The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army's Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress

Congressional research reportNov 17, 2005

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Order Code RL33161

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the

Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):

Issues for Congress

November 17, 2005

(name redacted)

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and the Army’s

Future Combat System (FCS): Issues for Congress

Summary

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) is a Department of Defense (DOD)

program that would play a significant role in the U.S Army’s proposed Future

Combat System (FCS) program. (For a more detailed description of the FCS

program see CRS Report RL32888, The Army's Future Combat System(FCS):

Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).) JTRS, envisioned as a

family of software programmable radios, has been described as the “backbone” of the

FCS and is intended to link the 18 manned and unmanned systems that would

constitute FCS. Two JTRS sub-programs managed by the Army — Cluster One and

Cluster Five — have experienced developmental difficulties, delays, and cost

overruns which calls into question their viability. This report will be updated on a

periodic basis.

Contents

Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Current Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Developmental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Experimentation and Spin Out One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Experimentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Spin Out One . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Program Restructuring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Program Budget Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Recent Congressional Actions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11

Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

The Viability of the Cluster One Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

JTRS Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

List of Tables

Table 1. JTRS Clusters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Table 2. Army JTRS Senate-Recommended Adjustments — FY2006

Defense Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

Table 3. Army JTRS House-Recommended Adjustments — FY2006

Defense Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

The Joint Tactical Radio System (JTRS) and

the Army’s Future Combat System (FCS):

Issues for Congress

Background

The JTRS program originated in the mid-1990s and was intended to replace the

25 to 30 families of radio systems used by the military — many of which could not

communicate with each other — with software-based radios that could operate across

the entire radio frequency spectrum.1 JTRS is intended to permit the Services to

operate together in a “seamless” manner via wireless voice, video, and data

communications through all levels of command, including direct access to near realtime information from airborne and battlefield sensors.2 Described as a “softwaredefined radio” JTRS is envisioned to function more like a computer than a

conventional radio and is to be upgraded and modified to operate with other

communications systems by the addition of software as opposed to redesigning

hardware - a more costly and time-consuming process. DOD also asserts that in

“many cases, a single JTRS radio with multiple waveforms3 can replace many

separate radios, simplifying maintenance” and that because JTRS is “software

programmable, they will also provide a longer functional life”4 with both features

offering potential long-term cost savings. It is also planned that JTRS will be

interoperable with current DOD radio systems, the Pentagon’s Global Information

Grid,5 and the communications systems of selected allied nations.6

JTRS has been characterized by the Army as a key complementary enabler of

the FCS network that would enable FCS sensors and combat systems to acquire and

Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over JTRS,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2005, p. 31.

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to

Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9.

Waveforms are defined as software applications that determine the total functionality of

the radio from the user’s perspective.

DOD Pamphlet on JTRS published by the JTRS Joint Program Office, undated.

The National Security Agency defines the Global Information Grid as “a net-centric

system operating in a global context to provide processing, storage, management, and

transport of information to support all DOD, national security, and related Intelligence

Community missions and functions (strategic, operational, tactical, and business) in war, in

crisis, and in peace.”

Buxbaum, pp. 31-33.

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engage targets at a distance as well as preventing them from being engaged by enemy

systems.7 To a significant extent, the Army has linked progress in the development

of a number FCS subsystems to progress in the JTRS program.

The JTRS program was originally broken into five “clusters’ with each cluster

having a particular Service “lead.”

Table 1. JTRS Clusters

Cluster

Description

One

Two

Three

Four

Five

Ground

Hand-Held

Vehicle and Radios

Helicopter

Radios

Fixed

Site and

Maritime

Radios

High

Performance

Aircraft

(Fixed Wing)

Radios

Handheld,

Dismounted,

and Small

Form Factora

Radios

U.S.

Navy

U.S. Air Force U.S. Army

Service Lead U.S. Army

U.S. Special

Operations

Command

(USSOCOM)

a. Form factor radios are essentially miniaturized radios that soldiers would carry, as well as radios

for weight and power-constrained platforms — such as FCS Unattended Ground Sensors and

Intelligent Munitions.

In early 2004, DOD merged Clusters Three and Four into a single program —

the Airborne, Maritime, and Fixed Station Program (AMF JTRS) — jointly managed

by the Navy and the Air Force — because studies suggested that developing the

clusters together would result in a more efficient procurement process and a better

overall product.8 All JTRS Clusters are being developed concurrently and there is no

requirement that one cluster is completed before another cluster can be developed.

Because the FCS program is heavily dependent on Clusters One and Five, this report

will address only issues involving these two clusters being developed by the Army.9

Ibid.

Henry S. Kenyon, “Communications Systems Meld for Greater Synergy,” SIGNAL

Magazine, February 2004.

Boeing (Anaheim, California) is the prime contractor for JTRS Cluster One. Other team

members include Northrop Grumman Mission Systems (Carson, California); Rockwell

Collins (Cedar Rapids, Iowa); BAE Systems (Wayne, New Jersey); and Harris

Communications (Rochester, New York). General Dynamics (Scottsdale, Arizona) is the

prime contractor for JTRS Cluster Five. Other team members include Rockwell Collins

(Cedar Rapids, Iowa); BAE Systems (Wayne, New Jersey); and Thales Communication

(Clarksburg, Maryland).

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Current Issues

Developmental. JTRS has experienced a number of developmental

difficulties to date. Some of the more notable difficulties are discussed in the

following sections.

Size and Weight Constraints and Limited Range. According to a

Government Accountability Office (GAO) report:

To realize the full capabilities of the Wideband Networking Waveform,10

including transmission range, the Cluster One radio requires significant amounts

of memory and processing power, which add to the size, weight, and power

consumption of the radio. The added size and weight are the results of efforts to

ensure the electronic parts in the radio are not overheated by the electricity

needed to power the additional memory and processing. Thus far, the program

has not been able to develop radios that meet size, weight, and power

requirements, and the current projected transmission range is only three

kilometers — well short of the 10-kilometer range required for the Wideband

Networking Waveform ... The Cluster One radio’s size, weight, and peak power

consumption exceeds helicopter platform requirements by as much as 80

percent.11

The inability to meet these fundamental design and performance standards has

raised concerns that Cluster One may not be able to accommodate additional

waveforms (current plan is for Cluster One to have four to eight stored waveforms)

as intended and that it may be too bulky or heavy to fit into the stringently weight and

size-constrained FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGVs)12 as well as the Army’s

helicopter fleet. Some are concerned that to meet these physical requirements, the

Army may significantly “dumb down” Cluster One performance specifications.13

According to the Army, however, it continues to make progress in terms of reducing

Cluster One’s weight and size and in increasing its transmission range, however

incorporating all of the desired waveforms into Cluster One is proving to be

The Wideband Networking Waveform is described as the core of the JTRS networking

capability and is intended to operate across a wide range of the radio frequency spectrum from 2 megahertz (MHZ) to 2 gigahertz (GHz) and would provide increased routing and

networking capability - as much as a hundred times more than existing communications

systems.

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to

Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15.

FCS Manned Ground Vehicles (MGV) are envisioned as a family of eight different

combat vehicles - with some having more than one variation - that are based on a common

platform and would be designed to be transported by U.S. Air Force transport aircraft and

deployed straight into combat with little or no post-flight reconfiguration. They would be

equipped with a variety of passive and active protection systems and sensors that the Army

hopes will offer them the same survivability as the current heavy armor force.

Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New Tactical Radio,” National

Defense, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.

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difficult.14 Cluster Five radios were also reportedly experiencing similar size, weight,

and power difficulties - difficulties more pronounced as some Cluster Five versions

are supposed to weigh no more than one pound. 15 Current reports on Cluster Five

progress appear to be more optimistic than Cluster One. General Dynamics reports

that they have been able to achieve systems compatibility between Cluster Five units

and three other key FCS components, the Non-Line of Sight Launch System, the

Unattended Ground Sensor, and the Intelligent Munitions System.16

DOD convened a mini-Defense Acquisition Board17 (DAB) for the Cluster One

program on October 11, 2005 and, according to one report, plans to hold another

review on November 21, 2005.18 Information concerning the October 11 review was

not publically released and there is some renewed concern that the Cluster One

program is in trouble. Another report suggests that the airborne version of Cluster

One, despite significant re-engineering, still exceeds weight limitations.19 The issue

appears to be that Boeing has had difficulty reducing the radio’s weight below 66

kilograms - with 52 kilograms being the maximum allowable weight for the airborne

version of Cluster One.20 According to Boeing officials, it would be possible to

achieve the 52 kilogram weight limit but it would require significant design changes

to a design that is already well established and not easily changed.21 Despite this

difficulty, certain aspects of the Cluster One program have shown improvement according to Boeing officials - with the first version of the Wideband Networking

Waveform apparently operational on some versions of Cluster One.22

Security. Security for JTRS has emerged as a significant developmental

difficulty. According to one expert, one of the program’s biggest problems is

security, “namely encryption, as JTRS encryption is software-based and is, therefore,

Meeting between CRS and the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s

Directorate of Integration FCS Office, September 15, 2005.

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to

Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 19.

Rebecca Christie, “Troubled DOD Radio Program Shows Progress Despite Delays,” Wall

Street Journal, October 3, 2005.

The Defense Acquisition Board is the Department of Defense’s senior level forum for

advising the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics on

critical decisions concerning major acquisition programs.

Rebecca Christie, “Pentagon Plans Another Review for Troubled Radio Program,” Wall

Street Journal, October 12, 2005.

Joshua Kucera, “Weight Issues Bear Down on JTRS,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, October

12, 2005, p. 8.

Ibid.

Rebecca Christie, “Troubled DOD Radio Program Shows Progress Despite Delays,” Wall

Street Journal, October 3, 2005.

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vulnerable to hacking.”23 Computer security experts generally agree that software

used for any purpose is vulnerable, as no current form of computer security offers

absolute security or information assurance. According to GAO, JTRS will be

required to operate applications at multiple levels of security and in order to meet this

requirement, developers will have to not only account for traditional radio security

measures but also computer and network security measures.24 In addition, National

Security Agency (NSA)25 security concerns about JTRS interface with radio systems

of U.S. allies, and the requirement for JTRS to be interoperable with DOD’s Global

Information Grid (GIG), are also expected to pose developmental challenges.26 One

such security-related challenge is that DOD’s Global Information Grid will also

interface with the Internet, which brings with it a whole additional set of security

concerns for JTRS.27

Interoperability with Legacy Radio Systems. Some have expressed

concerns that the goal of making JTRS “backward compatible” with legacy radios

may be technologically infeasible.28 Reportedly, early program attempts at crossbanding29 to synchronize incompatible legacy radio signals proved to be too complex

and current Army efforts are focusing on using the Wideband Networking Waveform

to link with legacy radio frequencies.30 One report suggests that while the Wideband

Networking Waveform can receive signals from legacy radios, legacy radios cannot

receive signals from JTRS and to rectify this situation, the Army is looking at using

19 different waveforms to facilitate JTRS transmissions to legacy systems.31

Incorporating up to 19 different waveforms into a JTRS radio has the potential to

significantly increase memory and processing power requirements which, in turn,

could drive up JTRS size, weight, and power requirements. Recently, the Joint Staff

asked the Services to prioritize JTRS waveforms and the Army reportedly identified

four waveforms as initial priorities for FCS and other complementary programs.32

Buxbaum, p. 32.

Ibid.

The National Security Agency is the U.S. government’s cryptologic organization. It

coordinates, directs, and performs highly specialized activities to protect U.S. government

information systems and produce foreign signals intelligence information.

Buxbaum, p. 32.

Jeff Child, “Cyber Security, JTRS, and the GIG,” COTS Journal, June 2005.

Sandra I. Erwin, “Military Sets Less Ambitious Goals for New Tactical Radio,” National

Defense, National Defense Industrial Association (NDIA), Washington, DC, August 2005.

Cross-banding is a technique of receiving a number of incompatible frequencies and then

re-transmitting them on previously designated channels, thereby allowing communications

systems operating on different bands to communicate with one another.

Ibid.

Jen DiMascio, “JTRS Cluster One to Play Role, Execs Say: Exercise to Test Mettle of

Early FCS Technologies Will Begin this Year,” Inside the Army, Vol. 17, No. 25, June 27,

2005, p. 7.

Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of

Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.

CRS-6

Cluster One Stop Work Order. On April 25, 2005, DOD issued a “Show

Cause” letter to Boeing- the lead contractor for JTRS Cluster One - stating that it was

considering cancelling the contract for the first phase of Cluster One due to Boeing’s

“anticipated failure to meet cost, schedule, and performance requirements.” Shortly

after this decision, work on Cluster Five was also partially suspended, due in part to

developmental problems, changing technical requirements, and a contract award

protest, and also because progress in Cluster Five was heavily leveraged against

progress on Cluster One.33 As a result of the work stoppage, DOD lifted its

requirement for Services to obtain a DOD waiver before purchasing non-JTRS radios

and the Services were authorized to purchase legacy radios, such as the Single

Channel Ground and Airborne Radio System (SINCGARS), which has been in

service since the 1980s.34

JTRS Alternatives. Some analysts suggest that there are alternatives to JTRS

that are already commercially available. Companies such as Harris Corporation —

a Cluster One team member - produces a software-defined radio (Falcon II AN/PRC117F(C)) and Thales — a Cluster Five team member and the lead contractor for

SOCOM’s Cluster Two radio — both produce software-defined radios that are

already in use in the field.35 It should be noted, however, that these software-defined

radios currently in use only run a subset of the current force waveforms, and the

Wideband Networking Waveform and Soldier Radio Waveform — both FCS

program requirements — would not be available on these radios.36 Another possible

solution could be to use existing software-defined radios and to acquire a commercial

wideband system such as WiMax37 — a non-line-of-sight commercial broadband

networking technology that could be modified for military use.38 Experts suggest that

a system such as WiMax could provide the military with more bandwidth and

enhanced over-the-horizon mobile communications.39 The Army asserts, however,

that if a system such as WiMax was adopted for use, that it would require NSA

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to

Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 3.

Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of

Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005 and Buxbaum, p. 32.

Scott Nance, “Analyst Sees Interim, Commercial Solutions if JTRS Canceled,” Defense

Today, Volume 26, Number 81, April 29, 2005, p. 4.

Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of

Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.

WiMax is an acronym that stands for Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access.

Proponents say that WiMax wireless coverage using WiMax nodes or “base stations” would

enable high-speed Internet connectivity for homes and businesses in a radius of up to 50 km

(31 miles). These base stations would eventually cover an entire metropolitan area, and

allow wireless mobility within it. It should be noted that claims of 50 km (31 miles) range,

especially claims that such distances can be achieved without lines of sight, represent a

theoretical maximum under ideal conditions.

Scott Nance.

Ibid.

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certification not unlike current certification efforts for JTRS.40 The greater

bandwidth and over-the-horizon mobile features of WiMax could address concerns

that FCS might not have sufficient bandwidth and the perceived over-reliance on

unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and other airborne platforms - which are subject

to hostile fire and weather constraints - to retransmit JTRS signals over extended

distances.

Boeing Retains Cluster One Contract. On July 19, 2005, the Army

reportedly decided to keep Boeing as the Cluster One lead contractor but would

continue to assess the program’s progress.41 No details were publically released as

to why the Army decided to keep Boeing as the lead contractor but some suggest that

it was not because Boeing demonstrated progress in correcting noted design

deficiencies, but instead because Boeing had a strong legal case against the Army if

the Army had decided to terminate its contract with Boeing. Work on Cluster Five

radios - which, unlike Boeing, was never formally suspended by DOD - has

continued in areas that were not dependent on Cluster One technologies and General

Dynamics has reportedly made progress in addressing size and power concerns raised

by GAO in their report.42

Experimentation and Spin Out One

Experimentation. In October 2005, the Army initiated what it calls

“Experiment 1.1” to test elements of the FCS network - including JTRS.43 The

experiment, slated to run through early 2006, is to test other network components

including the System of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCE)44 and

Networked Battle Command Systems.45 The intent is to test the network inside of

formations and down to the soldier level and also to link sensors to soldiers and

various FCS items in preliminary stages of development such as unmanned aerial

Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) Section’s Directorate of

Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.

James Gunsalus, “Boeing Retains Army Radio Deal,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, July 20,

2005.

CRS discussion with General Dynamics Program Manager for Cluster Five, September

29, 2005.

Information in this section is taken from Jen DiMascio, “JTRS Cluster One to Play Role,

Execs Say: Exercise to Test Mettle of Early FCS Technologies Will Begin this Year,” Inside

the Army, Vol. 17, No. 25, June 27, 2005, pp. 1-9.

SOSCOE is intended to be the network-centric operating system, or middleware, that

permits the integration of separate FCS communications software packages. The Army

equates SOSCE to Microsoft Windows on a much larger scale - SOSCOE will comprise

about 10 percent of the more than 30 million lines of FCS software code.

The Network Battle Command System consists of applications such as mission planning

and preparation, situational understanding, battle command and execution, and applications

linking soldiers and crews to various FCS systems.

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vehicles (UAVs), unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) and unattended munitions

systems. Because manned ground vehicles are not yet developed, network items including JTRS- are to be placed in surrogate vehicles (modified High Mobility

Multi-Wheeled Vehicles — HMMWVs).

These vehicles are to use early developmental models of the Cluster One radio.

The program manager for FCS, Brigadier General Charles Cartwright, expects to

receive 42 “pre-engineering” development models of Cluster One in December 2005

and also plans on using Cluster Five units in Experiment 1.1 — and, possibly, a

second “Experiment” — in 2006.46

The Army has a number of specific objectives for Experiment 1.1 including:

FCS risk mitigation;

Support the development of the Army’s modular force Brigade

Combat Teams (BCTs);47

Gain knowledge to support further development of FCS capabilities;

Provide information that could lead to program improvements and

perhaps more rapid development, and

To show the progress and maturity of the FCS program and the FCS

network in an operational environment.48

Given these objectives, it is not unreasonable to assume that the early development

models of JTRS Cluster one will undergo considerable experimentation and testing.

If this is the case, the experiment’s results could potentially have significant

ramifications for the future of the Cluster One program, particularly if Cluster One’s

performance fails to meet the Army’s expectations.

Spin Out One. The Army’s FCS program consists of four “spin outs” —

formerly known as spirals — that will introduce FCS technologies and systems to the

current force. These fielding spin outs are slated to occur in 2008, 2010, 2012, and

2014 to an experimental brigade and then two years later to the rest of the Army. The

first spin out of FCS technology in 2008 is to emphasize improved munitions and

sensors connected in an initial version of network capabilities.49 These network

capabilities are thought to include Clusters One and Five, Wideband Networking

Jen DiMascio, “Army to Receive 42 Model Radios by December: Pentagon to

Restructure Joint Tactical Radio System After DAB Review,” Inside the Army, 17, No. 38,

September 26, 2005, pp. 1-9.

For additional information on the Army’s modular force initiative see CRS Report

RL32476, U.S. Army’s Modular Redesign: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Comment from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) section’s Directorate of

Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.

Ibid.

CRS-9

Waveform, Warfighters Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T),50 and the System

of Systems Common Operating Environment (SOSCOE). In Spin Out One, Clusters

One and Five are planned to be used in conjunction with other FCS systems such as

Unattended Ground Sensors (UGS), the Intelligent Munitions System (IMS), and the

pre-production model of the Non-Line of Sight Cannon (NLOS-C).

GAO asserts that “it is unlikely that Cluster One radios will be available for the

first spiral [now referred to as spin out] of the FCS network, slated for FY2008 and

that Cluster Five radios might not be available for the first spiral.”51 Some reports

suggest that JTRS program progress is being made, particularly in the Cluster Five

program where technology workarounds necessitated by the Cluster One stop work

order, have helped Cluster Five to “achieve a degree of compatibility” with other

FCS components due to be tested in Spin Out One.52 If, however, Cluster One and

Five are not available by 2008, reports suggest that the Army is planning to use preproduction models and/or surrogate software defined radios of lesser capabilities in

their place.53

Program Restructuring

On July 28, 2005 the JTRS program underwent a Defense Acquisition Board

(DAB) review and although results have not been publically disclosed, the Secretary

of the Army, Francis Harvey, reportedly acknowledged that DOD would restructure

the entire JTRS program.54 In August, the JTRS Joint Program Executive Office

(JPEO) submitted a proposal to DOD which details how it would manage all JTRS

Cluster efforts (as opposed to the management structure depicted in Table 1) with the

intent of achieving near-term success by delivering usable capabilities to the field

now, while pursuing the long term goal of fielding a complete interoperable software

The Warfighter Information Network-Tactical (WIN-T) is the Army’s tactical

telecommunications system consisting of communication infrastructure and network

components from the maneuver battalion to the theater rear boundary. The WIN-T network

provides command, control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance and

reconnaissance (C4ISR) support capabilities that are mobile, secure, survivable, seamless,

and capable of supporting multimedia tactical information systems.

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to

Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 3.

Rebecca Christie, “Troubled DOD Radio Program Shows Progress Despite Delay,” Dow

Jones Newswire, October 4, 2005.

Peter A. Buxbaum, “Jitters Over JTRS,” Armed Forces Journal, July 2005, p. 31 and

David A. Fulghum, “A Case of the Jitters,”Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 2,

2005, p 30 and comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) section’s

Directorate of Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.

Jen DiMascio, “Army to Receive 42 Model Radios by December: Pentagon to

Restructure Joint Tactical Radio System After DAB Review,” Inside the Army, 17, No. 38,

September 26, 2005, pp. 1-9.

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defined radio over time.55 Preceding the JTRS program restructuring, Boeing and

Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC) — who serve as lead systems

integrators for the entire 18 system FCS program — announced in June 2004 that

Cluster One and Five programs would be restructured to better meet the needs of the

FCS program.56 While supporters suggest that this restructuring might help to focus

JTRS development efforts and provide definitive design guidance to JTRS

developers, critics say that this is just another in a series of program “restructurings”

— the Army added two years of additional effort and $458 million to Cluster One in

December 2004 to address developmental problems57 — for a program that started

in 1999 and “has a long ways to go before it can be used in military operations.”58

Program Budget Issues

According to GAO,59 the Cluster One program is expected to cost $15.6 billion

to develop and acquire over 100,000 Cluster One radios and $8.5 billion to develop

and acquire over 300,000 Cluster Five radios, and the Army has reportedly requested

$156.7 million in FY2006 for JTRS.60 Cost growth for Cluster One has been of

significant concern as noted by GAO:

Since the program entered systems development in 2002, the contractor has

overrun cost estimates by $93 million - nearly 28 percent above what was

planned. Although the program attempted to stabilize costs by adding

approximately $200 million to the contract in January 2004, costs continued to

grow steadily thereafter. In addition, the contractor has increasingly fallen behind

schedule and has had to devote more resources than originally planned. In

January 2005, the prime contractor estimated that the total costs for the Cluster

One radio and waveform development would be $531 million more than what

was originally budgeted, reaching $898 million at completion. However,

according to program officials, since contract award, the prime contractor has not

demonstrated strong cost estimating and cost management techniques, and it is

difficult to estimate with any confidence what the overall program is likely to

cost.61

Adam Baddeley, “Going Forward with JTRS,” Military Information Technology, October

2, 2005.

Scott Nance, “JTRS Restructuring Aimed at Better Supporting FCS, Contractors Say,”

Defense Today, Volume 26, Number 120, June 24, 2005.

Scott Nance, “GAO: FCS Communication Systems, Software are at Risk,” Defense Today,

Volume 26, Number 127, July 6, 2005.

Sandra I. Erwin.

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to

Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 9.

Fiscal Year 2006 Army Budget: An Analysis, Association of the United States Army

(AUSA), Washington, DC, September 2005, p. 76.

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

CRS-11

Given this history of cost overruns and the inability to forecast and manage

program costs, some say a strong case could be made to permanently stop work on

Cluster One while still in the Product Development and Demonstration Phase of

development, and transfer program elements that show promise to another developer

already in the JTRS program or a developer not in the program but with

demonstrated communications systems proficiency.

Recent Congressional Actions

The Senate passed its version of the FY2006 Defense Authorization Bill (S.

1042) on November 15. A conference agreement on the Defense Appropriations Bill

(H.R. 2863) has been delayed in part because the House has not formally appointed

conferees. Both the Senate and House Reports recommend cuts for the entire JTRS

program and the Army’s JTRS programs are addressed in the following sections:

Senate - In its report on the FY2006 Defense Authorization Bill62 the

Senate Appropriations Committee voiced its support for JTRS and

the ongoing JTRS review by DOD’s Program Executive Office

(PEO) but noted “the Army’s Cluster 1 program faces significant

technical challenges” further noting that “these challenges could

impact the program efforts in the Navy and Air Force.” The

Appropriations Committee also called for a DOD assessment and a

revised JTRS program plan to be provided to the defense

committees. Committee recommended adjustments for the Army’s

programs are in Table 2.

Table 2. Army JTRS Senate-Recommended Adjustments —

FY2006 Defense Appropriations

($ thousands)

Amount

FY2006 Reductions

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation - Army

FY2005 Rescissions

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation - Army

Other Procurement, Army

-178,000

-21,600

-68,500

Budget Request

FY2006

573,00063

FY2005

117,259

109,200

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to

Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 17.

S.Rept. 109-141 to accompany H.R. 2863, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,

2006, September 29, 2005.

This figure includes JTRS waveform development and Program Management Office

activities; Cluster One and Five hardware development; and JTRS aviation hardware

development.

CRS-12

House — The House Appropriations Committee Report on the

FY2006 Defense Appropriations bill64 while critical of the Army’s

Cluster One and Five programs recommended fully funding

waveform development and funding to continue hardware

development. The House also calls for a detailed DOD report on

JTRS to the House Armed Service Committee. Appropriations

Committee recommended adjustments for the Army’s programs are

in Table 3.

Table 3. Army JTRS House-Recommended Adjustments —

FY2006 Defense Appropriations

($ thousands)

Amount

FY2006 Reductions

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation - Army

Aircraft Procurement, Armyb

FY2005 Rescissions

Other Procurement, Army FY2005

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation - Army

FY2005

-69,500

-12,300

-60,500

-21,600

Budget Request

FY2006

549,800a

23,500

FY2005

109,200

117,259

a. Includes requested amounts for JTRS waveform development and Program Management Office

activities and Cluster One and Five hardware development. JTRS aviation development and

integration amounts are not included in JTRS program total.

b. This reduction is for the integration of aircraft (helicopter) versions of JTRS Cluster One units.

With these House and Senate figures, it is unlikely that a conference committee

would fully fund the JTRS program; actual recommended program cuts for the

FY2006 Defense Appropriations bill are pending the outcome of a conference. It is

unclear how these yet-to-be-determined program cuts would impact not only the

Cluster One and Five programs, but also how they would impact the overall FCS

program. Following a House-Senate conference report, the Army would likely issue

an assessment on how the cuts impact both the JTRS and FCS programs.

Issues for Congress

The Viability of the Cluster One Program. While both Clusters One and

Five have experienced a number of developmental difficulties, it appears that the

Cluster Five program has “divorced” itself from Cluster One through technological

workarounds and has achieved a degree of program success reportedly having

achieved compatibility with a number of FCS systems. Cluster One, however, seems

to be progressing to a lesser extent with its first “test” likely to be in Experiment 1.1

later on in 2005. The performance of Cluster One in this experiment might prove to

H.Rept. 109-119 to accompany H.R. 2863, Department of Defense Appropriations Bill,

2006, June 10, 2005.

CRS-13

be a useful metric to help decision- makers determine if the Cluster One program is

a viable one or if another course of action should be pursued. Although not believed

to be included in Experiment 1.1, the airborne version of Cluster One might warrant

further examination. It appears that in order for the airborne version to meet the

weight limit of 52 kilograms that significant capability trade offs may be required to

this system that is already in the advanced phases of development - likely resulting

in additional delays and significantly increased costs.

Given this situation, Congress might review the Army’s performance

expectations for Cluster One during Experiment 1.1 testing. Will Cluster One’s

performance impact on the Army’s decision to continue with what some call a

“troubled program” or will the Army opt to stick with Cluster One’s developers no

matter what the outcome, and attempt to rectify identified deficiencies through

additional funds and further program delays? Another issue that might be considered

for congressional review is the state of the airborne version of Cluster One. Some

suggest that the program has reached an impasse due to aircraft weight and size

constraints, and that the only way to meet these requirements is to redesign the

system into a significantly less-capable version — a course of action that could

further delay the program and carry with it significant cost implications.

Security. Congress may decide to examine the issue of security in greater

detail. According to GAO, in addition to a requirement to change JTRS hardware to

accommodate processing and memory capacity upgrades for enhanced security, the

current design of JTRS has been judged by the National Security Agency as:

Not sufficient to meet security requirements to operate in an open networked

environment. Specifically, particular versions of JTRS radios will be used by

allied and coalition forces, requiring the Army to release specific source code of

the software architecture to these forces. To address the release, the National

Security Agency has required changes to the security architecture.65

Although GAO expresses security concerns about JTRS use by allied and

coalition forces, it is not readily apparent how pervasive a problem security is for

JTRS and other components of the FCS network. Given the stated security challenges

of software-defined radios, it is conceivable that even if Cluster One and Five can

meet the Army’s communications and data transmission requirements, that security

deficiencies might preclude the operational employment of Clusters One and Five.

It can be argued that network security would take on an even a more significant

role in FCS than compared to the Army’s current force. FCS Manned Ground

Vehicles — lighter and less heavily armored than the M-1 Abrams and M-2 Bradleys

that they are intended to replace — would rely extensively on situational awareness

provided through the FCS Network for their survivability. Furthermore, this networkprovided situational awareness would have a significant impact on FCS’s ability to

engage enemy forces beyond line-of-sight. Given this significant reliance on the FCS

United States Government Accountability Office (GAO), Report to the Chairman,

Committee on Appropriations, House of Representatives, “Defense Acquisitions: Resolving

Developmental Risks in the Army’s Networked Communications Capabilities is Key to

Fielding Future Force,” GAO-05-669, June 2005, p. 15.

CRS-14

Network for survivability and for target acquisition and engagement, potential

adversaries might seek to identify and exploit security weaknesses in the FCS

network — including JTRS — as a means to attack FCS units. One potential

adversary — China — has “likely established information warfare units to deploy

viruses to attack enemy computer systems and networks” and China’s “recent

exercises have incorporated offensive [computer] operations, primarily as first strike

against enemy networks.”66 A potential scenario for consideration is that if an

adversary obtained FCS-related source code, they could engineer a virus that could

be introduced into the FCS network and computers. While some may consider this

an improbable scenario, the reported recent discovery by Russian security experts of

the first known computer virus spread by cell phone networks suggests otherwise.67

The Army is not unaware of these security challenges and notes that network

security and information assurance are an “ever growing priority, regardless of FCS

development.”68 As part of this recognition, the Army FCS program conducts bimonthly information assurance architecture development reviews with the Army staff

sections responsible for Intelligence (G-2) and Information and Communications (G6) and the National Security Agency and Office of the Secretary of Defense.69

JTRS Alternatives. With its history of developmental difficulties, program

delays, and additional costs, some suggest that the JTRS Cluster One program might

be a candidate for cancellation. In this view, Congress might opt to explore

alternatives to Cluster One with the Army and DOD. A possible starting point for

such a review might be an examination of software-defined radios already in service

within the U.S. military or commercially available through other manufacturers.

Some critics argue that the military should adopt commercially available and

emerging telecommunications technology. One example of such a technology is

third- generation cellular technologies that encompass streaming video, netted

communications, and data and voice communications over Internet provider

networks.70 While proponents maintain that third-generation cellular could exceed

JTRS performance capabilities, critics of the commercial approach note that these

technologies need to be ruggedized, customized to fit on specific vehicles and

systems, and require specialized encryption, and therefore the “off the shelf

approach” might be equally as expensive as developing JTRS. After a thorough

technical and cost-based evaluation of these and other JTRS alternatives, some

project the best course of action may be to continue Cluster One development as

currently planned.

Annual Report to Congress, The Military Power of the People’s Republic of China,

Unclassified, Office of the Secretary of Defense, 2005, p. 51.

Ryan Naraine, “Cell Phone Virus Ringing,” Internetnews.com, June 15, 2004.

Comments from the Army Staff’s G-8 (Force Development) section’s Directorate of

Integration FCS Office, November 10, 2005.

Ibid.

Adam Baddeley, “Military Explores Third-Generation Cellular,” Military Information

Technology, October 27, 2005.

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