U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

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U.S.-China Military Contacts:

Issues for Congress

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Specialist in Asian Security Affairs

January 5, 2015

Congressional Research Service

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RL32496

U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Summary

This CRS Report, updated through the 113th Congress, discusses policy issues regarding militaryto-military (mil-to-mil) contacts with the People’s Republic of China (PRC) and records major

contacts and crises since 1993. The United States suspended military contacts with China and

imposed sanctions on arms sales in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. In 1993,

President Clinton reengaged with the top PRC leadership, including China’s military, the People’s

Liberation Army (PLA). Renewed military exchanges with the PLA have not regained the

closeness reached in the 1980s, when U.S.-PRC strategic alignment against the Soviet Union

included U.S. arms sales to China. Improvements and deteriorations in overall bilateral

engagement have affected military contacts, which were close in 1997-1998 and 2000, but marred

by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of a PRC embassy in 1999, the

EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001, and the PLA’s aggressive maritime and air confrontations.

Issues for Congress include whether the Administration complies with legislation overseeing

dealings with the PLA and pursues contacts with the PLA that advance a prioritized set of U.S.

security interests, especially the operational safety of U.S. military personnel. Oversight

legislation includes the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246)

and National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65). A particular issue is

whether the President is required to issue waivers of sanctions. Skeptics and proponents of

military exchanges with the PRC have debated whether the contacts achieve results in U.S.

objectives and whether the contacts contribute to the PLA’s warfighting capability that might

harm U.S. and allied security interests. Some have argued about whether the value that U.S.

officials place on the contacts overly extends leverage to the PLA. Some believe talks can serve

U.S. interests that include risk-reduction or conflict-avoidance; military-civilian coordination;

transparency and reciprocity; tension reduction over Taiwan; weapons nonproliferation; talks on

nuclear, missile, space, and/or cyber domains; counterterrorism; and POW/MIA accounting.

Policy makers could review the approach to mil-to-mil contacts, given concerns about potential

crises and conflicts. U.S. officials have faced challenges in gaining cooperation from the PLA.

The PLA has tried to use its suspensions of exchanges while blaming U.S.-only “obstacles”

(including arms sales to Taiwan, FY2000 NDAA, and air and naval reconnaissance operations).

The PRC’s harassment of U.S. ships and increasing assertiveness in maritime disputes showed

some limits to mil-to-mil engagement, similar views, and PLA restraint. The U.S. articulations in

2011-2012 of a strategic “rebalancing” to the Asia-Pacific raised an issue of how to deal with

China’s challenges. The Administration’s “rebalance” entails not only expanded engagement with

the PLA, but also increasing exercises. The PLA Navy’s invited participation for the first time in

the U.S. Navy-led multinational exercise, RIMPAC, based at Hawaii in summer 2014 raised

concerns in Congress and elsewhere. The U.S. Navy has increased some “interoperability” with

the PLA Navy. The Defense Secretary issued the latest required annual report on June 5, 2014,

concerning military and security developments involving the PRC, cooperation, and military-tomilitary contacts. The report noted that the PLA uses combined exercises to improve capabilities

by learning from more advanced militaries and asserted that the Defense Department complies

with the FY2000 NDAA in all military contacts with China. The U.S. Pacific Air Forces

Commander sent a C-17 transport aircraft to China’s Zhuhai Air Show in November 2014.

Legislation in the 113th Congress includes the FY2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66); FY2014 Defense

Appropriations Act (H.R. 2397); Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, H.R. 4495 (Forbes); FY2015

NDAA, H.R. 4435 (McKeon), S. 2410 (Levin), and H.R. 3979 (P.L. 113-291); and H.Res. 643

(Chabot). On December 10, 2014, Representative Randy Forbes wrote to the Defense Secretary

with concerns about mil-to-mil contacts with China and to request a review of this policy.

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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Contents

Overview of and Options for Policy ................................................................................................ 1

Cooperation in the Cold War in the 1980s................................................................................. 1

Suspensions After the Tiananmen Crackdown of 1989 ............................................................. 1

Reengagement and Recovery from Crises................................................................................. 2

Reevaluation .............................................................................................................................. 2

Resumption ................................................................................................................................ 3

Reappraisal ................................................................................................................................ 3

Rebalancing ............................................................................................................................... 4

Options ...................................................................................................................................... 5

Policy Issues for Congress ............................................................................................................... 8

Congressional Oversight ........................................................................................................... 9

Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991 .............................. 10

Arms Export Control Act .................................................................................................. 11

Joint Defense Conversion Commission (JDCC) ............................................................... 11

Past Reporting Requirement.............................................................................................. 12

Programs of Exchanges ..................................................................................................... 12

Restrictions in the FY2000 NDAA ................................................................................... 13

RIMPAC 2014 ................................................................................................................... 14

Major Legislation: Required Reports and Classification .................................................. 15

Prohibitions on Defense Procurement ............................................................................... 18

Foreign Aid........................................................................................................................ 19

Leverage to Pursue U.S. Security Objectives .......................................................................... 19

Objectives .......................................................................................................................... 19

Debate ............................................................................................................................... 20

Perspectives ....................................................................................................................... 24

U.S. Security Interests ............................................................................................................. 26

Communication, Conflict Avoidance, and Crisis Management ........................................ 26

Civilian Control over PLA and Civil-Military Coordination ............................................ 34

Transparency, Reciprocity, and Information-Exchange .................................................... 36

Tension Reduction over Taiwan ........................................................................................ 37

Weapons Nonproliferation ................................................................................................ 41

Strategic Nuclear, Missile, Space, and Cyber Talks .......................................................... 42

Counterterrorism ............................................................................................................... 47

Accounting for POW/MIAs .............................................................................................. 49

Tables

Table 1. The PLA’s High Command ................................................................................................ 7

Table 2. Summary of Senior-Level Military Visits Since 1994 ....................................................... 8

Appendixes

Appendix. Major Military Contacts and Incidents Since 1993...................................................... 52

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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Contacts

Author Contact Information........................................................................................................... 82

Acknowledgments ......................................................................................................................... 82

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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Overview of and Options for Policy

U.S. leaders have applied military contacts as one tool and point of leverage in the broader policy

toward the People’s Republic of China (PRC). The first part of this CRS Report discusses policy

issues regarding such military-to-military (mil-to-mil) contacts. The second part provides a record

of such contacts since 1993, when the United States resumed exchanges after suspending them in

response to the Tiananmen Crackdown in 1989. Congress has exercised important oversight.

Cooperation in the Cold War in the 1980s

Since the mid-1970s, even before the normalization of relations with Beijing, the debate over

policy toward the PRC has examined how military ties might advance U.S. security interests,

beginning with the imperatives of the Cold War.1 In January 1980, Secretary of Defense Harold

Brown visited China and laid the groundwork for a relationship with the PRC’s military,

collectively called the People’s Liberation Army (PLA), intended to consist of strategic dialogue,

reciprocal exchanges in functional areas, and arms sales. Furthermore, President Ronald Reagan

changed policy in 1981 to remove the ban on arms sales to China. Secretary of Defense Casper

Weinberger visited Beijing in September 1983. In 1984, U.S. policy makers worked to advance

discussions on military technological cooperation with China.2 There were direct commercial

sales to the PLA that included Sikorsky Aircraft’s sale of 24 S-70C transport helicopters (an

unarmed version of the Black Hawk helicopter) and General Electric’s sale of five gas turbine

engines for two naval destroyers.3 Between 1985 and 1987, the United States also agreed to four

programs of government-to-government foreign military sales (FMS): modernization of artillery

ammunition production facilities; modernization of avionics in F-8 fighters; sale of four Mark-46

anti-submarine torpedoes; and sale of four AN/TPQ-37 artillery-locating radars.4

Suspensions After the Tiananmen Crackdown of 1989

The United States suspended mil-to-mil contacts and arms sales in response to the Tiananmen

Crackdown in June 1989. (Although the killing of peaceful demonstrators took place beyond just

Tiananmen Square in the capital of Beijing on June 4, 1989, the crackdown is commonly called

the Tiananmen Crackdown in reference to the square that was the focal point of the nationwide

pro-democracy movement.) Approved in February 1990, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act

for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246) enacted into law the sanctions imposed on arms sales and

other cooperation, while allowing for waivers in the general U.S. national interest. In April 1990,

China canceled the program (called “Peace Pearl”) to upgrade the avionics of the F-8 fighters.5 In

Michael Pillsbury, “U.S.-Chinese Military Ties?,” Foreign Policy, Fall 1975; Leslie Gelb, “Arms Sales,” Foreign

Policy, Winter 1976-77; Michael Pillsbury, “Future Sino-American Security Ties: The View from Tokyo, Moscow, and

Peking,” International Security, Spring 1977; and Philip Taubman, “U.S. and China Forging Close Ties; Critics Fear

That Pace is Too Swift,” New York Times, December 8, 1980.

Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asian and Pacific Affairs James Kelly, “Defense Relations With the

People’s Republic of China,” testimony at a hearing of the House Foreign Affairs Subcommittees on Asian and Pacific

Affairs, and International Economic Policy and Trade on “United States-China Relations,” June 5, 1984.

Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1984, and August 2, 1985. The helicopters lacked capability to fly low and fast.

Department of State and DSCA, “Congressional Presentation for Security Assistance, Fiscal Year 1992.”

Jane’s Defence Weekly, May 26, 1990.

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December 1992, President George H.W. Bush closed the four cases of suspended FMS programs,

returning PRC equipment, reimbursing unused funds, and delivering sold items without support.6

Reengagement and Recovery from Crises

In the fall of 1993, President Bill Clinton began to reengage the PRC leadership up to the highest

level and across the board, including the PLA, after suspensions over the crisis in 1989. However,

results were limited and the military relationship did not regain the closeness reached in the

1980s, when the United States and China cooperated strategically against the Soviet Union and

such cooperation included arms sales to the PLA. Improvements and deteriorations in overall

bilateral relations affected mil-to-mil contacts, which had close ties in 1997-1998 and 2000, but

were marred by the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, mistaken NATO bombing of the PRC

embassy in Yugoslavia in 1999, and the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis in 2001.

Reevaluation

In 2001, President George W. Bush continued the policy of engagement with the PRC, while the

Pentagon skeptically reviewed and cautiously resumed a program of mil-to-mil exchanges.

Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld reviewed the mil-to-mil contacts to assess the

effectiveness of the exchanges in meeting U.S. objectives of reciprocity and transparency. Soon

after the review began, on April 1, 2001, a PLA Navy F-8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3

reconnaissance plane over the South China Sea.7 Upon surviving the collision, the EP-3’s crew

made an emergency landing on China’s Hainan Island. The PLA detained the 24 U.S. Navy

personnel for 11 days. Instead of acknowledging that the PLA had started aggressive interceptions

of U.S. reconnaissance flights in December 2000 and apologizing for the accident, top PRC ruler

Jiang Zemin demanded an apology and compensation from the United States. Rumsfeld limited

mil-to-mil contacts after the crisis, subject to case-by-case approval, after the White House

objected to a suspension of contacts with the PLA as outlined in an April 30 Defense Department

memo. Rumsfeld told reporters on May 8, 2001, that he decided against visits to China by U.S.

ships or aircraft and against social contacts, because “it really wasn’t business as usual.” Deputy

Secretary of Defense Paul Wolfowitz reported to Congress on June 8, 2001, that mil-to-mil

exchanges for 2001 remained under review by Secretary Rumsfeld and exchanges with the PLA

would be conducted “selectively and on a case-by-case basis.” The United States did not transport

the damaged EP-3 out of China until July 3, 2001.

The Bush Administration hosted PRC Vice President Hu Jintao in Washington in the spring of

2002 (with an honor cordon at the Pentagon) and President Jiang Zemin in Crawford, TX, in

October 2002. Afterwards, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, in late 2002, resumed the Defense

Consultative Talks (DCT) with the PLA (first held in 1997) and, in 2003, hosted General Cao

Gangchuan, a Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission (CMC) and Defense Minister.

General Richard Myers (USAF), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, visited China in January

2004, as the highest ranking U.S. military officer to do so since November 2000.

President George H.W. Bush, news conference (announced suspensions of arms sales, senior military visits, and other

actions), June 5, 1989; Department of State, “Presidential Decision on Military Sales to China,” December 22, 1992.

CRS Report RL30946, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications, by

(name redacted) et al.

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Resumption

Still, mil-to-mil interactions remained “exceedingly limited,” according to the Commander of the

Pacific Command (PACOM), Admiral William Fallon, who visited China to advance mil-to-mil

contacts in September 2005. He discussed building relationships at higher and lower ranks,

cooperation in responding to natural disasters and controlling avian flu, and reducing tensions.

Fallon also said that he would seek to enhance military-to-military contacts with China and invite

PLA observers to U.S. military exercises, an issue of dispute in Washington.8 In October 2005,

Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld visited China, the first visit by a defense secretary since

William Cohen’s visit in 2000. After Rumsfeld’s visit, which was long sought by the PLA for the

perceived full resumption of the military relationship, General Guo Boxiong, a CMC Vice

Chairman and the PLA’s highest ranking officer visited the United States in July 2006, the first

such visit since General Zhang Wannian’s visit in 1998.

Reappraisal

China’s rising power with greater assertiveness and aggressiveness (particularly in maritime

areas), refusal to discuss nuclear weapons, cyber threats, and repeated suspensions of visits

showed limitations of the results of mil-to-mil exchanges. Also, a need arose for a review of the

U.S. approach of a greater stress on cooperative contacts than the PLA’s antagonistic attitude and

leveraging of military contacts to influence U.S. policies. The PLA has repeatedly suspended milto-mil contacts while blaming U.S. “obstacles” (including U.S. reconnaissance, arms sales to

Taiwan, legislated restrictions on contacts with the PLA, and the Pentagon’s annual report to

Congress on PRC Military Power). At a news conference on March 7, 2007, Defense Secretary

Robert Gates said that he did not see China as a “strategic adversary” of the United States, but “a

partner in some respects” and a “competitor in other respects.” Gates stressed the importance of

engaging the PRC “on all facets of our relationship as a way of building mutual confidence.”

Nonetheless, U.S. officials expressed concern about inadequate “transparency” from the PLA,

notably when it tested an anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon in January 2007. At a news conference in

China on March 23, 2007, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Marine General Peter Pace,

said the primary concern for the bilateral relationship is “miscalculation and misunderstanding

based on misinformation.” Deputy Under Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless testified to the

House Armed Services Committee on June 13, 2007, that “in the absence of adequate explanation

for capabilities which are growing dynamically, both in terms of pace and scope, we are put in the

position of having to assume the most dangerous intent a capability offers.” He noted a lack of

response from the PLA to an agreement at the U.S.-PRC summit in 2006 to discuss nuclear arms.

In November 2007, despite various unresolved issues, Secretary Gates visited China, and the PLA

agreed to a long-sought U.S. goal of a “hotline.” Later in the month, despite a number of senior

U.S. visits to China (particularly by U.S. Navy Admirals and Secretary Gates) to promote the milto-mil relationship, the PRC denied port calls at Hong Kong for U.S. Navy minesweepers in

distress and for the aircraft carrier USS Kitty Hawk for the Thanksgiving holiday and family

reunions, according to the PACOM Commander and Chief of Naval Operations (CNO), Admirals

Timothy Keating and Gary Roughead. The Pentagon protested to the PLA.9 Again after the

President notified Congress about arms sales to Taiwan in October 2008 and January 2010, the

PACOM, William Fallon, press conference, Hong Kong, September 11, 2005; author’s consultation with Pentagon.

“Navy: China ‘Not Helpful’ on Thanksgiving,” Associated Press, November 28, 2007; White House press briefing,

November 28, 2007; Washington Post, November 29, 2007.

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PLA repeated cycles of suspensions of military exchanges in what the Pentagon called “continued

politicization” of such contacts. In spite of its goal of cooperative engagement, the U.S. Navy

faced the PRC’s dangerous harassment of U.S. surveillance ships in March and May 2009. At the

U.S.-PRC Strategic and Economic Dialogue (S&ED) in July 2009 in Washington, President

Barack Obama stressed military contacts to diminish disputes with China. Later in 2009, the

National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended the requirement

in P.L. 106-65 for the report to Congress on PRC military power to expand the focus to security

developments, add cooperative elements, and fold in another requirement to report on mil-to-mil

contacts, including a new strategy on such contacts. Meanwhile, Admiral Robert Willard,

PACOM Commander, initiated in January 2010 reviews of approaches toward the PRC and

toward Taiwan (among other concerns like North Korea) by Strategic Focus Groups (SFGs).

Rebalancing

The announcements in 2011-2012 of a U.S. strategic “rebalancing” of priorities to the AsiaPacific prompted a debate in China on how to counter what some portrayed as Cold War-like antiChina “containment” (not used by U.S. officials) and whether U.S. attention to Asia (including

allies) would be sustainable given budget constraints. At the start of 2012, President Obama and

Defense Secretary Leon Panetta issued new Defense Strategic Guidance on how to maintain U.S.

military superiority in the face of budget cuts and to “rebalance” priorities, posture, and presence

to stress attention to Asia as well as the Mideast. The Administration added adjustments to its

messages about the strategy, including in National Security Advisor Tom Donilon’s speeches in

November 2012 and March 2013. He explained that the strategy is more a comprehensive

(diplomatic, defense, and economic) “whole of government” approach than a defense-dominated

initiative and that the strategy includes a constructive relationship with China (partly through

expanded engagement with the PLA). The PRC Foreign Ministry welcomed those remarks. Still,

the PLA’s Defense White Paper of April 2013 negatively assessed that “some countries” have

strengthened Asian alliances, expanded the military presence, and “frequently created” regional

tensions (an apparent reference to maritime disputes in the East and South China Seas especially

involving the PRC, Vietnam, Japan, and the Philippines—with the latter two being U.S. allies).

However, the Obama Administration expanded engagement with the PLA that involves exercises

and equipment, a sensitive step raising concerns about showing U.S. military technology, tactics,

and techniques. Other issues concern whether there is adherence to U.S. laws, including the

FY2000 NDAA, and consistency with U.S. concerns about allies showing U.S.-origin equipment.

Defense Secretary Panetta visited China in September 2012 and invited the PLA Navy to

participate for the first time in the U.S.-led multilateral, maritime Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC)

exercise in 2014 near Hawaii. At a press conference on July 19, 2013, the Chief of Naval

Operations (CNO), Admiral Jonathan Greenert, called for “interoperability” with the PLA Navy.

The Commander of Pacific Air Forces (PACAF) also said he hoped to bring a C-17 to China’s air

show in November 2014 (in General Hawk Carlisle’s interview with Defense News, February 10,

2014). PACAF sent a C-17 transport plane to the Zhuhai Air Show at a cost of $350,000, despite

some concerns in the Defense and State Departments, and U.S. objections to the Republic of

Korea’s proposal to send its T-50 trainers (with U.S. technology developed by Lockheed Martin).

The C-17’s presence at the air show was limited to a static display.10

Author’s consultations; “South Korea Cancels ‘Black Eagle’ Aerobatic Show in China,” Yonhap, November 2; “Why

the U.S. Sent a C-17 to a Chinese Air Show Despite Concerns Inside the Pentagon,” DefenseOne.com, November 11;

“China Getting a Look at Hawaii-based C-17, Crew Capabilities,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, November 15, 2014.

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Options

In a reassessment of the U.S. strategy toward and limitations of U.S. leverage in mil-to-mil

contacts to resolve disputes, policy makers have a number of options. The PRC’s reduced

appreciation for mil-to-mil exchanges at times has accompanied its rising assertiveness. Some say

China’s rising influence has reduced U.S. influence in relative terms. Others say U.S. power and

leadership remain dominant and valued by many countries to balance against China, with the

potential for the United States to shape China’s rise as a peaceful, responsible, and rules-based

power. In this context, one option is to stay the course in urging a more mature relationship to

reduce miscalculations and misperceptions, while dealing with repeated cycles in which the PLA

suspends contacts and then leverages the timing when it chooses to “resume” talks. A critical

view questions whether the status quo can be sustainable for long without another confrontation

or crisis with China and urges stepping up substantive talks about common concerns and relaxing

restrictions on engagement with the PLA. Another critical view recognizes that over the longterm, the military relationship has remained rocky and has reflected realistically not only the

antagonistic approach of the PLA but more broadly the PRC toward the United States. In this

view, the crux of the challenge for the U.S. military is not misunderstanding or misperception but

primarily competing (not common) interests. Alternatively, rather than either a major rise or

retrenchment in reaching out to the PLA, the U.S. military could recalibrate by reducing eager

requests and placing priority on the safety of U.S. military personnel in the air and at sea.

More specific options include a shift to stress multilateral settings for engagement with the PLA,

so that it has to engage with many countries amplifying their common concerns (e.g., about

freedom of navigation). However, U.S.-PRC disputes could remain unaddressed and affect any

effective cooperation in international contexts. In its first long-distance operation, the PLA Navy

has cooperated with the U.S. Navy and others to fight piracy in the Gulf of Aden since December

2008. Such contact could include expanded engagement in Europe between NATO and the PLA,

perhaps with coordination between the Defense Department and allied defense ministries. Partly

to address concerns of China’s neighbors, the U.S. military could engage the PLA along with the

10-member Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN)11 and the ASEAN Regional Forum

(ARF). The International Institute for Strategic Studies has held the annual “Shangri-la Dialogue”

of defense ministers in Singapore since 2002. China’s absence from the forum until 2007 and

refusals until 2011 to send the defense minister raised questions about China’s willingness to

engage with others on military matters and at an appropriately senior level.

Indeed, Defense Secretary Gates attended the Shangri-la Dialogue in June 2010 and critically

declared that the United States will remain a power in the Pacific and that the South China Sea

became an area of growing concern regarding the use of force, challenges to freedom of

navigation, and intimidation of U.S. and other companies. Gates chastised the PLA for not

following up with the top-level commitment by President Obama and Hu Jintao in 2009 to

advance the mil-to-mil relationship. (Hu was the CPC General-Secretary, CMC Chairman, and

PRC President.) Gates defended arms sales to Taiwan as part of U.S. policy since 1979 in part

because of China’s accelerating military buildup that largely has focused on Taiwan. He reiterated

that his department sought sustained and reliable military contacts to reduce miscommunication,

misunderstanding, and miscalculation. Such contacts would support regional security and a U.S.PRC relationship that is positive in tone, cooperative in nature, and comprehensive in scope,

Gates emphasized.12 (President Obama has pursued a “positive, cooperative, and comprehensive”

Brunei, Burma, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.

Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, speech at Shangri-la Hotel, Singapore, June 5, 2010.

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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

relationship with the PRC, but the PRC has translated “positive” with a Chinese word meaning

“proactive.”) The PLA sent a lower-level official (PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff and Air

Force General Ma Xiaotian) to the meeting and declined to host Gates for a visit in China.

By early September 2010, PRC media reported General Ma as saying positive remarks about the

U.S.-PRC military relationship, but the Defense Department spokesman cautioned on September

9 that Secretary Gates was not interested in merely “engagement for the sake of engagement.”

Gates again visited Asia in attending in Hanoi on October 11-12 the first ASEAN Defense

Ministers’ Meeting Plus (ADMM-Plus) between ASEAN and its partners (Australia, China, India,

Japan, Republic of Korea, New Zealand, Russia, and the United States). This time, the PLA sent a

CMC Member and the Defense Minister, General Liang Guanglie, who spoke in a moderate tone

even as several countries raised concerns about China’s maritime claims. Further, Minister Liang

invited Secretary Gates to visit in January 2011. On June 3-5, 2011, the PLA finally dispatched

for the first time the Defense Minister to the Shangri-la Dialogue. Defense Secretary Gates held a

meeting with General Liang Guanglie. However, the PLA did not send the Defense Minister to

attend the Shangri-la Dialogue in 2012, 2013, and 2014. In Hawaii in April 2014, Defense

Secretary Chuck Hagel held the first U.S.-hosted meeting with ASEAN defense ministers.

Another option is for mil-to-mil to be integrated further into the overall bilateral relationship,

pursued by the Obama Administration to shape China’s rise as a peaceful, responsible, and rulesbased power. As Gates implied a civil-military divide, there could be useful reminders to the PLA

to respect the top PRC leadership’s commitment to U.S.-PRC military engagement, other aspects

of PRC external policies, and international laws and norms. (Also see section below on “Civilian

Control over PLA and Civil-Military Coordination.”) Before Gates’ visit in January 2011, Deputy

Assistant Secretary of Defense Michael Schiffer said in a speech on January 6 that mil-to-mil

should be a critical component of bilateral engagement. However, any setbacks to the military

contacts could result in costs to the overall security, economic, and political relationship. There

also could be a risk that military mistrust could drive the bilateral relationship.

At the S&ED in Washington in July 2009, President Obama stressed that increased ties between

our militaries could diminish causes for disputes while providing a framework for cooperation.

The Under Secretary of Defense for Policy and the PACOM Commander attended that meeting,

but the PLA reluctantly sent a lower-level official. For the next S&ED in Beijing in May 2010,

the Pentagon sent the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs and

the PACOM Commander, even while the PLA suspended some exchanges in claimed objection to

U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell asserted an “innovation” to

include a PLA officer (a Deputy Chief of General Staff) at the 3rd S&ED in Washington on May

9-10, 2011. Still, the Chief of General Staff planned his visit on May 15-22, days after the S&ED.

Specifically regarding the PLA’s objection to U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, U.S. options include

reconsidering the policy under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) of 1979, P.L. 96-8, to make

available arms for Taiwan’s self-defense. Others have called for breaking the cycles since 2008 in

which Presidents Bush and Obama waited on pending arms sales to notify them to Congress all

on one day, cycles that could have raised expectations in Beijing of changes in U.S. policy

leading to escalations in Beijing’s demands for compromises. Another option would discuss with

the PLA how the United States has responded to the PLA’s threat posture against Taiwan.

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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

Select Abbreviations

AMS

Academy of Military Science

CMC

Central Military Commission

COSTIND

Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense

CPC

Communist Party of China

DCT

Defense Consultative Talks

DPCT

Defense Policy Coordination Talks

DPMO

Defense POW/Missing Personnel Office

GAD

General Armament Department

GLD

General Logistics Department

GPD

General Political Department

GSD

General Staff Department

Military Region

MMCA

Military Maritime Consultative Agreement

NDU

National Defense University

PACOM

Pacific Command

PLAAF

People’s Liberation Army Air Force

PLAN

People’s Liberation Army Navy

PLANAF

PLAN Air Force

Table 1. The PLA’s High Command

Central Military Commission (CMC) of the CPC

Chairman

Vice Chm

Member

General

General, PLAAF

General

Admiral, PLAN

General, PLAAF

General

Xi Jinping

Fan Changlong

Xu Qiliang

Chang Wanquan

Fang Fenghui

Zhang Yang

Zhao Keshi

Zhang Youxia

Wu Shengli

Ma Xiaotian

Wei Fenghe

CPC General Secretary; PRC President

CPC Politburo Member

Defense Minister, PRC State Councilor

Chief of General Staff (GSD)

Director of GPD

Director of GLD

Director of GAD

Commander of the Navy

Commander of the Air Force

Commander of the 2nd Artillery

Notes: Jiang Zemin was installed as the previous chairman of the CPC’s CMC in November 1989 and remained in

this position after handing other positions as CPC General Secretary and PRC President to Hu Jintao. Jiang had ruled

as the General Secretary of the CPC from June 1989 until November 2002, when he stepped down at the 16th CPC

Congress in favor of Hu Jintao. Jiang concurrently represented the PRC as president from March 1993 until March

2003, when he stepped down at the 10th National People’s Congress (NPC). At the 4th plenum of the 16th Central

Committee in September 2004, Jiang resigned as CMC Chairman, allowing Hu to complete the transition of power.

At the same time, General Xu Caihou rose from a CMC Member to a Vice Chairman, and the Commanders of the

PLA Air Force, Navy, and 2nd Artillery rose to be CMC Members for the first time in the PLA’s history, reflecting new

appreciation and action to integrate the PLA as a joint force. Xi Jinping was named as a CMC Vice Chairman on

October 18, 2010, further indicating that he would succeed Hu Jintao as the next CPC General Secretary in 2012.

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In November 2012, the 7th plenum of the 17th Central Committee announced the appointments of Fan Changlong

(though not a CMC Member) and Xu Qiliang to be Vice Chairmen, promoted respectively from positions as the

Commanders of the Jinan MR and PLAAF. PLA officers outside of the ground forces increased from three to four on

the CMC, further expanding joint representation. Contrary to Jiang Zemin, Hu Jintao transferred to Xi Jinping both

positions as CPC General Secretary and CMC Chairman at the leadership transition during the 18th Party Congress,

allowing Xi to consolidate the CPC General Secretary’s top control over the PLA and represent the PLA on the

seven-man Politburo Standing Committee. In March 2013, the 12th National People’s Congress announced the new

government positions of Xi Jinping as PRC President and General Chang Wanquan as Defense Minister.

The CMC under the Communist Party of China (CPC) commands the PLA. The PRC Ministry of Defense and its

titles are used for foreign contacts. The PRC Defense Minister is not equivalent to the U.S. Secretary of Defense in

terms of authority or functions. The Defense Minister has no operational command of forces and primarily performs

roles in foreign contacts. The Minister oversees defense mobilization in peacetime and wartime. The Minister also has

a government position under the State Council (like a Cabinet) and is concurrently a State Councilor. Also, he may

direct the Xinjiang Production and Construction Corps (PCC), a paramilitary force for internal security in Xinjiang.

Table 2. Summary of Senior-Level Military Visits Since 1994

Year

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2002

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

Defense Secretary/Minister

Highest Ranking Officer

Defense Consultative Talks

William Perry

Chi Haotian

William Cohen

John Shalikashvili

Zhang Wannian

1st DCT

2nd DCT

William Cohen

Henry Shelton

3rd DCT; 4th DCT

5th DCT

Cao Gangchuan

Richard Myers

Donald Rumsfeld

Robert Gates

Liang Guanglie, Leon Panetta

Chang Wanquan

Chuck Hagel

Guo Boxiong

Peter Pace

Michael Mullen

Martin Dempsey

6th DCT

7th DCT

8th DCT

9th DCT

10th DCT

11th DCT

12th DCT

13th DCT

14th DCT

15th DCT

Policy Issues for Congress

Skepticism in the United States about the value of military exchanges with China has increased

with the experiences in the 1990s; crises like the PLA’s missile exercises targeting Taiwan in

1995-1996, mistaken bombing of the PRC embassy in Belgrade in 1999, and the F-8/EP-3

collision crisis of 2001; and China’s confrontations over maritime areas. Still, Presidents and

some in Congress have striven to increase collaboration with the PLA. One long-standing issue

has concerned whether travel to Asia includes visits only to China or visits also to allies.

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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

In 2002, President George W. Bush decided to pursue a closer relationship with the PRC. As the

Defense Department gradually resumed the mil-to-mil relationship in that context, policy issues

for Congress included whether the Administration complied with legislation and used leverage

effectively in its contacts with the PLA to advance a prioritized list of U.S. security interests,

while balancing security concerns about the PLA’s warfighting capabilities.

President Barack Obama met with Hu Jintao at the G-20 summit in London on April 1, 2009, and

they agreed to improve the mil-to-mil relationship and set up the S&ED. The S&ED combined

the Bush Administration’s Strategic Economic Dialogue chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury

with the Senior Dialogue chaired by the Deputy Secretary of State, used the PRC’s preferred term

of “strategic” instead of “senior” dialogue, and elevated the Secretary of State to a co-chair.

Speaking at the 1st S&ED in Washington in July 2009, President Obama stressed military contacts

to diminish disputes with China, starting the integration of military talks in the S&ED and mil-tomil in the overall relationship. The Administration also has raised attention to a need for the PLA

to coordinate with the top leaders or civilian diplomats. Moreover, the Obama Administration

expanded engagement with the PLA, including increasing combined exercises. On December 10,

2014, Representative Randy Forbes wrote to the Defense Secretary with concerns about the

trajectory of mil-to-mil contacts with China and to request a review of this policy.13

Congressional Oversight

Congress has exercised oversight of various aspects of military exchanges with China. Issues for

Congress include whether the Administration has complied with legislation overseeing dealings

with the PLA and has determined a program of contacts with the PLA that advances, and does not

harm, U.S. security interests. The Defense Department has asserted that it conducts all militaryto-military contacts with China in a manner consistent with the provisions of the FY2000 NDAA.

Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990-FY1991 (P.L. 101-246)

prohibits arms sales to China, among other stipulations, in response to the Tiananmen Crackdown

in 1989. Section 1201 of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65)

restricts “inappropriate exposure” of the PLA to certain operational areas and requires annual

reports on contacts with the PLA. Section 1211 of the National Defense Authorization Act for

FY2006 (P.L. 109-163) prohibits procurement from any “Communist Chinese military company”

for goods and services on the Munitions List, with exceptions for U.S. military ship or aircraft

visits to the PRC, testing, and intelligence-collection; as well as waiver authority for the Secretary

of Defense. The NDAA for FY2010 (P.L. 111-84) amended the requirement in P.L. 106-65 for the

annual report on PRC military power to expand the focus to security developments involving the

PRC, add cooperative elements, and fold in another requirement to report on mil-to-mil contacts,

including a new strategy for such contacts.

One issue for Congress in examining military engagement with the PRC is the role of Congress,

including the extent of congressional oversight of the Administration’s policy. Congress could, as

it has in the past, consider the following options:

•

Host PLA delegations on Capitol Hill or meet them at other venues

Engage with the PLA as an aspect of visits by Codels to China

Receive briefings by the Administration before and/or after military visits

Randy Forbes, Letter to Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Deputy Secretary Robert Work, December 10, 2014.

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•

Investigate or oversee investigations of prisoner-of-war/missing-in-action

(POW/MIA) cases

Require reports or briefings from the Pentagon, particularly in unclassified form

Review exchanges at PACOM’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies

(APCSS) in Hawaii

Fund or prohibit funding for certain commissions or activities

Pass legislation on sanctions and exchanges with the PLA

Assess the Administration’s adherence to laws on sanctions, contacts, and reports

Obtain and review the Department of Defense (DOD)’s plan for upcoming milto-mil contacts, particularly proposed programs already discussed with the PLA

Require binding reviews of mil-to-mil contacts by the Defense Technology

Security Administration (DTSA) and counter-intelligence authorities

Examine whether to negotiate any agreements with the PLA, such as an

Acquisition and Cross-Service Agreement (ACSA) for logistics support

Require periodic (e.g., monthly, quarterly) reports to appropriations and defense

committees on the costs of travel and other elements of mil-to-mil exchanges.

Foreign Relations Authorization Act for Fiscal Years 1990 and 1991

Congress has oversight of sanctions imposed after the PLA’s role in the use of force in the

Tiananmen Square Crackdown of 1989. Commonly called the “Tiananmen Sanctions,” they were

enacted in Section 902 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1990 and FY1991 (P.L.

101-246). The sanctions continue to prohibit the issuance of licenses to export U.S. Munitions

List (USML) defense articles and defense services to China, including helicopters and helicopter

parts, as well as crime control equipment. Successive Presidents have used the waiver authority,

occasionally and on a case-by-case basis. In October 2010, President Obama issued a waiver for

temporary export licenses under the USML for the contingency of a landing by a civilianoperated C-130 transport plane in operations for an oil spill at sea, though it was not an export.

An issue is whether President Obama is required to issue waivers and consult with Congress

concerning the increased exposures of the PLA to U.S. equipment in military exchanges.

The U.S. ban on arms sales also shores up U.S. credibility and leadership, including opposition to

an end to the European Union (EU)’s arms embargo against China similarly imposed for the

Tiananmen Crackdown as well as in opposing Israel’s certain arms transfers to the PLA. In

January 2004, the EU decided to reconsider whether to lift its embargo on arms sales to China.

On January 28, 2004, a State Department spokesman acknowledged that the United States held

“senior-level” discussions with France and other countries in the EU about the issue of whether to

lift the embargo on arms sales to China. He said, “certainly for the United States, our statutes and

regulations prohibit sales of defense items to China. We believe that others should maintain their

current arms embargoes as well. We believe that the U.S. and European prohibitions on arms

sales are complementary, were imposed for the same reasons, specifically serious human rights

abuses, and that those reasons remain valid today.”14 At a hearing of the House International

Relations Committee on February 11, 2004, Representative Steve Chabot asked Secretary of State

Colin Powell about the EU’s reconsideration of the arms embargo against China, as supported by

France. Powell responded that he raised this issue with the foreign ministers of France, Ireland,

Department of State, press briefing by Richard Boucher, spokesman, January 28, 2004.

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United Kingdom, and Germany, and expressed opposition to a change in the EU’s policy at that

time in light of the PLA’s missiles arrayed against Taiwan, the referendums on sensitive political

issues then planned in Taiwan, and China’s human rights conditions.15 In prominent cases

concerning Israel, Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak on July 10, 2000, responded to objections

from President Clinton and Congress and told PRC ruler Jiang Zemin in a letter that Israel

canceled the nearly completed sale of the Phalcon airborne early warning system to the PLA.

Moreover, the PLA procured from Israel some Harpy anti-radiation drones in 2002.16 In 2004, the

United States demanded that Israel not return to China some upgraded Harpy attack drones.

Arms Export Control Act

In addition, the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629) governs U.S. transfers of defense

articles (weapons, etc.) and defense services (training, information, etc.), plus any subsequent

third-party transfers without U.S. consent. Section 6 of the AECA prohibits arms sales (through

letters of offer, credits, guarantees, or export licenses) governed by the act to any country that is

determined by the President to be engaged in a consistent pattern of intimidation or harassment

directed against individuals in the United States. The President is required to report any such

determination to the House Speaker and Chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

(For example, as discussed elsewhere, in 2010, PRC diplomats harassed U.S. executives over

arms sales to Taiwan, and Defense Secretary Gates objected to PRC intimidation of U.S. firms.)

In April 2013, the PRC’s Defense White Paper, “Diversified Employment of China’s Armed

Forces,” acknowledged the use of combined exercises with foreign militaries to “accelerate” the

PLA’s modernization. In “Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC,” the Defense

Secretary reported to Congress in May 2013 that PLA participation or observer status in military

training exercises of nations in possession of U.S. military equipment, systems, and weapons

could have unintended consequences that result in the unauthorized disclosure of defense articles,

technical data, or defense services to China. The report cited the “Tiananmen Sanctions” and the

AECA for denial of transfers of defense articles (including technical data) and defense services.

Joint Defense Conversion Commission (JDCC)

In China in 1994, Secretary of Defense William Perry and PLA General Ding Henggao, Director

of the Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND),17 set

up the U.S.-China Joint Defense Conversion Commission (JDCC). Its stated goal was to facilitate

economic cooperation and technical exchanges and cooperation in the area of defense conversion.

However, on June 1, 1995, the House National Security Committee issued H.Rept. 104-131 (for

the National Defense Authorization Act for FY1996) and expressed concerns that this

commission led to U.S. assistance to PRC firms with direct ties to the PLA and possible subsidies

to the PLA. The committee inserted a section to prohibit the use of DOD funds for activities

associated with the commission. The Senate’s bill had no similar language. On January 22, 1996,

conferees reported in H.Rept. 104-450 that they agreed to a provision (§1343 in P.L. 104-106) to

require the Secretary of Defense to submit semi-annual reports on the commission. They also

See CRS Report RL32870, European Union's Arms Embargo on China: Implications and Options for U.S. Policy,

by (name redacted), (name redacted), and (name redacted).

Washington Times, July 2, 2002; Guangzhou Daily, July 4, 2002; Ha’aretz, Tel Aviv, July 25, 2002; Flight

International, November 5-11, 2002; and Defense Secretary’s report on “PRC Military Power,” submitted in July 2003.

CRS Report 96-889, China: Commission of Science, Technology, and Industry for National Defense (COSTIND) and

Defense Industries, by (name redacted).

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noted that continued U.S.-PRC security dialogue “can promote stability in the region and help

protect American interests and the interests of America’s Asian allies.” Nonetheless, they warned

that Congress intends to examine whether that dialogue has produced “tangible results” in human

rights, transparency in military spending and doctrine, missile and nuclear nonproliferation, and

other important U.S. security interests. Then, in the National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)

for FY1997 (P.L. 104-201), enacted in September 23, 1996, Congress banned DOD from using

any funds for any activity associated with the commission until 15 days after the first semi-annual

report is received by Congress. In light of this controversy, Secretary Perry terminated the JDCC

and informed Congress in a letter dated July 18, 1996. Chairman Floyd Spence of the House

Committee on National Security had the General Accounting Office (GAO) audit the activities of

the JDCC, as reported in GAO/NSIAD-96-230R of September 30, 1996.

Past Reporting Requirement

Also in 1996, the House National Security Committee issued H.Rept. 104-563 (for the NDAA of

FY1997) that sought a “full accounting and detailed presentation” of all DOD interaction with the

PRC government and PLA, including technology-sharing, conducted during 1994-1996 and

proposed for 1997-1998, and required a classified and unclassified report by February 1, 1997.

DOD submitted the unclassified report on February 21, 1997, and did not submit a classified

version, saying that the unclassified report was comprehensive and that no contacts covered in the

report included the release of classified material or technology sharing.

Programs of Exchanges

Certain Members of Congress have written to the Secretary of Defense to express concerns that

mil-to-mil exchanges have not adequately benefitted U.S. interests. In early 1999, under the

Clinton Administration, the Washington Times disclosed the existence of a “Gameplan for 1999

U.S.-Sino Defense Exchanges,” and Pentagon spokesperson Kenneth Bacon confirmed that an

exchange program had been under way for years.18 Representative Dana Rohrabacher wrote a

letter to Secretary of Defense William Cohen, saying that “after reviewing the ‘Game Plan,’ it

appears evident that a number of events involving PLA logistics, acquisitions, quartermaster and

chemical corps representatives may benefit PLA modernization to the detriment of our allies in

the Pacific region and, ultimately, the lives of own service members.” He requested a detailed

written description of various exchanges.19

In December 2001, under the Bush Administration, Senator Bob Smith and Representative Dana

Rohrabacher wrote to Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld, expressing concerns about

renewed military contacts with the PRC. They contended that military exchanges failed to reduce

tensions (evident in the EP-3 crisis), lacked reciprocity, and provided militarily-useful

information to the PLA. They charged that the Clinton Administration “largely ignored” the spirit

and intent of legislation governing military exchanges with the PLA, including a “violation” of

the law by allowing the PLA to visit the Joint Forces Command in August 2000, and, as initiators

of the legislation, they “reminded” Rumsfeld of the congressional restrictions.20

Bill Gertz, “Military Exchanges with Beijing Raises Security Concerns,” Washington Times, February 19, 1999.

Dana Rohrabacher, letters to William Cohen, March 1, 1999 and March 18, 1999.

Bob Smith and Dana Rohrabacher, letter to Donald Rumsfeld, December 17, 2001.

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Restrictions in the FY2000 NDAA

Congress passed legislation concerning limits to helping the PLA’s warfighting capabilities.

Enacted on October 5, 1999, and based on an amendment introduced by Representative Tom

DeLay, the FY2000 NDAA set parameters to contacts with the PLA. Section 1201(a) of the

NDAA for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65) prohibits the Secretary of Defense from authorizing any mil-tomil contact with the PLA if that contact would “create a national security risk due to an

inappropriate exposure” of the PLA to any of the following 12 operational areas (with

exceptions granted only to any search and rescue or humanitarian operation or exercise):

•

Force projection operations

Nuclear operations

Advanced combined-arms and joint combat operations

Advanced logistical operations

Chemical and biological defense and other capabilities related to weapons of

mass destruction

Surveillance and reconnaissance operations

Joint warfighting experiments and other activities related to transformations in

warfare

Military space operations

Other advanced capabilities of the Armed Forces

Arms sales or military-related technology transfers

Release of classified or restricted information

Access to a DOD laboratory.

Section 1201(d) of the FY2000 NDAA required the Secretary of Defense to submit an annual

written certification by December 31 of each year as to whether any military contact with China

that the Secretary of Defense authorized in that year was a “violation” of the restrictions in the

law. Options include an alternative determination by an objective observer outside or inside the

Defense Department, such as the Defense Technology Security Administration (DTSA). On May

26, 2011, the House passed H.R. 1540, the FY2012 NDAA, with Section 1071(s) to remove

subsection (d) that required the certification. The final bill did not keep the section.

The PLA has objected to the U.S. law as an “obstacle” to the mil-to-mil relationship, blaming the

U.S. side. Under the Bush and Obama Administrations, the Pentagon cautioned that it would not

be necessary to change or lift the law to enhance exchanges, while the law contains prudent

parameters that do not ban all contacts. A third option would be for Congress or the Secretary of

Defense to clarify what type of mil-to-mil contact with the PLA would “create a national security

risk due to an inappropriate exposure.” At a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on

March 9, 2006, Admiral William Fallon, the PACOM Commander, raised with Representative

Victor Snyder the issue of whether to modify this law to relax restrictions on contacts with the

PLA.21 At a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on June 13, 2007, Deputy Under

Secretary of Defense Richard Lawless contended that limitations in the law should not change.

The PACOM Commander, Admiral Robert Willard, testified that he agreed with Secretary Gates

House Armed Services Committee, hearing on the FY2007 Budget for PACOM, March 9, 2006. Admiral Fallon also

discussed a consideration of modifying the law in an interview: Tony Capaccio, “Fallon Wants to Jumpstart Military

Contacts between U.S., China,” Bloomberg, March 13, 2006.

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that “no exchanges today approach the point where the provisions would prohibit the activity,” at

a hearing of the House Armed Services Committee on January 13, 2010. In 2014, however, the

Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Martin Dempsey, suggested that Congress might

relax the restrictions, depending on engagements with the PLA and its participation at RIMPAC.22

RIMPAC 2014

In June 2012, the PLA questioned the visiting PACOM Commander, Admiral Samuel Locklear,

about why the PLA Navy was not invited to the U.S.-led RIMPAC 2012 maritime exercise based

in Hawaii. The PLA’s idea seemed sensitive, partly because of U.S. laws. Moreover, at the time,

General Dempsey pointed out that the PLA was not willing to participate at a senior level at the

annual Shangri-la Dialogue of defense ministers, like other militaries. The Pacific Fleet

Commander, Admiral Cecil Haney, indicated that looking for exchanges with the PLA could

include its potential invitation to a humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) part of a

future RIMPAC. Nevertheless, by September, Defense Secretary Panetta announced that the U.S.

Navy will invite the PLAN to participate in (not just observe) RIMPAC 2014. The U.S. Navy

invited the PLA Navy to join at least five warfare areas of RIMPAC 2014: drills on surface

warfare (limited to surface gunnery); counter-piracy; HA/DR and military medicine; search and

rescue; and dive and salvage involved in explosive ordnance disposal. From June 26 to August 1,

RIMPAC 2014 included participation by four PLAN ships (destroyer, frigate, oiler, hospital ship).

The PLAN joined a drill led by the U.S. Coast Guard. The PLAN asked for training in opposed

boarding of a ship (dropping forces from a helicopter), which the U.S. Navy did not allow.

Though invited, the PLAN sent an intelligence-collection ship outside Hawaii’s territorial sea.23

The PLAN’s participation raised some concerns in Congress and elsewhere about protecting U.S.

and allied technology, tactics, techniques, and procedures; preventing disclosure of defense

articles and services; complying with U.S. laws; and whether to invite Taiwan. Representatives

Dana Rohrabacher and Steven Chabot raised objections. The House Armed Services Committee’s

report of June 7, 2013, on the House-passed FY2014 NDAA, H.R. 1960, included Representative

Randy Forbes’ amendment to require the Navy Secretary to brief Congress on the PLAN’s

participation in RIMPAC 2014 and compliance with laws (including the FY2000 NDAA). On

July 24, the House considered an amendment to H.R. 2397, Defense Department Appropriations

Act for FY2014, sponsored by Representative Steve Stockman to ban the use of funds for U.S.

military exercises that include PLA participation (including RIMPAC). Representatives Stockman

and Rohrabacher spoke in favor. Representatives Visclosky and Frelinghuysen spoke in

opposition. The amendment failed (137-286, 10 not voting). On October 21, Representative

Forbes led eight Members to send a letter to Defense Secretary Hagel, urging him to invite

Taiwan to participate in RIMPAC 2014.

On June 2, 2014, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 2410 (Levin), FY2015

NDAA, with Section 1212 to express the sense of the Senate that both the PRC and Taiwan

should be afforded the opportunity to participate (not just observe) in the HA/DR parts of

multilateral exercises, such as RIMPAC. On the eve of RIMPAC 2014, Representative Chabot

introduced H.Res. 643 (concerning the Justice Department’s indictments of PLA hackers

involved in the PRC’s cyber-enabled theft of U.S. trade secrets), which called for restrictions on

contacts with the PLA in compliance with U.S. laws. Also, Representative Forbes opposed the

PLAN’s participation in RIMPAC, saying that “given Beijing’s belligerent behavior towards its

Jeanette Steele, “Historic Moment for Naval War Games,” San Diego Union-Tribune, July 6, 2014.

Wall Street Journal, July 16, 2014; Honolulu Star-Advertiser, July 18, 2014; Aviation Week, August 19, 2014.

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neighbors across the Asia-Pacific in recent months, it gives me pause they would be rewarded

with the opportunity to participate in such a prestigious exercise.”24 Later, in December, the

House and Senate Armed Services Committees agreed on the language for the FY2015 NDAA

(H.R. 3979; P.L. 113-291), with Section 1259A to express the sense of Congress that the United

States should consider opportunities to help enhance the maritime capabilities and nautical skills

of Taiwan’s navy to contribute to Taiwan’s self-defense and to regional peace and stability; and

that the PRC and Taiwan should be afforded opportunities to participate in (not just observe) the

HA/DR portions of future multilateral exercises, such as RIMPAC.

Major Legislation: Required Reports and Classification

Section 1201(f) of the NDAA for FY2000 (P.L. 106-65) required an unclassified report by March

31, 2000, on past military-to-military contacts with the PRC. The Office of the Secretary of

Defense submitted this report in January 2001.

Section 1201(e) required an annual report, by March 31 of each year starting in 2001, from the

Secretary of Defense on the Secretary’s assessment of the state of mil-to-mil exchanges and

contacts with the PLA, including past contacts, planned contacts, the benefits that the PLA

expects to gain, the benefits that DOD expects to gain, and the role of such contacts for the larger

security relationship with the PRC. The law did not specify whether the report shall be

unclassified and/or classified. In the report submitted in January 2001 (on past mil-to-mil

exchanges), the Pentagon stated that “as a matter of policy, all exchange activities are conducted

at the unclassified level. Thus, there is no data included on the section addressing PLA access to

classified data as a result of exchange activities.” On June 8, 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense

Paul Wolfowitz signed and submitted an unclassified report on the mil-to-mil exchanges in 2000

under the Clinton Administration and did not provide a schedule of activities for 2001, saying that

the 2001 program was under review by the Secretary of Defense.

However, concerning contacts with the PLA under the Bush Administration, Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld submitted reports on military exchanges with China in May 2002, May 2003, and May

2005 (for 2003 and 2004) that were classified “Confidential” and not made public.25 In July 2006,

Secretary Rumsfeld submitted an unclassified report on contacts in 2005.26 Secretary of Defense

Robert Gates submitted an unclassified report in June 2007 for 2006.27 In March 2008, Deputy

Defense Secretary Gordon England submitted an unclassified report to Congress for 2007.28

Under President Obama, Defense Secretary Gates submitted an unclassified report to Congress on

March 31, 2009.29 On June 25, 2009, the House passed H.R. 2647, NDAA for FY2010, with

Section 1233 to change the requirement in Section 1202(a) of P.L. 106-65 for an annual report

(required by Congress by March 1 each year) on “PRC military power” to expand the focus to

Quoted in the Free Beacon, June 25, 2014.

Bill Gertz and Rowan Scarborough, “Inside the Ring,” Washington Times, May 17, 2002; author’s discussions with

the Defense Department and Senate Armed Services Committee.

Secretary of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1201(e) of the FY2000 National Defense

Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65),” July 19, 2006.

Secretary of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1201(e) of the FY2000 National Defense

Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65),” June 22, 2007.

Deputy Secretary of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to Section 1201(e) of the FY 2000 National Defense

Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65),” March 31, 2008.

Robert Gates, “Annual Report on the Current State of U.S. Military-to-Military Exchanges and Contacts with the

People’s Liberation Army, 2008,” March 31, 2009.

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security developments involving the PRC, add cooperative elements, fold in the separate

requirement to report on mil-to-mil contacts (in §1201 of P.L. 106-65), and require a new

comprehensive and coordinated strategy for such contacts. On July 23, the Senate passed its

version that did not include such changes to the reporting requirements. Reconciling differences,

the Senate receded. On October 7, 2009, Members issued the conference report that retained the

House-passed section and encouraged the Defense Secretary to examine further the implications

of China’s psychological, media, and legal warfare on U.S. military affairs. In this legislation,

enacted as P.L. 111-84 on October 28, 2009, Congress changed the title of the report to “Annual

Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s Republic of China.”

However, the Defense Department was late in submitting the report in 2010, 2011, 2012, 2013,

and 2014, while at times citing “inter-agency coordination.”30 The Pentagon also contended that a

report with the backing of the full Administration after coordination was a more authoritative U.S.

report. Moreover, P.L. 111-84 required consultation with the Secretaries of Energy and State.

Still, inter-agency coordination could start earlier for the process to meet the required deadline.

In June 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported (S.Rept. 111-201 on S. 3454) the

NDAA for FY2011 that expressed its displeasure with the Defense Department for failing to

submit the annual report by the deadline of March 1. In July, five Senators wrote to Defense

Secretary Gates to express “serious concern” over the “failure” of the Department of Defense

(DOD) to submit the 2010 report on PRC Military Power and to ask him to submit it to Congress

immediately with an explanation as to the “significant delay.” They noted that the report was then

almost five months overdue and that a draft report was already completed with the department

several months ago. The Senators stressed that “since the responsibility for this report lies within

the DoD alone, we ask for your assurance that White House political appointees at the National

Security Council or other agencies have not been allowed to alter the substance of the report in an

effort to avoid the prospect of angering China.”31 The Secretary submitted the unclassified report

on August 16, 2010, incorporating reports on PRC military power and on military contacts.32

Assistant Secretary of Defense Wallace Gregson wrote to Congress on February 25, 2011, that the

Pentagon needed additional time for inter-agency coordination of the annual report. On May 3,

Representative Randy Forbes of the House Armed Services Committee and Congressional China

Caucus wrote to Secretary Gates, expressing concern for the Defense Department’s “continued

disregard” of the deadline for the annual report on China and that the department failed to inform

Congress with timely reports on needs and threats in the Pacific. Under Secretary of Defense for

Policy Michele Flournoy responded on May 23 and cited “inter-agency coordination” for the

continued delay. On August 22, Representative Forbes wrote to Defense Secretary Leon Panetta,

suggesting that the continued delay was not caused by inter-agency or analytical challenges, but

rather the Administration’s willingness to let its compliance with laws be superseded by the

diplomatic calendar with the PRC. The Secretary finally submitted the report on August 24.33

In some other delays related to policy toward the PRC, President Obama did not notify Congress of major pending

Foreign Military Sales to Taiwan in 2009, submitting his first notifications all on one day on January 29, 2010. In

September 2009, President Obama sent his advisor, Valerie Jarrett, and Under Secretary of State Maria Otero to

Dharamsala, India, to talk to the Dalai Lama about putting off his visit to the White House until after the President’s

visit to the PRC in November 2009. President Obama met with the Dalai Lama in the White House on February 18,

2010. Into its second year, the Administration did not appoint commissioners to the Congressional-Executive

Commission on China (CECC) until mid-December 2010, after an annual report of October 10, 2010.

John Cornyn, John McCain, James Risch, Pat Roberts, and James Inhofe, letter to Robert Gates, July 23, 2010.

Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2010,” August 16, 2010.

Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2011,” August 24, 2011.

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On May 11, 2011, at the markup of H.R. 1540, the NDAA for FY2012, the House Armed

Services Committee adopted Representative Forbes’ amendment to change the name of the report

back to “Military Power of the People’s Republic of China” and require information on cyber

threats to the Pentagon. On May 26, the House passed H.R. 1540 with the language, but on June

22, the Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 1253 without such language. Enacted as

P.L. 112-81 on December 31, 2011, the final legislation required reporting on cyber threats

against the Defense Department but did not require the change back to the original title.

In 2012, Defense Secretary Panetta submitted the report late again, on May 17, 2012, after a visit

by PRC Defense Minister Liang Guanglie on May 4-10.34 On July 11, Chairman Howard

McKeon of the House Armed Services Committee wrote to Secretary Panetta to express concerns

that the annual report was submitted after the statutory deadline, was “wholly inadequate,” and

“minimizes the uncertainty and challenges posed by China’s military build-up.” He also called for

the Secretary to rescind a policy of limiting the length of all reports to Congress. That day, the

Defense Department issued a statement denying an intent to restrict information to Congress. The

next day, a spokesman said the department rescinded the guidance to restrict the page limit on

reports to Congress. The NDAA for FY2013 (enacted as P.L. 112-239 on January 2, 2013)

required reports on the PRC’s tunnel sites and nuclear weapons program; and on any critical gaps

in intelligence and capabilities to counter challenges from the PRC, North Korea, and Iran. The

legislation also required additional reporting to strengthen the annual report on the PLA to include

assessments of the PRC’s cyber, space, nuclear, anti-access/area denial, C4ISR, and maritime law

enforcement capabilities, among other information; and limit funds to no more than $7 million for

the Center of Excellence on Nuclear Security in China.

Secretary of Defense Hagel submitted the annual report late in May 2013.35 Based on S. 1197,

Section 1242 of the FY2014 NDAA (P.L. 113-66) required the report to cover the PLA’s 5th

generation fighters. Also, Section 233 prohibited the Defense Department from using funds to

integrate the PRC’s missile defense systems into U.S. missile defense systems. (In 2013, Turkey,

a NATO ally, considered a purchase of the PRC’s HQ-9 system.)

Secretary of Defense Hagel again submitted the annual report late in June 2014, after a visit by

PLA Chief of General Staff Fang Fenghui in May.36 In April, Representatives Forbes and

Hanabusa introduced H.R. 4495, Asia-Pacific Region Priority Act, to support the strategic

“rebalance” to the region. Section 205 seeks to add to the annual report some information on

developments in the PRC’s maritime law enforcement capabilities. The House passed H.R. 4435,

FY2015 NDAA, on May 22, incorporating much of the language in H.R. 4495. On June 2, the

Senate Armed Services Committee reported S. 2410 (Levin), FY2015 NDAA. On December 2,

the House and Senate Armed Services Committees agreed on language for the FY2015 NDAA

(inserted in H.R. 3979). Section 1252 amends the requirement for the annual report to examine

China’s maritime strategy. Section 1259 requires a report on the Defense Department’s maritime

security strategy in the Asia-Pacific, including an assessment of how the strategy leverages U.S.PRC mil-to-mil engagements to reduce the potential for miscalculation and tensions in the East

and South China Seas. In addition, the committees, in their Joint Statement on the NDAA, direct

the Defense Secretary to brief congressional defense committees, by March 15, 2015, on an

assessment of whether the mil-to-mil engagements meet PACOM’s objectives and to provide a

detailed description of mil-to-mil exchanges for the 12 months after March 15, 2015. Section

Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2012,” May 17, 2012.

Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC, 2013,” May 6, 2013.

Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC, 2014,” June 5, 2014.

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1259A expresses the sense of Congress that both the PRC and Taiwan should be afforded

opportunities to participate in the HA/DR portions of future multilateral exercises, such as

RIMPAC. Section 1265 prohibits the use of funds to integrate a PRC missile defense system into

any U.S. missile defense system. Section 1601 requires a study of potential alternative defense

and deterrent strategies in response to the existing and projected counter-space capabilities of

China and Russia. H.R. 3979 became P.L. 113-291 on December 19, 2014.

Prohibitions on Defense Procurement

Section 1211 of the NDAA for FY2006 (signed into law as P.L. 109-163 on January 6, 2006)

prohibits procurement from any “Communist Chinese military company” for goods and services

on the Munitions List, with exceptions for U.S. military ship or aircraft visits to the PRC, testing,

and intelligence-collection; as well as waiver authority for the Secretary of Defense. Original

language reported by the House Armed Services Committee in H.R. 1815 on May 20, 2005,

would have prohibited the Secretary from any procurement of goods or services from any such

company. S. 1042 did not have similar language. During conference (H.Rept. 109-360), the

Senate receded after limiting the ban to goods and services on the Munitions List; providing for

exceptions for procurement in connection with U.S. military ship or aircraft visits, testing, and

intelligence-collection; and authorizing waivers.

In May 2011, the House adopted an amendment to H.R. 1540, the NDAA for FY2012, proposed

by Representatives Rosa DeLauro and Frank Wolf, to broaden the ban against procurement of

PRC defense articles to include all entities owned or controlled by the PLA, the PRC government,

or an entity affiliated with PRC defense industries. Enacted as P.L. 112-81 on December 31,

2011, the final bill did not keep the House’s broadened definition of “Communist Chinese

military company” but adopted the requirement (in §1243) for a report from the Defense

Secretary not less than 15 days before any waiver of the ban in P.L. 109-163.

In related action, on February 18, 2011, Representative DeLauro introduced H.Res. 106 to

express the sense of the House that defense systems, including the Presidential helicopters, should

not be procured from a PRC entity. On July 22, Representatives Forbes and Madeleine Bordallo

led 17 Members to write to the Secretary of the Air Force to seek an explanation for the

procurement of T-53A trainers from Cirrus Aircraft, which was acquired by the Aviation Industry

Corporation of China (AVIC). The Senate Armed Services Committee held a hearing on

November 8 on China’s counterfeit electronic parts entering the U.S. defense supply chain. The

Committee later issued a report on its findings in May 2012.37

On April 25, 2013, the House Armed Services Subcommittee on Strategic Forces held a hearing

at which Representative Mike Rogers raised concerns about the Defense Department’s lease of a

PRC-owned commercial satellite (Apstar-7) in May 2012 for the Africa Command (AFRICOM).

In May 2013, the Defense Department renewed the contract after adding new higher-level review.

On June 14, the House passed the FY2014 NDAA, H.R. 1960, with Section 1605 to prohibit the

Defense Secretary from contracting satellite services with a foreign entity owned by a “covered

foreign country” (PRC, Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), or a state sponsor of

terrorism). Section 1602 in the final legislation (P.L. 113-66) contains the amended prohibition.

Representative Rogers explained the concern that “the military had no other option but to enter

Senate Armed Services Committee, “Inquiry into Counterfeit Electronic Parts in the Department of Defense Supply

Chain,” S.Rept. 112-167, May 21, 2012.

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into a contract that undermined our military embargo on China and exposed our military to the

risk that China may seek to turn off our ‘eyes and ears’ at a time of its choosing.”38

Foreign Aid

Section 620(f)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) prohibits assistance to any

Communist country, and specifically lists the PRC as a “Communist country” for purposes of the

subsection. Section 620(h) requires the President to ensure that U.S. foreign aid is not used to

promote or assist the foreign aid projects or activities of a Communist country for purposes of

subsection (f). Pursuant to Section 620(f)(2), the President is authorized to remove a country from

the application of Section 620(f), along with other provisions that reference it, if the President

makes a determination and reports to Congress that such action is important to U.S. national

interests. On December 11, 1985, acting pursuant to the authority under Section 620(f)(2), the

Secretary of State removed the PRC (and Tibet) from the application of Section 620(f) for an

indefinite period. Nonetheless, Section 7071(g) of the Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2010

(P.L. 111-117) stipulated that Section 620(h) applied to foreign aid projects or activities of the

PLA, including those by any entity owned or controlled by or affiliated with the PLA. The

Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2012 (P.L. 112-74) repeated this ban. Section 7043(e)(2)

of the FY2014 Consolidated Appropriations Act (P.L. 113-76) again repeated the ban.

Leverage to Pursue U.S. Security Objectives

Objectives

At different times, under successive Administrations, DOD has pursued exchanges with the PLA

to various degrees of closeness as part of the policy of engagement in the relationship with China.

The record of the mil-to-mil contacts can be used to evaluate the extent to which those contacts

resulted in tangible benefits to advance U.S. security goals and deterrence has been effective.

Some skeptics say strategy focuses on goals, while the “relationship” is not the end in itself.

The Pentagon’s last East Asia strategy report, issued by Secretary of Defense Cohen in November

1998, placed “comprehensive engagement” with China in third place among nine components of

the U.S. strategy. It said that U.S.-PRC dialogue was “critical” to ensure understanding of each

other’s regional security interests, reduce misperceptions, increase understanding of PRC security

concerns, and build confidence to “avoid military accidents and miscalculations.” While calling

the strategic non-targeting agreement announced at the summit in June 1998 a “symbolic” action,

it asserted that the action “reassured both sides and reaffirmed our constructive relationship.” The

report further pointed to the presidential hotline set up in May 1998, Military Maritime

Consultative Agreement (MMCA), and Defense Consultative Talks (DCT) as achievements.39

In March 2008, Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon England defined these principal U.S.

objectives in the annual report to Congress on contacts with the PLA:

•

support the President’s overall policy goals regarding China;

prevent conflict by clearly communicating U.S. resolve to maintain peace and

stability in the Asia-Pacific region;

lower the risk of miscalculation between the two militaries;

Mike Rogers, “Changing the Military’s Approach to Commercial Satellite Services,” Space News, January 13, 2014.

Secretary of Defense, The United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region, 1998.

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•

increase U.S. understanding of China’s military capabilities and intentions;

encourage China to adopt greater openness and transparency in its military

capabilities and intentions;

promote stable U.S.-China relations;

increase mutual understanding between U.S. and PLA officers; and

encourage China to play a constructive and peaceful role in the Asia-Pacific

region; to act as a partner in addressing common security challenges; and to

emerge as a responsible stakeholder in the world.

As discussed above on the required annual report, the NDAA for FY2010, P.L. 111-84, required

the Defense Secretary to address the U.S. strategy for engagement with the PLA. In his report

submitted on August 16, 2010, Secretary Gates told Congress that “sustainable and reliable”

military-to-military ties are an important component of the overall U.S.-China relationship and

are “necessary” for the relationship to be “comprehensive.” Gates also cautioned that such

military contacts are “not ends in and of themselves” and that “a sustained exchange program has

been difficult to achieve.” He sought to expand practical cooperation in areas in which U.S. and

PRC national interests converge and to discuss candidly those areas in which there is

disagreement. He noted the challenges for the risk that “misapprehension or miscalculation”

could lead to crisis or conflict. In laying out priorities, the Defense Department identified these:

•

build cooperative capacity (based on anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden),

foster institutional understanding (particular in nuclear, space, and cyber

strategies and policies), and

develop common views (on international security like nuclear nonproliferation in

North Korea and Iran, and stability in Afghanistan and Pakistan, but also

“respectful discussion” of differences over China’s claim to Exclusive Economic

Zones (EEZs) and harassment of U.S. ships and aircraft exercising international

freedom of navigation, while the United States remains “vigilant” in watching for

PRC behavior that puts at risk the safety of U.S. military personnel).40

In August 2011, Defense Secretary Leon Panetta submitted an annual report on the PLA, which

specified the mil-to-mil relationship as a critical part of the Administration’s strategy to shape

China’s rise in a way that maximizes cooperation and mitigates risks. One policy issue concerns

the effectiveness of such a strategy of shaping PRC behavior. In the annual report of June 2014,

Defense Secretary Hagel asserted that mil-to-mil engagement supports U.S. objectives of

promoting China’s development that would be consistent with international rules and norms, and

that would serve as a source of security and shared prosperity in Asia.

Debate

U.S. security objectives in mil-to-mil contacts with China have included gaining insights about

the PLA’s capabilities and concepts; deterrence against a PLA use of force or coercion against

Taiwan or U.S. allies; reduction in tensions in the Taiwan Strait; strategic arms control; weapons

nonproliferation in countries such as like North Korea, Iran, and Pakistan; closer engagement

with top PRC leaders; freedom of navigation and flight; preventing dangers to U.S. military

Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress: Military and Security Developments Involving the People’s

Republic of China 2010,” August 16, 2010.

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personnel operating in proximity to the PLA; minimizing misperceptions and miscalculations;

and accounting for American POW/MIAs.

Skeptics of U.S.-PRC mil-to-mil contacts say they have had little value for achieving these U.S.

objectives. Instead that they contend that the contacts served to inform the PLA as it builds its

warfighting capability against the United States, viewed by the PLA as a potential adversary.

There was concern that exchanges seemed to reward belligerence. They oppose rehabilitation of

PLA officers involved in the Tiananmen Crackdown. They question whether the PLA has shown

transparency and reciprocated with equivalent or substantive access, and urge greater attention to

U.S. allies over China. From this perspective, the ups and downs in the military relationship

reflect its use as a tool in the political relationship, in which the PRC at times had leverage over

the United States. Thus, they contend, a realistic appraisal of the nature of the PLA threat would

call for caution in military contacts, perhaps limiting them to exchanges such as strategic talks

and senior-level talks, rather than operational areas that involve military capabilities.

A former U.S. Army Attache in Beijing wrote in 1999 that under the Clinton Administration,

military-to-military contacts allowed PLA officers “broad access” to U.S. warships, exercises,

and even military manuals. He argued that “many of the military contacts between the United

States and China over the years helped the PLA attain its goals [in military modernization].” He

called for limiting exchanges to strategic dialogue on weapons proliferation, Taiwan, the Korean

peninsula, freedom of navigation, missile defense, etc. He urged policy makers not to “improve

the PLA’s capability to wage war against Taiwan or U.S. friends and allies, its ability to project

force, or its ability to repress the Chinese people.”41 He also testified to Congress in 2000 that the

PLA conceals its capabilities in exchanges with the United States. For example, he said, the PLA

invited General John Shalikashvili, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, to see the capabilities of

the 15th Airborne Army (in May 1997), but it showed him a highly scripted routine. Furthermore,

the PLA allowed Secretary of Defense Cohen to visit an Air Defense Command Center (in

January 1998), but it was “a hollow shell of a local headquarters; it was not the equivalent of

America’s National Command Center” that was shown to PRC leaders.42

In 2000, Randy Schriver, a former official in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, discussed

lessons learned in conducting military exchanges during the Clinton Administration and argued

for limiting such exchanges. Schriver assessed senior-level talks as exchanges of talking points

rather than real dialogue, but nonetheless helpful. He considered the MMCA a successful

confidence-building measure (before the EP-3 aircraft collision crisis less than one year later in

April 2001). He also said it was positive to have PLA participation in multilateral fora and to

expose younger PLA officers to American society. However, Schriver said that the United States

“failed miserably” in gaining a window on the PLA’s modernization, gaining neither access as

expected nor reciprocity; failed to shape China’s behavior while allowing China to shape the

behavior of some American “ardent suitors”; and failed to deter the PLA’s aggression while

whetting the PLA’s appetite in planning against a potential American adversary. He disclosed that

the Pentagon needed to exert control over PACOM’s contacts with the PLA, with the Secretary of

Defense issuing a memo to set guidelines. He also called for more consultations with Congress.43

Larry Wortzel, “Why Caution is Needed in Military Contacts with China,” Heritage Foundation, December 2, 1999.

Larry Wortzel, Director of the Asian Studies Center at the Heritage Foundation, testimony on “China’s Strategic

Intentions and Goals” before the House Armed Services Committee, June 21, 2000.

Randy Schriver, former Country Director for China in the Office of the Secretary of Defense during the Clinton

Administration, and later Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs during the Bush

Administration, discussed military contacts with China at an event at the Heritage Foundation on July 27, 2000. See

Stephen Yates, Al Santoli, Randy Schriver, and Larry Wortzel, “The Proper Scope, Purpose, and Utility of U.S.

(continued...)

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Warning of modest expectations for military ties and the PLA’s use of “suspended” exchanges to

signal messages or retaliate against a perceived wrong action, former Deputy Assistant Secretary

of Defense for East Asia and the Pacific (1995-2000) Kurt Campbell contended in late 2005 that

security ties can only follow, not lead, the bilateral relationship. After serving as a Deputy

Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Randy Schriver noted in 2007 that

military engagement has continued to pursue the “same modest, limited agenda that has been in

place for close to 20 years,” despite a visit by Secretary of Defense Robert Gates in November

2007. In 2011, Schriver called for reducing military contacts. Later, also as former Assistant

Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Campbell commented in 2014 that the

United States and PRC have divergent objectives in dealing with maritime incidents like the nearcollision between the USS Cowpens and a PLA Navy ship in December 2013. U.S. goals include

crisis prevention, but the PRC aims to limit U.S. military operations and deployments. Moreover,

the United States and PRC differ over deterrence.44 He wrote that,

America often employs overwhelming displays of military capability – shock and awe –

to create apprehension in the minds of potential adversaries or competitors. For China,

deterrence – or, perhaps better, doubt – is achieved not through overt displays of power,

but through creating uncertainty in the perception of others. So, by this avenue of logic,

the less operational intimacy and understanding with PLA forces, the greater the deterrent

value.

Proponents of military exchanges with the PRC point out that contacts with the PLA cannot be

expected to equal contacts with allies in transparency, reciprocity, and consistency. They argue

that the mil-to-mil contacts nonetheless promote U.S. interests and allow the U.S. military to gain

insights into the PLA, including its top leadership, that no other bilateral contacts provide. U.S.

military attaches, led by the Defense Attache at the rank of brigadier general or rear admiral, have

contacts at levels lower than the top PLA leaders and are subject to strict surveillance in China. In

addition to chances for open intelligence collection, the military relationship can minimize

miscalculations and misperceptions, and foster pro-U.S. leanings and understanding, particularly

among younger officers who might lead in the future. Proponents caution against treating China

as if it is already an enemy, since the United States seeks China’s cooperation on international

security issues. There might be benefits in cooperation in military medicine to prevent pandemics

of diseases, like avian flu. During the epidemic of SARS (severe acute respiratory syndrome) in

2003, it was a PLA doctor, Dr. Jiang Yanyong, who revealed the PRC leadership’s coverup of

SARS cases at premier PLA hospitals.45 Rather than bilateral exchanges, the U.S. military could

engage with the PLA in multilateral venues. On October 28, 2010, the PLA hosted in Beijing the

first “Pan Asian-Pacific Conference on Military Medicine.” Further, since the early 1990s,

Congress and the Defense Department have viewed China as the key to getting information to

resolve the cases of POW/MIAs from the Korean War 1950-1953.

Citing a few examples in 1998 (the PACOM Commander’s first foreign look at the 47th Group

Army, a U.S. Navy ship visit to Shanghai, and naval consultative talks at Naval Base Coronado),

the U.S. Naval Attache in Beijing wrote that “the process of mutual consultation, openness, and

(...continued)

Relations with China’s Military,” Heritage Lectures, October 10, 2000.

Kurt Campbell and Richard Weitz, “The Limits of U.S.-China Military Cooperation: Lessons From 1995-1999,”

Washington Quarterly, Winter 2005-2006; Randall Schriver, “The Real Value in Gates’ Asia Trip,” Taipei Times,

November 16, 2007; “Bound to Fail,” Washington Times, July 26, 2011; Kurt Campbell, “How China and America Can

Keep a Pacific Peace,” Financial Times, January 2, 2014.

John Pomfret, “Doctor Says Health Ministry Lied About Disease,” Washington Post, April 10, 2003; “Feature: A

Chinese Doctor’s Extraordinary April in 2003,” People’s Daily, June 13, 2003.

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sharing of concerns and information needed to preclude future misunderstandings and to build

mutual beneficial relations is taking place between the U.S. and China’s armed forces, especially

in the military maritime domain.” He stressed that “the importance of progress in this particular

area of the Sino-American relationship cannot be overestimated.”46

Two former U.S. military attaches posted to China maintained in a report that “regardless of

whether it is a high-level DOD delegation or a functional exchange of medical officers, the U.S.

military does learn something about the PLA from every visit.” They advocated that “the United

States should fully engage China in a measured, long-term military-to-military exchange program

that does not help the PLA improve its warfighting capabilities.” They said, “the most effective

way to ascertain developments in China’s military and defense policies is to have face-to-face

contact at multiple levels over an extended period of time.” Thus, they argued, “even though the

PLA minimizes foreign access to PLA facilities and key officials, the United States has learned,

and can continue to learn, much about the PLA through its long-term relationship.”47

Another former U.S. military attache in Beijing (from 1992 to 1995) acknowledged that he saw

many PLA drills and demonstrations by “showcase” units and never any unscripted training

events. Nonetheless, he noted that in August 2003, the PLA arranged for 27 military observers

from the United States and other countries to be the first foreigners to observe a PLA exercise at

its largest training base (which is in the Inner Mongolia region under the Beijing Military

Region). He wrote that “by opening this training area and exercise to foreign observers, the

Chinese military leadership obviously was attempting to send a message about its willingness to

be more ‘transparent’ in order to ‘promote friendship and mutual trust between Chinese and

foreign armed forces.’”48 However, in a second PLA exercise opened to foreign observers, the

“Dragon 2004” landing exercise at the Shanwei amphibious operations training base in

Guangdong province in September 2004, only seven foreign military observers from France,

Germany, Britain, and Mexico attended, with no Americans (if invited).49

A retired admiral and PACOM Commander, Dennis Blair, co-chaired a task force on the U.S.China relationship. Its report of April 2007 recommended a sustained high-level military strategic

dialogue to complement the “Senior Dialogue” started by the Deputy Secretary of State in 2005

and the “Strategic Economic Dialogue” launched by the Secretary of the Treasury in 2006.50 After

visiting China in 2011 as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen argued

for sustained dialogue in the face of disputes and potential common interests.51

After visiting China in 2013, the Chief of Staff of the Air Force and Commander of Pacific Air

Forces wrote that “distrust and increasing misperception have made the need to improve lines of

communication between our two governments and militaries all the more urgent.” They argued

that the two countries have “shared security interests.” Moreover, they contended that, because of

the growing frequency and proximity at which the U.S. and PRC militaries operate in

Brad Kaplan, USN, “China and U.S.: Building Military Relations,” Asia-Pacific Defense Forum, Summer 1999.

Kenneth Allen and Eric McVadon, “China’s Foreign Military Relations,” Stimson Center, October 1999.

Dennis Blasko, “Bei Jian 0308: Did Anyone Hear the Sword on the Inner Mongolian Plains?” RUSI Chinese Military

Update, October 2003.

Xinhua, September 2; Liberation Army Daily, September 3; Jane’s Defence Weekly, September 22, 2004.

Dennis Blair and Carla Hills, Task Force of the Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-China Relations: An

Affirmative Agenda, A Responsible Course,” April 10, 2007.

Mike Mullen, “A Step Toward Trust with China,” New York Times, July 25, 2011.

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international waters and in the airspace above the maritime domain, it is important to maintain the

highest levels of safety and professionalism in military interactions and for “managing friction.”52

Perspectives

Aside from a debate about how to engage with the PLA, some officials and observers warn about

challenges that stem from the different perspectives between the U.S. military and PLA. A stillsalient study prepared for the Defense Department’s Office of Net Assessment in 1997 focused on

a long-standing concern about China’s misperceptions that could pose dangers to U.S. security

interests.53 In particular, the study focused on five “dangerous misperceptions:” (1) overestimating U.S. hostility; (2) over-estimating U.S. weakness; (3) over-estimating U.S. decline; (4)

under-estimating costs of war; and (5) under-estimating fears of neighbors to China’s rising

military power. As implications for U.S. contacts with the PLA, the study suggested that the

Defense Department review past exchanges and plan future exchanges to rebut more directly and

effectively the most dangerous misperceptions held by China’s military. Nonetheless, the study

cautioned that while U.S. engagement with China softened its hostility and suspicion of the

United States in the 25 years after the “Shanghai Communique,” it was remarkable how little

China’s fundamental perceptions of world politics changed. U.S. policy makers would have to

consider prudently that another 25 years of “strategic dialogue” and military exchanges would not

eliminate completely the PRC’s dangerous misperceptions. U.S. policy might need to anticipate

the persistence of such misperceptions and potential miscalculations (including China’s use of

force) that could surprise the United States and the failure of U.S. efforts to deter the PLA.

In 1999, the Center for Naval Analyses found in a study that U.S. and PRC approaches to military

exchanges were “diametrically opposed,” thus raising tension at times. While the United States

has pursued a “bottom-up” effort starting with lower-level contact to work toward mutual

understanding and then strategic agreement, the PRC has sought a “trickle-down” relationship in

which agreement on strategic issues results in understanding and then allows for specific

activities later. The study said that “the PLA leadership regards the military relationship with the

U.S. as a political undertaking for strategic reasons—not a freestanding set of military initiatives

conducted by military professionals for explicitly military reasons. Fundamentally, the military

relationship is a vehicle to pursue strategic political ends.” While recognizing that using the

military relationship to enhance military modernization is extremely important to the PLA, the

study contended that “it is not the key motive force driving the PLA’s engagement with DOD.”

The report also argued that because the PLA suspects the United States uses the military

relationship for deterrence, intelligence, and influence, “it seems ludicrous for them to expose

their strengths and weaknesses to the world’s ‘sole superpower.’” It noted that using “reciprocity”

as a measure of progress was “sure to lead to disappointment.”54

In August 2011, the Defense Intelligence Officer for East Asia and a former Army Attache in

Beijing wrote about multiple lessons learned that the PRC’s cultural approach to relations or

friendships treats them as tough business negotiations. He warned U.S. officials that “the key is to

conclude all negotiations with a true win-win solution, not the promise of favor in the future.”55

Generals Mark Welsh and Hawk Carlisle, USAF, “Strengthening Understanding and Engagement with China’s Air

Force,” Air & Space Power Journal, January-February 2014.

Michael Pillsbury, “Dangerous Chinese Misperceptions: the Implications for DOD,” 1997.

David Finkelstein and John Unangst, “Engaging DoD: Chinese Perspectives on Military Relations with the United

States,” CNA Corporation, October 1999.

Col. (retired) Frank Miller, “Negotiating with the Chinese,” International Affairs, FAO Association, August 2011.

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After decades of U.S. efforts to engage the PLA, including increasing “habits of cooperation,” the

U.S. military has continued to face challenges in mil-to-mil engagement with the PRC.

Perspectives of the U.S. military and the PLA have remained critically divergent. Contrary to

some expectations in the 1990s, mil-to-mil engagement has failed to deter the PRC from robust,

rapid PLA modernization and what some officials have observed as assertive actions in maritime

areas of dispute. Some participants in the mil-to-mil engagement have observed that the PLA has

reduced the value placed on engaging with the United States, even as the PLA’s modernization,

roles, and interaction in the world increased. The Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Admiral

Mike Mullen, issued strategic guidance for 2011 that placed priority on U.S. security interests in

the Middle East, Afghanistan, and Pakistan. Still, he noted an increased focus on Asia-Pacific in

balancing risks from an “aggressive” North Korea and a “more assertive” China and in defending

international freedom of navigation. Others, however, have noted that China has been assertive in

various cycles over many years. (See the Appendix on confrontations with the U.S. military.)

Even if the PLA has not increased assertive actions, its capabilities and range have improved.

Even on relatively innocuous and cooperative efforts such as the parallel anti-piracy naval

operations in the Gulf of Aden since late 2008, the PLA has not described them as useful for milto-mil engagement or cooperation with the U.S. Navy (at odds with U.S. goals and views). U.S.

engagement with the PLA in anti-piracy included hosting the commander of the PLA Navy’s task

force at the Headquarters of the U.S. 5th Fleet in Bahrain in December 2010. In February 2011,

Admiral Mike Mullen, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, issued the National Military

Strategy in which he stated the goals of a deeper military relationship to “expand areas of mutual

interest and benefit, improve understanding, reduce misperception, and prevent miscalculation”

as well as promotion of “common interests through China’s cooperation in countering piracy and

proliferation of WMD, and using its influence with North Korea to preserve stability on the

Korean peninsula.” However, on March 31, 2011, the PLA issued its 2010 Defense White Paper

which included a new discussion of the PLA Navy’s anti-piracy operation but did not portray this

area as one for U.S.-PRC military cooperation. Indeed, the Defense White Paper did not even

mention contact with the U.S. military in discussing contacts with various foreign navies. In July

2012, the commander of the PLAN’s “naval escort” task force held only an “informal exchange”

in Oman at the “temporary request” of the multinational Combined Task Force (CTF) 151.

At the release of that Defense White Paper, a key researcher of the PLA’s Academy of Military

Science (AMS), Chen Zhou, candidly highlighted a key difference between China and others. He

said that unlike “Western” militaries that seek transparency as the premise for military mutual

trust, the PLA saw trust as the requirement for transparency. He called for first developing

common interests and respecting each other’s strategic interests.56

Recognizing the challenges in cooperation and divergent perspectives with the PLA, the Obama

Administration has tried to apply lessons learned to mil-to-mil engagement with China. While the

United States has sought to build confidence in avoiding crises, the PLA has avoided giving

confidence. On the eve of Secretary Gates’ visit in January 2011, Deputy Assistant Secretary of

Defense Michael Schiffer acknowledged some distance before achieving a deep and real

“strategic understanding” between our two countries. He presented the U.S. view that mil-to-mil

should be a “critical component” of the U.S.-PRC relationship; mil-to-mil should be sustained,

reliable, and continuous; mil-to-mil should not be used as a “reward or favor” or “punishment or

a penalty” to the United States; and mil-to-mil should not be viewed as separate from the overall

Interview in Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily], April 1, 2011.

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bilateral relationship. The U.S. approach sought a framework to institutionalize mil-to-mil and

integration of the PLA into the stated goal of “comprehensive” cooperation with China.57

U.S. Security Interests

With lessons learned, a fundamental issue in overall policy toward China is how to use U.S.

leadership and leverage in pursuing a prudent program of military contacts that advances, and

does not harm, a prioritized list of U.S. security interests. The Pentagon could pursue such a

program with focused control by the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD); with consultation

with Congress and public disclosures; and in coordination with allies and partners, such as Japan,

South Korea, Australia, Singapore, and Taiwan. Such a program might include these objectives.

Communication, Conflict Avoidance, and Crisis Management

Confrontations and Safety

The various crises of direct confrontation between the U.S. military and PLA might call for

greater cooperation with China to improve communication, conflict avoidance, and crisis

management. Given confrontations in the maritime areas (particularly in 2001 and 2009), some

stress that the foremost U.S. interest would be to safeguard the safety of U.S. military personnel.

There are increasing concerns that options pursued thus far still leave critical challenges.

Analysts in China have studied the government’s strengths and weaknesses in crisis management

in light of the EP-3 crisis in 2001.58 Nonetheless, the crisis over the EP-3 aircraft collision and

subsequent confrontations have shown the limits in benefits to the United States of pursuing

personal relationships with PLA leaders, the consultations under the Military Maritime

Consultative Agreement (MMCA), as well as the presidential hotline. From the beginning of the

crisis, PRC ruler Jiang Zemin pressed the United States with a hard-line stance, while PLA

generals followed without any greater inflammatory rhetoric.59

Telephones

During his second visit to China as PACOM Commander in December 1997, Admiral Prueher

said that “I remember wishing I had your telephone number,” in response to a PLA naval officer’s

question about Prueher’s thinking during the Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996.60 After becoming

ambassador to China in December 1999, Prueher was nonetheless frustrated when the Ministry of

Foreign Affairs and the PLA would not answer the phone or return phone calls in the immediate

aftermath of the EP-3 collision crisis in April 2001.61 Personal ties were not useful in crises.62

Author’s consultations; Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for East Asia, “Building Greater Cooperation in the

U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relationship in 2011,” IISS, Washington, DC, January 6, 2011.

Author’s discussions with government-affiliated research organizations in China in 2002.

CRS Report RL30946, China-U.S. Aircraft Collision Incident of April 2001: Assessments and Policy Implications,

by (name redacted) et al.

LTC Frank Miller (U.S. Army), “China Hosts Visit by the U.S. Commander in Chief, Pacific,” Asia Pacific Defense

Forum, Spring 1998. The article ended by saying that “perhaps the most important result of Adm. Prueher’s December

1997 trip to China is that, should there be another crisis like the March 1996 Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis, Adm.

Prueher now has the phone number.”

John Keefe, “Anatomy of the EP-3 Incident, April 2001,” Center for Naval Analyses report, January 2002.

Thomas Henderschedt and Chad Sbragia, “China’s Naval Ambitions,” Armed Forces Journal, September 2010.

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Still, some continue to believe there could be benefits in fostering relationships with PLA

officers, both at the senior level and with younger, future leaders. While in Beijing in January

2004, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Myers, said that “it’s always an

advantage to be able to pick up a telephone and talk to somebody that you know fairly well. The

relationship that I have with General Liang [Chief of General Staff], the relationship that Defense

Secretary Rumsfeld has with his counterpart, General Cao, is going to be helpful in that regard.”63

Likewise, visiting Beijing in September 2005, Admiral William Fallon, PACOM Commander,

hoped for the value for his regional responsibilities to “pick up the telephone and call someone I

already know.”64 During his visit to Beijing in July 2011, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of

Staff, Admiral Michael Mullen, still said he wished that he could “pick up the phone” in a crisis.65

Maritime Disputes and International Freedom of Navigation and Overflight

Much attention has been on the MMCA for resolving tension and preventing crisis or conflict.

The MMCA, initialed at the first DCT in December 1997 and signed by Secretary Cohen in

Beijing in January 1998, only arranged meetings to discuss maritime and air safety (i.e., to talk

about talking). There was no agreement on communication during crises or rules of engagement.

Despite the 2001 crisis, the U.S. military encountered difficulties with the PLA in discussions

under the MMCA, including simply setting up meetings and PLA objections to U.S. activities in

China’s claimed 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) (beyond the territorial sea up

to 12 nautical miles from the coast).66 In spite of the MMCA meetings since the late 1990s, the

U.S. Navy and Air Force have faced challenges to operational safety and freedom of navigation.

The Defense Secretary told Congress in a report in August 2010 that “the United States and China

continue to have differences over the rights of coastal states in their exclusive economic zones,

and the appropriate response to such differences.” It also stressed that “the United States remains

vigilant in its watch for behavior that puts at risk the safety of U.S. soldiers, sailors, airmen, and

marines, or is in clear violation of international norms. The Department will continue to use all

available channels, in particular an invigorated MMCA and Defense Policy Coordination Talks

process, to communicate the U.S. government position on these and other matters to the PLA,

while taking advantage of opportunities for the two sides to discuss practical ways to reduce the

chances for misunderstanding and miscalculation between our armed forces.”67

However, another assessment is that not only have dangerous confrontations occurred despite the

MMCA but that the tension have been based on different national interests rather than any

misperception or misunderstanding. The PLA has tried purposefully to keep U.S. military

operations farther from China and restrict them even beyond the PRC’s territorial seas. The

Defense Secretary reported to Congress in August 2010 that his department did not observe a

resurgence of harassment by PRC fishing vessels of U.S. naval auxiliary ships conducting routine

and lawful military operations beyond the PRC’s territorial seas that occurred in spring 2009.

Still, he warned that such harassment could occur again. Moreover, two months after the

Secretary’s report to Congress, at a meeting of the MMCA in Honolulu in October 2010, the U.S.

military raised concerns to the PLA about several incidents involving unsafe and unprofessional

Jim Garamone, “China, U.S. Making Progress on Military Relations,” AFPS, January 15, 2004.

PACOM, Admiral William J. Fallon, “Roundtable at Embassy PAS Program Room,” Beijing, September 7, 2005.

Fallon also said he consulted “extensively” with retired Admiral Prueher, a former PACOM Commander.

Admiral Michael Mullen, Media Roundtable, Beijing, China, July 10, 2011.

Chris Johnson, “DOD Will Urge China to Conduct Joint Search and Rescue Exercise,” Inside the Navy, March 13,

2006.

Secretary of Defense, “Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC 2010,” August 16, 2010.

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actions by PRC ships as well as aircraft that risked the lives of U.S. sailors and airmen in the

Navy and Air Force. The PLA repeated complaints about U.S. maritime and air reconnaissance by

U.S. ships and planes. Critically, the PLA rejected the possibility of accidents, blaming continued

U.S. operations for any risks, so that another collision would be only the United States’ fault. The

PLA also has limited its primary representation to the PLAN in attending MMCA meetings, while

the U.S. side has interacted with the PLA at a joint level led by PACOM. In 2010, PLA fighters

conducted unusually close intercepts of U.S. military aircraft operating in international airspace,

in addition to harassment by PRC ships of U.S. survey ships operating outside of PRC territorial

seas, reported the Secretary of Defense to Congress in August 2011. The 7th Fleet Commander

said in February 2011 that the PLAN ignored ship-to-ship communication in Asia, even if it made

such contact in anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden (that the PLA calls “escort missions”).68

At other times, the PLA indicated generally that it can understand the escalating dangers of

accidents and collisions. In 2010, General Liang Guanglie (a CMC Member and PRC Defense

Minister) acknowledged the risk of accidents. He used the phrase “an accidental discharge of

gunfire in cleaning a gun” to refer to inadvertent accidents that could lead to military tension.69

On June 29, 2011, Taiwan’s F-16 fighters flew to intercept PLA Air Force Su-27 fighters that

crossed a “median line” for the Taiwan Strait to confront a U.S. reconnaissance aircraft. Then, on

July 22, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton issued a statement that stressed respect for freedom of

navigation as well as overflight in the South China Sea, and three days later, met with PRC State

Councilor Dai Bingguo in Shenzhen and stressed freedom of navigation. In August, the two sides

held an MMCA working group meeting in Qingdao and discussed disputes over the PLA’s

complaints against U.S. reconnaissance flights. Again, there was no MMCA plenary in 2011.

Policy issues include how to reinvigorate the MMCA talks and how to include the actions of the

PLAAF and the PRC’s official maritime law enforcement ships and aircraft that have coordinated

with those of the PLAN and PLAAF.70 The PLAN has shifted ships to maritime law enforcement.

Wall Street Journal, February 21, 2011; and South China Morning Post, Hong Kong, February 22, 2011.

Interview with Defense Minister Liang Guanglie published in Renmin Ribao [People’s Daily], December 29, 2010.

China’s official maritime law enforcement forces previously included China Maritime Surveillance (CMS), under the

Ministry of Land and Resources; Fisheries Law Enforcement Command (FLEC), under the Ministry of Agriculture;

China Coast Guard (CCG), a paramilitary People’s Armed Police (PAP) force under the Ministry of Public Security

(MPS); Maritime Safety Administration (MSA) and China Rescue and Salvage (CRS), under the Ministry of

Transportation; and Anti-Smuggling Maritime Police, under the General Administration of Customs. Although some

analysts attributed rising tension in China’s territorial and maritime disputes to inadequate coordination among PRC

agencies, there have been reported inter-agency coordination and cooperation between the PLA and the maritime

forces. The official ships and aircraft augment the PLA’s naval ships and aircraft to assert China’s claims and control.

For example, On March 4-8, 2009, Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft, a PLAN frigate, PRC patrol and intelligence

collection ships, and trawlers coordinated in increasingly aggressive and dangerous harassment of unarmed U.S. ocean

surveillance ships, the USNS Victorious and USNS Impeccable, during routine operations in international waters in the

Yellow Sea and South China Sea. The civilian ships in involved in the “Impeccable Incident” included those from the

CMS and FLEC, and the U.S. Navy special mission ships defended themselves with non-lethal force. In January 2011,

Wu Shengli, CMC Member and PLAN Commander, spoke at a meeting on the PLAN’s anti-piracy operations in the

Gulf of Aden and referred to “close coordination” between the PLAN and shipping companies, and Ministries of

Foreign Affairs and Transportation. In April 2011, the PLAN held a military-civilian exercise in the South China Sea.

The next month, the Deputy Director of CMS forces referred to facing foreign “naval exercises” in 2010 in the Yellow

Sea. The PLA’s 2010 Defense White Paper of March 2011 asserted coordination and control between the PLA and

other forces. In June 2011, the PLA held an exercise with CMS forces for the first time near Hainan Island. In March

2012, the PRC’s National Administration of Surveying, Mapping, and Geoinformation (NASMG) announced a

working group to coordinate among 13 agencies in geographical surveys to map China’s claims, first in the South

China Sea and then also in the East China Sea (particularly concerning the Spratly and Senkaku Islands). On September

27, the Defense Ministry’s spokesman said that the PLA ties its readiness to cooperating closely with CMS, FLEC, and

(continued...)

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As the PLAN sails farther from China’s coast on long-distance training or operations, the PLAN

could pay more attention to freedom of navigation for its ships as well as foreign ships in a

manner consistent with international law, instead of contradictory stances for PLAN ships and for

foreign ships. The PLAN conducted military activities in the EEZs of other nations without their

permission, including several operations in the U.S. EEZs of Hawaii and Guam in 2012

(including during the RIMPAC 2012 exercise). On November 28 and December 10, 2012, the

official Xinhua agency reported that PLAN ships sailed through straits near Japan’s islands to and

from training in the Western Pacific Ocean, arguing that other countries should respect the PLA’s

freedom of navigation and overflight in accordance with international law. In May 2013, the

PLA’s spokesman acknowledged that submarines may navigate freely in international waters.

Despite its invited participation at RIMPAC 2014, the PLAN again sent an auxiliary general

intelligence (AGI) ship in Hawaii’s EEZ though not in the 12-nm territorial sea. The PLA then

sent an AGI ship to the U.S. EEZ of Guam during the Valiant Shield 2014 exercise.71

PACOM Commander, Admiral Samuel Locklear, testified to the House Armed Services

Committee on March 5, 2013, that there continued to be instances in which the PLA conducted

unsafe or unprofessional maneuvers to impede U.S. forces operating legally in international air

and maritime areas. On July 3, PRC media showed a video of a CMS ship that confronted the

USS Impeccable on June 21 as operating outside its rights, even though it was about 100 miles

from China’s coast in the East China Sea. Later in July, Admiral Locklear said that U.S. and PLA

forces have conducted operations around each other in an increasingly professional manner. Still,

Locklear acknowledged continued disagreement about interpretations of activities in EEZs, while

he argued against nations trying to control EEZs that cover one-third of oceans. Interceptions of

U.S. aircraft have raised concerns, particularly after the PLA’s announcement of an “East China

Sea Air Defense Identification Zone (ADIZ)” in November 2013 and dangerous confrontation

(...continued)

other forces to provide support for the government’s enforcement of laws at sea, fishing, oil and gas development, and

other activities. Indeed, on October 19, ships and aircraft from the PLAN, FLEC, and CMS held an exercise, simulating

actions against foreign ships. On January 19, 2013, a PLAN frigate directed a radar at a Japanese Maritime SelfDefense Force (MSDF) helicopter over the East China Sea. On January 30, another PLAN frigate directed its fire

control radar at a Japanese MSDF destroyer. On February 4, Qi Jianguo, a PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff,

convened a meeting held by the PLA’s GSD and other unnamed government agencies on cooperation in maritime

“struggles” and maritime security. On February 19, the State Oceanic Administration (SOA) and PLAN held a

conference in Beijing (with PLAN Deputy Commander Ding Yiping attending). On March 10, the PRC announced that

the maritime law enforcement forces (other than those under the Ministry of Transportation) would be reorganized as a

new China Coast Guard under the administration of the SOA and the direction of the MPS. A coordinating body, the

State Maritime Committee, would be set up in the reorganization of CMS, PAP, FLEC, and Customs forces into the

China Coast Guard. These developments appeared linked to the reported increased coordination since 2012 by top

leader Xi Jinping, who reportedly has headed a Leading Small Group on Maritime Security. On April 23, over 40

PLAAF fighters, including Su-27 and Su-30 fighters, flew near the Senkaku Islands, while eight CMS ships entered

Japan’s claimed territorial waters around the islands, and Japan scrambled F-15 fighters. A later PRC CCTV report,

apparently reporting on this drill, said that the PLAAF simulated precision strikes against land and maritime targets.

Another CCTV report said that the PLAN’s School for NCOs started training CMS personnel. On May 10, the

Philippines protested to the PRC over the presence of two CMS ships and a PLAN ship near Second Thomas Shoal.

Among other actions, in August 2013, the China Coast Guard started to “patrol” in claimed “territorial waters” around

the North Luconia and South Luconia Reefs, close to Malaysia. On January 26, 2014, PLAN ships “patrolled” James

Shoal (Zengmu) as the “southernmost part of China’s territory,” though it is a submerged reef 50 miles from Malaysia.

In September 2014, the PLAN held the Poseidon-2014 exercise that included support for maritime law enforcement.

Secretary of Defense, “Annual Report to Congress on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC,

2013,” May 2013. At the Shangri-la Dialogue in June, PLA Senior Colonel Zhou Bo said that the PLA Navy has sent

ships to conduct reconnaissance in U.S. EEZs, according to Defense News, June 10, 2013. Also: William Cole,

“Chinese Spy Ship off Hawaii Keeps Track of RIMPAC,” Honolulu Star-Advertiser, July 18, 2014; Erik Slavin,

“Chinese Ship Spies on Valiant Shield, and That’s OK with U.S.,” Stars and Stripes, September 22, 2014.

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with a U.S. Navy P-8 plane over the South China Sea in August 2014. Still, the Commander of

Pacific Air Forces (PACAF), General Hawk Carlisle, said most of such encounters were safe.72

The U.S. military and the PLA could discuss the PRC’s straight baselines drawn around islands,

such as the baselines published for Hainan Island and Paracel Islands in the South China Sea in

May 199673 and the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea in September 2012. In March 2013,

the United States protested to the PRC for its use of straight baselines around the Senkaku Islands

as inconsistent with international law and impinging on the rights, freedoms, and uses of the sea

under the Law of the Sea,74 while not taking a position on the ultimate sovereignty of the islands.

Since the PRC is not an archipelagic country, it is not allowed to draw straight archipelagic

baselines. The U.S. Navy may conduct operations to assert freedom of navigation (FON) to

show that the United States does not recognize claims that are inconsistent with international law.

In the annual report submitted to Congress two months later, the Defense Department criticized

the PRC for using improperly drawn straight baselines around the Senkaku Islands and adding to

the PRC’s network of maritime claims that are inconsistent with international law.

Some progress might have resulted from the U.S. and other foreign pressure on the PLA to stress

safety and prevention of collisions. In September 2012, even as a plenary meeting of the MMCA

was held, the PLAN blocked adoption of a Code for Unalerted Encounters at Sea (CUES) at the

Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) in Malaysia.75 At the WPNS in China in April 2014,

the PLAN and other navies finally approved CUES (changed to Code for Unplanned Encounters

at Sea) to set procedures for safety (e.g., to avoid collisions) and communication at sea. The

CUES stated that navies are expected to comply with the 1972 Convention on the International

Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (COLREGs). PLAN Commander Wu Shengli spoke

to commanders of foreign navies at WPNS and commended the new CUES for preventing

incidents at sea and in the air but did not mention the COLREGS. CMC Vice Chairman, General

Fan Changlong, met with WPNS attendees but did not cite the CUES.76 Issues remain about the

PLAN’s and China Coast Guard’s adherence to the COLREGS, UNCLOS,77 as well as CUES and

how U.S. and foreign militaries respond to PRC violations of international rules of behavior.

In August 2013, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel hosted the PRC Defense Minister, General

Chang Wanquan, and announced agreement with Xi Jinping’s proposal to President Obama at

their summit in June for new Working Groups on notifications of major military activities and

rules of behavior for air and naval activities. Issues included whether to follow the PLA’s mode of

negotiating over “security” rather than safety, and over bilateral, new “codes of conduct,” rather

than adhering to established international laws and rules of behavior. From July to November

2014, the Working Groups met five times to negotiate two Memoranda of Understanding

(MOUs). At a U.S.-PRC summit in Beijing in November 2014, Presidents Obama and Xi Jinping

announced the military-to-military confidence-building measures (CBMs). On November 12, the

two sides issued two MOUs on the Notification of Major Military Activities and Rules of

Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters (expanded from militaries to also coast

Jane’s Defense Weekly, July 10, 2013; Defense Department, news briefing with Admiral Samuel Locklear III, July

11, 2013; Washington Times, July 17, 2013; General Herbert “Hawk” Carlisle, quoted by AP, October 9, 2014.

Department of State, “Straight Baselines Claim: China,” Limits in the Seas, No. 117, July 9, 1996; and years later,

“China: Maritime Claims in the South China Sea,” Limits in the Seas, No. 143, December 5, 2014.

U.S. Navy, “People’s Republic of China,” Maritime Claims Reference Manual (MCRM), April 2013.

Jane’s Defense Weekly, September 28, 2012.

WPNS, CUES, April 22, 2014, Qingdao, China; Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily], April 23 and 24, 2014.

Article 94 of the U.N. Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) stipulates standards for safety at sea.

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guards). The MOU on Rules of Behavior refers to UNCLOS, COLREGs, and CUES, rather than

concluding new binding rules or agreements. The two sides issued an Annex on surface-tosurface encounters but did not complete an annex on air-to-air encounters (expected in 2015). The

MOU does not prejudice either side’s perspective on military activities in the EEZ. The U.S. side

stated that it would prioritize a mechanism for informing the other party of ballistic missile

launches as an annex to the MOU on the Notification of Major Military Activities. U.S. officials

contend that the MOUs offer talks about safety with PLA operational officers and top leaders.78

Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT)

In early 2005, U.S. defense and PLA officials held a Special Policy Dialogue to discuss policy

disputes and end an impasse in talks over safety and operational concerns under the MMCA. The

separate discussions continued in the first Defense Policy Coordination Talks (DPCT) held in

Washington in December 2006. The first combined exercise held under the MMCA, a search and

rescue exercise (SAREX), did not take place until the fall of 2006, after eight years of talks. By

2007, the MMCA’s status and value were in greater doubt, and no MMCA working groups or

plenary meetings took place that year.

On February 25-26, 2008, in Qingdao, PACOM’s Director for Strategic Planning and Policy (J-5),

USMC Major General Thomas Conant, and PLA Navy Deputy Chief of Staff Zhang Leiyu led an

annual meeting under the MMCA, the first since 2006. The PLA sought to amend the MMCA.

The U.S. side opposed PLA proposals to discuss policy differences at the MMCA meetings and to

plan details of future military exercises.79 The PLA and U.S. military have clashed over the PRC’s

disputes with foreign countries over the freedom of navigation in the high seas.

By 2011, the PLA seemed to downgrade the DPCT as merely “working-level” talks between the

U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense and the Director of the PLA’s Foreign Affairs Office.

The practice was at odds with the reaffirmation during Secretary Gates’ visit in early 2011, when

Defense Minister Liang Guanglie agreed that the DCT, DPCT, and MMCA were important talks.

Incidents at Sea (INCSEA) Protocol

For his nomination hearing to be the PACOM Commander on March 8, 2007, Admiral Timothy

Keating answered questions from the Senate Armed Services Committee by claiming that a

dangerous incident similar to the EP-3 crisis would be “less likely.” He also proposed negotiating

with the PLA an “Incidents at Sea” (INCSEA) protocol, like the 1972 one with the Soviet Union.

After the Pentagon reported in March 2009 that PRC ships were aggressively harassing U.S.

ocean surveillance ships (including the USNS Impeccable) in the Yellow Sea and South China

Sea, some observers raised again the issue of whether to agree with the PLA on an INCSEA. For

example, retired Rear Admiral Eric McVaden suggested that an INCSEA could compel China’s

Signed by the U.S. Defense Secretary and PRC Minister of Defense, two Memoranda of Understanding between the

Department of Defense of the United States of America and the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic

of China Regarding the Rules of Behavior for Safety of Air and Maritime Encounters, and on Notification of Major

Military Activities Confidence-Building Measures Mechanism, November 12, 2014. Also see White House, “President

Obama’s Visit to China,” November 11, 2014; and Commander Leah Bray (one of the negotiators), “It’s Time for

Good Behavior,” opinion, Wall Street Journal, December 4, 2014.

Major General Thomas Conant and Rear Admiral Zhang Leiyu, “Summary of Proceedings of the Annual Meeting

Under the Agreement Between the Ministry of National Defense of the People’s Republic of China and the Department

of Defense of the United States of America on Establishing a Consultative Mechanism to Strengthen Military Maritime

Safety,” Qingdao, February 26, 2008.

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top leaders to agree to avoid collisions or escalations of tensions, as well as provide rules and a

safety valve. However, skeptics said that the question was not whether there was an agreement or

dialogue. For example, former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Randy Schriver pointed out

that the MMCA would have been called an INCSEA (but the United States wanted to avoid “Cold

War connotations”) and that the MMCA had limited usefulness because China has more interest

in stopping U.S. reconnaissance than any interest in the agreement that it had signed. Thus, he

contended that the MMCA already has provided the mechanism for dealing with incidents at sea.

The problem has been that the PLA is not interested in a “rules-based, operator-to-operator

approach to safety on the high seas.”80 In early 2011, Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) Gary

Roughead explained another opposition to an INCSEA. Admiral Roughead said that an INCSEA

with only the PLAN would result in a separate and exclusive agreement, set the PLA apart when

all militaries ought to adhere to the same international “rules of the road,” and define the

relationship with the PLA as abnormal, aggressive, and a specter of that with the Soviet Union.81

Hotline, or Defense Telephone Link (DTL)

After staff-level preliminary discussions in 2003, Under Secretary of Defense Douglas Feith

formally proposed a hotline for crisis management and confidence building with the PLA at the

DCT in February 2004. However, the PLA did not give a positive signal until a defense

ministerial conference in Singapore in June 2007, when Lieutenant General (LTG) Zhang

Qinsheng, Deputy Chief of General Staff, said that the PLA would discuss such a hotline. During

Defense Secretary Gates’ visit to China in November 2007, the PLA agreed in principle to set up

a defense telephone link (DTL) with the Pentagon. The two sides signed an agreement in

February 2008. In May 2008, PACOM’s Commander, Admiral Keating, used the hotline in its

first operational use to communicate with PLA Deputy Chief of General Staff Ma Xiaotian about

the U.S. Air Force’s use of two C-17 transports to deliver earthquake relief supplies to Sichuan.

However, during the confrontation in March 2009 when PRC ships aggressively harassed the

U.S. surveillance ships, Secretary Gates told reporters on March 18, 2009, that he did not use the

hotline. Indeed, not until May 2011 did the PLA agree to actually use the DTL, as promised by

visiting Chief of General Staff Chen Bingde, according to Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff

Mullen’s remarks on July 10, 2011. Further, some observers urged PACOM and the Pentagon to

prepare transcripts of all uses of the DTL as records of communication with the PLA. Issues

include whether to use the DTL for regular communication (e.g., about visits), transparency, and

consultations with Congress and U.S. allies about these discussions. The Obama Administration

shifted to use the “hotline” for routine discussions, not only in times of crises. In March 2013,

General Dempsey, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, talked on the phone with General Fang

Fenghui, Chief of General Staff. The next month, Defense Secretary Chuck Hagel spoke on the

phone to General Chang Wanquan, PRC Defense Minister. In May, General Dempsey again

talked on the phone with General Fang. Defense officials have used the DTL at other times. In

May 2014, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey discussed with visiting Chief

of General Staff Fang Fenghui a U.S. proposal to upgrade the DTL to video teleconference.

Air Traffic Control (ATC)

Another area for possible improved communication and prevention of accidents is air traffic

control in China, which is controlled by the PLA Air Force. In December 2006, the PLA suddenly

Quoted in the “Nelson Report,” March 11, 2009.

Quoted in an interview with the Financial Times, January 18, 2011.

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shut down the busy Pudong International Airport near Shanghai and at least three other airports

under the Nanjing Military Region, ostensibly for training.82 In December 2010, PRC media

revealed the establishment of a new national air traffic control system and that it was one of the

high-priority, militarily-significant, and centrally-directed “863 Projects.”

Sanya Initiative and Other Informal Talks

Some believe that more dialogue, even unofficial talks involving U.S. retired senior generals and

admirals or nongovernmental “track two” researchers, could be useful to build understanding and

avoid conflict with the PLA.83 Others question the use of private channels that could undermine

or influence U.S. policies, send mixed messages, and confuse unofficial with official work,

particularly since the PLA would have only ostensibly unofficial representatives. In January 2010,

a delegation from the China Foundation for International and Strategic Studies (CFISS) visited

Washington with a delegation that included PLA major generals and other officers. They got

meetings with Under Secretaries of Defense, the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense

for Asian and Pacific Security Affairs, Deputy Secretary of State, Assistant Secretary of State for

East Asian and Pacific Affairs, and National Security Council officials.84

Even for dealing with possible crises, Admiral Keating revealed in 2007 that he used an unofficial

network of retired Admirals who had commanded PACOM and met with PLA commanders.85 The

PLA has pursued this track, including a visit to Beijing in November 2010 of a group led by

retired PACOM Commander and Admiral Thomas Fargo. Their host, General Li Jinai, a CMC

Member and Director of the GPD, asked the visitors to use their “personal influence” on mil-tomil ties. The China Association for International Friendly Contact (CAIFC) sponsored the group.

In addition, a “Sanya Initiative” (named for the first such informal dialogue at the Sanya resort on

Hainan Island) began in February 2008. Xiong Guangkai (President of the China Institute for

International Strategic Studies and former Deputy Chief of General Staff in charge of

intelligence) led the PLA side. Bill Owens (retired admiral and former Vice Chairman of the Joint

Chiefs of Staff) led the U.S. side. The PLA side asked the U.S. participants to help with PRC

objections to U.S. policies and laws: namely the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), Pentagon’s report

to Congress on PRC Military Power, and legal restrictions on military contacts in the NDAA for

FY2000.86 A second meeting was held on October 16-22, 2009, at PACOM in Honolulu,

Washington, and New York. Despite the unofficial talks, PACOM Commander (Admiral Tim

Keating), Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Admiral Mike Mullen), Vice Chairman of the

Joint Chief of Staff (General James Cartwright), Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn,

Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, and Assistant Secretary of State Kurt Campbell met with the

Sanya group. Afterwards, Bill Owens published an opinion to oppose the TRA as harming the

relationship with China that has rising wealth and influence.87 Observers noted Owen’s business

interests in China as a Managing Director of AEA Investors in Hong Kong. In May 2010, Owens

Bruce Stanley, “China’s Congested Skies,” Wall Street Journal, February 16, 2007.

Michael Swaine (Carnegie Endowment), “Avoiding U.S.-China Military Rivalry,” Diplomat, February 16, 2011.

The National Committee on U.S.-China Relations hosted the Track II Dialogue on Northeast Asian Security.

Forum on “Evolving and Enhancing Military Relations,” George Bush U.S.-China Relations Conference 2007,

Washington, DC, October 24, 2007.

People’s Daily, February 24, 2008; Sanya Initiative, “Key Outcomes and Summary Report,” March 2008; Jennifer

Harper, “Retired U.S. Brass to Defend Chinese Military,” Washington Times, April 4, 2008; CSIS, “A Briefing on the

Sanya Initiative,” June 6, 2008; author’s consultations, March 2009.

Bill Owens, “America Must Start Treating China as a Friend,” Financial Times, November 17, 2009.

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told the press that he was “grieved” by mil-to-mil suspensions over arms sales to Taiwan,

including postponement of another meeting of his Sanya Initiative, when he met with CMC Vice

Chairman Xu Caihou in Beijing.88 Owens and his group went to Beijing for a third round of the

Sanya talks in October 2010, and they met with CMC Member and GPD Director Li Jinai. In

June 2012, Owens led six retired generals and admirals to meet with retired PLA generals

(without Xiong Guangkai) in Annapolis and Washington. They met with Senators Carl Levin and

John McCain of the Senate Armed Services Committee; Representatives Charles Boustany and

Rick Larsen of the U.S.-China Working Group; Assistant Secretary of Defense Mark Lippert and

Lieutenant General (LTG) Terry Wolff; and Assistant Secretary of State Campbell.89

On December 20, 2012, Bill Owens and three retired Generals (Kevin Chilton, Michael Moseley,

and Peter Pace) visited Beijing for another round. They met with CMC Vice Chairman Xu

Qiliang, and CMC Member and GPD Director Zhang Yang. Owens again visited Beijing in June

and December 2013, meeting with GPD Director Zhang Yang.

Civilian Control over PLA and Civil-Military Coordination

Related to the U.S. security interest in preventing inadvertent or predictable conflict or crises with

China, the Obama Administration has sought “comprehensive” engagement and bilateral

dialogues that advance coordination between the PLA and the PRC’s top leadership or its civilian

officials in foreign affairs, including through the structure of the S&ED (as discussed above on

“Options”). Another goal has been the expansion of cooperation in overlapping interests.

As mentioned above, when the PLA declined to host Defense Secretary Gates in 2010, he implied

a divide between the PLA and the top PRC leadership. Then, on July 20, 2010, the United States

and Republic of Korea (ROK) announced combined military exercises in the seas to the west and

east of the ROK, commonly called the Yellow Sea and Sea of Japan, in response to North Korea’s

attack on the South Korean naval ship Cheonan on March 26 that killed 46 sailors. However,

even before the announcement and even though the exercises were not about China, PLA General

Ma Xiaotian on July 1 expressed “opposition” to the expected U.S.-ROK exercises in the Yellow

Sea. A week after that, the Foreign Ministry shifted from “concern” to “opposition” to any foreign

military ships and aircraft entering or flying over the Yellow Sea. The PRC especially objected to

the aircraft carrier USS George Washington joining exercises in the Yellow Sea, even off the coast

of South Korea. Still, while more assertive in its voice on policy, the PLA’s resistance or

opposition might not be a constant or dominant voice in PRC policymaking, as seen in the belated

invitation to Gates for his visit in January 2011. After North Korea again attacked South Korea on

November 23, 2010, launching artillery on Yeonpyeoung Island that killed two South Korean

Marines and even two civilians, the PLA was relatively quiet in public after the U.S. and ROK

announcement the next day that the USS George Washington would exercise with the ROK navy

in the Yellow Sea from November 28 to December 1, as first indicated back in July. Meanwhile,

the PRC Foreign Ministry shifted its stance from “taking note” of the U.S.-ROK exercise to

“opposing” any military action in “China’s” EEZ without China’s permission. Secretary Gates

pointedly asked Hu Jintao about a test of a J-20 stealth fighter conducted during Gates’ visit in

January 2011, and Gates said that Hu seemed surprised when asked about the test. Gates clarified

on June 2 that he did not believe that the PLA was not responsive to PRC leaders. He said that the

PLA did not seem to go out of its way to inform regularly the political leadership.

South China Morning Post, May 23, 2010; Xinhua, May 26, 2010.

“Fostering U.S.-China Military-to-Military Relations,” East West Institute (EWI), New York, June 28, 2012.

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In the two U.S.-PRC Joint Statements of November 2009 and January 2011, top PRC leader Hu

Jintao agreed to state with President Obama that “China welcomes the United States as an AsiaPacific nation that contributes to peace, stability, and prosperity in the region.” In contrast, the

PLA in March 2011 issued the 2010 Defense White Paper that did not include that sentiment but

did print implied and explicit criticism of the United States. The Joint Statement of January 2011

did not note a “strategic dialogue” that Gates proposed earlier that month during his visit.

However, questions were not new about the PLA’s actions separate from top PRC policymaking.

A more crucial concern about Hu Jintao’s command of the PLA already was raised after the

summit in April 2006 at which he discussed with President Bush about starting a strategic nuclear

dialogue, but the Commander of the PLA Second Artillery has declined to visit. Then, in January

2007, the PLA conducted its first successful, direct-ascent anti-satellite (ASAT) weapon test, but

the Foreign Ministry remained silent to the world about it for 12 days.90 There could have been a

division of labor where PLA and CPC leaderships pursued parallel relationships with foreign

countries, not only with the United States. For example, in May 2003, PLA General Cao

Gangchuan (a CMC Vice Chairman and Defense Minister) and PRC President Hu Jintao

simultaneously visited Moscow, Russia, but PRC media reported their visits separately with no

joint meetings. There could have been a lack of coordination between the PLA and civilian

officials in the weaker Foreign Ministry, though the CMC Chairman and CPC General-Secretary

remained in ultimate control of the PLA. Moreover, the PRC’s priority programs for military

modernization, including ASAT weapons, have existed for many years and have been coordinated

and controlled by a top-level military-civilian Central Special Committee (CSC) in line with the

PRC’s long-standing stress on “Military-Civilian Integration.”91 Another assessment focused on

the lack of military-civilian coordination at the lower levels, especially on foreign policy.92 In any

case, by 2010, U.S. officials noted the PLA’s stronger voice and capabilities, raising concern

about the PLA’s influence on China’s adherence to established international laws and norms.

The PLA can coordinate with civilian authorities when it chooses to do so. In March 2009, PRC

Y-12 maritime surveillance aircraft, a PLAN frigate, PRC patrol and intelligence collection ships,

and trawlers coordinated in increasingly aggressive and dangerous harassment of unarmed U.S.

ocean surveillance ships, the USNS Victorious and USNS Impeccable, during routine operations

in international waters in the Yellow Sea and South China Sea. In January 2011, Wu Shengli,

CMC Member and PLAN Commander, spoke at a meeting on the PLAN’s “escort” mission (vs.

U.S. counter-piracy operations) in the Gulf of Aden and referred to “close coordination” between

the PLAN and shipping companies, and Ministries of Foreign Affairs and Transportation. In

another example, in April 2011, the PLAN held a military-civilian exercise in the South China

Sea. The next month, the Deputy Director of the civilian China Marine Surveillance (CMS)

forces referred to facing foreign “naval exercises” in 2010 in the Yellow Sea.93 The Defense

White Paper of March 2011 noted coordination and control between the PLA and other agencies.

Secretary of State Clinton gave a speech on April 10, 2012, stressing that “China is not the Soviet

Union,” “we are not on the brink of a new Cold War in Asia,” and “this is not 1912 when friction

between a declining Britain and a rising Germany set the stage for global conflict.” Apparently

See CRS Report RS22652, China’s Anti-Satellite Weapon Test, by (name redacted).

Tai Ming Cheung, Fortifying China (Cornell University Press, 2009); Trefor Moss, “Rumours of PLA Dissent Are

Greatly Exaggerated,” Jane’s Defence Weekly, February 23, 2011. A PRC researcher close to the PLA conceded the

need for improved coordination in foreign policy to manage crises, Zhang Tuosheng, in Shijie Zhishi in January 2011.

Michael Swaine, “China’s Assertive Behavior; Part Three: The Role of the Military in Foreign Policy,” China

Leadership Monitor, Winter 2011.

Jiefangjun Bao, January 15, 2011; “Military Report,” CCTV-7, April 23, 2011; China Daily, May 2, 2011.

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U.S.-China Military Contacts: Issues for Congress

responding positively at the S&ED on May 3 in Beijing, PRC leader Hu Jintao called for a “new

type of great power relationship” that is reassuring to both countries and to others. General Liang

Guanglie, as the Defense Minister, visited the United States on May 4-10, where he echoed Hu by

saying that “China and the United States should build a new type of state-to-state relationship that

is not in the stereotype that the two major powers are predestined to engage into confrontation or

conflict.” The PLA supports a positive tone for U.S.-PRC ties, in line with top CPC leaders.

Unlike Hu’s visit to Moscow 10 years before, Xi Jinping visited in March 2013 and Defense

Minister Chang Wanquan joined him, at least in a military meeting. However, that change could

have been because Xi paid the first visit by a PRC head of state to the Russian Defense Ministry.

Transparency, Reciprocity, and Information-Exchange

Critics of military exchanges with China have charged that the United States gained limited

information about the PLA, while granting greater access to the PLA than the access we received.

A related question in the debate has concerned the extent to which the issues of reciprocity and

transparency should affect or impede efforts to increase mutual understanding with the PLA.

According to the Pentagon’s report to Congress of January 2001, in 1998, the PLA denied

requests by the Chief of Staff of the Air Force (CSAF) to fly in an SU-27 fighter, see integration

of the SU-27s into units, and learn about development of the F-10 fighter. Also in 1998, the PLA

denied the Defense Secretary’s request to visit China’s National Command Center. Still, the PLA

requested access to U.S. exercises showing warfighting capabilities, with two cases of U.S. denial

in 1999: PLA requests to send observers to the U.S. Army’s National Training Center (NTC) at

Fort Irwin, CA, and to the Red Flag air combat training exercise at Nellis Air Force Base, NV.

Regarding controversial access to the U.S. Army’s NTC, visits by the PLA in the 1990s included

those in November 1994 and December 1997.94 Then, in December 1998, the Army reportedly

resisted a PLA request for greater, unprecedented access to the NTC in 1999, because the PLA

asked for access greater than that granted to other countries, the PLA would gain information to

enhance its warfighting, and the PLA was unlikely to reciprocate with similar access for the U.S.

military. The PLA wanted to observe, with direct access, the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized)

and the 82nd Airborne Division in a training exercise. Army officials reportedly felt pressured by

Admiral Prueher at PACOM and Secretary Cohen to grant the request. In the end, the Pentagon

announced on March 17, 1999, that it denied the PLA’s request.95

The Defense Department’s 2003 report to Congress on PRC military power charged that “since

the 1980s, U.S. military exchange delegations to China have been shown only ‘showcase’ units,

never any advanced units or any operational training or realistic exercises.”96 However, a Rand

study in 2004 argued that the DOD’s statement “appears to be inaccurate.” Rand reported that

between 1993 and 1999, U.S. visitors went to 51 PLA units. (PLA delegations visited 71 U.S.

military units between 1994 and 1999.) The report recommended that “the best way of dealing

with the reciprocity and transparency issue is to remove it as an issue.” It called for proper

planning and a focus on educational exchanges.97 Still, reciprocal exchanges at military

The PLA’s visit to the NTC in November 1994 was not the first time that the PLA observed U.S. military training at

Fort Irwin. In August 1985, the United States allowed the PLA to observe military training at Fort Benning, GA; Fort

Bragg, NC; and Fort Irwin, CA. See Colonel Jer Donald Get, “What’s With the Relationship Between America’s Army

and China’s PLA?” Army War College monograph, September 15, 1996.

Sean Naylor, “Chinese Denied Full Access to the NTC,” Army Times, March 29, 1999.

Department of Defense, “Report on PRC Military Power,” July 2003.

Kevin Pollpeter, “U.S. China Security Management: Assessing the Military-to-Military Relationship,” RAND

(continued...)

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educational institutions has been challenged by the PLA’s separation of foreign military and PLA

students, with foreign students grouped in their own classes and facilities, while U.S. schools

tended to integrate U.S. and foreign students. It was not until March 2009, that the PLA

reportedly started to follow international practice to mix foreign and PLA students in the same

class, at the Air Force Command College of the PLAAF.98

In 2005, the PRC did not allow U.S. forces to observe the major combined PLA-Russian military

exercise, “Peace Mission 2005,” and prohibited U.S. participation in the multilateral humanitarian

exercise in Hong Kong, in which U.S. forces had joined for years in the past.99 Still, PACOM

Commander, Admiral Fallon, invited PLA observers to the U.S. “Valiant Shield” exercise that

brought three aircraft carriers to waters off Guam in June 2006. In August 2007, U.S. observers

were not invited to monitor the PRC-Russian combined exercise “Peace Mission 2007.”

Nonetheless, U.S. participants in contacts with the PLA have reported gaining insights into PLA

capabilities and concepts. The record of military contacts since 1993 (in the Appendix of this

report) showed some instances when the PLA allowed U.S. officials to be first-time foreign

visitors with first-time “unprecedented access.” These examples included the following:

•

Satellite Control Center in Xian (1995)

Guangzhou Military Region headquarters (1997)

Beijing Military Region’s Air Defense Command Center (1998)

47th Group Army (1998)

Armored Force Engineering Academy (2000)

Training base in Inner Mongolia (2003), with multinational access

Zhanjiang, homeport of the PLAN’s South Sea Fleet (2003)

Beijing Aerospace Control Center (2004)

2nd Artillery (missile corps) headquarters (2005)

39th Group Army (2006)

FB-7 fighter at 28th Air Division (2006)

Su-27 fighter and T-99 tank (2007)

Jining Air Force Base (2007)

Song-class submarine and Luzhou-class destroyer (2007)

CSS-7 (M-11) short-range ballistic missile and Yuan-class submarine (2011)

GZMR’s 121st Infantry Division of the 41st Group Army (2012)

Aircraft carrier (Liaoning) at Qingdao (2014).

Tension Reduction over Taiwan

There have been concerns about the PRC’s growing threat to Taiwan’s security since the early

1990s. In April 2004, Assistant Secretary of State James Kelly testified to Congress that U.S.

(...continued)

Corporation, 2004.

Jiefangjun Bao [Liberation Army Daily], July 16, 2010.

Assistant Secretary of Defense Peter Rodman, remarks to the U.S.-China Economic and Security Review

Commission, March 16, 2006.

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efforts at deterring China’s coercion “might fail” if Beijing becomes convinced that it must stop

Taiwan from advancing on a course toward permanent separation from China.100 Kelly also noted

that the PRC leadership accelerated the PLA buildup after 1999. The Pentagon reported to

Congress in May 2004 that the PLA has “accelerated” modernization, including a missile buildup,

in response to concerns about Taiwan.101

Under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, that has governed U.S. policy toward Taiwan

since 1979, Congress has oversight of the President’s management of the cross-strait situation

under the rubric of the “one China” policy.102 While considering contacts with the PLA, the

United States, after the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis, has increased arms sales to and ties with

Taiwan’s military.103 Policy considerations include offering arms sales and cooperation to help

Taiwan’s self-defense; securing leverage over Beijing and Taipei; deterring aggression or

coercion; discouraging provocations from Beijing or Taipei; and supporting cross-strait dialogue

and confidence-building measures (CBMs). In educational exchanges with the PLA, questions

have concerned whether to allow PLA officers to attend U.S. military academies, colleges, or

universities, and how that change could affect attendees from Taiwan’s military; and whether to

allow attendees from Taiwan at PACOM’s Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS).

Concerning the APCSS courses in

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