Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

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Prepared for Members and Committees of Congress

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

Summary

Opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking have eroded Afghanistan’s fragile political and

economic order over the last 30 years. In spite of ongoing counternarcotics efforts by the Afghan

government, the United States, and their partners, Afghanistan remains the source of over 90% of

the world’s illicit opium. Since 2001, efforts to provide viable economic alternatives to poppy

cultivation and to disrupt drug trafficking and related corruption have succeeded in some areas.

However, insecurity, particularly in the southern province of Helmand, and widespread corruption

fueled a surge in cultivation in 2006 and 2007, pushing opium output to all-time highs.

In 2008 and 2009, poppy cultivation decreased in north-central and eastern Afghanistan, while

drug activity became more concentrated in the south and west. National poppy cultivation and

opium production totals dropped in 2009 for the second straight season, as pressure from

provincial officials, higher wheat prices, drought, and lower opium prices altered the cultivation

decisions of some Afghan poppy farmers. Preliminary estimates for the 2010 season suggest that

poor weather conditions, disease, and military operations in key poppy growing areas will limit

production to 2009 levels, in spite of backsliding in some areas. Some experts continue to

question the sustainability of rapid changes in cultivation patterns and recommend reinforcing

recent reductions to replace poppy cultivation in local economies over time.

Across Afghanistan, insurgents, criminal organizations, and corrupt officials exploit narcotics as a

reliable source of revenue and patronage, which has perpetuated the threat these groups pose to

the country’s fragile internal security and the legitimacy of its elected government. The

trafficking of Afghan drugs appears to provide financial and logistical support to a range of

extremist groups that continue to operate in and around Afghanistan. Although coalition forces

may be less frequently relying on figures involved with narcotics for intelligence and security

support, many observers have warned that drug-related corruption among appointed and elected

Afghan officials creates political obstacles to progress.

As of April 2010, Congress had appropriated approximately $4.2 billion in regular and

supplemental foreign assistance and defense funding for counternarcotics programs in

Afghanistan from FY2001 through FY2010. The Obama Administration is pursuing a twopronged interdiction and development policy in support of the government of Afghanistan’s

implementation of its National Drug Control Strategy. At present, U.S. military and law

enforcement personnel are assisting Afghan forces and judicial authorities in targeting drug

trafficking organizations while State Department, USAID, and USDA personnel are

implementing expanded agricultural development assistance programs. The Administration ended

U.S. support for eradication after deciding previous efforts were inefficient and potentially

counterproductive. Afghan authorities continue to implement targeted eradication efforts.

This report provides current statistical information, profiles the narcotics trade’s participants,

explores linkages between narcotics, insecurity, and corruption, and reviews U.S. and

international policy responses since late 2001. The report also considers ongoing policy debates

regarding the counternarcotics role of coalition military forces, poppy eradication, alternative

livelihoods, and funding issues for Congress. See also CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: PostTaliban Governance, Security, and U.S. Policy, by (name redacted), CRS Report R40699,

Afghanistan: U.S. Foreign Assistance, by (name redacted), and CRS Report R40156,

War in

Afghanistan: Strategy, Military Operations, and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted) and

(name redacted).

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Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

Contents

Overview ....................................................................................................................................1

Afghanistan’s Opium Economy...................................................................................................1

2009 Production Statistics .....................................................................................................3

UNODC Projections and U.S. Assessments, 2010 .................................................................7

Obama Administration Policy and Funding Requests.............................................................8

Issues for Congress ................................................................................................................... 10

Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle.............................................................................. 10

Balancing Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency, and Counternarcotics ............................... 12

Defining the Role of the U.S. Military and ISAF ................................................................. 13

Targeting and Enforcement ........................................................................................... 13

Defense Authorization and the Provision of Equipment and Weaponry .......................... 17

Alternative Livelihoods and Development........................................................................... 18

Eradication.......................................................................................................................... 19

Central Government and Governor-Led Eradication ...................................................... 19

Manual or Aerial Herbicide-based Eradication............................................................... 20

Counternarcotics Assistance Certification and Reporting Requirements ............................... 21

Certification Requirements............................................................................................ 21

Reporting Requirements................................................................................................ 22

Figures

Figure 1. Opium Production in Afghanistan, 1981-2009 ..............................................................4

Figure 2. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1986-2009 ...................................................5

Figure 3. Estimated Opium Poppy Cultivation by District, 2009..................................................6

Figure 4. Narcotics, Corruption, and Security in Afghanistan..................................................... 11

Tables

Table 1. Opium Prices in Afghanistan..........................................................................................7

Table 2. Counternarcotics Appropriations and Requests, Afghanistan FY2009-FY2011 ..............9

Contacts

Author Contact Information ...................................................................................................... 23

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Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

Overview

In spite of ongoing international efforts to combat Afghanistan’s narcotics trade, U.N. officials

estimate that Afghanistan supplies over 90% of the world’s illicit opium. 1 Afghan, U.S., and

international officials have stated that opium poppy cultivation and drug trafficking constitute

serious strategic threats to the security and stability of Afghanistan and jeopardize the success of

post-9/11 counterterrorism and reconstruction efforts. Since 2001, counternarcotics policy has

emerged as a focal point in broader, recurring debates in the executive branch and in Congress

about the United States’ strategic objectives and policies in Afghanistan.

Relevant concerns include the role of U.S. military personnel and strategies for continuing the

simultaneous pursuit of counterterrorism and counternarcotics goals, which may be complicated

by practical necessities and political realities. Coalition forces pursuing regional

counterinsurgency and counterterrorism objectives may rely on the cooperation of security

commanders, tribal leaders, and local officials who may be involved in the narcotics trade.

Counterinsurgency operations in key poppy growing areas have presented U.S. forces and

officials with challenging decisions about the relative merits and risks inherent in simultaneously

seeking to limit poppy cultivation and maintain positive relationships with local farmers. U.S.

officials and many observers also believe that the introduction of a democratic system of

government to Afghanistan has been accompanied by the election and appointment of many

narcotics-associated and corrupt individuals to positions of public office.

Efforts to combat the opium trade in Afghanistan face the challenge of ending a highly profitable

enterprise fueled by international demand that has become deeply interwoven with the economic,

political, and social fabric of a war-torn country. Afghan, U.S., and international authorities are

engaged in a campaign to reverse the unprecedented upsurge of opium poppy cultivation and

heroin production that occurred following the fall of the Taliban. U.S. officials continue to

implement a multifaceted counternarcotics initiative that includes public awareness campaigns,

judicial reform measures, economic and agricultural development assistance, support for Afghan

demand reduction programs, and drug interdiction operations. Questions regarding the likely

effectiveness, resource requirements, and implications of counternarcotics strategies in

Afghanistan continue to arise as Members of the 111th Congress review and debate the Obama

Administration’s policies.

Afghanistan’s Opium Economy

Opium production has become an entrenched negative element of Afghanistan’s fragile political

and economic order over the last 30 years in spite of ongoing local, regional, and international

efforts to reverse its growth. At the time of Afghanistan’s pro-Communist coup in 1978, narcotics

experts estimated that Afghan farmers produced 300 metric tons (MT) of opium annually, enough

to satisfy most local and regional demand and to supply a handful of heroin production facilities

whose products were bound for Western Europe. 2 From the early 1980s through 2007, a trend of

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)/Government of Afghanistan Ministry of Counternarcotics

(MCN), Afghan Opium Survey 2009, December 2009.

See Jonathan C. Randal, “Afghanistan’s Promised War on Opium,” Washington Post, November 2, 1978, and Stuart

Auerbach, “New Heroin Connection: Afghanistan and Pakistan Supply West With Opium,” Washington Post, October

(continued...)

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Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

increasing opium poppy cultivation and opium production unfolded during successive periods of

insurgency, civil war, fundamentalist government, and recently, international engagement

(Figures 1 and 2). During the 2006-2007 poppy growing season, Afghanistan produced a world

record opium poppy crop that yielded 8,200 MT of illicit opium—an estimated 93% of the

world’s supply.

A slight reduction in national poppy cultivation and opium output was recorded in 2007-2008,

and many international officials attributed the changes to more effective counternarcotics

approaches, including governor-enforced poppy cultivation bans and eradication. United Nations

and Afghan government officials announced that further reductions in national cultivation and

output statistics were recorded for the 2008-2009 season, due in part to bad weather, interdiction

efforts, market prices, and improved agricultural assistance in some key poppy growing areas.

Estimates for 2010, suggest that production will remain relatively static, with crop disease and

poor weather conditions exerting downward pressure on output.

Overall, practitioners and observers remained focused on Afghan government, United Nations,

and other field reporting that shows reductions in poppy cultivation in some northern, central, and

eastern provinces, while large-scale cultivation continues in conflict-ridden southern provinces

and remote areas of the east and west. By nearly all accounts, opiate trafficking and related

corruption remain nationwide problems. With regard to so-called “poppy free” provinces, experts

and practitioners continue to debate the causes and durability of recent reductions in poppy

cultivation, with some analysts calling for more targeted development assistance to capitalize on

and consolidate what they argue are still-reversible reductions in many areas. Parallel debates

focus on the advisability and targeting of interdiction and eradication and the relative importance

of and appropriate methods for sustainably replacing poppy cultivation and opium industry labor

as income sources for Afghan households.

The concentration of poppy cultivation in insecure and remote areas has raised doubts in the

minds of some observers about the likelihood of further gains in the absence of more fundamental

improvements in security and stability. In the most volatile areas of the country, insecurity and

corruption create a climate in which poppy cultivators and drug-trafficking groups remain largely

free to operate. Violence and criminality stifle licit economic activity and prevent effective

eradication, interdiction, outside investment, or the provision of development assistance. Reports

suggest that the drug trade provides financial support to corrupt officials, criminal groups, and

insurgents who in turn protect traffickers and perpetuate the chaotic environments that allow

illicit trade to thrive.

In light of these challenges, current U.S. policy is designed to: break self-reinforcing cycles of

insecurity, crime, and violence through direct action against traffickers, insurgents, and corrupt

officials; understand, consolidate, and sustain reductions in poppy cultivation where they have

occurred; and, reproduce sustainable reductions in cultivation nationwide.

(...continued)

11, 1979.

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Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

2009 Production Statistics

According to the 2009 Afghanistan Opium Survey conducted by the Afghan Ministry of

Counternarcotics (MCN) and the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC):3

•

Opium poppy cultivation took place in 14 of 34 Afghan provinces in 2008-2009

(see Figure 3). The land area under poppy cultivation fell by 22% to 123,000

hectares (equal to 1.6% of Afghanistan’s arable land). Cultivation remains

overwhelmingly concentrated in conflict-ridden Helmand province, where

farmers cultivated over 69,833 hectares of poppy—a 33% decline in the province

from the prior season. MCN-UNODC estimates for 2010 suggest that three

provinces may lose their poppy-free status while several others could become

poppy-free depending on Afghan government responses and international support

(see below).

•

The 2008-2009 opium poppy crop had the potential to produce 6,900 MT of

illicit opium, a 10% decline from the prior season. However, crop yields once

again improved 15% due to better weather conditions in some areas. A range of

accepted opium-to-heroin conversion rates indicate that an estimated opium yield

of 6,900 MT could produce 690 to 985 MT of refined heroin. 4

•

Approximately 254,000 Afghan households cultivated opium poppy in 20082009, equal to roughly 1.6 million people or 6.4% of the Afghan population.

Thousands of laborers, traffickers, warlords, and officials continue to participate.

•

The estimated $438 million farmgate value (equal to volume multiplied by the

price of non-dried opium paid to farmers) of the 2008-2009 opium harvest is

equivalent in value to approximately 4% of the country’s licit GDP. The export

value of the 2008 crop may have exceeded $3.4 billion, equivalent to

approximately 33% of the country’s licit 2008 GDP. Many licit and emerging

industries have been financed or supported by profits from narcotics trafficking. 5

As noted above, some experts and practitioners consider provincial and district level data to be a

more accurate and informative reflection of counternarcotics challenges and successes. Recent

UNODC/MCN reports attribute sustainable declines in poppy cultivation to political stability,

economic integration, alternative livelihood assistance, and effective law enforcement. Other

variables such as weather, raw opium prices (see Table 1), and the prices of licit crops, including

wheat, have significant and difficult to quantify effects on farmers’ decisions to grow poppy. At

present, changes in opium and wheat price trends have led some expert observers and officials to

express concern that prevailing price relationships that have undermined poppy cultivation may

be slowing or entering a period of reversal. At the same time, weather conditions and disease

patterns that have favored high opium yields in recent years appear to have reversed, amid

widespread reports of blight from infection and drought.

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009. Available at:

http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/Afgh-opiumsurvey2009_web.pdf.

Methodology described in UNODC/Afghan Gov., Afghanistan Opium Survey 2004, November 2004, pp. 105-7.

Edouard Martin and Steven Symansky, “Macroeconomic Impact of the Drug Economy and Counter-Narcotics

Efforts,” in Doris Buddenberg and William A. Byrd (eds.), Afghanistan’s Drug Industry: Structure, Functioning,

Dynamics, and Implications for Counter-Narcotics Policy, World Bank/UNODC, November 2006.

Congressional Research Service

Figure 1. Opium Production in Afghanistan, 1981-2009

Source: Graphic developed by CRS using UNODC/MCN data. One metric ton is equal to 2,200 pounds. The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under their

control in 2001 but allowed opium trafficking to continue. Limited poppy cultivation continued in areas under Northern Alliance control.

CRS-4

Figure 2. Opium Poppy Cultivation in Afghanistan, 1986-2009

Source: Graphic developed by CRS using UNODC/MCN data. One hectare is equal to 10,000 square meters. The Taliban banned opium poppy cultivation in areas under

their control in 2001but allowed opium trafficking to continue. Limited poppy cultivation continued in areas under Northern Alliance control.

CRS-5

Figure 3. Estimated Opium Poppy Cultivation by District, 2009

Source: Adapted by CRS from UNODC/MCN Afghanistan Opium Survey 2009, p. 17.

Notes: District boundaries approximate.

CRS-6

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

Table 1. Opium Prices in Afghanistan

(regionally weighted fresh opium farmgatea price, current US$/kilogram)

Opium Price

2000

2001b

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

$28

$301

$350

$283

$92

$102

$94

$86

$70

$48

Source: United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime, Afghanistan Opium Surveys 2004-2009.

Farmgate price for fresh opium is the price paid to farmers for non-dried opium.

Dry opium prices increase following the Taliban ban on poppy cultivation and skyrocketed to nearly

$700/kg immediately following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks. According to UNODC, prices

temporarily fell to $93/kg after U.S. airstrikes began.

UNODC Projections and U.S. Assessments, 20106

The December 2009 UNODC/Afghan Government opium survey reported further consolidation

of poppy cultivation in the southern and western provinces of Helmand, Kandahar, Nimroz,

Farah, Dai Kundi, Uruzgan, and Zabol. According to the U.S. State Department, 97% of

Afghanistan’s opium is produced in six of these seven provinces. Overall, UNODC monitoring

found a significant decrease in national cultivation levels in 2009, due primarily to an over 33%

reduction in cultivation in Helmand province. According to UNODC estimates, three provinces,

Kapisa, Baghlan, and Faryab, became “poppy-free” in the last year, while limited production in

remote and less secure areas of upper Nangarhar stripped the province of the poppy free

designation it earned in 2008.

Although wheat prices declined from their 2008 high, they remained at roughly double their 2007

levels during 2009 and thus remained attractive relative to declining prices in Afghanistan’s

oversupplied opium market. Survey information from early 2010 suggests this price relationship

may be shifting, as wheat prices begin to decline at a faster rate than opium prices. Survey data

suggests that government intervention remains less influential in insecure southern and western

provinces, with the exception of the Food Zone area of Helmand province, where a specially

targeted interdiction and development program is credited with contributing significantly to the

large drop in poppy cultivation observed in 2009. Farmers surveyed suggest that the effectiveness

of alternative development programs varies across the country, and many reportedly emphasize

the need for programs to extend beyond district centers to more remote or “grass roots” areas.

Security remains a decisive factor in the ability of the Afghan government and its international

partners to do so.

The March 2010 State Department International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for

Afghanistan states that:

“the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) generally relies on the

international community for assistance in implementing its national counternarcotics

strategy. However, more political will, greater institutional capacity, and more robust efforts

at the central and provincial levels are required to decrease cultivation in the south and west,

Based on UNODC/MCN, Afghanistan Opium Survey, September 2009.

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maintain cultivation reductions in the rest of the country, and combat trafficking in coming

years.”7

The report also concludes that during 2009, “several governors were unwilling or unable to

implement successful poppy reduction programs due to the lack of security and high levels of

insurgent activity in their provinces.” The 2010 INCSR report concludes that “many Afghan

government officials are believed to profit from the drug trade, particularly at the provincial and

district levels of government.” The report also includes accounts of corruption among officials in

national security forces, such as a Afghan National Police commander from Kandahar province.

In April 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton called corruption in Afghanistan “a cancer” that

“eats away at the confidence and the trust of the people in their government.”8

Obama Administration Policy and Funding Requests

The Obama Administration is implementing new counternarcotics policies in conjunction with its

strategic reviews of U.S. policy in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Administration’s strategic

review white paper, released March 27, 2009, called for “a complete overhaul of our civilian

assistance strategy” and identified “agricultural sector job creation” as “an essential first step to

undercutting the appeal of al Qaeda and its allies.” The review document states that the Obama

Administration believes crop substitution and alternative livelihood programs in Afghanistan

“have been disastrously underdeveloped and under-resourced.” It further indicates that

interdiction and eradication operations will continue, but targeting will shift toward “higher level

drug lords.” These goals were echoed in the Afghanistan-Pakistan Regional Stabilization plan

released in February 2010, which outlines a two-pronged approach of more robust interdiction

and law enforcement efforts supported by agricultural development assistance and existing

demand reduction and communications programs. A new National Security Council-approved

counternarcotics strategy document summarizes the Administration’s goals as follows: “Goal 1:

Counter the link between narcotics and the insurgency and significantly reduce the support the

insurgency receives from the narcotics industry. Goal 2: Address the narcotics corruption nexus

and reinforce the Government of Afghanistan.”9

In support of these objectives, the Administration requested civilian staff funding, development

assistance, and enforcement funding in the FY2009 supplemental and its FY2010 budget and

supplemental proposals. The FY2009 supplemental request included Diplomatic and Consular

Program (D&CP) funding requests for $84.8 million to support new U.S. Embassy and provincial

reconstruction team (PRT) personnel from the State Department, USAID, and the U.S.

Department of Agriculture (USDA). In addition, the D&CP account request included $137.6

million to support expanded interagency staffing in the areas of agriculture, justice, customs and

border management, health, finance, and aviation. Some of the staffing funding requests would

directly increase the number of U.S. personnel devoted to counternarcotics programs in

Afghanistan. The Administration also requested $129 million in International Narcotics Control

and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account funding to “support counternarcotics and law

enforcement efforts primarily in the south and east of Afghanistan” and $214 million in Economic

Available at: http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2010/vol1/index.htm.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Full Transcript Of Interview With Hillary Clinton, April 6, 2009.

U.S. Department of Defense, Report on Progress Toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress in

accordance with section 1230 of the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2008 (P.L. 110-181), April

2010, p. 73.

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Support Fund (ESF) account funding to support “counternarcotics and stabilization programs,

especially in the south and east.” The Administration’s FY2010 request did not dramatically

expand economic assistance specifically earmarked for counternarcotics purposes, in spite of

official statements about those programs having been “under-resourced” in the past. However,

ESF assistance requests for agricultural programs were significantly larger for FY2010.

Table 2 details appropriations and requests for the main funding accounts supporting U.S.

counternarcotics programming in Afghanistan for FY2009 through FY2011. Drug Enforcement

Administration (DEA) funds are not included: in July 2009, the Special Inspector General for

Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) reported that Congress had appropriated $127.37 million

for DEA activities in Afghanistan from FY2002 to FY2009. SIGAR also reported that Congress

had appropriated approximately $3 billion for counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan from

2001 through 2008. Since 2006, Congress has placed conditions on some amounts of U.S.

economic assistance to Afghanistan by requiring the President to certify that the Afghan

government is cooperating fully with counternarcotics efforts prior to the obligation of funds or to

issue a national security waiver (see “Certification Requirements” below).

Table 2. Counternarcotics Appropriations and Requests, Afghanistan FY2009FY2011

(Current $, millions)

Accounta

FY2009

Actual

FY2010 Estimate

Base

FY2011

Request

Supplemental Request

International Narcotics

Control and Law

Enforcement (INCLE)b

296.50

257.60

25.00

250.60

Economic Support

Funds (ESF)

164.60

209.93

135.00

185.00

Department of Defense

Counterdrug Activitiesc

215.67

324.60

94.00

457.10

Total

$676.77

$1,046.13

$892.70

Source: Congressional Budget Justifications for Foreign Operations Requests; Office of the Undersecretary of

Defense (Comptroller), Justification Materials; and, CRS communications with Office of the Secretary of Defense

and Department of State Bureau of Legislative Affairs, 2007 through March 2010.

Notes:

Figures for State Department administered accounts (INCLE, ESF, DA) reflect amounts designated for the

‘Counternarcotics’ program area, under the ‘Peace and Security’ objective in the State Department’s foreign

assistance framework. Other funds appropriated in those and other accounts also may contribute to the

achievement of U.S. counternarcotics objectives. For more information on the State Department foreign

assistance framework, see CRS Report R40213, Foreign Aid: An Introduction to U.S. Programs and Policy, by

(name redacted) and Marian Leonardo Lawson.

Includes INCLE funds for counternarcotics, police, and justice programs.

Figures for FY 2009 Department of Defense Counterdrug Activities denote funds used for programs in

Afghanistan, Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and "other regional support" in the CENTCOM

area of responsibility. Figures for FY2010 and FY2011 denote Defense counterdrug requests for Overseas

Contingency Operations.

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Issues for Congress

Experts and government officials have warned that narcotics trafficking jeopardizes international

efforts to secure and stabilize Afghanistan. U.S. officials believe that efforts to reverse the related

trends of opium cultivation, drug trafficking, corruption, and insecurity must expand if broader

strategic objectives are to be achieved. A broad U.S. interagency initiative to assist Afghan

authorities in combating the narcotics trade has been developed, and some officials argue that the

U.S. efforts have been effective in areas where all elements of the strategy have been advanced

simultaneously. However, in many areas, regional insecurity and corruption continue to prevent

or complicate counternarcotics initiatives and thus present formidable challenges.

Primary issues of interest to Congress include program funding, the role of the U.S. military, and

the scope and nature of eradication, interdiction, and development assistance initiatives. During

the term of the 110th Congress, the Bush Administration argued that insecurity in key opium

poppy producing areas, delays in building and reforming Afghan institutions, and widespread

Afghan corruption continued to prevent full implementation of U.S. and Afghan counternarcotics

strategies. The Obama Administration and the 111th Congress have devoted new resources to

counternarcotics efforts as part of an expanded civilian and military effort to bring stability to

Afghanistan. The shift toward a civilian-military counterinsurgency strategy has created new

challenges and opportunities for Afghan and U.S. counternarcotics efforts.

Breaking the Narcotics-Insecurity Cycle

Narcotics trafficking and political instability remain intimately linked in Afghanistan. U.S.

officials have identified narcotics trafficking as a primary barrier to the establishment of security

and consider insecurity to be a primary barrier to successful counternarcotics operations. The

narcotics trade fuels three corrosive trends that have undermined the stability of Afghan society

and limited progress toward reconstruction since 2001. First, narcotics proceeds can corrupt

police, judges, and government officials and prevent the establishment of basic rule of law in

many areas. Second, the narcotics trade can provide the Taliban and other insurgents with funding

and arms that support their violent activities. Third, corruption and violence can prevent reform

and development necessary for the renewal of legitimate economic activity. In the most conflictprone areas, symbiotic relationships between narcotics producers, traffickers, insurgents, and

corrupt officials can create self-reinforcing cycles of violence and criminality (see Figure 4)

Across Afghanistan, the persistence of these trends undermines Afghan civilians’ confidence in

their local, provincial, and national government institutions.

Critics of counternarcotics efforts to date have argued that Afghan authorities and their

international partners have been reluctant to directly confront prominent individuals and groups

involved in the opium trade because of their fear that confrontation will lead to internal security

disruptions or expand armed conflict to include drug-related groups.10 Indeed, conflict and

regional security disruptions have accompanied some efforts to expand crop eradication programs

and to implement interdiction and alternative livelihood policies.

In the past, Afghan authorities have expressed their belief that “the beneficiaries of the drugs trade will resist

attempts to destroy it,” and have argued that “the political risk of internal instability caused by counternarcotics

measures” must be balanced “with the requirement to project central authority nationally” for counternarcotics

purposes. See National Drug Control Strategy, Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, May 18, 2003.

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Figure 4. Narcotics, Corruption, and Security in Afghanistan

Source: Adapted and updated by CRS from World Bank, Afghanistan: State Building, Sustaining Growth, and

Reducing Poverty, Country Economic Report No. 29551-AF September 9, 2004, p. 87.

The Obama Administration has incorporated more robust interdiction efforts and targeted major

drug trafficking figures as a component of an expanded counterinsurgency strategy. For years,

U.S. officials have identified rural security and national rule of law as prerequisites for effective

counternarcotics policy implementation, while simultaneously identifying narcotics as a primary

threat to security and stability. As early as 2005, the State Department was arguing that:

“Poppy cultivation is likely to continue until responsible governmental authority is

established throughout the country and until rural poverty levels can be reduced via

provision of alternative livelihoods and increased rural incomes.... Drug processing and

trafficking can be expected to continue until security is established and drug law enforcement

capabilities can be increased.”11

Although an increasing number of Afghan police, security forces, and counternarcotics authorities

have been trained by U.S. and coalition officials, the limited size and capability of Afghan forces

rendered them unable to effectively and independently challenge entrenched drug-trafficking

groups and insurgents. For years, Afghan security and counternarcotics forces alone proved

unable to establish the security conditions necessary for the more robust interdiction and

alternative livelihood programs planned by U.S. and Afghan officials. Current coalition military

operations in areas like central Helmand province—the poppy growing heartland of

Department of State, INCSR, March 2005.

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Afghanistan—seek to establish security conditions for the Afghan government to assert its

authority and, working in conjunction with U.S. and other international partners, to disrupt

reinforcing relationships between insurgents and narcotics traffickers.

Balancing Counterterrorism, Counterinsurgency, and

Counternarcotics

In pursuing counterterrorism and counterinsurgency objectives, Afghan and coalition authorities

consider difficult political choices when confronting corrupt officials, militia leaders, narcotics

traffickers, and poppy farmers. These choices have changed over time as the conflict in

Afghanistan has evolved and differ from region to region. Regional and local militia commanders

with alleged links to the opium trade played significant roles in initial post-9/11 coalition efforts

to undermine the Taliban regime and capture Al Qaeda operatives, particularly in southern and

southeastern Afghanistan.12 Some of these figures and their political allies were subsequently

incorporated into government and security structures, including positions of responsibility for

enforcing counternarcotics policies.13 For example, the current governor of Nangarhar province,

Gul Agha Sherzai, is now credited with effectively enforcing bans on poppy cultivation and

supporting anti-drug-trafficking efforts. However, in 2001 and 2002, as governor of his native

Kandahar province, he was alleged to have maintained a close relationship with an alleged

Taliban-associated narcotics kingpin that has been indicted on drug-trafficking charges in the

United States.14

In areas that enjoyed relative security prior to the more recent Taliban resurgence, Afghan

government officials, provincial leaders, and international partners faced difficult decisions about

implementing counternarcotics enforcement policies. Forced eradication, whether by central

government or provincial government forces, risked antagonizing local populations with marginal

economic alternatives and created opportunities for patronage and corruption on the part of those

choosing eradication targets and enforcing the policy. Similarly, interdiction targets multiplied as

the country’s opium economy erupted and expanded, but corruption and the strengthening of

trafficking groups created significant potential political and security costs for officials

contemplating interdiction and anti-corruption responses. Pragmatic decisions taken since 2001 to

prioritize counterterrorism operations and maintain relationships with figures known to benefit

from the drug trade compounded these challenges in some areas, as tactical coalition allies

According to Afghanistan scholar Barnett Rubin, “the empowerment and enrichment of the warlords who allied with

the United States in the anti-Taliban efforts, and whose weapons and authority now enabled them to tax and protect

opium traffickers,” have provided the opium trade “with powerful new protectors.” Rubin, “Road to Ruin:

Afghanistan’s Booming Opium Industry,” October 7, 2004.

See Syed Saleem Shahzad, “U.S. Turns to Drug Baron to Rally Support,” Asia Times, December 4, 2001; Charles

Clover and Peronet Despeignes, “Murder Undermines Karzai Government,” Financial Times, July 8, 2002; Susan B.

Glasser, “U.S. Backing Helps Warlord Solidify Power,” Washington Post, February 18, 2002; Ron Moreau and Sami

Yousafzai, with Donatella Lorch, “Flowers of Destruction,” Newsweek, July 14, 2003; Andrew North, “Warlord Tells

Police Chief to Go,” BBC News, July 12, 2004; Steven Graham, “Group: Warlords to Hinder Afghan Election,”

Associated Press, September 28, 2004; and Anne Barnard and Farah Stockman, “U.S. Weighs Role in Heroin War in

Afghanistan,” Boston Globe, October 20, 2004.

CBS Evening News, “Newly Arrived US Army Soldiers Find it Difficult to Adjust...,” February 7, 2002; Mark

Corcoran, “America’s Blind Eye,” Australian Broadcasting Corporation, Foreign Correspondent, April 10, 2002; and,

Steve Inskeep, “Afghanistan’s Opium Trade,” National Public Radio, April 26, 2002.

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inhibited the ability of the central government to extend its authority and enforce its

counternarcotics policies.15

U.S. and Afghan officials have been increasingly adamant in stating that the Taliban resurgence

that has unfolded since early 2006 has been supported in part by narcotics proceeds and that

narcotics-related corruption undermines the effectiveness of Afghan security forces. However,

current plans to employ counterinsurgency tactics against the Taliban and enforce

counternarcotics policies more strictly also may conflict with each other, forcing Afghan and

coalition authorities to manage competing priorities. Coalition military operations in Helmand

province, and specifically U.S. Marine operations in Marjah and the surrounding districts of Nade Ali and Garm Ser (see below), have illustrated these challenges. One senior Defense

Department official has argued that U.S. counternarcotics strategy in Afghanistan must recognize

“the impact the drug trade has on our other policy objectives, while complementing (and not

competing with) our other efforts in furtherance of those objectives.”16 Striking such a balance

may continue to create challenges for the United States and its allies.

Defining the Role of the U.S. Military and ISAF

Debate over the role of the U.S. military and coalition forces in the International Security

Assistance Force has shifted as the roles and missions of those forces have changed. The initial

focus on counterterrorism (CT) led military forces to view the narcotics trade as a contingent

priority, while the shift toward a counterinsurgency (COIN) approach has dictated an increased

role for the military in eliminating narcotics targets providing support for the Taliban and other

anti-government forces.

Targeting and Enforcement

For years, some observers argued that U.S., coalition, and NATO military forces should play an

active, direct role in targeting the leaders and infrastructure of the opiate trade. For example,

following the announcement of record poppy cultivation and opium production in 2005-2006,

UNODC Director Antonio Maria Costa called for direct NATO military involvement in

counternarcotics enforcement operations in Afghanistan. Arguments in favor of coalition

involvement in counternarcotics enforcement activities often cited the limited capabilities of

Afghan security forces and held that coalition forces able to take action against narcotics

traffickers should do so in the interest of Afghanistan’s national security and coalition goals.

In general, opponents of a direct enforcement role for U.S., coalition, or NATO forces claimed

that such a role would alienate forces from the Afghan population, jeopardize ongoing

counterterrorism missions that require local Afghan intelligence support, and divert limited

coalition military resources from direct counter-insurgent and counterterrorism operations. Others

in the U.S. government and in Congress opposed direct military involvement in counternarcotics

enforcement activities based on concerns about maintaining distinct authorities and capabilities

The 2007 UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey argued that “in the provinces bordering with Pakistan, tacit

acceptance of opium trafficking by foreign military forces as a way to extract intelligence information and occasional

military support in operations against the Taliban and Al-Qaida undermines stabilization efforts.”

Testimony of Mary-Beth Long, then-Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Counternarcotics before the House

Committee on International Relations, March 17, 2005.

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among agencies. For example, the House report on the FY2007 Defense authorization bill argued

that the Defense Department “must not take on roles in which other countries or other agencies of

the U.S. Government have core capabilities” with regard to counternarcotics in Afghanistan.

During the George W. Bush Administration, U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) officials

indicated that Defense Department counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan were “a key

element of our campaign against terrorism.”17 However, U.S. military officials largely resisted the

establishment of a direct counternarcotics enforcement role for U.S. forces owing to limited

resources and concerns about exacerbating security threats. As late as 2006, former NATO

Commander and current National Security Adviser General James Jones advanced the idea that

counternarcotics enforcement was “not a military mission,” and stated that “having NATO troops

out there burning crops” was “not going to significantly contribute to the war on drugs.”18

Until October 2008, NATO International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) directives precluded

direct military action against narcotics targets such as traffickers and laboratories.19 Changes in

authorization agreed to in Budapest during an October 2008 meeting and subsequent

consultations now allow ISAF forces to take action against insurgency-linked narcotics targets if

they so choose and if authorized under their own domestic laws. 20

According to the Department of Defense, U.S. military forces have long been authorized to seize

narcotics and related supplies encountered during the course of normal stability and

counterterrorism operations. Those basic rules of engagement have been changed, but the

Defense Department does not publicly disclose details on the content of the changes.21 Defense

Department policy guidance issued in December 2008 states that Department personnel “will not

directly participate in searches, seizures, arrests, or similar activity unless such personnel are

otherwise authorized by law” with the exception of the provision of force protection “up to and

including on the objective.”22 According to the guidance, Department personnel may accompany

U.S. or host nation law enforcement and security forces on counternarcotics field operations

within presidentially declared combat zones. Executive Order 13239 (issued December 12, 2001,

“U.S. CENTCOM views narcotrafficking as a significant obstacle to the political and economic reconstruction of

Afghanistan... Local terrorist and criminal leaders have a vested interest in using the profits from narcotics to oppose

the central government and undermine the security and stability of Afghanistan.” Major Gen. John Sattler, USMC, Dir.

of Operations-US CENTCOM before the House Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal

Justice, Drug Policy, and Human Resources, April 21, 2004.

Lolita C. Baldor, “NATO to Provide More Afghanistan Troops,” Associated Press, September 20, 2006.

In response, Pentagon press secretary Geoff Morrell stated that, ''Secretary Gates is extremely pleased that, after two

days of thoughtful discussion, NATO has decided to allow ISAF forces to take on the drug traffickers who are fueling

the insurgency, destabilizing Afghanistan, and killing our troops.” Judy Dempsey, “NATO allows strikes on Afghan

drug sites Ministers agree to major strategic shift,” International Herald Tribune, October 11, 2008.

In conjunction with the decision, ISAF released the following statement: “Based on the request of the Afghan

government, consistent with the appropriate United Nations Security Council resolutions, under the existing operational

plan, ISAF can act in concert with the Afghans against facilities and facilitators supporting the insurgency, in the

context of counternarcotics, subject to authorization of respective nations.” NATO Press Release, “NATO steps up

counter-narcotics efforts in Afghanistan,” October 10, 2008.

Rules of engagement generally are outlined in classified documents. Author consultations with Department of

Defense officials, February and September 2009.

U.S. Department of Defense, Memorandum: Department of Defense International Counternarcotics Policy,

December 24, 2008.

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effective as of September 19, 2001) designated Afghanistan and the airspace above it as combat

zones. 23

In August 2009, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee released a report containing statements

from unnamed U.S. military officers and officials that provides an unconfirmed account of how

the new U.S. military policy on counternarcotics enforcement may be being applied in

Afghanistan. According to the report

two U.S. generals in Afghanistan said that the ROE [rules of engagement] and the

internationally recognized Law of War have been interpreted to allow them to put drug

traffickers with proven links to the insurgency on a kill list, called the joint integrated

prioritized target list. The military places no restrictions on the use of force with these

selected targets, which means they can be killed or captured on the battlefield; it does not,

however, authorize targeted assassinations away from the battlefield. The generals said

standards for getting on the list require two verifiable human sources and substantial

additional evidence. Currently, there are roughly 50 major traffickers who contribute funds

to the insurgency on the target list.24

The Defense Department has declined to comment on the specific statements included in the

Senate report. However, a Pentagon spokesman said that “there is a positive, well-known

connection between the drug trade and financing for the insurgency and terrorism,” and, it is

“important to clarify that we are targeting terrorists with links to the drug trade, rather than

targeting drug traffickers with links to terrorism.”25 Thus far, U.S. and ISAF officials have

declined to offer further public comment on the specific criteria currently used for targeting

individuals associated with both the drug trade and insurgency.

Some observers have questioned the legal basis for the targeting of so-called “nexus targets”

based on international humanitarian law (IHL), which generally prohibits the direct use of force

against civilians unless and for so long as they are directly participating in hostilities. 26 Under this

view, drug traffickers could be subject to direct military attack only if they are considered to be

active members of the armed forces of a party to the conflict or if they are considered to be

civilians directly participating in hostilities. In July 2009, the International Committee of the Red

Cross (ICRC) released nonbinding interpretive guidance on the notion of direct participation in

hostilities under IHL.27 The guidance states that individuals involved with the “purchase,

production, smuggling and hiding of weapons; general recruitment and training of personnel; and

financial, administrative or political support to armed actors” retain the protected status against

The other combat zone with potential relevance to counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan was created January

17, 1991, in Executive Order 12744. The order designated the following areas (including air space and adjacent waters)

as combat zones: Persian Gulf; Red Sea; Gulf of Oman; Gulf of Aden; that portion of the Arabian Sea that lies north of

10 degrees N. Lat., and west of 68 degrees E. Long.; and the total land areas of Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Oman,

Bahrain, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates.

“Afghanistan’s Narco-War: Breaking the Link Between Drug Traffickers and Insurgents,” Report to the Committee

on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, August 10, 2009.

James Risen, “U.S. to Hunt Down Afghan Drug Lords Tied to Taliban,” New York Times, August 10, 2009

See, for example, the concerns expressed in February 2009 when purported NATO operational guidance addressing

narcotics targets was leaked. Susanne Koelbl, “Battling Afghan Drug Dealers: NATO High Commander Issues

Illegitimate Order to Kill,” Speigel Online, January 28, 2009; and Matthias Gebauer and Susanne Koelbl, “Battling

Drugs In Afghanistan: Order to Kill Angers German Politicians,” Speigel Online, January 29, 2009.

Available at: [http://www.icrc.org/Web/eng/siteeng0.nsf/htmlall/direct-participation-report_res/$File/directparticipation-guidance-2009-icrc.pdf].

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direct military attack that all civilians enjoy unless such acts qualify as “preparatory measures

aiming to carry out a specific hostile act” and are “specifically designed to [inflict harm] in

support of a party to an armed conflict and to the detriment of another.”28 Press reports, field

surveys, and coalition military statements suggest that some individuals and groups involved in

narcotics trafficking provide varying levels of support to some anti-Afghan government forces,

which may or may not include direct participation in hostilities on a case-by-case basis.

Expanded counternarcotics roles for the U.S. military, whether under U.S. command, or as a

component of ISAF, may lead to requests for more resources. The January 2009 Defense

Department report on stability and security in Afghan argued that:

Use of limited forces in Afghanistan is a zero-sum endeavor. A shift in force application

from one mission set to another comes with a cost of a reduction of available forces for the

former mission set. A shift of limited assets may result in a degradation of the

[counterinsurgency] COIN mission. At the same time, the COIN mission cannot be

addressed effectively without engaging in the [counternarcotics] CN mission. Additional

resources, targeted to the CN mission, would be needed to expand direct DoD support to

counternarcotics operations.29

The July 2009 report echoed this assessment, arguing that “care must be taken in shifting limited

assets out of CT COIN or the CT-COIN nexus into purely CN activities. Such a shift would

detract from the former mission and likely result in detrimental effects on the population as

military force is applied to purely civilian-criminal narcotics activities.” Administration officials

have not clearly defined the distinction between so called “nexus targets” that support the

insurgency and what it considers “purely civilian-criminal narcotics activities,” particularly with

regard to narcotics-related government corruption. According to the April 2010 report to

Congress on current U.S. strategy and operations in Afghanistan, “The Government of

Afghanistan has the lead in all CN operations and partners with ANSF, U.S., and international

forces to target narcotics traffickers and facilities known to support the insurgency.”

Operation MOSHTARAK and Marja Accelerated Agricultural Transition Program

U.S. military operations in Helmand province have brought U.S. forces into direct contact with communities and

individuals at the epicenter of the poppy cultivation and opiate trafficking economies in Afghanistan. Adapting military

operations and counternarcotics policies to fit the needs of the overarching civilian-military counterinsurgency

campaign plan in Helmand have proven challenging and have required flexibility and ingenuity on the part of Afghan

and U.S. personnel. U.S.-assisted counternarcotics raids in central Helmand province during 2009 disrupted narcotics

trafficking operations and netted large seizures of opiates and pre-cursor chemicals used in the production of

morphine and heroin. The Department of Defense reports that, in advance of the planned Operation MOSHTARAK

in early 2010, narcotics traffickers “began buying significant amounts of stocks, settling debts, and closing and moving

their businesses to avoid risk of impending interdiction.”30 The Administration observed that “buyers and

Ibid. For a discussion of the ICRC’s three core criteria - threshold of harm, direct causation and belligerent nexus see pages 46-64. According to the guidance, “Acts amounting to direct participation in hostilities must meet three

cumulative requirements: (1) a threshold regarding the harm likely to result from the act, (2) a relationship of direct

causation between the act and the expected harm, and (3) a belligerent nexus between the act and the hostilities

conducted between the parties to an armed conflict.” The guidance argues that, “In line with the distinction between

direct and indirect participation in hostilities, it could be said that preparatory measures aiming to carry out a specific

hostile act qualify as direct participation in hostilities, whereas preparatory measures aiming to establish the general

capacity to carry out unspecified hostile acts do not.”

U.S. Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress pursuant to

Section 1230 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), January 2009, p. 99.

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transporters have demonstrated that they are unwilling to absorb sustained risk and the narcotics business has

significantly decreased in the corresponding operational areas.” The Administration believes that the “suppressing

effect” of military operations in key poppy growing and opiate trafficking areas “creates a window of opportunity to

further separate the insurgent criminal nexus from the population.”

Managing the economic and political effects of recent military interventions in a major poppy growing area of

Helmand like Marja underscored the competing priorities inherent to the simultaneous pursuit of counterinsurgency

and counternarcotics goals. As 2nd Marine Expeditionary Brigade commander Brig. Gen. Lawrence Nicholson stated,

"When we went into Marja, we didn't declare war on the poppy farmer.”31 Nevertheless, ISAF strategic planners, the

Marines, and State Department advisers all recognized that Operation MOSHTARAK “disrupted the economic cycle

of Marja” by halting the cultivation of poppy. Amid pressure from the Afghan government to introduce forced

eradication measures, U.S. personnel implemented a temporary program known as the Marja Accelerated

Agricultural Transition Program that would compensate farmers that destroyed their crops and committed not to

cultivate in the future in exchange for a payment of $300 per hectare derived from U.S. Commanders Emergency

Response Program (CERP) funds.32 The program is an experiment in balancing the overarching desire to extend

government authority with a recognition of the negative economic and political consequences of counterinsurgency

operations in key poppy growing areas. Critics of similar compensation programs have argued that payments create

perverse incentives for others to grow poppy in pursuit of self-eradication payments. U.S. forces and officials have

been strenuous in asserting that the Marja program was a unique response to a unique situation and have committed

to carefully monitoring its results as an indication of the program’s potential value and costs for future operations.

Defense Authorization and the Provision of Equipment and Weaponry

From 2002 through 2009, Congress and the Bush Administration gradually expanded the role for

U.S. military forces in training, equipping, and providing intelligence and airlift support for

Afghan counternarcotics teams. To date, Defense Department authorizations for counternarcotics

activities in Afghanistan have been provided via reference to Section 1033 of the Defense

Authorization Act for FY1998 (P.L. 105-85, as amended) and Section 1004 of the Defense

Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510, as amended). Both acts have been amended on a

semiannual basis to extend existing authorizations into subsequent fiscal years, to expand the

authorities to include new countries, and, as written, to require reauthorization to extend beyond

the end of FY2006. Since 2005, other legislative proposals to expand Defense Department

counternarcotics authorities in Afghanistan have been considered, but not adopted. 33 The FY2009

Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417) restated the existing authorizations and reauthorized the

Secretary of Defense to provide non-lethal counternarcotics assistance to Afghanistan and a

number of its neighbors (and other countries) through FY2009. The FY2010 authorization (P.L.

(...continued)

U.S. Department of Defense, Progress toward Security and Stability in Afghanistan, Report to Congress pursuant to

Section 1230 of the 2008 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-181), April 2010, p. 76.

U.S. Marine Corps, Press Release, “Marines Try Unorthodox Tactics To Disrupt Afghan Opium Harvest,” April 14,

2010.

C.J. Chivers, “In Afghan Fields, a Challenge to Opium's Luster,” New York Times, May 23, 2010.

The conference report (H.Rept. 109-360) on the Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) did not

include a provision that was included in the Senate version of the bill (S. 1042, Section 1033) that would have

authorized the Defense Department to provide a range of technical and operational support to Afghan counternarcotics

authorities under Section 1004 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY1991 (P.L. 101-510). The Senate version would

have authorized “the use of U.S. bases of operation or training facilities to facilitate the conduct of counterdrug

activities in Afghanistan” in response to the Defense Department’s request “to provide assistance in all aspects of

counterdrug activities in Afghanistan, including detection, interdiction, and related criminal justice activities.” (S.Rept.

109-69) This would have included transportation of personnel and supplies, maintenance and repair of equipment, the

establishment and operation of bases and training facilities, and training for Afghan law enforcement personnel.

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111-84) extended the authorization through FY2010 and requires the submission of an counterdrug plan for each fiscal year support is provided.

Section 1021 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY2004 (P.L. 108-136) added Afghanistan to

the list of countries eligible for transfers of non-lethal Defense Department counternarcotics

equipment authorized under Section 1033 of the Defense Authorization Act for FY1998 (P.L.

105-85). The FY2005 and FY2006 supplemental appropriations acts (P.L. 109-13 and P.L. 109234) further authorized the provision of individual and crew-served weapons, ammunition,

vehicles, aircraft, and detection, interception, monitoring and testing equipment to Afghan

counternarcotics forces. To date, .50-caliber machine guns have been provided along with night

vision equipment and a range of other supplies. Afghan counternarcotics forces have requested

further weaponry in response to attacks by well armed and supplied trafficking groups. The

FY2009 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417) reauthorized provision of .50-caliber and

lighter crew-served weaponry and ammunition through FY2009. The FY2010 authorization (P.L.

111-84) extended the authorization through FY2010. The House version of the FY2011 defense

authorization (H.R. 5136), would extend existing authorities and reporting requirements through

FY2011.

Alternative Livelihoods and Development

As noted above, the Obama Administration has highlighted alternative livelihood and agricultural

development assistance as a key component of its new strategic priorities in Afghanistan.

USAID’s current alternative livelihood programs are based on a two-track approach. In areas that

have reduced poppy cultivation in the north, east, and west of the country, USAID and its

contracting partners are seeking to provide broad-based agricultural development assistance

designed to consolidate positive changes in poppy cultivation patterns. The $150 million

Incentives Driving Economic Alternatives for the North East, and West (IDEA-NEW) program is

planned to run through FY2014. In southern and eastern areas of the country where

counterinsurgency operations are ongoing amid continued poppy cultivation and drug production,

USAID and its contracting partners plan to provide more targeted, quick-impact agricultural and

development assistance as a means of reinforcing efforts to secure newly cleared areas.34 The

$300 million Afghanistan Vouchers for Increased Production in Agriculture (AVIPA-Plus)

program is scheduled to run through FY2010 and includes initiatives coordinated with U.S.

counterinsurgency operations in Helmand and Kandahar provinces.

Obama Administration officials have stated that “part of making the counternarcotics strategy

more effective will be working a lot harder on crop substitution,” which has been an area of

congressional interest in the past.35 The U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA) has expanded its

presence in country in support of new USAID programs, and USDA officials now serve as part of

a consolidated interagency agriculture policy team based in Kabul.36

Author consultation with USAID Afghanistan Desk, September 2009.

Remarks By Undersecretary of Defense for Policy Michele Flournoy, Brookings Institution, Washington, D.C.,

Federal News Service, March 27, 2009. The House report on H.R. 2765 (H.Rept. 110-197) directed the Secretary of

State to initiate a pilot crop substitution program in “an area in which poppy production is prevalent.”

Author consultation with USAID Afghanistan Desk, September 2009. Basic information on current USDA activities

in Afghanistan is available at: http://www.fas.usda.gov/ICD/drd/afghanistan.asp.

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Helmand: Food Zone Program

Helmand Governor Gulab Mangal, USAID, and the United Kingdom have developed a targeted alternative

development effort in Helmand province known as the “Food Zone” program. The initiative is geared toward low

income farmers in a series of zones in the fertile poppy producing areas along the Helmand river covering a

27,000 hectare area that stretches from Gareshk in the north through the provincial capital of Lashkar Gah to

Garm Ser in the south. The program includes the distribution of improved seeds and fertilizer along with technical

assistance during planting, tending, and harvest periods. Beneficiary farmers are required to sign pledges to not

grow poppy, and strong eradication efforts have been introduced to areas not participating in the program.

Governor Mangal is credited with having led an effective administration as the governor of Laghman Province and

is viewed by U.S. officials as committed to achieving counternarcotics goals in Afghanistan’s main poppy producing

province. The UNODC 2009 Opium Survey cites independent survey data that suggests that the significant

decrease in poppy cultivation in Helmand during 2009 occurred mostly in the Food Zone, whereas cultivation was

observed to increase by as much as 8% outside of the Zone.

Eradication

Central Government and Governor-Led Eradication

The Obama Administration has “phased out” U.S. support for poppy eradication efforts in

Afghanistan in line with its strategic review and the judgment of Administration officials that

eradication programs were not cost efficient and that eradication activities often proved

counterproductive. The policy change comes after years of debate in Washington, DC, Kabul, and

across Europe about the relative merits and drawbacks of supporting Afghan government poppy

eradication efforts.

Proponents of forced eradication have long argued that destroying large portions of Afghanistan’s

opium poppy crops is necessary in order to establish and maintain a credible deterrent for farmers

and landowners in line with Afghan law. Critics of forced eradication argued in response that

eradication in the absence of existing alternative livelihood options for Afghan farmers

contributes to the likelihood that farmers will continue to cultivate opium poppy in the future and

may encourage some farmers and landowners to support anti-government elements, including the

Taliban.

To date, U.S. and Afghan authorities have maintained that the Central Poppy Eradication Force

and governor-led eradication programs have been effective in deterring and reducing some opium

poppy cultivation. However, given recurrent clashes between eradication forces and farmers and

accounts of selective, politicized eradication efforts by local authorities, other observers and

officials have expressed concern about the safety and effectiveness of current ground-based

eradication efforts. The Bush Administration sought to improve eradication results by embedding

“poppy elimination” teams (now referred to as Counternarcotics Advisory Teams or CNATs) in

key opium poppy growing provinces to monitor and advise on early season, locally executed

eradication activities. The strategy was designed to minimize violent farmer resistance to central

government forces and give farming families time to plant replacement cash crops.

The Obama Administration redirected roughly $150 million in FY2009 INCLE funding from

support to central poppy eradication efforts to other initiatives, including interdiction operations,

public information campaigns, and advisory efforts by CNAT personnel. 37 Air assets previously

Author consultations with State and Defense Department personnel, September 2009.

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used for air support and medivac purposes may be redirected to support Afghan-DEA interdiction

operations. The 600-person Central Poppy Eradication Force has been disbanded and its

personnel were redirected to other activities—initially election security—but may resume some

counternarcotics security functions. The Counternarcotics Infantry Kandak (CNIK) created to

secure poppy eradication operations may be redirected to support other counternarcotics or

security operations. Accounts suggest that the Obama Administration’s decision to “phase out”

U.S. support to eradication efforts has not eliminated the Afghan government’s commitment to

continue to support eradication efforts by Afghan governors. The April 2010 Administration

report to Congress on security and stability in Afghanistan notes that “the Afghan Government

managed to eradicate 647 hectares of poppy in Helmand and Farah during the first quarter of

2010” through operations planned and implemented by the Ministry of Counter Narcotics and

provincial governors.

Manual or Aerial Herbicide-based Eradication

Afghan and U.S. authorities discussed the introduction of aerial herbicide-based eradication to

Afghanistan in late 2004, but decided against initiating a program in early 2005 due to financial,

logistical, and political considerations. Since 2006, ground-based eradication results have varied

drastically based on location and local political and security conditions. This has led some to

renew their calls for the introduction of stronger eradication methods, including the use of

herbicides to kill poppy plants. With the Obama Administration’s policy changes in place, the

prospects for such a program look increasingly unlikely. Nevertheless, policy makers and

Members of Congress may engage in further debate concerning options for using herbicides for

manual or aerial poppy eradication and their possible risks and rewards.

In the past, Afghan President Hamid Karzai has expressed categorical opposition to the use of

aerial eradication, citing public health and environmental safety concerns. 38 The 2006 Afghan

national drug control strategy also stated that the Afghan government “has also decided that

eradication must only be delivered by manual or mechanical ground based means.”39 Bush

Administration officials argued for more widespread and non-negotiated eradication operations

and stated that while herbicides may be efficient and safe, U.S. officials would follow the

decisions of Afghan officials concerning their potential use. Since FY2005, Congress has sought

to prohibit or condition the use of appropriated funds to support aerial herbicide spraying in

Afghanistan. In the 111th Congress, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009 (H.R. 1105; P.L. 1118) specifies that:

none of the funds appropriated under this heading for assistance for Afghanistan may be

made available for eradication programs through the aerial spraying of herbicides unless the

Secretary of State determines and reports to the Committees on Appropriations that the

President of Afghanistan has requested assistance for such aerial spraying programs for

counternarcotics or counterterrorism purposes.

Office of the Spokesperson to the President—Transitional Islamic State of Afghanistan, “About the Commitment by

the Government of Afghanistan to the Fight Against Narcotics and Concerns About the Aerial Spraying of Poppy

Fields.” In January 2007, President Karzai announced that any herbicide-based eradication efforts would be delayed,

and presidential spokesmen have since repeated their criticism of herbicides on numerous occasions. It was unlikely

that President Karzai would have approved a controversial measure such as aerial eradication in the run up to the 2009

presidential election and he has not indicated support for such a policy since his reelection.

Afghanistan Ministry of Counternarcotics, Updated NDCS, January 2006, p. 21.

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The Act further requires the Secretary of State to consult with the Committees on Appropriations

prior to the obligation of funds for an aerial eradication programs in the event that such a

determination is made.

Counternarcotics Assistance Certification and Reporting

Requirements

Since 2002, funding for U.S. counternarcotics operations in Afghanistan has consisted of U.S.

program costs and financial and material assistance to Afghan counternarcotics organizations.

Although poppy cultivation and drug trafficking were widespread prior to the fall of the Taliban

regime, U.S. counternarcotics programs in the region were limited, and focused on eliminating

poppy cultivation and supporting interdiction activities in neighboring countries. U.S. funding for

counternarcotics programs in Afghanistan did not increase dramatically until FY2005, when the

Bush Administration submitted requests to Congress for funding to support the introduction of its

five pillar counternarcotics strategy (See Table 2 above.).

Certification Requirements

Since 2006, Congress has placed conditions on some amounts of U.S. economic assistance to

Afghanistan by requiring the President to certify that the Afghan government is cooperating fully

with counternarcotics efforts prior to the obligation of funds or to issue a national security waiver.

The conditions serve as signal of congressional views that U.S. assistance should not be given to

a government not fully cooperating with U.S. counternarcotics efforts unless U.S. national

security would be jeopardized if assistance were withheld. The 2006 Foreign Operations

Appropriations Act (P.L. 109-102) stated that no more than $225 million in Economic Support

Fund (ESF) assistance could be obligated until the President certified to Congress that the Afghan

government “at both the national and local level is cooperating fully with United States funded

poppy eradication and interdiction efforts.” The Act provided waiver authority to the President if

he deemed it necessary to preserve the vital national security interests of the United States. The

Bush Administration issued a waiver of the certification requirement for FY2006 ESF

appropriations for Afghanistan on May 22, 2006.40

Subsequent appropriations legislation also has included these provisions. For FY2007, the

FY2006 conditions were carried forward based on the provisions of the Revised Continuing

Appropriations Resolution, 2007 (P.L. 110-5).41 The certification and justification report were

completed in June 2007. The FY2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 110-161, H.R. 2764)

limited the obligation of FY2008 ESF assistance to Afghanistan to $300 million until the

Secretary of State certified to the Appropriations committees that the Afghan government “at both

the national and local level” was fully cooperating with U.S.-funded poppy eradication and drug

U.S. Department of State Public Notice 5486, “Determination To Waive the Certification Requirement that the

Government of Afghanistan Is Cooperating Fully with U.S.-Funded Poppy Eradication and Interdiction Efforts in

Afghanistan,” May 22, 2006. Federal Register, Volume 71, Number 153, August 9, 2006.

The House version of the FY2007 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (H.R. 5522) would have limited the

obligation of Economic Support Fund (ESF) assistance to Afghanistan to $225 million until the Secretary of State

certified to the Appropriations committees that the Afghan government “at both the national and local level” was fully

cooperating with U.S.-funded poppy eradication and drug interdiction efforts. The Senate version of the FY2007

foreign operations bill did not contain this provision.

Congressional Research Service

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

interdiction efforts. The Act provided for a presidential waiver of this provision, subject to a

reporting requirement. The Bush Administration waived the certification requirement for FY2008

ESF appropriations for Afghanistan on May 9, 2008, and issued a detailed report to Congress

justifying its decision and describing U.S. and Afghan counternarcotics efforts and remaining

challenges. 42

In the 111th Congress, the Omnibus Appropriations Act, 2009, states that $200,000,000 in ESF

funding may be obligated “only after the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on

Appropriations that the Government of Afghanistan at both the national and provincial level is

cooperating fully with United States-funded poppy eradication and interdiction efforts in

Afghanistan.” The Act provides for a presidential waiver based on national security

determination. Section 7076(d) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010 states that

$200,000,000 in ESF funding may not be obligated “unless the Secretary of State certifies to the

Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Afghanistan is cooperating fully with

United States efforts against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and to reduce poppy cultivation and illicit

drug trafficking.” The Act provides for waiver authority to the Secretary of State based on

national security interests determination. 43

Reporting Requirements

Since 2002, Congress has required the executive branch to submit a number of detailed reports on

its counternarcotics strategies and the use of appropriated funds to support counternarcotics

programs in Afghanistan. Among these reports are worldwide annual surveys of Defense

Department counterdrug activities, required reports justifying the waiver of conditions on U.S.

ESF assistance, and specific reports on the opiate trade in and around Afghanistan and

Administration plans to combat it. The following list highlights a number of recent reports that

may be of interest to Congress for oversight purposes. It is not exhaustive:

•

Section 7104 of the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004

(P.L. 108-458) required the submission of an interagency report that described

current progress toward the reduction of poppy cultivation and heroin production

in Afghanistan and provided detail on the extent to which drug profits support

terrorist groups and anti-government elements in and around Afghanistan. The

report was completed in October 2005.44

U.S. Department of State, Justification for the Waiver and the Status of Cooperation by the Government of

Afghanistan with the United States Funded Poppy Eradication and Interdiction Efforts in Afghanistan, April 2008,

transmitted to Congress May 12, 2008.

The House version of the FY2010 Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 3081) stated that $300,000,000 in

ESF funding may be obligated “only after the Secretary of State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that the

Government of Afghanistan at both the national and provincial level is cooperating fully with United States-funded

poppy eradication and interdiction efforts in Afghanistan.” The House version provided for a presidential waiver based

on national security determination. The Senate version of the bill (S. 1434) stated that $55 million in International

Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE) funds for Afghanistan may not be obligated “unless the Secretary of

State certifies to the Committees on Appropriations that the Government of Afghanistan is cooperating fully with

United States efforts against the Taliban and Al Qaeda and to reduce poppy cultivation and illicit drug trafficking.” The

Senate version provided for a waiver authority based on a national security interests determination.

Report on Counter Drug Efforts in Afghanistan—October 18, 2005, as required by Sec. 7104, Section 207 (b) of the

Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act, 2004 (P.L. 108-458); House Committee on International Relations,

Ex. Comm. 4575.

Congressional Research Service

Afghanistan: Narcotics and U.S. Policy

•

P.L. 110-28 required the DEA Administrator to submit a report by July 31, 2007

that included a plan to target and arrest Afghan drug kingpins in Helmand and

Kandahar provinces.

•

House report on H.R. 2764 (H.Rept. 110-197) required the Administration to

report on “the use of aerial assets to include fixed and rotary wing aircraft in

coordination with and in support of Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA)

counternarcotics operations,” and, “the extradition status of Afghan drug

kingpins and narco terrorists, the destruction of Afghan heroin laboratories, local

Afghan prosecutions of heroin-related crimes, and illegal border crossings by

foreign nationals from Pakistan into Afghanistan.”

•

The National Defense Authorization Act, 2008 (Section 1230, P.L. 110-181)

requires the executive branch to submit a report on the comprehensive strategy of

the United States for security and stability in Afghanistan every 180 days through

FY2010. The reports issued to date have included sections devoted to

counternarcotics policy as well as other issues such as police training and judicial

reform relevant to U.S. and Afghan counternarcotics goals.

•

The FY2009 Duncan Hunter National Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 110-417)

extended the requirement for annual Defense Department reporting on its

overseas counterdrug activities through 2009, and Section 1026 of the Act

requires the Secretary of Defense to submit by June 30, 2009, “a comprehensive

strategy of the Department of the Defense with regard to counternarcotics efforts

in the South and Central Asian regions, including the countries of Afghanistan,

Turkmenistan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, Pakistan, and India, as well as

the countries of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and China.”

•

The FY2010 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 111-84) requires the submission of

a counter-drug plan for each fiscal year that Defense Department support is

provided.

Author Contact Information

(name redacted)

Analyst in Middle Eastern Affairs

[redacted]@crs.loc.gov, 7-....

Congressional Research Service

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