Administration later released the shipment of 500-pound bombs,35 it
continued to review the 2,000-pound bomb shipment until President Biden’s term ended.
International Restrictions on Arms Sales to/from Israel
Along with the Biden Administration’s withholding of bomb shipments, other nations also
suspended or reduced some of their arms exports to Israel during the war. Over the past decade,
the United States and Germany have been Israel’s main weapons suppliers (see Figure 2).
Actions to either limit some exports to, or imports from, Israel, have come from countries such
as: Britain,36 Belgium, Canada, Columbia,37 Germany,38 Italy,39 the Netherlands,40 and Spain.41 In
October 2024, French President Emmanuel Macron called on the international community to
cease supplying Israel with weapons that could be used in either Gaza or Lebanon.42
32 “Senior Democrat backs conditioning Israel aid if Rafah op launched sans provisions to protect civilians,” Times of
Israel, April 4, 2024.
33 “Erin Burnett Outfront: One-On-One with the President of the United States,” CNN, May 8, 2024.
34 U.S. Department of Defense, “Pentagon Press Secretary Air Force Maj. Gen. Pat Ryder Holds a Press Briefing,” May
9, 2024.
35 Nancy A. Youssef and Jared Malsin, “U.S. Agrees to Ship 500-Pound Bombs,” Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2024.
36 Oliver Holmes, “Which countries have banned or restricted arms sales to Israel?” The Guardian (UK), September 3,
2024.
37 Astrid Suarez, “Colombia breaks diplomatic ties with Israel but its military relies on key Israeli-built equipment,”
Associated Press, May 3, 2024.
38 “Germany has stopped approving war weapons exports to Israel, source says,” Reuters, September 19, 2024. Some
sources have claimed that contrary to reports of German restrictions on certain exports to Israel, overall, German
defense exports to Israel actually increased in 2024. See, “German arms exports to Israel up sharply,” Globes (Israel),
October 28, 2024.
39 “Italy arms exports to Israel continued despite block, minister says,” Reuters, March 24, 2024.
40 “FACTBOX-Who are Israel ’s main weapons suppliers and who has halted exports?” Reuters, May 10, 2024.
41 “Spain cancels purchase of police ammunition from Israeli firm,” Reuters, October 29, 2024; and “Maersk container
ship denied docking at Spanish port over arms to Israel,” Agence France Presse, November 9, 2024.
42 “Macron calls to halt arms deliveries to Israel in Gaza war,” BBC News, October 5, 2024.
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Congressional Opposition to Biden’s
“Arms Embargo”
Figure 2. Who Supplies Arms to Israel?
(% of Total Weapons Sold to Israel, 2013-2023)
While some Members of Congress continued
to support the application of U.S. laws that
would restrict U.S. aid to recipient countries
in various circumstances,43 other Members
rejected calls for conditioning U.S. aid to
Israel and criticized the Administration for
pressuring the Israeli government amid
ongoing hostilities against foreign terrorist
organizations such as Hamas and Hezbollah.44
On April 9, 2024, H.Res. 1117 was introduced
in the House. Among other things, it opposed
“efforts to place one-sided pressure on Israel
with respect to Gaza.” On May 16, 2024, the
House passed (224-187) H.R. 8369, the Israel
Source: Stockholm International Peace Research
Institute, estimated volume of major arms transfers,
Security Assistance Support Act, which,
2013-2023.
among other things, would have prohibited
FY2024 or earlier funds from being used to withhold defense items/services to Israel. Some
lawmakers accused the Administration of not only publicly withholding the shipment of 2,000pound bombs, but also conducting an “arms embargo” against Israel by delaying consideration of
other U.S. sales.45 The Biden Administration claimed that by mid-2024, it could no longer bypass
Congress in approving weapons sales, and seeking congressional approval appeared to contribute
to making the process of clearing FMS and DCS cases longer than in the early months of the
war.46
Biden Administration and Key Members of Congress Approve F-15 Sale
In summer 2024, after Israel launched a military operation in Rafah that then-Secretary Blinken
argued reflected restraint as compared to its original plans,47 Netanyahu criticized the
Administration publicly for withholding weapons.48 Both Israel and Hamas then resisted various
ceasefire proposals, and the Administration accelerated efforts to finalize a series of major arms
sales to Israel, including for F-15 fighter aircraft.49 In June, the foreign affairs committee leaders
in the House and Senate, after a period of consideration, signed off on this major package of FMS
43 Senator Peter Welch, “Welch Leads Colleagues Calling for Consistent Application of Leahy Law to the IDF,” May
7, 2024; and Representative Jason Crow, “Reps. Crow, Deluzio Lead 86 Members in Letter Urging Biden to Enforce
U.S. Law & Policy Regarding US Humanitarian Aid to Gaza,” May 3, 2024.
44 Speaker Mike Johnson (@SpeakerJohnson), “The President’s ultimatums should be going to Hamas, not Israel,” X
post, April 4, 2024, https://twitter.com/SpeakerJohnson/status/1776046097086972393.
45 Senator Tim Scott, “Scott, Cotton, 46 Senate GOP Colleagues to Biden-Harris Admin: Delaying Weapons to Israel
Undermines Our Ally, Accommodates Iran,” August 2, 2024.
46 David Horowitz, “The ambassador’s farewell warning: You can’t ignore the impact of this war on future US
policymakers,” Times of Israel, January 12, 2025.
47 Lulu Garcia-Navarro, “The Interview: Antony Blinken Insists He and Biden Made the Right Calls,” New York Times,
January 4, 2025.
48 Julia Frankel and Drew Callister “Israel’s Netanyahu blames Biden for withholding weapons. US officials say that’s
not the whole story,” Associated Press, June 18, 2024.
49 John Hudson, “Key Democrats approve major arms sale to Israel, including F-15s,” Washington Post, June 17, 2024.
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sales to Israel.50 In August 2024, during a congressional recess, the Administration formally
notified Congress of five potential FMS to Israel for over $20 billion total, including up to 50 new
F-15IA fighter aircraft and F-15 upgrades for $18.82 billion.51
On September 25, 2024, Senator Bernie Sanders introduced six joint resolutions of disapproval,
or JRDs (S.J.Res. 111, S.J.Res. 112, S.J.Res. 113, S.J.Res. 114, S.J.Res. 115, and S.J.Res. 116).
Five of these JRDs corresponded to the five FMS sales mentioned above;52 a sixth resolution
corresponded to a Direct Commercial Sale (DCS) to Israel of Joint Direct Attack Munitions, or
JDAMs.53 On November 6, 2024, the Israel Ministry of Defense and Boeing signed a
procurement contract in which Israel will acquire 25 advanced F-15IA fighter jets over a number
of years for more than $5 billion.
Biden Administration Warning to Israel over Gaza Humanitarian Aid
On October 13, 2024, senior U.S. officials sent a letter to their Israeli counterparts, which the
State Department reportedly described as a “private diplomatic communication.”54 The letter
stated that “Israel must, starting now and within 30 days,” act on several “concrete measures” visa-vis Gaza, such as enabling a surge of humanitarian aid into Gaza. The letter stated that
“[f]ailure to demonstrate a sustained commitment to implementing and maintaining these
measures may have implications for U.S. policy” under existing law. After the 30-day period, the
Department of State said that it had not made an assessment that the Israelis are in violation of
U.S. law, and that it would continue monitoring Israeli actions and assessing their compliance
with U.S. law.55
Senate Considers Resolutions of Disapproval
On November 20, 2024, the Senate failed to discharge the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
from further consideration of three JRDs (S.J.Res. 111, S.J.Res. 113, and S.J.Res. 115), pertaining
to proposed sales of guided and unguided munitions.56 In each of the three instances, at least 17
Senators voted in favor of discharging the committee, with 19 voting for discharging the
committee from further consideration of S.J.Res. 113 (pertaining to a proposed sale of mortar
cartridges) and 78 opposing.
Biden Administration Pre-Notifies Congress of Major Sales to Israel
In late November 2024, the Administration approved and pre-notified (an informal step generally
taken before providing formal notification under the Arms Export Control Act) the foreign
relations committees of a possible $680 million package of Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAMs) kits and small diameter bombs to Israel.57 In early January 2025, media reports
indicated that the Administration had notified Congress of several additional possible munitions
Robert Jimison, “After Delay, Top Democrats in Congress Sign Off on Sale of F-15 Jets to Israel,” New York Times,
June 17, 2024.
51 See https://www.dsca.mil/tags/israel.
52 Senators Peter Welch, Jeff Merkley, and Brian Schatz each cosponsored one or more of the JRDs.
53 Senator Bernie Sanders, “Sanders and Colleagues Move to Block Arms Sales to Israel,” September 25, 2024.
54 X, Barak Ravid, October 15, 2024, 9:33am, at https://x.com/BarakRavid/status/1846182689222664471.
55 U.S. Department of State, “Press Briefing,” November 12, 2024.
56 See CRS Report R48289, Fact Sheet: Congressional Votes Relating to the Israel-Hamas Conflict, by Travis A.
Ferrell and Clayton M. Levy.
57 Felicia Schwartz, “US to approve $680mn arms sale to Israel,” Financial Times, November 27, 2024.
50
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sales totaling $8 billion, including guidance kits for MK-84 2,000-pound bombs and MK-82 500pound bombs, BLU-109 bunker buster bombs, AMRAAM and Hellfire missiles, and 155mm
artillery rounds. At least $6.75 billion would fund two different kinds of precision kits—one for
small diameter bombs, and one for 2,000-pound bombs—unnamed officials said.58
Israel Opts to Produce More Armaments Domestically
In January 2025, Israel’s Ministry of Defense signed contracts with Israeli firms to produce some
munitions previously purchased from outside suppliers, including the United States. According to
one Israeli defense analyst, “Israel has refrained, until recently, in producing certain munitions
primarily because of profit considerations.... It is cheaper to buy them with the money allocated to
Israel by the U.S.”59 Some reports suggested that by fall 2024, some of Israel’s munitions supplies
had become low, particularly missile defense interceptors.60
President Trump Releases Bomb Shipment and Exempts Israel from Aid
Freeze
In late January 2025, President Trump announced that he had released a Biden Administration
hold on the delivery of 1,800 MK-84, 2,000-pound bombs destined for Israel.61 At the same time,
the State Department issued guidance regarding the execution of an Executive Order freezing all
U.S. foreign aid; the guidance exempted U.S. foreign aid to Israel and Egypt from the freeze
(along with life-saving global humanitarian food aid).62
Trump Administration Bypasses House Foreign Affairs Committee Review
and Notifies Congress of over $8 billion in Arms Sales to Israel
On February 7, 2025, the Trump Administration officially notified Congress of four FMS/DCS
sales to Israel totaling $8.4 billion, of which one case totaled $6.75 billion for precision-guided
and un-guided munitions and guidance conversion kits – the largest single munitions sale to Israel
since 2015.63 According to one analysis, Israel’s request for large numbers of guidance kits, but
not certain guided bombs, may indicate its willingness to produce certain munitions
domestically.64 Reportedly, as previously mentioned, the Biden Administration had already
approved the sales65 and pre-notified these cases to the foreign affairs committees in each
chamber; after the presidential transition, although (according to the New York Times) the
Ranking Member on the House Foreign Affairs Committee had not cleared the sales, the Trump
58 Jared Malsin, Nancy A. Youssef, and Carrie Keller-Lynn, “U.S. Plans Big Arms Sale to Israel—Administration tells
Congress $8 billion package will include bombs, missiles,” Wall Street Journal, January 6, 2025.
59 Adam Taylor, “Israel moves to make heavy bombs, but U.S. reliance hard to shake, experts say,” Washington Post,
January 12, 2025.
60 Ha’aretz and Yaniv Kubovich, “Report: Israel Is Facing a ‘Serious’ Shortage of Interceptor Missiles,” Ha’aretz,
October 15, 2024.
61 “Trump makes 2,000-pound bombs available to Israel, undoing Biden pause,” Reuters, January 26, 2025.
62 Edward Wong, “Sweeping Halt to Foreign Aid Does Not Apply to Arms for Israel and Egypt,” New York Times,
January 25, 2025.
63 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel – Munitions, Guidance Kits, Fuzes, and Munitions Support,”
Transmittal No. 24-13, February 7, 2025.
64 Jeremy Binnie, “US approves air-launched munitions for Israel,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 10, 2025.
65 Felicia Schwartz, “US to approve $680mn arms sale to Israel,” Financial Times, November 27, 2024.
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Administration proceeded to formally notify Congress.66 Clearance of U.S. arms sales cases by
congressional committee leaders prior to official notification is a long established, normative
process developed between the executive and legislative branches. It is not codified in law.
On February 20, Senator Sanders introduced JRDs corresponding to each sale.67
Lawmakers Introduce the United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025
On February 12, 2025, a group of bipartisan House and Senate lawmakers introduced H.R. 1229
and S.554, respectively, the United States-Israel Defense Partnership Act of 2025. The bills
would, among other things
•
•
•
•
establish a new U.S.-Israeli counter-unmanned aerial systems program (CUAS)
authorized at a funding level of $150 million per year through FY2030;
raise the funding cap on the existing U.S.-Israeli CUAS program from $55
million annually to $75 million annually through calendar year 2028;
direct the Department of Defense to establish a Defense Innovation Unit office in
Israel in order to collaborate with the private sector to counter Iran’s dual-use
defense technologies; and
mandate that the Secretary of Defense engage the “Minister of Defense of Israel
in a discussion of the process of the ascension of Israel into the national
technology and industrial base (as defined in Section 4801 of Title 10, United
States Code).”
Trump Administration Rescinds NSM-20
According to the Washington Post, on February 21, 2025 then-National Security Adviser Michael
Waltz rescinded President Biden’s NSM-20.68 While some lawmakers decried the move,69 others
welcomed it.70
Trump Administration Circumvents Congressional Review of Arms Sales to
Israel
On February 28, 2025, the Trump Administration, citing Section 36(b) of the Arms Export
Control Act (AECA),71 declared that an “emergency exists,” that requires the sales to Israel of
various weapons systems, such as general purposes bombs, JDAMs, and Caterpillar D9
bulldozers.72 In sum, the President issued an emergency declaration for four FMS cases to Israel,
totaling nearly $4 billion. Amongst these four cases, Israeli press reports had focused on the sale
66 Edward Wong and Robert Jimison, “Trump Administration Moves to Send $8 Billion in Arms to Israel, Bypassing
Some Lawmakers,” New York Times, February 8, 2025.
67 Some of the JRDs were duplicative due to updates in filing. In sum, they included S.J.Res. 20, S.J.Res. 21, S.J.Res.
22, S.J.Res. 23, S.J.Res. 26, and S.J.Res. 27.
68 Alex Horton, Missy Ryan, and Meg Kelly, “Trump repeals Biden directive linking U.S. arms transfers to human
rights,” Washington Post, February 25, 2025.
69 Horton, et al., “Trump Repeals Biden Directive.”
70 For example, Senate Foreign Relation Committee, “Risch Statement on Trump NSM-20 Revocation,” February 24,
2025.
71 See 22 U.S. Code §2776.
72 For example, see Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel – Munitions and Munitions Support,” Transmittal
No. 25-34, February 28, 2025.
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of D9 bulldozers. In late 2024, these items had been reported as awaiting export approval by the
Biden Administration, alongside speculation that the Biden Administration may have delayed
approval because of its apparent opposition to Israeli use of bulldozers to raze Palestinian
homes.73 Israeli media noted that before leaving office, the Biden Administration had begun to
issue export licenses for some of the D9s sought by Israel, possibly in part due to ceasefire
agreements.74 One report noted that the ranking members of the foreign affairs committees in
Congress had placed a hold on at least two of the four pre-notified cases, including the sale of
bulldozers.75 Upon issuing the emergency declaration, Secretary of State Marco Rubio stated
I have signed a declaration to use emergency authorities to expedite the delivery of
approximately $4 billion in military assistance to Israel. The decision to reverse the Biden
Administration’s partial arms embargo, which wrongly withheld a number of weapons and
ammunition from Israel, is yet another sign that Israel has no greater ally in the White
House than President Trump. Since taking office, the Trump Administration has approved
nearly $12 billion in major FMS sales to Israel. This important decision coincides with
President Trump’s repeal of a Biden-era memorandum which had imposed baseless and
politicized conditions on military assistance to Israel at a time when our close ally was
fighting a war of survival on multiple fronts against Iran and terror proxies. The Trump
Administration will continue to use all available tools to fulfill America’s long-standing
commitment to Israel’s security, including means to counter security threats. 76
On March 10, Senator Sanders again issued new JRDs for the aforementioned four sales
(S.J.Res.32, S.J.Res.33, S.J.Res.34, and S.J.Res.35).
Trump Administration Notifies Congress of Rifle Sales to the Israeli National
Police
On March 6, 2025, the Trump Administration notified Congress that it was issuing export licenses
for three DCS cases to Israel of various automatic rifles to the Israeli national police requested by
Israel before the Hamas attacks of October 7, 2023.77 Previously, during the Biden
Administration, then-Secretary Blinken had not approved the export licenses, reportedly due to
some congressional concern that the weapons could be used in the West Bank against Palestinians
in “acts of unjustified violence” by Israeli forces or could fall into the hands of settler militias,
according to the New York Times.78 Congressional notification of the issuing of the licenses
corresponded with the visit of an ultra-nationalist member of the Netanyahu government, Finance
Minister Bezalel Smotrich, to Washington, DC. On March 27, Senator Sanders again issued new
JRDs for the aforementioned three sales (S.J.Res.40, S.J.Res.41, and S.J.Res.42).
73 Yoav Zitun, “D9 bulldozer shipment stalled by US embargo, leaving Israeli soldiers exposed,” YnetNews.com,
November 10, 2024.
74 Yehuda Shlezinger, “US partially lifts arms embargo on Israel ahead of ceasefire,” Israel Hayom, January 19, 2025;
and Danny Zaken, “Revealed: How US-Israel deal helped Netanyahu sign off on ceasefire,” Israel Hayom, November
27, 2024.
75 Laura Kelly, “Congress puts hold on Trump’s $1 billion arms sale to Israel,” The Hill, February 4, 2025.
76 U.S. Department of State, “Military Assistance to Israel,” March 1, 2025.
77 Michael Crowley and Edward Wong, “Gaza War Turns Spotlight on Long Pipeline of U.S. Weapons to Israel,” New
York Times, April 7, 2024.
78 Edward Wong, “U.S. Considers Sending Israel 24,000 Assault Rifles Held Back Under Biden,” New York Times,
January 31, 2025.
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Second Round of Senate Voting on JRDs since October 7
On April 3, 2025, the Senate voted against discharging the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
from further consideration of two JRDs (S.J.Res.26 and S.J.Res.33) by votes of 15-83 and 15-82,
respectively.
U.S. Arms Deliveries to Israel since October 2023
On May 27, 2025, the Israeli Defense Ministry reported that the United States had dispatched 800
transport planes and 140 ships to deliver more than 90,000 tons of armaments and military
equipment to Israel since the start of the war in October 2023.79
U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military Technology
Almost all current U.S. aid to Israel is military assistance.80 U.S. military aid has helped
transform Israel’s armed forces into one of the most technologically sophisticated militaries in the
world (see “Qualitative Military Edge (QME)”). U.S. military aid also has helped Israel build its
domestic defense industry, which now ranks as one of the top global arms exporters.81 Israeli
defense companies, such as Israel Aerospace Industries (IAI), Rafael, and Elbit Systems, export
nearly 70% of their products82 and combined, those three companies account for 70% of all
Israeli defense exports.83 Rather than producing large-scale hardware (combat aircraft, tanks),
Israeli companies generally export advanced technological products (such as missile defense
systems, unmanned aerial vehicles, cybersecurity products, radar, and electronic communications
systems) to numerous customers globally. India (34%), the United States (13%), and the
Philippines (8.1%) are Israel’s largest defense export markets as of 2025.84
In 2024 and 2025, several reports have suggested that despite global criticism of Israel’s wars in
Gaza and Lebanon, foreign demand for Israeli defense products has surged (see Figure 3).85
Recently, there have been several major Israeli exports of defense equipment, including
•
•
2023: Finland – David’s Sling Long Range Air Defense System ($330 million);
2023: Germany – Arrow 3 Missile Defense System ($4.3 billion);
79 Emanuel Fabian, “Israel marks 800 th planeload of US guns, bombs and ammo as war nears day 600,” Times of Israel,
May 27, 2025.
80 For many years, U.S. economic aid helped subsidize a lackluster Israeli economy, but since the rapid expansion of
Israel’s high-tech sector and overall economy in the 1990s (sparked partially by U.S.-Israeli scientific cooperation),
Israel has become one of the world’s most dynamic economies (as of 2025, according to the International Monetary
Fund, Israel’s Gross Domestic Product per capita ranks 21st worldwide). Israel and the United States agreed to
gradually phase out economic grant aid to Israel. In FY2008, Israel stopped receiving bilateral Economic Support Fund
(ESF) grants. The country had been a large-scale recipient of grant ESF assistance since 1971.
81 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), from 2020 to 2024, Israel was the 8th
largest arms exporter worldwide, accounting for 3.1% of world deliveries. See “Trends in International Arms Transfers,
2024,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, March 2025.
82 Sasson Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even (editors), “Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid,” INSS,
Memorandum No. 202, July 2020.
83 Dov Lieber, “Defense Industry Is Booming in Israel—Regional war, quest for aerial-defense systems fuel a surge
despite embargoes,” Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2025.
84 See Zain Hussain and Dr Alaa Tartir, “Recent trends in international arms transfers in the Middle East and North
Africa,” Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), April 10, 2025.
85 See, for example, Dov Lieber, “Defense Industry Is Booming in Israel—Regional war, quest for aerial-defense
systems fuel a surge despite embargoes,” Wall Street Journal, January 9, 2025.
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•
•
2024: Slovakia—Barak MX Integrated Air Defense System ($579.1 million); and
2024: Netherlands – Elbit Self Protection Suites for Aircraft ($175 million) 86
Figure 3. Israel’s Annual Arms Exports: 2012-2024
Current U.S. $ in billions
$14.80
$12.56 $13.07
$11.30
$9.20
$7.40
2012
$6.54
2013
$5.66
$5.60
2014
2015
$6.50
2016
2017
$7.50
$7.20
2018
2019
$8.30
2020
2021
2022
2023
2024
Source: Created by CRS. Information from Israel Ministry of Defense, International Defense Cooperation
Directorate (SIBAT), as reported by various media sources.
Notes: SIBAT does not produce a specific list of Israeli customers by country.
As Israel has become a global leader in certain niche defense technologies, Israeli defense exports
to the U.S. market have grown substantially.87 The United States has purchased from Israel,
among other items, the following Israeli defense articles: the Iron Fist Active Protection Systems
(APS) for U.S. Bradley infantry fighting vehicles, Trophy APS for M1 Abrams tanks, enhanced
night-vision goggles, laser range finders for the U.S. Marines, helmets for F-35 fighter pilots,
wings for the F-35, and portable satellite communication (SATCOM) terminals.
To facilitate the unhindered access to some key supplies, the Department of Defense (DOD) has
entered into bilateral Security of Supply Arrangements (SOSAs) with selected foreign
governments to secure the mutual timely provision of defense-related goods and services during
peacetime, emergencies, and armed conflict.88 SOSAs allow DOD to request prioritized
performance of contracts from companies in SOSA-signatory nations, and for SOSA signatories
to request the same from U.S. firms. In 2023, the United States and Israel signed a (SOSA)
agreement.89
86 Due to U.S. participation in the David’s Sling and Arrow 3 programs, the United States approved Israel’s sale to
Finland and Germany respectively in 2023, several months before both final sales agreements had been signed.
87 Per a 1987 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, as amended (Reciprocal Defense
Procurement and Acquisition Policy Memorandum of Understanding), Israeli and U.S. defense contractors are able to
compete for contracts in both countries on an equal basis. For the text of the MOU, see https://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/
Docs/mou-israel.pdf.
88 See CRS In Focus IF11894, Security of Supply Arrangements (SOSAs): Background and Issues.
89 U.S. Department of Defense, Security of Supply, available at https://www.businessdefense.gov/security-ofsupply.html.
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Israeli Exports of Spyware
Revelations regarding the export of Israeli software have drawn attention to Israel’s Defense Export Controls
Agency (DECA), which was established in 2006. In 2021, after investigative reports indicated the Israeli-owned
cybersecurity firm NSO Group had sold mobile-phone software to foreign governments that then used it to spy
on other heads of state, dissidents, and human rights activists, the Israeli media looked more closely at DECA’s
export licensing process. In December 2021, Israel altered its export licensing policy for cybersecurity software,
requiring purchasers to pledge they will not use Israeli equipment to commit “terrorist acts” or “serious crime,”
as defined by DECA.90 Since then, DECA has increased its oversight of cyber technology exports and limited to 37
the number of countries eligible to procure Israeli cyber technology.91 In February 2024, the State Department
announced that it would impose visa restrictions for individuals who abused the use of commercial spyware, as
well as for those who facilitated such actions.92
The United States and Israel are in the process of gradually phasing out Israel’s ability to use a
portion of its U.S. military assistance for domestic purchases (also known as Off-Shore
Procurement);93 as a result, some Israeli companies have opened subsidiaries that are licensed to
do business in the United States. Incorporating in the United States enables Israeli companies to
both increase business with the U.S. military and, in some cases, conduct U.S. aid-financed
military deals with the Israeli government. The establishment of a U.S. presence by more Israeli
companies has led to an increase in defense partnerships between U.S. and Israeli firms, whereby
weapons development takes place in Israel and production in the United States.94 Elbit Systems of
America (Fort Worth, Texas), a wholly owned subsidiary of Israel’s Elbit Systems, is one of the
largest Israeli-owned firms operating in the United States. It acts as a purchasing agent for the
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Foreign Military Sales programs.95 In 2022, Leonardo
DRS (a subsidiary of the Italian firm Leonardo SpA) purchased Israeli firm RADA Electronics
Industries, in one of the first major acquisitions of an Israeli firm by a U.S.-based firm.96 In April
2025, General Atomics Electromagnetic Systems (GA-EMS) and Rafael Advanced Defense
Systems announced the joint manufacture of a long-range, precision-guided strike missile to be
constructed in Tupelo, Mississippi.97
As long as these subsidiaries follow U.S. guidelines (each must be a U.S.-based supplier,
manufacturer, reseller, or distributor incorporated or licensed to do business in the United States
and registered with the Israeli Ministry of Defense Mission in New York),98 they are eligible
(pending U.S. government approval) to enter into FMF-financed Direct Commercial Sales (DCS)
90 See “Israel Issues Stricter Guidelines for use of its Cyber Tech Exports,” Reuters, December 6, 2021.
91 Omer Benjakob, Josh Breiner, and Avi Scharf, “Israeli Firm Suspected of Illegally Selling Classified Spy Tech,”
Ha’aretz, March 8, 2023.
92 “US to restrict visas for those who misuse commercial spyware,” Reuters, February 5, 2024.
93 P.L. 118-50, the FY2024 Emergency Supplemental Act, did permit up to up to $769.3 million (out of $3.5 billion) in
FMF to be used for Off-Shore Procurement.
94 Ora Coren, “Israel’s Arms Makers to Become more American under New Military-Aid Pact,” Ha’aretz, updated
April 10, 2018.
95 Available online at https://elbitsystems.com/globalpresence/.
96 Stephen Losey, “Ukraine lessons helped drive acquisition of RADA, Leonardo DRS chief says,” Defense News, June
22, 2022.
97 General Atomics, “General Atomics Partners with Rafael to Build Precision-Guided Missile for U.S. Defense
Customers,” April 7, 2025.
98 CRS conversation with U.S. State Department, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (PM), January 6, 2022.
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contracts99 with the Israeli government.100 Recurring language in annual appropriations bills,101 as
implemented by Department of Defense guidance, permits Israel (along with Egypt, Jordan,
Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Greece, Turkey, Portugal, and Pakistan) to use FMF to finance DCS
contracts, in which the purchaser (Israel) enters into a contract directly with a vendor.102
According to the U.S. Department of Commerce, Israel’s Ministry of Defense spends
approximately one-third of its annual FMF allocation on Direct Commercial Contracts (DCC)
procurements.103
Israel Moves to Expand its Industrial Base
Perhaps as a response to soaring international demand for certain armaments, as well as international pressure
against Israel for its conduct of the war in Gaza, former Israeli defense leaders104 and the current coalition
government have advocated for greater Israeli independence in the domestic manufacturing of certain weapons,
most notably air-dropped munitions. In March 2024, as tensions between the Biden Administration and Israel
heightened over Israel’s conduct of the war in Gaza, Prime Minister Netanyahu’s office issued a statement
declaring, “We need to be much more independent in the ability to manufacture the war materiel that we need....
We will do this but we will do so very responsibly and prudently, so that Israel will be independent.”105 Months
later, Israeli media reported on the government’s decision to manufacture heavy bombs (akin to the MK-84) and
tank ammunition domestically.106 Called the Blue and White Independence Program, this initiative has begun
producing materiel that Israel has previously imported. In January 2025, Israel’s Ministry of Defense announced
that it had contracted with Elbit Systems to produce heavy aerial munitions and a “national raw materials plant”
that will produce materials previously sourced abroad.107
Qualitative Military Edge (QME)
U.S. military aid for Israel has been designed to maintain Israel’s “qualitative military edge” over
neighboring militaries. The rationale for QME is that Israel must rely on better equipment and
99 Direct Commercial Contracts Division (DCC)/DCS allow a foreign entity to contract directly with a U.S.-based
company in order to obtain needed supplies or services (subject to U.S. Government review and approval). This process
takes the U.S. Government out of the “middleman” role that it plays in facilitating FMS transactions. See CRS In Focus
IF11441, Transfer of Defense Articles: Direct Commercial Sales (DCS).
100 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Guidelines for Foreign Military Financing of Direct Commercial Contracts,
March 2017.
101 See, for example, Section 7035(b)(3), “Commercial Leasing of Defense Articles” in P.L. 118-47, the Further
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2024.
102 P.L. 101-167, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 1990, states that
“Only those countries for which assistance was justified for the Foreign Military Sales Financing Program in the fiscal
year 1989 congressional presentation for security assistance programs may utilize funds made available under this
heading for procurement of defense articles, defense services or design and construction services that are not sold by
the United States Government under the Arms Export Control Act.” The Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s
Security Assistance Manual further states that “DSCA (Directorate for Security Assistance (DSA) Direct Commercial
Contracts Division (DCC)) approves DCCs to be financed with FMF on a case-by-case basis.” See Chapter 9.7.3,
Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency Manual 5105.38-M,
DSCA Policy 12-20.
103 U.S. Department of Commerce, International Trade Administration, “Israel - Country Commercial Guide,
Aerospace and Defense,” October 6, 2023.
104 Dov S. Zakheim, “Is Turkey a threat to Israel?” The Hill, January 10, 2025.
105 Alisa Odenheimer, “Israel Must Be More Independent in Weapons Production, PM Says,” Bloomberg, March 31,
2025.
106 Lilach Shoval, “Amid US tensions, Israel pivots to self-reliance on homegrown arms,” Israel Hayom, August 13,
2024.
107 Jeremy Binnie, “Israeli MoD orders locally produced bombs,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 7, 2025.
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training to compensate for being much smaller in land area and population than most of its
potential adversaries.
The Origins of QME
The concept of QME (independent of its application to Israel) dates back to the Cold War. In assessing the
balance of power in Europe, U.S. war planners would often stress to lawmakers that, because Warsaw Pact
countries had a numerical advantage over U.S. and allied forces stationed in Europe, the United States must
maintain a “qualitative edge” in defense systems.108 The concept was subsequently applied to Israel in relation to
its Arab adversaries. In 1981, then-U.S. Secretary of State Alexander Haig testified before Congress, saying, “A
central aspect of US policy since the October 1973 war has been to ensure that Israel maintains a qualitative
military edge.”109
For decades, successive Administrations, in conjunction with Congress, have taken measures to
maintain Israel’s QME in a number of ways. For example,
•
•
•
•
U.S. arms sales policy has traditionally allowed Israel first regional access to
U.S. defense technology. For example, Israel acquired the F-15 in 1976, six years
before Saudi Arabia. It received delivery of the F-16 fighter in 1980, three years
before Egypt.110
In cases in which both Israel and an Arab state operate the same U.S. platform,
Israel has first received either a more advanced version of the platform or the
ability to customize the U.S. system.111
In cases in which Israel objected to a major defense article sale to an Arab
military (e.g., the 1981 sale of Airborne Early Warning and Control System
aircraft or “AWACS” to Saudi Arabia), Congress has, at times, advocated for and
legislated conditions on the usage and transfer of such weapons prior to or
after a sale.112
The United States has compensated Israel with “offsetting” weapons packages or
military aid when selling other U.S. major defense articles to a Middle Eastern
state (see textbox below).
Over time, Congress codified informal QME-related practices in ways that encouraged a more
deliberate interagency process for each major U.S. arms sale to Middle Eastern governments
other than Israel.113 In the 110th Congress, Representative Howard Berman sponsored legislation
108 For example, see Written Statement of General William O. Gribble Jr., Hearings on Research, Development, Test,
and Evaluation Program for Fiscal Year 1973, Before Subcommittee No. 1 of Committee on Armed Services, House of
Representatives, 92nd Cong., 2nd sess., February 2, 3, 7, 9, 22, 23, 24, March 6, 7, and 8, 1972.
109 Secretary of State Alexander Haig, Statement for the Record submitted in response to Question from Hon. Clarence
Long, House Appropriations Subcommittee on Foreign Operations Appropriations, April 28, 1981.
110 In 1977, P.L. 95–92 provided that “In accordance with the historic special relationship between the United States
and Israel and previous agreements and continuing understandings, the Congress joins with the President in reaffirming
that a policy of restraint in United States arms transfers, including arms sales ceilings, shall not impair Israel’s deterrent
strength or undermine the military balance in the Middle East.”
111 “The Double Edged Sword of the Qualitative Military Edge,” Israel Policy Forum, April 11, 2016.
112 See Section 131, Certification Concerning AWACS sold to Saudi Arabia, P.L. 99-83, the International Security and
Development Cooperation Act of 1985.
113 Prior to 2008, during congressional review of possible U.S. arms sales to the Middle East, QME concerns were
addressed on an ad hoc basis, usually through consultations between the military and committee staff. Some
congressional staff argued that assessments for specific arms sales tended to be overly subjective and asserted that
codifying the requirement would rationalize the process, make it more objective, and incorporate it as a regular
component of the U.S. arms sales review process to Middle Eastern governments. CRS conversation with Senate
Foreign Relations Committee staff member, September 24, 2020.
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(H.R. 5916, Section 201) to “carry out an empirical and qualitative assessment on an ongoing
basis of the extent to which Israel possesses a qualitative military edge over military threats.”
After becoming chairman of the House Foreign Affairs Committee (HFAC), then-Chairman
Berman was able to incorporate this language into the Naval Vessel Transfer Act of 2008 (P.L.
110-429). The relevant QME provisions of this law had three primary elements: (1) they defined
QME;114 (2) they required an assessment of Israel’s QME every four years; and (3) they amended
the Arms Export Control Act (AECA, 22 U.S.C. §2776) to require a determination, for any export
of a U.S. defense article to any country in the Middle East other than Israel, that such a sale
would not adversely affect Israel’s QME.
Preserving QME: Offsetting Weapons Packages for Israel
The following specific instances supplemented general U.S. efforts to strengthen Israel’s QME:115
•
In 1992, after the United States announced a sale to Saudi Arabia of F-15 fighters, the George H. W. Bush
Administration provided Israel with Apache and Blackhawk helicopters and pre-positioned U.S. defense
equipment in Israel for Israeli use with U.S. approval.116
•
In 2007, after the George W. Bush Administration agreed to sell Saudi Arabia Joint Direct Attack Munitions
(JDAMs), the Administration reportedly agreed to sell more advanced JDAMs to Israel.117
•
In 2010, the Obama Administration agreed to sell an additional 20 F-35 aircraft to Israel following a sale to
Saudi Arabia that included F-15s.118
•
In 2013, after the Obama Administration agreed to sell the United Arab Emirates (UAE) advanced F-16
fighters, then-Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel announced that the United States would provide Israel with
KC-135 refueling aircraft, anti-radiation missiles, advanced radar, and six V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft.119 At
the time, the U.S. proposal marked the first time that the United States had offered to sell tilt-rotor Ospreys
to another country. Israel would eventually cancel its planned purchase of the V-22, citing budgetary
constraints.
Since the passage of the QME law and its amending of the AECA, the interagency process to
assess Israel’s QME has taken place behind closed doors and with little fanfare. According to the
Defense Security Cooperation Agency’s (DSCA) Security Assistance Manual, QME
determinations can be classified.120 After a QME determination has been made regarding a
specific proposed sale, DSCA includes a line in the applicable congressional notification reading,
“The proposed sale will not alter the basic military balance in the region.”
Lawmakers have amended or attempted to amend aspects of the 2008 law. The U.S.-Israel
Strategic Partnership Act (P.L. 113-296) amended Section 36 of the AECA to require that the
Administration explain, in cases of sales or exports of major U.S. defense equipment to other
114 Section 201(d)(2) defines QME as “the ability to counter and defeat any credible conventional military threat from
any individual state or possible coalition of states or from non-state actors, while sustaining minimal damage and
casualties, through the use of superior military means, possessed in sufficient quantity, including weapons, command,
control, communication, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance capabilities that in their technical characteristics
are superior in capability to those of such other individual or possible coalition of states or non-state actors.”
115 See, e.g., U.S. Department of State, Remarks by Andrew J. Shapiro, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of PoliticalMilitary Affairs, November 4, 2011; “U.S.-Israel Strategic Cooperation: U.S. Provides Israel a Qualitative Military
Advantage,” Jewish Virtual Library.
116 See Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, White House Statement on US Military Assistance to Israel, September 26,
1992, VOLUME 13-14: 1992-1994.
117 Dan Williams, “Israel to get ‘Smarter’ U.S.-made Bombs than Saudis,” Reuters, January 13, 2020.
118 Eli Lake, “In Gates Book, Details of Israel’s Hard Bargaining over Saudi Arms,” Daily Beast, January 10, 2014.
119 “U.S. Near $10 Billion Arms Deal with Israel, Saudi Arabia, UAE,” Reuters, April 19, 2013.
120 See https://www.samm.dsca.mil/chapter/chapter-5.
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Middle Eastern states, “Israel’s capacity to address the improved capabilities provided by such
sale or export.”
U.S. Bilateral Military Aid to Israel
Since 1999, U.S. assistance to Israel has been outlined in 10-year government-to-government
Memoranda of Understanding (MOUs). MOUs are not legally binding agreements like treaties,
and do not require Senate ratification. Additionally, Congress may accept or change year-to-year
assistance levels for Israel or provide supplemental appropriations. Nevertheless, past MOUs
have significantly influenced U.S. aid to Israel; Congress has appropriated foreign aid to Israel
largely according to the terms of the MOU in place at the time (with the exception of
supplemental appropriations acts). P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National
Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2021, contains Section 1273 of the United States
Israel Security Assistance Authorization Act of 2020, which authorizes “not less than” $3.3
billion in annual FMF to Israel through 2028 per the terms of the current MOU (see below).
Appropriators have matched or exceeded that authorization level each year since its passage.
Brief History of MOUs on U.S. Aid to Israel
The first 10-year MOU (FY1999-FY2008), agreed to under the Clinton Administration, was known as the “Glide
Path Agreement” and represented a political commitment to provide Israel with at least $26.7 billion in total
economic and military aid (of which $21.3 billion was military aid) during its duration.121 This MOU provided the
template for the gradual phase-out of all economic assistance to Israel.
In 2007, the George W. Bush Administration and the Israeli government agreed to a second MOU consisting of a
$30 billion military aid package for the 10-year period from FY2009 to FY2018. Under the terms of that
agreement, Israel was explicitly permitted to continue spending up to 26.3% of U.S. assistance on Israelimanufactured equipment (known as Off-Shore Procurement or OSP—discussed below). The agreement stated
that “Both sides acknowledge that these funding levels assume continuation of adequate levels for U.S. foreign
assistance overall, and are subject to the appropriation and availability of funds for these purposes.”122
The Current 10-Year Security Assistance Memorandum of
Understanding (MOU)
On September 14, 2016, U.S. and Israeli government representatives signed another 10-year
MOU on military aid covering FY2019 to FY2028. Under the terms of this third MOU, the
United States pledges, subject to congressional appropriation, to provide $38 billion in military
aid ($33 billion in FMF grants, plus $5 billion in defense appropriations for missile defense
programs) to Israel. According to the terms of the MOU, “Both the United States and Israel
jointly commit to respect the FMF levels specified in this MOU, and not to seek changes to the
FMF levels for the duration of this understanding.”123
During the negotiations for the current MOU, Israeli officials had sought a higher U.S.
commitment of as much as $45 billion.124 One of the MOU’s negotiators, former U.S.
Ambassador to Israel Daniel B. Shapiro, explained constraints that precluded such an increase:
121 See, The White House, “Joint Statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Ehud Barak,” July 19, 1999.
122 United States-Israel Memorandum of Understanding, Signed by then U.S. Under Secretary of State R. Nicholas
Burns and Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs Director General Aaron Abramovich, August 16, 2007.
123 Memorandum of Understanding between the United States and Israel, September 14, 2016.
124 Peter Baker and Julie Hirschfeld Davis, “U.S. Finalizes Deal to Give Israel $38 Billion in Military Aid,” New York
Times, September 13, 2016.
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At $3.1 billion (the closing level of FMF in the previous MOU), the Israeli share of the
global FMF budget stood at roughly 40 percent. Two of the three next largest recipients of
FMF were Egypt and Jordan, Israel’s two Arab peace partners. The American side
explained that there would be no way to increase FMF to Israel to certain levels without
cutting deeply into the Egyptian and Jordanian programs, and likely eliminating altogether
a number of smaller programs in other countries. 125
The terms of the FY2019-FY2028 MOU differ from previous agreements on issues such as,
•
•
Phasing out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP).126 OSP was to decrease slowly
until FY2024, and then phase out more dramatically over the MOU’s last five
years, ending entirely in FY2028 (see Figure 4). The MOU calls on Israel to
provide the United States with “detailed programmatic information related to the
use of all U.S. funding, including funds used for OSP.” In response to the planned
phase-out of OSP, some Israeli defense contractors started merging with U.S.
companies or opening U.S. subsidiaries to continue their eligibility for defense
contracts financed through FMF (see “U.S. Aid and Israel’s Advanced Military
Technology”).127
Missile Defense. The Administration pledged to request $500 million in annual
combined funding for missile defense programs with joint U.S.-Israeli
elements—such as Iron Dome, Arrow II and Arrow III, and David’s Sling.
Previous MOUs did not include missile defense funding, which has traditionally
been appropriated via separate interactions between successive Administrations
and Congresses. While the MOU commits both the United States and Israel to a
$500 million annual U.S. missile defense contribution, it also stipulates that
under exceptional circumstances (e.g., major armed conflict involving Israel),
both sides may agree on U.S. support above the $500 million annual cap).128
Considerations for the Next MOU
The current MOU is in effect through September 30, 2028. U.S. and Israeli officials will probably
soon begin the formal process for negotiating the next assistance agreement. Israeli lawmakers
and various experts have begun publishing position papers on the future of U.S. military
assistance to Israel. Some call for maintaining or increasing aid, while others call for gradually
phasing out assistance and, instead, pursuing a model of cooperative programming.129 During
125 Daniel B. Shapiro, “A Review of the Negotiations on the 2016 US-Israel MOU on Military Assistance,” in Sasson
Hadad, Tomer Fadlon, and Shmuel Even, Editors, Israel’s Defense Industry and US Security Aid, INSS, pp. 61-68.
126 Section 42(c) (22 U.S.C. §2791(c)) of the AECA prohibits using funds made available under this act for
procurement outside the United States unless the President determines that such procurement does not have an adverse
effect on the U.S. economy or the industrial mobilization base. Executive Order 13637 designated this authority to the
Secretary of Defense and the issuance of an OSP waiver requires concurrence by the Departments of State and
Commerce. See U.S. Department of Defense, Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Security Assistance Manual,
Chapter 9.
127 “Israeli UAV Firm agrees deal for Unnamed US Company,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 18, 2017.
128 In FY2022, Congress appropriated $1 billion in additional missile defense funding for Israel. In FY2024, Congress
appropriated $8.7 billion in combined FMF and missile defense funding (see Table 2).
129 “By Itself, With U.S.: The Case for a U.S.-Israel Mutual Defense Treaty Post-10/7,” The Jewish Institute for
National Security of America (JINSA), October 7, 2024. Lahav Harkov, “Meet the Likud lawmaker advocating for the
U.S. to phase out military aid to Israel,” Jewish Insider, March 13, 2025; and “U.S.–Israel Strategy: From Special
Relationship to Strategic Partnership, 2029–2047,” The Heritage Foundation, March 12, 2025.
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both the Biden and Trump Administrations, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has stated that
Israel needs to “wean ourselves off of American security aid.”130
With both sides having already agreed to tens of billions worth of U.S. arms sales since October
7, 2023, and with Israel’s ability under U.S. law to use cash flow financing (see below) to stretch
FMF payments on those contracts over years, a new MOU may be necessary to finance existing
payment schedules on equipment already purchased. If the two sides are unable to reach an
arrangement, and Congress does not appropriate FMF to Israel, the Israeli government would
either have to pay for existing contracts with national funds, arrange other sources of external
financing, or terminate ongoing contracts, at which point the United States and Israel may both be
liable for certain contract termination costs.
As both sides prepare for MOU negotiations, projected Israeli defense budgets and U.S. foreign
assistance budgets may factor into the aid levels in the next MOU. Israel has signaled that it may
raise its own defense spending significantly in the coming years. An Israeli government
commission recently recommended adding another $30 billion to military spending over the next
decade.131 As Congress considers recent Administration reviews of U.S. foreign assistance, some
experts have noted that reductions in U.S. assistance globally could have an indirect impact on
Israel even if U.S. aid to Israel continues. For example, former U.S. Ambassador to Israel Daniel
Shapiro has said that if other countries are receiving U.S. aid, “Israel is not so exposed,” as the
recipient of a majority of FMF.132
Figure 4. Phasing Out Off-Shore Procurement (OSP) Under the MOU
Source: CRS graphics.
130 Lahav Harkov, “Netanyahu calls to ‘wean’ Israel off U.S. aid amid growing tensions,” Jewish Insider, May 12,
2025.
131 Carrie Keller-Lynn, “Israel Must Bolster Military, Panel Warns,” Wall Street Journal, January 8, 2025.
132 Daniel B. Shapiro, “Let’s talk about the next US-Israel military-assistance agreement,” Defense One, January 31,
2025.
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Figure 5. U.S. Foreign Military Financing to Israel over Decades
Source: CRS graphics.
Foreign Military Financing (FMF) and Arms Sales
The Foreign Military Financing appropriations account is the primary legislative funding vehicle
through which Israel receives security assistance. Historically, Israel has been the largest recipient
of FMF. Annual FMF grants to Israel represent approximately 14% of the overall Israeli defense
budget.133 In the decades-long history of U.S. military aid to Israel, current levels of U.S. military
aid represent a lower percentage of overall Israeli defense spending than in previous eras due to
the growth of Israel’s economy and national budget.134 Israel’s defense expenditure as a
percentage of its Gross Domestic Product (8.8% in 2024) is one of the highest in the world.135
Like other global recipients of major U.S. defense equipment, the state of Israel procures U.S.
arms through the Foreign Military Sales program (recipient procures item from the U.S.
government) and Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) licenses (U.S. firms sell defense articles
directly to international partners). From 1950 to 2022, the United States implemented more than
$53.4 billion in FMS for Israel, making it the second largest U.S. defense customer by value
worldwide (after Saudi Arabia).136 In April 2025, the Bureau of Political-Military Affairs (POLMIL) at the State Department (the bureau responsible for policy direction of U.S. arms sales)
reported that “as of April 2025, the United States has 751 active Foreign Military Sales (FMS)
cases with Israel that are valued at $39.2 billion.... From FY2018 through FY2022, the U.S. has
also authorized the permanent export of over $12.2 billion in defense articles to Israel via the
Direct Commercial Sales (DCS) process.”137
133 The Israeli Ministry of Defense provides funding figures for its domestic defense budget but excludes some
procurement spending and spending on civil defense. The estimate referenced above is based on figures published by
Jane’s, “Israel Defence Budget,” January 12, 2024. Jane’s removes FMF from its Israeli defense budget calculations to
reflect how much Israel independently spends on defense.
134 United States General Accounting Office, “U.S. Assistance to the State of Israel,” Report by the Comptroller
General of the United States, June 24, 1983.
135 According to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), “Military spending as a share of GDP
rose from 5.4 per cent in 2023 to 8.8 per cent in 2024, giving Israel the second highest military burden in the world
behind Ukraine.” See, Xiao Liang, Nan Tian, Diego Lopes da Silva, Lorenzo Scarazzato, Zubaida Karim, and Jade
Guiberteau Ricard, “Trends in World Military Expenditure, 2024,” SIPRI Fact Sheet, Stockholm International Peace
Research Institute (SIPRI), April 2025.
136 Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA), Historical Sales Book Fiscal Years 1950 to 2022, FY2022 edition.
137 U.S. Department of State, Bureau of Political-Military Affairs, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Israel: Fact Sheet,”
April 25, 2025.
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Figure 6. FMF as a Percentage of Israel’s Defense Budget
Source: Jane’s Defence Budget (April 2025).
Notes: This table does not include annual missile defense appropriations. Jane’s Defence uses Israeli Ministry of
Finance figures and other sources to estimate annual budget projections. Jane’s figures are in constant 2025 USD
billions.
Cash Flow Financing
Section 23 of the AECA (22 U.S.C. §2763) authorizes the President to finance the “procurement
of defense articles, defense services, and design and construction services by friendly foreign
countries and international organizations, on such terms and conditions as he may determine
consistent with the requirements of this section.” Successive Administrations have used this
authority to permit Israel to utilize FMF funds to finance multiyear purchases in advance
appropriations, rather than having to pay the full amount of such purchases up front (see text box
below). Known as “cash flow financing,” this benefit enables Israel to negotiate major arms
purchases with U.S. defense suppliers with payments scheduled over a longer time horizon.138
138 Cash flow financing is defined in Section 25(d) of the AECA and Section 503(a)(3) of the Foreign Assistance Act of
1961, as amended.
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Early History of Cash Flow Financing to Israel
The United States initially began authorizing installment-style sales to Israel to help it rebuild its military capabilities
after the 1973 war with Egypt and Syria. Congress appropriated $2.2 billion for Israel in P.L. 93-199, the
Emergency Security Assistance Act of 1973. Section 3 of that act stated that “Foreign military sales credits [loans
or grants] extended to Israel out of such funds shall be provided on such terms and conditions as the President
may determine and without regard to the provisions of the Foreign Military Sales Act as amended.” At the time,
the Foreign Military Sales Act of 1968 (amended in 1971 and the precursor to the Arms Export Control Act of
1976), capped the annual amount of foreign military sales credit that could be extended to a recipient at no more
than $250 million per year. Under the authorities contained in P.L. 93-199, President Richard Nixon, in two
separate determinations (April and July 1974), allocated the $2.2 billion to Israel as $1.5 billion in grant military aid,
the largest U.S. grant aid package ever for Israel at the time. The remaining $700 million was designated as a
military loan. According to the New York Times, the Ford Administration reached a new arms sales agreement with
Israel a year-and-a-half later, providing that “the cost of the new military equipment would be met through the
large amount of aid approved by the just-completed session of Congress as well as the aid that will be approved by
future Congresses.”139
Cash flow financing and its derivatives also have allowed Israel to use U.S. government-approved
sources of external financing to support the procurement of major U.S. defense systems, such as
combat aircraft. Beginning with its purchase of F-16D aircraft from Lockheed Martin over 20
years ago and continuing presently with ongoing procurement of the F-35, the United States has
utilized what is known as the “Deferred Payments Program.”140 This program allows Israel to
defer payments owed under its Letter of Offer and Acceptance (LOA) for F-35 aircraft and use
future-year FMF appropriations to make payments pursuant to a pre-determined payment
schedule. Upon deferral of a given payment by Israel, a private bank (in the case of the F-35, a
small consortium led by Citibank) pays Lockheed Martin in full and Lockheed Martin assigns its
right to be paid by the U.S. Government to the bank.141
In Foreign Military Sales cases in which Israel and the United States seek to execute LOAs
beyond the scope of the current MOU (either beyond FY2028 or above the $33 billion pledged),
the U.S. government has established a “Special Billing Arrangement” (SBA) with Israel. The
purpose of SBAs, according to DSCA, is to “improve cash management for eligible FMS
partners.”142 Under an SBA, Israel may use national cash reserves for funding requirements
associated with an FMS case (e.g., funds to cover termination liability) that exceeds the amount
of funds listed in or duration of the current MOU.143
139 See “U.S. Decides to Sell Some Arms to Israel That It Blocked in the Past,” New York Times, October 12, 1976.
140 Under this arrangement, Lockheed Martin sells Citibank a legal claim on its defense contract with Israel. The
Defense Department then repays Citibank using the available FMF allocation for Israel. The Israeli government uses its
own national funds to pay interest on the Citibank loans. One organization in support of continued U.S. support for
Israel has advocated for Congress to authorize the use of FMF to cover Israeli interest payments on weapons deals to
creditors. See Jonathan Ruhe, Charles B. Perkins, and Ari Cicurel, “Israel’s Acceleration of U.S. Weapons
Procurement: Analysis and Recommendations,” The Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA),
February 2021. However, according to DSCA, it is unclear whether FMF is legally available for that purpose.
141 CRS Correspondence with DSCA, January 2022.
142 See Chapter 9.10.2, Security Assistance Management Manual (SAMM) as Defense Security Cooperation Agency
Manual 5105.38-M, DSCA Policy 12-20.
143 According to DSCA, “Since requirements and procedures are unique to each country, they are normally established
in an agreement between the customer country, DSCA, and the appropriate banking institutions in the U.S. and the
purchaser’s country.” See Defense Security Cooperation University, Security Cooperation Management, Chapter 12,
edition 41, May 2021.
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Table 3. Selected Notified U.S. Foreign Military Sales to Israel
Amount/Description
Cong. Notice
Primary Contractor(s)
Estimated Cost
KC-46A aerial refueling aircraft
2020
Boeing Corporation
$2.4 billion
JP-8 aviation fuel, diesel fuel, and
unleaded gasoline
2020
N/A
$3 billion
18 CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters (with
support equipment)
2021
Lockheed Martin (parent
company of Sikorsky) and
General Electric Company
$3.4 billion
*120mm M830A1 High Explosive AntiTank Multi-Purpose with Tracer (MPAT)
tank cartridges
2023
U.S. Army inventory
$106.5 million
*M107 155mm projectiles
2023
U.S. Army inventory
$147.5 million
50 new F-15IA multi-role fighter aircraft
and modification kits for 25 F-15I multirole fighter aircraft
2024
Boeing Corporation
$18.82 billion
30 AIM-120C-8 Advanced Medium
Range Air-to-Air Missiles (AMRAAM)
and 1 AMRAAM guidance section
2024
RTX Corporation
$102.5 million
32,739 120mm tank cartridges
2024
General Dynamics
Ordnance and Tactical
Systems and Northrop
Grumman Defense
Systems
$774.1 million
50,000 M933A1 120mm High Explosive
Mortar Cartridges
2024
General Dynamics
Ordnance and Tactical
Systems Inc.
$61.1 million
M1148A1P2 Family of Medium Tactical
Vehicles (FMTV)
2024
Oshkosh Corporation
$583.1 million
Heavy Duty Tank Trailers (HDTT)
2024
Leonardo DRS
$164.6 million
Munitions, Guidance Kits, Fuzes, and
Munitions Support
2025
Boeing Corporation and
others
$6.75 billion
AGM-114 Hellfire Missiles
2025
Lockheed Martin
$660 million
*Caterpillar D9 Bulldozers
2025
Caterpillar
$295 million
*Munitions, Guidance Kits, and
Munitions Support
2025
Boeing Corporation and
others
$675.7 million
*Munitions and Munitions Support
2025
General Dynamics and
others
$2.04 billion
Eitan Powerpack Engines
2025
Rolls-Royce Solutions
America, Inc
$180 million
Sources: Defense Security Cooperation Agency, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute Arms
Transfer Database, IHS Jane’s.
Notes: All figures are approximate. ***Notified under emergency authority under Section 36(b) of the Arms
Export Control Act.
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Early Transfer and Interest-Bearing Account
Since FY1991 (P.L. 101-513), Congress has mandated that Israel receive its FMF aid in a lump
sum during the first month of the fiscal year (not including supplemental appropriations).144
P.L.118-47, the FY2024 Further Consolidated Appropriations Act states that, “of the funds
appropriated by this Act under the heading ‘Foreign Military Financing Program,’ not less than
$3,300,000,000 shall be available for grants only for Israel which shall be disbursed within 30
days of enactment of this Act.” Once disbursed, Israel’s military aid is transferred to an interestbearing account with the U.S. Federal Reserve Bank.145 In the past, Israel used interest collected
on its military aid to pay down, among other things, its bilateral debt (nonguaranteed) to U.S.
government agencies. As of September 2024, Israel no longer maintained any outstanding
sovereign debt to the United States government.146 Israel cannot use accrued interest for defense
procurement inside Israel.
Shorter Congressional Review Period of Arms Sales
Per provisions in the AECA, Israel, along with North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
member states, Japan, Australia, South Korea, and New Zealand (commonly referred to as
NATO+5) have shorter congressional review periods (15 days instead of 30) and higher dollar
notification thresholds than other countries for both government-to-government and
commercially licensed arms sales. The prior notice threshold values for transfers to these
recipients are $25 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of major defense equipment;
$100 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of defense articles and defense services; and
$300 million for the sale, enhancement, or upgrading of design and construction services.147
F-35 Joint Strike Fighter
Israel was the first declared international operator of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter.148 It has
purchased 50 F-35s in three separate contracts using FMF grants and agreed to a Letter of Offer
and Acceptance (LOA) with the U.S. government for 25 more planes (for a total of $3 billion)
pending finalized contracts with Lockheed Martin. Deliveries of this additional tranche of jet
fighters are not expected to be completed until 2035. As of January 2025, Israel had received 39
of 50 jets on order,149 which it has divided into three squadrons (the 116th ‘Lions of the South,’ the
144 On at least one occasion when government operations were funded by a continuing resolution, Congress has
included provisions in the resolution preventing the early transfer of FMF to Israel until the final appropriations bill for
that fiscal year was passed. See Section 109 of P.L. 113-46, the Continuing Appropriations Act, 2014.
145 According to DSCA, “Some countries may establish an account with the federal reserve bank (FRB), New York, for
their FMS [Foreign Military Sales] deposits. An agreement between the FMS purchaser’s defense organization, the
purchaser’s central bank, FRB New York and DSCA identifies the terms, conditions, and mechanics of the account’s
operation. Countries receiving FMFP funds must maintain their interest-bearing account in the FRB.” See Defense
Institute of Security Assistance Management (DISAM), “The Management of Security Cooperation (Green Book),”
34th edition, April 2015.
146 Foreign Credit Reporting System (FCRS), Amounts Due the U.S. Government, United States Department of the
Treasury, Office of Global Economics and Debt. Israel finished paying off long-standing debts to the U.S. government
in June 2023.
147 See CRS Report RL31675, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, by Paul K. Kerr.
148 In September 2008, DSCA notified Congress of a possible Foreign Military Sale of up to 75 F-35s to Israel in a deal
with a possible total value of $15.2 billion. See Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel - F-35 Joint Strike
Fighter Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 08-83, September 29, 2008.
149 Emanuel Fabian, “Israel inks deal to buy 25 more F-35 fighter jets for $3 billion,” Times of Israel, June 4, 2024.
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140th ‘Golden Eagles,’ and the 117th Training Squadron) based at Nevatim Air Base in southern
Israel.150
In 2018, Israeli defense officials claimed that Israel was the first country to operate the F-35 in
combat.151 To date, only the United States and Israel have ever used the aircraft in aerial strikes.
Since 2018, Israeli pilots have reportedly flown the F-35 across multiple theaters (both permissive
and contested in terms of air defenses), such as Syria, Iran, and Yemen.152 Some reports suggest
that Israel used its F-35s to strike deep within Iranian territory in October 2024, destroying Iran’s
Russian-supplied S-300 anti-aircraft systems.153 When asked how the Israel Air Force’s versions
of the F-35 have performed, U.S. Air Force Lieutenant General Michael J. Schmidt stated in a
2023 hearing before the House Armed Services Committee that it had been “absolutely
outstanding” and “their full mission capable rates are high.”154
The Department of Defense’s F-35 program is
an international cooperative program in which
Israel (and Singapore) are considered
“security cooperation participants” outside of
the F-35 cooperative development
partnership.155 Israel is not eligible to assign
staff to the F-35 Joint Program Office in
Virginia and does not receive full F-35
technical briefings.156 The U.S. government
and Lockheed Martin retain exclusive access
to the F-35’s software code, which Israel is
not permitted to alter.
Figure 7. U.S. and Israeli F-35s Fly in
Formation
Joint Exercise Enduring Lightning III (October 2020)
Despite these limitations, Israel’s involvement
in the F-35 program is extensive, with Israeli
companies making F-35 wing sets (IAI) and
Source: U.S. Air Force.
helmets (Elbit Systems). Under a 2020
agreement with Lockheed Martin, the defense contractor committed to re-investing 35%157 of the
F-35 contract’s value into Israeli industry through offset and counter-trade activity; as of 2020,
Lockheed had invested over $4 billion in Israel’s defense sector.158
Israel also has received significant development access to the F-35 and the ability to customize its
planes with Israeli-made C4 (command, control, communications, computers) systems, under the
150 Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli Air Force Favouring Additional F-35s,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 10, 2020.
151 Anna Ahronheim, “IAF commander: Israel first to use F-35 jet in combat,” Jerusalem Post, May 22, 2018.
152 For example, see “F-35 Stealth Fighter Sees First Combat, in Israeli Operation,” BBC News, May 22, 2018 and
“Israel - Air Force,” Jane’s World Air Forces, July 5, 2019, Yaakov Lappin and Jeremy Binnie, “IDF details Iranian
UAV incursions,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 9, 2022, Jake Epstein, “The F-35 stealth fighter’s victory against
Iran’s air defenses highlights its ability to wage a higher level of war,” Business Insider, December 14, 2024.
153 Aaron Spray, “5 Times The F-35 5th-Generation Fighter Has Been Used in Combat,” Simpleflying.com, November
11, 2024.
154 CQ Transcripts, “House Armed Services Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces Holds Hearing on F-35
Acquisition Program Update,” December 12, 2023.
155 See CRS Report R48304, F-35 Lightning II: Background and Issues for Congress.
156 “Israel,” Jane’s World Air Forces, September 1, 2020.
157 According to Jane’s, FMF‐funded contracts in Israel (see Off-Shore Procurement) cannot be used for direct offsets.
See, “Israel – Market Report,” Jane’s Emerging Markets Reports, January 17, 2024.
158 Charles Forrester, “Lockheed Martin signs umbrella offset agreement with Israel,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, August
17, 2020.
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condition that the software coding be done by the United States. In 2018, the Navy awarded
Lockheed Martin a $148 million contract for “the procurement of Israel-unique weapons
certification, modification kits, and electronic warfare analysis.”159 Software upgrades (called
Block 3F+) added to the main computer of Israel’s F-35s reportedly facilitate the “use of Israelidesigned electronic equipment and weaponry,” thereby permitting Israel to “employ its own
external jamming pod and also allow internal carriage of indigenous air-to-air missiles and guided
munitions.”160 In December 2021, the Defense Department awarded a $49 million contract to
Lockheed Martin to support work on “an F-35 variant ‘tailored’ for an undisclosed FMS
customer,” probably Israel.161
F-15IA
Israel has flown variants of the F-15 since the
late 1970’s, and due to their ranges and
payload capacities, these variants (F-15I)
have been considered the top fighters in
Israel’s F-15 fleet. However, for over two
decades, Israel had not acquired any new F15 fighters. Internal Israeli budgetary and
political disagreements had delayed a formal
Israeli request to move ahead with an
acquisition of 25 F-15IAs (or F-15EXs) until
2023.162 In a long-range Israeli air strike
scenario (against a country like Iran), the
stealthy F-35 is designed to target an enemy’s
air defenses, while the F-15IA is to use its
heavy-weapons payload against various
hardened targets.
Figure 8. F-35 Helmet Mounted Display
Made by Israeli Manufacturer Elbit Systems
Source: Elbit Systems Ltd.
Notes: The F-35 Helmet Mounted Display is a joint
venture between Elbit Systems and Rockwell Collins.
As mentioned above, in August 2024, the Biden Administration formally notified Congress of
potential Foreign Military Sales to Israel for up to 50 new F-15IA fighter aircraft and F-15
upgrades for $18.82 billion.163 In November 2024, Israel and Boeing agreed to contract terms for
the purchase of 25 F-15IAs for $5.2 billion. Initial delivery is set to take place in 2031, with 4-6
aircraft to be supplied annually thereafter.164 Reportedly, the new F-15IA will be equipped with
advanced Israeli electronic warfare equipment and data links.165
159 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Navy, Contracts for February 2, 2018.
160 Gareth Jennings, “Israel Stands-Up Second F-35 Unit,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 17, 2020.
161 Gareth Jennings, “Lockheed Martin to Design and Develop F-35 Variant ‘Tailored’ for Foreign Customer,” Jane’s
Defence Weekly, December 29, 2021.
162 Arie Egozi, “Israel formally requests 25 F-15 EX from the US: Sources,” Breaking Defense, January 19, 2023.
163 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel – F-15IA and F-15I+ Aircraft,” Transmittal 24-01, August 13, 2024.
164 “Israel signs $5.2 billion deal to acquire 25 F-15 fighter jets from Boeing,” Reuters, November 7, 2024.
165 Emanuel Fabian, “Defense Ministry signs $5.2 billion deal to buy 25 advanced F-15IA fighter jets,” Times of Israel,
November 7, 2024.
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KC-46A Pegasus
To extend the range of its aerial attack capability and enhance personnel mobility, Israel has
pursued procurement of Boeing’s KC-46A “Pegasus” multirole tanker. The Pegasus can refuel all
types of U.S. and allied military aircraft and can carry passengers, fuel, and equipment. The
Israeli Air Force originally procured its current fleet of tankers (converted Boeing 707s) in the
1970s. According to one account, “With the ability to fly for 36 hours, the KC-46A has a high
endurance for long missions and comes equipped with anti-electronic jamming equipment to
make the large target safer from attack.”166 According to several Members of Congress, “Israeli
KC-46As would not only benefit Israel’s refueling operations but, since they are interoperable
with U.S. aircraft, would also expand U.S. capabilities in the Middle East—without the United
States having to pay to station and maintain tankers in the region.”167
In March 2020, DSCA notified Congress of a
planned sale to Israel of eight KC-46A
Boeing “Pegasus” aircraft for an estimated
$2.4 billion.168 Israel is the second foreign
country approved by the United States to
receive the KC-46A, after Japan. In February
2021, Israel signed an LOA to buy two KC46As and, in January 2022, it reached a
second LOA for two additional tankers. In
late August 2022, Boeing and Israel signed a
contract for four KC-46As, plus associated
maintenance, logistics, and training, for $927
million. Delivery of the Pegasus tankers may
occur at some point in either 2025 or 2026;
Israel’s government has sought to expedite
this timetable.169
Figure 9. The KC-46A Pegasus
Source: U.S. Air Force.
Since Israel may use the KC-46A to refuel its F-35 fighters, a key capability in projecting force
toward Iran and elsewhere,170 some lawmakers have sought to expedite deliveries of the refueling
aircraft along with associated specialized training for Israeli pilots. Section 1256 of P.L.118-31,
the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024, directs the Secretary of the Air Force to,
among other things: provide U.S. resources to train members of the Israel Air Force on the
operation of KC-46A, authorize Israeli participation in an Air Force Military Personnel Exchange
Program, and provide an estimated date of delivery to Israel of KC-46A aircraft. When this
provision was first presented in the Senate, the Biden Administration opposed it, noting that the
“Air Force is actively planning KC-46 training and exchange programs with the Government of
166 Robert Tollast and Thomas Helm, “How Israel could strike back against Iran: Experts outline high-risk options,”
The National (UAE), April 14, 2024.
167 Reps. August Pfluger and Rob Wittman, and Chris Stewart and Michael Makovsky, “U.S. must expedite delivery of
KC-46A aerial refueling tanker to Israel,” Washington Times, May 1, 2024.
168 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel—KC-46A Aerial Refueling Aircraft,” Transmittal No. 20-12, March
3, 2020.
169 Joseph Trevithick, “Israel’s Request to Speed Delivery Of KC-46 Tankers Critical for Striking Iran Denied - The
War Zone,” The Drive, December 14, 2021.
170 Seth Frantzman, “Israel inks $3 Billion deal for KC-46 Tankers, CH-53 helos,” Defense News, January 4, 2022.
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Israel and will execute such programs on a timeline, and in a manner, that is mutually agreeable
to the U.S. and Israeli Air Forces.”171
To prepare Israeli defense infrastructure for the KC-46A, U.S. companies have been expanding
Israeli runways at various air bases.172 These U.S. firms have been paving runways and taxiways
and building hangars of sufficient size for the new tankers.173
171 Executive Office of the President, Office of Management and Budget, July 27, 2023, Follow-on to Statement of
Administration Policy, S. 2226 – National Defense Authorization Act for FY2024.
172 Jeremy Binnie, “Israeli airbase to be upgraded for new KC-46 tankers,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 4, 2024.
173 Conti Federal, “Conti Federal Awarded Task Order Contract for Taxiway and Runway Rehabilitation in Israel,” July
11, 2024.
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Other Pillars of U.S.-Israeli Military Cooperation
For decades, the U.S. and Israeli governments have engaged in a number of cooperative military activities, such as
joint exercises, working groups, and coordinated operations. Below are some examples of these pillars of defense
cooperation.
Joint Bilateral Exercises: For 20 years, the U.S. and Israeli militaries have conducted exercises as part of the
“Juniper” series. The most recent one, Juniper Oak, was held in January 2023.174 The Israeli Navy and the U.S. 5th
Fleet also conduct naval exercises, codenamed “Intrinsic Defender.” Section 1213 of P.L.118-52, the National
Defense Authorization Act for FY2025, requires, among other things, that the United States Central Command
(CENTCOM) invite Israel to conduct joint military exercises with U.S. forces, including in subterranean warfare.
Joint Working Groups: Since the early 1980s, U.S. and Israeli officials have participated in the Joint Political
Military Group (JPMG), a bilateral forum to discuss and plan military cooperation.175 Other groups include: the
U.S.-Israel Defense Policy Advisory Group (DPAG),176 the U.S.-Israel Defense Acquisition Advisory Group
(DAAG), the U.S.-Israel Defense Industrial Base Working Group, and the U.S.-Israel Operations-Technology
Working Group (OTWG). While these bilateral groups have been created by the executive branch, Congress has
at times legislated changes to U.S.-Israeli working groups.177 Section 1214 of P.L.118-52, the National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2025, requires the Secretary of Defense to establish a partnership between the Defense
Innovation Unit of the Department of Defense and appropriate counterparts of Israel to, among other things,
“enhance market opportunities for United States-based and Israeli-based defense technology companies.”
U.S. Military Presence in Israel: With the exception of wartime emergencies, such as late 2023 and much of
2024 when the United States deployed significant forces in and around Israel,178 the United States does not
regularly maintain a large presence of U.S. troops inside Israel. According to a media report, the United States
does have access to Mashabim Israeli Air Base, where several dozen U.S. Air Force personnel are apparently
located.179 Another report suggests that, as of 2021, the United States and Israel maintain a Combined Joint
Operations Center at Hatzor Air Base.180
One of the most significant gestures of U.S. support for Israel’s missile defense architecture has been the
deployment of the AN/TPY-2 X-Band radar system (built by Raytheon) to Israel in late 2008. The X-Band system
remains U.S.-owned and is operated by U.S. troops and defense contractors—the first indefinite U.S. military
presence to be established on Israeli soil.181
CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters
Since 1969, Israel’s Air Force has used its Sikorsky Yasur helicopters (CH-53D) to transport
personnel and equipment. In upgrading its fleet of transport helicopters, Israel chose the Sikorsky
174 U.S. Department of Defense, U.S. Central Command, “Completion of Juniper Oak 23.2 Exercise,” January 26,
2023.
175 A 1981 MOU laid out in broad terms which issues U.S.-Israeli defense working groups would cover. See,
Memorandum of Understanding between the Government of the United States and the Government of Israel on
Strategic Cooperation, November 30, 1981. The parties reached this MOU several months after the U.S. sale to Saudi
Arabia of AWACs. See, Bernard Gwertzman, “U.S. and Israel Sign Strategic Accord to Counter Soviet: Senate Vote,”
New York Times, December 1, 1981.
176 This group was established in 1999 at a time when the Clinton Administration sought to improve bilateral ties with
the Ehud Barak government. See, Norman Kempster, “Clinton, Barak Agree on Plan to Strengthen Military Ties,” Los
Angeles Times, July 20, 1999.
177 For example, see Section 1299M of P.L. 116-283, the William M. (Mac) Thornberry National Defense
Authorization Act for FY2021.
178 See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, “Austin Deploys Missile Battery, Personnel to Israel,” October 15,
2024.
179 Judah Ari Gross, “In first, US establishes permanent military base in Israel,” Times of Israel, September 17, 2018.
180 Jeremy Binnie, “US building combined joint ops centre in Israel,” Jane’s Defense, July 14, 2021.
181 P.L. 110-417, the Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act for FY2009, authorized up to $89 million for
the activation and deployment of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based X-band radar to a “classified location.” In report
language (H.Rept. 110-652) accompanying H.R. 5658, the House-passed FY2009 Defense Authorization bill, Members
(continued...)
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“King Stallion” CH-53K Heavy Lift helicopters over competing systems. In 2021, DSCA notified
Congress of a planned sale to Israel of up to 18 CH-53Ks at an estimated cost of $3.4 billion.182
In late 2021, Israel signed an LOA with the United States to purchase 12 CH-53K Heavy Lift
helicopters for $2 billion (with an option to procure an additional six helicopters).183 In February
2022, multiple sources reported that Lockheed Martin’s Sikorsky Aircraft Corporation had agreed
to a contract with Israel to produce the first four CH-53Ks for $372 million. In 2023, Sikorsky
was awarded a Department of Defense contract worth $2.7 billion to deliver 35 CH-53Ks,
including eight for Israel.184 Initial delivery is anticipated sometime between 2025 and 2026.
Figure 10. CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopter
for Israel
(an artist’s rendering)
Excess Defense Articles
The Excess Defense Articles (EDA) program
provides an avenue for the United States to
advance foreign policy objectives—assisting
friendly and allied nations—while also
reducing its inventory of outdated or excess
equipment. This program, managed by
DSCA, enables the United States to provide
friendly countries with supplies in excess of
U.S. requirements, at either reduced rates or
no charge.185
As a designated “major non-NATO ally,”
Israel is eligible to receive EDA under
Section 516(a) of the Foreign Assistance Act
(FAA) and Section 23(a) of the AECA. According to DSCA, from 2013 to 2023, Israel received
at least $296 million in EDA deliveries (current value).186 The State Department notes that since
1992, the United States has provided a total of $6.6 billion worth of EDA to Israel.187
Source: Lockheed Martin.
stated that “The State of Israel faces a real and growing threat from short- and medium-range ballistic missiles from
states such as the Syrian Arab Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The committee believes that the deployment
of a U.S. Army-Navy/Transportable-2 (AN/TPY-2) missile defense discrimination radar to Israel would greatly
increase the capabilities of both Israel and U.S. forces deployed in support of Israel to defend against ballistic missile
threats. Therefore, the committee urges the Department of Defense to begin discussions with Israel about the possibility
of deploying an AN/TPY-2 radar on its territory at the earliest feasible date.” The Senate version, S. 3001, included an
amendment making funds available for the deployment of the AN/TPY-2 forward-based X-band radar.
182 Defense Security Cooperation Agency, “Israel – CH-53K Heavy Lift Helicopters with Support,” Transmittal No.
21-52, July 30, 2021.
183 U.S. Naval Air Systems Command, “Israel to purchase CH-53K King Stallion,” NAVAIR News, January 4, 2022.
184 Justin Katz, “Sikorsky awarded $2.7B contract for 35 CH-53K King Stallions, some bound for Israel,” Breaking
Defense, August 25, 2023.
185 To access DSCA’s Excess Defense Articles database, see http://www.dsca.mil/programs/eda.
186 Excess Defense Articles Database Tool, Defense Security Cooperation Agency.
187 U.S. Department of State, “U.S. Security Cooperation with Israel: Fact Sheet,” January 20, 2025.
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Origins of Israel’s Status as a “Major Non-NATO Ally”
On November 4, 1986, President Reagan signed into law P.L. 99-661, the National Defense Authorization Act for
FY1987. In Section 1105 of that act, Congress called for greater defense cooperation between the United States
and countries that the Secretary of Defense could designate as a “major non-NATO ally” (MNNA). Such
cooperation could entail U.S. funding for joint research and development and production of U.S. defense
equipment. In February 1987, the United States granted Israel MNNA status along with several other countries
(Egypt, Japan, South Korea, and Australia). According to press reports at the time, in the absence of a U.S.-Israeli
mutual defense agreement, supporters of Israel had been advocating for Israel to receive “equal treatment” with
regard to certain special military benefits (such as the ability to bid on U.S. defense contracts) that NATO allies
received from the United States.188 Nearly a decade later, Congress passed additional legislation that further
solidified Israel’s MNNA status. In 1996, Section 147 of P.L. 104-164 amended the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961
by requiring the President to notify Congress 30 days before designating a country as a MNNA. According to the
act, Israel, along with several other countries, “shall be deemed to have been so designated by the President as of
the effective date of this section, and the President is not required to notify the Congress of such designation of
those countries.”189
Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli
Missile Defense Programs
For years, Iran and Iran-supported non-state actors across the Middle East have developed short
and long-range capabilities designed to threaten Israel. In response, Congress and successive
Administrations have supported joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense projects. As previously
mentioned, (see, “The Current 10-Year Security Assistance Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU)”) the current MOU on assistance commits the president to requesting $500 million
annually from Congress in missile defense funding for joint U.S.-Israeli systems. Congress has
provided these funds for Israeli and U.S.-Israeli missile defense programs in defense
authorization and appropriations bills and, at times (2021, 2024), has appropriated additional
funding during wartime. Israel and the United States each contribute financially to several
weapons systems and engage in co-development, co-production, and/or technology sharing in
connection with them.
How do the United States and Israel Spend Missile Defense Funds?
In any given fiscal year, after Congress appropriates joint U.S.-Israeli missile defense funding, the Department of
Defense’s Missile Defense Agency (MDA) and the Israel Missile Defense Organization (IMDO) jointly cooperate to
execute the $500 million annual program. This program has two broad components: (1) research, development,
testing, and evaluation (or RDT&E) and (2) procurement/co-production. U.S. contributions toward RDT&E are
matched by Israel on an annual basis, while the MOU stipulated that 50% or greater of annual procurement/coproduction funds must be spent in the United States. According to the MDA, since the annual $500 million
program is divided roughly into $300 million for RDT&E and $200 million for procurement/co-production, at least
$100 million a year is then spent on missile defense funding inside the United States by either U.S. firms or
American-based subsidiaries of Israeli defense contractors.190
188 See “Israel seeks to obtain the kind of Financial Aid that NATO Members get from U.S. Government,” Wall Street
Journal, February 3, 1987.
189 See 22 U.S.C. §2321j.
190 CRS Meeting with Missile Defense Agency, February 20, 2025.
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Figure 11. Locations of U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Co-Production
IDDS (Iron Dome), DSWS (David’s Sling), and AWS (Arrow)
Source: Provided to CRS by the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, March 2025.
Notes: Approved for public release; distribution unlimited. No U.S.-Israeli missile defense co-production in
Alaska or Hawaii (not shown).
The following section provides background on Israel’s four-layered active defense network: Iron
Dome (short range), David’s Sling (low to mid-range), Arrow II (upper-atmospheric), and Arrow
III (exo-atmospheric).191 In addition to these existing systems, according to open source reports,
Israel, the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, and various private defense contractors are working on
next generation defense systems, such as Arrow IV192 and various ground and air-based laser
systems, including Iron Beam (see below).193 Beyond these interception systems, Israel also has
extensive civil defense procedures and advanced warning infrastructure to move civilians into
shelters in the event of a missile/rocket/drone attack.
Iron Dome
Iron Dome is a short-range anti-rocket, anti-mortar, anti-drone, anti-missile, and anti-artillery
system (intercept range of 2.5 to 43 miles) developed by Israel’s Rafael Advanced Defense
Systems and originally produced in Israel. Iron Dome’s targeting system and radar are designed
to fire its Tamir interceptors only at incoming projectiles that pose threats to the area being
protected (generally, strategically important sites, including population centers); it is not
configured to fire on rockets outside of that area. The Tamir interceptor’s warhead detonates the
target warhead in the air. Iron Dome consists of a wheeled chassis launcher (each with 20
interceptors), a radar unit, and battle management and control center. While Iron Dome’s software
can make split-second targeting decisions, human operators oversee the system, reload the
191 Israel also maintains its own proprietary missile defense platforms, such as Rafael’s SPYDER air-defense system.
192 Udi Shaham, “Israel, US developing Arrow-4,” Jerusalem Post, February 19, 2021.
193 Anna Ahronheim, “Lockheed Martin, Rafael Join Forces to Build ‘Ground-Based’ Laser Weapon,” Jerusalem Post,
July 28, 2021.
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launchers, and provide force protection for the unit. Israel can move Iron Dome batteries as
threats change (there is a sea-variant of Iron Dome known as C-Dome).
To date, the United States has provided over
$6 billion to Israel for Iron Dome batteries,
interceptors, co-production costs, and general
maintenance (see Table 5). Because Iron
Dome was developed by Israel alone, Israel
initially retained proprietary technology rights
to it. The United States and Israel have had a
decades-long partnership in the development
and co-production of other missile defense
systems (such as the Arrow). As the United
States began financially supporting Israel’s
development of Iron Dome in FY2011, U.S.
interest in ultimately becoming a partner in its
co-production grew. Congress then called for
Iron Dome technology sharing and coproduction with the United States.194
Figure 12. How Iron Dome works
Source: Rafael Advanced Systems.
In March 2014, the U.S. and Israeli governments signed a co-production agreement to enable the
manufacture of components of the Iron Dome system in the United States, while also providing
the U.S. Missile Defense Agency (MDA) with full access to what had been proprietary Iron
Dome technology.195 Subsequent amendments to the original co-production agreement define the
percentage of “U.S. workshare” in the co-production process. According to 2023 testimony by the
then Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, the U.S. workshare percentage for Iron Dome
stood at 30%.196 U.S.-based RTX (formerly known as Raytheon) is Rafael’s U.S. partner in the
co-production of Iron Dome.197 In 2020, the two companies formed a joint venture incorporated
in the United States known as “Raytheon Rafael Area Protection Systems (R2S).” Tamir
interceptors (the U.S. version is called SkyHunter) are manufactured at an RTX missile and
defense facility in Tucson, Arizona and elsewhere and then assembled in Israel. Israel also
maintains the ability to manufacture Tamir interceptors within Israel. Rafael claims that its Iron
Dome systems have made over 5,000 successful interceptions with a reported mission record
success rate of over 90%.198
194 In conference report language accompanying P.L. 112-239, the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2013,
conferees agreed: “The Department of Defense needs to obtain appropriate data rights to Iron Dome technology to
ensure us the ability to use that data for U.S. defense purposes and to explore potential co-production opportunities.
The conferees support this policy and expect the Department to keep the congressional defense committees informed of
developments and progress on this issue.”
195 The co-production agreement is formally titled, “Agreement Between the Department of Defense of the United
States of America and the Ministry of Defense of the State of Israel Concerning Iron Dome Defense System
Procurement.”
196 Testimony of Vice Admiral Jon A. Hill, USN, Director, Missile Defense Agency, House Armed Services
Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, April 18, 2023.
197 The FY2014 Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Resolution, P.L. 113-145, exempted $225 million in Iron
Dome funding—requested by Israel on an expedited basis during the summer 2014 Israel-Gaza conflict—from the coproduction requirements agreed upon in March 2014.
198 Rafael, Iron Dome Family, available at https://www.rafael.co.il/system/iron-dome/.
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U.S. Marines Testing Iron Dome Components
As the U.S. Marines prepare to field a new missile defense capability, known as the Medium-Range Intercept
Capability, or MRIC, the Corps has integrated elements of Iron Dome into the MRIC and testing is ongoing. 199
According to one report, the Marine Corps purchased 80 Tamir Interceptors from Israel in FY2024 with plans to
purchase an additional 240 additional interceptors from a new production line in East Camden, Arkansas200, by
RTX and Rafael.201 Several years ago, the U.S. Army procured two Iron Dome batteries from Rafael at a cost of
$373 million. In 2023, those batteries were leased back to Israel.
David’s Sling
David’s Sling is a short/medium-range system designed to counter long-range rockets and slowerflying cruise missiles fired at ranges from 25 to 186 miles, such as those possessed by Iran and
Hezbollah in Lebanon. In August 2008, Israel and the United States officially signed a “project
agreement” to co-develop the David’s Sling system.202 David’s Sling is designed to intercept
missiles with ranges and trajectories for which Iron Dome and/or Arrow interceptors are not
optimally configured. It has been developed jointly by Rafael Advanced Defense Systems and
RTX.203 David’s Sling uses RTX’s Stunner missile for interception, and each launcher can hold up
to 12 missiles. Unlike Iron Dome, the Stunner missile is a “hit-to-kill” interceptor with more
maneuverability and a much higher per unit cost.204 In April 2017, Israel declared David’s Sling
operational.
Since FY2006, the United States has contributed over $3.8 billion to the development of David’s
Sling (see Table 5). In June 2018, the United States and Israel signed a co-production agreement
for the joint manufacture of the Stunner interceptor. Some interceptor components are built in
Tucson, Arizona, by RTX.
The Arrow and Arrow II
Under a 1986 agreement allowing Israel to participate in the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI),
the United States and Israel have co-developed different versions of the Arrow anti-ballistic
missile, and, since 1988, have engaged in joint development.205 The Arrow is designed to counter
199 Meredith Roaten, “MRIC nears end of FY2024 evaluation for US marines,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, July 29, 2024.
200 In 2023, RTX and Rafael jointly announced a $33 million capital investment to establish an interceptor production
facility at this location.
201 Ashley Roque, “Marines eye 2025 fielding of 3 new, mobile air defense systems,” Breaking Defense, May 3, 2024.
202 This joint agreement is a Research, Development, Test and Evaluation (RDT&E) Framework agreement between
the United States and Israel. The joint program to implement the agreement is known as the Short Range Ballistic
Missile Defense (SRBMD) David’s Sling Weapon System (DSWS) Project. The Department of Defense/U.S.-Israeli
Cooperative Program Office manages the SRBMD/DSWS program, which is equitably funded between the United
States and Israel.
203 See Raytheon Missile and Defense, David’s Sling System and SkyCeptor Missile at
https://www.raytheonmissilesanddefense.com/capabilities/products/davidssling.
204 Thomas Newdick, “Israel’s Vaunted Integrated Air Defense System Explained,” The War Zone, October 20, 2023.
205 Shortly after the start of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in 1985, the Reagan Administration sought allied
political support through various cooperative technology agreements on ballistic missile defense (BMD). A
memorandum of understanding was signed with Israel on May 6, 1986, to jointly develop an indigenous Israeli
capability to defend against ballistic missiles. Subsequently, a number of additional agreements were signed, including,
for example, an April 1989 Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) to develop an Israeli computer facility as part of the
Arrow BMD program, a June 1991 agreement to develop a second-generation Arrow BMD capability, and a September
2008 agreement to develop a short-range BMD system to defend against very short-range missiles and rockets. Israeli
(continued...)
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short-range ballistic missiles. The United States has funded just under half of the annual costs of
the development of the Arrow Weapon System, with Israel supplying the remainder. The total
U.S. financial contribution (for all Arrow systems) has exceeded $4.7 billion (see Table 4). The
system became operational in 2000 in Israel and has been tested successfully. The Arrow II
program (officially referred to as the Arrow System Improvement Program or ASIP), a joint effort
of Boeing and IAI, is designed to defeat longer-range ballistic missiles in the upper atmosphere.
High Altitude Missile Defense System (Arrow III)
Citing a potential nuclear threat from Iran, Israel has sought a missile interceptor that operates at
a higher altitude and greater range than the original Arrow systems. In October 2007, the United
States and Israel agreed to establish a committee to evaluate Israel’s proposed “Arrow III,” an
upper-tier system designed to intercept medium-range ballistic missiles outside the atmosphere.
The Arrow III is a more advanced version—in terms of speed, range and altitude—of the current
Arrow II interceptor. In 2008, Israel decided to begin development of the Arrow III and the
United States agreed to co-fund its development despite an initial proposal by Lockheed Martin
and the DOD urging Israel to purchase the Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD)
missile defense system instead.206
The Arrow III, made (like the Arrow II) by IAI and Boeing, has been operational since January
2017. The United States and Israel signed an Arrow III co-production agreement in June 2019;
their co-production of Arrow III components is ongoing.207 A U.S.-based subsidiary of IAI, Stark
Aerospace Inc. based in Columbus, Mississippi, is producing canisters for the Arrow III system.
Since co-development began in 2008, Congress has appropriated $1.5 billion for Arrow III (see
Table 5).
interest in BMD was strengthened by the missile war between Iran and Iraq in the later 1980s, and the experience of
being attacked by Scud missiles from Iraq during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.
206 For additional information on THAAD see CRS In Focus IF12645, The Terminal High Altitude Area Defense
(THAAD) System.
207 In July 2010, the United States and Israel signed a bilateral agreement (The Upper-Tier Interceptor Project
Agreement) to extend their cooperation in developing and producing the Arrow III, including an equitable U.S.-Israeli
cost share.
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Table 4. U.S. Contributions to the Arrow Program (Arrow, Arrow II, and Arrow III)
current U.S. dollars in millions
Fiscal Year
Total
Fiscal Year
Total
Fiscal Year
Total
1990
52.000
2004
144.803
2018
392.300
1991
42.000
2005
155.290
2019
243.000
1992
54.400
2006
122.866
2020
214.000
1993
57.776
2007
117.494
2021
250.000
1994
56.424
2008
118.572
2022
235.000
1995
47.400
2009
104.342
2023
253.000
1996
59.352
2010
122.342
2024
253.000
1997
35.000
2011
125.393
2025
253.000
1998
98.874
2012
125.175
1999
46.924
2013
115.500
2000
81.650
2014
119.070
2001
95.214
2015
130.908
2002
131.700
2016
146.069
2003
135.749
2017
272.224
Total
4,754.811
Source: U.S. Missile Defense Agency.
Iron Beam
In 2014, Rafael Advanced Defense Systems announced that the company was developing a
mobile, ground-based high energy laser (HEL) interception system. After eight years of
development, Israel publicly demonstrated the capabilities of Iron Beam in 2022. Iron Beam first
tracks an incoming rocket, artillery, or mortar (RAM) or unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV), then
fires two electrically sourced high energy lasers at the target, destroying it at a range of up to 2.7
miles away.208 If successfully tested and operational, Iron Beam could significantly enhance
Israel’s national counter-RAM and counter-drone defenses. Each use of the Iron Beam would cost
between two and four dollars, compared to tens of thousands of dollars to manufacture a
conventional interceptor.209 However, HEL interception systems are intended to complement,
rather than substitute for, Israel’s current multi-layered defense system. It is difficult for laser
systems to operate in inclement weather and their range is typically shorter than existing kinetic
systems, like Iron Dome. In addition, if Israel faced a barrage of RAMs or a swarm of drones, it
would require a number of HEL batteries to protect its homeland.210
In December 2022, Lockheed Martin and Rafael signed a teaming agreement to jointly develop
and manufacture a HEL system based on “the assets that have been developed independently by
208 Gareth Jennings, “Israel to deploy protective ‘laser wall’, likely Iron Beam,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 2,
2022.
209 “Israel says laser missile shield to cost just $2 per interception,” Reuters, June 1, 2022.
210 Yaakov Lappin, “Israeli PM announces ‘laser wall’ air defence plan,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 2, 2022.
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Rafael and the Ministry of Defense’s Directorate of Defense Research and Development
(DDR&D) within the framework of the IRON BEAM project.”211
As previously mentioned, Congress first appropriated funding for Iron Beam in P.L. 118-50,
Division A - Israel Security Supplemental Appropriations Act, FY2024. On October 21, 2024, the
United States and Israel completed an “exchange of letters” outlining how U.S. supplemental aid
for missile defense and Iron Beam will be allocated.212 Israeli defense contractor Elbit Systems
has joined Rafael as a co-developer of Iron Beam, which is set to be deployed in 2025.
211 Lockheed Martin press release, “Lockheed Martin and Rafael Advanced Defense Systems to Collaborate on High-
Energy Laser System,” December 5, 2022.
212 “US initiates $5.2 billion aid package to strengthen Israel’s air defenses,” Israel National News (Arutz Sheva),
October 21, 2024.
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Table 5. Defense Budget Appropriations for U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense:
FY2006-FY2023
current U.S. dollars in millions
Fiscal Year
Arrow II
Arrow III
(High
Altitude)
David’s Sling
(ShortRange)
Iron
Dome
Iron Beam
Total
FY2006
122.866
—
10.0
—
132.866
FY2007
117.494
—
20.4
—
137.894
FY2008
98.572
20.0
37.0
—
155.572
FY2009
74.342
30.0
72.895
—
177.237
FY2010
72.306
50.036
80.092
—
202.434
FY2011
66.427
58.966
84.722
205.000
415.115
305.700
FY2012
58.955
66.220
110.525
70.000a
FY2013 After
Sequestration
40.800
74.700
137.500
194.000
447.000
FY2014
44.363
74.707
149.712
460.309
(includes
supp)
729.091
FY2015
56.201
74.707
137.934
350.972
619.814
FY2016
56.519
89.550
286.526
55.000
487.595
FY2017
67.331
204.893
266.511
62.000
600.735
FY2018
82.300
310.000
221.500
92.000
705.800
FY2019
163.000
80.000
187.000
70.000
500.000
FY2020
159.000
55.000
191.000
95.000
500.000
FY2021
173.000
77.000
177.000
73.000
500.000
1,500.000
FY2022
173.000
62.000
157.000
1,108.000b
FY2023
173.000
80.000
167.000
80.000
500.000
FY2024
173.000
80.000
167.000
80.000
500.000
FY2024
(Supp)
-
-
1,000.000
3,000.000
1,200.000
5,200.000
FY2025
173.000
80.000
167.000
80.000
-
500.000
Total
2,145.476
1,567.779
3,828.317
6,075.281
1,200.000
14,816.853
Source: http://www.congress.gov.
Notes:
a. These funds were not appropriated by Congress but reprogrammed by the Obama Administration from
other Department of Defense accounts.
b. P.L. 117-103, the FY2022 Consolidated Appropriations Act provided $108 million in Iron Dome
appropriations from the Defense Department’s Procurement, Defense-Wide and Research, Development,
Test and Evaluation Defense-Wide accounts. Section 8142 of the act also provided $1 billion in
supplemental aid for Iron Dome for FY2022-FY2024.
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U.S.-Israeli Missile Defense Cooperation During Wartime: 20232025
Amongst the many coordinated tactics Hamas terrorists employed in attacking Israel on October
7, 2023 was its barrage of rocket fire into Israel; the IDF estimated that during the first few hours
of the attacks, an estimated 2,500 to 3,000 rockets were fired from the Gaza Strip.213 An estimated
18 civilians were killed from rocket fire from Gaza on October 7 and the ensuing days,214 and
there was extensive infrastructure damage in southern Israel.215 Though Iron Dome batteries
actively intercepted many incoming rockets, the quantity of incoming projectiles may have
temporarily overwhelmed Israeli defenses. Days later, IDF officials refused to provide
interception performance figures, as many Israeli officials cautioned about divulging sensitive
information to Israel’s enemies.216 Israel may further investigate its standing missile defense
architecture if/when Israel officially forms a state commission of inquiry on the intelligence
failures of October 7.
In the weeks and months following the attacks of October 7 and the ensuing war in Gaza, Israel
faced incoming projectiles fired from Iran, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, Gaza, and Yemen. Never before
had Israel faced incoming fire from so many fronts and from so many different threat elements,
ranging from long-range ballistic missiles to low-flying high-speed unmanned aerial vehicles
designed to evade radar detection. All told, various monitoring organizations estimate that
between October 7, 2023 and January 19, 2025 (the start of a Gaza ceasefire that lasted until
March), Israel faced somewhere between 27,000 and 34,000 incoming projectiles (e.g., rockets,
drone, ballistic missiles).217 Some attacks against Israel came on a daily or near-daily basis
(Hezbollah), and others came in episodic and/or coordinated waves (e.g., Iran’s April and October
2024 attacks).
213 Emanuel Fabian, “IDF: 9,500 rockets fired at Israel since Oct. 7, including 3,000 in 1 st hours of onslaught,” Times of
Israel, November 9, 2023.
214 Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Swords of Iron: Civilian Casualties, Updated to January 10, 2025.
215 “The October 7 Massacre: Explained,” The Israeli Defense Forces, October 6, 2024.
216 “Israel refuses to publish Iron Dome rate of successful interceptions so far,” All Israel News, October 26, 2023.
217 For example, see Jewish Institute for National Security of America (JINSA), “Iran Projectile Tracker”; Armed
Conflict Location & Event Data (ACLED), “Key figures on attacks by and against Israel since 7 October 2023,”; and
the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS), “Swords of Iron: An Overview.”
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Throughout the conflict, Israel’s multi-layered
system of defenses, Iron Dome (short range),
David’s Sling (low to mid-range), Arrow II
(upper-atmospheric), and Arrow III (exoatmospheric), was successfully used on
multiple occasions to defend Israel’s civilian
population and military installations.218
According to accounts, no Israeli died during
Iran’s two missile/drone barrages in 2024. No
Israeli died from any Houthi missile attack
against Israel, and one Israeli died from a
Houthi drone attack against Tel Aviv in July
2024. In April 2024, a seven-year-old Israeli
Bedouin girl was injured by falling shrapnel.
In October 2024, a Palestinian in the West
Bank died from falling shrapnel.
Figure 13. Israel Launches Arrow
Interceptor
November 2023
Source: Israeli Ministry of Defense.
The United States (along with some European and Arab partners) also played a significant role in
defending Israel and commercial Red Sea shipping by deploying various assets to Israel and the
Middle East region. Between 2023 and 2025, U.S. guided missile cruisers fired standard missiles
at Houthi projectiles and incoming Iranian ballistic missiles headed toward Israel.219 In October
2024, the United States deployed a Terminal High Altitude Area Defense battery (along with
nearly 100 U.S. personnel) to Israel to augment Israel’s multi-layered missile defense. Five years
earlier, U.S. and Israeli forces had reportedly tested THAAD and Israeli systems together to
enhance integration and interoperability.220 According to one late 2024 analysis by the New York
Times, “When combined with U.S. antimissile systems in the region [THAAD, Patriot], Israel
currently has the most layers of missile defense in the world.”221 According to testimony from
Lieutenant General Heath A. Collins, the Director of the U.S. Missile Defense Agency, “Israeli
missile defenses and the U.S. Missile Defense System demonstrated combat-proven
interoperability by detecting, tracking, and engaging the most complex, dense, and stressing
ballistic missile attacks in history, saving countless Israeli and American lives.”222
While Israeli officials credit U.S.-Israeli co-produced systems for saving many lives in conflict
against Hamas, Hezbollah, Iran, and the Houthis,223 they also acknowledge that no missile
defense system can 100% accurately defend against all threats. At times, human operators must
make split-second decisions over the choice to intercept,224 and adversaries adapt to changing
circumstances. At times between 2023 and 2025, Israel’s adversaries managed to penetrate its
218 Arrow II and Arrow III began intercepting missiles fired by the Houthis from Yemen in October and November
2023. Arrow II and III also were used to defend against Iran’s direct attacks on Israel. David’s Sling intercepted a
Hezbollah missile headed toward Tel Aviv in fall 2024.
219 For example, see Sam Lagrone, “SM-3 Ballistic Missile Interceptor Used for First Time in Combat, Officials
Confirm,” USNI News, April 15, 2024.
220 U.S. Army, “U.S. Deploys THAAD to Israel,” March 15, 2019.
221 Agnes Chang and Samuel Granados, “How Missile Defense Works (and Why It Fails),” New York Times,
November 2, 2024.
222 Testimony of Lieutenant General Heath A. Collins, USAF, Director, Missile Defense Agency, Before the House
Armed Services Committee, Strategic Forces Subcommittee, April 30, 2025.
223 See, “Israel’s Missile Defense Engagements Since October 7 th,” Interview with Moshe Patel, director of the Israeli
Missile Defense Organization, Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), July 12, 2024.
224 Lior Ohana, “'There are nights we'll never forget’: Up close with the Arrow air defense system,” YnetNews.com,
January 13, 2025.
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multi-layered defense system. According to one report, after Iranian-supplied drones repeatedly
failed to penetrate Israeli air space, the Houthis altered their approach routes into southern
Israel.225 In its conflict with Israel, Iran has demonstrated more sophisticated capabilities, such as
ballistic missiles that not only can reach Israel in 12 minutes, but can reportedly evade
interceptors through post-reentry maneuvering.226 Iran’s October 2024 attack against Israel
consisted of an estimated 180 ballistic missiles fired, some of which landed in areas around Israeli
military bases.227 Iran’s October barrage featured more ballistic missiles than its April attacks,
and, unlike in April, Iran reportedly did not warn the United States in advance.
Between 2023 and 2024, Hezbollah inflicted damage against northern Israel; Israeli civilian
evacuations of the north may have reduced casualties. During Israel’s Operation Northern Arrows
against Hezbollah in fall 2024, one research center estimates that Hezbollah launched
approximately 16,000 munitions into Israel (rockets, drones, and anti-tank missiles);
approximately 1,000 munitions hit, killing 77 Israelis (4
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