Conventional Warheads for Long-Range Ballistic Missiles: Background and Issues for Congress

Congressional research reportJan 26, 2009

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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

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The United States has deployed long-range ballistic missiles in its strategic offensive nuclear

forces for more than 40 years. In recent years, some have proposed that the United States deploy

conventional warheads on these missiles. This would provide the United States with the ability to

strike promptly anywhere in the world, regardless of the presence of overseas bases or nearby

naval forces.

The Air Force and Navy have both studied the possible deployment of conventional warheads on

their long-range ballistic missiles. The Air Force has been pursuing, with DARPA, research into a

number of technologies that might enhance the U.S. long-range strike capability. These include a

hypersonic glide vehicle, known as the Common Aero Vehicle (CAV), that could carry

conventional munitions on modified Minuteman II or Peacekeeper missiles, or it could deploy

these missiles with more familiar conventional warheads. This effort is now known as the

Conventional Strike Missile (CSM) and could be deployed as a mid-term option for the Prompt

Global Strike mission. The FY2007 Defense Budget requested $127 million to pursue the

deployment of conventional warheads on Trident missiles, which might be deployed in 2-4 years,

but the 109th Congress rejected most of this request. The FY2008 budget requested $175.4

million, but the 110th Congress did not approve this funding, either, instead transferring $100

million to a combined fund to conduct research into a broad range of “prompt global strike”

technologies. In the FY2009 budget, the Administration requested $117.6 million for the prompt

global strike program element.

Many have expressed concerns about the possibility that other nations, such as Russia or China

might misinterpret the launch of a conventionally-armed ballistic missile and conclude that they

are under attack with nuclear weapons. The Air Force outlined a number of measures that might

reduce this risk with its CSM concept. For example, it could base these missiles along the U.S.

coast, far from bases with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. The United States could also use

consultations, notifications, and inspections to inform others of the difference between

conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles. But, although these measures could address some of

the concerns, they are not likely to eliminate the risks of misunderstandings, particularly if the

United States used these missiles on short notice in a crisis. The Navy would not segregate its

conventional missiles, but would deploy them on submarines that also carry nuclear warheads,

but it could still notify Russia or other nations to mitigate the possibility of misunderstandings.

Long-range ballistic missiles can bring unique capabilities to the PGS mission. But these missiles

are only uniquely capable if the United States must attack promptly, or within hours, of the start

of an unanticipated conflict. In any other circumstance, the United States is likely to have the time

to move its forces into the region. Hence, Congress may review whether the benefits brought by

these systems outweigh the risks of misunderstandings arising from their use. This report will be

updated as needed.

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Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 1

Background ..................................................................................................................................... 2

Conventional Ballistic Missiles and Offensive Strike Forces ................................................... 2

Conventional Ballistic Missiles and Prompt Global Strike....................................................... 3

The Prompt Global Strike Mission (PGS) .......................................................................... 3

PGS and the New U.S. Strategic Command ....................................................................... 4

Potential Targets and Weapons for the PGS Mission.......................................................... 5

Plans and Programs ......................................................................................................................... 6

Navy Programs.......................................................................................................................... 7

Reentry Vehicle Research ................................................................................................... 7

Conventional Trident Modification..................................................................................... 9

Submarine-Launched Intermediate-Range Ballistic Missile (SLIRBM) .......................... 10

Air Force Programs ..................................................................................................................11

Missile Options ................................................................................................................. 12

Warhead Options............................................................................................................... 12

System Characteristics ...................................................................................................... 13

Legislative Activity ................................................................................................................. 14

FY2003 and FY2004......................................................................................................... 14

FY2005 ............................................................................................................................. 15

FY2006 and FY2007......................................................................................................... 15

FY2008 ............................................................................................................................. 16

FY2009 ............................................................................................................................. 18

Issues for Congress........................................................................................................................ 19

Assessing the Rationale........................................................................................................... 19

The Nuclear Posture Review ............................................................................................ 19

PGS ................................................................................................................................... 20

Reviewing the Alternatives ..................................................................................................... 21

Land-Based Ballistic Missiles........................................................................................... 21

Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles............................................................................ 25

Long-Range Bombers ....................................................................................................... 25

Tomahawk Cruise Missiles ............................................................................................... 26

Hypersonic Cruise Missiles .............................................................................................. 26

Forward-Based Global Strike (FBGS) .............................................................................. 26

Arms Control Issues................................................................................................................ 27

Air Force Plans ................................................................................................................. 27

Navy Plans ........................................................................................................................ 28

Weighing the Benefits and Risks ............................................................................................ 29

Author Contact Information .......................................................................................................... 31

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The United States began to deploy long-range ballistic missiles in the late 1950s and early 1960s.

These missiles—land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) and sea-based submarinelaunched ballistic missiles (SLBMs)—have served as the backbone of the U.S. strategic nuclear

deterrent for more than 40 years. They provided the United States with the ability to threaten

targets throughout the Soviet Union, and, if necessary, in other nations, from the United States or

from submarines patrolling at sea. When the Cold War ended in the early 1990s, these missiles

carried more than 8,000 nuclear warheads. The United States has reduced its strategic forces

during the past 15 years, but it still has approximately 4,816 warheads deployed on 982 ICBMs

and SLBMs.1 All the missiles still carry nuclear warheads.

In recent years, analysts both inside and outside the government have suggested that the United

States consider deploying conventional warheads on its long-range ballistic missiles. The Bush

Administration, in the 2001 Nuclear Posture Review, called for the integration of precision

conventional weapons with strategic nuclear forces in a new category of “offensive strike”

weapons.2 Ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads are one possible option for a new

type of precision conventional weapon. In addition, the Pentagon identified a new mission—

prompt global strike (PGS)—that would allow the United States to strike targets anywhere on

earth in a matter of hours, without relying on forward based forces. Many analysts believe that

long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads would also be an ideal weapon

for this mission.

Both the Navy and Air Force have studied concepts and technologies that might allow the

deployment of conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles. The Administration has

requested funding for these initiatives in recent years. These requests have thus far received a

mixed reception in Congress. In FY2007 and FY2008, the Administration requested funding for

both the Air Force and the Navy. In FY2008, Congress did not approve the requested funding for

the separate services, but combined the funding in a new category that would explore a wider

range of options for the prompt global strike mission. This funding—$100 million in FY2008—

fell well short of total of the separate amounts requested by the Administration. As a result,

Congress and the Bush Administration have continued to debate the alternative programs and to

discuss the best way for the United States to proceed, if at all, with the deployment of

conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles.

This report provides an overview of the Administration’s rationale for the possible deployment of

conventional warheads on long-range ballistic missiles. It then reviews the Air Force and Navy

efforts to develop these systems. It summarizes congressional reaction to these proposals, then

provides a more detailed account of the issues raised by these concepts and programs.

U.S. Department of State, START Aggregate Numbers of Strategic Offensive Arms. Fact Sheet. Bureau of Arms

Control, October 1, 2007. These numbers reflect the counting rules outlined in the 1991 START Treaty, and include the

warheads that could be carried on the deactivated Peacekeeper missiles. Hence, it overstates the actual number of

deployed forces by about 50 missiles and 500 warheads.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Hearing on the Nuclear Posture Review. Statement of the

Honorable Douglas J. Feith. Under Secretary of Defense for Policy. February 14, 2002. p. 4.

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The Bush Administration’s Nuclear Posture Review (NPR), released in early January 2002, calls

for the deployment of a “new triad” of capabilities that would contribute to deterrence and U.S.

national security in the coming years.3 During the Cold War, the United States deployed a “triad”

of forces comprised of the three types of delivery vehicles for strategic nuclear weapons—landbased intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs),

and long-range bombers. In the “new triad,” these nuclear-armed delivery vehicles would

combine with precision-guided conventional weapons and become known as “offensive strike”

forces.4

In the Administration’s view, offensive strike weapons with conventional warheads could address

some missions now assigned to long-range nuclear forces. While some critics claim that this

concept would blur the distinction between conventional and nuclear weapons and increase the

likelihood of a U.S. use of nuclear weapons, the Administration has argued that the availability of

precision conventional weapons would, possibly, provide the President with more options in a

crisis, and, therefore, reduce the likelihood of the use of nuclear weapons. In testimony before the

Senate Armed Services Committee in April 2005, General James Cartwright, then the commander

of STRATCOM, noted that “the New Triad concept will enable more precisely tailored global

strike operations.”5 Furthermore, some have argued that, by replacing some nuclear weapons with

conventional weapons in the U.S. strategic war plan6 the United States might be able to further

reduce its number of deployed strategic nuclear weapons.7

General Cartwright and others have asserted that the substitution of conventional warheads for

nuclear warheads in the U.S. war plan would require significant improvements in the accuracy of

U.S. long-range ballistic missiles. If missiles can deliver their payloads more precisely to their

targets, then, for some categories of targets, they may not need the explosive yield of a nuclear

weapon to destroy the target. General Cartwright has sought a study that will allow him to

determine what proportion of the targets in the U.S. war plan could be attacked with conventional

weapons. An industry analyst has estimated that his proportion could be between10% and 30% of

U.S. Department of Defense. “Special Briefing on the Nuclear Posture Review,” News Transcript. January 9, 2002.

The other two legs of the new triad are missile defenses, which the Administration has stated will contribute to

deterrence by complicating an adversary’s attack planning and undermining his confidence; and a “responsive

infrastructure” which would allow the United States to maintain and, if necessary, expand its nuclear arsenal in

response to emerging threats. These three legs are joined together by “command and control, intelligence, and planning

capabilities,” which, according to the Administration, will provide the United States the ability to identify targets and

plan nuclear or conventional attacks on short notice, in response to unexpected threats. See U.S. Congress, Senate

Committee on Armed Services. Statement of the Honorable Douglas J. Feith, Under Secretary of Defense For Policy.

February 14, 2002.

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Strategic. Testimony of Admiral James E.

Cartwright, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. Hearing, April 4, 2005.

The war plan that outlines options for the use of nuclear weapons was known as the SIOP (Single Integrated

Operational Plan) throughout the Cold War. It is now known as OPLAN 8044 and it reflects changes in U.S. targeting

plans and priorities that resulted from the Bush Administration’s nuclear posture Review.

Grossman, Elaine M. “U.S. General: Precise Long-Range Missiles may Enable Big Nuclear Cuts,” Inside the

Pentagon, April 28, 2005.

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the existing targets.8 Both the Navy and the Air Force are exploring advanced guidance and

targeting technologies, such as the use of GPS guidance, that might provide their missiles with

these improvements in accuracy. This effort has been underway for more than a decade.

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Throughout the Cold War, the United States maintained military bases overseas so that it could

position its troops to deter, and if necessary, respond promptly to an attack from the Soviet Union

or its allies. These forward bases were located, for the most part, in Europe and Asia—regions

where conflict seemed most likely to occur. These overseas bases and forces were believed not

only to increase preparedness, but also to deter conflict by their very presence in unstable regions.

However, with the demise of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, analysts argue that

the United States must now be prepared to fight a wider range of potential adversaries in

unexpected areas who may possess a great variety of military capabilities. And, although the

United States continues to deploy its military forces at bases around the world, it can no longer be

certain that these bases will be located close to the theater of operations if a conflict occurs. As a

result, the United States not only plans to restructure, and, in some cases, reduce, its forces based

overseas, it has also sought to improve its ability to move military forces into a region quickly

when and if a conflict occurs.

At the same time, many analysts and military officials have argued that the United States must

maintain and enhance its long-range strike capability so that it can strike anywhere in the world

with forces that are based in or near the United States,9 or with forces that have the range to reach

targets across the globe from wherever they are deployed. This would not only allow the United

States to pursue an adversary without relying on forward bases, it would also allow the United

States to reach targets deep inside an enemy’s territory. Further, some argue that the United States

must be able to attack targets, across the globe, in a matter of hours, or less, either at the start of a

conflict or during ongoing operations. This is because, as some have argued, U.S. adversaries

could to adapt to the U.S. precision-strike capability by withholding targeting information with

concealment techniques or mobility, leaving the United States with little time to attack after it

identified relevant targets. Finally, many have noted that adversaries could seek to protect their

assets by deploying them in buried or hardened facilities, leading to a requirement for

improvements in the U.S. ability to defeat hardened and deeply buried targets.

The need for prompt long-range, or global, strike capabilities has been addressed both in more

general defense policy studies, such as the 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), which

noted that the U.S. defense strategy “rests on the assumption that U.S. forces have the ability to

project power worldwide,” and also in more specific service reports on Air Force doctrine, which

have noted that “rapid power projection based in the continental United States has become the

predominant military strategy.” In May 2003, the Air Force issued a formal Mission Need

Statement for the Prompt Global Strike (PGS) Mission. This document was written by Air Force

Grossman, Elaine M. “U.S. General: Precise Long-Range Missiles May Enable Big Nuclear Cuts,” Inside the

Pentagon, April 28, 2005.

See, for example, Watts, Barry D. Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency, and Options. Center for Strategic and

Budgetary Assessments. April 2005.

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Space command, coordinated with officials in the Joint Staff and the Office of the Secretary of

Defense, and validated by the Joint Requirements Oversight Council (JROC). This statement

indicated that the United States should be able to strike globally and rapidly with joint

conventional forces against high-payoff targets. The United States should be able to plan and

execute these attacks in a matter of minutes or hours, as opposed to the days or weeks needed for

planning and execution with existing forces, and it should be able to execute these attacks even

when it had no permanent military presence in the region where the conflict would occur.10 The

2006 Quadrennial Defense Review also highlighted a growing need for global strike capabilities.

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In October 2002, the U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM), which was in charge of plans and

operations for U.S. strategic nuclear weapons, merged with U.S. Space Command (SpaceCom),

which commanded military space operations, information operations, computer network

operations, and space campaign planning.11 This merger gave the new STRATCOM the “ability

to project power around the globe through space and information warfare.” Further, in late 2002

and early 2003, the Pentagon restructured the new STRATCOM so that it could take on new

missions, including the planning and execution of the prompt global strike mission.12 This change

in the command structure highlighted the growing emphasis on long-range, strategic missions in

conventional warfighting doctrine.

Admiral James O. Ellis, the first Commander of the new STRATCOM, stated that the new

mission “extends our long-standing and globally-focused deterrent capabilities to the broader

spectrum of conflict.” He further indicated that “the incorporation of conventional, non-kinetic,13

and special operations capabilities into a full-spectrum contingency arsenal will enable the

command to deliberately and adaptively plan for and deliver rapid, limited-duration, extendedrange combat power anywhere in the world (emphasis added).” This will “provide a wider range

of options to the President in responding to time-critical global challenges.” He also stated that

STRATCOM’s capabilities would “provide the nation an immediate ability to engage a select set

of targets by moving rapidly from actionable intelligence, through adaptive planning, to nationallevel decision-making and the delivery of effects across thousands of miles.”14 He stated that

data-gathering, decision-making, and execution must occur in minutes to support the PGS

mission, a standard that is not yet possible with existing technology.

General James Cartwright, the second commander of STRATCOM, defined the global strike

mission area by stating that “it provides to the nation the ability to rapidly plan and rapidly

deliver effect any place on the globe ... ” The capability would not necessarily be nuclear, and a

Jumper, John, General, U.S. Air Force. Final Mission Need Statement. “Prompt Global Strike,” May 2, 2003.

U.S. Department of Defense. “DOD Announces Merger of U.S. Space and Strategic Commands,” June 26, 2002.

According to Admiral James O. Ellis, the Commander of STRATCOM, these missions included global strike

planning and execution; information operations; global missile defense integrations; and oversight of command,

control, communications, computers, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (C4ISR) in support of strategic and

global operations. See Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis. Commander United States Strategic Command. Before the

House Armed Services Committee. March 13, 2003. p. 4.

Kinetic energy weapons are those that destroy their targets with blast or impact; non-kinetic weapons, such as lasers,

destroy their targets through electromagnetic or other forms of energy.

Statement of Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, House Armed Services Committee,

March 13, 2003.

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regional combatant commander could “tailor it for his target and deliver it very quickly, with very

short time lines on the planning and delivery, any place on the face of the Earth.” General

Cartwright also emphasized that the global strike capability involved much more than just the

delivery of a weapon to a target, stating that “it encompasses both the ability to plan rapidly, to

apply the precision to the intelligence and gather that intelligence in a very rapid manner, and

then to apply that intelligence to the target and understand the effect we want to create.”15 The

U.S. military is seeking to acquire the capabilities needed to meet this standard.

The intelligence requirements for the PGS mission are often overlooked, and may prove to be so

demanding as to affect the likelihood for success. As General Michael Hayden, the CIA director,

noted in mid-2007, the PGS mission will require “very convincing intelligence” before any

attacks occur.16 He further stated that “if you are going to strike suddenly ... it has to be based on

very powerful, very convincing intelligence.” Further, the intelligence may need to be released to

the public, to demonstrate both the military need and time restraints that made the attack

necessary.

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The United States might need to strike several categories of targets promptly, throughout the

spectrum of conflict. For example, if an adversary deployed air defense or anti-satellite weapons

that could disrupt the U.S. ability to sustain an attack, the United States might choose to strike

promptly at the start of a conflict with weapons that could penetrate and destroy the defenses. A

prompt strike against an adversary’s ballistic missiles or caches of weapons of mass destruction

(WMD) might allow the United States to destroy these weapons early before an adversary could

use them. Some targets could also appear quickly and remain vulnerable for short periods of time

during a conflict. These might include leadership cells that could move during a conflict or

mobile military systems that the adversary had chosen to keep hidden prior too their use.

The United States might use a number of different weapons systems, in the near term, in the PGS

mission.17 These could include medium- or long-range aircraft, cruise missiles launched from

bombers or submarines, and ballistic missiles based at sea or on land in the United States.18 But

conventional aircraft, even if they are based near the theater of operations, could take several

hours, or more, to reach their targets. Aircraft may also be vulnerable to enemy air defenses,

particularly if they tried to attack targets deep inside enemy territory. Similarly, aircraft or cruise

U.S. Congress, Senate Committee on Armed Services. Subcommittee on Strategic. Testimony of Admiral James E.

Cartwright, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command. Hearing, April 4, 2005.

Grossman, Elaine, M. Hayden: “Prompt Global Strike” Raises Bar for Intel Community. Inside The Air Force. June

22, 2007.

In the longer term, the Air Force and Navy are both exploring the use of ramjets, or scramjets, for long-range attack

term. These hypersonic aircraft, which could fly at speeds of Mach 2-Mach 5, are still in the early stages of

development. The are envisioned to launch from air bases, like aircraft, but to travel at speeds that far exceed those of

U.S. aircraft and may approach the speeds of missiles. See, for example, Pincus, Walter. “Pentagon Has Far-reaching

Defense Spacecraft in Works,” Washington Post, March 16, 2005. p. 3.

In his testimony in 2003, Admiral Ellis specifically mentioned two systems that could contribute to this mission,

Trident submarines reconfigured to carry Tomahawk cruise missiles with conventional warheads and the proposed

Common Aero Vehicle, which could be used to deploy conventional munitions on long-range ballistic missiles. See the

statement of Admiral James O. Ellis, Commander, U.S. Strategic Command, House Armed Services Committee, March

13, 2003.

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missiles based at sea may be too far from the theater of operations to strike critical targets in a

timely manner.

Officials in the Air Force, at the Pentagon, and at STRATCOM, along with some analysts outside

government, believe that the United States could achieve the prompt global strike mission with its

long-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs).19 The Pentagon’s Defense Science Board

(DSB), in a study published in early 2004, asserted that land-based long-range ballistic missiles

have “unique, time-critical characteristics” that include “responsiveness, range, speed, precision,

lethality, and freedom of maneuver.”20 With these capabilities, they could attack targets anywhere

in the world within an hour of their launch, without relying on forward bases or supporting

military capabilities, such as the tanker aircraft needed to support long-range flights by bombers.

They would not be at risk from air defenses, and there would be no risk to flight crews. Further, if

the warheads could maneuver to slow their reentry and increase their angle of attack, they might

be effective against some types of hardened and deeply buried targets. The DSB study asserted

that these weapons could provide “a reliable, low-cost force on continuous alert with a high

readiness rate and the capability to immediately react under strict control of the National

Command Authority.” In other words, the high levels of reliability, readiness, and command and

control that were needed as a part of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent during the Cold War are

also valuable characteristics for a long-range conventional strike system in the post-Cold War era.

However, because U.S. long-range ballistic missiles have always carried nuclear warheads, many

analysts believe that potential adversaries might misunderstand U.S. intentions if the United

States employed ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads, possibly deciding, if and

when they detect a launch, that they are under nuclear attack from the United States. This

possibility has been at the core of congressional concerns with the deployment of conventional

warheads on long-range missiles. Accordingly, several studies, including the National Academy

of Sciences Study on U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike, have sought to evaluate the

validity of the concern and to propose steps that the United States might take to mitigate the

risks.21

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Both the Navy and the Air Force have studied the possible deployment of conventional warheads

on their long-range ballistic missiles in the past. The Air Force briefly studied the penetration

capabilities of conventional ICBMs in the mid-1990s. In August 1995 it launched an ICBM

armed with a “pointy” front end (and no explosive warhead) against a granite slab that had

characteristics similar to reinforced concrete. Press reports indicate that the warhead entered the

target at a 90 degree angle and penetrated to a depth of 30 feet, which is greater than the depth of

See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition,

Technology, and Logistics. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces.

February 2004. See, also, Eric A. Miller and Willis A. Stanley. The Future of Ballistic Missiles. National Institute for

Public Policy, October 2003.

U.S. Department of Defense, Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics.

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces. February 2004. p. 5-1.

Committee on Conventional Prompt Global Strike Capability, U.S. Conventional Prompt Global Strike: Issues for

2008 and Beyond, National Research Council of the National Academies, Washington, D.C., August 2008,

http://www.nap.edu.catalog/12061.html.

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penetration of any existing U.S. weapon.22 The Navy also sponsored studies in the 1990s that

sought to develop a non-nuclear penetrating warhead for the Trident SLBM. These studies also

focused on questions about whether a reentry vehicle from a ballistic missile could penetrate a

hardened target, using only its speed and angle of reentry, without a nuclear explosion. Both the

Navy and the Air Force recognized that, without a nuclear explosion, the reentry vehicle from a

ballistic missile would have to be far more accurate than those deployed in the 1990s (and still

deployed today) to attack and destroy a buried target.

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In FY2003, the Navy requested funding for research on a new type of reentry vehicle that could

significantly improve the accuracy of the Trident II (D-5) missiles. This program, known as the

Enhanced Effectiveness (E2) Initiative, included an initial funding request of $30 million, a threeyear study, and a full-scale flight test in early 2007.23 Congress rejected the initial funding request

in FY2003 and FY2004, but Lockheed Martin Corporation, the contractor pursuing the study,

continued with a low level of research into this system.

The E2 reentry vehicle would integrate the existing inertial measurement unit (IMU) guidance

system (the system currently used to guide long-range ballistic missiles) with global positioning

system (GPS) technologies so that the reentry vehicle could receive guidance updates during its

flight.24 A standard MK4 reentry vehicle, which is the reentry vehicle deployed on many Trident

SLBMs, would be modified with flap-based steering system, allowing it to maneuver when

approaching its target to improve its accuracy and increase its angle of penetration. This steering

system, which the Navy has referred to as a “backpack extension,” would increase the size of the

reentry vehicle, making it comparable in size to the MK5 reentry vehicle that is also deployed on

Trident missiles. The E2 warhead could possibly provide Trident missiles with the accuracy to

strike within 10 meters of their intended, stationary, targets. This accuracy would not only

improve the lethality of the nuclear warheads but it would also permit the missiles to destroy

some types of targets with conventional warheads.25

Grossman, Elaine M. “Pentagon Eyes Bunker-Busting Conventional Ballistic Missile for Subs.” Inside the Pentagon.

June 27, 2002. p. 1.

Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. “U.S. Nuclear Forces 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists.

January/February 2005. pp. 73-75.

According to the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces, the IMU would guide the

missile in its early phases, but the reentry body would receive a GPS update during its exoatmospheric flight; it would

then use the IMU and control flaps to steer the warhead with GPS-like accuracy during atmospheric reentry. See U.S.

Department of Defense. Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces. February

2004. pp. 5-7.

Grossman, Elaine M. “Pentagon Eyes Bunker-Busting Conventional Ballistic Missile for Subs,” Inside the Pentagon,

June 27, 2002. p. 1. See also, Robert S. Norris and Hans M. Kristensen. “U.S. Nuclear Forces 2005,” Bulletin of the

Atomic Scientists, January/February 2005, pp. 73-75.

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Lockheed Martin, flew these reentry vehicles in test flights of Trident missiles.26 In a test

conducted in 2002, it demonstrated that the new reentry vehicle could steer towards a target and

strike with improved accuracy. In a test conducted in early 2005, a modified version of its reentry

vehicle demonstrated that it could not only steer towards a target with improved accuracy, but

also slow down and “control the impact conditions,” capabilities that would be needed for the

delivery of some types of conventional warheads to their targets. Lockheed estimated that, if the

program received funding from Congress beginning in FY2006, its reentry vehicle could enter

production in FY2010 and achieve an initial operational capability in 2011. The Navy, however,

did not seek funding for this program in FY2004, 2005, or 2006.

The Lockheed reentry vehicle became a part of the plan to deploy conventional warheads on

Trident submarine-launched ballistic missiles, and was been included in the Navy’s budget

request for FY2007 and FY2008. The budget request for FY2008 indicated that most of the work

needed to design and develop the reentry vehicle for the conventional Trident could have been

completed in FY2008, with an additional $20 million request planned for FY2009.27 The FY2008

funding would support, among other things, efforts to finalize the guidance and flap system on

the maneuvering body extension of the reentry body, design an interface between the new

guidance system and the missile system flight controls, begin development of a conventional

payload that could fit within the reentry body, and initiate efforts to modify existing facilities so

that they can test the CTM designs. Congress, however, rejected these funding requests.

If it had received the requested funding in FY2008, and proceeded with the expected work plan,

the Navy would have conducted system development and demonstration activities in FY2008 and

FY2009, and could have planned to begin production and deployment in FY2010. With this

timeline, the system would have reached its full operational capability by the end of 2012.

However, as is noted below, Congress rejected its funding request in for FY2008 and restructured

the PGS program.

Nevertheless, reports indicate that the Navy sought to continue pursuing this concept with its

portion of the combined funding for the PGS mission. In documents submitted with its FY2009

budget request, the Navy sought funding for a 2009 flight experiment “using a Life Extension

Rest Bed (LETB-2) reentry body on a currently planned Trident D-5 missile test.”28 The LETB-2

is essentially the new name of the maneuvering reentry body, described above, that evolved from

the E2 reentry vehicle program. Congress had prohibited the use of any of the PGS funds for the

CTM modification. Even thought the test bed would fly on a Trident missile test, the Navy

contends that the technology would be applicable to any conventional ballistic missile, and,

therefore, is not prohibited by the FY2008 legislation.

The Navy has also requested, in its FY2009 budget, funding for a reentry body for a conventional

ballistic missiles. This program, known as the Medium Lift Reentry Body, would be too large to

fit on a Trident missile, but carry the warhead on the intermediate range submarine-launched

Krivich, David. Director, SMP Advanced Programs and Business Development. Lockheed Martin Space Systems

Company. Update on Precision Conventional Ballistic Missile Global Strike Capabilities. Briefing to the Defense

Science Board Task Force on Nuclear Capabilities. July 22, 2005.

Department of the Navy. Fiscal Year 2008/2009 Budget Estimates. Justification of Estimates. February 2007.

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Navy Budget Activity 4.

Elaine M. Grossman, “Controversial Missile Idea Lingers,” Global Security Newswire., March 20, 2008.

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ballistic missile described below. It would carry a flechette warhead, which would be designed to

destroy area targets such as airfields and military bases.

ȱȱȱ

The Navy began to speak publicly about its plans for the Conventional Trident modification

(CTM) in early March 2006, in anticipation of congressional testimony by General Cartwright.

The budget prepared for FY2007 included a total of $503 million over five years, with $127

million for FY2007, $225 million for FY2008, $118 million for FY2009, and $33 million for

FY2010.29 As is noted below, Congress denied the funding request in FY2007. The Pentagon

requested a total of $175.4 million for FY2008, but Congress did not approve the specific funding

again. Instead, as is noted in more detail below, it provided research and development funding for

a more general category of “prompt global strike” initiatives.

With the Conventional Trident Modification (CTM) concept, the Navy planned to deploy each of

its 12 Trident submarines on patrol (2 would be in overhaul at any given time) with 2 missiles

equipped to carry 4 conventional warheads each. The remaining 22 missiles on each submarine

would continue to carry nuclear warheads, and the submarines would continue to patrol in areas

that would allow them to reach targets specified in the nuclear war plan, although the patrol areas

could be adjusted to accommodate targeting requirements for the CTM. Only four submarines

would be within range of their targets, with two in the Pacific Ocean and two in the Atlantic

ocean. Consequently, only eight conventional missiles would be available for use at any time, and

only one or two of the submarines would likely be within range of the targets specified for attack

with conventional ballistic missiles.30

The Navy considered two types of warheads for the CTM program in the near-term. One warhead

would be designed to destroy or disable soft, area targets, using a reentry vehicle loaded with

tungsten rods—known as flechettes—that would rain down on the target and destroy everything

within an area of up to 3,000 square feet. The other might be able to destroy hardened targets if it

were accurate enough to strike very close to the target. Each would be deployed within the reentry

body developed and tested under the E2 program. The Navy is also exploring, for possible future

deployment, technologies that might be able to penetrate to destroy hardened, buried targets.

If Congress approved the program and the funding, these warheads would provide the Navy with

the ability to contribute to the prompt global strike mission in the near term, a goal that was

identified in the 2006 QDR. The report indicated that the Navy would seek to deploy an “initial

capability to deliver precision-guided conventional warheads using long-range Trident” missiles

within two years,31 although many expect it to take four years to field the full complement of 96

warheads. The capability, even when fully deployed, would be limited by the small number of

available warheads. Hence, it seems likely that the Pentagon would only plan to use these

missiles in limited circumstances to meet specific goals.

Grossman, Elaine. Pentagon Wants Early Start on Conventional Missiles for Subs. InsideDefense.Com, January 20,

2006. See also, Grossman, Facing Doubts, Pentagon Readies Pitch for New Sub-launched Missile. Inside the Pentagon.

March 9, 2006.

Ibid.

U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. February 6, 2006 p. 50.

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The Navy is also studying the possible development and deployment of an intermediate-range

missile that could be launched from its ballistic missile submarines. It requested industry

participation in the study in mid-2003, and planned to conduct two static test-firings of a

prototype rocket engine in 2005.32 According to the Defense Science Board Task Force, this

missile might deliver a 2,000 pound payload over a 1,500 mile range,33 with an accuracy of less

than 5 meters. This would allow the missile to reach its target in less than 15 minutes.34 Reports

of the initial studies into this concept indicated that this proposed missile could carry either

nuclear or conventional warheads, allowing it to contribute to the missions requiring prompt,

long-range strike capabilities.35 These missiles could also be deployed on the modified Trident

submarines, with two or three missiles each in up to 22 of the submarine’s launch tubes, for a

total of 66 missiles per submarine. However, as the concept has emerged, it has become evident

that the missiles would be deployed, with perhaps two per launch tube, in the four Trident

submarines that have already been converted to carry conventional cruise missiles and other nonnuclear weaponry.

The proposed submarine-launched intermediate range ballistic missile would achieve many of the

objectives necessary for the PGS mission. It could attack targets quickly, both at the start of a

conflict if the submarines were within range, and during the conflict if new targets emerged. Its

speed and angle of attack might also make it capable of attacking some types of hardened or

buried targets. It would also be able to penetrate an adversary’s defenses without putting aircraft

or crews at risk. Further, by launching from submarines based close to the theater of conflict,

these missiles might avoid some of the overflight problems that would occur if a ballistic missile

launched from the continental United States. It would not eliminate all possibilities of

misunderstanding, however, because nations observing the launch might not be able to tell

whether the missiles carried nuclear or conventional warheads, and, with the short time-of-flight,

they might decide to assume the worst. Nevertheless, Navy officials have stated that there would

be “immediate observable differences at launch” between this missile and a Trident missile

because this missile would use two, rather than three, stages and would deliver a single reentry

body and warhead, while the Trident missiles can carry up to eight warheads.36 Further, the

warhead under development for this missile would be too tall to fit on a Trident missile.37

Congress earmarked $10 million for the SLIRBM in FY2005 and $7.2 million in FY2006. In the

House, the Defense Appropriations subcommittee has added $2 million for this effort in FY2007,

but the Conference Committee provided only $1.3 million. The Pentagon did not request any

additional funding for this program for FY2008, but it did indicate that prior-years funding would

be used to continue funding efforts that will demonstrate the affordability and feasibility of this

concept.

Norris, Robert S. and Hans M. Kristensen. “U.S. Nuclear Forces 2005,” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists,

January/February 2005. pp. 73-75.

A Trident II (D-5) missile can deliver its warheads over a range of 4,000 miles.

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces. February 2004. p. 5-12.

Koch, Andrew. “U.S. Considers Major Changes to Strategic Weapons,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 27, 2003

Grossman, Elaine M. “Navy Eyes New Weapon for Global Strike, Missile Defense,” Global Security Newswire, July

17, 2008.

Dan Taylor, “Official: No Conventional Trident, But a Smaller Missile is Possible,” Inside Defense, July 21, 2008.

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Recent reports indicate, however, that the Pentagon has shown renewed interest in this concept

and may allocate $120 million in FY2008 and $140 million in FY2009 to pursue a medium-range

“Submarine-launched Global Strike Missile” with a range of 2,000-3000 nautical miles.38 This

missile would carry a conventional warhead, and would not have a nuclear variant. Funding could

come from the new account established in the FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bills. This

missile, however, would not provide a near-term alternative to the CTM. Reports indicate that,

with test launches beginning around 2012, the missile might become operational between 2015

and 2018.

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The Air Force began an Analysis of Alternatives (AOA) study in 2006 to review technologies and

programs that could meet the requirements of the prompt global strike mission. Reports indicate

that the Navy and Air Force are collaborating on the study. Personnel reportedly have been

exchanging information on “service-specific” platforms, and are thinking broadly, across service

lines, to consider a range of alternative platforms for the long-term PGS option.39 These include a

long-range land-based option, a shorter-range forward deployed land-based missile, a sea-based

option, and an air-breathing option. The Air Force expected to complete the study by the summer

of 2008, and to send it forward to the Joint Requirements Oversight Council, but, as of late 2008,

the results were not yet available.40

In addition, the Air Force is pursuing the development of the Conventional Strike Missile (CSM).

It initially expected this missile to serve as a mid-term follow-on to the Conventional Trident

Modification (CTM) Program,41 but, after Congress refused to fund development of the CTM, the

Air Force alternative may become the earlier option for the PGS mission. Reports indicate that

the Commander in Chief of STARTCOM, General Kevin Chilton, assigned the Air Force the lead

role in developing the long-range missile capability for PGS in mid-2008.42 The CSM would

draw on existing missile technologies and reentry technologies developed under the FALCON

(Force Application and Launch From Conus [Continental United States]) program, a joint Air

Force/DARPA demonstration that is developing, among other things, both near-term and far-term

capabilities for the prompt global strike missions.43

The Air Force has outlined a notional architecture and concept of operations for the CSM. Unlike

the Trident plan, which would deploy nuclear and conventional warheads on the same

submarines, the Air Force plan would segregate the missiles armed with conventional warheads

and deploy them far from bases with nuclear warheads. The missiles could be deployed “on

Grossman, Elaine, M. Midrange Missile May be Backup to Modified Trident. Global Security Newswire. September

21, 2007.

Munez, Carlos. Services Collaborate on Long-Term Prompt Global Strike Study. Inside the Navy. September 10,

2007.

Emelie Rutherford, “AoA for Prompt Global Strike to go to JROC this Summer, Chilton Says,” Defense Daily,

March 5, 2008.

Grossman, Elaine M. “Conventional Strike Missile” Proposed as Midterm Global Option. Inside Defense. April 6,

2006.

Elaine Grossman, “Chilton Shifts Prompt Strike Priority to the Air Force,” Global Security Newswire, September 3,

2008.

DARPA, “FALCON (Force Application and Launch from CONUS) Technology Demonstration Program,” Fact

Sheet. November 2003.

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mobile launchers or in semi-buried silos or berms on each coast, ready to launch on short

notice.”44 The two potential bases include Vandenberg Air Force Base on the West Coast and

Cape Canaveral on the East Coast. As is discussed in more detail below, some experts believe that

this missile, and the Air Force Concept of Operations for it, would make it easier to distinguish

from a nuclear missile and less likely to be open to misinterpretation than a CTM launch.

ȱȱ

Although it could build a new missile in the future, the Air Force has indicated that it could

modify both Minuteman II missiles and Peacekeeper (MX) missiles to carry conventional

warheads in the near term. The Minuteman II missile was first deployed in 1965 and was retired

in the early 1990s. The Air Force deployed 450 of these missiles. Each carried a single nuclear

warhead and had a range of over 7,000 miles. The Air Force has already modified some of these

missiles, using five as target vehicles in tests of missile defense technologies and a few in a

space-launch configuration. The Peacekeeper missile was first deployed in 1986; the Air Force

began to deactivate these missiles in October 2002 and is to complete the process by the end of

FY2005. The Air Force deployed 50 of these missiles; each carried 10 warheads and had a range

greater than 6,000 miles.

The Air Force has designated these modified missiles as the Minotaur II and Minotaur III

missiles. It has stated that the modifications can be made at a relatively low cost and low level of

technical risk. They would use the missiles’ existing rocket motors. The avionics and guidance

systems could rely, primarily, on existing technologies, with some modifications to allow the

upper stages of the missiles and their reentry vehicles to maneuver for improved accuracy. The

Air Force has noted that it could deploy its ballistic missiles with conventional warheads as a

“mid-term” solution, between 2013 and 2015, for the PGS mission. The Air Force has indicated

that this option, using a modified Peacekeeper missile, would be able to carry much larger

payloads than the Trident missile. 45

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The modified Minuteman II missiles might each be able to carry a single warhead that weighed

between 500 and 1,000 pounds; a modified Peacekeeper could possibly carry between 6,000 and

8,000 pounds of payload, which would allow for multiple warheads or reentry vehicles.46

According to some estimates, these missiles could even destroy some targets without an explosive

warhead, using the “sheer force of impact of a reentry vehicle moving at 14,000 feet per

second.”47 They could also carry a single conventional warhead with a reentry body that had been

modified to improve accuracy by allowing for the maneuverability of the warhead, like the

maneuvering warhead the Navy has considered for the Trident modification. Reports indicate that

the Air Force is also considering deploying some of these missiles with specialized warheads that

could be designed to destroy selected categories of targets.

Air Force Space Command. Common Aero Vehicle White Paper.

Sirak, Michael. Air Force Envisions Mid-Term, Prompt Global Strike Missile. Defense Daily, July 7, 2006.

Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Future Strategic Strike Forces. February 2004. p. 5-3.

Schmitt, Eric. “U.S. Considers Conventional Warheads on Nuclear Missiles,” New York Times, February 24, 2003.

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One of the leading options for a reentry package, and a central focus of the FALCON study noted

above, is the proposed Common Aero Vehicle (CAV). The CAV would be an unpowered,

maneuverable hypersonic glide vehicle capable of carrying approximately 1,000 pounds in

munitions or other payload. According to the Air Force, these payloads might include a “fuzed

penetrator” warhead that would hit its targets with impact speeds of approximately 4,000 feet per

second. With this high impact speed, the CAV should be able to attack and destroy some types of

hardened or buried targets. The CAV could also carry several small smart bombs to destroy

facilities and infrastructure above ground, wide area autonomous search munitions (WAASM) to

destroy dispersed targets, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that could gather intelligence in

the target area.

The Air Force, which now refers to the CAV as the hypersonic test vehicle, plans to conduct two

flight tests of the experimental vehicle in FY2009. A third test, which might explore the vehicle’s

ability to delivery weapons to a target, might occur in FY2010.48 The Army is also developing a

hypersonic payload vehicle; this might also serve as the front end of the Air Force CSM in the

future.

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The FALCON study indicated that the proposed CAV, based on a modified ICBM or other launch

vehicle, should be able to travel at 5 times the speed of sound (Mach 5) so that it can deliver a

substantial payload from the continental United States to anywhere in on Earth in less than two

hours.49 The study has identified a number of objectives for the CAV system, in addition to the

possible range of munitions loadings, that would allow it to achieve these goals. For example, to

meet the “prompt” needs of the mission, the CAV and its delivery vehicle should achieve alert

status, which would make it ready to launch, in under 24 hours. Further, it should then be able to

launch from this alert status in less than 2 hours, once it has received an execution order. It should

then be able to reach its target within one hour of its launch.50 These characteristics would

provide it with the capabilities needed to attack time-sensitive targets.51

To meet the “global” portion of the PGS mission, the CAV should not only have the range to

“strike throughout the depth of an adversary’s territory,” it should also have a cross-range

capability of 3,000 nautical miles. The cross range measures the ability of the CAV to maneuver

and vary from a standard ballistic trajectory after its release from its launch vehicle. This ability

to maneuver would allow the CAV to adjust to new information so that it could attack mobile

targets, if timely and accurate information became available and were communicated to the CAV

during its flight. Further, it would provide the CAV with a high degree of accuracy, allowing it to

Elaine M. Grossman, “Chilton Shifts Prompt Strike Priority to Air Force,” Global Security Newswire, September 3,

2008. See, also, Caitlin Harrington. “USAF Plans Hypersonic Weapon Test in 2010.” Jane’s Defense Weekly. August,

2008.

DARPA, “FALCON (Force Application and Launch from CONUS Technology Demonstration Program,” Fact

Sheet. November 2003. See, also, Pincus, Walter. “Pentagon has Far-Reaching Defense Spacecraft in the works. Bush

Administration Looking to Space to Fight Threats,” Washington Post, March 16, 2005, p. 3.

Report to Congress on the “Concept of Operations” for the Common Aero Vehicle. Submitted in response to

Congressional Reporting Requirements, by Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force. February 24, 2004. p. 2.

This implies that the U.S. command and control system would have the capability to identify potential targets, plan

the mission, and prepare to launch the CAV within this time frame. These capabilities would be needed for the PGS

mission, regardless of the munitions package on the ballistic missile.

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deliver its weapons within a planned 3 meters of the intended target. The CAV would also have to

be linked to “complete, timely intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance information.”

Consequently, the ability of a missile armed with a CAV, or one armed with a single conventional

warhead, to deliver its weapons to targets across the globe within hours of a decision to launch an

attack presumes several interrelated capabilities. The United States would need the intelligence,

surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) capability that would allow it to identify a target precisely

and quickly. It would also need the command and control capability to review the targets, plan the

attack, target the CAV vehicles, and order the launch within a short amount of time. Finally, it

would need the continuing reconnaissance capability to verify that the intended target remained

available and that the CAV reached and destroyed that target. The requirements would exist for

both land-based and sea-based missiles.

ȱ¢ȱ

Congress first considered the Administration’s plans to develop conventional warheads for

possible deployment on long-range ballistic missiles in FY2003. Since then, it has demonstrated

some support, and some skepticism, about the plans.

ŘŖŖřȱȱŘŖŖŚȱ

As was noted above, the Navy requested $30 million for its E2 program in FY2003 and FY2004.

In each case, this was to be the initial year of funding in a three-year study. Congress refused the

Navy’s request in both years; the Navy has not requested additional funds for research and

development on conventional warheads for SLBMs in subsequent years.

The Bush Administration requested $12.2 million in research and development funding for the

CAV program in FY2004. The House, in its version of H.R. 1588, the FY2004 National Defense

Authorization Bill, nearly doubled the authorized funding to $24.2 million. The Senate provided

the requested amount, and the Conference Committee split the difference, authorizing $17.025

million. Although Congress supported the Administration’s request for funding, the House had

shown concerns about the possibility that U.S. launches of ballistic missiles armed with

conventional warheads could be misinterpreted as non-conventional launches by nations who

might monitor U.S. military activity, a concern, particularly, to Russia and China. Hence, the

House required that the Air Force submit a report on the concept of operations for the CAV that

would address questions about the potential for misinterpretation of the launches. This reporting

requirement remained in the final version of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal

Year 2004 (P.L. 108-136).

The National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2004, (P.L. 108-136, Sec. 1032) also

contains a requirement for an annual report describing “an integrated plan for developing,

deploying, and sustaining a prompt global strike capability.” Congress mandated that the plan

should include information on, among other things, the types of targets for long-range strike

assets, the capabilities desired for these assets, an assessment of the command and control,

intelligence, and surveillance capabilities necessary to support the PGS mission, integration with

tactical missions, and cost and schedule for achieving the mission. In the Conference report

(H.Rept. 108-354), Congress noted that its interest in these issues derived from the Nuclear

Posture Review and its focus on integrating nuclear and conventional strike capabilities to reduce

reliance on nuclear weapons. It indicated that it saw a need for further analysis of future system

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requirements, along with a comprehensive effort to link planning and programs in a PGS

roadmap to achieve a coherent force structure. Hence, although the Air Force considers the NPR

objective of integrating nuclear and conventional strike forces as a separate mission and separate

concept from PGS, Congress, initially at least, blended both into the request for a new report.

The Air Force submitted its report on the CAV concept of operations to Congress in February

2004. This report offered several suggestions for measures the United States could take to reduce

the possibility of misinterpretation if the United States were to deploy, and employ, ballistic

missiles with conventional warheads. Many of the measures discussed in this report are reviewed

below, under “Issues for Congress.”

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The Bush Administration requested $16.4 million for research and development on the CAV in

FY2005. Congress again increased this funding level, appropriating $21.6 million for the

development of the CAV. However, in July 2004, with passage of the FY2005 Defense

Appropriations Act (H.R. 4613, P.L. 108-287), Congress repeated its concerns about the potential

for misinterpretation. In the report on the Defense Appropriations Bill, Congress questioned

whether there were safeguards in place to guarantee that other nuclear weapons states did not

misinterpret the intent or use of ballistic missiles armed with CAV. In response to these concerns,

the report states that funds provided for CAV could only be used for non-weapons related

research on hypersonic technologies, including studies into microsatellites or other satellite

launch requirements. Congress specified that the funds could not be used to “develop, integrate,

or test a CAV variant that includes any nuclear or conventional weapons.” Congress also

indicated that the funds could not be used to “develop, integrate, or test a CAV for launch on any

ICBM or SLBM.” Congress would consider expanding the scope of this program in future years

if safeguards negotiated among international partners were put into place.52

ŘŖŖŜȱȱŘŖŖŝȱ

The Bush Administration requested $27.2 million for CAV in FY2006. In response to the

restrictions in the FY2005 Defense Appropriations Act, it restructured the program, and

redesignated the CAV as the Hypersonic Technology Vehicle. This new program excludes any

development of weapons capabilities for the CAV. Congress approved the requested funding in

the FY2006 Defense Appropriations Act and did not impose any new restrictions. The Bush

Administration requested, and Congress appropriated, an additional $33.4 million for CAV in its

FY2007 budget. Congress also appropriated $12 million for the Air Force to Conventional

Ballistic Missile (CBM) program, which is exploring the possible use of a modified Minuteman

missile as a mid-term option for the PGS mission.

The budget projections in the FY2006 budget request demonstrate how costs could increase if the

Air Force continues to pursue the CAV program. The budget requests were projected to be

between $31 and $39 million each year for the next three years, but they were then projected to

rise to $92 million in FY2010 and $94 million in FY2011. This sharp increase reflects an

expected change in the program from research and development to production and deployment at

U.S. Congress, House. Making Appropriations for the Department of Defense for the Fiscal Year Ending September

30, 2005, and For Other Purposes. Conference Report to Accompany H.R. 4613, H.Rept. 108-622. p. 240.

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the end of the decade. This change would require that the Air Force address and resolve

congressional concerns about the potential for misunderstandings with the launch of ballistic

missiles armed with conventional warheads. But it also indicates that the CAV would not provide

a near-term solution to the PGS mission needs, as might the Navy’s CTM program.

As was noted above, the Navy’s FY2007 budget included $127 million for the conventional

Trident modification. The request separated into three categories. The budget included $38

million for the CTM within the much larger ($957.6m) budget for Trident II missile

modifications; $12 million for strategic missile systems equipment to support the CTM; and $77

million for the development of an advanced strike capability that would demonstrate the

feasibility of the CTM concept.

Neither the House nor the Senate Armed Services committees authorized the Administration’s

request in their versions of the FY2007 Defense Authorization Bills (S. 2766 and S.Rept. 109254; H.R. 5122 and H.Rept. 109-452). Both Committees noted their concerns about the

possibility that nations, such as Russia, might misunderstand the launch of a conventional Trident

missile and determine that it was under attack from U.S. nuclear weapons. Both committees

requested reports from the Administration that would address a range of issues raised by this

prospective program. The Senate Armed Services Committee withheld $95 million of the

Administration’s request, pending completion of the report. It authorized the use of $20 million

for the preparation of the report and $32 million for research and development on technologies

that would support the Trident modification. It specified that the money could not be used on the

CTM program itself. The full Senate accepted the Committee’s position. The House Armed

Services Committee eliminated the $38 million for CTM in the Trident II modification budget

and the $12 million for strategic missile systems equipment. It also reduced by $47 million the

Navy’s request for funding for the CTM program, leaving $30 million for this effort.

The Conference Committee, in its report (H.Rept. 109-702, Sec. 219) adopted the reporting

requirements included in the Senate Bill, but, instead of fencing the funding pending completion

of the report, accepted the House’s reduction in CTM funding. Therefore, as was the case in the

House bill, the Conference Report includes only $30 million for research and development into

an advanced strike capability that would support the CTM concept.

The House and Senate Appropriations Bills also rejected the Administration’s request for funding

for the CTM program. Following the HASC, the Defense Appropriations subcommittee in the

House eliminated all but $30 million in research and development funding. It also raised

questions about the feasibility of the proposed schedule for the program and questioned whether

the decision to move forward immediately would pre-judge the outcome of the PGS AOA study.

In the Senate, the Defense Appropriations Subcommittee eliminated all funding for the CTM

program, and provided $5 million for the National Academy of Sciences to analyze the mission

requirement and recommend alternatives. The Conference Report on the Defense Appropriations

Act (H.Rept. 109-676) retained the Senate provision that funded $5 million for a report from the

National Academy of Sciences. It also included $20 million in Research, Development, Test and

Evaluation funds for research that would focus on those “developmental items which are common

to all the global strike alternatives.”

ŘŖŖŞȱ

The President’s budget request for FY2008 included continued funding of $32.8 million for the

CAV. Congress did not approve this request, but in both the Authorization and Appropriations

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Bills, transferred this funding to a new, integrated account for Prompt Global Strike Research.

Congress also eliminated separate funding of $50 million for other elements of the FALCON

program, rolling them into the new account as well. As is discussed in more detail below, the total

funding for this new account was set at $100 million for FY2008, less than half of the requested

funding for all the programs that were combined in the new account. The Pentagon has objected

to this transfer, noting that the elimination of the specific line items and the overall reduction in

funding would lead to the termination of the FALCON program and the cancellation of several

planned flight test for the CAV. Although the Pentagon eventually accepted the idea of a

combined program for PGS research, it suggested that the total budget be set at $208 million, an

amount equal to the total proposed for the combined programs, so that each could continue to

receive the required level of investment.53 Congress did not accept this appeal, and the conference

reports on both the Authorization (H.R. 1585, H.Rept. 110-477) and Appropriations (P.L. 110116, H.Rept. 110-134) bills limited the funding to $100 million.

The President’s budget for FY2008 also included a total of $175.4 million for the CTM program.

This request included $36 million, within the much larger budget of just over $1 billion for

Trident II modifications, to begin modifying the Trident II missiles to carry conventional

warheads. Congress had denied all funding for this purpose in FY2007. It also included $13

million in strategic systems missile equipment, which would be used to begin modifying Trident

submarines to carry the conventional missile. Congress had also denied this funding in FY2007.

Finally, the budget included $126.4 million to develop advanced strike capabilities under the

“Hard and Deeply Buried Target Defeat System Program” area. This funding is allocated to

continue research and development into reentry vehicle technologies for the conventional Trident

modification. Congress had appropriated only $20 million for this effort in FY2007, even though

the budget had requested $77 million.

The House Armed Services Committee, in its version of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill

(H.R. 1585, H.Rept. 110-146), supported continued research, development, testing, and

evaluation of the conventional Trident concept, but prevented funds from being obligated or

expended for the operational deployment of the system. Specifically, it approved the request for

$126.4 million for continued research and development on the reentry vehicle, and authorized

$16 million for procurement, but reduced the budget request by $33 million, withholding all

funds for long-lead procurement. The Strategic Forces Subcommittee noted that it supported, in

general, the pursuit of technologies for the Prompt Global Strike Mission, but also noted that

questions remained about the concept of operations and the possibility for misunderstandings.

Hence, it sought to slow the program until the National Academy of Sciences completed its

report.

The Senate Armed Services Committee, in its version of the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill

(S. 1547, S.Rept. 110-77), recommended that no funding be provided specifically for the CTM

program, and that all $208 million in PGS funding be transferred to PE 65104D8Z, to support

common prompt global strike concepts. The committee specifically indicated that this program

element should support a “coordinated look at a variety of kinetic non-nuclear concepts is

necessary to address the feasibility of a prompt global strike.” In its report, it noted that the

services are exploring several potential options for the PGS mission, and that research funded

through this program element could support, “in a coordinated fashion,” technologies that could

Department of Defense Budget Appeal, FY2008 Defense Appropriations Bill. October 15, 2007.

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be common to several of these concepts. The committee also indicated that it believed any

resulting PGS capability should be clearly, and unambiguously, non-nuclear.

The Conference Committee adopted the Senate’s approach to combining the funding in a single

account, but, as the Appropriations Committee had done, limited the funding to $100 million

(H.Rept. 110-477). The Conference Report also required that the Under Secretary of Defense for

Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics submit a plan describing how DOD would obligate the

FY2008 funds (H.Rept. 110-477, sec. 243). This funding profile indicates that Congress has not

rejected the Prompt Global Strike concept completely, even though it has not accepted the

Administration’s sense of urgency or its certainty in the need for the CTM program in the nearterm.

The House and Senate Appropriations Committees followed the “combined funding” model

established by the SASC. The House Appropriations Committee eliminated the specific funding

for the CTM, directed DOD to create a “prompt global strike program element within the

Research, Development, Test, and Evaluation, Defense-Wide appropriation,” and moved $100

million into this new account to “further the Department’s prompt global strike initiative” without

“limiting the Nation to a single option” at this point in time. Some of these funds could be used to

support research and development on the CTM concept. The committee also mandated that DOD

submit a report “that discusses the technology thrusts and investment objectives and outlines the

allocation of funding towards achieving these objectives.” The Senate Appropriations Committee,

in its version of the Bill (H.R. 3222, S.Rept. 110-155) provided $125,000,000 for the Research,

Development, Test and Evaluation, Defense-Wide account for prompt global strike mission. It

noted that these funds should be used “for engineering and development of alternatives to the

conventional TRIDENT missile program.” The final version of the FY2008 Appropriations Bill

limited the funding to $100 million (P.L. 110-181, H.Rept. 110-477).

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The Pentagon requested $117.6 million for the prompt global strike program element established

in the FY2008 Defense Authorization and Appropriations processes. It also submitted a report to

Congress, as required by the FY2008 Defense Authorization Bill (P.L. 110-181, H.Rept. 110-477,

Sec. 243), that outlined its plans for dividing up the FY2008 and FY2009 funding under the PGS

program element. In this report, DOD planned to spend $58 million in FY2008 and $70 million in

FY2009 on tests of hypersonic glide vehicle. It also allotted $30 million in FY2008 and $40

million in FY2009 for alternative re-entry systems development, a reference to the Medium-Lift

Reentry Body that could be deployed on a new sea-based ballistic missile. Further, the report

indicated that DOD would spend $6 million in FY2008 and $3 million in FY2009 on the LETB-2

demonstration described above (see “Reentry Vehicle Research”).

The House Armed Services Committee, following the lead of the Strategic Forces Subcommittee,

approved this request. The Senate Armed Services Committee, however, added $30 million to this

amount, for a total of $147.6, in its version of the FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill (S. 3001).

It indicated that these added funds, plus an additional $15 million in the budget request, were to

be allocated to R&D on an advanced hypersonic-glide vehicle—the CAV program described

earlier in this report. However, in the final version of the FY2009 Defense Authorization Bill,

Congress provided the requested amount of $117.6 million for the PGS account.

The Defense Subcommittee of the Senate Appropriations Committee, however, deleted $43

million from the PGS account, leaving only 74.6 million. It removed the $40 million planned for

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work on the Medium Lift Re-entry Body and the $3 million allocated to the LETB-2 test bed

program. In other words, it rejected DOD’s plans to continue developing reentry technologies that

could be deployed on either the Trident missile or a new sea-based conventional ballistic missile.

The final version of the Defense Appropriations Bill, which was included in a larger consolidated

appropriations bill, included this reduction in funding. Further, the legislation specified that “not

less than one-fourth” of the funds provided, or $19 million, must be “available” for the Advanced

Hypersonic Weapon under development by the Army.54

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During the past few years, when reviewing Administration’s request for funding for these

programs, Congress has focused, primarily, on questions about the potential that

misunderstandings might arise if the United States were to launch long-range missiles during

crises or conflicts. Stepping back from the specific programs, however, Congress has also

reviewed the rationales offered by the NPR and PGS mission to determine whether the threats

and capabilities faced by the United States justify the pursuit of these programs. It has also begun

to question whether other military programs and capabilities can satisfy the emerging

requirements, without raising many of the questions about the potential for misunderstandings

associated with the deployment of conventional warheads on ballistic missiles. Further, Congress

could review the Air Force proposals for addressing the issues raised by the deployment of CAV

or other conventional warheads on ICBMs and the more recent proposals to meet the PGS

mission need with the near-term deployment of conventional warheads on Trident missiles.

Finally, U.S. obligations under the 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) could

impinge plans for the deployment of long-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.

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Those who believe that conventional ICBMs might contribute to this mission argue that, with

improvements in accuracy, conventional warheads could substitute for nuclear warheads in

attacking some sites now targeted by nuclear weapons. The Bush Administration and some

analysts have argued that this would provide the President with a wider range of options during a

crisis and, therefore, reduce the likelihood that he would have to use a nuclear weapon. Some

have questioned, however, whether the President needs more options or flexibility. Nuclear

weapons have always been reserved for the most extreme circumstances, serving particularly as a

deterrent against nuclear attack from other nations with nuclear weapons. In less extreme

circumstances, the President has never lacked for conventional options, they say, as is evidenced

by the fact that the United States has not used nuclear weapons since 1945.

Many analysts have also argued that the Bush Administration’s formula for integrating

conventional and nuclear capabilities into an “offensive strike” force could actually increase the

likelihood of nuclear war by blurring the distinction between nuclear and conventional weapons.

This new capability could allow the President to respond with conventional strikes against some

Elaine M. Grossman, “Strategic Arms Funds Tilt Conventional in 2009,” Global Security Newswire. November 7,

2008.

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types of targets, but it is not clear that the adversary would know that the incoming weapons

carried conventional warheads. It is also not clear that the United States would be able to control

the adversary’s reaction or the escalation of the conflict, particularly if the adversary possessed

nuclear weapons. Hence, by making the start of the war “easier” the deployment of conventional

warheads on ballistic missiles might, in this view, actually make the eventual use of nuclear

weapons more likely.

The PGS mission’s requirements are based on the assumption that a future conflict would take

place far from existing U.S. bases overseas, and possibly far from ocean areas where the U.S. has

deployed most of its sea-based forces. They also assume that a future conflict could develop

quickly, allowing too little time for the United States to move its forces into the region, either by

acquiring basing rights on land or by moving sea-based forces closer to the theater of conflict.

Further, the concern about hidden or relocatable targets reflects an assumption that targets could

appear with little notice and remain vulnerable for a short period of time, factors that place a

premium on the ability to launch quickly and arrive on target quickly. The requirements also

assume that U.S. forces are likely to face an “anti-access” threat, or air defense capabilities that

would impede operations by U.S. aircraft.

Many of these characteristics were present in Afghanistan in 2001, when the United States

attacked al Qaeda training camps and the Taliban government after the September 11 terrorist

attacks. The attacks on the United States came without warning, and, although the United States

took several weeks to plan its response and acquire the needed intelligence information on target

areas, speed was of the essence if the United States hoped to trap and destroy leaders at the

training camps in Afghanistan. The United States had no military bases in the region, and had to

take the time to acquire basing rights in nearby nations and to move U.S. naval forces into the

region. Further, the mountainous terrain offered the enemy areas, deep within the country, where

it could conceal its leadership and hope to evade attack.

These characteristics, with the premium they place on prompt, long-range attacks, support the

view that the United States should deploy long-range ballistic missiles with conventional

warheads for the PGS Mission. In this view, other weapons systems cannot address all the

characteristics at the same time; bombers may be too slow to arrive and too vulnerable to air

defense systems, sea-based or air-launched cruise missiles may also be too slow too arrive and of

too short a range to reach remote targets, and sea-based systems, with the exception of long-range

ballistic missiles, may also be too far away to reach high priority targets promptly at the sudden

start of a conflict.

However, the presence of many of these characteristics in one recent conflict does not necessarily

mean that they will all be present in most, or even many, future conflicts. While each is certainly

possible, taken together, these characteristics describe a worst-case scenario that may occur

rarely, or not at all, in its entirety. This observation highlights several questions that Congress

could consider when reviewing the rationale for the PGS mission. How likely is it that the United

States would face a sudden, unanticipated conflict, with no time to build up its forces in the

region and with the requirement to strike some targets within hours of the start of the conflict?

Would a delay of several hours or even days undermine the value of attacking these targets at the

start of a conflict? Could other weapons systems provide the United States with the ability to

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“loiter” near the theater of operations, allowing a prompt attack during the conflict if hidden or

concealed targets are revealed?55 A comparison of the likelihood of those scenarios that may

provide the most stressing environments with the likelihood of less stressful scenarios may lead to

the conclusion that other weapons systems can respond to many of these requirements in most

circumstances.

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Long-range land-based ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads would likely possess

many of the operational strengths associated with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. They would

have extremely high rates of readiness and reliability, allowing military planners to expect more

than 90% of the missiles to be available for use at any given time; they could to respond promptly

after a decision to launch; and they have high degree of accuracy allowing for attacks across a

wide range of targets. Consequently, these systems would “free the U.S. military from reliance on

forward basing and enable it to react promptly and decisively to destabilizing or threatening

actions by hostile countries and terrorist organizations.”56 They would allow the United States to

“hold adversary vital interests at risk at all times, counter anti-access threats, serve as a halt phase

shock force, and conduct suppression of enemy air defense and lethal strike missions.” Further,

they address the need to “defeat time-critical, high value, and hardened and deeply buried

targets.”57 In other words, these weapons would address all the potential circumstances cited in

requirements for the PGS mission.

But the resemblance to nuclear-armed ballistic missiles would also raise questions and create

concerns. If the United States were to launch them during a conflict, nations with minimal launch

notification systems (such as China) or degraded launch notification systems (such as Russia)

could conclude that they were under attack with nuclear missiles.58 Further, because many

possible targets lie south of Russia and China, and the United States has historically planned to

launch its ballistic missiles over the North Pole, a conventionally-armed long-range ballistic

missile would likely fly over these to nations to strike its targets. For many minutes during their

flight patterns, these missiles might appear to be headed towards targets in these nations. The

potential for misunderstanding is compounded by the short time of flight of these missiles, giving

these nations little time to evaluate the event, assess the threat, and respond with their own forces.

Barry Watts, an analyst expert in this subject has stated that, “for those rare occasions when it really is imperative to

be able to strike anywhere on the globe from the United States as quickly as possible, a long-range ballistic missile

solution is the most sensible near-term option in light of cost and technological risk.” But he has also asserted that it

may be “far more important to be able to dwell or loiter to await information and take advantage of opportunities” to

attack hidden or mobile targets during a conflict. Watts, Barry D. Long-Range Strike: Imperatives, Urgency and

Options. Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments. April 2005.

DARPA, “FALCON (Force Application and Launch from CONUS Technology Demonstration Program,” Fact

Sheet. November 2003.

Ibid.

For a description of ongoing problems with Russia’s early warning system for ballistic missile attack, see Mosher,

David E., et al. Beyond the Nuclear Shadow: A Phased Approach for Improving Nuclear Safety and U.S.-Russian

Relations. RAND Corporation, 2003. p. 5.

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There is precedent for the United States to deploy some types of delivery vehicles with both

nuclear and conventional warheads. For example, U.S. long-range bombers have always been

able to carry conventional weapons and all three of the current types of nuclear-capable

bombers—B-1, B-2, and B-52—have delivered conventional weapons during recent conflicts. In

addition, the conventional cruise missiles carried by the B-52 bomber were initially deployed as

nuclear air-launched cruise missiles and were later (during the early 1990s) converted to carry

conventional weapons. Unlike ballistic missiles however, bombers can change their course and

return to base if necessary. Further, the Tomahawk sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) have

always been deployed in both nuclear and conventional versions. The United States has often

launched the conventional SLCMs during conflicts and has never experienced misunderstandings

about whether these missiles carried nuclear or conventional warheads.59 But these have never

flown over Russia in pursuit of their targets.

Long-range ballistic missiles with conventional warheads could be viewed with far more concern

than these other dual-capable systems because they were developed and deployed solely as a part

of the U.S. strategic nuclear deterrent force. Even if the United States were to convince other

nations that we had deployed some of these missiles with conventional warheads, they could still

question whether the missiles launched during a conflict carried conventional warheads or

whether the United States had converted them back to carry nuclear warheads.

The launch of land-based long-range ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads could

present another type of problem for the United States and Canada. If these missiles were launched

from existing ICBM bases in the northern and central United States, they could drop their rocket

motor stages over populated areas of the United States or Canada. This may have been considered

a small price to pay during a global nuclear war with the Soviet Union, but it may be far less

acceptable within civilian populations under less trying and catastrophic circumstances.

As was noted above, the Air Force has said it would rename the retired Minuteman and

Peacekeeper missiles as the Minotaur II and Minotaur III missiles if it deploys them with the

conventional warheads or the proposed CAV system. This would allow the United States to

differentiate between the conventional and nuclear-armed versions of its ballistic missiles in its

operational plans, and possibly help provide other nations with a means to distinguish between

the two. The Air Force has also identified a concept of operation for the Minotaur missiles that

includes a number of “mitigating measures” that might ease concerns about the potential for

misunderstandings and damage arising from their launch. These factors fall into three general

categories: basing measures; cooperative measures; and operational measures.

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The Air Force has stated that it would deploy ballistic missiles armed with CAVs or other

conventional warheads for PGS mission at bases far from missiles armed with nuclear warheads

and far from bases with storage facilities for nuclear warheads.60 The two potential sites include

Vandenberg Air Force base in California and Cape Canaveral in Florida. According to the Air

On the other hand, the Soviet Union, and Russia, have sought to contain U.S. cruise missile capabilities by

suggesting arms control limits on nuclear SLCMs that could also capture SLCMs armed with conventional warheads.

Soviet and Russian analysts have viewed these weapons as threatening to Soviet nuclear facilities, regardless of their

warhead, because of their high accuracy and relatively short time of flight.

U.S. Air Force. Common Aero Vehicle White Paper. p. 7.

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Force, “the new coastal basing sites would have no nuclear capability or association”61 as they

would lack the facilities and equipment needed to handle or store nuclear weapons. The coastal

basing plan would also address concerns about debris from missile launches falling on populated

areas in the United States or Canada. If the missiles were launched from the U.S. coast, rather

than from bases in northern, central states, then the debris would likely fall over the oceans rather

than over land.

The Air Force has also stated that it could deploy Minotaur missiles on mobile launchers,

horizontally in earthen berms, or above ground, rather than in the hardened, vertical silos used at

nuclear ICBM bases. The United States could then declare, to Russia or other nations, that these

new, modified launchers were equipped with conventional-only delivery vehicles. This

declaration would further demonstrate that the missiles at the two coastal bases were different

from nuclear ICBMs, even though it would not preclude the possible covert deployment of

nuclear warheads on the missiles.62 Further, their deployment with a CAV reentry vehicle, rather

than a standard post-boost vehicle and warhead present on a nuclear-armed missile, would

reinforce this designation.63

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The Air Force has proposed that the United States institute a number of cooperative measures

with other nations to add confidence to the U.S. declaration that the Minotaur missiles deployed

at coastal bases would carry conventional warheads. These measures could include military-tomilitary contacts, high level political consultations, and ongoing discussions to keep Russia and

other nations informed about U.S. plans for these missiles and to make them aware of the

observable differences between conventional and nuclear ballistic missiles. The Air Force has

referred to this process as a “strategic dialogue” that might, over time, answer questions and ease

concerns about the plans for and capabilities of long-range ballistic missiles armed with

conventional warheads.64

The United States could also invite other nations to observe test launches of these missiles or to

participate in exercises that include simulations with these missiles. This might allow nations

such as Russia to become familiar with the operational procedures associated with ballistic

missiles armed with conventional warheads and to distinguish between these procedures and

those associated with nuclear-armed missiles. Further, the United States could allow Russia to

conduct short-notice inspections at the Minotaur bases, similar to, or even more intrusive than,

the inspections permitted at nuclear missile bases under the START Treaty, to confirm the

absence of nuclear weapons either on the missiles or in the storage facilities.65 Over time, these

measures would not only provide information about the missiles and their missions, but might

Report to Congress on the “Concept of Operations” for the Common Aero Vehicle. Submitted in response to

Congressional Reporting Requirements, by Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force. February 24, 2004. p. 4.

The United States uses a similar formula with its B-1 bombers. Although they were originally equipped to carry

nuclear weapons, they have been deployed at bases that do not house nuclear weapons and redesignated as

conventional bombers. Hence, their weapons delivery status is determined by basing and declaration, rather than by

their original nuclear capabilities.

Air Force Space Command. Common Aero Vehicle White Paper. p. 8.

Ibid. p. 7.

Report to Congress on the “Concept of Operations” for the Common Aero Vehicle. Submitted in response to

Congressional Reporting Requirements, by Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force. February 24, 2004. p. 4.

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also build confidence and understanding between the parties. The increased level of cooperation,

and possibly decreased level of suspicion, might then reduce the likelihood of misinterpretation if

the United States were to launch ballistic missiles with conventional warheads.

The United States could also provide Russia with prior notification of planned launches of

ballistic missiles with conventional warheads, or the two nations could set up a dedicated “hot

line” for use after a launch, so the United States could inform Russia of the launch and assure it

that the missile did not carry a nuclear warhead and was not headed for targets in Russia. Further,

as has been discussed on many occasions over the years, the United States and Russia could share

early-warning data at a joint facility so that Russia would have the information it needed to

distinguish between the launch of a nuclear-armed ballistic missile from a northern base and the

launch of a conventional-armed ballistic missile from a coastal base.

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The Air Force has also indicated that it could alter the trajectory of ballistic missiles armed with

conventional warheads so that they would not resemble the trajectories that would be followed by

nuclear-armed ballistic missiles on course for targets in Russia or China.66 As was noted above,

CAV is have the capability to travel 3,000 miles downrange and 3,000 miles cross-range, after

release from its ballistic missile delivery system. Hence, according to the Air Force, the missile

could travel on a “shaped trajectory” or, if launched from the East Coast towards the Middle East,

a southern trajectory, so that it would not fly over Russia or China, and make up for the added

distance by using the flight range of the CAV. The missile could also launch with a “depressed

trajectory,” then use the aerodynamic lift of the CAV to achieve the range it would need to reach

around the globe without flying over Russia.

Taken together, these three types of measures might help reduce the risks of misunderstandings.

But the accumulation of information during peacetime and frequent communications during

crises may not be sufficient address problems that could come up in an atmosphere of confusion

and incomplete information during a conflict. Specifically, the argument in favor of using longrange ballistic missiles for the PGS mission assumes that the United States might have little

warning before the start a conflict and might need to launch its missiles promptly at that time.

This scenario would allow little time for the United States to consult with, or even inform, other

nations about its intentions. If other nations are caught by surprise and fear they might be under

nuclear attack, they might also decide to respond promptly, before the United States had the

opportunity to convince them that the missiles carried conventional warheads.

Further, routine data exchanges and on-site inspections can provide confidence in the absence of

nuclear warheads on the missiles on a day-to-day basis in peacetime, but they cannot provide

assurances that the warheads could not be changed in a relatively short period of time or that the

warheads were not actually changed in the days or weeks since the last inspection. In addition,

changing the basing patterns or launch patterns of missiles to draw a sharper distinction between

conventional and nuclear-armed missiles assumes both that other nations can observe the

differences and that they believe the different appearances indicate different warheads. Finally,

these measures would do nothing to alleviate concerns among nations that did not participate in

the cooperative programs. As a result, while the measures described above can reduce the

possibility of misunderstandings, they probably cannot eliminate them.

Air Force Space Command. Common Aero Vehicle White Paper. p. 11.

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As was noted above, DOD had hoped to deploy conventional warheads on Trident long-range

ballistic missiles. Although they would be based at sea, these missiles would share many

characteristics of land-based ballistic missiles that make them suited to the PGS mission. As

nuclear delivery vehicles, they have been deployed with the command and control systems

needed to allow for prompt decision making and prompt launch during a crisis. They have the

range to reach targets around the world and they would have the accuracy, particularly if the

reentry vehicles can receive GPS updates, to attack a wide range of targets on short notice.

Congress has offered modest support for this effort in the past, providing an additional $10

million in the FY2005 Defense Appropriations Act for “Advanced Conventional Strike Capability

Assessment.” And, as was noted above, the Navy requested $127 million for this effort in the

FY2007 budget, with funding to total $503 million in the next six years, but Congress rejected

this funding request, providing only $30 million for research on the reentry vehicle. It has

requested $162.4 million in FY2008.

SLBMs armed with conventional warheads could raise many of the same questions about

misunderstandings as land-based ballistic missiles, particularly if these warheads are deployed on

the same submarines that currently carry nuclear warheads. The Navy could not employ many of

the techniques identified by the Air Force to convince potential adversaries that the missiles

carried conventional warheads. Even if the United States did deploy SLBMs with conventional

warheads on submarines that did not carry nuclear warheads, it would be extremely difficult to

demonstrate these differences and assure other nations of the segregated deployments in a

submarine that is intended to be hidden and invulnerable when at sea. Further, according to some

reports, Russia’s ability to monitor U.S. SLBM launches is even more degraded than its ability to

monitor ICBM launches, so it might conclude that it is under nuclear attack if it observed an

SLBM launch from a U.S. ballistic missile submarine.

On the other hand, because the submarines are mobile and the missiles are long-range, the United

States could alter the patrol areas for Trident submarines so that, if they were to launch their

conventional missiles, they could use trajectories that did not require them to fly over these

nations on their way to their intended targets. Alternatively, the submarines could move prior to

launching their missiles, to avoid overflight of Russia or China, but this presumes that the United

States had the time to move its submarines to these new launch points prior to the start of the

conflict, a possibility that is inconsistent with the PGS mission’s assumption that the United

States could need to launch its missiles promptly at the start of an unexpected conflict.

The plan to deploy Trident missiles with conventional warheads on the same submarines as

missiles with nuclear warheads could also raise questions about the command and control of

those missiles. At the present time, submarine commanders can not launch their missiles until

they receive authorization from the National Command Authority (essentially, the President). It is

unclear whether the missiles with conventional warheads would be subject to the same stringent

command and control processes, or whether someone within the military chain of command

would be able to authorize their use without Presidential approval.

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U.S. bombers—B-52s, B-2s, and B-1s—have the range and payload needed to deliver weapons to

targets across the globe. But they may not be suited to the PGS mission because they could take

hours or days to reach targets in remote areas, and they would require tanker support to refuel

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during their missions. The long flight time could contribute to crew fatigue and air defenses could

deny the bombers access to some critical target areas. Conventional cruise missiles delivered by

B-52 bombers would allow the aircraft to stay out of the range of some air-defense systems, but

they could still take too long to reach their targets meet the objectives of the PGS mission. On the

other hand, the long time of flight could give the United States time to review and resolve the

situation without resort to military attacks.

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At the present time, the Navy has the capability to attack targets at ranges of around 1,500

nautical miles with sea-based cruise missiles. These Tomahawk missiles have been employed

often in the conflicts in the past 15 years, providing the United States with the ability to reach

targets without risking aircraft or their crews. The Navy is currently modifying four of its Trident

ballistic missile submarines so that they can carry cruise missiles. These submarines are to be

equipped to carry up to 7 Tomahawk missiles each in up to 22 (out of 24) of their Trident launch

tubes, for a total of 154 cruise missiles per submarine. But these missiles may be limited in their

ability to contribute to the PGS mission. With a maximum speed of about 550 miles per hour and

a range of 1,500 nautical miles they can take 2-3 hours to reach their targets. Further, their reach

is limited, even if the ships or submarines carrying the missiles are deployed in the region of the

conflict. Consequently, the Navy has also explored alternatives that would allow it to reach its

potential targets more quickly.

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Since the mid-1990s, the Navy has explored several options for the development and deployment

of an attack missile that could travel at speeds of Mach 3-Mach 5.67 These hypersonic missiles

would allow the Navy to attack targets within 15 minutes from ships or submarines based within

500-600 nautical miles of their targets. Hence, they would provide the capability for prompt

strikes within the theater of operations, but they would not have the range sought for the PGS

mission. The United States would either need to keep its vessels on station near potential areas of

conflict, which it already does in certain areas, or it would need days or weeks to move its ships

or submarines into place.

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Analysts have also explored the option of deploying long-range land-based ballistic missiles at

bases outside the continental United States. For example, it might be deployed in Guam, Diego

Garcia, or Alaska. This system would use a two-stage rocket motor, with a payload of up to 1,000

pounds, a flight time to target of less than 25 minutes, and an accuracy of less than 5 meters. It

could employ many of the same reentry vehicle and warhead options as the CTM and CSM

systems. Because it would rely on existing rocket technologies, it might be available for

deployment by 2012, in roughly the same time frame as the CSM system. However, because it

would be launched from outside the continental United States, its trajectory would not resemble

that of a land-based ICBM. Hence, some analysts argue that it would solve many of the questions

For a summary of these programs see Statement of Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense, Congressional

Research Service, before the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Projection Forces. Hearing on

Long-Range Strike Options. March 3, 2004. pp. 10-11.

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about misunderstandings and misperceptions that plague the CTM and CSM systems. The

Defense Subcommittee of the House Appropriations Committee included $4 million for this effort

in the FY2007 defense appropriations bill, but the Conference Committee reduced this amount to

$1.8 million.

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The Air Force has acknowledged that “depending on system design” long-range ballistic missiles

armed with conventional warheads could be covered by the provisions in the 1991 START

Treaty.68 This assessment, however, assumes that the START Treaty remains in force when the

missiles are deployed. START expires at the end of 2009, and, at this time, it seems possible that

the bulk of the Treaty will lapse, even though the United States and Russia may retain some of the

monitoring and verification provisions.

START limits the United States to a total of 4,900 “attributed” warheads on its land-based and

sea-based long-range ballistic missiles (ICBMs and SLBMs). The number of warheads attributed

to each type of missile is outlined in a memorandum of understanding that accompanies the

treaty. The Minuteman II missile, which would serve as the base for the Minotaur II missile, is

counted as carrying one warhead; the Peacekeeper, which could become the Minotaur III missile,

is counted as carrying 10 warheads.

The treaty specifies that all ICBM launchers and submarine launch tubes that can hold ballistic

missiles covered by the treaty will count against the treaty limits. This would presumably include

launchers for Minotaur missiles. However, even if the Minotaur missiles count against the START

limits as if they were still Minuteman II or Peacekeeper missiles, it is unlikely that the United

States would exceed the START limit of 4,900 warheads. This is because the United States plans

to reduce its warheads to between 1,700 and 2,200 “operationally deployed warheads,” as it is

required to do under the 2002 Moscow Treaty between the United States and Russia. These

deeper reductions warheads on nuclear-armed ballistic missiles will mean that the United States

has the “room” to deploy missiles with conventional warheads without exceeding START limits.

The United States would not have to count missiles with conventional warheads against the limits

in the 2003 Moscow Treaty if it excludes these systems from its definition of “operationally

deployed warheads.”69

The START Treaty could, nonetheless, impinge on the Air Force plan to deploy ballistic missiles

with conventional warheads at coastal bases. The treaty indicates that new types of ICBMs, or

modified versions of existing ICBMs, must be deployed at ICBM bases in rail-mobile, roadmobile, or silo launchers.70 The United States could declare Vandenberg to be a new ICBM base,

Report to Congress on the “Concept of Operations” for the Common Aero Vehicle. Submitted in response to

Congressional Reporting Requirements, by Peter B. Teets, Under Secretary of the Air Force. February 24, 2004. p. 4.

The Moscow Treaty does not define “operationally deployed warheads.” Each nation can do so on its own, and

declare which systems it will count under the limit of 2,200 operationally deployed warheads.

Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction and

Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (START Treaty). Article V, para 3. Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan and Belarus

succeeded the Soviet Union as parties to the Treaty.

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but it would have to build new silos, or use mobile launchers for the missiles. The treaty does

allow the parties to locate “soft-site” launchers for ICBMs at test ranges or space launch facilities,

which would include Vandenberg and Cape Canaveral.71 But the treaty states that the parties

cannot flight test ICBMs equipped with reentry vehicles from space-launch facilities, which

would seem to preclude deployment at Cape Canaveral.72 The treaty further limits the aggregate

number of ICBMs and SLBMs located at test facilities (which would include Vandenberg) to 25

and the aggregate number of test launchers to 20.73 The United States has already declared that it

has 15 test launchers at Vandenberg, leaving little room for the deployment of additional

launchers for ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads.

The START Treaty also allows on-site inspections at bases housing delivery vehicles limited by

the treaty, notifications prior to the launch of missiles limited by the treaty, and the provision of

telemetry generated during test flights of missiles limited by the treaty. These provisions could all

apply to the new Minotaur missiles, even if they are deployed with conventional warheads far

from bases that house nuclear warheads or nuclear delivery vehicles. These provisions,

particularly those calling for prior notification of missile launches, could help the United States

inform Russia or other nations of its intentions when it decides to use a Minotaur missile in a

conflict. On the other hand, these provisions could also complicate U.S. efforts to launch these

missiles promptly at the start of a sudden, unexpected conflict.

The United States could claim that, because the Minotaur missiles were deployed with

conventional warheads, they should not count under START or be subject to the deployment

restrictions and data exchange provisions in the Treaty. However, it is likely that the United States

would have to meet with Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan, the four former Soviet states

that are parties to the Treaty to work out how the provisions of the Treaty are to apply to these

missiles. Regardless, the relationship between these missiles and U.S. arms control obligations,

along with Russia’s possible reaction to U.S. proposals to either apply or avoid these obligations

for the new Minotaur missiles, deserves further analysis.

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The Navy has not yet addressed, publicly, arms control questions that might arise from the

deployment of conventional warheads on its Trident missiles. Many of the issues discussed above

for the Air Force stem from the plan to segregate missiles with conventional warheads from those

with nuclear warheads, and to have those with conventional warheads recognized as different

missiles. Because the Navy would deploy the missiles with conventional and nuclear warheads on

the same submarines, the Navy would not have similar concerns. It would, in all likelihood,

simply accept that the conventional warheads on Trident missiles count under the START Treaty.

The warheads would count against the Treaty limit of 4,900 ballistic missile warheads, and the

missiles carrying the warheads would be subject to short-notice inspections to confirm that they

did not carry more than the agreed number of 8 warheads (or 6 warheads if the missiles were

declared to be “downloaded.”) Because the DOD plan appears to call for the missiles to be

deployed with only 4 warheads each, and because the Navy would be under no obligation to

START Treaty, Article V, para 9.

START Treaty, Article V, para 14.

START Treaty, Article IV, para 1(D).

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display the exact configuration of the missiles, but only to demonstrate that they carried fewer

than 8 warheads, these requirements apparently would not impinge on the CTM program.

The Moscow Treaty provisions also probably would not constrain the CTM program. That Treaty

limits the United States to 2,200 “operationally deployed” nuclear warheads. It does not define

this term and it does not outline any counting rules that the nations must use when determining

which warheads count under the limits. The United States likely would not count the warheads on

the CTM missiles under the limits and it would be under no obligation to reveal this to Russia; it

would simply have to inform Russia of the total number of warheads it was counting under the

Treaty. Further, the United States could deploy more warheads on its ICBMs, or on other SLBMs,

to make up for the 96 conventional warheads on the conventional Trident missiles. An arithmetic

method, multiplying deployed missiles by the number of warheads carried by those missiles, like

the one used in START Treaty, might then put the United States over the 2,200 warhead limit, but

the Moscow Treaty does not use such a method to count deployed warheads.

Russia may object to the CTM plan on arms control grounds, insisting that the warheads on the

conventional Trident missiles should count against the Treaty limits and that the United States

should have to reduce the number of warheads on other systems to accommodate these missiles.

However, this view is not consistent with the provisions or requirements of the Moscow Treaty.

Consequently, even if the missiles raised issues for bilateral discussions about arms control

implementation, it is unlikely that the United States would have to alter its plans to accommodate

the Moscow Treaty.

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The Air Force, and many analysts outside government, have argued that long-range land-based

ballistic missiles armed with conventional warheads can provide a low-cost, near-term solution to

the meet the demands of the prompt global strike mission. They have demonstrated, during their

many years on alert during the Cold War, that they have high levels of reliability and readiness,

along with a robust and responsive command and control structure. They were also designed to

perform with and a great degree of accuracy, which may improve in the future if they are

deployed with new guidance technologies. Many experts argue that these characteristics are

invaluable for a long-range conventional strike system in the post-Cold War era.

But these weapons might provide the United States with more capability than it needs under most

circumstances, while, at the same time, raising the possibility that their use might be

misinterpreted as the launch of nuclear weapons. For example, as would be true for any weapon

seeking to achieve this mission, the ability to attack targets across the globe on short notice

depends on the U.S. ability to acquire precise information about the locations of potential targets

and to translate that information into useful targeting data. If it takes longer for the United States

to acquire and use that information than it would take for it to launch and deliver a ballistic

missile, or, as has often been the case, if such precise information is unavailable, then the United

States may not be able to benefit from the unique characteristics of long-range ballistic missiles.

Bombers would take longer to reach their targets, but this added time might provide the United

States with the opportunity to acquire the needed intelligence. A recent report by the Government

Accountability Office (GAO) identified this particular problem, noting that many of the ongoing

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studies into global strike and prompt global strike have not addressed the need for critical

enabling capabilities along with the weapons systems that would be used in the attacks.74

In addition, long-range ballistic missiles would have an advantage over sea-based systems if the

United States did not have naval forces near the conflict region, or did not have time to move

these forces to the area, or if the target area were out of range for the sea-based systems. But the

U.S. Navy deploys its force around the world and maintains capabilities near likely areas of

conflict. A few targets may be out of range for these weapons, but bombers armed with cruise

missiles might be able to reach them. Land-based long-range ballistic missiles would only be

needed in the rare circumstance where the United States had no warning, needed a prompt attack,

and had to reach too far inland for sea-based systems. But even in these circumstances, the

benefits of the use of long-range ballistic missiles might not outweigh the risks.

Most analysts recognized, during the Cold War, that long-range land-based ballistic missiles

could prove destabilizing in a crisis, when nations might have incomplete information about the

nature of an attack, and too little time to gather more information and plan an appropriate

response. Faced with these circumstances, a nation who was not an intended target, such as

Russia, might choose to respond quickly, rather than to wait for more information. The same

could be true for the adversaries who are the intended targets of U.S. ballistic missiles. If the

United States hoped to destroy a nation’s military forces or weapons of mass destruction at the

start of a conflict, before they could be used against U.S. troops, the other nation might choose to

use these weapons even more quickly during a crisis, before it lost them to the U.S. attack.

Some have argued that the possible crisis instabilities associated with long-range ballistic missiles

should not eliminate them from consideration for the PGS mission because the United States can

work with Russia, China, and other nations to reduce the risks and because no other weapons, at

least in the short term, provide the United States with the ability to attack promptly anywhere on

the globe, at the start of an unexpected conflict. Yet the question of whether the United States

should accept the risks associated with the potential for misunderstandings and crisis instabilities

can be viewed with a broader perspective. How likely is the United States to face the need to

attack quickly at great distances at the start of an unexpected conflict? How much would the

United States lose if it had to wait a few hours or days to move its forces into the region (or to

await the intelligence reports and precise targeting data needed for an attack)?

If the risks of waiting for bombers or sea-based weapons to arrive in the theater are high, then

long-range ballistic missiles may be the preferred response, even with the risk that other nations

might misunderstand U.S. intentions. On the other hand, if the risks of waiting for other forces to

arrive in theater are deemed to be manageable, and the risks of potential misunderstandings and

crisis instabilities associated with the launch of long-range ballistic missiles are thought to be

high, then the United States can consider a broader range of alternative weapons systems to meet

the needs of the PGS mission.

U.S. Government Accountability Office. Military Transformation. DOD Needs to Strengthen Implementation of its

Global Strike Concept and Provide a Comprehensive Investment Approach for acquiring Needed Capabilities. GAO08-325. April 2008. p. 5.

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Amy F. Woolf

Specialist in Nuclear Weapons Policy

awoolf@crs.loc.gov, 7-2379

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This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.