The Earthquake in South Asia: Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations

Congressional research reportMar 24, 2006

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CRS Report for Congress

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The Earthquake in South Asia:

Humanitarian Assistance and Relief Operations

Updated March 24, 2006

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Research Associate

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

name redacted

Specialist in Foreign Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

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The Earthquake in South Asia: Humanitarian

Assistance and Relief Operations

Summary

On October 8, 2005, a powerful earthquake struck northern Pakistan and India,

killing at least 74,000 people and injuring over 70,000 more. The earthquake

damaged the homes of millions of people, forcing more than 2.8 million to search for

alternative means of shelter. The full extent of the destruction is now being revealed

as government authorities and relief organizations are able to access some of the

remote locations. The United States government (USG) has pledged $510 million

toward the relief effort, almost all of it to assisting Pakistan, which remains a key

U.S. ally in the war against terror. Because of the heavy USG military and

development presence in neighboring Afghanistan, the logistics of bringing resources

into Pakistan have been relatively straightforward. The USG, Government of

Pakistan, and NATO, among others, operated daily relief flights to ferry supplies,

personnel, and victims to and from the region.

The earthquake struck a region that lies along the southern reaches of the

Himalayan Mountains. While delivering humanitarian assistance and gaining full

access was critical, one of the main humanitarian priorities early on was ensuring that

the estimated three million people who lost their homes had adequate protection from

winter weather and diseases. Extensive preparation and coordinated relief efforts

helped greatly to mitigate against the impact of winter. Aid agencies continue to

provide much needed assistance and are now planning for the transition from relief

to reconstruction, which is scheduled to take place in April.

A November public poll suggests that the USG’s aid effort has improved

ordinary Pakistanis’ opinions of the United States, although apparent U.S. missile

attacks on Pakistani territory in December 2005 and January 2006, and anger over the

February publication in European newspapers of cartoons deemed offensive to

Muslims, reinvigorated anti-Western and anti-American sentiments among some

segments of the Pakistani populace. Some experts have raised concerns that the

economic burden of the disaster could contribute toward long-term instability in an

area perceived to be of critical importance to the United States in the war on terror.

It remains to be seen what progress is made in the recovery and reconstruction phase

and what impact this may have on public opinion.

Immediately following the disaster, legislative activity included the introduction

of several resolutions expressing sympathy for those affected by the earthquake,

pledging American support for the victims, and lauding the relief efforts of U.S.

personnel. Additional funds were not added to the regular FY2006 Foreign

Operations spending measure for earthquake relief, but the FY2006 supplemental

request proposes $126.3 million for Pakistan earthquake relief. The House-passed

bill fully funds the request for Pakistan earthquake assistance in order to reimburse

funds that were previously reprogrammed to meet emergency needs. A final update

of this report will be completed once the relief operation comes to an end (scheduled

for April 2006) and the recovery phase is officially launched.

Contents

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Comparisons to Past Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Relief Update . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Relief to Recovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Numbers at a Glance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5

Coordination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Humanitarian Relief Sectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Recovery and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

IDP Returns, Protection, and Camp Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

Emergency Shelter . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Food Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Water and Sanitation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Health and Disease . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Education . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Logistics and Telecommunications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

National Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Criticism of Government Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Militant Groups Provide Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

India . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

Assistance by Source . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

USAID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

DoD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

State/PRM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

USDA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

NGOs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Private Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

FY2006 Supplemental Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

U.S. Response to Other International Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

The U.S. Emergency Response Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

International Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Donors’ Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Flash Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

NATO . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

U.S. Image in Pakistan; Effects on War Against Terror . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Competing Aid and Budget Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

From Relief to Recovery: The Cost of Rebuilding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Transparency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Assessing U.N. Performance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Appendix A: Maps of Disaster Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Appendix B: U.N. Flash Appeal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

List of Figures

Map 1. The Affected Area . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33

Map 2. The Epicenter and Political Boundaries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34

List of Tables

Table 1. Deadliest Natural Disasters Since 1900 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Table 2. Estimated Number of People Affected by the South Asia Earthquake . . 5

Table 3. USG Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Table 4. USG Aid in Past International Natural Disasters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

The Earthquake in South Asia:

Humanitarian Assistance and Relief

Operations

Background

Introduction

A powerful earthquake of magnitude 7.6 on the Richter scale struck northern

Pakistan at 8:50 am local time on October 8, 2005. Its epicenter was near the city of

Muzaffarabad, 65 miles north northeast of Islamabad, Pakistan, and near the frontier

with India. The earthquake was felt as far away as New Delhi, India, and Kabul,

Afghanistan.1 The vast majority of the deaths — over 73,000 — occurred in

Pakistan, most of them in the Pakistani-controlled portions of the disputed territory

of Kashmir. The fatality count in India stands at 1,309. Afghanistan registered four

deaths.2

The former princely state of Jammu and Kashmir, as it is called in India, or

Azad (“Free”) Jammu and Kashmir, as it is known in Pakistan, has been a source of

contention between India and Pakistan since the two countries gained their

independence from Great Britain in 1947.3 Although the earthquake has led to a

certain amount of rapprochement between New Delhi and Islamabad — including the

United States Geological Survey (USGS), National Earthquake Information Center,

[http://earthquake.usgs.gov/eqinthenews/2005/usdyae/], accessed October 20, 2005.

USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #29, December 8, 2005.

See CRS Report IB93097, India-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted): “The problem is

rooted in claims by both India and Pakistan to the former princely state, divided since 1948

by a military Line of Control (LOC) separating India’s Jammu and Kashmir and

Pakistan-controlled Azad [Free] Kashmir (India and Pakistan fought full-scale wars over

Kashmir in 1947 and 1965). Some Kashmiris seek independence from both countries.

Spurred by a perception of rigged state elections that unfairly favored pro-New Delhi

candidates in 1989, an ongoing separatist war between Islamic militants and their supporters

and Indian security forces in Indian-held Kashmir has claimed 40,000-90,000 lives. India

blames Pakistan for fanning the rebellion, as well as supplying arms, training, and fighters.

Pakistan, for its part, claims to provide only diplomatic and moral support to what it calls

‘freedom fighters’ who resist Indian rule in the Muslim-majority region.” See also CRS

Issue Brief IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations, by (name redacted); and Haqqani, Husain,

Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC: Carnegie Endowment for

International Peace, 2005. For a short summary, see BBC, “India and Pakistan: Tense

Neighbors,” December 16, 2001.

Available at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/]

world/south_asia/ 102201.stm. For recent exchanges between Pakistan and India, see CRS

Report RS21584, Pakistan: Chronology of Recent Events, by (name redacted).

CRS-2

opening of telephone exchanges and previously closed border crossings — its longterm political effects in the region remain to be seen. The domestic significance of

the earthquake within Pakistan and India is taken up in subsequent sections of this

report.

Comparisons to Past Disasters

The full extent of the damage caused by the earthquake in South Asia continues

to unfold, but more in-depth assessments now provide clearer indicators of the

overall disaster. Although its toll in human lives appears to be less than a third of

that of the December 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami, current reports indicate that

damage to Pakistan’s economy and infrastructure has been substantial. Table 1

presents a list of the ten deadliest natural disasters of the past century, based

principally on the Emergency Events Database (EM-DAT) maintained by the World

Health Organization’s (WHO) Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters

(CRED). Although CRED makes efforts to ensure the reliability of its data, it must

be cautioned that obtaining precise and accurate information about natural disasters,

many of which occurred decades ago and in areas where political and environmental

conditions made data collection difficult, is not possible. Thus casualty figures

stemming from, for instance, the series of deadly floods in China that took place a

half-century ago, must all be taken as very rough approximations. Even the figures

for the recent tsunami vary to some degree from source to source, and must be

considered estimates. On the whole, however, the EM-DAT, because of its explicit

definitions and uniform criteria for event inclusion, provides the best means of

comparing data across different disasters.4

Table 1. Deadliest Natural Disasters Since 1900

Date

Location

Event

Estimated

Fatalities

July 1931

China (Huang He River)

Flood

3.7 million

July 1959

China (Northern areas)

Flood

2 million

July 1939

China (Honan Province)

Flood

500,000

Nov. 12, 1970

Bangladesh (Khulna, Chittagong) Cyclone

300,000

July 27, 1976

China (Tangshan, Tientsin)

Earthquake

(magnitude 7.6)

242,000a

Dec. 26, 2004

Indian Ocean (esp. Indonesia,

Maldives, Sri Lanka, Thailand)

Tsunami and

Earthquake (9.0)

224,495b

May 22, 1927

China (Jiangxi Province)

Earthquake (7.9)

200,000

Dec. 16, 1920

China (Kansu Province)

Earthquake (7.8)

180,000

Sep. 1, 1923

Japan (Kanto plain)

Earthquake (7.9)

143,000

1935c

China (Yangtze river)

Flood

142,000

EM-DAT is at [http://www.em-dat.net/index.htm].

[http://www.em-dat.net/criteria.htm].

Criteria and definitions are at

CRS-3

Sources: EM-DAT (op cit) and United States Geological Survey (USGS) at

[http://neic.usgs.gov/neis/eqlists/eqsmosde.html]. This table does not include droughts, epidemics,

and famines, the most significant of which have claimed as many as twenty million victims. The

events are excluded because of the difficulty in pinpointing their locations and timing, and, more

importantly, the extent to which they were exacerbated — or created — by humans. It would be

difficult to argue, for instance, that the recent North Korean famines, which have likely claimed several

hundred thousand lives over several years, are entirely “natural” in their origin.

a. USGS lists official death toll at 255,000; some reports indicate toll as high as 655,000.

b. The USGS lists death toll from earthquake and tsunami at 283,106.

c. Month unknown.

Although its nearly 73,000 fatalities rank it as a truly major calamity, the recent

earthquake in South Asia was not among the ten deadliest natural disasters of the last

century.5

Relief Update6

Overview

Relief to Recovery. It is expected that the relief operation will come to an

end in April — roughly six months after the October 8, 2005 earthquake — at which

point the recovery and reconstruction phase will officially be launched. The U.N.

system, in coordination with the GoP and others centrally involved in the relief effort,

has developed “The Action Plan from Relief to Recovery,” (the Action Plan) which

will propose a stronger coordination mechanism and concrete project proposals to

support Pakistan in its recovery efforts. The Plan is scheduled to be released at the

six-month point on April 8. The recovery stage is expected to cover one year.7 As

The December 2004 tsunami, however, was. The tsunami was unique in both the extent

of its damage and the number of countries it affected. Unlike other disasters, which have

been relatively more localized, the tsunami struck thousands of miles of populous coastline

in nearly a dozen countries, affecting millions of people. Also, the deaths of thousands of

tourists from the industrialized world vacationing in southern Thailand and Sri Lanka —

mostly Europeans but also many Americans and Japanese — may have given the Indian

Ocean tsunami a higher profile than the more recent South Asian earthquake. Indeed, there

has been some concern that donors who contributed to the tsunami relief effort may be less

enthusiastic about assisting victims of the second major South Asian natural disaster to

strike in less than a year. The Pakistan Federal Relief Commission (FRC) also provides a

comparison of the two natural disasters and specifically focuses on the number of people

impacted; terrain and access of the areas affected; number of helicopters provided in the

relief effort; and number of pledges realized as commitments.

Tom Coipuram, Information Research Specialist, contributed to the update of this section.

The United Nations Special Envoy for the South Asia Earthquake, former U.S. President

George H.W. Bush, met in March with key representatives at the United Nations, including

Jan Egeland, Emergency Relief Coordinator, and Kemal Dervis, Administrator of the U.N.

Development Program (UNDP) to discuss the transition and critical need for continued

support. United Nations News Service, “Former US President Bush, UN Envoy, Helps Plan

Pakistan Quake Recovery,” March 24, 2006.

CRS-4

the relief operation winds down, the military side of the operation is also coming to

an end — NATO completed its mission on February 1, 2006, and the phased

withdrawal of U.S. forces will end on March 31.

Overall, the relief effort is seen as a success so far. Moreover, the fears of a

second wave of deaths, massive population movements, malnutrition, and disease

were not realized.8 Government agencies and humanitarian organizations have

identified a number of critical needs to be addressed during the remainder of the

relief operation. These include maintaining relief operations, improving camp

sanitation, and preparing for the return of Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs).9 It is

anticipated that cooperation between the GoP, provincial and local governments, and

the aid community will continue in the transition to a recovery operation.

Numbers at a Glance. In addition to the 74,651 deaths recorded so far, over

69,000 injuries have been reported in Pakistan and 6,622 in India. The Federal Relief

Commission (FRC) in Pakistan adds another 58,897 as “other injured.” The

International Organization for Migration (IOM) estimates more than 2.8 million

people were displaced as a result of the earthquake and most require alternative

shelter.10 All of the figures could change as government authorities and humanitarian

organizations continue to survey remote areas and reconcile their information. The

onset of winter made access to these areas even more difficult.11

Table 2 summarizes the number of people affected by the earthquake; updates

are available on the Pakistan FRC website, cited below.

UNOCHA, “United Nations — Pakistan Moves to Recovery and Reconstruction,” March

8, 2006.

Ibid.

USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #42, March 17, 2006, citing the government

of India and IOM.

WFP Emergency Report no. 44, October 28, 2005, available at [http://www.wfp.org/

english/?n=34]; updates are provided regularly. For road clearance information, see

government of Pakistan Summary of Relief Activity, November 5, 2005, available at

[http://www.earthquakepakistan.com/images/summary%20oct-nov.pdf].

CRS-5

Table 2. Estimated Number of People Affected by the South

Asia Earthquake

(Current as of March 17, 2006)

Pakistan

India

Afghanistan

Total

Killed

73,338

1,309

74,644

Injured

128,309

6,622

n/a

134,931

Displaced

2.8 million

150,000

n/a

2.95 million

Sources: Pakistani casualty figures are from government of Pakistan Federal Relief Commission

website at [http://earthquakepakistan.com/Press_Brief_latest.htm], which is updated regularly. Injury

figures include 69,412 “seriously injured,” and 58,897 “other injured.” Other data reported USAID

South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet # 42, March 17, 2006, citing the government of India and IOM.

Access. The weather and terrain have presented major challenges in the relief

operation and delayed or prevented access to many of the earthquake victims.12

Three weeks after the earthquake, the United Nations Office for the Coordination of

Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) estimated that 30% of the affected areas of

northern Pakistan were still inaccessible to relief workers, leaving as many as

200,000 people unable to receive assistance. In the days after the earthquake

landslides blocked many key road links. Then winter conditions presented a

potentially formidable challenge, although the U.N. recently declared that the battle

to assist and sustain the millions of homeless survivors had gone well due to the mild

winter, extensive preparation, and massive international aid.13 According to U.N.

Deputy Humanitarian Aid Coordinator Jamie McGoldrick, “it was very kind weather,

the number of helicopters we had at our disposal also helped and ... people didn’t

come down from the mountains and overburden the towns.”14 Throughout the relief

operation there has been a continuing reliance on aircraft to ferry in supplies and

transport the wounded.

The World Food Program (WFP) reports that although the weather has

improved, roads are still blocked. “The snow line has receded significantly since its

maximum on the 19th of January 2006 and no significant further snowfall is forecast

at this moment. However, heavy rains continued to hamper relief efforts in some

areas and have caused fatal landslides for the local population and UN staff.”15

Melting snow is only adding to the problem.

In the months following the earthquake, there have been more than 2,000 seismic

aftershocks.

McGuirk, Rod, “U.N. Airlifts Save 3 Million Pakistan Quake Survivors,” AP, March 9,

2006.

Ibid.

WFP Emergency Report No. 11, March 11, 2006

[http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=78&Key=679#586].

CRS-6

Road closures delay food dispatches and IDP returns. McGoldrick also said

that “road accessibility will remain a major challenge and it is expected that there

will be a continued need for a minimum of five or six helicopters until at least

September.”16 UNOCHA reports that landslides and falling rock are expected

through the July monsoon season and it will likely take months to repair and open

roads.17 For example, in Muzaffarabad, rain has impeded WFP and other U.N.

logistics and cargo services. In Neelum and Jhelum valleys, entrances are

temporarily closed until further estimation of the damage is assessed.18

In February and early March strikes and demonstrations in Pakistan temporarily

disrupted relief activities. However, the security situation has stabilized in the

earthquake affected areas. By late March, the situation was reported to be relatively

calm and relief operations are back to normal.

Coordination. With so many international and domestic actors and agencies

on the ground, one of the most important issues is coordination of relief activity.

Reportedly 70 local NGOs, 69 international NGOs and organizations, and 23 U.N.

agencies have been providing relief assistance. As will be discussed in further detail

later in the report, several sources indicated that the GoP was slow to organize its

own response to the earthquake and to coordinate the host of international actors

involved in the relief effort. According to assessments of the USAID Disaster

Assessment and Response Team (DART), the GoP’s performance steadily improved

and information was more effectively centralized at the macro-level by the FRC. The

GoP’s performance at the regional level has varied from location to location, and has

depended on local capacity and the assistance provided by international relief

agencies.19

Humanitarian Relief Sectors

The primary locus of international coordination remains UNOCHA, which has

established four regional coordination centers in Muzaffarabad, Mansehra, Bagh, and

Batagram.20 The major humanitarian actors initially divided the relief effort

sectorally into ten relief sectors or clusters, with a different organization taking the

lead for each sector, as follows: Emergency Shelter (lead: International Organization

for Migration [IOM]), Logistics (lead: WFP), Nutrition (lead: WFP), Health (lead:

WHO), Water and Sanitation (lead: UNICEF), Education (lead: UNICEF), Protection

(lead: UNICEF), Camp Management (lead: UNHCR), IT and Communications (lead:

WFP), and Early Recovery/Reconstruction (lead: United Nations Development

Ibid.

OCHA Situation Report No. 39, South Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, March 10, 2006, p. 5.

Ibid, p. 5.

Author’s interview with USAID DART members, November 22, 2005.

The Humanitarian Information Centre (HIC) for Pakistan is an information service

provided to the humanitarian community. It is managed by UNOCHA and operates in

coordination with several partners. See [http://www1.earthquake05.un.org.pk].

CRS-7

Program [UNDP]).21 Each of the clusters is responsible for providing information

to the FRC, OCHA, and each other. According to some reports, performance has

varied significantly from cluster to cluster. A brief update of the progress in each

cluster is provided below:22

Recovery and Reconstruction. The Action Plan mentioned earlier in this

report develops a process for the transition to recovery in the areas of education,

health, livelihoods, water and sanitation, shelter and housing, camp management,

support to vulnerable groups, governance, and coordination and common services.

Developed in collaboration with the military and civil authorities, the hope is that the

GoP’s Earthquake and Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority (ERRA) will

continue to work with the humanitarian cluster system. The ERRA also plans to

focus long term on the areas of housing, education, health, and livelihoods.

As of mid-March 2006, UNOCHA identified the following immediate priorities

for humanitarian operations: 1) assisting IDP returns; 2) reviewing the Action Plan;

3) providing food and non-food assistance in IDP camps; 4) ensuring revitalization

of primary health care services, increased access to health care and continued disease

surveillance;23 and 5) creating opportunities for education and teacher training.

IDP Returns, Protection, and Camp Management. In this report, the

IDP returns, Protection, and Camp Management issues have been combined in one

cluster because they are interrelated and now focus mostly on population returns. As

the transition to a recovery phase takes shape, those displaced by the earthquake

remain the central focus of relief activities but now with an emphasis on the return

to their places of origin. The IDP returns are being coordinated and monitored to

ensure a safe, voluntary, and dignified process in keeping with international

standards. On March 11, the Returns Task Force (RTF) released policy guidelines

for the returns process in a document entitled “The Framework and Operational

Process for the Return or Resettlement of Persons Displaced by the October

Earthquake.” RTFs at the provincial level have been set up in coordination with

humanitarian hubs.24 Assisted returns began on March 10.

Protection largely involves monitoring and reporting on the returns process —

whether it is voluntary, whether people are informed about the process and whether

conditions in the areas of return are adequate. NGO personnel and U.N. and GoP

agencies are coordinating these efforts. According to UNHCR, those IDPs returning

For cluster information, see the

[http://earthquake05.un.org.pk/] index.php.

U.N.

coordination

website

For more detail on recent cluster activities, see UNOCHA Situation Report No. 40, South

Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, March 24, 2006.

OCHA Situation Report No. 39, South Asia — Earthquake: Pakistan, March 10, 2006.

[http://ochaonline.un.org/DocView.asp?DocID=4294].

United Nations Country Team in Pakistan, “Pakistan: Framework and Operational

Process for the Return or Resettlement of Persons Displaced by the October Earthquake,”

March 11, 2006. A UNHCR-World Vision-UNICEF collaborative effort is underway to

draft guidelines on the role of the humanitarian hubs in the IDP returns process.

CRS-8

home are concerned about basic needs — shelter, drinking water and food — and

also the availability of land and the repair required for homes and roads. A public

information campaign on the returns process is also being conducted by the FRC.

There are both planned and spontaneous camps in the earthquake-affected area

and the estimated numbers vary. UNOCHA reports that “a total of 156 camps with

a population of 142,940 people are in the earthquake-affected area.” The United

Nations Country Team says that statistics indicate that over 297,000 displaced

persons are living in camps.25

Camp management now includes implementing check out procedures,

monitoring the returns process at the camp departure stage, and preparing for camp

closure. It is assumed that vulnerable people who are unable to return at present will

be provided with continuing assistance. Initially, it was reported that the Pakistani

government announced plans to close by the end of March the relief camps that

housed more than 200,000 people through winter. According to USAID, contrary to

these earlier reports of a March 31 deadline for camp closures, the GoP says that

there is no deadline.26

Emergency Shelter. With an estimated three million left homeless by the

earthquake in the foothills of the Himalayas, provision of emergency shelter before

the onset of winter was among the most pressing priorities facing humanitarian

workers. UNOCHA reported that many residents of highland areas preferred to stay

on their land through the winter rather than descend to emergency camps in the

valleys. In response, the Pakistani military and the humanitarian community have

been seeking to rebuild as many shelters as possible in these areas.27

According to news sources, “about 2 million other quake survivors have been

staying in tents elsewhere, and about 400,000 have lived in tin shacks in the

mountains. They now face the daunting task of rebuilding their homes.”28

Food Security. The general IDP camp feeding and general food distribution

will end on March 31. Food for vulnerable people will be available. Targeted foodfor-work and food-for-training will also continue. The WFP Executive Board

recently approved the two-year Protracted Recovery and Relief Operation (PRRO),

which will begin on April 1, 2006. The PRRO, which is a short term operation to

move from a relief to a recovery operation, is

United Nations Country Team in Pakistan, “Pakistan: Framework and Operational

Process for the Return or Resettlement of Persons Displaced by the October Earthquake,”

March 11, 2006.

United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, “Pakistan: Earthquake Camp Closures

Start Today,” March 10, 2006.

For updated information, please refer to OCHA’s situation reports, available at

[http://ochaonline.un.org/webpage.asp?MenuID=9839&Page=1385].

The Associated Press, “U.N. Claims Victory in Bid to Sustain Survivors of Pakistan

Quake,” The New York Times, March 9, 2006.

CRS-9

comprised of two essential components: a) relief, returnees will be provided with

food while they rebuild their homes and animal shelters and rehabilitate their

land and agricultural infrastructure, and assistance to the people residing in the

locations above the snow line, and those who have been made homeless; and b)

recovery, comprised of two sub-components: i) sustainable livelihoods,

environment and natural resources, ii) education and Food-for-Training (FFT).29

About 670,000 homeless people will be provided with food as they return to rebuild

their homes and community infrastructure. Food also will be provided to 450,000

school children to maintain attendance and address short-term hunger. The

operational cost for the PRRO is $67.8 million or 113,648 tons of food.30

Water and Sanitation. According to the latest OCHA Situation Report,

access to safe drinking water in IDP’s living in camps has improved, including in

Muzaffarabad, where 85.7% of the population in camps and 95% outside camps have

access to drinking water. In Bagh, 100% of the population in camps and 10% outside

camps have access to safe drinking water. In Shangla, 100% of the population in

camps and 30% outside camps have access to drinking water, and in Battagram, 57%

of the population in camps and 30% outside camps have access to safe drinking

water.31 Access to sanitation facilities has also improved.

Health and Disease. The World Health Organization (WHO) opened field

offices to coordinate medical response, disseminate health information, and provide

disease surveillance. The organization has also been distributing medicine to clinics

and hospitals and has hired health workers to carry out health promotion and

consultation activities.32 In addition to shelter, WHO in November 2005 said there

was an urgent need for more field hospitals, female paramedics, and improved water

and sanitary conditions.33

According to March 2006 WHO Health Situation Reports, the “return process

of the earthquake affected population is taking place, and vaccinating centers and

medical checkouts are being set up to minimize imminent health risks.”34 Highlights

WFP Emergency Report No. 11, March 11, 2006

[http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=78&Key=679#586].

Ibid.

UNOCHA Situation Report No. 39, South Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, March 10, 2006.

“South Asia Earthquake Situation Report #20,” WHO and Pakistan Ministry of Health,

November 2-7, 2005.

See also earlier reports, all available at

[http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/pakistan_earthquake/sitrep/en/index.html].

“South Asia Earthquake Situation Report #24,” WHO and Pakistan Ministry of Health,

November 20-25, 2005. See also earlier reports, particularly #18, on WHO website:

[http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/pakistan_earthquake/en/index.html]. Cholera

report is in Naqash, Zeeshan, “Possible Cholera Outbreak in Pakistan Quake Camps,” AFP,

November 6, 2005.

World Health Organization Health Situation Report No. 35, March 1-15, 2006

[http://www.who.int/hac/crises/international/pakistan_earthquake/sitrep/WHO%20Pakist

an%20earthquake%20situation%20report35%201-15Mar2006.pdf].

CRS-10

from the latest WHO Health Situation Report states that a total of 45 medical

professionals currently taking care of the 740 spinal injured patients affected by the

earthquake, were trained to improve their skills in physical rehabilitation, 20 out of

the 35 confirmed prefabricated WHO basic health units have been completed, a total

of 1,458,058 children up to five years of age were vaccinated against polio in the

earthquake affected areas, and over 80% of the targeted population between 12

months and five years of age were covered.35 The United Nations Children’s Fund

(UNICEF) confirms that it immunized as many children as possible against polio as

well as measles, tetanus, whooping cough, and diphtheria.36 Health education is also

being emphasized. The Ministry of Health and the WHO are working together to

develop a disaster preparedness program for future disasters.

Education. UNOCHA reports that “of the 449,138 primary school-level

children in the affected areas, 186,580 have been enrolled in 1,357 schools with

support of U.N. agencies and NGOs.”37 According to UNICEF, more than 17,000

Pakistani children died when their schools collapsed in the earthquake. Nearly

20,000 children may have physical impairments due to injuries and amputations. The

current focus now is to provide psychological support to vulnerable children. “There

is critical need for psychosocial support — people are reeling from the trauma the

quake’s left behind,” says UNICEF Protection Officer Mannan Rana and that “they

did not get a chance to grieve — they were rushed to pick up the pieces of their lives

and have had to struggle to survive.”38

Logistics and Telecommunications. According to the WFP Emergency

Report, the U.N. Humanitarian Air Service (UNHAS) funding is due to run out in

spring 2006, and $24.0 million is needed to maintain the helicopter operation until

August 2006.39 Of the 20 UNHAS helicopters that was operational, by March seven

were off contract. The WFP Emergency Report also stated that “military air support

will also stop on March 31, 2006, leaving UNHAS with a total fleet of 13 aircrafts

as of April 1st, as opposed to the fleet of 28 helicopters that was previously tasked

by UNHAS...”40 The United Nations Joint Logistics Center (UNJLC) is also

conducting road assessments and gathering GPS data to improve maps and

Ibid.

Ibid.; “Winter Trebles Illnesses in Pakistan Quake Zone,” AFP, November 30, 2005;

“Deadly Pneumonia Hits Pakistan Quake Children, AFP, November 29, 3005; and Haider,

Zeeshan, “Immunisation Race Starts in Quake-Hit Pakistan,” Reuters, November 13, 2005.

UNOCHA Situation Report No. 40, South Asia Earthquake, Pakistan, March 24, 2006.

Spry-Leverton, Julia, “Protection Centres Offer Quake-Affected Children a Chance to

Leave Trauma Behind,” UNICEF: Pakistan, January 20, 2006. Available at

[http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/pakistan_30790.html].

WFP Emergency Report No. 11, March 11, 2006

[http://www.wfp.org/english/?ModuleID=78&Key=679#586].

Ibid; U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan Press Release, “U.S. Provides $6 Million in

Equipment and Announces U.S. Military Departure Schedule,” February 4, 2006. Available

online at [http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h06020401.html].

CRS-11

information about access. The UNJLC is due to end its operations on April 12, but

a request has been filed to extend its mandate to the end of June.41

The Interagency radio room is scheduled to close at the end of March.

Telecommunications installations and field-based radio training are ongoing.

National Response42

The Pakistani response to the earthquake has come from many sectors of the

state and society. Relief has come not only from the government and military, but

also from nongovernmental groups — including militant organizations — as well as

individual Pakistanis acting on their own. The GoP created a Federal Relief

Commission (FRC) on October 10, 2006, to coordinate relief efforts. President

Musharraf established the Earthquake Reconstruction and Rehabilitation Authority

(ERRA) on October 12 to oversee reconstruction policies. According to UNOCHA,

ERRA is putting together technical working groups at the federal and provincial

levels which will monitor and coordinate reconstruction activities. ERRA is also

examining building design and food security, agriculture, and livestock activities.

Efforts are being made to include the GoP in recovery planning and implementation

and representatives are involved in the humanitarian cluster meetings.43

While the GoP has received credit from several sources for its efforts, it has also

been criticized for responding too slowly to the disaster. Several media reports,

discussed below, have contrasted this delayed reaction with the swift work of several

Islamist political parties and militants, which were reported on several occasions to

be the first to provide relief to victims. There has also been criticism of the military’s

control over relief coordination and the degree to which there may be duplication on

relief and reconstruction efforts.

For its part, the government of India (GoI) has announced that it does not need

outside assistance in dealing with the aftermath of the earthquake. This stance has

been the subject of some criticism as domestic aid has at times been slow to reach

victims.

Pakistan

The GoP reportedly has estimated that it will cost Pakistan $5 billion to recover

from the earthquake; the World Bank places the figure at $5.2 billion44 According to

United Nations Joint Logistics Centre, “UNJLC Bulletin No. 39 - Pakistan Earthquake,”

March 22, 2006.

This section updated with the assistance of (name redacted), Analyst in Asian Affairs.

UNOCHA, “Pakistan — Earthquake: OCHA Situation Report No. 40,” March 24, 2006.

“Pakistan: Quake Cost about $5 billion,” Reuters, October 15, 2005. World Bank figure

from [http://www.worldbank.org.pk/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/COUNTRIES/

SOUTHASIAEXT/PAKISTANEXTN/0,,contentMDK:20723425~menuPK:293057~pag

ePK:141137~piPK:141127~theSitePK:293052,00.html].

CRS-12

the GoP, Pakistan has received $330.86 million in grants and loans from the

international community, in addition to $1.1 billion in cash and in-kind contributions

received earlier. The GoP reports that in addition to the international community’s

efforts, 70 local NGOs provided relief assistance.

The GoP has responded by mobilizing both civil and military personnel to

provide health care, shelter, power, and road clearance. According to fact sheets, the

GoP is operating 24 medical treatment centers and has fielded 39 treatment teams.45

The GoP has also set up twelve medical relief camps and three hospital and

convalescence centers, both of which are reported as having free space. (This

appears to be a change from earlier reporting, which showed total occupancy in the

camps of 13,128, well above the stated capacity of 10,575 individuals. According

to these earlier reports, the GoP was operating seven hospitals and convalescence

centers, with a capacity of 2,920 individuals and an occupancy of 1,874.46)

Turning to infrastructure repairs, the GoP states that, as of March 15, 2006, it

had opened all main road arteries except the Laswa Bypass and had restored 70% of

lost electrical power, 75% of the water supply, and 96% of telecommunications. An

earlier report stated that the GoP had cleared 10-15% of the earthquake debris; this

data was not available on later reports.47 While an explanation of how the

government arrived at these percentages is not provided, an undated but earlier fact

sheet from the same source shows more detail on the progress. According to this

sheet, the GoP had restored all of the telecommunications linkages in the Northwest

Frontier Province (NWFP) and 86% of the disrupted linkages in Azad Kashmir.

Twenty telephone exchanges (of a total 67 disrupted) had not yet been restored. In

the meantime, the government had established 103 free telephone centers for victims,

as well as 110 satellite phone centers. Power had been restored, at least partially, to

eight of nine affected areas. The government had restored 90% of the water supply

to Muzaffarabad and 100% to Rawalkot, and was working to restore supply to Bagh

and Balakot. Where the government has been unable to clear roads blocked by

debris, it has constructed mule tracks in order to ferry in supplies.48

Pakistan Federal Relief Commission Press Brief of March 24, 2006,

[http://www.earthquakepakistan.com/Press_Brief_latest.htm]. Earlier press briefings

divided the GoP response into civil and military components. According to these earlier

reports, the Pakistani Army was operating four forward medical treatment centers and had

fielded ten treatment teams. An additional 18 surgical teams and 21 health services teams

had been fielded from civil sources.

Pakistan Federal Relief Commission Press Release of November 14, 2005, op cit. The

information on health teams comes from an undated press release: “Relief Operations,

Details,” previously available at [http://www.earthquakepakistan.com/images/

foreighn_medical_rescue_support.pdf].

Pakistan Federal Relief Commission Press Release of November 21, 2005, op cit. Earlier

report was accessed November 14.

“Relief Operations, Details,” op cit. A total of 13,902 of NWFP’s 668,136 lines were

disrupted; all have been restored. In AJ&K, 20,294 lines (of a total 105,592) were

disrupted; 2,831 remain to be restored.

CRS-13

Criticism of Government Response. President Pervez Musharraf and his

government have been criticized by some for not responding more swiftly to the

earthquake. It has been reported that the Pakistani Army did not begin bringing

supplies into affected areas until October 12, four days after the earthquake struck,

and even then, according to some sources, the Army appeared thin on the ground.49

Ayaz Amir, a columnist for the influential — and generally perceived as progovernment — Pakistani newspaper Dawn, stated,

From Hazara to Azad Kashmir voices arising from the deepest recesses of the

heart will tell you how grateful they are to the people of Pakistan who came

unbidden in their hour of need. I heard this in Balakot amidst the ruins and I

heard this in Muzaffarabad. But as God is my witness in all this wide arc of

disaster not one word, not a single one, did I hear in praise of the government or

the army.50

Pakistan’s opposition parties also criticized President Musharraf and the army

for a slow response and alleged mismanagement of the relief operation. They

launched a motion shortly after the earthquake calling on the government to “give a

full accounting of the relief efforts to Pakistan’s parliament. ‘The government has

failed to organize the crisis management,’ their motion stated. ‘The matter is very

serious and needs to be discussed on the floor of the house.’” Some opposition

members have accused General Musharraf of using the crisis to aggrandize his own

power: “Everything from the relief to the foreign donations is being controlled by the

Army, and it is not accountable to anyone,” said Sherry Rehman, a member of

Parliament from the opposition Pakistan People’s Party.51

In response to such charges, President Musharraf has asserted that the

government and the military have “done a good, if not a very good, job.”52 He

compared the Pakistani response to that of the US government in the wake of

Hurricane Katrina: “In this type of calamity, no country can have 100 percent

success. Even the United States cannot do it.”53 Musharraf also criticized the

international community for its “double standard” by comparing the earthquake to

the Katrina response in another way: “I know that the contributions to Katrina were

much more. Did the U.S. need more aid than Pakistan?”54 On the issue of

Lancaster, John, “Pakistanis Vent Anger About Pace of Relief,” Washington Post,

October 13, 2005.

Amir, Ayaz, “The Best and the Worst,” Dawn, October 28, 2005. See also Roedad Khan,

“A President in Crisis,” The Nation, October 23, 2005.

Hussain, Zahid, “‘We Do Not Need Them’; Islamist Groups Take a High Profile in the

Kashmir Relief Effort, and Decry an Influx of Western Troops,” Newsweek, November 7,

2005.

Bokhari, Farhan and Jo Johnson, “Musharraf Defends his Response to Earthquake,”

Financial Times, October 26, 2005.

“Musharraf Defends Quake Response, Pledges 500,000 Tents for Survivors,” AP,

November 1, 2005.

Haven, Paul, “A Month After Monster South Asian Earthquake, Fears that the Tragedy

May Just be Beginning,” AP, November 8, 2005.

CRS-14

parliamentary oversight of earthquake relief, the government appears not to have

responded in detail to the charges by the Pakistani opposition that it is cutting

Parliament out of the relief effort. Continued disagreement means that some see the

situation as “unfortunate ... in the backdrop of a national tragedy, a humanitarian

issue is being used to twist the ruling party’s arm,” and running the risk that

prolonged negotiations may well be outpaced by progress on the ground.55 It is also

worth noting that President Musharraf has decided to postpone a planned purchase

of F-16 fighters from the United States in order to concentrate on earthquake relief

efforts. The deal is still on hold but expected in 2006. The opposition Pakistan

People’s Party (PPP) has demanded that the government defer a $1 billion weapons

deal with Sweden.56

Militant Groups Provide Aid. While the GoP was criticized by some

observers for a slow reaction, it was stated by many sources that some militant

groups acted very quickly to provide aid to victims. Jamaat-ul-Dawa, an “Islamic

extremist” group with alleged ties to Al-Qaida, has been playing an active role in

relief operations in Muzaffarabad, where it is reportedly operating a field hospital

that performs twenty surgeries a day. Jamaat-ul-Dawa is an affiliate of Lashkar-eTaiba, a U.S.-designated foreign terrorist organization.57 The Gulf Times reports that

banned Pakistani militant groups have not only played an active role in providing

immediate aid after the earthquake, but are also soliciting and collecting funds for

further relief efforts.58 The Islamic militant group Hizbul Mujahideen — which has

condemned recent violence against civilians in Kashmir — is also active in the relief

effort.59 Many of those receiving assistance appear to see the involvement of

militant groups as a positive development. Some experts acknowledge these groups

have played an important role in the relief effort and hope that by seeing the benefits

of relief work, they will relinquish violence for more peaceful, mainstream political

ambitions. Others fear that the involvement of these groups only empowers them.

Provision of relief does not mean they have given up their ideology and may only

“Parliamentary Oversight of Earthquake Relief,” Business Recorder, December 19, 2005.

See CRS Report RS21584, Pakistan: Chronology of Recent Events, by (name redacted),

and “Makdoom Amin Fahim Wants Deferring of Plane Purchases, GHQ Shifting,” Pakistan

Press International, November 8, 2005.

Philp, Catherine, “Terror Groups Move into Quake Vacuum,” The Times (London),

October 17, 2005; Hussain, Zahid, “Still No Help for 40 Villages: Pakistan Death Toll

Jumps to 73,000,” Ottawa Citizen, November 3, 2005. See also Lancaster and Khan, op cit.

Hyat, Kamila, “Banned Groups Back with a Vengeance,” Gulf News, November 4, 2005.

She writes, “The comments by President Pervez Musharraf that banned groups were free to

carry out relief work have brought them out into the open and proved that these forces are

entrenched in the country. Some groups like the Jaish-e-Mohammad are reported to have

been the first to arrive on the scene in some parts of Pakistan-controlled Kashmir and to

have swiftly initiated relief work.”

Huggler, Justin, “Pakistan Failures on the Road to Disaster,” The Independent, November

10, 2005.

CRS-15

increase their presence in the affected areas. In the long run this could infringe on

democracy and tolerance.60

The same Washington Post reporter who observed very few army vehicles on

the roads four days after the earthquake noticed that a road he was on, “was crowded

with private relief convoys, many belonging to the social service arm of Jamaat-eIslami, Pakistan’s largest and best-organized Islamic party,”61 which reportedly has

ties to the Palestinian militant group Hamas.62 Although there is some evidence that

the United States is receiving positive feedback in Pakistan for its role in assisting

relief efforts (see below), some have speculated that the high visibility of Islamist

groups may bode badly for both President Musharraf and the United States:

“Musharraf, already seen as a Western stooge by Islamist groups, has been criticized

for the pace of the operations... That, many worry, is going to affect the popularity

of an already unpopular United States and public opinion about Musharraf.”63

To some extent, the efforts by Islamist groups to aid victims may be seen as part

of a larger outpouring of support by ordinary Pakistanis, who may have found a sense

of unity in the crisis that many felt has been lacking in the past. Pakistan has long

been a country divided by ethnicity, class, and even, to some extent, religion. A

recent survey conducted by the Pew Research Global Attitudes Project found that,

of six Muslim countries surveyed, Pakistanis are far more likely to see themselves

as “Muslims first” (79%), than they are as “national citizens first” (7%).64 According

to Husain Haqqani, an expert on Pakistan at the Carnegie Endowment, Pakistan’s

disparate elements have been held together for many years with a self-consciously

constructed official ideology characterized by the belief that “Pakistan’s success

depend[s] on an Islamic nationalism, confrontation with India, and external alliances”

with the West.65 These bonds have worked with varying success over the years, as

Pakistani opinions about the West and its relationship to Islam have changed. It is

against this backdrop, some experts believe, that the outpouring of support from

“Quake Aid Gives Radical Islam a Stage,” The Christian Science Monitor, March 10,

2006. For a more in-depth discussion of this issue, see International Crisis Group,

“Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Policy Briefing, March 15, 2006.

Lancaster, John, op cit.

Lancaster, John and Kamran Khan, “Hard-line Islamists Lead in Pakistan Relief Effort,”

The Washington Post, October 16, 2005.

Calamur, Krishnadev, “Pace of Quake Aid May Help Militants,” UPI, October 24, 2005.

Pew Research Center, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Western

Publics,” released July 14, 2005, at [http://pewglobal.org/reports/

display.php?ReportID=248]. The six Muslim countries surveyed were Pakistan, Jordan,

Morocco, Turkey, Indonesia, and Lebanon.

Haqqani, Husain, Pakistan: Between Mosque and Military, Washington, DC: Carnegie

Endowment for International Peace, 2005, p. 50.

CRS-16

ordinary Pakistanis may have provided something of a boost to national feeling.66

Others, however, have questioned how long this sentiment will last.67

India

As it did after the December 2004 tsunami, the GoI has declared that it does not

need foreign assistance in dealing with the October earthquake. “‘We ourselves are

taking care of our victims,’ said Navtej Sarna, the Foreign Ministry spokesman.

‘When there are offers by friendly countries and anything is needed, these offers are

considered.’” The GoI has responded to the earthquake by moving thousands of

tents, blankets, tarpaulins, and woollen garments, as well as tons of medicine, water,

and food to the affected area.68

As noted above, the earthquake caused far less damage in India than it did in

Pakistan. There is a sense, however, that the Indian official response has at least as

much to do with political posturing as it does with perceived needs on the ground.

The decision to go it alone has attracted some criticism amidst complaints that crucial

supplies, such as tents, are failing to reach victims.69

U.S. Humanitarian Assistance

Shortly after the earthquake, the United States pledged $50 million to assist

victims; at the donors conference on November 19 in Islamabad, the United States

pledged a total of $510 million for earthquake relief and reconstruction to be funded

over a four-year period (FY2006-2009), of which $300 million would come from

U.S. economic and humanitarian assistance programs. The balance of the pledge was

made up of Defense Department in-kind support for relief operations ($110 million)

and assumed U.S. private donations ($100 million).70 The total package included

both financial and in-kind contributions to humanitarian agencies, logistical and

transportation support, and direct assistance to affected populations, including the

provision of food and non-food items. The FY2006 Supplemental request for

Pakistan includes $126.3 million for humanitarian assistance and reconstruction

(discussed in detail later in the report.) A breakdown of USG assistance is provided

in Table 3.

See, e.g., Ali Khan, Asif, “Quake Unites the Nation,” Business Recorder (Pakistan),

October 22, 2005.

Inayatullah, “Fault Lines of Another Kind,” The Nation, October 26, 2005.

Data are available in Government of India Ministry of Home Affairs, National Disaster

Management Division, Situation Report, October 26, 2005.

Sengupta, Somini, “Pride and Politics: India Rejects Aid,” The New York Times, October

20, 2005.

The full pledge as announced by USAID Administrator Andrew Natsios, including

anticipated private donations, was thus $510 million. See USAID South Asia Earthquake

Fact Sheet #26, November 22, 2005.

CRS-17

Table 3. USG Assistance

(As of March 17, 2006)

Agency

USAID/OFDA

Pledge

Value

assistance to Pakistan

$61,195,689

assistance to India

$600,662

USAID/FFP

in-kind contributions to WFP

USAID/GDA

partnership with Procter and Gamble to

provide safe drinking water

$300,000

State/PRM

contribution to UNHCR (part of appeal)

$4,100,000

USDA

46,000 tons of Title I wheat

$12,000,000

Department of

Defense

transport, relief supplies (tents, blankets,

plastic sheeting, etc.)

$106,600,000

TOTAL

$8,981,200

$193,777,551

Sources: USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #42, March 17, 2006. A more detailed

breakdown of DoD efforts is forthcoming.

Assistance by Source

USAID. USAID sent a Disaster Assessment and Response Team (DART) to

Pakistan on October 10. According to USAID, the “mission of the USAID/DART

is to assess humanitarian needs, assist with targeting and coordination of USG

assistance in conjunction with USAID/Pakistan, and provide technical assistance as

required.” The DART is headquartered in Islamabad and has field offices in

Mansehra and Muzaffarabad.71 It has issued regular field reports (many cited in this

report) and cables assessing the progress of relief operations. The USAID/DART is

scheduled to depart on March 31, although USAID/OFDA personnel will remain on

the ground.

DoD. The United State military also began its relief operations on October 10,

2005, when it dispatched a transport jet from Bagram Air Base in Afghanistan with

twelve pallets of food, water, medicine, and blankets for earthquake victims. The

U.S. military continued to fly in food and supplies, while also airlifting injured

Pakistanis to areas where they could get medical help.72 Three weeks after the

earthquake there were 993 U.S. military personnel and 24 helicopters supporting

relief operations in Pakistan, with nine additional CH-47s positioned at Bagram for

deployment to Pakistan when space became available. As of March 2, DoD had

USAID website, [http://www.usaid.gov/locations/asia_near_east/south_asia_quake/].

Cunningham, James H., “First U.S. Earthquake Relief Supplies Arrive in Pakistan,”

American Forces Press Service, Oct. 10, 2005; Garamone, Jim, “U.S. Helicopters, Personnel

Helping Pakistan Recovery,” American Forces Press Service, Oct. 21, 2005.

CRS-18

flown nearly 4,853 helicopter missions delivering over 13,582 tons of relief supplies,

and transported nearly 20,200 evacuees and relief workers.

In addition, DoD has set up a Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) in

Muzaffarabad, equipped with 96 beds and two operating rooms. The MASH has

performed 276 surgeries and treated 4,937 patients.73 Although many of the supplies

being sent to Pakistan come from U.S. positions in Afghanistan, the relief effort is

not reportedly having a discernable effect on U.S. military activities in Afghanistan.

According to USAID, DOD has obligated $106.6 million for earthquake relief

operations.

On February 4, 2006, the U.S. Disaster Assistance Center announced that U.S.

forces will provide Pakistan over $6 million in military medical and construction

equipment and outlined the phased withdrawal of U.S. forces, which began in midFebruary and is scheduled to end on March 31, 2006.74

State/PRM. The Department of State’s Bureau for Population, Refugees, and

Migration has donated $4.1 million toward UNHCR’s earthquake appeal.

USDA. The U.S. Department of Agriculture has provided 46,000 metric tons

of Title I wheat to Pakistan.

NGOs. U.S.-based NGOs have played a very active role in the relief and

recovery effort in Pakistan, several of them with USG funding, including Catholic

Relief Services, International Rescue Committee, Mercy Corps International, and

Save the Children.75 Many more organizations than these have been active,

however.76

Private Sector. On October 27, President Bush announced that a group of

five CEOs from major American corporations were joining to encourage private

sector support for victims of the earthquake. The group has inaugurated a website,

organized through The Committee to Encourage Corporate Philanthropy. According

to USAID, the South Asia Relief Fund, administered by the Committee, announced

on February 27, 2006, that the U.S. private sector had pledged more than $100

million in cash and in-kind contributions.77

USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #42, March 17, 2006; DoD Support to Pakistan

Earthquake Executive Summary, November 1, 2005 (as of 0800).

U.S. Embassy in Islamabad, Pakistan Press Release, “U.S. Provides $6 million in

Equipment and Announces U.S. Military Departure Schedule,” February 4, 2006. Available

at [http://islamabad.usembassy.gov/pakistan/h06020401.html].

The full list of supported NGOs is available in the USAID South Asia Earthquake Fact

sheets, op cit.

A list of U.S. NGOs that are active in the relief and recovery efforts in Pakistan can be

obtained from a variety of sources, including Interaction, which is an alliance of U.S. based

international development and humanitarian NGOs at [http://www.interaction.org].

USAID, South Asia Earthquake, Update, March 3, 2006.

CRS-19

FY2006 Supplemental Funding78

Without additional funds added to the regular FY2006 Foreign Operations

spending measure for earthquake relief, USAID has been drawing on contingency

funds and reallocating existing appropriations to meet emergency requirements for

earthquake victims. The $126.3 million supplemental proposal would replenish

some of these diverted funds, plus provide resources for continuing reconstruction

efforts.79 The Administration says because of the sizable drawdown — estimated to

be $70 million — from the International Disaster and Famine Assistance account, the

ability of the United States to respond to other global disasters in FY2006 would be

seriously undermined. The $70 million allocation for Pakistan earthquake relief

represents about 17% of USAID’s worldwide emergency disaster budget.

Congressional Action. The House-passed bill fully funds the request for

Pakistan earthquake assistance in order to reimburse funds that were previously

reprogrammed to meet emergency needs.

U.S. Response to Other International Natural Disasters

In financial terms, the U.S. government response to the South Asian earthquake

falls somewhere in the middle when compared to the amount of aid it has provided

in past international natural disasters. Table 4 presents USG relief assistance for the

seven international natural disasters of the past ten years that caused more than

10,000 fatalities.80

This section provided by (name redacted). For more information on the FY2006

supplemental, see CRS Report RL33298 FY2006 Supplemental Appropriations: Iraq and

Other International Activities; Additional Katrina Hurricane Relief by (name redacted),

Specialist in Social Legislation and (name redacted), Specialist in Foreign Affairs.

The FY2006 Supplemental Request includes $70 million for International Disaster and

Famine Assistance (IDFA); $40.5 million for Economic Support Fund (ESF); $5.3 million

for child Survival and Health (CSH); and $10.5 million for Development Assistance (DA).

This list does not include the European heat wave of 2003, which was responsible for as

many as 45,000 deaths, nor the repeated food shortages in North Korea, which are arguably

at least as man-made as they are natural.

CRS-20

Table 4. USG Aid in Past International Natural Disasters

Total

damage

USG

assistancea

18,799 dead

3,240,000 affected

$6.04

billion

$882.9

million

Earthquake

(9.0), tsunami

224,495 dead

over 2 million

affected

$7.71

billion

$882.5

million

Pakistan,

India

Earthquake

(7.6)

74,644 dead

130,000 injured

3 million homeless

$5.2

billion

$510

million

Aug.,

1999

Turkey

Earthquake

(7.4)

15,000 dead

24,000 injured

250,000 homeless

$10

billion

$24.46

million

Jan.,

2001

India

Earthquake

(7.7)

20,005 dead

166,812 injured

4,365,000 affected

$2.62

billion

$13.1

million

Dec.,

1999

Venezuela

Flood

30,000 killed

2,700 injured

366,547 affected

$3.16

billion

$11.05

million

Dec.,

2003

Iran

Earthquake

(6.6)

26,796 dead

22,628 injured

45,000 homeless

$1.0

billion

$5.7 million

Date

Country

Disaster

Oct.,

1998

Honduras,

Nicaragua

Hurricane

Mitch

Dec.,

2004

Indian

Ocean (12

countries)

Oct.,

2005

Casualties

Sources: All data, unless noted otherwise, are from EM-DAT Emergency Disasters Database,

([http://www.em-dat.net]). Due to the difficulty of obtaining reliable information, all data should be

taken as approximate, especially estimates of “affected” population. See notes for Table 1 and text

box below for more qualifications about data.

a. Data sources for USG assistance: Hurricane Mitch: CRS Report RL30083, Supplemental

Appropriations for FY1999: Central America Disaster Aid, Middle East Peace, and Other

Initiatives, by (name redacted). Tsunami: CRS Report RL32783, FY2005 Supplemental

Appropriations for Iraq and Afghanistan, Tsunami Relief, and Other Activities, by (name redacted)

and (name redacted). A total of $656 million was approved for the Tsunami Recovery and

Reconstruction Fund, but $25 million was committed to avian flu. S. Asia earthquake: USAID

South Asia Earthquake Fact Sheet #27, November 29, 2005. Turkey earthquake: CRS Report

RS20328, Turkey: After the Earthquake, by Carol Migdolovitz. Total includes $14.46 million

in OFDA aid plus $10 million in assistance from the DoD. The DoD aid was omitted from the

OFDA Annual Report, which lists the USG total as $14.39m. India Earthquake: OFDA

Annual Report FY2001, p. 49. Venezuela flood: OFDA Annual Report FY2000, p. 82. Iran

earthquake: USAID, [http://www.usaid.gov/iran/].

CRS-21

Difficulties in Comparing Disaster Assistance

Comparing USG aid figures across disasters is a speculative undertaking.

Authority, definitions, and categories of services are not necessarily equivalent

across events. Each agency has its own budget, with its own criteria, accounting

detail, and regional specificity. The fact that an urgent response to humanitarian

crises is often required only compounds the problem. Budgets may reflect regional

support, a certain area, specific countries, or a combination thereof over time and

with changing events.

Even if we accept that USG aid is comparable across disasters, the disasters

themselves are not equivalent: the areas in which they occur differ dramatically in

terrain, underlying economic conditions, and governmental capacity. It thus makes

little sense to compare, for example, the amount of USG aid delivered per casualty.

Even the decision to look at fatalities as the measure of a disaster’s severity can be

questioned, in part because of the difficulty of obtaining accurate figures. In

assessing the amount of aid provided to disasters, it may make more sense to look

at the economic damage each has caused. Measured in this way, the seven greatest

international natural disasters of the last ten years are: (1) the 1995 earthquake in

Kobe, Japan ($95 billion in damage); (2) the 1998 flood in China ($30 billion); (3)

the 2004 earthquake in Niigata, Japan ($24 billion); (4) the 1997 wildfires in

Indonesia ($17 billion); (5) the 1995 flood in North Korea ($15 billion); (6) the

1995 earthquake in Taiwan ($14.1 billion), and (7) the 1996 flooding in China

($12.6 billion). (The United States, if included in this list, would garner a spot for

Hurricane Katrina, which caused $25 billion in damage.)81

Once again, however, such a comparison may conceal more than it reveals:

a major factor affecting the economic severity of a natural disaster is clearly the

economic prosperity of the area in which it occurs. The Kobe earthquake was

expensive because Japan was so well off. Furthermore, obtaining reliable and

consistent figures for the cost of recovering from a natural disaster is notoriously

difficult. Estimates range tremendously depending upon the criteria used — for

instance, replacement cost vs. auction cost vs. assessed value of damaged property

— and the organization doing the estimate.

Comparing USG and international aid is even more difficult, because of the

often dramatically different forms the assistance takes (in-kind contributions vs.

cash, for instance). Finally, it is not always evident whether figures represent

pledges of support or more specific obligations.

Estimates are once again from EM-DAT, op cit.

CRS-22

The U.S. Emergency Response Mechanism

The United States is generally a leader and major contributor to relief efforts in

humanitarian disasters.82 In 2004 the United States contributed more than $2.4 billion

to disaster relief worldwide.83 In the case of both the South Asian earthquake and the

Indian Ocean earthquake and tsunami, some say that the response will require a

major long-term effort beyond the relief and recovery operation currently underway.84

The President has broad authority to provide emergency assistance for foreign

disasters and the United States government provides disaster assistance through

several United States agencies. The very nature of humanitarian disasters — the need

to respond quickly in order to save lives and provide relief — has resulted in an

rather unrestricted definition of what this type of assistance consists of at both a

policy and an operational level. While humanitarian assistance is assumed to provide

for urgent food, shelter, and medical needs, the agencies within the U.S. government

providing this support typically expand or contract the definition in response to

circumstances. Funds may be used for U.S. agencies to deliver the services required

or to provide grants to international organizations (IOs), international governmental

and non-governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as private or religious

voluntary organizations (PVOs). USAID is the U.S. agency charged with

coordinating U.S. government and private sector assistance. It also coordinates with

international organizations, the governments of countries suffering disasters, and

other governments.

The Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) in USAID’s Bureau of

Humanitarian Response can respond immediately with relief materials and personnel,

many of whom are already abroad on mission.85 It is responsible for the provision

of non-food humanitarian assistance and can quickly assemble Disaster Area

Response Teams (DARTs) to conduct assessments. OFDA has wide authority to

borrow funds, equipment, and personnel from other parts of USAID and other federal

agencies. USAID has two other offices that administer U.S. humanitarian aid: Food

For Peace (FFP) and the Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI). USAID administers

Title II of the FFP under P.L. 480 and provides relief and development food aid that

does not have to be repaid. OTI provides post-disaster transition assistance, which

includes mainly short-term peace and democratization projects with some attention

to humanitarian elements but not emergency relief.

The Department of Defense (DoD) Overseas Humanitarian, Disaster and Civic

Aid (OHDACA) appropriation funds three DoD humanitarian programs: the

For background information see CRS Report RL32714, International Disasters and

Humanitarian Assistance: U.S. Governmental Response, by (name redacted).

This total is based on FY2004 appropriations for International Disaster and Famine

Assistance (IDFA), the Refugee and Migration Account (MRA), and the Emergency

Refugee and Migration Account (ERMA), as well as the “emergency” program level for

food assistance (PL480 title II).

See text box above, “Difficulties in Comparing Disaster Assistance.”

Authorized in Sec. 491-493 of P.L. 87-195, the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961.

CRS-23

Humanitarian Assistance Program (HAP), the Humanitarian Mine Action (HMA)

Program, and Foreign Disaster Relief and Emergency Response (FDR/ER). The

office provides humanitarian support to stabilize emergency situations and deals with

a range of tasks including the provision of food, shelter and supplies, and medical

evacuations. In addition the President has the authority to draw down defense

equipment and direct military personnel to respond to disasters. The President may

also use the Denton program to provide space-available transportation on military

aircraft and ships to private donors who wish to transport humanitarian goods and

equipment in response to a disaster.86

Generally, OFDA provides emergency from thirty to ninety days after a disaster.

The same is true for Department of Defense humanitarian assistance. After the initial

emergency is over, assistance is provided through other channels, such as the regular

country development programs of USAID.

The State Department also administers programs for humanitarian relief with

a focus on refugees and the displaced. The Emergency Refugee and Migration

Account (ERMA) is a contingency fund87 that provides wide latitude to the President

in responding to refugee emergencies. Emergencies lasting more than a year come

out of the regular Migration and Refugee Account (MRA) through the Population,

Migration and Refugees (PRM) bureau.88 PRM covers refugees worldwide, conflict

victims, and populations of concern to the United Nations High Commissioner for

Refugees (UNHCR), often extended to include internally displaced people (IDPs).

Humanitarian assistance includes a range of services from basic needs to community

services.

International Assistance

In addition to the United States, a great many international actors are also

providing relief to the earthquake-affected region, either through financial

contributions to the Pakistani government or aid organizations, or by directly

providing relief supplies and emergency personnel. Reportedly 70 local NGOs, 69

international NGOs and organizations, and 23 U.N. agencies provided relief

assistance. Obtaining an exact up-to-date record of all international contributions is

not possible — in part because some assistance is not reported to governments or

Section 402 of Title 10, named after former Senator Jeremiah Denton, authorizes shipment

of privately donated humanitarian goods on U.S. military aircraft provided there is space and

they are certified as appropriate for the disaster by USAID/OFDA. The goods can be

bumped from the transport if other U.S. government aid must be transported.

Governed by P.L. 103-326, the maximum amount is $100 million. Authorized in sections

2 and 3 or P.L. 87-510 of the Migration and Refugee Assistance Act of 1962.

When there is functional or programmatic overlap between USAID and PRM, they

coordinate with each other and define partners. Traditionally PRM funds UNHCR and other

multilateral actors while USAID creates bilateral arrangements with NGOs. This is not a

hard and fast rule, however, and both organizations exercise a degree of latitude in their

response to crises.

CRS-24

coordinating agencies — and in part because of the delay in their recording.89 The

vast majority of the funding is going to Pakistan. The government of India has, for

the most part, declined offers of assistance, stating that it is capable of handling the

relief operation on its territory.

Donors’ Conference

The total amount of funds pledged for relief and reconstruction at the November

donors’ conference in Islamabad stands at $6.9 billion to Pakistan to assist in relief

and recovery efforts, exceeding the GoP’s goal of $5.2 billion. Major contributors

include the Asian Development Bank ($1 billion), the Islamic Development Bank

($501 million) and the European Union ($270 million).90 It is not clear how much

has been received to date.

Flash Appeal

On October 11, 2005, UNOCHA released a multi-agency appeal for $312

million in urgent humanitarian assistance to earthquake-affected areas of Pakistan.

The appeal was revised to $550 million at a donors meeting on October 26. Despite

the higher-than-expected pledge totals announced at the November 19 meeting in

Islamabad, the U.N. flash appeal was initially underfunded. As of mid-February

2006, the total amount pledged towards the U.N. Flash Appeal was $371 million.91

A breakdown of the appeal by receiving organization is provided in Appendix B.

According to the United Nations, the USG has so far contributed approximately

$28.8 million toward the appeal (see Table 3).

The disparity between overall funding of the relief effort and contributions

toward the U.N. appeal is due to several factors. Many countries, including the USG,

are providing assistance in the form of direct contributions of items such as blankets,

food, and tents, or through the operation of relief flights and logistics support. Much

of this assistance is coordinated directly with the GoP or the Pakistani military. In

addition to direct bilateral assistance, a good deal of funding has been provided to

NGOs operating outside of the U.N. appeal.

While the U.N. Flash Appeal focuses on early recovery efforts (in the initial six

months after the earthquake) the majority of funding pledged by the donor

community is towards longer-term reconstruction efforts and will be addressed in the

Action Plan. There will not be a new appeal as such to fund the activities under the

For the latest pledge numbers, see ReliefWeb’s site: [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/dbc.nsf/

doc105?OpenForm&rc=3&emid=EQ-2005-000174-PAK]. Note that ReliefWeb’s tally does

not necessarily match that of any given contributing organization, including the United

States, presumably because of delays in recording pledges.

Ahmad, Munir, “Pakistan Says $5.4 Billion in Quake Aid Raised, Surpassing Target at

Donor Conference,” AP, November 19, 2005.

UNOCHA, Consolidated Appeal for South Asia Earthquake Flash Appeal 2005, available

at [http://ocha.unog.ch/fts/reports/daily/ocha_R1_A688___05112221.pdf]. Appeal numbers

are still being revised. UNHCR, for instance, has recently reduced its goal from $30 million

to $17 million.

CRS-25

Action Plan. Rather, concrete proposals will be used to mobilize funding from the

pledges that have not yet translated into real funding by the donors. Consultations

are currently underway with the GoP and various partners, both national and

international. The total funding needs under the Action Plan (targeted for the next

12 months) are yet to be finalized. The needs assessments and programme

formulation are being discussed among the various stakeholders.92

NATO

On October 10, 2005 the Pakistani Government requested NATO’s assistance

with the relief operation. The North Atlantic Council approved the air operation on

October 11 and the mission began on October 13. In response to an additional

request from Pakistan on October 21, NATO agreed to send engineers and medical

personnel. NATO’s mission ended on February 1, 2006.93

In its first purely humanitarian mission, NATO contributed to the relief effort

by operating two “airbridges” from Germany and Turkey to fly relief supplies into

Pakistan. NATO flew over 169 relief flights from these two bases, providing nearly

3,500 tons of relief supplies, including blankets, stoves, tents, and food. NATO also

deployed specialist troops (engineers and medical units) from the NATO Response

Force. Teams began to arrive on October 29.94 NATO helicopters lifted more than

1,700 tons of relief supplies in country and evacuated more than 7,600 people;

medical teams treated more than 8,000 patients. Engineers cleared roads, built

shelters and schools, and set up medical centers. In total, the operation involved

approximately 1,000 engineers and supporting staff and 200 medical personnel.

NATO also contributed to the Pakistani Army’s efforts towards “Operation Winter

Race” to assist with the construction of shelters.

NATO’s relief operation had five main elements: 1) coordination of donations

from NATO and partner countries through the Euro-Atlantic Disaster Relief

Coordination Centre (EADRCC); 2) operation of air bridges; 3) operation of

helicopters in country for relief supplies, transportation and evacuation; 4) provision

of medical support; and 5) provision of engineering expertise for rebuilding roads,

schools, medical facilities, etc. The NATO land component in Pakistan was lead by

the Spanish; the NATO air Component in Pakistan came from the French Air

Defense and Operation Command; and NATO Headquarters drew on personnel from

the Joint Force Command Lisbon with staff from NATO’s Supreme Headquarters,

Allied Powers Europe (SHAPE).

UNDP February 24, 2006.

For information on the NATO mission

[http://www.nato/int/issues/pakistan_earthquake/index.html]

Pakistan,

see

NATO Relief Mission in Pakistan Fact Sheet ([http://www.nato.int/issues/

pakistan_earthquake/051207-factsheet.htm]) and NATO Euro-Atlantic Disaster Response

Coordination Center (EADRCC) Situation Reports. Precise details about each NATO flight

are provided at [http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2005/10/statistics.htm]. See also

[http://www.nato.int/issues/pakistan_earthquake/in_practice.htm].

CRS-26

Opinion surrounding NATO’s involvement in the relief operation is discussed

below. Issues outstanding include the lessons learned from NATO’s involvement

in this relief operation — for example, what precedent the operation in Pakistan

might have set, whether NATO should provide humanitarian assistance; and whether

this mission was an effective use of resources.95

Issues for Congress

U.S. Image in Pakistan; Effects on War Against Terror

There has been some discussion in the media about the effects of the U.S. relief

effort on Pakistani perceptions of the United States and, more specifically, the U.S.

government. This issue is seen as important because President Musharraf’s

government is a key U.S. ally in the global war on terror. Many high-ranking

members of Al Qaeda and the Taliban are believed to remain in the rugged regions

of northwest Pakistan, and the ability of the United States to locate and capture them

likely depends on Pakistan’s cooperation. At the same time, Musharraf’s relationship

with the United States is not supported by a large portion of the Pakistani population.

A widely-cited survey taken by the Pew Center before the earthquake found that 23%

of the Pakistani public had a favorable view of the United States, while 51% had a

favorable impression of Osama bin Laden.96

A more recent systematic public polling of Pakistani opinion on this issue by

Terror Free Tomorrow’s survey conducted between November 14-28, 2005, showed

a significant shift in public opinion. Favorable views of the United States jumped to

46% and support for Osama bin Laden dropped to 33%. Those conducting the poll

believe the shift is a direct result of the provision of U.S. humanitarian assistance to

earthquake victims.97 Some argue that sustaining relief and reconstruction assistance

may prove to be important in creating support for the United States while at the same

time undermining support for global terrorists. The degree to which the United

States receives positive press for its contributions to the earthquake relief effort may

also make it easier for Musharraf to support U.S. anti-terror activity in the region.

However, apparent U.S. missile attacks on Pakistani territory in December 2005

and January 2006, and anger over the February publication in European newspapers

of cartoons deemed offensive to Muslims, reinvigorated anti-Western and antiAmerican sentiments among some segments of the Pakistani populace. Violent

public protests in February appeared to have strong anti-American and anti-

For further information see NATO, “Lessons Learned in Pakistan: NATO Providing

Humanitarian Aid,” March 8, 2006, Stopwatch 3, Debate 2.

See

[http://www.nato.int/multi/video/stopwatch/060308/v060308e.htm]

Pew Research Center, “Islamic Extremism: Common Concern for Muslim and Wester

Publics,” released July 14, 2005, at [http://pewglobal.org/reports/

display.php?ReportID=248]. Only Jordan had higher approval ratings of Osama bin Laden

(60%) and lower ratings of the United States (21%).

Terror Free Tomorrow, “Poll: Dramatic Change of Public Opinion in the Muslim World,”

CRS-27

Musharraf components, and many analysts believe that Islamist leaders are

manipulating public sentiments to forward their own political goals. Further

disappointment with the United States arose in March with a widespread perception

among Pakistanis that President Bush’s visit to the region made stark their country’s

subordinate position to India with regard to U.S. policy making.98

Late in 2005, several reporters presented anecdotal evidence suggesting that the

United States is reaping something of a “public relations” dividend because of its

involvement. It was reported that U.S. relief efforts in Pakistan had been quite

visible on Pakistani television news broadcasts and thus reached a fairly broad crosssection of the population.99 Reporters’ encounters with Pakistanis living and working

in affected areas also support this. Several individuals made a point of telling the

journalist that they were grateful for Western aid.100 Academics and commentators

as well reported a perceptible change in Pakistani attitudes toward the United

States.101 There were some positive reports in Pakistani media as well, although they

are perhaps thinner than in the American press. The Nation, for instance, printed an

opinion piece praising the United States for its efforts in saving Pakistani lives and

excoriating critics of the United States.102 This latter sentiment, however, appeared

to indicate that a sizable number of Pakistanis remained critical of the United States.

Indeed, “Pakistani officials and political analysts” cautioned that any change in

perceptions might be limited to moderate, urban Pakistanis, and “unlikely to sway the

country’s small core of militants who support Al Qaeda.”103

As noted earlier, some commentators have speculated that the pace of Pakistan’s

response could by implication affect public opinion about the United States, which

is widely seen as supporting the rule of General-cum-President Pervez Musharraf.

The greatest criticism of U.S. involvement appears to come from the Pakistani

political opposition, especially from Islamist parties, one of whose leaders has said

that Pakistan does not need any foreign — including American and NATO —

support.104 Similar complaints about NATO were expressed by the leader of the

opposition party Pakistan Muslim League-N, who worried about the presence of

foreign soldiers on Pakistani territory if “tomorrow we have to fight a war with India

See, for example, Somini Sengupta, “U.S. Gives India Applause, Pakistan a Pat on the

Back,” New York Times, Mar. 5, 2006; “A Dull Affair,” News (Karachi), Mar. 5, 2006.

Lancaster, John, “Quake Aid Helps U.S. Alter Image in Pakistan,” The Washington Post,

October 22, 2005.

100

Rhode, David, “For Devout Pakistani Muslims, Aid Muddles Loyalties,” The New York

Times, October 26, 2005.

101

King, Ledyard, “U.S. Response to Pakistan Quake Could Help Image among Muslims,”

Gannett News Service, October 21, 2005.

102

Khan, A. R., “It is not Charity but a Duty,” The Nation (Pakistan), October 27, 2005.

103

Rhode, David, op cit.

104

MMA Secretary General and Leader of Opposition in the National Assembly Maulana

Fazlur Rehman, quoted in Raja Asghar, “MMA Opposes Nato, US Forces for Quake

Relief,” Dawn, October 29, 2005. It was not clear whether Rehman was speaking on behalf

of the entire opposition or only his own coalition of six Islamic parties.

CRS-28

or any other country.”105 In response to such concerns, Pakistani Prime Minister

Shaukat Aziz has gone on record saying that NATO poses no security threat: “They

are here to help us. Even if they are in uniform, it should not be a cause of

concern.”106 Other experts focus on objections to President Musharraf’s decision to

authorize NATO’s relief mission without consultation or approval by the parliament.

This may have led opposition groups to disagree with NATO’s involvement even if

they might otherwise have supported it.107

Burdensharing and Donor Fatigue

Although the United States is the world’s largest provider of foreign assistance

in absolute terms, it is often one of the lowest contributors when measured as a

percentage of its economic capacity. According to the Organization for Economic

Cooperation and Development (OECD), the United States provided 0.16% of its

Gross National Income (GNI) in 2004 for Overseas Disaster Assistance (ODA). By

comparison the average of major donors is 0.25%. The percentages for other major

donors are as follows: Japan (0.19%), the United Kingdom (0.36%), France (0.42%)

and Germany (0.28%).

In previous disasters, pledges made by governments have not always resulted

in actual contributions; the earthquake of December 2003 in Bam, Iran, is but one

example raised by the United Nations. Concerning the billions of dollars pledged to

help the victims of the tsunami disaster, there is skepticism whether all these pledges

will be honored. It also cannot be assumed that the funds committed to relief actually

represent new contributions, since the money may previously have been allocated

elsewhere. It will take time for a more complete picture to reveal how the actual

costs of the tsunami disaster will be shared among international donors.108 In the case

of the October South Asia earthquake, Amir Abdulla, WFP Regional Director for the

Middle East, Central Asia and Eastern Europe commented early on that “it is

extremely worrying that the international community — which was so generous after

the Indian Ocean tsunami — has so far failed to come up with an adequate response

to this crisis.” After a slow start, as of mid-February, the United Nations had

received two-thirds of its flash appeal of $550 million.109

Some experts are concerned about funding priorities and resources for other

disaster areas and a real possibility of international donor fatigue. Finding a balance

between burdensharing on the one hand and donor fatigue on the other often results

105

Acting parliamentary leader of the Pakistan Muslim League-N (PML-N) Chaudhry Nisar

Ali Khan, quoted in Amir Wasim, “Govt Criticized for Accepting Nato Forces,” Dawn,

October 26, 2005.

106

Khan, Iftikhar, “Nato Forces Posing no Security Threat: PM,” Dawn, November 1, 2005.

107

International Crisis Group, “Pakistan: Political Impact of the Earthquake, Policy

Briefing, March 15, 2006.

108

James Darcy, “The Indian Ocean Tsunami Crisis: Humanitarian Dimensions,” Overseas

Development Institute, January 11, 2005.

109

United Nations Humanitarian Information Centre, “Beyond Relief: Transition to

Recovery and Reconstruction,” Country Team, Islamabad, Pakistan, February 24, 2006.

CRS-29

in delay and can negatively impact U.N. operations during emergencies when

immediate funds are required for a response. This question was raised at the U.N.

World Summit in September. Key donor countries pledged $150 million for an

emergency fund to allow the United Nations to respond more quickly to natural

disasters and humanitarian emergencies. The Central Emergency Response Fund

(CERF) is seen by proponents as a way to enable the United Nations to respond more

efficiently, effectively, and consistently to humanitarian crises worldwide.

Competing Aid and Budget Priorities.110 Amid efforts to tackle rising

budget deficits by, among other measures, slowing or reducing discretionary

spending, finding the resources to sustain U.S. aid pledges may be difficult. After

the tsunami disaster, some Members of Congress publicly expressed concern that

funding for tsunami relief and reconstruction, which depleted most worldwide

disaster contingency accounts, could jeopardize resources for subsequent

international disasters or for other aid priorities from which tsunami emergency aid

had been transferred.111 These accounts were fully restored through supplemental

appropriations. At the time, others noted the substantial size of American private

donations for tsunami victims and argued that because of other budget pressures, the

United States did not need to transfer additional aid. The point remains, however,

that when disasters require immediate emergency relief, the Administration may fund

pledges by depleting most worldwide disaster accounts. In order to respond to future

humanitarian crises, however, these resources would need to be replenished or it

could curtail U.S. capacity to respond to other emergencies.

From Relief to Recovery: The Cost of Rebuilding. The earthquake’s

effect on Pakistan’s economy remains to be seen. The majority of the country’s

industry is located in the south, well away from the earthquake zone. For this reason,

some observers believe that the disaster will not have a serious impact on the

Pakistani economy’s impressive growth rate. The World Bank, for instance, has

slightly revised its prediction for Pakistan’s FY2006 growth in Gross Domestic

Product (GDP), from 6.5% to 6.1%.112 Nevertheless, the costs of rebuilding the

damaged infrastructure in the north as well as caring for the millions of affected

Pakistanis are expected to seriously strain the Pakistan government’s capacity. Some

observers have cautioned against overly optimistic projections.113

Transparency. Some Members of Congress have also raised concerns about

transparency of donor contributions, allocation of monies, and monitoring of projects

by the United Nations. The United Nations has said it will improve its financial

tracking and reporting system and Pricewaterhouse Coopers is reportedly assisting

110

Prepared by (name redacted), Foreign Affairs Specialist.

111

Elizabeth Becker, “No New Funds Needed For Relief, Bush Aides Say,” New York

Times, January 4, 2005.

112

The GoP’s initial projection of 7.0% had already been reduced to 6.5% because of lower

than anticipated crop yields. See Asian Development Bank and World Bank, Pakistan 2005

Earthquake Preliminary Damage and Needs Assessment, November 12, 2005, Islamabad,

Pakistan, p. 12.

113

“Global Economic Prospects,” Business Recorder (Pakistan), November 23, 2005.

CRS-30

in that effort. In responding to international disasters, many contributions are also

made directly to international organizations and non-governmental organizations,

which could raise the same questions about transparency requirements. Moreover,

while earmarks and time limits may ensure greater accountability, they can also add

pressure for organizations to spend contributed funds, sometimes leading to

unnecessary spending, waste and duplicated efforts. Restrictions on funds also often

do not allow flexibility to adapt projects to better meet the changing needs on the

ground.114

Assessing U.N. Performance

As noted above, the United Nations flash appeal for earthquake relief and

reconstruction remains seriously underfunded. By contrast, an international donors’

conference in Islamabad garnered more pledges than expected. To a certain extent,

this reflects some donors’ preference for providing bilateral rather than multilateral

funding. According to some reports, however, the initial response of some United

Nations agencies to the earthquake was confused and inadequate, prompting donors

to commit their resources to other agencies. More recent reporting indicated that

many U.N. agencies greatly improved their performance and that the overall relief

operation was a success.

The USAID DART has been critical of some U.N. agencies for an inadequate

initial response to the earthquake. Some of the criticism has been structural: it is not

clear, DART members say, that the United Nations’ “cluster approach” (see above)

is the most effective method of disaster management. A problem may stem from the

sometimes competing demands placed on the cluster leaders: liaising with the host

government and gathering and disseminating data, as well as responding to

immediate needs and coordinating relief activity. There has been some question

about the ability of individual agencies to fulfill all of these functions with limited

staffing under emergency conditions.115 The cluster system is being discussed at the

United Nations.

Some of the DART’s criticism, however, reflected a more specific concern that

several U.N. agencies were inadequate in their response to the earthquake, prompting

USAID, in some cases, to look to NGOs instead of the U.N. system to carry out relief

activities. According to the DART, some U.N. agencies were slow to realize the

severity of the disaster and to allocate sufficient human and financial resources to the

relief effort. The DART singled out UNHCR, the WFP, UNJLC, and IOM (not part

of the U.N. system but a close collaborator) for particular criticism. The following

paragraph summarizes some of the DART’s reporting early on in the relief operation.

UNHCR has been thin on the ground and remains uncertain about its mandate

as head of the camp management cluster. DART members reported visiting camps

with no visible UNHCR presence. The WFP, which has performed adequately in its

role as head of the logistics cluster, has done a worse job in the food cluster. The

114

Edward Clay, “Lessons for Life,” The Guardian Review, January 12, 2005.

115

Author’s interview with members of USAID DART, November 22, 2005.

CRS-31

agency’s staff were slow to gather information on NGO activities, leading at times

to a duplication of aid delivery efforts. The UNJLC, charged with coordinating

transportation, was also slow to ramp up its operations, leading again to a duplication

of aid deliveries. Finally, IOM has failed to provide effective leadership of the

shelter cluster. Like UNHCR, its staff have appeared unsure of its mandate, and have

adopted a facilitative, rather than a leadership, role.116

The DART team spoke more favorably of UNICEF and the WHO, both of

which, despite rocky starts, quickly built up capacity and assumed leadership of their

respective clusters. Both agencies were singled out for effective coordination and

implementation.117

The DART itself points out that some of its concerns cannot be attributed to

U.N. underperformance. To begin with, the DART notes that the best-performing

agencies are also the better-funded ones, and states that better funding of the other

agencies might positively affect their performance. Beyond this, some concerns have

reflected the constraints of the United Nations’ particular operational mandate rather

than failure on its part. Unlike some NGOs, which may operate more informally, the

United Nations must carefully coordinate all of its activities with the Pakistani

government. Thus, to the extent that the GoP’s initial response to the earthquake was

slow and confused, this may have affected U.N. performance as well.118 Sources

familiar with U.N. operations, including members of the DART, later reported that

the United Nations’ performance improved markedly, demonstrated in part by the

success of relief efforts over the winter.

There does not appear to have been much public criticism of the United

Nations’ response in the media. The DART’s concerns have largely aired within the

USG. Perhaps for this reason, the United Nations has not issued any public response

to such charges. Privately, however, UNHCR officials have acknowledged some

missteps, especially in the early days of the relief effort. They were slow to mobilize

some assets and reorganize their staff in the field. They have pointed out, however,

that most organizations operating in Pakistan faced difficulties at that time. The

GoP’s initial disorganization had a ripple effect through the humanitarian

community. Despite such difficulties, UNHCR officials note that they immediately

opened up their warehouses, releasing thousands of tents and other supplies to the

GoP.119 UNHCR also reminds visitors to its website that its mandate is to care for

refugees and other victims of “man-made” disasters. Its involvement in the

earthquake relief operation is a function of its logistical and operational capabilities

in Pakistan, not its legal or organizational mandate.120 UNHCR as well as many of

116

“Six Weeks after Pakistan’s Earthquake: Assessing the UN’s Performance,” Department

of State unclassified cable, Islamabad 17311, November 22, 2005.

117

Ibid.

118

Author’s interview with DART members, November 22, 2005, and with staff at

Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration, November 22, 2005.

119

Author’s November 23, 2005, interview with officials at Department of State’s PRM

Bureau, who are in daily contact with UNHCR officials.

120

See [http://www.unhcr.ch/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/earthquake?page=intro].

CRS-32

its sister agencies have also argued that they have been hamstrung by poor funding.121

With the conclusion of the relief operations and launch of the recovery phase

scheduled to take place in mid-April 2006, the final update of this report will include

a review of lessons learned.

121

Details are at [http://www.reliefweb.int].

CRS-33

Appendix A: Maps of Disaster Area

Map 1. The Affected Area

Source:

OCHA

Situation

Report

No.

13,

available

[http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/0CCCDBD73C013DD3852570A000658

E55/$File/rw_EQ_pak201005.pdf?OpenElement]

CRS-34

Map 2. The Epicenter and Political Boundaries

Source: USAID, October 13, 2005, available at [http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/

fullMaps_Sa.nsf/luFullMap/6571D95BC2D4E2A88525709900761C3B/$File/

usaid_EQ_southasia131005.pdf?OpenElement]

CRS-35

Appendix B: U.N. Flash Appeal

Organization

Appeal

Australian Aid International

$850,000

Action Contre la Faim/USA

$1,000,000

Aga Khan Foundation

$110,000

Catholic Relief Svcs

$800,000

Food and Agriculture Organization

$25,000,000

Greenstar Marketing

$1,000,000

Int’l Labor Organization

$3,000,000

Int’l Organization for Migration

$60,500,000

Int’l Rescue Committee

$1,500,000

ISCOS (Trade Union Institute for Development Cooperation )

ISDR (Int’l Strategy for Disaster Reduction)

$850,000

$1,000,000

Mercy Corps Int’l

$500,000

MDM (Medecins du Monde)

$500,000

Merlin (UK)

$850,000

OCHA

Office of the U.N. High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

Save the Children Alliance

Joint U.N. Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

$4,900,000

$200,000

$8,030,000

$500,000

UNDP

$90,750,000

UN Department of Safety and Security (UNDSS)

$1,180,000

UN Environment Program (UNEP)

$500,000

UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO)

$1,300,000

UN Population Fund (UNFPA)

$9,300,000

UN Human Settlements Programme (UN-HABITAT)

$650,000

UNHCR

$30,000,000

UNICEF

$92,564,274

WFP

$181,901,667

WHO

$27,750,000

World Vision

$1,100,000

TOTAL

Source: U.N. Consolidated Appeal (available at [http://www.reliefweb.int]).

$549,585,941

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