China Naval Modernization: Implications for U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues for Congress
Congressional research reportApr 24, 2025
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China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and
Issues for Congress
Updated April 24, 2025
Congressional Research Service
https://crsreports.congress.gov
RL33153
SUMMARY
China Naval Modernization: Implications for
U.S. Navy Capabilities—Background and Issues
for Congress
RL33153
April 24, 2025
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in Naval Affairs
China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the top focus of
U.S. defense planning and budgeting. China’s naval modernization effort has been underway for
about 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed China’s navy into a much more
modern and capable force. China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and it is conducting a
growing number of operations in the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around Europe.
China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and sometime between 2015 and 2020 it surpassed the U.S.
Navy in numbers of battle force ships, meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy. DOD
states that China’s navy “is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including
major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet
auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include approximately 60 HOUBEI-class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship
cruise missiles (ASCM). The… overall battle force [of China’s navy] is expected to grow to 395 ships by 2025 and 435 ships
by 2030.” The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force ships as of September 30, 2024, and the Navy’s FY2025
budget submission projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030. U.S. military officials and
other observers are expressing concern or alarm regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort, the capacity of
China’s shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding industry, and trend lines regarding the
relative sizes and capabilities of China’s navy and the U.S. Navy.
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of ship, aircraft, weapon, and C4ISR (command and control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance) acquisition programs, as well as improvements
in logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises. China’s navy currently has certain limitations
and weaknesses, which it is working to overcome. China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization
effort, is assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things, addressing the situation with Taiwan
militarily, if need be; achieving a greater degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the
South China Sea; defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly those linking China to the
Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and
a major world power. Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an anti-access/area-denial
(A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other
issue, or failing that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.
The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval modernization effort. Among other things, the U.S.
Navy has shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific; assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft to the
Pacific; maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental exercises, and engagement and
cooperation with allied and other navies in the Indo-Pacific; increased the planned future size of the Navy; initiated,
increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft,
unmanned vehicles, and weapons; and developed new operational concepts for countering PRC maritime A2/AD forces. The
issue for Congress is whether to approve, reject, or modify the Trump Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets,
and programs for responding to China’s naval modernization effort.
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Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1
Issue for Congress ..................................................................................................................... 1
Sources and Terminology .......................................................................................................... 1
Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort ........................................................... 2
Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy ......................................................................... 6
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 6
Ultimate Size and Composition of China’s Navy Not Publicly Known ............................. 7
Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can Be
of Value Analytically ....................................................................................................... 7
Tables Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships ........................................... 7
Graphs Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships.........................................11
Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort .................................................... 17
Anti-Ship Missiles ............................................................................................................ 17
Submarines........................................................................................................................ 23
Aircraft Carriers ................................................................................................................ 27
Surface Combatants .......................................................................................................... 36
Amphibious Ships ............................................................................................................. 41
Operations Away from Home Waters................................................................................ 47
U.S. Navy Response ................................................................................................................ 50
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 50
Planned Size of Navy ........................................................................................................ 50
Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Other Systems......................................... 51
New Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Operating Concept ................................. 52
Cooperation with Naval Forces of Allies and Other Countries......................................... 53
Issues for Congress ........................................................................................................................ 54
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 54
U.S.-China Balance of Naval Power ................................................................................. 54
Davidson Window/Decade of Concern ............................................................................. 56
Shipbuilding Capacity ....................................................................................................... 59
Other Specific Issues......................................................................................................... 60
Legislative Activity for FY2025 .................................................................................................... 65
Coverage in Related CRS Reports .......................................................................................... 65
FY2025 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 8070/S. 4638/H.R. 5009 /P.L.
118-159) ............................................................................................................................... 66
House ................................................................................................................................ 66
Enacted.............................................................................................................................. 68
Figures
Figure 1. PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships ......................... 12
Figure 2. PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships ................................. 13
Figure 3. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships ....................................................... 14
Figure 4. Launch Dates for PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships........................................................ 15
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Figure 5. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Submarine Displacements ................................................... 16
Figure 6. Aggregate Numbers of VLS Cells: Ratio of PLA Navy to U.S. Navy ........................... 17
Figure 7. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM) ................................................................ 18
Figure 8. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM) ................................. 19
Figure 9. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) .................................................. 21
Figure 10. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) ................................................ 21
Figure 11. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM) ................................................ 22
Figure 12. Illustration of Reported Potential Containerized ASCM Launcher.............................. 22
Figure 13. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS) ..................................................................... 25
Figure 14. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN) ................................................................ 25
Figure 15. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN) ................................................... 26
Figure 16. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier ........................................................................... 30
Figure 17. Shandong (Type 002) Aircraft Carrier ......................................................................... 31
Figure 18. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 31
Figure 19. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 32
Figure 20. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier ............................................................................... 33
Figure 21. Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier ...................................................................... 34
Figure 22. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter .................................................................. 35
Figure 23. J-35 Carrier-Capable Fighter........................................................................................ 35
Figure 24. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer) ......................................................... 37
Figure 25. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer) ......................................................... 38
Figure 26. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer .............................................................................. 38
Figure 27. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate .................................................................................. 39
Figure 28. Jiangkai II (Type 054B) Frigate ................................................................................... 40
Figure 29. Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette ....................................................................................... 40
Figure 30. Reported New Corvette Design ................................................................................... 41
Figure 31. Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship ........................................................................... 42
Figure 32. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship .............................................................. 43
Figure 33. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship .............................................................. 44
Figure 34. Yulan (Type 076) Amphibious Assault Ship................................................................. 45
Figure 35. Bridge-Equipped Landing Barge ................................................................................. 46
Tables
Table 1. Numbers of Certain Types of PLA Navy and U.S. Ships Since 2004 ............................... 8
Table 2. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000-2030 .......................... 10
Table 3. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships, 2020-2040 ................................................11
Appendixes
Appendix A. Comparing U.S. and PRC Numbers of Ships and Naval Capabilities ..................... 70
Appendix B. U.S. Navy’s Ability to Counter PLA ASBMs and Hypersonic Weapons ................ 72
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Contacts
Author Information........................................................................................................................ 77
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Introduction
Issue for Congress
This report provides background information and issues for Congress on the naval modernization
effort of the People’s Republic of China (PRC, or China) and its implications for U.S. Navy
capabilities. China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is the
top focus of U.S. defense planning and budgeting.1 The issue for Congress is whether to approve,
reject, or modify the Trump Administration’s proposed U.S. Navy plans, budgets, and programs
for responding to China’s naval modernization effort. Congress’s decisions on this issue could
affect U.S. Navy capabilities and funding requirements, and the U.S. defense industrial base.
Sources and Terminology
This report is based on unclassified open-source information, such as the annual Department of
Defense (DOD) report to Congress on military and security developments involving China,2 a
2019 Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) report on China’s military power,3 a 2015 Office of
Naval Intelligence (ONI) report on China’s navy,4 published reference sources such as IHS Jane’s
Fighting Ships,5 and press reports.
For convenience, this report uses the term China’s naval modernization effort to refer to the
modernization not only of China’s navy, but also of PLA forces outside China’s navy that can be
used to counter U.S. naval forces operating in the Western Pacific, such as land-based anti-ship
ballistic missiles (ASBMs), land-based surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), land-based Air Force
aircraft armed with anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), and land-based long-range radars for
detecting and tracking ships at sea.
China’s military is formally called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). Its navy is called the
PLA Navy, or PLAN (also abbreviated as PLA[N]), and its air force is called the PLA Air Force,
or PLAAF. The PLA Navy includes an air component that is called the PLA Naval Air Force, or
PLANAF. China refers to its ballistic missile force as the PLA Rocket Force (PLARF).
This report uses the term China’s near-seas region to refer to the Yellow Sea, East China Sea, and
South China Sea—the waters enclosed by the so-called first island chain. The so-called second
island chain encloses both these waters and the Philippine Sea that is situated between the
Philippines and Guam.6
1 For an overview of China’s military, see CRS Report R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army
(PLA), by Caitlin Campbell.
2 Department of Defense, Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China 2024, Annual
Report to Congress, released on December 18, 2024, 166 pp. Hereinafter 2024 DOD CMSD. The report is also
sometimes referred to by a predecessor title, the China Military Power Report. See, for example, Department of
Defense, Fact Sheet, 2024 China Military Power Report, undated but with an internet file date of December 18, 2024,
2 pp.
3 Defense Intelligence Agency, China Military Power, Modernizing a Force to Fight and Win, 2019, 125 pp.
Hereinafter 2019 DIA CMP.
4 Office of Naval Intelligence, The PLA Navy, New Capabilities and Missions for the 21st Century, undated but released
in April 2015, 47 pp.
5 IHS Jane’s Fighting Ships 2022-2023, and previous editions.
6 For a map showing the first and second island chains, see 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 67.
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Background
Brief Overview of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Key overview points concerning China’s naval modernization effort include the following:
•
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•
China’s naval modernization effort, which forms part of a broader PRC military
modernization effort that includes several additional areas of emphasis,7 has been
underway for about 30 years, since the early to mid-1990s, and has transformed
China’s navy into a much more modern and capable force.
China’s navy is a formidable military force within China’s near-seas region, and
it is conducting a growing number of operations in more-distant waters, including
the broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and waters around
Europe.
China’s navy is, by far, the largest of any country in East Asia, and as shown in
Table 2, sometime between 2015 and 2020, China’s navy surpassed the U.S.
Navy in numbers of battle force ships (meaning the types of ships that count
toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy), making China’s navy the numerically
largest in the world. DOD states, “The PLAN is the largest navy in the world
with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e., ships], including major surface
combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships, mine warfare ships,
aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not include
approximately 60 HOUBEI class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395
ships by 2025 and 435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major
surface combatants.”8 The U.S. Navy, by comparison, included 296 battle force
ships as of September 30, 2024, and the Navy’s FY2025 budget submission
projects that the Navy will include 294 battle force ships by the end of FY2030.9
U.S. military officials and other observers are expressing concern or alarm
regarding the pace of China’s naval shipbuilding effort, the capacity of China’s
shipbuilding industry compared with the capacity of the U.S. shipbuilding
industry, and trend lines regarding the relative sizes and capabilities of China’s
navy and the U.S. Navy.10 China’s navy is viewed as posing a major challenge to
7 Other areas of emphasis in China’s military modernization effort include space capabilities, cyber and electronic
warfare capabilities, ballistic missile forces, and aviation forces, as well as the development of emerging militaryapplicable technologies such as hypersonics, artificial intelligence, robotics and unmanned vehicles, directed-energy
technologies, and quantum technologies. For more on China’s military modernization effort in general, see CRS Report
R46808, China’s Military: The People’s Liberation Army (PLA), by Caitlin Campbell. For a discussion of advanced
military technologies, see CRS In Focus IF11105, Defense Primer: Emerging Technologies, by Kelley M. Sayler. U.S.China competition in military capabilities in turn forms one dimension of a broader U.S.-China strategic competition
that also includes political, diplomatic, economic, technological, and ideological dimensions.
8 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 51. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63.
9 For additional discussion, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and
Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
10 See, for example, Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval
Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024; James Stavridis, “China Has 350
Warships. The US Has 290. That’s a Problem,” Bloomberg, May 1, 2024; Lauren C. Williams, “China Is Winning the
Shipbuilding Numbers Game—and That’s a Problem, INDOPACOM Nom [Nominee] Says,” Defense One, February
2, 2024; Svetlana Shkolnikova, “China’s Buildup of Warships on a ‘Concerning Trajectory,’ Says Nominee to
(continued...)
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the U.S. Navy’s ability to achieve and maintain wartime control of blue-water
ocean areas in the Western Pacific—the first such challenge the U.S. Navy has
faced since the end of the Cold War. China’s navy forms a key element of a PRC
challenge to the long-standing status of the United States as the leading military
power in the Western Pacific.
China’s naval ships, aircraft, and weapons are much more modern and capable
than they were at the start of the 1990s, and are comparable in many respects to
those of Western navies. DOD states, “Today, the PLAN is largely composed of
modern multi-role platforms featuring advanced anti-ship, anti-air, and antisubmarine weapons and sensors.”11 ONI states that “Chinese naval ship design
and material quality is in many cases comparable to [that of] USN [U.S. Navy]
ships, and China is quickly closing the gap in any areas of deficiency.”12
China’s naval modernization effort encompasses a wide array of platform and
weapon acquisition programs, including anti-ship ballistic missiles (ASBMs),
anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs), submarines, surface ships, aircraft, unmanned
vehicles (UVs),13 and supporting C4ISR (command and control,
communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance)
systems. China’s naval modernization effort also includes improvements in
logistics, doctrine, personnel quality, education and training, and exercises.14
China’s military modernization effort, including its naval modernization effort, is
assessed as being aimed at developing capabilities for, among other things,
addressing the situation with Taiwan militarily, if need be; achieving a greater
degree of control or domination over China’s near-seas region, particularly the
Command US Forces in Indo-Pacific,” Stars and Stripes, February 1, 2024; Mackenzie Eaglen, “The U.S. Navy Is
Falling Behind China, And The Pentagon Knows It,” 19FortyFive, October 31, 2023; Michael Lee, “Chinese
Shipbuilding Capacity Over 200 Times Greater Than US, Navy Intelligence Says,” Fox News, September 14, 2023;
Joseph Trevithick, “Alarming Navy Intel Slide Warns Of China’s 200 Times Greater Shipbuilding Capacity,” The
Drive, July 11, 2023; Chris Bradford, “Point of No Return, US Navy Faces Being Totally Outgunned by China in Just
Seven Years—We Need a Fleet Ready to Fight War Now, Says Expert,” U.S. Sun, March 1, 2023; Keith Griffith,
“China's Naval Fleet Is Growing and the US ‘Can't Keep Up’ with the Warship Buildup as Beijing Uses Its Sea Power
to Project an ‘Increasingly Aggressive Military Posture Globally,’ Navy Secretary Warns,” Daily Mail (UK), February
23, 2023; Brad Lendon and Haley Britzky, “US Can’t Keep Up with China’s Warship Building, Navy Secretary Says,”
CNN, February 22, 2023; Meredith Roaten, “Shipyard Capacity, China’s Naval Buildup Worries U.S. Military
Leaders,” National Defense, January 26, 2023; Oliver Parken and Tyler Rogoway, “Extremely Ominous Warning
About China From US Strategic Command Chief, Admiral Richard Says ‘The Big One’ with China Is Coming and the
‘Ship Is Slowly Sinking’ in Terms of U.S. Deterrence,” The Drive, November 6, 2022; Xiaoshan Xue, “As China
Expands Its Fleets, US Analysts Call for Catch-up Efforts,” VOA, September 13, 2022.
For articles offering differing perspectives, see, for example, David Axe, “The Chinese Navy Can’t Grow Forever—
The Slowdown Might Start Soon,” Forbes, November 12, 2020; Mike Sweeney, Assessing Chinese Maritime Power,
Defense Priorities, October 2020, 14 pp.
11 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 49.
12 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 3. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
13 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Reveals New Heavily Armed Extra-Large Uncrewed Submarine,” Naval
News, February 23, 2023; Ryan Martinson, “Gliders With Ears: A New Tool in China’s Subsea Surveillance Toolbox,”
Maritime Executive, March 21, 2022; Gabriel Honrada, “Underwater Drones Herald Sea Change in Pacific Warfare,”
Asia Times, January 12, 2022; Ryan Fedasiuk, “Leviathan Wakes: China’s Growing Fleet of Autonomous Undersea
Vehicles,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), August 17, 2021.
14 See, for example, Roderick Lee, “The PLA Navy’s ZHANLAN Training Series: Supporting Offensive Strike on the
High Seas,” China Brief, April 13, 2020.
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South China Sea; enforcing China’s view that it has the right to regulate foreign
military activities in its 200-mile maritime exclusive economic zone (EEZ);15
defending China’s commercial sea lines of communication (SLOCs), particularly
those linking China to the Persian Gulf; displacing U.S. influence in the Western
Pacific; and asserting China’s status as the leading regional power and a major
world power.16 Additional missions for China’s navy include conducting
maritime security (including antipiracy) operations, evacuating PRC nationals
from foreign countries when necessary, and conducting humanitarian
assistance/disaster response (HA/DR) operations.
Observers believe China wants its navy to be capable of acting as part of an antiaccess/area-denial (A2/AD) force—a force that can deter U.S. intervention in a
conflict in China’s near-seas region over Taiwan or some other issue, or failing
that, delay the arrival or reduce the effectiveness of intervening U.S. forces.
The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly
known. In contrast to the U.S. Navy, China does not release a navy force-level
goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total
ship procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, and resulting projected
force levels.
Although China’s naval modernization effort has substantially improved China’s
naval capabilities, China’s navy currently is assessed as having limitations or
weaknesses in certain areas,17 including joint operations with other parts of
China’s military,18 anti-submarine warfare (ASW), long-range targeting, a limited
capacity for carrying out at-sea resupply of combatant ships operating far from
home waters,19 a limited number of overseas bases and support facilities,20 a need
to train large numbers of personnel to crew its new ships,21 non-commissioned
officers (NCOs) that are not empowered by unit commanders through mission
command to achieve a commander’s intent,22 and a lack of recent combat
15 For additional discussion, see CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China Seas:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
16 For additional discussion, see Ryan D. Martinson, “Deciphering China’s ‘World-class’ Naval Ambitions,” U.S.
Naval Institute Proceedings, August 2020.
17 For discussions focusing on these limitations or weaknesses, see David Roza, “Not 10 Feet Tall: Experts Say China’s
Military Faces Major Issues,” Air & Space Forces Magazine, January 31, 2025; Timothy R. Heath, The Chinese
Military's Doubtful Combat Readiness, RAND, PEA 830-1, January 2025 (posted online January 27, 2025), 31 pp.;
Girish Linganna, “China’s Big but Weak Navy: The illusion of Maritime Power,” Modern Diplomacy, January 4, 2025.
18 See, for example, Ben Noon and Chris Bassler, “Schrodinger’s Military? Challenges for China’s Military
Modernization Ambitions,” War on the Rocks, October 14, 2021.
19 See, for example, Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,”
Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023; Will Mackenzie, “Commentary: It’s the Logistics, China,” National
Defense, June 10, 2020.
20 See, for example, Kristin Huang, “Size of China’s Navy May Be Closing Gap on US Fleet But What Can the PLA
Do with Just One Overseas Naval Base?” South China Morning Post, March 14, 2021.
21 See, for example, Peter Suciu, “China’s Aircraft Carriers Might Have an ‘Achilles Heel,’” National Interest, October
10, 2024 (concerning a shortage of pilots for carrier-based aircraft); Minnie Chan, “China’s Navy Goes Back to Work
on Big Ambitions but Long-Term Gaps Remain,” South China Morning Post, August 22, 2020. See also Mallory
Shelbourne, “At-Sea Political Officers Could Pose Problems for Chinese Navy in War, Experts Say,” USNI News,
September 20, 2023.
22 See, for example, Rich Abott, “INDOPACOM Official Names Chinese Military Structure Limitations And Russian
Debts To China,” Defense Daily, October 12, 2023.
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experience.23 China is working to reduce or overcome such limitations and
weaknesses.24 Although China’s navy has limitations and weaknesses, it may
nevertheless be sufficient for performing missions of interest to China’s leaders.
23 Alastair Gale, “China’s Military Is Catching Up to the U.S. Is It Ready for Battle?” Wall Street Journal, October 20,
2022; Benjamin Brimelow, “China’s Military Is Growing Rapidly, But It Hasn't Been ‘Tested’ Like US Troops Have,
Former Top US Admiral Says,” Business Insider, March 29, 2022. See also Andrew Scobell, “Xi Jinping’s Worst
Nightmare: A Potemkin People’s Liberation Army,” War on the Rocks, May 1, 2023.
In November 2023, The Economist published a collection of articles regarding weaknesses and limitations in China’s
military as a whole, including its navy. The online landing page for the collection is “Unknown Soldiers,
Overestimating China’s Armed Forces Would Be Dangerous, Argues Jeremy Page,” Economist, November 11, 2023.
Individual articles in the collection include the following: “How Scary is China? America Must Understand China’s
Weaknesses as Well as Its Strengths,” Economist, November 9, 2023; “The People’s Liberation Army Is Not Yet as
Formidable as the West Fears,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “From Hypersonic Missiles to Undersea Drones, The
PLA Is Making Leaps, But China’s Military Tech Still Lags Behind the West’s,” Economist, November 6, 2023;
“China Is Struggling to Recruit Enough Highly Skilled Troops,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “Xi Jinping Worries
That China’s Troops Are Not Ready to Fight,” Economist, November 6, 2023; “Xi Jinping Is Obsessed with Political
Loyalty in the PLA, Ideology Is Undermining China’s Drive to Prepare Forces for Combat,” Economist, November 6,
2023; “Invading Taiwan Would Be a Logistical Minefield for China,” Economist, November 6, 2023. See also Paul
Dibb, “Be Alert to China’s Military Weaknesses,” Strategist, December 1, 2023.
The use of a dual command structure in the crews of larger PLA Navy ships, involving both a commanding officer and
a political officer, has been raised as a source of potential reduced command effectiveness in certain tactical situations.
See Mallory Shelbourne, “At-Sea Political Officers Could Pose Problems for Chinese Navy in War, Experts Say,”
USNI News, September 20, 2023; Roderick Lee, PLA Navy Submarine Leadership - Factors Affecting Operational
Performance, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, June 2023, 21 pp.; “Leadership:
China Cripples Naval Officers,” Strategy Page, July 18, 2020.
Regarding corruption in China’s military, see, for example, Minxin Pei, “Trump Wants Hitler’s Generals? That’s Xi’s
Problem, Massive Corruption Continues to Plague the Chinese Military Because of a Promotion System that Prizes
Loyalty above Competence,” Bloomberg, December 11, 2024; “Fresh Doubts about China’s Ability to Invade Taiwan,
How Corruption in the PLA Is Changing the Calculations of Analysts,” Economist, December 5, 2024; Bloomberg
News, “China’s Military Probes Slew of Graft Issues Going Back to 2017,” Bloomberg, July 26, 2023; “Xi Jinping Is
Struggling to Stamp Out Graft in the PLA, How Will It Affect China’s Fighting Ability?” Economist, January 11,
2024; Chun Han Wong, “China’s Military Shake-Up Raises Questions About Combat Readiness,” Wall Street Journal,
January 4, 2024; Peter Martin and Jennifer Jacobs, “US Intelligence Shows Flawed China Missiles Led Xi to Purge
Army,” Wall Street Journal, December 6, 2023; Gordan G. Chang, “China’s Military Is Nowhere Near as Strong as the
CCP Wants You to Think,” Newsweek, June 16, 2023. For an alternative perspective, see Alex Velez-Green,
“Corruption in China’s Military Is No Excuse for American Complacency,” Defense News, January 22, 2024; John
Grady, “Chinese Military Corruption Won’t Slow PLA Expansion, Panel Says,” USNI News, October 31, 2023.
24 For example, China’s naval shipbuilding programs were previously dependent on foreign suppliers for some ship
components. ONI, however, states that “almost all weapons and sensors on Chinese naval ships are produced incountry, and China no longer relies on Russia or other countries for any significant naval ship systems.” (Source:
Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China:
Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, pp. 2-3. Provided by
Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.) Regarding the ASW capabilities of China’s Navy, DOD states
The PLAN is improving its anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities through the development of
its surface combatants and special mission aircraft but continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW
capability.
(2024 DOD CMSD, p. 53.)
See also Gabriel Honrada, “China Simulates ‘Z-day’ Total Sea War with the US,” Asia Times, July 5, 2023; Stephen
Chen, “Chinese Military Conjures World War Z Scenario of All-Out Conflict to Test and Evaluate New Navy
Weapons,” South China Morning Post, June 28, 2023; Felix K. Chang, “Sustaining the Chinese Navy’s Operations at
Sea: Bigger Fists, Growing Legs,” Foreign Policy Research Institute, May 3, 2023; Bryan Clark, “Submarines Will Not
Solve America’s Eroding Undersea Advantage,” Washington Examiner, December 5, 2022; Ryan D. Martinson and
Conor Kennedy, “Using the Enemy to Train the Troops—Beijing’s New Approach to Prepare its Navy for War,” China
Brief, March 25, 2022; Samuel Cranny-Evans, “China’s Maritime Surveillance Network: Bold Moves for Ocean
Dominance,” Jane’s International Defence Review, February 17, 2022.
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•
As China’s navy reduces its weaknesses and limitations, it may become sufficient
to perform a wider array of potential missions.
In addition to modernizing its navy, China has substantially increased the size
and capabilities of its coast guard. DOD states that China’s coast guard is “the
largest maritime law enforcement fleet in the world.”25 China also operates a
sizeable maritime militia that includes a large number of fishing vessels. China
relies primarily on its maritime militia and coast guard to assert and defend its
maritime claims in its near-seas region, with the navy operating over the horizon
as a potential backup force.26
Numbers of Ships; Comparisons to U.S. Navy
Overview
DOD states
The PLAN is the largest navy in the world with a battle force of over 370 platforms [i.e.,
ships], including major surface combatants, submarines, ocean-going amphibious ships,
mine warfare ships, aircraft carriers, and fleet auxiliaries. Notably, this figure does not
include approximately 60 HOUBEI class patrol combatants that carry anti-ship cruise
missiles (ASCM). The PLAN’s overall battle force is expected to grow to 395 ships by
2025 and 435 ships by 2030. Much of this growth will be in major surface combatants.27
DIA states that “the PLAN is rapidly retiring older, single-mission warships in favor of larger,
multimission ships equipped with advanced antiship, antiair, and antisubmarine weapons and
sensors and C2 [command and control] facilities.”28
Another set of observers states
China’s rapid military buildup has left the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) poised
to overtake the U.S. Navy in several measures of maritime might more quickly than
sometimes assumed. If China continues to expand its fleet at the current pace and the
United States does not revitalize its shipbuilding industry, China will grow increasingly
likely to emerge victorious from interstate war, especially a prolonged great power war….
25 DOD states that
The CCG’s continued expansion and modernization makes it the largest maritime law enforcement
fleet in the world. Newer CCG vessels are larger and more capable, enabling them to operate
farther off shore and remain on station longer. The CCG has over 150 regional and oceangoing
patrol vessels (more than 1,000 tons). These larger vessels include over 20 corvettes transferred
from the PLAN, which were modified for CCG operations. The newer, larger CCG vessels are
equipped with helicopter facilities, high-capacity water cannons, multiple interceptor boats and
guns ranging from 30 mm to 76 mm. Revised estimates indicate the CCG operates more than 50
regional patrol combatants (more than 500 tons), which can be used for limited offshore operations,
and an additional 300 coastal patrol craft (100 tons to 499 tons). In 2023 and early 2024, the CCG
launched seven offshore patrol ships as well as two additional patrol ships based on a large salvage
ship design. Several more offshore patrol ships are likely under construction.
(2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 76-77. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 78.)
26 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 76-78, and CRS Report R42784, U.S.-China Strategic Competition in South and East China
Seas: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
27 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 51. See also 2019 DIA CMP, p. 63.
28 2019 DIA CMP, p. 69.
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China now possesses the world’s largest maritime fighting force, operating 234 warships
[excluding auxiliary and support ships] to the U.S. Navy’s 219 [warships excluding
auxiliary and support ships].29
Ultimate Size and Composition of China’s Navy Not Publicly Known
The planned ultimate size and composition of China’s navy is not publicly known. The U.S. Navy
makes public its force-level goal and regularly releases a 30-year shipbuilding plan that shows
planned procurements of new ships, planned retirements of existing ships, and resulting projected
force levels, as well as a five-year shipbuilding plan that shows, in greater detail, the first five
years of the 30-year shipbuilding plan.30 In contrast, China does not release a navy force-level
goal or detailed information about planned ship procurement rates, planned total ship
procurement quantities, planned ship retirements, or resulting projected force levels. The ultimate
size and composition of China’s navy might be an unsettled and evolving issue among China’s
military and political leaders. One observer states that “it seems the majority of past foreign
projections of Chinese military and Chinese navy procurement scale and speed have been
underestimates…. All military forces have a desired force requirement and a desired ‘critical
mass’ to aspire toward. Whether the Chinese navy is close to its desired force or not, is of no
small consequence.”31
Number of Ships Is a One-Dimensional Measure, but Trends in Numbers Can
Be of Value Analytically
Relative U.S. and PLA naval capabilities are sometimes assessed by showing comparative
numbers of U.S. and PLA ships (or comparative aggregate fleet displacements [i.e, tonnages]).
Although the total number of ships in a navy (or a navy’s aggregate displacement) is relatively
easy to calculate, it is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out numerous other factors that bear
on a navy’s capabilities and how those capabilities compare to its assigned missions. As a result,
as discussed in further detail in Appendix A, comparisons of the total numbers of ships in
China’s navy and the U.S. Navy (or aggregate displacements) are highly problematic as a means
of assessing relative U.S. and PLA naval capabilities and how those capabilities compare to the
missions assigned to the two navies. At the same time, however, an examination of trends over
time in these relative numbers of ships (or aggregate displacements) can shed some light on how
the relative balance of U.S. and PLA naval capabilities might be changing over time.
Tables Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships
Table Showing Figures from Annual DOD Reports
Table 1 shows numbers of certain types of PLA Navy ships—those that might be thought of as
the principal combat ships (PCSs)32 of China’s navy—from 2004 to the present, along with the
number of China Coast Guard ships from 2016 to the present, as presented in DOD’s annual
reports on military and security developments involving China. (The DOD report for a given year
29 Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for
Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
30 For more information on the U.S. Navy’s force-level goal, 30-year shipbuilding plan, and five-year shipbuilding
plan, see CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress,
by Ronald O'Rourke.
31 Rick Joe, “Hints of Chinese Naval Procurement Plans in the 2020s,” Diplomat, December 25, 2020.
32 The term principal combat ships (PCSs) is a term used in this CRS report.
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presents data for PLA forces for the previous year.)33 As can be seen in Table 1, most PLA Navy
ships shown in the table have increased numerically since 2004.
Table 1. Numbers of Certain Types of PLA Navy and U.S. Ships Since 2004
Figures for PLA ships taken from annual editions DOD reports on military and security developments
involving China dated 2005 and subsequent years, showing data for 2004 and subsequent years
Principal PLA combat ships—excludes auxiliary and support ships. (The figure for
total U.S. battle force ships shown toward the right includes auxiliary and support
ships, but excludes patrol craft, of which the Navy has very few.)
Data for
that year
(as shown
in DOD
report
dated the
following
year)
SSB
SSN
SS
CV
CG
DD
FF
FFL
PC
2004
1
6
51
0
0
21
43
0
2005
1
5
50
0
0
25
45
2006
1
5
53
0
0
25
2007
1
5
54
0
0
2008
2
6
54
0
2009
2
6
54
2010
2
5
2011
2
2012
Submarines
Surface combatants
Amphibious ships
Total
U.S.
battle
force
ships
U.S.
vs.
China
LHA
LST/
LPD
LSM
Total
China
Coast
Guard
51
0
20
23
216
n/a
292
+76
0
45
0
25
25
221
n/a
281
+60
47
0
41
0
25
25
222
n/a
281
+59
29
45
0
45
0
26
28
233
n/a
279
+46
0
27
48
0
70
0
27
28
262
n/a
282
+20
0
0
25
49
0
85
0
27
28
276
n/a
285
+9
49
0
0
26
53
0
86
0
27
28
276
n/a
288
+12
5
48
0
0
26
53
0
86
0
28
23
271
n/a
284
+13
3
5
49
1
0
23
52
0
85
0
29
26
273
n/a
287
+14
2013
3
5
51
1
0
24
49
8
85
0
29
28
283
n/a
285
+2
2014
4
5
53
1
0
21
52
15
86
0
29
28
294
n/a
289
-5
2015
4
5
57
1
0
23
52
23
86
0
30
22
303
n/a
271
-32
2016
4
5
54
1
0
21
56
23
88
0
34
21
317
185
275
-42
2017
4
5
57
1
0
28
51
28
86
0
33
23
306
240
279
-27
2018
4
6
50
1
0
33
54
42
86
0
37
22
335
248
286
-49
2019
4
6
46
2
1
32
49
49
86
0
37
21
333
255
290
-43
2020
6
9
56
2
1
32
48
51
86
57
348
223
296
-52
2021
6
9
56
2
6
36
45
50
84
57
351
224
294
-57
2022
6
6
47
2
8
42
47
50
60
3
57
328
142
289
-39
2023
6
6
47
3
8
42
49
50
60
3
58
332
141
291
-41
-4
+3
+8
+21
+6
+50
+9
+116
n/a
-1
-117
Change from 2004 to 2023
+5
0
+18
Sources: Table prepared by CRS based on 2005-2024 editions of annual DOD report to Congress on military
and security developments involving China (known for 2009 and prior editions as the report on China military
power), and (for U.S. Navy ships) U.S. Navy data as presented in CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and
Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke. The DOD report shows data for
33 Thus, the 2023 edition of the DOD report covers presents data for 2022, and so on for prior-year editions of the
report.
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China for the year prior to the report’s cover date. For example, the 2005 edition of the DOD report shows
data for 2004.
Key to abbreviations: n/a = data not available in annual DOD report. SSB = ballistic missile submarines. SSN
= nuclear-powered attack submarines. SS = diesel attack submarines. CV = aircraft carriers. CG = cruisers. DD
= destroyers. FF = frigates. FFL = corvettes (i.e., light frigates). PC = missile-armed patrol craft. LST =
amphibious tank landing ship. LPD = amphibious transport dock ship. LSM = amphibious medium landing ship.
(Starting with the 2021 edition, the annual DOD report shows a combined figure for LST/LPD and LSM.)
Column for Total PLAN ship types shown to right, which shows what might be thought of as the principal
combat ships of China’s navy, does not include other PLAN ship types not shown to right, such as auxiliary and
support ships. CCG = China Coast Guard ships. U.S. total = Total U.S. Navy battle force ships, which includes
auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft). U.S. vs.
PLAN ship types shown = total U.S. Navy battle force ships compared to the column for Total PLAN ship
types shown to right.
As can be seen in Table 1, about 84% of the net increase in the total number of PLA ships since
2004 (a net increase of 97 ships out of the total net increase of 116 ships) resulted from increases
in cruisers and destroyers (29 ships), corvettes (i.e., light frigates) (50 ships), and amphibious
ships (18 ships). The corvettes alone account for about 43% of the total net increase.
Table 1 lumps together less capable older PLA ships with more capable modern PLA ships. In
examining the numbers in the table, it can be helpful to keep in mind that for many of the types of
PLA ships shown in the table, the percentage of the ships accounted for by more capable modern
designs was growing over time, even if the total number of ships for those types was changing
little.
For reference, Table 1 also shows the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs),
meaning the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy, and compares it to
the total number of the types of PLA ships that are shown in the table. The result is an apples-vs.oranges comparison, because the PLA figures exclude auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S.
Navy figure includes auxiliary and support ships but excludes patrol craft (although the U.S.
Navy has very few patrol craft). Changes over time in this apples-vs.-oranges comparison,
however, can be of value in understanding trends in the comparative sizes of the U.S. and PLA
navies.
On the basis of the figures in Table 1, it might be said that in 2014, the total number of principal
combat ships in China’s navy (a figure that excludes PLAN auxiliary and support ships) surpassed
the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships (a figure that includes U.S. Navy auxiliary and
support ships). It is important, however, to keep in mind the differences in composition between
the two navies. The U.S. Navy, for example, has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy has many more diesel attack
submarines, frigates, and corvettes.34
Table Showing ONI Figures from February 2020
Table 2 shows comparative total numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy battle force ships (BFSs),
as well as specific figures for certain types of ships that contribute toward China’s total number of
battle force ships from 2000 to 2030, with the figures for 2025 and 2030 being projections. The
figures for China’s ships are taken from an ONI information paper of February 2020. (As noted
earlier, battle force ships are the types of ships that count toward the quoted size of the U.S. Navy.
The ONI information paper applied the same counting rules to the PLA Navy.) For China, the
total number of battle force ships shown excludes the missile-armed patrol craft (PCs) shown in
34 For further discussion on this point, see Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking
China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
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Table 1, but includes auxiliary and support ships that are not shown in Table 1. Compared to
Table 1, the figures in Table 2 come closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of the
two navies’ numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China’s missile-armed patrol craft
can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain.35
Table 2. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships, 2000-2030
Figures for PLA Navy ships taken from ONI information paper of February 2020
2000
2005
2010
2015
2020
2025
2030
Ballistic missile submarines
1
1
3
4
4
6
8
Nuclear-powered attack submarines
5
4
5
6
7
10
13
Diesel attack submarines
56
56
48
53
55
55
55
Aircraft carriers, cruisers, destroyers
19
25
25
26
43
55
65
Frigates, corvettes
38
43
50
74
102
120
135
Total number of China Navy battle force
ships, including types not shown above
210
220
220
255
360
400
425
Total U.S. Navy battle force ships
318
282
288
271
296
287
294
U.S. total above compared to China total above
+108
+62
+68
+16
-64
-113
-131
Selected ship types
Sources: Table prepared by CRS. Source for China’s navy: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for
Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy
Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, 4 pp. Provided by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and
CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the committee’s permission. Figures are for end of
calendar year. Source for figures for U.S. Navy: U.S. Navy data; figures are for end of fiscal year.
Note: In the column for the year 2000, the ONI information paper showed a figure for the total number of
China navy battle force ships of 110, but the Navy later stated that this was a typo, and that the correct figure is
210.
As shown in Table 2, China’s navy surpassed the U.S. Navy in terms of total number of battle
force ships sometime between 2015 and 2020. As mentioned earlier in connection with Table 1,
however, it is important to keep in mind the differences in composition between the two navies.
The U.S. Navy, for example, currently has many more aircraft carriers, nuclear-powered
submarines, and cruisers and destroyers, while China’s navy currently has many more diesel
attack submarines, frigates, and corvettes.36
Table Showing U.S. Navy Figures from October 2020
Table 3 shows numbers of certain types of PLA Navy ships in 2020, and projections of those
numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040, along with the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in
2020, and projections of those numbers for 2025, 2030, and 2040. The figures for China’s ships
were provided by the Navy at the request of CRS. As with Table 1, the result is an apples-vs.oranges comparison between the PLA Navy and U.S. Navy totals, because the PLA total excludes
auxiliary and support ships, while the U.S. Navy total includes auxiliary and support ships, but
excludes patrol craft (although the U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft).
35 See, for example, Richard Sterk, “Chinese Missile Boats Operate on an Attack Swarm Principle,” Defense and
Security Monitor, March 19, 2024.
36 For further discussion on this point, see Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking
China’s Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
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Table 3. Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships, 2020-2040
Figures for PLA ships are from U.S. Navy, reflecting data as of October 2020
2020
2025
2030
2040
2040 change
from 2020
Ballistic missile submarines
4
6
8
10
+6
Nuclear-powered attack submarines
6
10
14
16
+10
Diesel attack submarines
47
47
46
46
-1
Aircraft carriers
2
3
5
6
+4
Cruisers and destroyers
41
52
60
80
+39
Frigates and corvettes
102
120
135
140
+38
LHA-type amphibious assault ships
0
4
4
6
+6
LPD-type amphibious ships
7
10
14
14
+7
LST-type amphibious tank landing ships
30
24
24
15
-15
TOTAL for China of types shown above
239
276
310
333
+94
TOTAL number of U.S. Navy battle force ships
296
287
294
378
+82
U.S. total above compared to China total above
+57
+9
-16
+45
-12
Ship type
Sources: For PLA Navy ships: U.S. Navy data provided to CRS by Navy Office of Legislative Affairs, reflecting
data as of October 26, 2020. For U.S. Navy ships: U.S. Navy data—actual for 2020, and projections for
subsequent years shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan.
As shown in Table 3, the U.S. Navy projects that between 2020 and 2040, the total number of
PLA ships of the types shown in the table will increase by 94, or about 39%, with most of that
increase (77 ships out of 94) coming from roughly equal increases in numbers of large surface
combatants (cruisers and destroyers—39 ships) and small surface combatants (frigates and
corvettes—38 ships). The total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2040
assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships
in a given year has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year
editions of the Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.37
Graphs Showing Numbers of PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships
Graph Showing PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force
Ships
Figure 1, which uses numbers from Table 1 and Table 3, shows the total number of PLA Navy
principal combat ships (PCSs)—a figure that excludes auxiliary and support ships—and the total
number of U.S. Navy battle force ships—a figure that includes auxiliary and support ships. In
other words, Figure 1 depicts the apples-vs.-oranges comparison discussed earlier in connection
with Table 1 and Table 3. The total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2025
through 2040 assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented.
37 Congressional Budget Office, Shipbuilding, the Congress, and the Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Presentation at the
U.S. Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington 2024, Dr. Eric J. Labs, National Security Division, December 11,
2024, available at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-12/60772-Shipbuilding.pdf, slide 3 (PDF page 4 of 17),
entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet Under the Past 13 Shipbuilding Plans and Its Actual Inventory.”
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As shown by CBO analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year
has often been less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the
Navy’s 30-year shipbuilding plan.38
Figure 1. PLA Navy Principal Combat Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships
PLAN principal combat ships (PCSs) excludes auxiliary and support ships; U.S. Navy battle force ships
(BFSs) includes auxiliary and support ships
Sources: Data from Table 1 and Table 3 of this CRS report and (for U.S. Navy figures) U.S. Navy data,
including projected figures for 2025 and beyond shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. PCSs are
principal combat ships (which exclude auxiliary and support ships); BFSs are battle force ships (which include
auxiliary and support ships).
Graph Showing PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships
Figure 2, which uses figures from Table 1 and Table 3, shows the total number of PLA Navy
battle force ships (BFSs), the total number of PLA Navy battle force ships plus missile-armed
patrol craft (PCs), and the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships. (As mentioned earlier, the
U.S. Navy has very few patrol craft.) As discussed in connection with Table 2, comparing total
38 Congressional Budget Office, Shipbuilding, the Congress, and the Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Presentation at the
U.S. Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington 2024, Dr. Eric J. Labs, National Security Division, December 11,
2024, available at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-12/60772-Shipbuilding.pdf, slide 3 (PDF page 4 of 17),
entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet Under the Past 13 Shipbuilding Plans and Its Actual Inventory.”
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numbers of battle force ships comes closer to providing an apples-to-apples comparison of the
two navies’ numbers of ships, although it could be argued that China’s missile-armed patrol craft
can be a significant factor for operations within the first island chain. As discussed in connection
with Figure 1, the total number of U.S. Navy battle force ships projected for 2025 through 2040
assumes that the Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan is fully implemented. As shown by
CBO analysis, the realized number of U.S. Navy battle force ships in a given year has often been
less than the number that was projected for that year in prior-year editions of the Navy’s 30-year
shipbuilding plan.39
Figure 2. PLA Navy Battle Force Ships and U.S. Navy Battle Force Ships
Figures for both PLAN and U.S. Navy are total number of battle force ships (BFSs), which include auxiliary
and support ships.
Sources: Data from Table 1 and Table 2 of this CRS report and (for U.S. Navy figures) U.S. Navy data,
including projected figures for 2025 and beyond shown in Navy’s FY2025 30-year shipbuilding plan. BFSs are
battle force ships; PCs are missile-armed patrol craft.
39 Congressional Budget Office, Shipbuilding, the Congress, and the Shipbuilding Industrial Base, Presentation at the
U.S. Naval Institute’s Defense Forum Washington 2024, Dr. Eric J. Labs, National Security Division, December 11,
2024, available at https://www.cbo.gov/system/files/2024-12/60772-Shipbuilding.pdf, slide 3 (PDF page 4 of 17),
entitled “The Navy’s Projections of Its Fleet Under the Past 13 Shipbuilding Plans and Its Actual Inventory.”
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Graph Showing PLAN and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships Excluding Patrol
Craft
Figure 3, which was prepared by Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) using data
from the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), shows numbers of PLA Navy and
U.S. Navy principal combatant ships, excluding missile-armed patrol craft (PCs). The dashed line
at the top is the line for the U.S. Navy.
Figure 3. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Principal Combat Ships
Excluding missile-armed patrol craft (PCs)
Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s
Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
Figure 4, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the launch dates of PLA
Navy and U.S. Navy warships. (Launched means the ship has been put into the water for the final
stages of its construction.)
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Figure 4. Launch Dates for PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Ships
Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s
Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
Note: Launched means the ship has been put into the water for the final stages of its construction.
Figure 5, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the aggregate displacement
(i.e., tonnage) of PLA Navy submarines and U.S. Navy submarines. A ship’s displacement is
sometimes used as a rough proxy for its capability, as a larger ship can carry more combat system
equipment and more weapons. As mentioned earlier and discussed in further detail in Appendix
A, displacement is a one-dimensional measure that leaves out other factors bearing on a ship’s
capability.
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Figure 5. PLA Navy and U.S. Navy Submarine Displacements
Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s
Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
Notes: “Chinese conventio…” is Chinese conventionally powered submarines. “Chinese nuclear-p…” is
Chinese nuclear-powered submarines.
Figure 6, which was prepared by CSIS using data from IISS, shows the ratio between the
aggregate number of vertical launch system (VLS) cells on U.S. Navy ships and the aggregate
number of VLS cells on PLA Navy ships. VLS cells are cells on a ship for storing and firing
missiles. A ship’s number of VLS cells is one measure of the ship’s weapon capacity, though not a
complete one, as ships can be armed with additional missiles that are fired from deck-mounted
box launchers rather than VLS cells, and ships can be armed with weapons other than missiles,
including guns. Even so, aggregate numbers of VLS cells are sometimes used as a shorthand for
measuring a navy’s total missile capacity.40
40 See, for example, U.S. Navy, Report to Congress on the Annual Long-Range Plan for Construction of Naval Vessels
for Fiscal Year 2025, March 2024, p. 11 (Figure 1), and Congressional Budget Office, An Analysis of the Navy’s
Fiscal Year 2024 Shipbuilding Plan, October 2023, p. 22 (Figure 8).
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Figure 6. Aggregate Numbers of VLS Cells: Ratio of PLA Navy to U.S. Navy
Source: Figure accompanying Alexander Palmer, Henry H. Carroll, and Nicholas Velazquez, “Unpacking China’s
Naval Buildup,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), June 5, 2024.
Notes: VLS is vertical launch system.
Selected Elements of China’s Naval Modernization Effort
Below are brief overviews of selected elements of China’s naval modernization effort.
Anti-Ship Missiles
Anti-Ship Ballistic Missiles (ASBMs)
China has fielded two types of land-based ballistic missiles with a capability of hitting ships at
sea at extended ranges—the DF-21D (Figure 7), a road-mobile anti-ship ballistic missile
(ASBM) with a range of more than 1,500 kilometers (i.e., more than 810 nautical miles),41 and
41 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 65.
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the DF-26 (Figure 8), a road-mobile, multi-role intermediate range ballistic missile (IRBM) with
a maximum range of 3,000 kilometers to 4,000 kilometers42 (i.e., about 1,620 nautical miles to
2,160 nautical miles). DOD states that “the multi-role DF-26 is designed to rapidly swap
conventional and nuclear warheads and is capable of conducting precision land-attack and antiship strikes in the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the SCS [South China Sea] from
mainland China.”43
Figure 7. DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic Missile (ASBM)
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Andrew S. Erickson, “China’s DF-21D Anti-Ship Ballistic
Missile (ASBM)—Officially Revealed at 3 September Parade—Complete Open Source Research Compendium,”
AndrewErickson.com, September 10, 2015, accessed August 28, 2019.
Observers have expressed strong concerns about China’s ASBMs, because such missiles, in
combination with broad-area maritime surveillance and targeting systems, would permit China to
attack aircraft carriers, other U.S. Navy ships, or ships of allied or partner navies operating in the
Western Pacific.44 Prior to the advent of these weapons, the U.S. Navy had not previously faced a
threat from highly accurate ballistic missiles capable of hitting moving ships at sea. For this
reason, some observers have referred to ASBMs as a “game-changing” weapon.
China reportedly is developing hypersonic glide vehicles that, if incorporated into PLA ASBMs,
could make PLA ASBMs more difficult to intercept.45 DOD states:
In April 2022, the PRC had reportedly developed a new type of ASBM, possibly designated
the YJ-21, small enough to fit into a surface combatant’s VLS cell and tested-fired from a
RENHAI [i.e., Type 055 cruiser or large destroyer]….
42 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 64. A map on page 67 of the report shows the DF-26 with a range of 4,000 kilometers.
43 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 65. The report similarly states on page 89: “The DF-26 intermediate range ballistic missile is a
capable of ranging Guam and is capable of conducting nuclear, precision conventional, and maritime attacks.”
44 See, for example, Chris Panella, “China Has a Lot More Missiles — with US Warships and Bases in Its Sights,”
Business Insider, May 4, 2024.
45 See, for example, Jeff Schogol, “How Much of a Threat Are Chinese Hypersonic Missiles to US Navy Ships and
Sailors?” Task & Purpose, April 18, 2025.
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In April 2019, the PLAN revealed during its 70th anniversary celebration that its new
guided-missile cruiser [i.e., the Renhai or Type 055] can employ long-range, land-attack
cruise missiles and, in 2022, launched the YJ-21 hypersonic missile designed to defeat
aircraft carriers.46
Figure 8. DF-26 Multi-Role Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (IRBM)
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Missile Defense Project, “Dong Feng-26 (DF-26),”
Missile Threat, Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 8, 2018, last modified January 15, 2019,
accessed August 28, 2019.
An August 9, 2024, press report states
Through a series of images and videos that went viral via Open Source Intelligence
(OSINT) sources, the latest test launches of the new YJ-21 hypersonic anti-ship missile
from a Type 055 destroyer of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) have come to
light….
The YJ-21 is one of the most advanced hypersonic anti-ship missiles in service at the
People’s Liberation Army Navy, with an operational range of approximately 1,500
kilometers [about 810 nm] and cruising speeds of Mach 6, reaching terminal speeds of
Mach 10.
Although many details about the missile remain classified, various sources speculate that
the missile is an adapted version for launch from surface ships, based on the CM-401
missile, but with substantial improvements in speed and range. Furthermore, as various
reports suggest, there are versions designed to be launched from H-6N bombers in service
with the People’s Liberation Army Air Force.47
A February 2, 2023, press report states
For the first time, the PLA has officially revealed the performance of its advanced antiship hypersonic missile, sending a warning to the US amid high tensions in the Taiwan
Strait, Chinese analysts said.
China’s YJ-21, or Eagle Strike-21, has a terminal speed of Mach 10, cannot be intercepted
by any anti-missile weapons system in the world and can launch lethal strikes towards
46 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 88, 150.
47 “A Type 055 Destroyer of the Chinese Navy Successfully Conducted the Launch of the New YJ-21 Hypersonic Anti-
Ship Missile,” Zona Militar, August 9, 2024. See also Mark Nicol, “China Has Made ‘Dramatic Advances’ in Its
Hypersonic Missiles that Can Reach up to 6,500mph and Are Almost Impossible to Stop, Intelligence Officials Warn,”
Daily Mail (UK), February 7, 2024.
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enemy ships, according to an article posted by the official Weibo account of the People’s
Liberation Army Strategic Support Force on Monday [January 30]....
The article declares that the missile travels six times the speed of sound all the way, and
has a terminal speed of 10 times the speed of sound, meaning a speed of 3,400 metres per
second (11,155 feet per second) when it hits the target.
“Such a terminal speed cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapon system at this
stage. Even if it is dropped directly at this terrifying speed [hitting the target] without an
explosion it will cause a fatal strike to the enemy ship,” the article stated.
The debut of its export variant, the YJ-21E, at last year’s Airshow China “shows that the
domestic version of the Eagle Strike-21 ship-borne hypersonic missile is no longer the
navy’s most advanced ship-borne hypersonic missile, and more advanced ship-borne
hypersonic missiles are likely to have appeared,” it said.
The article was first published on the website of China Science Communication,
Guangming Online last year, but it was reposted by an official PLA account for the first
time, a development experts described as a clear message for the US.48
Anti-Ship Cruise Missiles (ASCMs)
Although China’s ASCMs do not always receive as much press attention as China’s ASBMs,
observers are nevertheless concerned about them. As discussed later in this report, the relatively
long ranges of certain PLA ASCMs have led to concerns among some observers that the U.S.
Navy is not moving quickly enough to arm U.S. Navy surface ships with similarly ranged
ASCMs.
China’s anti-ship cruise missiles (ASCMs) (see Figure 9, Figure 10, and Figure 11 for examples
of reported images) include both Russian- and PRC-made designs, including some advanced and
highly capable ones, such as the PRC-made YJ-18.49 Press reports in April 2019 and December
2021 stated that China might be developing a YJ-18 launcher that can be packaged inside a
standard commercial shipping container, for the potential purpose of surreptitiously deploying
YJ-18s on merchant ships (Figure 12),50 a capability that, if implemented, could violate the law
of naval warfare.51 DOD states, “It is possible the PRC is developing a launcher that can fit inside
48 Amber Wang, “Chinese Military Announces YJ-21 Missile Abilities in Social Media Post Read as Warning to US
Amid Tension in Taiwan Strait,” South China Morning Post, February 2, 2023. Material in brackets as in original. See
also Gabriel Honrada, “China’s Hypersonic Triad Pressing Down on US,” Asia Times, April 4, 2023.
49 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 54, 61, 88. See also Dmitry Filipoff, “Fighting DMO, PT. 8: China’s Anti-Ship Firepower
And Mass Firing Schemes,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), May 1, 2023 (the acronym DMO
refers to distributed maritime operations); Sam Goldsmith, Vampire Vampire Vampire, The PLA’s Anti-Ship Cruise
Missile Threat to Australian and Allied Naval Operations, Australian Strategic Policy Institute (ASPI), April 2022, 43
pp.; Michael Peck, “Chinese Scientists Say They’re Working on an Anti-Ship Missile that Can Fly as High as an
Airliner and Dive as Deep as a Submarine,” Business Insider, October 20, 2022; “China Is Developing a New
Supersonic Anti-Ship Missile,” Naval News, September 19, 2022.
50 See, for example, Bill Gertz, “China Building Long-Range Cruise Missile Launched From Ship Container,”
Washington Free Beacon, March 27, 2019; Alex Hollings, “China’s New Long-Range Cruise Missiles Are Built to be
Fired from Containers on Merchant Ships,” SOFREP (Special Operations Forces Report), April 4, 2019; “China Is
Building Long-Range Cruise Missiles Launched from Ship Containers,” Navy Recognition, April 8, 2019; Rajesh
Uppal, “Threat of Concealed Weapon and Missiles Systems on Standard International Shipping Container,”
International Defense, Security & Technology, October 20, 2021; Tariq Tahir, “China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in
Shipping Containers for Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World,” U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021.
See also Fan Wei and Cao Siqi, “China Debuts Container-Type Missile Launch System; Weapon Can ‘Effectively
Improve Defense Capabilities of Coastal Countries,’” Global Times, November 12, 2022.
51 Raul (Pete) Pedrozo, “China’s Container Missile Deployments Could Violate the Law of Naval Warfare,”
International Law Studies (U.S. Naval War College), vol. 97, 2021: 1160-1170.
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a standard commercial shipping container for covert employment of the YJ-18 aboard merchant
ships.”52
Figure 9. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)
Source: Detail of photograph accompanying Pierre Delrieu, “China Promotes Export of CM-302 Supersonic
ASCM,” Asian Military Review, July 3, 2017. (The article states “This is an article published in our December 2016
Issue.”) The article states “According to Chinese news media reports, the China Aerospace Science and Industry
Corporation (CASIC) CM-302 missile is being marketed for export as ‘the world’s best anti-ship missile.’ The
missile was showcased at the Zhuhai air show in the southern People’s Republic of China (PRC) in early
November [2016], and is advertised as [a] supersonic Anti-Ship Missile (AShM) [ASCM] which can also be used
in the land attack role. The report, published by the national newspaper China Daily, suggest[s] that the CM-302
is the export version of CASIC’s YJ-12 supersonic AShM, which is in service with the PRC’s armed forces.”
Figure 10. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)
Source: Photograph accompanying “YJ-18 Eagle Strike CH-SS-NX-13,” GlobalSecurity.org, updated October 1,
2019. The article states, “A grand military parade was held in Beijing on 01 October 2019 to mark the People’s
Republic of China’s 70th founding anniversary.… One weapon featured was a new generation of anti-ship missiles
called YJ-18. China unveiled YJ-18/18A anti-ship cruise missiles in the National Day military parade in central
Beijing.”
52 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 54.
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Figure 11. Reported Image of Anti-Ship Cruise Missile (ASCM)
Source: Dennis M. Gormley, Andrew S. Erickson, and Jingdong Yuan, A Low-Visibility Force Multiplier, Assessing
China’s Cruise Missile Ambitions, Published by National Defense University Press for the Center for the Study of
Chinese Military Affairs, Institute for National Strategic Studies, Washington, DC, 2014. The image appears on an
unnumbered page following page 14. The caption to the photograph states, “YJ-83A/C-802A ASCM on display at
2008 Zhuhai Airshow.” The photograph is credited to Associated Press/Wide World Photos.
Figure 12. Illustration of Reported Potential Containerized ASCM Launcher
Source: Illustration accompanying Tariq Tahir, “China Feared to be Hiding Missiles in Shipping Containers for
Trojan Horse-Style Plan to Launch Attack Anywhere in World,” U.S. Sun, December 6, 2021.
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Submarines
Overview
China has been steadily modernizing its submarine force, and most of its submarines are now
built to relatively modern PRC and Russian designs.53 Qualitatively, China’s newest submarines
might not be as capable as Russia’s newest submarines,54 but compared to China’s earlier
submarines, which were built to antiquated designs, its newer submarines are much more
capable.55 An August 2023 Naval War College Report on China’s submarines states
After nearly 50 years since the first Type 091 SSN was commissioned, China is finally on
the verge of producing world-class nuclear-powered submarines. This report argues that
the propulsion, quieting, sensors, and weapons capabilities of the Type 095 SSGN could
approach Russia’s Improved Akula I class SSN. The Type 095 will likely be equipped with
a pump jet propulsor, a freefloating horizontal raft, a hybrid propulsion system, and 12-18
vertical launch system tubes able to accommodate anti-ship and land-attack cruise missiles.
China’s newest SSBN, the Type 096, will likewise see significant improvements over its
predecessor, with the potential to compare favorably to Russia’s Dolgorukiy class SSBN
in the areas of propulsion, sensors, and weapons, but more like the Improved Akula I in
terms of quieting. If this analysis is correct, the introduction of the Type 095 and Type 096
would have profound implications for U.S. undersea security.56
A September 2023 Naval War College report on China’s submarine industrial base states
In recent years, China’s naval industries have made tremendous progress supporting the
modernization of the People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) submarine force, both
through robust commitment to research and development (R&D) and the upgrading of
production infrastructure at the country’s three submarine shipyards…. Nevertheless,
China’s submarine industrial base continues to suffer from surprising weaknesses in
propulsion (from marine diesels to fuel cells) and submarine quieting. Closer ties with
Russia could provide opportunities for China to overcome these enduring technological
limitations by exploiting political and economic levers to gain access to Russia’s remaining
undersea technology secrets.57
53 For a discussion of Russian military transfers to China, including transfers of submarine technology, see Paul
Schwartz, The Changing Nature and Implications of Russian Military Transfers to China, Center for Strategic and
International Studies (CSIS), June 2021, 8 pp. See also Gabriel Honrada, “China-Russia in a Nuclear Sub Counter to
AUKUS,” Asia Times, October 23, 2023; Joseph Trevithick, “Top Russian Submarine Design Bureau Hit By Cyber
Attack With Chinese Characteristics,” The Drive, May 10, 2021.
54 Observers have sometimes characterized Russia’s submarines as being the most capable faced by the U.S. Navy. See,
for example, Joe Gould and Aaron Mehta, “US Could Lose a Key Weapon for Tracking Chinese and Russian Subs,”
Defense News, May 1, 2019; Dave Majumdar, “Why the U.S. Navy Fears Russia’s Submarines,” National Interest,
October 12, 2018; John Schaus, Lauren Dickey, and Andrew Metrick, “Asia’s Looming Subsurface Challenge,” War
on the Rocks, August 11, 2016; Paul McLeary, “Chinese, Russian Subs Increasingly Worrying the Pentagon,” Foreign
Policy, February 24, 2016; Dave Majumdar, “U.S. Navy Impressed with New Russian Attack Boat,” USNI News,
October 28, 2014.
55 For an additional overview of China’s submarine force, see U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Studies
Institute, Quick Look Report “Chinese Undersea Warfare: Development, Capabilities, Trends,” undated, 2 pp., which
summarizes an academic conference on China’s undersea warfare capabilities that was held by the China Maritime
Studies Institute on April 11-13, 2023. See also Alastair Gale, “The Era of Total U.S. Submarine Dominance Over
China Is Ending, New Chinese Submarines and Sensors to Catch U.S. Subs Will Alter the Balance of Power,” Wall
Street Journal, November 20, 2023.
56 Christopher P. Carlson and Howard Wang, A Brief Technical History of PLAN Nuclear Submarines Nuclear
Submarines, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, August 2023, p. 1.
57 Sarah Kirchberger, China’s Submarine Industrial Base: State-Led Innovation with Chinese Characteristics State-Led
(continued...)
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Types and Numbers
Most of China’s submarines are non-nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSs). China also
operates a small number of nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs) and a small number of
nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs). The number of SSNs and SSBNs may
grow in coming years, but the force will likely continue for some time to consist mostly of SSs.
DOD states that China’s navy “has highly prioritized modernizing its submarine force but its
force structure continues to grow modestly as it matures its force, integrates new technologies,
and expands its shipyards. The PLAN operates six nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines
(SSBN), six nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSN), and 48 diesel-powered/air-independent
powered attack submarines (SS). Despite the ongoing retirement of older hulls, the PLAN’s
submarine force is expected to grow to 65 units by 2025 and 80 units by 2035 due to an
expansion of submarine construction capacity.”58
ONI states that “China’s submarine force continues to grow at a low rate, though with
substantially more-capable submarines replacing older units. Current expansion at submarine
production yards could allow higher future production numbers.” ONI projects that China’s
submarine force will grow from a total of 66 boats (4 SSBNs, 7 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2020 to 76
boats (8 SSBNs, 13 SSNs, and 55 SSs) in 2030.59 A November 27, 2022, press report states “The
dry-docks at China’s nuclear submarine facility at Huludao, Liaoning province, show increased
activity. New construction halls are primed. Another dry dock is ready to go. International
analysts point to this as evidence Beijing is gearing up for the mass production of a new
generation of nuclear-powered attack and ballistic missile submarines.”60
China’s newest series-built SS design is the Yuan-class (Type 039) SS (Figure 13), its newest
SSN class is the Shang-class (Type 093) SSN (Figure 14), and its newest SSBN class is the Jin
(Type 094) class SSBN (Figure 15). DOD states
The PRC continues to increase its inventory of conventional submarines capable of firing
advanced ASCMs. Between the mid-1990s and mid-2000s, the PLAN purchased 12
Russian-built KILO class SS units, eight of which can launch ASCMs. PRC shipyards have
delivered 13 SONG class SS units (Type 039) and 21 YUAN class diesel-electric airindependent propulsion attack submarines (SSP) (Type 039A/B). The PRC is expected to
produce 25 or more YUAN class submarines by 2025. In late 2021, the PLAN retired the
first two KILO class submarines (both non-ASCM capable) purchased from Russia in the
1990s.61
Innovation with Chinese Characteristics, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College,
September 2023, p. 1.
58 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 52.
59 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 1. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission. See also H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Production Of AIP Submarines With Massive New
Shipyard,” Naval News, February 16, 2021; H. I. Sutton, “First Image Of China’s New Nuclear Submarine Under
Construction,” Naval News, February 1, 2021.
60 Jamie Seidel, “Satellite Photos Reveal China’s Hypocrisy After Dig to Australia,” News.com.au, November 27,
2022. See also Monty Khanna, The Nuclear Submarine Building Capacity of China’s Bohai Shipyard, Observer
Research Foundation, September 2024, 23 pp.; H. I. Sutton, “Further Expansion Of China's Nuclear Submarine
Shipyard,” HISutton.com, January 5, 2023.
61 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 52-53.
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Figure 13. Yuan (Type 039) Attack Submarine (SS)
Source: Photograph accompanying “Type 039A Yuan class,” SinoDefence.com, July 10, 2018, accessed August
28, 2019.
Figure 14. Shang (Type 093) Attack Submarine (SSN)
Source: Photograph accompanying SinoDefence.com, “Type 093 Shang Class,” July 1, 2018, accessed August 27,
2019, at http://sinodefence.com/type093_shang-class/.
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Figure 15. Jin (Type 094) Ballistic Missile Submarine (SSBN)
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Minnie Chan, “China Puts a Damper on Navy’s 70th
Anniversary Celebrations As It Tries to Allay Fears Over Rising Strength,” South China Morning Post, April 23,
2019. The article credits the photograph to Xinhua.
DOD states further that
Over the past 15 years, the PLAN has constructed 12 nuclear-powered submarines—two
SHANG I class SSNs (Type 093), four SHANG II class SSNs (Type 093A), and six JIN
class SSBNs (Type 094). Equipped with the CSS-N-14 (JL-2) submarine-launched ballistic
missile (SLBM) (3,900 nm) or the CSS-N-20 (JL-3) SLBM (5,400 nm), the PLAN’s six
operational JIN class SSBNs represent the PRC’s first credible sea-based nuclear deterrent.
Each JIN class SSBN can carry up to 12 missiles. In 2019, Beijing displayed these missiles
at the PRC’s 70th founding anniversary parade. The PRC’s next-generation Type 096
SSBN will reportedly be armed with follow-on longer range SLBM. The Type 096 will
likely begin construction soon. Considering the projected 30-plus-year service life of the
platforms [i.e., submarines], the PRC will operate its JIN and Type 096 SSBN fleets
concurrently in the 2030s. This would align with Xi’s 2018 directive for the SSBN force
to achieve “stronger growth.”
The PRC launched four SHANG III class (Type 093B) guided-missile nuclear-powered
attack submarines (SSGN) between May 2022 and January 2023 and could have three hulls
of this class operational by 2025. This new SHANG class variant enhances the PLAN’s
anti-surface warfare capability and could provide a clandestine land-attack option if
equipped with LACMs. The PLAN is improving its anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
capabilities through the development of its surface combatants and special mission aircraft
but continues to lack a robust deep-water ASW capability.62
A June 21, 2024, press report states
62 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 53. See also H. I. Sutton, “New Unreported Submarine In China Leaves West Guessing,”
Naval News, February 3, 2025; Sarah Kirchberger and Christopher P. Carlson, “Neither Fish nor Fowl: China’s
Development of a Nuclear Battery AIP Submarine,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), January 22,
2025; Bill Gertz, “Sunken Chinese Submarine Was a New Hybrid Nuclear-Conventional Attack Boat, U.S. Says,”
Washington Times, September 30, 2024; H. I. Sutton, “China Launches Its Most Sophisticated Submarine to Date,”
Naval News, August 21, 2024.
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China’s increased focus on nuclear-powered submarines is aimed at boosting long-distance
naval combat and deterrence power amid growing risks of high-seas confrontation with the
US, according to military analysts.
The People’s Liberation Army has for the first time publicly acknowledged a strategic shift
away from conventional submarines, as Beijing pushes to build a modernised military by
2027.
“The current development of China’s submarine fleet is dual-capable, both nuclearpowered and conventional, with a focus on nuclear capabilities,” Wen Xuexing, a member
of a PLA Navy submarine unit, told state broadcaster CCTV.63
Submarine Weapons
China’s submarines are armed with one or more of the following: ASCMs, wire-guided and
wake-homing torpedoes, and mines. Wake-homing torpedoes can be very difficult for surface
ships to decoy. China reportedly is also developing a capability for submarines to deploy
drones.64 DOD states that each Jin-class SSBN is equipped to carry up to 12 JL-2 or JL-3 nucleararmed submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs).65 The JL-3 is a new SLBM with a range
longer than that of the JL-2. A May 2, 2021, press report stated that China’s latest Jin-class SSBN
is armed with JL-3s.66
Aircraft Carriers
Overview
China’s first aircraft carrier, Liaoning (Type 001), entered service in 2012. China’s second aircraft
carrier (and its first fully indigenously built carrier), Shandong (Type 002), entered service in
2019. China’s third carrier, Fujian (Type 003), reportedly began conducting sea trials in 2024.
China’s fourth carrier reportedly has begun construction.
Liaoning and Shandong are conventionally powered and launch fixed-wing aircraft using an
upward-sloping “ski ramp” at the ship’s bow. Compared with Liaoning and Shandong, U.S. Navy
aircraft carriers are larger, nuclear powered (giving them greater cruising endurance than a
63 Zhao Ziwen and Coy Li, “Chinese Military Focusing on Nuclear-Powered Subs with Eye on US Navy: Analysts,”
South China Morning Post, June 21, 2024.
64 Stephen Chen, China’s Submarine-Launched Drones Can Do More than the US Military Thinks: Study,” South
China Morning Post, January 22 (updated January 23), 2025.
65 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 56, 104. DOD estimates the range of the JL-2 at 3,900 nautical miles (2024 DOD CMSD, p.
53). Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack targets in Alaska (except the Alaskan panhandle) from
protected bastions close to China, targets in Hawaii (as well as targets in Alaska, except the Alaskan panhandle) from
locations south of Japan, targets in the western half of the 48 contiguous states (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) from
mid-ocean locations west of Hawaii, or targets in all 50 states from mid-ocean locations east of Hawaii. DOD states
that
With a range of approximately 3,900 nm, a JIN equipped with the JL-2 would have to operate in
the mid-Pacific Ocean to threaten targets in the western half of the continental United States
(CONUS) (as well as Hawaii and Alaska) or east of Hawaii to threaten targets on the East Coast of
the United States. PRC sources claim the JL-3 has a range of over 5,400 nm, which would allow a
JIN armed with this missile to target portions of CONUS from PRC littoral waters.
(2024 DOD CMSD, p. 56.)
66 Minnie Chan, “China’s New Nuclear Submarine Missiles Expand Range in US: Analysts,” South China Morning
Post, May 2, 2021. The article states that the JL-3 has a “range [of] over 10,000km (6,200 miles), a source close to the
[PLA] navy said.” Such a range could permit Jin-class SSBNs to attack larger portions of the United States from the
locations described in the previous footnote.
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conventionally powered ship), able to embark and operate a larger number of aircraft, and launch
fixed-wing aircraft using catapults, which can give those aircraft a range/payload capability
greater than that of aircraft launched with a ski ramp. Fujian is conventionally powered, closer in
size and flight deck configuration to U.S. Navy aircraft carriers,67 and equipped with catapults
rather than a ski ramp for launching aircraft.
Observers have speculated that China may eventually field a force of four to six (or possibly more
than six) aircraft carriers. Observers expect that it will be some time before China masters carrierbased aircraft operations on a substantial scale.68
Although aircraft carriers might have some value for China in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios,
they are not considered critical for PLA operations in such scenarios, because Taiwan is within
range of land-based PLA aircraft. Consequently, most observers believe that China is acquiring
carriers primarily for their value in other kinds of operations, and to demonstrate China’s status as
a leading regional power and major world power. PLA aircraft carriers could be used for powerprojection operations, particularly in scenarios that do not involve opposing U.S. forces, and to
impress or intimidate foreign observers.69 In a combat situation involving opposing U.S. naval
and air forces, PLA aircraft carriers would be highly vulnerable to attack by U.S. ships and
aircraft, but conducting such attacks could divert U.S. ships and aircraft from performing other
missions. PLA aircraft carriers could also be used for humanitarian assistance and disaster relief
(HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as antipiracy operations), and
noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs).
Liaoning (Type 001)
Liaoning (Figure 16) is a refurbished ex-Ukrainian aircraft carrier that China purchased from
Ukraine in 1998 as an unfinished ship.70 It has an estimated full load displacement of about
60,000 tons, and reportedly can accommodate an air wing of 30 or more fixed-wing airplanes and
helicopters, including 24 fighters. China has used Liaoning in part for pilot training. In May 2018,
China reportedly announced that the aircraft carrier group formed around Liaoning had reached
initial operational capability (IOC),71 although that term might not mean the same as it does when
used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon systems.
67 For a graphic providing an overhead comparison of the Type 003 design to the U.S. Navy’s Gerald R. Ford (CVN-
78) class aircraft carrier design, see Kathrin Hille, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Prepares to Take to the Seas,”
Financial Times, September 12, 2023.
68 For additional discussion, see Bradley Perrett, “Chinese Carrier Aircraft Fleet Is Poised For Rapid Growth,” Aviation
Week, June 20, 2023; Michael Dahm, “Lessons from the Changing Geometry of PLA Navy Carrier Ops,” U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, January 2023; Michael Peck, “China Is Scrambling to Find Pilots to Fly From Its Growing
Aircraft Carrier Fleet,” Business Insider, March 8, 2023.
69 For a discussion, see, for example, Bryan McGrath and Seth Cropsey, “The Real Reason China Wants Aircraft
Carriers, China’s Carrier Plans Target U.S. Alliances, Not Its Navy,” Real Clear Defense (www.realcleardefense.com),
April 10, 2014; Sebastien Roblin, “All of the Reasons Why the World Should Fear China’s Aircraft Carriers,” National
Interest, October 24, 2017. See also Ben Ho Wan Beng, “(Re)assessing the Near-Term Chinese Carrier Threat in a
Taiwan Scenario,” Breaking Defense, July 21, 2023.
70 Prior to the dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991, Ukraine was a part of the Soviet Union and the place
where the Soviet Union built its aircraft carriers.
71 Andrew Tate, “Liaoning Carrier Group Reaches Initial Operational Capability, IHS Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 4,
2018. See also Travis Fedschun, “China Says Carrier Group Reaches ‘Initial’ Combat Capability,” Fox News, May 31,
2018; “China’s First Aircraft Carrier Formation Capable of Systemic Combat Operation,” CGTV.com, May 31, 2018;
Global Times, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Forming All-Weather Combat Capability with Successful Night Takeoff and
Landing,” People’s Daily Online, May 29, 2018.
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Shandong (Type 002)
Shandong (Figure 17) is a modified version of the Liaoning design that incorporates some design
improvements, including features that reportedly will permit it to embark and operate a larger air
wing of 40 aircraft that includes 36 fighters.72 Its displacement is estimated at about 66,000 tons.
Fujian (Type 003)
Fujian (and Figure 18, Figure 19, and Figure 20) was launched (i.e., put into the water for the
final stages of its construction) on June 17, 2022,73 and reportedly began conducting sea trials in
early May 2024.74 Some observers believe it could be years before the ship begins making regular
deployments.75 The ship has an estimated full load displacement of about 80,000 tons and is
equipped, as observers had expected, with electromagnetic catapults rather than a ski ramp, which
will improve the range/payload capability of the fixed-wing aircraft that it operates.76
China’s Fourth Carrier
China reportedly is building a fourth aircraft carrier.77 The ship’s design, including its estimated
displacement and whether it will be nuclear-powered or conventionally powered, had not been
announced as of April 2025.
Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier
China reportedly is building a new dedicated drone carrier (i.e., a carrier whose embarked air
wing would consist entirely of unmanned aerial vehicles [UAVs]) (Figure 21).78
72 See, for example, Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Second Aircraft Carrier Can Carry 50% More Fighter Jets Than Its First,”
Global Times, August 13, 2019; Liu Zhen, “China’s New Aircraft Carrier to Pack More Jet Power Than the Liaoning,”
South China Morning Post, August 15, 2019.
73 See, for example, Alexandra Stevenson, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier in Major Milestone for Xi Jinping,”
New York Times, June 17, 2022; Chun Han Wong, “China Launches Third Aircraft Carrier, Advancing Naval
Ambitions,” Wall Street Journal, June 17, 2022; Jack Lau, “China Launches Fujian, PLA Navy’s 3rd Aircraft Carrier,”
South China Morning Post, June 17, 2022.
74 See, for example, Zhao Lei, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Completes Maiden Sea Trials,” China Daily, May 8,
2024; Jesse Johnson, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Begins First Sea Trials,” Japan Times, May 1, 2024; Brad
Lendon, “China’s Newest Aircraft Carrier Heads to Sea for First Time,” CNN, May 1, 2024; Dzirhan Mahadzir,
“Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Leaves for First Set of Sea Trials,” USNI News, May 1, 2024; Jun Mai, Yuanyue
Dang, and Hayley Wong, “China’s Third Aircraft Carrier Fujian Tests Power, Navigation in Maiden Sea Trial,” South
China Morning Post, May 1, 2024; Yuichi Shiga and Tamayo Muto, “China Flexes Muscle at Sea as New Aircraft
Carrier Starts Trials,” Nikkei Asia, May 1, 2024; Albee Zhang, Ryan Woo and Kevin Krolicki, “China Launches Sea
Trials for Next-Generation Aircraft Carrier,” Reuters, May 1, 2024.
75 See, for example, Alex Wilson, “China’s Newest Carrier Likely Several Years Away from Regular Deployments,
Experts Say,” Stars and Stripes, May 2, 2024.
76 China Power Team. “How Advanced Is China’s Third Aircraft Carrier?” Center for Strategic and International
Studies (CSIS), May 17, 2023 (updated May 3, 2024); Naval News, “3rd China Navy’s Aircraft Carrier Fujian Holds
Propulsion Tests,” Navy Recognition, May 4, 2023.
77 Matthew Bodner and Keir Simmons, “China Is Working on an Enormous Aircraft Carrier That Rivals the Biggest in
The U.S. Fleet, Analysts Say,” NBC News, March 2, 2025; Thomas Newdick, “Structure At Chinese Shipyard May
Point To China’s Next Aircraft Carrier’s Capabilities,” The War Zone, February 13, 2025.
78 H. I. Sutton, “China Builds World’s First Dedicated Drone Carrier,” Naval News, May 15, 2024.
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Figure 16. Liaoning (Type 001) Aircraft Carrier
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Chris Osieck, “Analysis of Chinese Aircraft Carriers
Their History, Modifications, Spotted Places, and What the Future Has in Store for Us,” Medium, June 14, 2022.
Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship
See also the discussion of the Type 076 amphibious assault ship that might be equipped with an
electromagnetic aircraft catapult, in the section on China’s amphibious ships.
Commercial Heavy-Lift Ship Reportedly Used in Exercise as Helicopter Carrier
In August 2020, it was reported that China had used a commercial heavy-lift ship in a military
exercise as a platform for operating at least two PLA Army helicopters.79
79 David Axe, “Surprise! The Chinese Navy Just Transformed This Cargo Ship Into An Instant Helicopter Carrier,”
Forbes, August 22, 2020; Dave Makichuk, “PLA Army Tests Commercial Ships as Wartime Flight Decks,” Asia
Times, August 25, 2020; John Dotson, “Semi-Submersible Heavy Lift Vessels: A New “Maritime Relay Platform” for
PLA Cross-Strait Operations?” Jamestown Foundation, August 31, 2020.
For articles discussing other aviation-capable ships whose purpose is not clear, see Hayley Wong, “China Tests CarrierLike Ship, but Mystery Vessel’s Purpose Remains Murky,” South China Morning Post, December 3, 2024; Thomas
Newdick, “Detailed Deck View Emerges Of China’s Mysterious Aircraft Carrier-Like Ship,” The War Zone, December
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Figure 17. Shandong (Type 002) Aircraft Carrier
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “China’s Shandong Aircraft Carrier Strike Group
Operated under Strict Surveillance by Japanese Naval Air Assets,” Zona Militar, July 17, 2024.
Figure 18. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Orange Wang, “China Says Its Fujian Carrier Is World’s
Largest Conventionally Powered Warship,” South China Morning Post, June 23, 2024. The caption to the
photograph credits the photograph to Xinhua.
2, 2024; Edward Szekeres and Brad Lendon, “Satellite Imagery Shows Mystery Ship Built in China amid Breakneck
Naval Expansion,” CNN, November 1, 2024; Joseph Trevithick, “New Chinese Mystery Flattop Emerges,” The War
Zone, October 28, 2024.
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Figure 19. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier
Source: Photograph accompanying Ryan Chan, “China Puts Most Advanced Aircraft Carrier to Sea,” Newsweek,
September 3, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to “Pu Haiyang/Xinhua via AP.”
Carrier-Based Aircraft80
China’s primary carrier-based fighter aircraft is the J-15, or Flying Shark (Figure 22), an aircraft
derived from the Russian Su-33 Flanker aircraft design that can operate from carriers equipped
with a ski ramp rather than catapults, but that some observers have critiqued for its range/payload
limitations in operations from carriers equipped with ski ramps rather than catapults.81 China has
developed an upgraded, catapult-capable version of the J-15 that could have improved
range/payload when operated from a catapult-equipped carrier.82
80 For an overview of PLA naval aviation forces, see “PLA Navy Aerospace Forces” in PLA Aerospace Power: A
Primer on Trends in China’s Military Air, Space, and Missile Forces, 3rd Edition, Air University, China Aerospace
Studies Institute (CASI), undated, posted August 15, 2022, pp. 38-52. See also Akhil Kadidal, “Armed to the Teeth:
China’s New Aircraft Carrier Provides Unprecedented Strike Power,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, January 5, 2023.
81 For a discussion of the J-15, see, for example, Rick Joe, “China’s J-15 Carrierborne Fighter: Sizing up the
Competition,” Diplomat, May 20, 2021.
82 Thomas Newdick, “China’s J-15T Enhanced Carrier-Based Flanker Officially Unveiled,” The War Zone, November
6, 2024; Thomas Newdick, “Two New Versions Of China’s J-15 Carrier Fighter Now Appear To Be Operational,” The
War Zone, October 31, 2024; Andreas Rupprecht Mainz and Jon Grevatt, “Shenyang Produces First Catapult-Capable
J-15,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, December 16, 2021; David Axe, “China’s Next Carrier Fighter Is A Lighter, Meaner J15,” Forbes, December 20, 2021.
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Figure 20. Fujian (Type 003) Aircraft Carrier
Source: Photograph accompanying Zhao Lei, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Fujian Completes Maiden Sea Trials,”
China Daily, May 8, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to Xinhua.
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Figure 21. Reported New Dedicated Drone Carrier
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying H. I. Sutton, “China Builds World’s First Dedicated
Drone Carrier,” Naval News, May 15, 2024. The uncropped version carries a mark showing that it is from
Airbus DS. The line extending away from the left end of the ship is an annotation that was added to the
uncropped version to indicate that this is the dedicated drone carrier.
DOD states that China is developing a carrier-capable variant of its FC-31/J-31 fifth-generation
stealth fighter, known as the F-35 (Figure 23), to complement or succeed the J-15 on catapultequipped PLA carriers.83 China reportedly is also developing a carrier-based airborne early
warning (AEW) aircraft, called the KJ-600, that is similar to the U.S. Navy’s carrier-based E-2
Hawkeye AEW aircraft,84 and stealth drone aircraft.85
83 See 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 55, 61. See also Seong Hyeon Choi and Amber Wang, “China’s J-35 Stealth Fighter to
Be Suited Up for Aircraft Carrier Service,” South China Morning Post, November 14, 2024; Liu Xuanzun, “China’s
New-Type Warplane Tested on Aircraft Carrier Liaoning,” Global Times, September 14, 2024; Yukio Tajima, “China
Develops New Stealth Aircraft Likely to Be Deployed on Carriers,” Nikkei Asia, July 8, 2024; Amber Wang, “China’s
Latest Stealth Fighter Jet ‘J-31B’ Ready for Military Service, CCTV Video Post Suggests,” South China Morning Post,
July 6, 2024.
84 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 55. See also, for example, Liu Zhen, “China’s Military Steps Up Development of Ship-Based
Warplanes to Keep Up with Aircraft Carrier Advances,” South China Morning Post, July 30, 2022; Liu Xuanzun,
“China’s First Carrier-Based Early Warning Plane Continues Flight Tests: Report,” Global Times, February 22, 2021;
H. I. Sutton, “First Image Of China’s New Carrier-Based AEW Plane,” Forbes, August 29, 2020; Liu Xuanzun,
“China’s First Carrier-Based, Fixed-Wing Early Warning Aircraft Makes Maiden Flight: Reports,” Global Times,
September 1, 2020; Peter Suciu, “The Xian KJ-600 Could Make China’s Aircraft Carriers Far More Powerful,”
National Interest, September 5, 2020; Kris Osborn, “KJ-600: China’s New Surveillance Plane Will Make Their
Aircraft Carriers Even More Deadly,” National Interest, September 8, 2020.
85 Minnie Chan, “China to Deploy Sharp Sword Stealth Drone for New Type 001A Aircraft Carrier,” South China
Morning Post, September 17, 2019. See also Joseph Trevithick, “Chinese Aircraft Carrier Seen With A Fleet Of
Drones On Its Deck,” The Drive, June 2, 2022.
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Figure 22. J-15 Flying Shark Carrier-Capable Fighter
Source: Photograph accompanying “China Developing Elite New Variants of the J-15 Flying Shark to Deploy
from EMALS Equipped Future Carriers; Implications for the Balance of Power at Sea,” Military Watch Magazine,
August 17, 2018, accessed August 28, 2019.
Figure 23. J-35 Carrier-Capable Fighter
Source: Photograph accompanying Gordon Arthur, “China Unveils J-35A and Other New Fighters at Zhuhai
Airshow,” Defense News, November 13, 2024. The caption to the photograph credits the photograph to China
Military.
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Surface Combatants
Overview
China since the early 1990s has put into service numerous new classes of indigenously built
surface combatants, including a highly capable new cruiser (also referred to as a large destroyer),
several successive classes of increasingly modern and capable destroyers and frigates, a new class
of corvettes (i.e., light frigates), and a new class of missile-armed patrol craft. These new classes
of surface combatants demonstrate a significant modernization of PLA Navy surface combatant
technology.
DOD states that China’s navy “remains engaged in a robust shipbuilding program for surface
combatants. As of early 2024, the PLAN is building a new batch of CG [cruisers], DDG
[destroyers], and two different classes of guided-missile frigates, including a larger, more capable
variant: designated JIANGKAI III ([Type] 054B). These assets will significantly upgrade the
PLAN’s air defense, anti-ship, and anti-submarine capabilities and will be critical as the PLAN
expands its operations beyond the range of the PLA’s shore-based air defense systems.”86 DIA
states that “the era of past designs has given way to production of modern multimission destroyer,
frigate, and corvette classes as China’s technological advancement in naval design has begun to
approach a level commensurate with, and in some cases exceeding, that of other modern
navies.”87 China has also upgraded some of its older surface combatants with new weapons and
other equipment.88
Type 055 Cruiser/Large Destroyer
China is building a new class of cruiser (also referred to as a large destroyer), called the Renhaiclass or Type 055 (Figure 24 and Figure 25) that reportedly displaces between 12,000 and
13,000 tons.89 A March 7, 2021, press report by a PRC media outlet states that the ship displaces
more than 12,000 tons.90 By way of comparison, the U.S. Navy’s Ticonderoga (CG-47) class
cruisers and Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class destroyers (aka the U.S. Navy’s Aegis cruisers and
destroyers) displace about 10,100 tons and 9,700 tons, respectively, while the U.S. Navy’s three
Zumwalt (DDG-1000) class destroyers displace about 15,700 tons. ONI states that Type 055 ships
are being built by two shipyards.91 The first Type 055 ship was reportedly commissioned into
86 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 53.
87 2019 DIA CMP, p. 70.
88 See, for example, H. I. Sutton, “China Increases Potency Of Anti-Carrier Capabilities,” Forbes, May 1, 2020; Peter
Suciu, “Chinese Warships Are Now Armed with Supersonic Anti-Ship Missiles,” National Interest, May 10, 2020.
89 One article from a Chinse media outlet, for example, states, “This ship class has a displacement of more than 12,000
tons.” (Liu Xuanzun, “Chinese PLA’s Two Newly Commissioned Large Destroyers ‘Ready for Combat’ with Latest
Drills,” Global Times, August 22, 2022.) See also China Daily, “2nd Type 055 Destroyer Enters Service,” People’s
Daily Online, March 10, 2021.) For a discussion of the Type 055 design, see Sidharth Kaushal, “The Type 055: A
Glimpse into the PLAN’s Developmental Trajectory,” Royal United Services Institute (RUSI), October 19, 2020.
90 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Large Destroyer Enters Naval Service,” Global Times, March 7, 2021.
91 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
committee’s permission.
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service in January 2020,92 and the 10th was reportedly launched (i.e., put into the water for the
final stages of its construction) in May 2024.93
Figure 24. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Liu Zhen, “Meet the Type 055 Destroyers Steering
China’s Blue-Water Ambitions as Far as Australia,” South China Morning Post, February 26, 2025. The article
credits the photograph to CCTV.
China since the early 1990s has put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built
destroyers, the most recent of which is the Luyang III (Type 052D) class (Figure 26), which
displaces about 7,500 tons and is equipped with phased-array radars and vertical launch missile
systems that outwardly are broadly similar to those on U.S. Navy cruisers and destroyers. Type
052D ships have been in serial production for some time; a March 12, 2023, press report states
that the 27th and the 28th Type 052D ships had been launched (i.e., put into the water for the final
stages of their construction), and that three additional Type 052D ships were under construction at
the same shipyard.94
92 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 2nd Type 055 Large Destroyer Enters Naval Service,” Global Times, March 7, 2021. See also
China Daily, “2nd Type 055 Destroyer Enters Service,” People’s Daily Online, March 10, 2021; Xavier Vavasseur,
“China’s 2nd Type 055 Destroyer ‘Lhasa’ 拉萨 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, March 7, 2021; Xavier
Vavasseur, “China Commissions A Type 055 DDG, A Type 075 LHD And A Type 094 SSBN In A Single Day,”
Naval News, April 24, 2021.
93 Alex Luck, “China Launches 10th Type 055 Vessel, Increases Production At Dagushan,” Naval News, May 28,
2024.
94 Tayfun Ozberk, “China Launches Two More Type 052DL Destroyers In Dalian,” Naval News, March 12, 2023. See
also Liu Xuanzun, “China Launches Two New Type 052D Destroyers: Media,” Global Times, March 12, 2023; John
Hill, “China’s Navy Launches New Destroyers at Dalian Shipyard,” Naval Technology, March 14, 2023. An August
21, 2022, press report (Xavier Vavasseur, “Five Type 052D Destroyers Under Construction In China,” Naval News,
August 21, 2022) referred to a photograph of five Type 05D ships under construction at a shipyard at Dalian, China.
The article stated, “Contacted by Naval News, two Chinese military observers confirmed that there are currently 25
destroyers of the class (13 Type 052D and 12 Type 052DL) currently in service with the PLAN. They will soon be
joined by the five under construction at Dalian and (at least) one more being built at the Jiangnan Changxing
Shipbuilding and Heavy Industry Corporation (the other Chinese shipyard building large surface combatants, located
North East of Shanghai).”
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Figure 25. Renhai (Type 055) Cruiser (or Large Destroyer)
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying Joseph Trevithick, “China’s Sudden Live Fire Naval Drills
Off Australia Rattle Canberra,” The War Zone, February 21, 2025. The article credits the photograph to “Chinese
Navy.”
Figure 26. Luyang III (Type 052D) Destroyer
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “Type 052D Luyang-III Class,” SinoDefence.com,
September 3, 2017, accessed August 28, 2019.
Type 054 Frigate
China since the early 1990s has also put into service multiple new classes of indigenously built
frigates, the most recent of which is the Jiangkai II (Type 054A) class (Figure 27), which
displaces about 4,000 tons. ONI stated in February 2020 that 30 Type 054As entered service
between 2008 and 2019.95 Construction of Type 054 frigates reportedly has shifted to improved
95 Source: Unclassified ONI information paper prepared for Senate Armed Services Committee, subject “UPDATED
China: Naval Construction Trends vis-à-vis U.S. Navy Shipbuilding Plans, 2020-2030,” February 2020, p. 4. Provided
by Senate Armed Services Committee to CRS and CBO on March 4, 2020, and used in this CRS report with the
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versions called the Type 054AG and 054B (Figure 28).96 The first Type 054B reportedly was
commissioned into service in January 2025.97
Figure 27. Jiangkai II (Type 054A) Frigate
Source: Cropped version of photograph accompanying “Steaming Ahead for Training,” China Military Online,
March 30, 2025. The photograph is credited to “eng.chinamil.com.cn/Photo by Fang Zhikun.” The ship (hull
number 553) is identified as a Type 054A frigate in China Military Online, “Helicopter Engages in Take-Off and
Landing Training,” People’s Daily Online, March 7, 2025.
Type 056 Corvette
China has built a new class of corvettes (i.e., a light frigates, or FFLs) called Jiangdao class or
Type 056 ships (Figure 29) that reportedly displace 1,300 tons to 1,500 tons.98 Type 056 ships
were built at a high annual rate in four shipyards—the first was commissioned in 2013, and the
72nd and final ship of the type was reportedly commissioned in early 2021, implying an average
commisisoning rate of about eight ships per year. DOD states that China’s navy “commissioned
the 72nd JIANGDAO in February 2021, completing the production run. The PLAN subsequently
transferred the early flight Type 056 variants, likely 22 ships total, to the CCG [China Coast
committee’s permission. For a press article discussing the potential features of China’s next frigate design beyond the
Type 054A, see Rick Joe, “What Will the Chinese Navy’s Next Frigate Look Like?” Diplomat, May 15, 2020.
96 Richard Thomas, “China’s New Type 054B Frigate Exposes US Naval Inertia,” Naval Technology, January 24,
2025; Alex Luck, “China Launches Improved Type 054AG Frigate, More Hulls Coming,” Naval News, August 14,
2024; Liu Zhen, “China’s Navy Starts Open Water Trials for New Type 054B Frigate,” South China Morning Post,
January 19, 2024; Minnie Chan, “China Has Launched Bigger, Faster Version of 054A Guided Missile Frigate, Online
Photos Suggest,” South China Morning Post, August 28, 2023; Alex Luck, “China’s Type 054B Next-Gen Frigate
Under Construction?” Naval News, January 30, 2023; Minnie Chan, “China Makes Progress on Advanced Warship
Bigger than Type 054A Frigate, According to New Satellite Images,” South China Morning Post, January 27, 2023;
“China Makes Progress on Advanced Warship Bigger than Type 054A Frigate, According to New Satellite Images,”
Pakistan Defence, January 27, 2023; Minnie Chan, “China Naval Steel Order Sparks Speculation over Bigger, Faster
Frigate,” South China Morning Post, May 7, 2022.
97 Christopher Bodeen, “China’s Navy Commissions New-Generation Frigate as Competition Rises with US and
Others,” Associated Press, January 22, 2025; Xinhua, “China’s First Type 054B Frigate Luohe Commissioned,”
People’s Daily Online, January 22, 2025.
98 For an overview of the Type 056 corvette, see Eric Wertheim, “China’s Jiangdao-class Corvette: Mainstay of the
First Island Chain,” U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, September 2022.
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Guard] in 2021, probably due to the early models’ lack of towed-array sonar. The remaining
JIANGDAOs (056A) are equipped with a towed-array sonar and are, thus, capable of
contributing to ASW operations.”99 As shown in Table 1, the rapid growth in the number of Type
056 corvettes since 2013 accounts for a substantial share of the net increase in the total number of
ships in China’s navy since 2013.
Figure 28. Jiangkai II (Type 054B) Frigate
Source: Photograph accompanying Christopher Bodeen, “China’s Navy Commissions New-Generation Frigate
as Competition Rises with US and Others,” Associated Press, January 22, 2025. The article credits the photograph
to “Pu Haiyang/Xinhua via AP.”
Figure 29. Jingdao (Type 056) Corvette
Source: Photograph accompanying “Type 056 Corvette,” Wikipedia, updated April 9, 2025, accessed April 24,
2025. The photograph is credited to Japan’s Ministry of Defense.
99 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 53.
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Reported New Corvette Design
China reportedly has built at least one example of a new corvette (i.e., light frigate or FFL) design
that observers estimate to be somewhat larger than the Type 056 design. It is not clear whether
this ship is a test platform or the lead ship of a new class of corvettes.100
Figure 30. Reported New Corvette Design
Source: Photograph accompanying Dylan Malyasov, “China’s New Stealth Warship Unveiled in Leaked Images,”
Defence Blog, August 28, 2024.
Amphibious Ships
Type 071 Amphibious Ship
China’s new Yuzhao or Type 071 amphibious ships (Figure 31) have an estimated displacement
of more than 19,855 tons,101 compared to about 25,900 tons for the U.S. Navy’s new San Antonio
(LPD-17) class amphibious ships. A May 6, 2021, press report states that the eighth Type 071 ship
“recently made its first publicly known maritime exercise appearance.”102
100 Joseph Trevithick and Oliver Parken, “China’s Mysterious Stealthy Warship Has Headed Out To Sea (Updated),”
The War Zone, May 14, 2024.
101 Unless otherwise indicated, displacement figures cited in this report are full load displacements. IHS Jane’s Fighting
Ships 2017-2018, p. 156, does not provide a full load displacement for the Type 071 class design. Instead, it provides a
standard displacement of 19,855 tons. Full load displacement is larger than standard displacement, so the full load
displacement of the Type 071 design is more than 19,855 tons.
102 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s Newly Commissioned Amphibious Landing Ship Joins Exercises, ‘to Form Powerful
Partnership with Amphibious Assault Ship,’” Global Times, May 6, 2021.
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Figure 31. Yuzhao (Type 071) Amphibious Ship
Source: Cropped version of photograph from Chinese Military Review, “Jinggang Shan (999) Type 071 YUZHAO
Class Amphibious Transport Dock,” undated (but with a URL suggesting that it was posted in February 2012),
accessed August 29, 2018.
Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship
In April 2021, China commissioned into service the first of a new type of amphibious assault
ship,103 called the Yushen or Type 075 (Figure 32 and Figure 33), that has an estimated
displacement of about 36,000 tons, compared to 41,000 to 45,000 tons for U.S. Navy LHA/LHDtype amphibious assault ships.104 In March 2022, it was reported that the first Type 075 ship had
achieved initial operational capability (IOC),105 although that term might not mean the same as it
does when used by DOD in connection with U.S. weapon systems. The second Type 075 ship
reportedly was commissioned into service in late December 2021.106 The third was reportedly
commissioned on or perhaps a few days prior to October 1, 2022.107 The fourth reportedly
103 Amphibious assault ships, also referred to as helicopter carriers or (in British parlance) commando carriers, look like
medium-sized aircraft carriers. U.S. Navy amphibious assault ships are designated LHA or LHD.
104 See, for example, Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “China’s
Massive Next-Generation Amphibious Assault Ship Takes Shape,” Center for Strategic and International Studies
(CSIS), August 1, 2024; Mike Yeo, “China simultaneously commissions three warships on Navy anniversary,” Defense
News, April 26, 2021. For an in-depth discussion of the Type 075 design, see Conor M. Kennedy and Daniel Caldwell,
The Type 075 LHD: Development, Missions, and Capabilities, China Maritime Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval
War College, China Maritime Report No. 23, October 2022, 45 pp.
105 Liu Xuanzun, “China’s 1st Amphibious Assault Ship Reaches Initial Operating Capability, To Make World Tour,”
Global Times, March 2, 2022; Ridzwan Rahmat, “China’s First Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Achieves Initial
Operating Capability,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, March 4, 2022.
106 Xavier Vavasseur, “China’s 2nd Type 075 LHD Guangxi 广西 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, December
30, 2021.
107 Xavier Vavasseur, “China’s 3rd Type 075 LHD Anhui 安徽 Commissioned With PLAN,” Naval News, October 1,
2022.
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“arrived at the port of Zhanjiang on an undisclosed date after leaving the Hudong-Zhonghua
shipyard on January 8 [2025].”108
Figure 32. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship
Source: Photograph accompanying David Axe, “China Is Finishing Its First Large Helicopter Assault Ship,”
National Interest, October 29, 2019.
Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship
China reportedly is building a new type of amphibious assault ship called the Yulan or Type 076
that has an estimated displacement of roughly 50,000 tons and is equipped with an
electromagnetic aircraft catapult for launching drones (Figure 34). The first such ship reportedly
was launched (i.e., put into the water for the final stages of its construction) on December 27,
2024.109
108 Redacción, “The Chinese Navy Is Preparing to Commission the Fourth of Its New Type 075 Amphibious Assault
Ships,” Zona Militar, January 31, 2025.
109 Enoch Wong, “China Confirms PLA Navy’s New Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship Will Be a Drone Carrier,”
South China Morning Post, January 13, 2025; Brad Lendon and Nectar Gan, “China Launches New Amphibious
Assault Ship in a Race to Rival US Military,” CNN, December 27, 2024; Maritime Executive, “China Floats Largest,
Next-Generation Amphibious Assault Ship,” Maritime Executive, December 27, 2024; Amber Wang, “China’s
Launches First Type 076 Warship Tipped to Become World’s First ‘Drone Carrier,’” South China Morning Post,
December 27, 2024; Zhao Lei, “China Launches First Type 076 Amphibious Assault Ship,” China Daily, December
27, 2024; Matthew P. Funaiole, Brian Hart, Aidan Powers-Riggs, and Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., “China’s Massive NextGeneration Amphibious Assault Ship Takes Shape,” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), August 1,
2024; Maritime Executive, “China is Building the World's Largest Amphib and Adding a Catapult,” Maritime
Executive, August 1, 2024; Chen Chuanren, “China Equipping Amphibious Assault Ship With UCAS Launch System,”
Aviation Week, June 10, 2024.
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Figure 33. Yushen (Type 075) Amphibious Assault Ship
Source: Photograph accompanying Liu Zhen, “Chinese Military’s First Type 075 Amphibious Assault Ship Begins
Sea Trial,” South China Morning Post, August 7, 2020. The article credits the photograph to Weibo. Possible Type
076 Catapult-Equipped Amphibious Assault Ship.
Bridge-Equipped Landing Barges
China reportedly is building new bridge-equipped landing barges that observers assess as being
intended to enhance China’s ability to conduct an amphibious landing on the shores of Taiwan.110
110 Chris Buckley, Christoph Koettl, and Agnes Chang, “China’s New Barges Could Make a Tough Task Easier:
Invading Taiwan,” New York Times, April 1, 2025; Alex Wilson, “Bridge-Forming Barges Could Speed Up a Chinese
Invasion Of Taiwan, Experts Say,” Stars and Stripes, March 20, 2025; “China Is Developing Some Startling New Kit
in Its Quest to Seize Taiwan,” Economist, March 20, 2025; Helen Davidson, “China Has Debuted Its New Landing
Barges – What Does This Mean for Taiwan?” Guardian, March 20, 2025; J. Michael Dahm and Thomas Shugart,
Bridges Over Troubled Waters: Shuiqiao-Class Landing Barges in PLA Navy Amphibious Operations, China Maritime
Studies Institute (Naval War College), CMSI Note 14, March 20, 2025, 16 pp.; Andrew S. Erickson, “Shuiqiao Bridge
Barges Expand & Extend PRC Amphibious Landing Capabilities, Threatening Taiwan (Updated),” Andrews S.
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Figure 34. Yulan (Type 076) Amphibious Assault Ship
Source: Photograph accompanying Enoch Wong, “China Confirms PLA Navy’s New Type 076 Amphibious
Assault Ship Will Be a Drone Carrier,” South China Morning Post, January 13, 2025. The article credits the
photograph to Xinhua.
Amphibious Ship Roles and Missions
Although larger amphibious ships such as the Type 071, Type 075, and Type 076 would be of
value for conducting amphibious landings in Taiwan-related conflict scenarios, some observers
believe that China is building such ships in part for their value in conducting other operations,
such as operations for asserting and defending China’s claims in the South and East China Seas,
humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) operations, maritime security operations (such as
antipiracy operations), and noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs). Politically, amphibious
ships can also be used for naval diplomacy (i.e., port calls and engagement activities) and for
impressing or intimidating foreign observers.
Erickson (andrewerickson.com), March 13, 2025; Amber Wang, “The PLA Is Building a Fleet of Barges with Taiwan
in Mind, Analysts Say,” South China Morning Post, January 22, 2025; Kathrin Hille, “China Building New Mobile
Piers that Could Help Possible Taiwan Invasion,” Financial Times, January 13, 2025; H.I. Sutton, “China Suddenly
Building Fleet Of Special Barges Suitable For Taiwan Landings,” January 10, 2025.
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Figure 35. Bridge-Equipped Landing Barge
Source: Photograph accompanying Alex Wilson, “Bridge-Forming Barges Could Speed Up a Chinese Invasion
Of Taiwan, Experts Say,” Stars and Stripes, March 20, 2025. The caption to the photograph credits the
photograph to “Screenshot from X.”
Potential Use of Commercial Ships
Whether and when China will become capable of conducting a large-scale amphibious invasion
of Taiwan is an ongoing matter of debate and discussion.111 In assessing China’s capacity for
conducting a large-scale amphibious invasion of Taiwan, some observers have focused on China’s
potential for using civilian ferries and other commercial ships to augment the transport and
landing capacity of China’s amphibious ships. Reported PLA exercises indicate that China is
exploring and testing this concept.112
111 See, for example, Jeff Seldin, “Doubts Cast China Will Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027,” VOA, April 17, 2024;
Jesse Johnson, “China on Track to Be Ready to Invade Taiwan by 2027, U.S. Commander Says,” Japan Times, March
21, 2024; Laura Zhou, “PLA May Not Be Ready for Major Amphibious Attack on Taiwan Before 2030: Ex-US Navy
Intelligence Officer,” South China Morning Post, February 11, 2024.
112 See, for example, Gregor Stuart Hunter, “China Preparing Armada of Ferries to Invade Taiwan,” Telegraph (UK),
May 26, 2024; Conor M. Kennedy, Deck Cargo Ships: Another Option for a Cross-Strait Invasion, China Maritime
Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, CMSI Note No. 4, February 8, 2024, 6 pp.; J. Michael Dahm,
Beyond Chinese Ferry Tales, The Rise of Deck Cargo Ships in China's Military Activities, 2023, China Maritime
Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Report No. 35, February 2024, 68 pp.; Matthew P.
Funaiole, Brian Hart, Jaehyun Han, and Jennifer Jun, “China Accelerates Construction of ‘Ro-Ro’ Vessels, with
Potential Military Implications,” China Power (Center for Strategic and International Studies [CSIS]), October 11,
2023; Jack Lau, “China’s Navy Includes Civilian Ferry in Military Transport Drill,” South China Morning Post, July
26, 2023; John Konrad, “Is COSCO China’s Secret Invasion Fleet?” gCaptain, April 1, 2023; Conor Kennedy, “RORO Ferries and the Expansion of the PLA’S Landing Ship Fleet,” Center for International Maritime Security
(CIMSEC), March 27, 2023; J. Michael Dahm, More Chinese Ferry Tales: China's Use of Civilian Shipping in
Military Activities, 2021-2022 Use of Civilian Shipping in Military Activities, 2021-2022, China Maritime Studies
Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Report No. 25, January 2023, 71 pp.; Parth Satam,
“Civilian Ship Armed With Tanks—Scary Images Reveal China’s ‘Notorious Plan’ To Invade & Annex Taiwan,”
Eurasian Times, November 8, 2022; Thomas Shugart, “Mind the Gap, Part 2: The Cross-Strait Potential of China’s
Civilian Shipping Has Grown,” War on the Rocks, October 12, 2022; H I Sutton and Sam LaGrone, “Chinese Launch
Assault Craft from Civilian Car Ferries in Mass Amphibious Invasion Drill, Satellite Photos Show,” USNI News,
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Operations Away from Home Waters
Ship Operations
Although China’s navy operates primarily in China’s home waters, PLA Navy ships are
conducting increasing numbers of operations away from China’s home waters, including the
broader waters of the Western Pacific, the Indian Ocean, and the waters surrounding Europe,
including the Mediterranean Sea and the Baltic Sea. A November 23, 2019, DOD news report
quoted Admiral Philip Davidson, the commander of the U.S. Indo-Pacific Command, as stating
that China’s navy had conducted more global naval deployments in the previous 30 months than
it had in the previous 30 years.113
DOD states that “the PLAN’s ability to perform missions beyond the FIC [first island chain] is
modest but growing as it gains more experience operating in distant waters and acquires larger
and more advanced platforms. The PRC’s experience in extended range operations primarily
comes from extended task group deployments and its ongoing counterpiracy mission in the Gulf
of Aden.”114 China has been conducting antipiracy operations in the Gulf of Aden since December
2008 via a succession of more than 45 rotationally deployed naval escort task forces.115 China’s
long-distance naval deployments have also been for making diplomatic port calls and conducting
training exercises.
September 28, 2022; Bethany Dawson, “China Is Using a Stealth Fleet of Fishing Boats and Ferries to Boost Its Naval
Power, Say Military Experts,” Business Insider, September 24, 2022; David Rising, “China Using Civilian Ships to
Enhance Navy Capability, Reach,” Associated Press, September 24, 2022; Thomas Shugart, “Mind The Gap: How
China’s Civilian Shipping Could Enable a Taiwan Invasion,” War on the Rocks, August 16, 2022; J. Michael Dahm,
Chinese Ferry Tales, The PLA’s Use of Civilian Shipping in Support of Over-the-Shore Logistics, China Maritime
Studies Institute (CMSI), U.S. Naval War College, China Maritime Report No. 16, November 2021, 56 pp.; Brian
Waidelich, Patrick deGategno, Timothy Ditter, and Thomas Bickford, Chinese Views of Civilian Ship Mobilization,
DSI-2021-U-030614-Final, CNA, November 10, 2021, 2 pp. (with a note indicating that it is a summary based on the
full-length CNA report, Chinese Views of Civilian Ships’ Support to PLA Maritime Operations, DRM2021-C-029795Final); Kris Osborn, “Could China’s Civilian Ferries Play a Role in a Taiwan Invasion?” National Interest, October 21,
2021; Keoni Everington, “Video Shows Ship Packed with Chinese Tanks for ‘Future Battlefield’ in Taiwan,” Taiwan
News, October 18, 2021; Michael Dahm and Conor M. Kennedy, “Civilian Shipping: Ferrying the People’s Liberation
Army Ashore,” Center for International Maritime Security (CIMSEC), September 9, 2021; Chris Horton, “China
Mobilizes Civilian Ferries for Taiwan Invasion Drills,” Nikkei Asia, August 25, 2021; Andrew Tate, “Chinese Military
Using Commercial Ro-Ro Shipping to Enhance Its Amphibious Capabilities,” Jane’s, August 23, 2021; Thomas
Shugart, “Mind the Gap: How China’s Civilian Shipping Could Enable a Taiwan Invasion,” War on the Rocks, August
16, 2021; Mike Yeo, “China Reportedly Converted Civilian Ferries for Amphibious Assault Operations,” Defense
News, August 4, 2021; David Hambling, “China Converts Car Ferries For Amphibious Assault,” Forbes, July 27, 2021;
Courtney Mabeus, “Chinese Navy Using Commercial Car Ferries to Launch Amphibious Landing Craft,” USNI News,
July 26, 2021; Conor Kennedy, “Ramping the Strait: Quick and Dirty Solutions to Boost Amphibious Lift,” China
Brief, July 16, 2021.
113 David Vergun, “Freedom of Navigation in South China Sea Critical to Prosperity, Says Indo-Pacific Commander,”
DOD News, November 23, 2019.
114 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 50. See also p. 90.
115 See Dennis J. Blasko, Recent Changes in the PLA Navy’s Gulf of Aden Deployment Pattern, China Maritime Studies
Institute (CMSI), Naval War College, CMSI Note No. 8, August 13, 2024, 8 pp. See also, for example, Global Times,
“47th Chinese Naval Escort Taskforce Departs for Gulf of Aden,” Global Times, December 15, 2024.
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Current or Potential Bases Outside China
China’s distant naval operations are supported in part by China’s military base in Djibouti,
which is located where the Gulf of Aden meets the Red Sea. China officially opened the base in
August 2017 as its first overseas military base.116
Some observers expect that China in coming years will seek to establish a global network of
locations in various parts of the world for refueling and resupplying PLA Navy ships conducting
distant naval operations.117 DOD states that
Beyond its base in Djibouti, the PRC is very likely considering and planning for additional
military logistics facilities to support naval, air, and ground forces projection.
The PRC has likely considered Burma, Thailand, Indonesia, Pakistan, Sri Lanka, United
Arab Emirates, Kenya, Equatorial Guinea, Seychelles, Tanzania, Angola, Nigeria,
Namibia, Mozambique, Bangladesh, Papua New Guinea, the Solomon Islands, and
Tajikistan. The PRC has probably already made overtures to Gabon, Equatorial Guinea,
Namibia, Vanuatu, and the Solomon Islands. The PLA is probably most interested in
military access along the SLOCs from the PRC to the Strait of Hormuz and Africa.118
Observers are following developments at Cambodia’s Ream naval base, which fronts onto the
Gulf of Thailand.119 DOD states, “In June 2022, a PRC official confirmed that the PLA would
116 For discussions of Djibouti and other potential PLA military bases outside China, see 2024 DOD CMSD, pp. 57, 90,
143; Kathrin Hille, Demetri Sevastopulo, and John Paul Rathbone, “China Denies Building Naval Bases But Fear of Its
Military Reach Grows,” Financial Times, June 19, 2022. Regarding China’s military base in Djibouti, see H. I. Sutton,
“Satellite Images Show That Chinese Navy Is Expanding Overseas Base,” Forbes, May 10, 2020; Peter Suciu,
“China’s Naval Base in Africa Is Getting Bigger. Is a Network of Bases Next?” National Interest, May 11, 2020; staff
writer, “Chinese Navy Expanding Base in Africa, Satellite Images Confirm,” War Is Boring, May 11, 2020; Jean-Pierre
Cabestan, “China’s Djibouti Naval Base Increasing Its Power,” East Asia Forum, May 16, 2020; Dave Makichuk,
“China Builds a Mega-Fortress on the Horn of Africa,” Asia Times, May 18, 2020; Michael Evans, “Beijing’s African
Port Ready for Aircraft Carriers,” Times (UK), May 19, 2020.
117 See, for example, Maxwell Simon and Jayaram Ravi, Navigating China’s Opportunistic Approach to Overseas
Naval Base Acquisition, Belfer Center (Harvard Kennedy School), November 2023, 69 pp.; Cristina L. Garafola,
Stephen Watts, and Kristin J. Leuschner, China’s Global Basing Ambitions, Defense Implications for the United States,
RAND, report RRA1496-1, 2022, 31 pp.; Brad Lendon and Simone McCarthy, “Blue-Water Ambitions: Is China
Looking Beyond Its Neighborhood Now It Has the World’s Largest Navy?” CNN, September 2, 2023; John Grady,
“Beijing Investing in Network of Global Chinese Naval Bases, Researchers Find,” USNI News, August 16, 2023;
Rathindra Kuruwita, “AidData Report Warns of a Chinese Naval Base in Sri Lanka’s Hambantota Port,” Diplomat,
August 15, 2023; Guy Taylor, “Port Call: China’s Navy Scouting Range of Sites for Future Overseas Bases,”
Washington Times, August 15, 2023; Philip Heijmans, “China’s Top Option for Next Naval Base Is Sri Lanka, Report
Says,” Bloomberg, July 28, 2023; Alexander Wooley and Sheng Zhang, “Beijing Is Going Places—and Building Naval
Bases,” Foreign Policy, July 27, 2023; Alex Wooley, Sheng Zhang, Rory Fedorochko, and Sarina Patterson, Harboring
Global Ambitions: China's Ports Footprint and Implications for Future Overseas Naval Bases, AidData (William &
Mary), July 2023 (posted online July 25, 2023), 44 pp.
118 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 143.
119 Rahman Yaacob, “Partnership of Convenience: Ream Naval Base and the Cambodia–China Convergence,” Lowy
Institute, December 4, 2024; Jonathan Head, “Does China now Have a Permanent Military Base in Cambodia?” BBC,
October 7, 2024; RFA Staff, “Cambodian Naval Base Could Accommodate Chinese Submarines: Analyst,” Radio Free
Asia (RFA), July 26, 2024; Agnes Chang and Hannah Beech, “The Chinese Base That Isn’t There,” New York Times,
July 14, 2024; Christopher Woody, “China’s Newest Military Base Abroad Is Up and Running, and There Are More on
the Horizon,” Breaking Defense, July 12, 2024; Austin Ramzy, “Cambodia Denies Hosting Chinese Naval Base, but
Two Ships Raise Suspicions,” Wall Street Journal, July 1, 2024; RFA Staff, “Record Number of Chinese Warships
Operating in Cambodia,” Radio Free Asia (RFA), May 21, 2024; Sopheng Cheang and David Rising, “Chinese
Warships Have Been Docked in Cambodia for 5 Months, But Government Says It’s Not Permanent,” Associated Press,
May 8, 2024; Philip Heijmans, “Chinese Warships in Cambodia Fuel Fresh Concerns as Wang Visits,” Bloomberg,
April 22, 2024; Seong Hyeon Choi, “Chinese War Ships Have ‘Exclusive’ Access at Cambodia Port: US Report,”
South China Morning Post, April 19, 2024; Shaun Turton and Bopha Phorn, “Chinese warships at Cambodian base for
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have access to parts of Cambodia’s Ream Naval Base. Two PLAN corvettes became the first
ships to dock at the newly constructed pier there in December 2023.”120
A security agreement between China and the Solomon Islands that was announced by the
Solomon Islands in April 2022 has led some observers to express concern that the agreement
could eventually lead to, among other things, the establishment of a PRC naval base in that
country.121 The Prime Minister of the Solomon Islands reportedly ruled out that possibility, stating
that it would “put our country and our people as targets for potential military strikes.”122
In December 2021, it was reported that China may be seeking to establish a military (including
naval) base at a port in Equatorial Guinea, a country located on the Atlantic coast of Africa—a
location that could enhance China’s ability to conduct naval operations in the Atlantic.123
A January 3, 2023, press report states, “China is once again pressuring Argentina to build a naval
base in Ushuaia, Tierra del Fuego province, which would mean opening the door to Antarctica
for Beijing.”124
A November 7, 2023, press report states, “President Joe Biden has been briefed on what his
advisers see as a PRC plan to build a military facility in Oman, people familiar with the matter
said, amid a broader effort by Beijing to deepen defense and diplomatic ties with the Middle
East.”125
months, CSIS analysis shows,” Nikkei Asia, April 18, 2024; “First Among Piers: Chinese Ships Settle in at Cambodia’s
Ream,” Asia Maritime Transparency Initiative (AMTI), Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), April 18,
2024; Yuji Nitta, “Chinese Warships Spotted Again at Cambodia Naval Base,” Nikkei Asia, April 1, 2024; Aadil Brar,
“US Worried About China-Funded Naval Base,” Newsweek, March 8, 2024; Seong Hyeon Choi, “US Has ‘Serious
Concerns’ about Chinese-Funded Upgrade to Cambodian Naval Base, Senior Diplomat Daniel Kritenbrink Says,”
South China Morning Post, March 7, 2024; Aadil Brar, “Satellite Photos Show China's Dramatic Progress at Foreign
Naval Base,” Newsweek, February 23, 2024.
120 2024 DOD CMSD, p. 141.
121 See, for example, Camilla Pohle-Anderson, “China’s Search for a Permanent Military Presence in the Pacific
Islands,” U.S. Institute of Peace, July 21, 2022; Damien Cave, “Why a Chinese Security Deal in the Pacific Could
Ripple Through the World, In Potentially Opening the Door to a Chinese Military Base, the Solomon Islands Threatens
the Balance of Power in a Vital Shipping Region,” New York Times, April 20, 2022; Ralph Jennings, “Analysts:
Chinese Navy to Grow Through 2050, With Emphasis on Hardware,” Voice of America, April 5, 2022.
122 See, for example, “Solomons Leader: Chinese Base Would Make His People Targets,” Associated Press, July 14,
2022; John Feng, “China Military Base in Solomon Islands Ruled Out in Blow to Naval Ambitions,” Newsweek, July
14, 2022; Lice Movono and Kate Lyons, “Solomon Islands PM Rules Out China Military Base and Says Australia is
‘Security Partner of Choice,’” Guardian, July 13, 2022.
123 See, for example, Nadia Helmy, “The Impact of the Potential Chinese Naval Bases on the Atlantic Ocean,” Modern
Diplomacy, February 15, 2024; Michael M. Phillips, “U.S.-China Tensions Have a New Front: A Naval Base in
Africa,” Wall Street Journal, February 10, 2024; Alex Vines, Henry Tugendhat, and Armida van Rij, “Is China Eyeing
a Second Military Base in Africa?” U.S. Institute of Peace, January 30, 2024; Paul Nantulya, “Considerations for a
Prospective New Chinese Naval Base in Africa,” Africa Center for Strategic Studies, May 12, 2022; Cobus van Staden,
“Fears of a Chinese Naval Base in West Africa Are Overblown,” Foreign Policy, March 3, 2022; Michael M. Phillips,
“U.S. Aims to Thwart China’s Plan for Atlantic Base in Africa,” Wall Street Journal, February 11, 2022; Bonny Lin,
Jude Blanchette, Joseph S. Bermudez Jr., and Mvemba Phezo Dizolele, “Is China Building a New String of Pearls in
the Atlantic Ocean?” Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), December 20, 2021; Michael M. Phillips,
“China Seeks First Military Base on Africa’s Atlantic Coast, U.S. Intelligence Finds, Alarmed Officials at the White
House and Pentagon Urge Equatorial Guinea to Rebuff Beijing’s Overtures,” Wall Street Journal, December 5, 2021.
124 Guillermo Saavedra, “China Pressures Argentina to Build Naval Base,” Diálogo Americas, January 3, 2023.
125 Michelle Jamrisko and Jennifer Jacobs, “Biden Briefed on Chinese Effort to Put Military Base in Oman,”
Bloomberg, November 7, 2023.
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U.S. Navy Response
Overview
The U.S. Navy has taken a number of actions to counter China’s naval modernization effort.
Among other things, the U.S. Navy has
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
shifted a greater percentage of its fleet to the Pacific;126
assigned its most-capable new ships and aircraft to the Pacific;
maintained or increased general presence operations, training and developmental
exercises, and engagement and cooperation with allied and other navies in the
Indo-Pacific;
increased the planned future size of the Navy;
initiated, increased, or accelerated numerous programs for developing new
military technologies and acquiring new ships, aircraft, unmanned vehicles, and
weapons;
developed new operational concepts (i.e., new ways to employ Navy and Marine
Corps forces) for countering PLA maritime A2/AD forces; and
signaled that the Navy in coming years will shift to a more distributed fleet
architecture that will feature a substantially greater use of unmanned vehicles.
Some of the above items are discussed in more detail below.
Planned Size of Navy
As discussed in greater detail in another CRS report,127 the Navy’s preferred force-level goal calls
for achieving and maintaining a fleet of 381 battle force ships, compared to the Navy’s 296 battle
force ships as of September 30, 2024. Under the Navy’s FY2025 30-year (FY2025-FY2054)
shipbuilding plan, the U.S. Navy would grow to more than 300 ships in FY2032 and reach a total
of more than 381 ships in FY2042.
126 Efforts in this regard began at least as far back as 2006: The final report on the 2006 Quadrennial Defense Review
(QDR) directed the Navy “to adjust its force posture and basing to provide at least six operationally available and
sustainable carriers and 60% of its submarines in the Pacific to support engagement, presence and deterrence.” (U.S.
Department of Defense, Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2006. February 6, 2006, p. 47.) Subsequent
to this directive, the Navy announced an intention to increase to 60% (from a starting point of about 55%) the
percentage of the fleet as a whole that is assigned to the Pacific. An October 13, 2021, press report stated, “US Naval
Chief of Operations, Admiral Michael Gilday, on Tuesday kicked off his 5-day visit to India by meeting his Indian
counterpart Admiral Karambir Singh, Chief of Defence Staff General Bipin Rawat and other senior government
officials.... Asked about what the US intends to do to counter China’s aggressive modernisation of its Navy, Gilday
said they will not try to outspend it, but partners like India in the region will be the key to ensure that the Indian Ocean
Region (IOR) is stable. Given the importance of the region, 60 per cent of US Navy’s forces are now in the IndoPacific, he said.” (Krishn Kaushik, “60% Navy Forces in Indo-Pacific Region Now: US Navy Chief,” Indian Express,
October 13, 2021.)
127 CRS Report RL32665, Navy Force Structure and Shipbuilding Plans: Background and Issues for Congress, by
Ronald O'Rourke.
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Highly Capable Ships, Aircraft, Weapons, and Other Systems
Many of the Navy’s programs for acquiring highly capable ships, aircraft, weapons, and other
systems can be viewed as intended, at least in part, at improving the U.S. Navy’s ability to
counter PLA maritime A2/AD capabilities. Examples include the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Virginia-class nuclear-powered attack submarines (SSNs);128
the Navy’s envisaged next-generation SSN, called the SSN(X);129
Gerald R. Ford (CVN-78) class nuclear-powered aircraft carriers (CVNs);130
Navy and Marine Corps versions of the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF);131
Arleigh Burke (DDG-51) class guided missile destroyers (DDGs);132
the Navy’s envisaged next-generation DDG, called the DDG(X);133
Constellation (FFG-62) class frigates;134
new anti-ship weapons, such as the Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM);135
hypersonic weapons, including the ship-launched Conventional Prompt Strike
(CPS) weapon and the Hypersonic Air-Launched OASuW (HALO) weapon, also
known as OASuW Increment 2;136
an ability to do at-sea reloading of Vertical Launch System (VLS) missile tubes
on Navy surface combatants, so that VLS-equuipped Navy surface combatants
engaged in combat operations do not need to withdraw to a distant port to be
reloaded;137
shipboard high-energy lasers;138
128 For more on the Virginia-class program, see CRS Report RL32418, Navy Virginia-Class Submarine Program and
AUKUS Submarine Proposal: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
129 For more on the SSN(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11826, Navy Next-Generation Attack Submarine (SSN[X])
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
130 For more on the CVN-78 program, see CRS Report RS20643, Navy Ford (CVN-78) Class Aircraft Carrier
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
131 For more on the JSF program, see CRS Report RL30563, F-35 Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program, by John R.
Hoehn.
132 For more on the DDG-51 program, see CRS Report RL32109, Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000 Destroyer Programs:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
133 For more on the DDG(X) program, see CRS In Focus IF11679, Navy DDG(X) Next-Generation Destroyer
Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
134 For more on the FFG-62 program, see CRS Report R44972, Navy Constellation (FFG-62) Class Frigate Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
135 For more on the LRASM program, see CRS In Focus IF11353, Defense Primer: U.S. Precision-Guided Munitions,
by Daniel M. Gettinger.
136 For more on the CPS program, see CRS Report R45811, Hypersonic Weapons: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Kelley M. Sayler
137 See, for example, Gidget Fuentes, “Navy Conducts First Successful Tests Reloading Missiles and Rearming
Warships At Sea,” USNI News, October 15, 2024; John Konrad, “US Navy Reloads Missiles At Sea: Is America Now
Ready For A Naval War With China?” gCaptain, October 12, 2024; Tyler Rogoway, “Navy Just Reloaded A Vertical
Launch System For The First Time While Underway At Sea,” The War Zone, October 12, 2024; Caitlyn Burchett, “A
Navy First: USS Chosin Tests Resupplying Rapid-Fire Launch System at Sea,” Stars and Stripes, October 11, 2024.
138 For more on Navy laser programs, see CRS Report R44175, Navy Shipboard Lasers: Background and Issues for
Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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•
new electronic warfare systems;139 and
undersea surveillance systems for detecting and tracking adversary
submarines.140
New Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Operating Concept
As discussed in another CRS report,141 the Department of the Navy (which includes the Navy and
Marine Corps) is implementing a new operating concept called Distributed Maritime Operations
(DMO) for using U.S. naval (i.e., Navy and Marine Corps) forces in combat operations against an
adversary, particularly China, that has substantial capabilities for detecting and attacking U.S.
Navy surface ships with anti-ship missiles and other weapons. Key features of DMO appear to
include the following:
•
•
•
•
Dispersing Navy units over a larger area within the theater of operations, so as to
make it harder for an adversary to detect and target Navy units, while still
permitting Navy units to support one another and concentrate their fires on
adversary targets.
Spreading the Navy’s sensors and weapons across a wider array of ships and
aircraft, so as to reduce the fraction of the Navy’s sensors and weapons that
would be lost due to the destruction of any one Navy ship or aircraft (i.e., avoid
“putting too many eggs into one basket”).
Making greater use of longer-ranged weapons, unmanned vessels, and unmanned
aircraft in support of the previous two points.
Using resilient communication links and networking technologies to knit the
resulting widely dispersed force of manned and unmanned ships and aircraft into
a coordinated battle force that can withstand and adapt to enemy attacks on Navy
communications and networks.
Some examples of Navy acquisition programs that appear associated with DMO include the
following:
•
•
Programs for acquiring longer-ranged weapons, such as the Maritime Strike
Tomahawk (a new anti-ship variant of the Tomahawk cruise missile) and the
previously mentioned Long-Range Anti-Ship Missile (LRASM).
The Large Unmanned Surface Vessel (LUSV), which is to be equipped with a
Vertical Launch System (VLS) for storing and firing anti-ship missiles and other
weapons. LUSVs are intended to act as adjunct missile magazines for manned
Navy surface combatants.142
139 See, for example, Thomas Newdick, “Destroyer Looks Radically Different After Electronic Warfare Upgrade,” The
War Zone, November 8, 2023; Brett Tingley and Tyler Rogoway, “Navy’s New Shipboard Electronic Warfare System
Is Being Shrunk Down For Smaller Ships,” The War Zone, January 15, 2022.
140 See, for example, Joe Brock, “U.S. Revives Cold War Submarine Spy Program to Counter China,” Reuters,
September 21, 2023; Anders Hagstrom, “US Pours Billions into Cold War Submarine Program as China Bolsters
Navy,” Fox News, September 21, 2023.
141 See CRS In Focus IF12599, Defense Primer: Navy Distributed Maritime Operations (DMO) Concept, by Ronald
O'Rourke.
142 For more on the LUSV program, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
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The Medium Unmanned Surface Vessel (MUSV), which is to be equipped with
radars or other sensors. MUSVs are intended to help form a distributed sensor
network for supporting Navy operations.143
The light replenishment oiler (TAOL) shipbuilding program for building a new
class of smaller oilers. TAOLs are intended to enhance the Navy’s ability to
provide fuel and supplies to Navy ships that are operating in a more distributed
manner across a wider sea area.144
The Medium Landing Ship (LSM) program for building a class of smaller
amphibious ships. The LSM program is central to implementing a Marine Corps
operating concept associated with DMO that is called Expeditionary Advanced
Base Operations (EABO).145
Cooperation with Naval Forces of Allies and Other Countries
In General
U.S. Navy efforts to increase cooperation with naval forces from allies such as Japan and
Australia and other countries such India, including exercises and other forms of engagement,
appear aimed not only at improving interoperability between U.S. and allied naval forces, but also
at expanding existing bilateral forms of naval cooperation (e.g., U.S.-Japan, U.S.-Australia,
U.S.-India) into trilateral (e.g., U.S.-Japan-Australia, U.S.-Australia-India) or quadrilateral (e.g.,
U.S.-Japan-Australia-India) forms that could enhance the ability of the United States and its allies
in the Indo-Pacific region to balance against China’s growing military capabilities and deter
potential assertive actions by China.146
AUKUS Security Agreement
The Australia-United Kingdom-United States (AUKUS) trilateral security partnership announced
in September 2021 includes a major initiative (called Pillar 1) to homeport U.S. and UK nuclearpowered attack submarines (SSNs) in Australia and establish an eight-boat Australian SSN
force,147 and another major initiative (called Pillar 2) for the three countries to cooperatively
pursue advanced military capabilities, including undersea capabilities other than SSNs (such as
unmanned underwater vehicles and undersea weapons); quantum technologies; artificial
intelligence and autonomy; advanced cyber capabilities; hypersonic and counter-hypersonic
capabilities; and electronic warfare.148
143 For more on the MUSV program, see CRS Report R45757, Navy Large Unmanned Surface and Undersea Vehicles:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
144 For more on the TAOL program, see CRS In Focus IF11674, Navy Light Replenishment Oiler (TAOL) Program:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O'Rourke.
145 For more on the LSM program and EABO, see CRS Report R46374, Navy Medium Landing Ship (LSM) (Previously
Light Amphibious Warship [LAW]) Program: Ba
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