Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors

Order Code RL32021

CRS Report for Congress

Received through the CRS Web

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):

FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance

for Colombia and Neighbors

Updated January 31, 2004

(name redacted)

Specialist in Latin American Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

(name redacted)

Analyst in Latin American Affairs

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):

FY2003 Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance

for Colombia and Neighbors

Summary

In 2003, Congress considered President Bush’s requests for FY2004 and

FY2003 supplemental assistance for Colombia and six regional neighbors in a

continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) launched in 2001. ARI was

proposed as an expansion of support for Plan Colombia, under the Clinton

Administration, with more funding for social and economic development programs

for Colombia and its neighbors, who are affected by Colombia’s struggle against

guerrillas and drug traffickers. From FY2000 through FY2003, Colombia and other

ARI recipients have received more than $3 billion in U.S. funding.

In early 2003, an FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental bill (H.Rept. 10876/P.L. 108-11) provided $105 million in additional assistance for the Andean

Counterdrug Initiative and related programs. This included $34 million for the State

Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account, $34

million for the Department of Defense’s Drug Interdiction and Counter-Drug

Activities account, and $37.1 million in Foreign Military Financing Program funds.

The President submitted his FY2004 budget request to Congress on February

3, 2003, including $990.7 million for countries comprising the Andean Regional

Initiative, including military funding for Colombia. Of the $990.7 million requested,

$731 million is for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $133.5 million for the Foreign

Military Financing Program, with the remainder of the overall figure in development,

economic, and health programs.

The House passed H.R. 2800, (H.Rept. 108-222) the FY2004 Foreign

Operations Appropriations Bill, on July 23, 2003, fully funding the President’s

request for $731 million for ACI. The Senate passed S. 1426 (S.Rept.108-106) on

October 24, 2003, providing $660 million for ACI, with authority to transfer an

additional $37 million from the State Department’s International Narcotics Control

and Law Enforcement (INCLE) account to ACI. The conference report (H.R.

2673/H.Rept. 108-401), passed by the House on December 8, 2003, and the Senate

on January 22, 2004, provides $731 million. (P.L. 108-199 signed January 23, 2004.)

Both the House and Senate passed the FY2003-FY2004 Foreign Relations

Authorization Act (H.R. 1950/S. 925), with provisions relating to Colombia and drug

interdiction programs in the Andean region. The Senate Foreign Relations

Committee reported out the FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization Act (S.

1161/S.Rept.108-56) with several modifications on assistance to Colombia and the

Andean region. Congress completed the FY2004 National Defense Authorization

Act, (P.L. 108-136) providing authorization for drug interdiction and counterdrug

activities for DOD programs. It also passed the FY2004 Intelligence Authorization

Act (P.L. 108-177) authorizing continuing counterdrug and counterterrorism

activities. This report will not be updated.

Contents

President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Past Requests and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

FY2002 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

FY2003 Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Administration Requests in 2003 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

FY2004 Funding Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Pastrana Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Uribe Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Coca Cultivation and Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

U.S. Policy Debate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13

Funding and Requests for Colombia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17

Funding and Requests for Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19

Funding and Requests for Bolivia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

Funding and Requests for Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23

Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Funding and Requests for Brazil . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25

Funding and Requests for Venezuela . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27

Funding and Requests for Panama . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28

Major Legislative Activity in 2003 on Andean Regional Initiative Issues . . . . . 29

FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Conference Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

FY2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32

Conference Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35

FY2004-FY2005 Foreign Relations Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39

FY2004 National Defense Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Conference Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

FY2004 Intelligence Authorization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

House Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Senate Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41

Conference Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Temporary Protected Status Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional Initiative Countries . . . . . . . . . . 43

Appendix B. FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44

Appendix C. FY2003 Andean Regional Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45

Appendix D. FY2004 Andean Regional Initiative . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2003

Supplemental and FY2004 Assistance

for Colombia and Neighbors

In 2003,1 Congress considered President Bush’s requests for FY2003

supplemental and FY2004 funding for Colombia and six regional neighbors in a

continuation of the Andean Regional Initiative that was launched in 2001.2 The

region has been viewed as important primarily because it produces virtually all of

the world’s cocaine and increasing amounts of heroin. Moreover, the stability of

Colombia and the region is threatened by Colombia’s longstanding guerrilla

insurgency and rightist paramilitary groups, which are both believed to be largely

funded by their participation in illegal narcotics cultivation and trade.

President Bush’s Andean Regional Initiative

Past Requests and Congressional Action

FY2002 Request. The Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) was launched in

April 2001, when the Bush Administration requested $882.29 million in FY2002

economic and counternarcotics assistance, as well as an extension of trade

preferences and other measures, for Colombia and six regional neighbors (Peru,

Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Panama, and Venezuela). Of this amount, $731 million

was designated as International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE)

assistance in a line item in the budget request known as the Andean Counterdrug

Initiative (ACI). A central element of the program was the training and equipping

of counternarcotics battalions in Colombia.

1

This report on 2003 action draws heavily from CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional

Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and

Neighbors, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), which covers congressional action in

2002. See also CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002

Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by (name redacted) and (name redacted), which

provides more background on the ARI and covers congressional action in 2001.

2

The U.S. program to provide anti-narcotics assistance to Colombia and its neighbors was

called the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI) from 2001 until 2003. ARI encompassed the

previous “Andean Counterdrug Initiative” (ACI) as well as other assistance programs such

as development assistance, child survival and health, economic support funds, and Foreign

Military Financing. For FY2004, the budget request returned to the usage of Andean

Counterdrug Initiative, with other funding that previously was part of ARI requested from

their regular accounts.

CRS-2

According to the Administration, the distinctive features of the program,

compared to Plan Colombia assistance approved in 2000,3 were that a larger portion

of the assistance was directed at economic and social programs, and that more than

half of the assistance was directed at regional countries experiencing the spill-over

effects of illicit drug and insurgency activities.

In a mid-May 2001 briefing on the Andean Regional Initiative, Administration

spokesmen set out three overarching goals for the region that could be called the

three D’s — democracy, development, and drugs. The first goal was to promote

democracy and democratic institutions by supporting judicial reform, anti-corruption

measures, human rights improvement, and the peace process in Colombia. The

second was to foster sustainable economic development and trade liberalization

through alternative economic development, environmental protection, and renewal

of the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA). The third was to significantly reduce

the supply of illegal drugs to the United States from the source through eradication,

interdiction and other efforts.4 Under consideration by the Congress in 2001, critics

of the initiative argued that it overemphasized military and counter-drug assistance,

and provided inadequate support for human rights and the peace process in

Colombia. Supporters argued that it continued needed assistance to Colombia, while

providing more support for regional neighbors and social and economic programs.

By the end of 2001, the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriation Act (H.R.

2506/P.L. 107-115) provided a total of $782.82 million for the ARI of which $625

million was designated for the ACI, a reduction of $106 million from the President’s

request. It further allowed for the transfer of an additional $35 million from the State

Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement account to the

ACI.5

FY2002 Emergency Supplemental Request. On March 21, 2002, the

Administration proposed an Emergency FY2002 Supplemental for counter-terrorism

purposes that included a request for $4 million of State Department international

narcotics control (INCLE) funding for Colombia police post support, $6 million of

FMF funding for Colombia and $3 million for Ecuador for counter-terrorism

3

“Plan Colombia” refers to the $1.3 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental

appropriations approved by the 106th Congress in the FY2001 Military Construction

Appropriations bill (H.R. 4425/P.L. 106-246) for counternarcotics and related efforts in

Colombia and neighboring countries. There was no limitation on the fiscal year in which

the funding could be obligated or spent; see Appendix C for a chart on the obligation of this

and other funding to Colombia in FY2000 and FY2001. For more detail, see CRS Report

RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001). For

the latest figures on aid to Colombia, as well as past assistance, see CRS Report RS21213,

Colombia: Summary and Tables on U.S. Assistance, FY1989-FY2003.

4

See U.S. Department of State International Information Programs Washington File, Fact

Sheet: U.S. Policy Toward the Andean Region, and Transcript: State Department Briefing

on Andean Regional Initiative, May 17, 2001, also available online at the following website:

[http://usinfo.state.gov/regional/ar/colombia/].

5

For more detail, see CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002

Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

CRS-3

equipment and training, and $25 million for counter-kidnapping training in

Colombia. Also included in the submission were requests to broaden the authorities

of the Defense and State Departments to utilize FY2002 and FY2003 assistance and

unexpended Plan Colombia assistance to support the Colombian government’s

“unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, terrorist activities, and other threats

to its national security.” Congress fully funded the President’s request for Colombia,

with various human rights conditions, and it granted broader authority to pursue new

activities in Colombia, but with modifications that blended the House and Senate

provisions. The measure provided identical authority for the use of INCLE and

Department of Defense (DOD) funds, including prior year funds, to support “a

unified campaign against narcotics trafficking, against activities by organizations

designated as terrorist organizations” such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC, “and to

take actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency circumstances,

including undertaking rescue operations.” Legislators approved the FY2002

Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act (H.R. 4775) in late July 2002, and the

President signed it into law (P.L. 107-206) on August 2, 2002.6

Extension of Andean Trade Preference Act. In April 2001, President

Bush requested the extension and broadening of the Andean Trade Preferences Act

(ATPA) expiring in December 2001, that would give duty free or reduced-rate

treatment to the products of Bolivia, Peru, Ecuador and Colombia. Following

committee action in late 2001 in both houses, and extensive negotiations in mid2002, Congress completed action on the President’s request. Following lengthy

debate in July 2002, the Trade Act of 2002 was signed into law (P.L. 107-210) on

August 6, 2002. Title XXXI of the act, entitled the Andean Trade Promotion and

Drug Eradication Act, extended preferential tariff treatment to designated Andean

countries through December 31, 2006, and broadened coverage to include products

previously excluded.7

FY2003 Request. On February 4, 2002, President Bush submitted a FY2003

budget request of $979.8 million for the Andean Regional Initiative (ARI), with $731

million in counternarcotics assistance under the Andean Counterdrug Initiative

(ACI). This request included $537 million in ARI funding for Colombia, with $439

million in ACI funding and $98 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to train

and equip a Colombian army brigade to protect an oil pipeline in northeastern

Colombia.

By the end of 2002, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees

reported their versions of an FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill, but this

and other appropriations bills had not been enacted. Congress incorporated the 11

unfinished bills into an omnibus spending package, H.J.Res. 2 (for continuing

appropriations). The House passed H.J.Res 2 on January 8, 2003, and the Senate

followed suit on January 28, 2003. Both chambers approved the conference report

6

For more detail, see CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002

Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by (name redacted) and

(name redacted).

7

For more information, see CRS Report RL30790, The Andean Trade Preference Act:

Background and Issues for Reauthorization, by (name redacted).

CRS-4

(H.Rept. 108-10) on February 13, 2003, and the measure was signed into law (P.L.

108-7) on February 20, 2003.8

Provisions relating to the Andean Regional Initiative and Colombia included

both funding and reporting requirements. Overall ARI funding totaled $835.5

million. Of that amount, Congress provided $700 million for the Andean

Counterdrug Initiative, a reduction of $31 million from the President’s request.

However, the conference agreement allowed for the authority to transfer up to $31

million from the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law

Enforcement account to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. The conference

agreement provided that up to $93 million in Foreign Military Financing funds may

be transferred to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative for helicopters, training and other

assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces for security of the Caño Limón Coveñas

pipeline, a reduction of $5 million from the President’s request. The agreement also

included a number of conditions and reporting requirements.

8

!

Expanded Authorities. Following the pattern of the FY2002

supplemental, Congress provided authority for a unified campaign

against narcotics trafficking, terrorist organizations and to take

actions to protect health and human welfare. This was done, the

Conference Report notes, in recognition that “the narcotics industry

is linked to the terrorist groups, including the paramilitary

organizations in Colombia.” However, the Conference Report also

warned that this authority “is not a signal...for the United States to

become more deeply involved in assisting the Colombian Armed

Forces in fighting the terrorist groups, especially not at the expense

of the counternarcotics program, but to provide the means for more

effective intelligence gathering and fusion, and to provide the

flexibility to the Department of State when the distinction between

counternarcotics and counterterrorism is not clear cut.” Expanded

authorities would end if the Secretary of State has credible evidence

that the Colombian military is not “conducting vigorous operations

to restore government authority and human rights in areas under the

effective control of paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.” The

Report also calls for the Secretary of State to report, within 90 days

of enactment, the changes in policy, including new procedures and

operations, as a result of implementing expanded authorities.

!

Caps on Personnel. Congress maintained the existing caps on

military personnel and civilian contractors that can be assigned to

duty in Colombia at 400 each, with exceptions for search and rescue

operations. This cap applies to U.S. personnel in Colombia “in

support of Plan Colombia,” but does not include U.S. personnel

assigned as part of their regular duties to the U.S. Embassy. As of

late November, there were 278 temporary and permanent U.S.

For more detail, see CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002

Supplemental and FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by (name redacted) and

(name redacted), which tracks the legislative activity and the provisions of this act.

CRS-5

military personnel and 373 U.S. citizen civilian contractors in

Colombia in support of Plan Colombia. These numbers vary as

programs are begun, expanded, or completed. During 2003, they

have varied between 208 and 396 military personnel and 247 to 400

civilian contractors. The U.S. civilian contractor number was 400

on November 18 but was reduced to 373 the following day due to

departures. During November, there were about 600 foreign

national contractors present in Colombia who are not covered by the

personnel caps, most of whom were Colombian nationals.

!

Human Rights. Section 564 allows for the distribution of 75% of

the funds for Colombia’s military, after which the Secretary of State

must certify that Colombian members of the armed forces alleged to

have committed human rights violations are being suspended,

prosecuted, and punished, and that the Colombian military is

severing ties with and apprehending leaders of paramilitary

organizations. Such a certification by the Secretary would release

12.5% of assistance to the Colombian military. The remaining

12.5% would be available after July 31, 2003, if the Secretary

certifies that the Colombian military is continuing to meet its

obligations required in the first certification and trying to gain

authority and protect human rights in areas under control of

paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. On July 8, 2003, the

Secretary issued the first certification which released approximately

$30 million. As of November, the second certification was reported

to be near completion. Congress also maintained a prohibition on

the issuance of visas to any alien who the Secretary of State

determines has willfully provided support to the FARC, ELN, or

AUC, or has participated or ordered the commission of gross

violations of human rights.

!

Aerial Fumigation. The Secretary of State is required to certify that

aerial fumigation of drug crops is occurring within a series of

guidelines for health, environment, compensation for those unjustly

sprayed, and availability of alternative development programs

“where security permits.” Until such a report is issued, 80% of

funding for herbicides is withheld. The conference report (H.Rept.

108-10) states that Congress expects that “every reasonable

precaution will be taken in the aerial fumigation program to ensure

that the exposure to humans and the environment in Colombia meets

Environmental Protection Agency standards for comparable use in

the United States.” According to the State Department, this report

will be issued soon.

!

Helicopters. Language is also maintained from previous legislation

which requires the return of any helicopters procured with ACI funds

that are used to aid or abet the operations of any illegal self-defense

organizations.

CRS-6

!

Air-Bridge Denial Program. Following the shooting down of an

airplane in Peru on April 20, 2001, which was found not to be

associated with drug trafficking and which resulted in the deaths of

several individuals, including two American missionaries, Congress

maintained language prohibiting the resumption of U.S. support for

a Peruvian air interdiction program. In order to resume U.S. support,

the Secretary of State and the Director of Central Intelligence must

certify to Congress, 30 days prior to any resumption of U.S.

involvement, that the ability of the Peruvian Air Force to shoot down

aircraft will include enhanced safeguards and procedures to prevent

similar accidents. The United States and Colombia announced the

resumption of the program in August of this year after an agreement

was reached on protocols to ensure against accidental shootdowns.

Administration Requests in 2003

FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental Aid. On March 25, 2003,

the Bush Administration requested some $75 billion to provide funds to “cover

military operations, relief and reconstruction activities in Iraq, ongoing operations in

the global war on terrorism, enhancements to the safety of U.S. diplomats and

citizens abroad, support for U.S. allies in the war, and homeland security protection

and response measures.” Of the total amount, the Administration requested $34

million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $34 million in Department of Defense

Drug Interdiction and Counter-drug Activities in Colombia, and an unspecified

portion of $2.059 billion in Foreign Military Financing for 19 countries, one being

Colombia.

FY2004 Funding Request. On February 3, 2003, President Bush requested

$990.7 million for the Andean Regional Initiative countries in the accounts

comprising ARI funding, including military funding for Colombia. The

Administration made its request under the title of “Andean Counterdrug Initiative”

(ACI) with no reference to Andean Regional Initiative (ARI). ACI funding forms

part of the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement

(INCLE) account while ARI has included ACI plus development aid, child survival

and health aid, and foreign military financing. For comparative purposes, a

distinction between ACI and ARI is maintained in this report. For ACI, $731 million

was requested, to be distributed as follows in descending order:

!

!

Colombia: $463 million, consisting of $150 million for alternative

development, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and

$313 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication programs.

The overall request also includes $110 million in FMF funding, and

$1.6 million in International Military Education and Training

(IMET) funds.

Peru: $116 million, consisting of $50 million for alternative

development, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and

$66 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication programs. The

overall request also includes $2.5 million in FMF funding, and

$700,000 in IMET funds.

CRS-7

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Bolivia: $91 million, consisting of $42 million for alternative

development, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and

$49 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication programs. The

overall request also includes $4 million in FMF funding, and

$900,000 in IMET funds.

Ecuador: $35 million, consisting of $15 million for alternative

development, humanitarian assistance and institution building, and

$20 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication programs. The

overall request also includes $15 million in FMF funding, and

$650,000 in IMET funds.

Brazil: $12 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law enforcement

programs, and $500,000 in IMET funds.

Panama: $9 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law

enforcement programs. The overall request also includes $2.5

million in FMF funding, and $200,000 in IMET funds.

Venezuela: $5 million, all in narcotics interdiction and law

enforcement programs, and $700,000 in IMET funds.

FMF for Colombia is intended to “support counter-terrorism operations and

protect key infrastructure such as the oil pipeline,” according to the request. The

funding is proposed to provide training, weapons, and night vision goggles and

communications equipment to the Army’s elite mobile brigades and the Special

Forces brigade, as well as to support the Colombian Navy and Air Force, including

the provision of interdiction boats, training and infrastructure improvements, the

purchase of two additional AC-47 gunships and a C-130 support plan that will

procure four C-130e aircraft and maintenance support. The request also noted that

FY2004 FMF funding will continue to provide munitions, equipment, and training

for the 5th and 18th Colombian Army Brigades, tasked with protecting the CañoLimón Coveñas oil pipeline.

Other requested assistance included $47.8 million in Development Aid for

Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, Panama, and Peru, $43.4 million in Child Survival and

Health programs for Bolivia, Brazil, Ecuador, and Peru, and $35 million in Economic

Support funds for democratic institution building and economic growth programs in,

Bolivia, Ecuador, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The request also included $21

million for Migration and Refugee Assistance for the Western Hemisphere, an

unspecified portion of which is assistance for Internally Displaced Persons (IDP) in

Colombia. Further, the State Department estimates that it will spend some $45

million in Colombia from the central State Department Air Wing Account.

In addition to International Affairs accounts, the Administration requested

$817.4 million in Department of Defense (DOD) counternarcotics funds for

worldwide programs. The Defense Department does not provide country

breakdowns of the requested amount. As in previous years, it requested a lump sum

for all counternarcotic programs worldwide under Sections 1004 and 1033, and under

Section 124, which provides DOD with the lead role in detection and monitoring

programs. The Defense Department can reallocate these funds throughout the year

in accordance with changing needs. In FY2000, DOD allocated $128.5 million in

addition to the $300 million appropriated under Plan Colombia legislation (P.L. 106-

CRS-8

246). In FY2001, DOD allocated 190.2 million, $119.1 million in FY2002, $165

million in FY2003, and is proposing to spend $122 million in FY2004.

Situation in Colombia and Neighboring Countries

The Andean Regional Initiative was designed to provide assistance to seven

countries in the broadly defined Andean region9: Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador,

Panama, Peru, and Venezuela. The ARI built on the Clinton Administration’s 2000

“Plan Colombia” legislation, which sought to address the increasing cultivation of

coca and heroin crops in Colombia through the creation of a Colombian Army

counternarcotics brigade, and sharply increased assistance for eradication and

alternative development programs in the country’s two southern provinces of

Putumayo and Caquetá, the region where illegal coca production and a leftist

guerrilla presence was expanding most rapidly. The ARI expanded assistance to help

counter possible spill-over effects in six nearby countries: Peru and Bolivia, where

past successes in reducing cocaine production could be threatened by expected

progress in eradicating crops in Colombia; Ecuador, the most exposed neighbor

because of its border with Colombia’s Putumayo province; and Brazil, Venezuela

and Panama, where the threat is primarily confined to common border areas with

Colombia.

The region is important to the United States because it includes the three major

drug producing countries (Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru) where virtually all the

world’s cocaine and 60% of the heroin seized in the United States are produced. It

also includes two major oil producing countries (Venezuela and Ecuador), members

of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), which supply

significant quantities of oil to the United States. While the designated countries have

diverse trading relationships, the United States is the major trading partner by far for

all of them. For the five traditional Andean countries (Colombia, Venezuela,

Ecuador, Peru, and Bolivia), the Andes mountain range that runs through South

America poses geographical obstacles to intra-state and inter-state integration, but the

countries are linked together in the Andean Community economic integration pact.

The ARI countries are some of the most heavily populated in Latin America,

including the first (Brazil), third (Colombia), fifth (Peru), sixth (Venezuela), and

eighth (Ecuador) most populous. Although Colombia and Venezuela have largely

European-Indian mixed race (mestizo) populations, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador have

significant Amerindian indigenous populations.

9

Panama and Brazil are not normally considered to be part of the Andean region; Bolivia

is an Andean country but it does not share a border with Colombia.

CRS-9

Colombia

Colombia’s spacious and rugged territory, whose western half is transversed by

three parallel mountain ranges, provides ample isolated terrain for drug cultivation

and processing, and contributes to the government’s difficulty in exerting control

throughout the nation. With a population of 41 million, Colombia is the third most

populous country in Latin America after Brazil and Mexico. It is known for a long

tradition of democracy, but also for continuing violence, including a guerrilla

insurgency dating back to the 1960s, and persistent drug trafficking activity. Recent

administrations have had to deal with a complicated mix of leftist guerrillas, rightist

paramilitary (or “self-defense” forces), both associated with many groups of

independent drug traffickers. The two main leftist guerrilla groups are the

Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army

(ELN) both of whom regularly kidnap individuals for ransoms, and reap profit from

their participation in the drug trade. The rightist paramilitaries are coordinated by the

United Self-Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC) which has been accused of gross

human rights abuses and collusion with the Colombian Armed Forces in fighting the

FARC and ELN. The AUC has also been accused of participating in narcotics

trafficking. There are additional paramilitaries not under the AUC umbrella, such as

Metro Block, a former AUC faction that withdrew from peace negotiations with the

government in late 2002.

Pastrana Administration. During the presidency of Andres Pastrana

(August 1998-2002), U.S. involvement in Colombia deepened. Pastrana was elected

largely on the basis of pledges to bring peace to the country by negotiating with the

guerrillas, strengthening the Colombian military and counternarcotics forces, and

seeking international support for these efforts and other reforms to address the

country’s unusually serious economic difficulties. Months after Pastrana’s

inauguration, he initiated peace talks with the country’s largest guerrilla group, the

FARC, and later with representatives from the smaller ELN. In 1999, in cooperation

with the United States, Pastrana developed a $7.5 billion plan called “Plan

Colombia,” with $4 billion to come from Colombia and $3.5 billion from

international donors, although funding from Colombia and the international

community has fallen far short of these goals.

To support Plan Colombia10, the Clinton Administration developed, and the U.S.

Congress approved, a $1.3 billion package of assistance in 2000. Most of the

funding was to support programs in Colombia, with $416.9 million for helicopters,

training, and other assistance to three Colombian Army counternarcotics battalions.

The focus of most of the funding, while incorporating alternative development and

governance programs, was to support counternarcotics objectives.

Pastrana’s efforts were largely frustrated by a variety of factors, including,

according to a variety of analysts, the lack of a consistent negotiation strategy, the

poor implementation of elements of Plan Colombia, and a lack of interest by the

10

For information on U.S. “Plan Colombia” assistance in FY2000-FY2001, including all

Congressional action and congressionally imposed conditions, see CRS Report RL30541,

Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001), by Nina Serafino.

CRS-10

guerrillas in negotiating peace. An early Pastrana concession to the FARC was the

creation of a sanctuary area (“despaje”) for the FARC as an incentive to enter into

negotiations. The outcome, however, was the consolidation of FARC forces in the

area after the withdrawal of government security forces. Prompted by an

intensification of guerrilla activities, President Pastrana decided in February 2002

to terminate peace talks with the FARC, and ordered the military to retake the

despaje. Days later, the FARC kidnaped Senator Ingrid Betancourt, a presidential

candidate with a small following. She remains a captive to this day. By the end of

Pastrana’s term, there was a strong perception that peace talks had failed, guerrilla

activity (fed by the drug trade) had increased, and the security situation in major

cities had deteriorated.

Uribe Administration.11 Alvaro Uribe ran for the presidency on a platform

focusing on defeating the guerrilla insurgents, eliminating the paramilitaries, and

ending narcotics trafficking. He won 53% of the vote in an eleven-candidate field

in the May 26, 2002 presidential elections. He is the first president since the 1991

Constitution to win by an outright majority, thus avoiding a run-off election. Upon

taking office on August 7, 2002, he announced a hard-line approach to negotiations,

declaring that the government would only negotiate with those groups who are

willing to “give up terrorism and agree to a cease-fire,” including paramilitary

groups, with whom President Pastrana had refused to negotiate. The FARC

increased its armed activities by threatening with death all mayors who did not resign

their posts, and conducting relatively large armed confrontations with rightist

paramilitary groups, resulting in massacres of civilians in several locations. FARC

also was responsible for bombings in urban areas of Medellín and Cartegena, as well

as a deadly mortar attack in Bogotá close to the Congress building where Uribe was

being sworn in. These attacks signaled FARC’s new-found, and long-threatened,

ability to take their fight to the cities.

In order to address the complex problems facing Colombia, Uribe took a

number of steps, some of which have proven to be controversial. He promulgated

a decree invoking emergency powers, allowing the security forces to make arrests

without warrants and imposing controls on movements in war-torn parts of the

country. Under Colombia’s 1991 Constitution, states of emergency may be declared

for 90 days, and then can be renewed for two additional 90-day periods. The

country’s constitutional court has, on several occasions, ruled components of the state

of emergency unconstitutional that give security forces increased powers. In

response, the Uribe Administration introduced legislation in April of 2003 to change

the Constitution to give security forces permanent powers to tap phones and to search

homes without warrants in all parts of the country.

President Uribe also announced plans to increase the size of the military and

police, largely through a one-time 1.2% war tax on wealthy individuals and

businesses, and to create of a “civilian informers” program. This effort also entails

the augmentation of Colombia’s regular armed forces with “peasant soldiers” who

receive less training than regular troops, and are based near their own hometowns.

11

For more information on Uribe, see CRS Report RS21242, Colombia: The Uribe

Administration and Congressional Concerns.

CRS-11

The Uribe Administration has inducted 10,000 peasant soldiers, each serving for two

years, with plans to have a total force of 20,000. Further, Uribe authorized the

widespread aerial fumigation of coca crops, that under the Pastrana administration,

had been limited to small plots of growers who had signed eradication pledges. On

June 26, 2003, a Colombian court ruled that the Colombian government should

immediately suspend its aerial fumigation program until the Environment Ministry

charts an Environment Management Plan. Officials of the Uribe Administration have

stated that fumigation will continue while it appeals the decision. Two previous

appeals have been won by the government.

Uribe has also received approval from the Constitutional Court for a referendum

to cut government spending and pension payments, to prohibit the re-election of

corrupt officials, and to restructure the Colombian Congress by reducing the number

of representatives, restricting its budgetary powers, and allowing it to be dissolved

by popular vote. The referendum was scheduled for October 25, 2003, to coincide

with mayoral and gubernatorial elections slated for the following day. In the weeks

leading up to the elections, the FARC threatened to kill all candidates and their

families for the October 26 municipal elections. In total, 25 candidates were killed

and 160 withdrew their names from the balloting.12 In order for the referendum to

succeed, the law required 25% (6.3 million) of Colombian voters to participate. Not

having received sufficient turnout, the referendum items failed even though all

received majority support by those voting. President Uribe has since taken some of

the same issues to the Colombian Congress for support, especially those relating to

the budget.

In late December 2002, Uribe appointed a commission to explore the possibility

of a dialogue with the AUC. This initiative grew out of an October 2002 meeting of

Colombia’s High Commissioner for Peace and five Roman Catholic bishops with the

AUC leadership, after which the AUC declared an indefinite cessation of hostilities,

in part because of Uribe’s more forceful stance against the guerrillas. The Bush

Administration, which on September 25, 2002, requested the extradition of two top

AUC leaders, Carlos Castaño and Salvador Mancuso, announced on January 8, 2003,

that it would not withdraw the request. On July 15, 2003, the Uribe Administration

announced that an agreement had been reached with leaders of the AUC that would

result in their demobilization by the end of 2005. It is estimated that there are

between 10,000 and 13,000 members of the AUC operating in the country. Formed

in the 1980s by wealthy cattle ranchers to fight leftist guerrilla groups, the AUC is

a loose coordinating body, leading some observers to question whether negotiations

with the AUC will result in the demobilization of self-defense groups not under the

AUC umbrella. It is estimated that as many as 6,500 fighters operate outside of the

AUC,13 some of whom are negotiating separately with the government, and others

who are not participating at all. Related to this effort is a controversial legislative

proposal by the Uribe administration to grant conditional amnesties to illegal

combatants in exchange for their demobilization and reparations to victims.

12

Jeremy McDermott, “Uribe Gains the Upper Hand in Colombia’s Guerrilla War,” Jane’s

Intelligence Review, December 2003.

13

Phil Stewart, “Colombia Mulls Fate of Paramilitary Outlaws”, Reuters, July 19, 2003.

“Colombia No Longer Needs Paramilitaries,” Reuters, July 20, 2003.

CRS-12

Coca Cultivation and Eradication. Colombia is the source for 80% of the

world’s cocaine hydrochloride (HCI), and significant quantities of high quality heroin

entering the United States. While noting the ill effects of the drug trade on the lives

of Colombians, President Uribe linked the drug trade and the guerrilla insurgency as

intertwined problems that must be addressed in a coordinated fashion. Reflecting

this sentiment, the United States began, in 2002, providing Colombia with the

flexibility to use U.S. counterdrug funds for a unified campaign to fight drug

trafficking and terrorist organizations. (The State Department has designated the

FARC, ELN, and AUC as terrorist organizations.)

Upon taking office, Uribe announced that aerial eradication and alternative

development would form a significant basis of the government’s efforts. The Plan

Colombia eradication spraying program began in December 2000 with operations by

the U.S. funded counternarcotics brigade in Putumayo.14 Despite early indications

that coca cultivation had increased by 25% in 2001 even though a reported 22,200

acres had been sprayed, Colombian and U.S. officials have reported decreases of

15% in 2002. During 2002, acres devoted to coca cultivation decreased from nearly

420,000 acres in 2001 to 357,000 acres in 2002. Colombia reported that an

additional 160,000 acres had been sprayed in the first five months of 2003.

Similarly, cultivation of opium poppy declined by 24% in 2002, with an additional

4,000 acres sprayed in the first five months of 2003.

Aerial fumigation has been controversial.15 Critics charge that it has unknown

environmental and health effects, and that it deprives farmers of their livelihood,

particularly in light of a lack of coordination with alternative development programs.

The alternative development program, in which farmers can get assistance to grow

substitute crops after agreeing to the eradication of their illicit crops, has been

plagued with delays. A U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) report attributed the

program’s obstacles to inadequate security in coca-growing areas, where the

Colombian governments lacks control, and to the government’s limited ability to

carry out sustained interdiction operations. The State Department’s annual

International Narcotics Control Strategy Report for 2002 claims that since the

inception of the Alternative Development program in December 2000, 20,128

families have benefitted and nearly 39,000 acres of licit crops have been planted in

previous coca and poppy areas. The Colombian government reported that 38,000

families in 33 municipalities signed voluntary eradication pacts. As of early 2002,

media reports noted that less than a third of those families have received any

compensation and many were still growing coca.16

Proponents argue that both eradication and alternative development programs

need time to work. In its response to the GAO report, AID argued that alternative

development programs do not achieve drug crop reduction on their own, and that the

14

The two Army counternarcotics battalions funded by Plan Colombia were trained and

operating by the spring of 2001. The first commenced operations in December 2000.

15

See CRS Report RL33163, Drug Crop Eradication and Alternative Development in the

Andes, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

16

Susannah A. Nesmith, “Anti-drug Crop Plan in Doubt, Study Says Cocaine Growers in

Colombia Seen with Few Choices,” The Boston Globe, April 4, 2002.

CRS-13

Colombia program was designed to support the aerial eradication program and to

build “the political support needed for aerial eradication efforts to take place.” At the

start of his Administration, Uribe announced that increased Colombian resources

would be devoted to alternative development.

With regard to environmental and health consequences, the Secretary of State

certified in 2002, as required by Congress, that the herbicide, glyphosate, is not

considered to pose unreasonable health or safety risks to humans or the environment.

In the certification, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency confirmed that

application rates of the aerial fumigation program in Colombia are within the

parameters listed on U.S. glyphosate labels. (A certification required under the

FY2003 Consolidated Appropriations Bill has not yet been released.) However,

press reports indicate that many Colombians believe the health consequences of

aerial fumigation are grave.17 Furthermore, Ecuador, neighboring Colombia, has

complained that the fumigation program is damaging Ecuadorean crops, rivers, soil

and people’s health, according to its Foreign Minister, Nina Pacari.18

U.S. Policy Debate. The U.S. policy debate has focused on a number of

related issues, such as the effectiveness and implementation of the program in

general, respect for human rights, the expansion of U.S. support to address what

many consider to be a purely civil conflict, and the level of resources that Colombia,

and other countries are willing to contribute. Supporters argue that Colombia is a

friendly democracy under siege by powerful armed forces of the left and right fueled

by drug money. In the context of the global war on terrorism, and with the growing

recognition of the relationship between drug trafficking and the guerrilla insurgency,

proponents argue that Colombia and its neighbors should be supported with

counterterrorism assistance before the situation deteriorates further. They favored

expanding the scope of military assistance to strengthen the ability of Colombian

security forces to combat the leftist guerrillas and to expand their control throughout

rural areas, thereby undercutting the rationale and support for paramilitary groups.

Opponents of U.S. policy argue that the counterdrug program uses a repressive

and military approach to curbing drug production. They argue for halting aerial

fumigation of coca crops and aid to the Colombian military, believing that coca

farmers cannot be expected to abandon coca farming voluntarily until adequate

economic alternatives are in place. They fear that forcing such farmers to give up

coca growing will only drive many to the ranks of the armed groups, or to become

displaced persons dependent on the state.19 Instead, they support a policy that focuses

largely on economic and social aid to combat the conflict’s root causes, curbs the still

rampant human rights abuses by paramilitary groups, provides vigorous support for

a negotiated end to the fighting, and emphasizes illicit drug demand reduction in the

17

“Coca Harvester Killed by Fumigation in Colombia,” EFE News Service, July 5, 2003.

18

“Foreign Minister Says Colombian Fumigation Affects Ecuador,” Associated Press

Newswires, July 16, 2003.

19

Nancy San Martin, “U.S. Antinarcotics Plan for Colombia Is Failing, Report Concludes,”

Knight Ridder Tribune News Service, July 10, 2003.

CRS-14

United States. They also argue that assisting Colombia to fight its leftist guerrillas

will involve the United States in a major guerrilla conflict of indeterminate duration.

Others, some of whom support current U.S. policy, argue for a

“Colombianization” of the program in that they believe that Colombians should be

conducting the aerial spraying and other counternarcotics activities, not U.S.

government contractors, and for Colombia itself to do more to fight its own war

against terrorism and drug trafficking. They have argued that any expansion of U.S.

involvement should await a greater commitment by Colombia’s government and

elites to the war effort, including a larger budget for the Colombian military. Still

others argue that assistance to Colombia should have the effect of improving its

economy and providing employment for Colombians, maintaining that the current

implementation in which U.S. contractors are hired does not contribute to the

economy or employment.

Debate in the United States has also focused on allegations of human rights

abuses by the Colombian Armed Forces, the FARC and ELN, and the paramilitary

groups. The Colombian security forces have often turned a blind eye to paramilitary

activities, considering these groups as augmenting their fight against the FARC and

ELN, despite a record of human rights abuses. Many policymakers, both supporters

and opponents of U.S. policy, have worked to break the ties between the Colombian

military and the AUC, and President Uribe has vowed that paramilitary activities will

not be tolerated. U.S. policy has supported the creation and assistance for a Human

Rights Unit within the Attorney General’s office. Some non-governmental groups

have claimed that the unit is ineffective and has poor leadership.20 They argue for

full enforcement of legislative conditions that require concrete steps to prosecute

members of the armed forces who commit human rights violations, or who tolerate

activities of paramilitary organizations. Requirements for the U.S. Secretary of State

to certify that the Colombian military is prosecuting human rights violators, and

breaking ties with the paramilitaries, are longstanding provisions in legislation.

These certifications, one issued on July 8, 2003, and the latest issued on January 21,

2004, are criticized by human rights organizations as not adequately reflecting the

human rights situation.21

Concerns in the United States have also been fueled by several incidents in

which U.S. citizens have been killed or kidnaped in the region. On April 20, 2001,

a private aircraft flying over Peru and carrying American missionaries was shot

down, killing two, after the Peruvian military, working with U.S. support, identified

it as a possible drug trafficking flight. As a result, the so-called “Air-Bridge Denial

Program” was halted in both Peru and Colombia, until the Secretary of State certified

that a renewed program would incorporate safety enhancements. This determination

was made on August 18, 2003. Having reached an agreement with Colombian

authorities on operational aspects that would provide greater safeguards against

20

“A Wrong Turn: The Record of the Colombian Attorney General’s Office,” Human Rights

Watch, November 2002.

21

“U.S. Misses an Opportunity: Certification Not Based On Facts,” Human Rights Watch,

July 8, 2003, and “Colombia: Flawed Certification Squanders U.S. Leverage,” Human

Rights Watch, January 23, 2004.

CRS-15

accidental shootdowns, the program was operationally capable of resuming as of

August 22. Concern also heightened that greater U.S. involvement will result in a

protracted commitment in a civil conflict occurred in response to the loss of five U.S.

civilian contractors and aircraft operating in Colombia since February 2003. In the

first incident, in February, a Cessna 208 aircraft carrying both U.S. and Colombian

personnel crashed in a FARC controlled region. One American and a Colombian

were killed, and three are being held by the FARC. Another Cessna 208, with U.S.

civilian contractors, crash landed in March during a subsequent search and rescue

operation, killing three Americans. A fifth American contractor was killed on April

7 when his T-65 air tractor crashed during a spraying operation. While these flights

were considered crashes, fumigation flights have been fired on, and since August

2003, two planes have been downed by hostile fire. On August 25, a spray aircraft

piloted by a U.S. citizen was shot down, injuring the pilot. An OV Bronco aircraft

was downed on September 21, reportedly by hostile fire, killing its pilot which in

some press reports was identified as a naturalized American citizen from Costa Rica.

A further concern of policymakers has centered on current U.S. policy opposing

the application of jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court to U.S. citizens.

Countries who had not agreed to sign so-called “article 98 agreements” referring to

Article 98 of the Rome Treaty on the International Criminal Court, preventing the

ICC from proceeding with a request for surrender of U.S. personnel present in the

country, are subject to a cutoff of U.S. military assistance. On August 8, 2003, an

article 98 agreement was signed with Colombia. This action was required under the

American Service Members Protection Act of 2002, which was incorporated as Title

II of H.R. 4775, the FY2002 Supplemental Appropriations Bill (P.L. 107-206).

Funding and Requests for Colombia.

!

Under the P.L. 106-246 Plan Colombia funding, Colombia received

$860.3 million. Of that, $424.9 was State Department funding and

$91.8 was Department of Defense funding to assist Colombian

military anti-drug efforts through interdiction support and the

training and equipping of the Colombian counternarcotics battalions.

The remaining $435.4 was State Department funding for assistance

to the Colombian police, economic and alternative development

assistance, assistance for displaced persons, human rights,

administration of justice and other governance programs.

!

Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Colombia received $379.9

million in ACI funding, with $243.50 million in counternarcotics

assistance, and $137 million in economic and social programs.

!

Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental, the Administration

requested $4 million of International Narcotics Control and Law

Enforcement (INCLE) funding for police post support in areas of

weak government control, $6 million of FMF funding (which

Congress directed to be transferred to the INCLE account) for

counter-terrorism equipment and training, and $25 million of

Nonproliferation, Anti-Terrorism and Demining (NATD) funding

for counter-kidnapping training. The enacted legislation specifically

CRS-16

provided $6 million for infrastructure protection for the Cano-Limón

Coveñas oil pipeline, and fully funded the other accounts.

!

For FY2003, the Administration requested $537 million in ARI

funding for Colombia, including $439 million in ACI funding, and

$98 million in FMF funding to train and equip a Colombian army

brigade to protect an oil pipeline in the country. Congress reduced

this request by $5 million, providing $93 million in FMF funds for

the oil pipeline, as well as $433 million in ACI funding.

!

In the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental, the President

requested additional funding for Colombia. Congress approved

$105.1 million, consisting of $34 million of State Department for the

Andean Counterdrug Initiative, $34 million of DOD funds for Drug

Interdiction and Counter-Drug Activities, and fully funded the

Foreign Military Financing Program, out of which it provided that

$20 million could be transferred to the ACI account. The

Administration advised Congress that it had designated another

$17.1 million in FMF funds for Colombia.

!

For FY2004, the Administration requested a total of $573 million of

which $463 million is for the ACI, consisting of $150 million for

alternative development, humanitarian assistance and institution

building, and $313 million for narcotics interdiction and eradication

programs. The overall request also included $110 million in FMF

funding. In addition, the Administration proposed $1.6 million in

International Military Education and Training (IMET) funds.

Congress provided $731 million for the ACI in the FY2004

Consolidated Appropriations Bill (H.R. 2673/H.Rept. 108-401),

passed by the House on December 8, 2003, and still pending in the

Senate.

CRS-17

Peru

Peru, which shares its northern border with Colombia, is the fifth most populous

country in Latin America, with 27.5 million inhabitants. President Alejandro Toledo

was elected on June 3, 2001, with 53% of the vote, against former left-leaning

President Alan Garcia with 47%. A longtime opposition leader to previous

President Alberto Fujimori who fled the country on corruption charges, Toledo was

inaugurated as President on July 28, 2001.22 President Toledo promised to end

corruption and to stabilize the economy through orthodox policies, but observers

have worried that tangible results will not meet the expectations of the populace,

especially poor, indigenous groups. The President has had to deal with many strikes

and protests, his party fared poorly in the November 2002 elections for new regional

governments, and his popularity reached new lows in 2003.23 President Toledo

labeled drug trafficking a national security problem for Peru and established a drug

czar for the country to better coordinate counternarcotics initiatives. When President

Bush visited Peru on March 23, 2002, the two Presidents agreed to enhance

cooperation on counternarcotics and counter-terrorism issues. However, U.S.

military aid to Peru was suspended on July 1, 2003, because Peru had not signed an

agreement exempting U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal

Court, which would result in the loss of $2.7 million in military equipment and

training requested for FY2004.24

Representatives of Peru and the United States launched an investigation into the

circumstances and procedures leading to an incident on April 20, 2001, in which a

Peruvian military plane shot down a small plane, killing an American missionary

woman and her infant daughter, after a CIA surveillance plane had indicated that the

small craft might be involved in drug trafficking activities. As a result of this

accident, U.S. surveillance of drug-related flights in Peru and Colombia was

suspended pending clarification of procedures. The State Department released a

report of the U.S.-Peruvian investigative team on August 2, 2001, concluding that

“communications systems overload” and “cumbersome procedures” played a role in

the accident. President Bush indicated during his March 2002 trip to Peru that talks

were continuing between the countries on appropriate procedures before the renewal

of the anti-drug surveillance flights. Current U.S. law requires the Secretary of State

to notify Congress 30 days prior to resuming U.S. support for the air interdiction

program and to provide assurances that greater safety enhancements are in place.

When the White House announced the resumption of the aerial interdiction program

with Colombia on August 19, 2003, Administration spokesmen stated that

22

For more details, see CRS Report RL30918, Peru: Recovery from Crisis, by (name r

edacted).

23

See Scott Wilson, Peruvian President Gets Mixed Reviews, Washington Post, March 31,

2003, p. A9.

24

See The International Criminal Court and U.S. Military Assistance, by Jennifer Elsea and

(name redacted), on the CRS website on Fo

reign Operations Appropriations at

[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/apfor40.html].

CRS-18

arrangements with Peru had not been completed and that the proposed program with

Peru would be more limited.25

Peru is the second largest cocaine producer in the world and exports high purity

cocaine and cocaine base to markets in South America, Mexico, Europe, and the

United States. Nevertheless, it has been viewed as a success story in counternarcotics

efforts because six years of joint U.S.-Peru air and riverine interdiction operations,

aggressive eradication efforts, and alternative development programs have

significantly reduced coca production. However, while coca production remained

constant in 2001, the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report noted an 8% increase in production during 2002, although this level is still

36,000 hectares (88,956 acres) below 1995 levels. Facing mounting protests, the

Peruvian government temporarily suspended the drug eradication program in the

Upper Huallaga Valley in early July 2002, but resumed the program in September

2002 once concerns were addressed, in part to be eligible for Andean Trade

Preference Act benefits.

Peruvian spokesmen have worried about spillover effects of illicit drug activities

from Colombia into Peru, and the increase in coca production. They have denounced

illicit plantings of coca and poppies in Peru, and international trafficking of arms

through Peru to FARC guerrillas in Colombia. Responding to press reports that

FARC forces have penetrated into Peruvian territory, Peruvian officials stated in

early 2002 that there are no permanent FARC forces in Peru, but they conceded that

they may cross temporarily into border areas. Because of these threats, Peru has

moved military bases from its border with traditional rival Ecuador, where tensions

have diminished, to the border with Colombia. The March 20, 2002 bombing of a

shopping center near the U.S. Embassy in Lima, three days before President Bush’s

visit to Peru, raised fears of a resurgence of guerrilla groups.

Funding and Requests for Peru.

25

!

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental

funding, Peru received $25 million for KMAX helicopters for the

Peruvian National Police, and benefitted from regional interdiction

funding.

!

Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Peru received $142.5 million in

ACI funds, with $75 million in counternarcotics aid and $67.5

million for alternative development. In addition, Peru received

$23.7 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $15 million in

Development Assistance, and $14.5 million in Economic Security

Funds. No funds were requested for Peru in the FY2002

supplemental.

See “U.S. Says Aerial Drug Interdiction Program to Resume in Colombia,” on State

Department website [http://usinfo.state.gov/gi/Archive/2003/Aug/20-661332.html], August

20, 2003; and “U.S. Resumes Aid for Drug Patrols, Colombian Safeguards Cited,”

International Herald Tribune, August 21, 2003, p. 2.

CRS-19

!

Under the ARI allocation for FY2003, Peru is to receive $128.1

million in ACI funds, with $59.5 million in counternarcotics aid and

$68.6 million for alternative development. In addition, it would

receive nearly $22 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $16.3

million in Development Assistance, and $9 million in Economic

Support Funds.

!

For FY2004, the Administration requested $116 million in ACI

funds, with $66 million in counternarcotics aid and $50 million for

alternative development. In addition, the Administration proposed

$16.7 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $15.3 million in

Development Assistance, and $9 million in Economic Security

Funds.

Bolivia

Landlocked Bolivia shares no border with Colombia, but Bolivia’s significant

gains in reducing illegal coca production could be threatened by any successes in

controlling production in Colombia. Once the world’s foremost producer of coca

leaf, Bolivia made great strides in reducing coca cultivation under the BanzerQuiroga administration (1997-2002).26 However, forcible eradication of coca has

become a source of social discontent, exacerbating tensions over class and ethnicity

that may foment political instability in Latin America’s poorest country.

With a population of 8.3 million, Bolivia is the eleventh most populous country

in Latin America. Despite a long past history of instability, Bolivia has, since the

mid-1980s, experienced a period of unprecedented political stability as a series of

elected governments instituted extraordinary political changes and economic

liberalization, and peacefully transferred power to their successors. Beginning in the

mid-1990s, governments have carried out major privatization programs and reforms

that were heralded as putting the country on a sound macroeconomic footing, but

have also led to significant social dislocations. Economically, it is tied to the region

through two organizations: the Andean Community and as an associate member of

the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) formed by Brazil, Argentina, Paraguay

and Uruguay.

President Gonzalo Sánchez de Losada, of the National Revolutionary Movement

(MNR) a 72-year old wealthy businessman who had served once before as president

(1993-1997), began his five-year term on August 6, 2002, with only 22% of the vote

in an eleven candidate field. Evo Morales, a 42-year old Aymara, who is head of the

Movement Towards Socialism (MAS) party and leader of the Bolivian coca growers

union, ran a close second. Under the Bolivian constitution, the lack of a majority

victory sent the election to the Bolivian Congress, where Members of the upper and

lower chambers (27 senators and 130 representatives) selected between the two top

vote getters. To secure the presidency, the MNR formed a coalition with the

26

President Jorge Quiroga assumed the presidency on August 7, 2001, when President

Hugo Banzer, whom he had served as vice president, resigned because of illness. Quiroga

could not, by law, subsequently run for election.

CRS-20

Movement of the Revolutionary Left (MIR), led by fourth place winner Jaime Paz

Zamora, Sánchez de Lozada’s traditional adversary and also a former president

(1989-1993). During his first year in office, President Losada had to deal with

numerous protests and demonstrations.

Shortly after Sánchez de Lozada’s inauguration, his Interior Minister announced

the government would resume the eradication efforts of the previous government.

Perhaps foreshadowing challenges to come, both domestically and in relations with

the United States, confrontations erupted the next day between peasants and police

in the coca-growing Chapare and Yungas regions. More recent political unrest led

to the resignation of Sánchez de Lozada on October 17, 2003, just fifteen months

after he was elected. Succeeding him as President is his former Vice President,

Carlos Mesa, a popular former television journalist, historian, and political

independent. This change in leadership came about after months of protests led by

indigenous and workers groups who carried out strikes and road blockages that

paralyzed most of the country and resulted in up to 80 deaths. The focus of the

protests was the continued economic marginalization of the poorer segments of

society especially in response to government plans to export natural gas via a port in

Chile, an historic adversary of Bolivia. The new President faces many difficulties in

governing a politically fractured society, one of the poorest nations in the

hemisphere, within the context of a highly mobilized indigenous community, and the

uncertainty of obtaining consensus on natural gas exports as a basis for the country’s

future economic development.

For some 20 years, U.S. relations with Bolivia have centered largely on

controlling the production of coca leaf and coca paste, which was usually shipped to

Colombia to be processed into cocaine. In support of Bolivia’s counternarcotics

efforts, the United States has provided significant interdiction and alternative

development assistance, and it has forgiven all of Bolivia’s debt for development

assistance projects, and most of the debt for food assistance. Not until President

Hugo Banzer set a goal in his “Dignity Plan” of eliminating illegal coca cultivation

and narco-trafficking by the end of his five-year term in 2002 was there much

success. Bolivia, like Peru, has been viewed by many as a counternarcotics success

story, with joint air and riverine interdiction operations, successful eradication

efforts, and effective alternative development programs reducing illegal coca

cultivation to the lowest level in five years, with a net reduction of approximately

70% between 1996 and 2001. Others, however, view the forced eradication as a

social and political disaster: in places it was implemented regardless of the

availability of alternative development programs funding, and in some places the

Dignity Plan’s mandated use of the military to carry out the eradications has

generated charges of human rights abuses.27

27

Kathryn Ledebur. Coca and Conflict in the Chapare. Drug War Monitor Briefing Series.

Washington Office on Latin America. July 2002. pp 6-7. According to recent reports,

alleged abuses committed by members of the U.S. funded Expeditionary Task Force, a unit

of 1,500 armed ex-soldiers based in the Chapare region, have included at least five killings

and 50 cases this year of beatings and theft. See Anthony Faiola. “U.S. Role in Coca War

Draws Fire.” Washington Post. July 23, 2002. pp A1-A23.

CRS-21

According to the State Department’s International Narcotics Control Strategy

Report, coca cultivation increased 23% in 2002. Nearly 12,000 hectares (29,652

acres) was eradicated, but the authorities have had little success in preventing

replantings. Yet, Bolivia’s coca cultivation is about half of its 1995 levels. It should

also be noted that Bolivian law allows up to 12,000 hectares of coca cultivation for

traditional use. Although President Jorge Quiroga had promised to carry out the

Dignity Plan program, he relented after violent protests by coca growers in the

Yungas and the Chapare regions. The latter was once the country’s primary illegal

coca-growing region. Much of the illegal commercial crop had been eliminated there,

but some has been replanted.

Bolivia has signed an article 98 agreement exempting U.S. citizens from the

jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court. The agreement is pending

consideration before the Bolivian Congress. In July 2003, and previous to an

agreement being signed, the Bush Administration had waived the withholding of U.S.

military aid from the country.

Funding and Requests for Bolivia.

!

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental

funding, Bolivia received $25 million for regional interdiction

assistance and $85 million in alternative development assistance.

!

Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Bolivia received $87.6 million

in ACI funds, consisting of $52 million in drug interdiction and

eradication, and $35.6 million in alternative development. In

addition, Bolivia received $19.7 million in Child Survival and

Health funds, $12.9 million in Development Assistance, $10 million

in Economic Support Funds, and $500,000 in Foreign Military

Financing.

Under the FY2003 ARI allocation, Bolivia is to receive nearly $91

million in ACI funding, consisting of $49 million in interdiction and

eradication, and $41.7 million in alternative development. In

addition, Bolivia would receive $18.5 million in Child Survival and

Health funds, $12.2 million in Development Assistance, $10 million

in Economic Support Funds, and $2 million in Foreign Military

Financing.

!

!

For FY2004, the Administration requested $91 million in ACI funds,

consisting of $52.5 million in interdiction and eradication, and $38.5

million in alternative development. In addition, the Administration

proposed $14.4 million in Child Survival and Health funds, $11.4

million in Development Assistance, $8 million in Economic Support

Funds, and $4 million in Foreign Military Financing.

CRS-22

Ecuador

On Colombia’s southern border, Ecuador is the most exposed of Colombia’s

neighbors because it is situated adjacent to areas in southern Colombian that are

guerrilla strongholds and heavy drug producing areas. With a population of 13.2

million, Ecuador is the eighth most populous country in Latin America. President

Lucio Gutierrez, a retired colonel and a leader of the January 2000 uprising which

toppled the previously elected President, Gustavo Noboa, was elected on November

20, 2002, and inaugurated on January 15, 2003. He has embarked upon a very

ambitious program to cut government expenditures, and in March 2003, he obtained

a $205 million stand-by arrangement from the International Monetary Fund and the

extension of repayments on past obligations to help the country deal with its debt

problems.

According to press reports, Colombian guerrillas pass into Ecuadoran territory

for rest, recuperation, and medical treatment, and there are reports that Colombians

are buying ranches and farms in the Ecuadoran border region, possibly for drug

cultivation. Ecuadoran officials say they have uncovered and destroyed several small

cocaine processing labs in the area. The Ecuadoran border region is experiencing a

constant flow of Colombian refugees into the poor areas, and fighters with

Colombian paramilitary organizations have been arrested for running extortion rings

in Ecuadorian border regions. The FARC has been accused of kidnaping people in

Ecuador, although the FARC denies the allegations. Ecuador reinforced its northern

border with Colombia in early 2002 as Colombian anti-guerrilla operations

intensified following the breakdown of the peace talks, and Ecuador was said to be

seeking additional international assistance.28 President Gutierrez has said that the

armed conflict in Colombia is having an adverse affect on Ecuadoran peasants in

border areas, and he has claimed that the aerial fumigation in Colombia is harming

the Ecuadoran environment and negatively affecting Ecuadorans’ health.29

Colombian President Uribe thanked Ecuadoran for taking in Colombians fleeing

violence when he visited Ecuador, on August 22, 2003, and he promised to eradicate

terrorism in Colombia so that it would not spread to Ecuador.30

As a major transit country for cocaine and heroin from Colombia and Peru,

Ecuador cooperates extensively with the United States in counternarcotics efforts.

In November 1999, the United States signed a 10-year agreement with Ecuador for

a forward operating location (FOL) in Manta, on the Pacific Coast, for U.S. aerial

counterdrug detection and monitoring operations. Although the agreement is solely

for the detection of drug trafficking flights in the region, some human rights groups

and politicians in Ecuador fear that the facility could be used to support operations

against guerrillas in neighboring Colombia.

28

See “Ecuador Wants Money to Strengthen Border; Guerrilla Infiltration Concern Grows

After Military Action Against FARC,” Financial Times, March 8, 2002, p. 10.

29

See “Ecuador’s Gutierrez Says Colombian Conflict Moving Beyond Its Borders,” BBC

Monitoring Americas Report, June 30, 2003.

30

See “Colombia’s Uribe in Ecuador Thanks President Gutierrez for Help, Support,”BBC

Monitoring Americas Report, August 24, 2003.

CRS-23

Ecuador has not signed an agreement to exempt U.S. citizens from the

jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and it became subject to U.S.

sanctions on July 1, 2003, with the possible loss of $15.7 million in FMF funding and

IMET education in FY2004. Press reports at the time of the announcement of the

cutoff of military aid quoted some Ecuadoran officials as saying they might

reexamine the military relationship with the United States, including the Manta

facility.

Funding and Requests for Ecuador.

!

As part of the FY2000 Plan Colombia emergency supplemental

funding Ecuador received $20 million in U.S. assistance, of which

$12 million was to support drug interdiction efforts, and $8 million

was for alternative development assistance. Another $61.3 million

has been allocated for the construction of a Forward Operating

Location in Manta, Ecuador for counternarcotics aerial surveillance.

!

Under ARI allocations for FY2002, Ecuador received $25 million in

ACI funding, consisting of $15 million in interdiction and law

enforcement programs, and $10 million in alternative development.

In addition, Ecuador received $6.9 million in Development

Assistance, $15 million in Economic Support Funds.

!

Under the Emergency FY2002 Supplemental request, Ecuador

received $3 million in FMF funding.

!

Under the FY2003 ARI allocations, Ecuador is to receive nearly

$30.9 million in ACI funding, consisting of $15 million for

interdiction and law enforcement programs, and $15.9 million for

alternative development. In addition, Ecuador would receive $7.1

million in Development Assistance, $15.5 million in Economic

Support Funds, and $1 million in Foreign Military Financing.

!

For FY2004, the Administration requested $35 million in ACI

funding, consisting of $20 million for interdiction and law

enforcement, and $15 million for alternative development. In

addition, Ecuador would receive $300,000 in Child Survival and

Health funds, $7.1 million in Development Assistance, $14 million

in Economic Support Funds, and $15 million in Foreign Military

Financing.

CRS-24

Brazil

Brazil’s isolated Amazon region, populated largely by indigenous groups, forms

Colombia’s southeastern border. With a population of 174.5 million, Brazil is the

largest and most populous country in Latin America, with most of its inhabitants

concentrated in the more developed southeastern areas of the country and along the

Atlantic coast. Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva of the leftist Workers Party was inaugurated

as President on January 1, 2003, after decisively winning the second round

presidential election in October 2002, with support from a wide range of parties. He

has promised to follow sound economic policies, while putting priority on the

elimination of hunger in the country. He is seeking to create a strong South

American bloc that would merge the Southern Common Market (Mercosur),

composed of Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay (with Bolivia and Chile as associate

members) with the Andean Community, composed of Venezuela, Colombia,

Ecuador, Peru and Bolivia. President Lula da Silva visited Peru on August 25, 2003,

and Peruvian President Toledo signed a free trade agreement between Peru and

Mercosur, and talks for a broader free trade agreement between Mercosur and the

Andean Community are scheduled to conclude by December 2003. Brazil views

these integration efforts as facilitating more advantageous negotiations with the

United States in the talks to conclude a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by

January 2005.

In efforts to strengthen ties with the United States, on June 20, 2003, President

Lula da Silva made an official visit to Washington, D.C. and he and President Bush

resolved “to create a closer and qualitatively stronger [bilateral] relationship.”

Leaders agreed on a framework for regular high-level discussions on a wide range of

issues, including agreements to enhance cooperation in science and nuclear energy;

to jointly promote HIV/AIDS treatment in the Portuguese-speaking African countries

of Mozambique and Angola; and to establish an energy partnership for cooperation

on alternative energy sources. Brazil has not agreed to exempt U.S. citizens from the

jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court, and in July 2003 it became subject

to sanctions that could result in the loss of $500,000 in IMET military education and

training funds in FY2004.

Brazil is not a significant drug-producing country, but it is a conduit for the

transit of cocaine base and cocaine HC1 from Colombia to Europe and the United

States. With increasing drug use within the country, a major action in 2002 was the

passage of an omnibus Brazilian federal counter-narcotics law.

Brazilians have long been concerned about the sparsely populated territory in

the huge Amazon region, and they have been fearful historically of foreign designs

and intervention in this territory. In an effort to exercise control over this vast

territory Brazil has constructed a $1.4 billion sensor and radar project called the

Amazon Vigilance System, or SIVAM from its acronym in Portuguese, and it has

offered to share data from this system with neighbors and the United States. It has

established a military base at Tabatinga, with 25,000 soldiers and policemen, with

air force and navy support, and has launched Operation Cobra with heightened

vigilance to deal with spillover effects from Colombia.

CRS-25

Press accounts suggest evidence of Colombian drug traffickers encouraging

indigenous communities in Brazil to plant coca, Brazilian drug traffickers linked to

Colombian traffickers, and FARC incursions along the border. In one example in

late 1998, the FARC captured a city on the Colombian border, forcing Colombian

troops to withdraw into Brazilian territory, before recapturing the city. In another

example, a plane from Suriname with arms for FARC guerrillas was discovered

when it was forced to make an emergency landing in Brazil. In another more recent

example, FARC forces crossed into Brazil in early March 2002 and exchanged

gunfire with Brazilian military forces.31 In late June 2003, Brazil announced that it

would increase the number of troops in states that share a border with Colombia. In

another strange incident, it was reported in August 2003 that French officials landed

a C-130 plane in Brazilian territory in mid-July 2003, without informing Brazilian

authorities, in an effort to rescue Ingrid Betancourt, a former Colombian presidential

candidate who is also a French citizen, who has been held captive by FARC

guerrillas.32

Funding and Requests for Brazil.

!

Brazil received only a small amount of Plan Colombia assistance,

but under ARI allocations for FY2002 Brazil received $6 million in

ACI funds, nearly all in law enforcement funding. Brazil also

received $9.2 million in Child Survival and Health funds, and $4.8

million in Development Assistance.

!

Under the FY2003 ARI allocation, Brazil is to receive $6 million in

ACI funds, nearly all in law enforcement funding. In addition,

Brazil is to receive $9.8 million in Child Survival and Health funds,

and $6.4 million in Development Assistance.

!

FY2004, the Administration requested $12 million in ACI funding,

nearly all in law enforcement funding.

In addition, the

Administration proposed $12 million in Child Survival and Health

funds, and $8.2 million in Development Assistance.

Venezuela

Venezuela, Colombia’s eastern neighbor, is now the fourth largest supplier of

crude oil to the United States. With a population of 24 million, Venezuela is the

sixth most populous country in Latin America. The country is presently led by

President Hugo Chavez, a populist and leader of an unsuccessful military coup in the

early 1990s, who was initially elected in 1998 on a campaign to rewrite the

constitution, rid the country of corruption, and more adequately meet the needs of the

people. Under President Chavez, Venezuela has undergone enormous political

changes, with a new constitution and revamped political institutions.

31

See “Brazil: Incidents with FARC on Border with Colombia Viewed,” BBC Monitoring

Americas, March 9, 2002.

32

“French Rescue Effort Sets Off Diplomatic Spat with Brazil,” Washington Post, August

3, 2003, p. A19.

CRS-26

Although Chavez remained widely popular until mid-2001, his popularity

subsequently eroded significantly after that, especially among the middle class,

because of his perceived ineffectiveness in improving living conditions and concerns

that he was imposing a leftist agenda on the country. Following massive anti-Chavez

protests in April 2002, the Venezuelan military took Chavez into custody and

business leader Pedro Carmona declared himself interim President, but Chavez was

restored to power in days with the support of the military. From December 2002 until

February 2003, the opposition orchestrated a general strike that disrupted the

economy but was unsuccessful in getting President Chavez to agree to early elections

or a non-binding referendum on his rule. After months of negotiations facilitated by

OAS Secretary General Cesar Gaviria, President Chavez and the opposition signed

an agreement on May 29, 2003, to resolve the political crisis. Implementation of the

accord, which could lead to a recall referendum for President Chavez, will not

necessarily be easy, but observers emphasize that it is an important first step for

achieving political stability.33

Under the Chavez government, there has been friction at times in U.S.Venezuelan relations, and Chavez has at times used anti-U.S. rhetoric. He denounced

Plan Colombia as a U.S.-dominated military strategy, and denied the United States

overflight rights over Venezuela territory for drug interdiction. Following the

September 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Chavez criticized U.S. military

action in Afghanistan, and he visited Libya, Iran, and Iraq, prompting President Bush

to exclude him from his March 2002 meeting with Andean leaders in Peru.34

Venezuelan officials have refused to exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the

International Criminal Court, and in July 2003, the country became subject to

sanctions that could lead to the loss of $700,000 in military education and training

funds in FY2004.

There has been increasing concern about the guerrilla conflict in Colombia

spreading to Venezuela. At times, Colombian guerrillas and paramilitaries have

entered Venezuela territory causing frictions in Colombian-Venezuelan relations. In

April 2003, Venezuela’s military exchanged fire with Colombian paramilitaries that

had crossed the border pursuing FARC guerrillas; a subsequent meeting between

Chavez and Colombian President Alvaro Uribe eased tensions and led to Venezuelan

promises to increase border patrols in order to prevent incursions by armed

Colombian groups. There also have been long-held suspicions that President Chavez

has supported the Colombian guerrillas, but President Chavez denies such support.

The Senate Foreign Operations Bill for FY2004 contains a provision denying

Venezuela assistance if the Secretary of State certifies that Venezuela is assisting,

harboring, or providing sanctuary to Colombian terrorist organizations.

Venezuela is a major transit route for cocaine and heroin from neighboring

Colombia to the United States and Europe. In 2001, some coca fields were located

and eradicated, and processing labs were detected and destroyed. There were no

33

For more details, see CRS Report RL32488, Venezuela: Political Conditions and U.S.

Policy, by (name redacted).

34

See Peter Slevin, Political Crisis in Venezuela Worries White House, Washington Post,

February 23, 2002, p. A18.

CRS-27

eradication efforts in 2002. Despite various policy disagreements with the United

States, the Chavez government has cooperated with the United States in

counternarcotics efforts.

Funding and Requests for Venezuela.

!

While Venezuela received only a small amount of Plan Colombia

assistance, under the final ARI allocations for FY2002, Venezuela

received $5 million in ACI funding, consisting of law enforcement

and administration of justice programs. Venezuela also received

$500,000 in Economic Support Funds.

!

Under FY2003 ARI allocations, Venezuela would receive $2.1

million in ACI funding, consisting of law enforcement and

administration of justice programs. Venezuela would also receive

$500,000 in Economic Support Funds.

!

For FY2004, the Administration requested $5 million in ACI

funding, consisting of law enforcement and administration of justice

programs. The Administration also proposed $500,000 in Economic

Support Funds.

Panama

Panama is separated from Colombia along its southern border by the difficult

and environmentally sensitive wetlands and rain forest of the “Darien Gap.” Here,

the 16,000 mile Pan American highway (stretching from Alaska to the tip of southern

Chile) is interrupted for a 60 mile stretch. A part of Colombia until 1903, Panama

is now the twentieth most populous country in Latin America, with a population of

2.8 million.

Panama’s history has been heavily influenced by its strategic location and the

transit of commerce through the Panama Canal in the center of the country, where the

major cities are located. It is led by President Mireya Moscoso, elected and

inaugurated in 1999, who has been dealing with economic difficulties in Panama, and

with Panama’s new responsibilities for the Panama Canal since the U.S. withdrawal

on the last day of 1999. Despite considerable effort in the period leading up to the

U.S. withdrawal, Panama was unwilling to allow the United States to retain a formal

military presence in Panama for counternarcotics surveillance purposes.35 This

forced the United States to develop the Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) in El

Salvador, Aruba/Curacao and Ecuador as substitute locations for such activities.

U.S.-Panama relations have been very friendly, however, and Panama did agree to

exempt U.S. citizens from the jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court shortly

before President Moscoso’s late June 2003 official visit to Washington, D.C.

35

For more detail, see CRS Report RL30981, Panama: Political and Economic Conditions

and U.S. Relations, by (name redacted).

CRS-28

Panama has been the scene of cross-border incursions by Colombian guerrillas

and paramilitary groups. There is some evidence that paramilitary groups are being

founded in Panama, with support from Colombian groups, because of the perception

that the Panamanian government has left some areas unprotected. Shipments of

small arms for the Colombian guerrillas have been seized in Panamanian territory as

well.

Panama is not an illicit drug producing country, but it is a major transshipment

point for illicit drugs, especially cocaine, smuggled from South America, and it is a

major site for money-laundering activity. In recent years, Panama has cooperated

with the United States in bilateral counternarcotics efforts, seizing significant

amounts of illicit drugs and enforcing recently passed anti-money laundering

legislation. In early 2002, a comprehensive U.S.-Panama maritime anti-drug

agreement entered into force.

Funding and Requests for Panama.

!

While Panama received only a small amount of Plan Colombia

assistance, under allocations for FY2002, Panama received $5

million in ACI funding, consisting largely of border control and law

enforcement funds. Panama also received $4.5 million in

Development Assistance and $4.2 million in Economic Support

Funds.

!

For FY2003, Panama is to receive $4.5 million in ACI funds,

consisting largely of border control and law enforcement funds. In

addition, Panama is to receive $4.9 million in Development

Assistance, $3 million in Economic Support Funds, and $1 million

in Foreign Military Financing.

!

For FY2004, the Administration requested $9 million in ACI funds,

consisting largely of border control and law enforcement funds. In

addition, the Administration proposed $5.7 million in Development

Assistance, $3.5 million in Economic Support Funds, and $2.5

million in Foreign Military Financing.

CRS-29

Major Legislative Activity in 2003

on Andean Regional Initiative Issues

In 2003, Congress has acted on a variety of appropriation and authorization

measures related to the Andean region that are cited below. In April 2003, the

Congress passed an FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental, to fund continuing

operations in Iraq, that also included funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative.

On December 8, 2003, the House passed the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations

Bill (H.R. 2673/H.Rept. 108-401), which combined a number of individual

appropriations measures that had not yet been approved. The bill passed the Senate

on Janaury 22, 2004, and was signed into law the next day (P.L. 108-199).

FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriations

By the end of 2002, both the House and Senate Appropriations Committees had

reported their versions of an FY2003 Foreign Operations Appropriation bill, but this

and other appropriations bills had not been enacted. As a result, Congress

incorporated the 11 unfinished bills into an omnibus spending package, H.J.Res. 2

(for continuing appropriations). The House passed H.J.Res. 2 on January 8, 2003,

and the Senate followed suit on January 28, 2003. Both chambers approved the

conference report (H.Rept. 108-10) on February 13, 2003, and the measure was

signed into law (P.L. 108-7) on February 20, 2003.36 In the omnibus bill, Congress

provided $835.5 million for the Andean Regional Initiative, of which $700 million

was provided for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. It further allowed the transfer

of $31 million from the State Department’s International Narcotics Control and Law

Enforcement (INCLE) account to the ACI.

FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental

On March 25, 2003, President Bush requested $74.7 billion in additional

funding for military operations and reconstruction activities in Iraq, and for ongoing

operations in the global war on terrorism. It also included requests for counterdrug

and military funding for Colombia.

House Action. The House Appropriations Committee marked up H.R. 1559

on April 2, 2003, providing the President with most of his request. The House

passed the measure on April 3, 2003, by a vote of 414-12. During floor

consideration, an amendment offered by Representative Jim McGovern was defeated

by a vote of 209-216. The amendment would have decreased by $61 million funding

for Interdiction and Counterdrug Activities and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative

for Colombia, and would have increased funding for the Office of Domestic

Preparedness by $34 million.

36

See CRS Report RL31383, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY2002 Supplemental and

FY2003 Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors, by (name redacted) and (name redacted),

which tracks the legislative activity and the provisions of this act.

CRS-30

Senate Action. The Senate passed H.R. 1559 on April 7, 2003, by a vote of

93-0, after it struck all after the enacting clause and inserted the text of S. 762, the

Emergency Wartime Supplemental, reported out by the Senate Appropriations

Committee on April 1.

Conference Report. The conference agreement passed both the House and

the Senate on April 12, 2003, and was signed into law on April 16, 2003 (P.L. 10811). With regard to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative and Colombia, it provided

$34 million for the ACI of which $5 million is to assist persons who have been

displaced as a result of the armed conflict in Colombia. Further, it provided that up

to $20 million in Foreign Military Financing (FMF) funds could be transferred to the

ACI for aircraft, training, and other assistance for the Colombian Armed Forces.

Overall FMF funding totaled $2.059 billion, of which the Administration

subsequently allocated an additional $17.1 million for Colombia. The Department

of Defense was provided with an additional $34 million for its Drug Interdiction and

Counter-Drug Activities to fund “increased operational tempo in Colombia’s unified

campaign against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities.” Report language

directed the Secretary of Defense to submit a report to Congress within 30 days of

enactment detailing how these funds are to be obligated in support of the U.S.

Southern Command’s Colombia initiative.

FY2004 Foreign Operations Appropriations

House Action. The House Foreign Operations Appropriations Subcommittee

marked up the FY2004 bill (H.R. 2800/H.Rept. 108-222) on July 10, 2003, which

was followed by full committee consideration on July 16, 2003. The Committee

approved the President’s request of $731 million for the Andean Counterdrug

Initiative, and included a number of conditions and reporting requirements. The

Committee does not earmark funds by country from the Child Survival and Health

programs, Development Assistance, Foreign Military Financing, and Economic

Security Funds (with some exceptions), which comprise components of the Andean

Regional Initiative. However, the Committee provided additional funding over

FY2003 levels for the Child Survival and Health Program, and moderate increases

for the Economic Support Fund, and Foreign Military Financing programs.

Development Assistance was cut slightly.

As in previous years, the Committee included a number of funding conditions

and reporting requirements. These provisions include the following:

!

Expanded authority for a unified campaign against narcotics

trafficking, activities of terrorist organizations, and to take actions

to protect human health and welfare in emergency situations,

including rescue operations. The Committee Report notes, as it has

in previous years, that this authority is not a signal for the United

States to become more deeply involved in assisting the Colombian

military in fighting its terrorist groups, and especially not at the

expense of counternarcotics programs. Expanded authority is meant

to provide “more effective intelligence gathering and fusion, and to

provide the flexibility to the Department of State when the

CRS-31

distinction between counternarcotics and counterterrorism are [sic]

not clear cut.”

!

Expanded authority shall cease if the Secretary of State determines

that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous

operations to restore government authority and respect for human

rights in areas under the effective control of paramilitary and

guerrilla organizations. This is similar language to previous years.

!

If any helicopters procured with ACI funds are used to aid or abet

the operations of paramilitaries, the helicopters shall be immediately

returned to the United States. This is similar language to previous

years.

!

Support for a Peruvian air interdiction program is denied until the

Secretary of State and Director of Central Intelligence certify to

Congress, 30 days prior to any resumption, that such a program will

include enhanced safeguards and procedures to prevent any similar

occurrence to the April 20, 2001 incident in which two American

missionaries were killed after a plane in which they were flying was

shot down.

!

It requires a report from the State Department and Agency for

International Development within 45 days of the bill’s enactment on

the proposed uses of all ACI funds on a country-by-country basis for

each proposed program, project, or activity.

!

It allows for the obligation of 75% of ACI funds without prior

certification from the Secretary of State with regard to human rights.

To release the remaining 25%, the Secretary must certify that 1) the

Colombian Armed Forces are suspending those who have been

credibly alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights,

or to have aided paramilitary organizations; 2) the Colombian

government is prosecuting military personnel accused of human

rights abuses; 3) the Colombian military is cooperating with civilian

prosecutors and judicial authorities in such cases; 4) the Colombian

military is severing links with paramilitary organizations; and 5) the

Colombian military is executing orders for the capture of

paramilitary leaders. The Committee directs the Secretary to meet

with internationally recognized human rights organizations prior to

making the certification.

!

It directs the Secretary of State to deny visas to any alien who has

provided support to the FARC, ELN, or AUC or has committed or

abetted the commission of gross violations of human rights.

!

The report recommends $1 million for the Naval Post Graduate

School (N.S.) to strengthen public engagement and democratic

control of national security in Colombia.

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!

The report states the Committee’s support for USAID’s continuing

alternative development strategy, and for the so-called “carabineros”

police program to establish a law enforcement presence in rural and

remote areas.

!

The report states the Committee’s concern that U.S. assistance is not

adequately reaching the substantial Afro-Colombian population,

which has been significantly affected by the conflict.

!

The report states the Committee’s concern with the increase in

Colombian heroin and directs the State Department to consult with

the Committee on its strategy for heroin eradication.

During full committee consideration, Chairman Jim Kolbe accepted an

amendment proposed by Representative Sam Farr to require the State Department to

submit a report no later than 60 days from enactment that describes detailed plans

and programs to train Colombian nationals for the purpose of assuming

responsibilities for programs currently being executed by U.S. contractors with funds

provided in the bill.

H.R. 2800 passed the House on July 23, 2003. During its consideration, the

House defeated by a 195-226 margin an amendment by Representative Jim

McGovern and Representative Ike Skeleton to cut $40 million from the Andean

Counterdrug Initiative and $35 million from Foreign Military Financing funds, and

to transfer this $75 million to Child Survival and Health programs.

Senate Action. The Senate Committee on Appropriations reported out their

bill (S. 1426/S.Rept. 108-106) on July 17, 2003, providing $660 million of the

President’s ACI request, with the authority to transfer an additional $37 million from

the State Department’s INCLE account to ACI. Of this total of $697 million, the

Committee directed that not less than $250 million be allocated directly to USAID

for alternative development and institution building programs, including judicial

reform. Of the $250 million, $165 million is directed to these types of programs in

Colombia. In addition, the Committee earmarked funding for certain programs in

Colombia: $2.5 million to protect human rights defenders; $2.5 million for the

United Nations Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia;

$10 million for assistance to the Colombian Attorney General’s Human Rights Unit;

and $2.5 million for assistance to the human rights office of the Colombian

Procuraduria. (During Senate floor consideration, this amount was increased to $3.5

million by an amendment offered by Senator Leahy.) The Senate took up H.R. 2800

on October 24, substituting the text of S. 1426, passing the bill on October 30 by

voice vote.

Like the House bill, it includes a number of reporting requirements.

!

It provides expanded authority for a unified campaign against

narcotics trafficking, activities of terrorist organizations, and to take

actions to protect human health and welfare in emergency situations,

including rescue operations.

CRS-33

!

Expanded authority shall cease if the Secretary of State determines

that the Colombian Armed Forces are not conducting vigorous

operations to restore government authority and respect for human

rights in areas under the effective control of the paramilitary and

guerrilla organizations.

!

If any helicopters procured with ACI funds are used to aid or abet

the operations of any illegal self-defense group or illegal security

cooperative, the helicopters shall be immediately returned to the

United States.

!

It requires a report from the State Department, in consultation with

USAID, within 45 days of the bill’s enactment, on the proposed uses

of all ACI funds on a country-by-country basis for each proposed

program, project or activity.

!

Section 664 allows for the obligation of 50% of ACI funds prior to

a certification from the Secretary of State with regard to human

rights. The release of the remaining 50% would be in two

installments: the first after such a certification; the second after July

31, 2004, with an additional certification. Specifically, the Secretary

must certify that (1) the Colombian Armed Forces are suspending

personnel who have been credibly alleged to have committed gross

violations of human rights, including extra-judicial killings, or to

have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; (2) the Colombian

government is investigating and prosecuting members of the

Colombian Armed Forces who have been credibly alleged to have

committed gross violations of human rights; (3) the Colombian

Armed Forces are cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial

authorities in such cases; (4) the Colombian Armed Forces are

severing links with paramilitary organizations; and 5) the Colombian

Armed Forces are dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial

networks by arresting commanders and financial backers. The

Committee directs the Secretary of State to meet with internationally

recognized human rights organizations at least 10 days prior to

making these certifications.

!

Section 665 directs the Secretary of State to deny visas to any alien

who has provided support to the FARC, ELN, or AUC, or has

committed or abetted the commission of gross violations of human

rights.

!

It continues previously enacted provisions that would prohibit not

more than 20% of funds to be used for the procurement of chemicals

for aerial coca and poppy fumigation unless the Secretary of State,

in consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency, certifies that (1) the herbicide mixture is being

used in accordance with EPA label requirements for comparable use

in the United States and with the Colombian Environmental

Management Plan; (2) the herbicide mixture, in the manner it is

CRS-34

being used, does not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to

humans or the environment; and (3) complaints of harm to health or

licit crops caused by fumigation are evaluated and fair compensation

is being paid for meritorious claims. It also states that these funds

may not be used unless programs are being implemented by USAID,

the government of Colombia, or other organizations, to provide

alternative sources of income in areas where security permits for

small-acreage farmers whose illicit crops are targeted for fumigation.

!

It prohibits any U.S. Armed Forces personnel or U.S. civilian

contractors employed by the United States from participating in any

combat operation in Colombia.

!

It commends the commitment of Colombian President Uribe in

tackling the threats of terrorism and narcotics in Colombia.

!

It includes language maintaining the existing caps on U.S. personnel

in Colombia at 400 for military and 400 for civilian contractors in

support of Plan Colombia.

!

It commends the Colombian National Police for reasserting its

presence throughout the country and provides $17 million in FMF

funds for three DC-3 aircraft to increase their mobility. The

Committee report notes that it sees “the Colombian military as a

particularly weak link in the fight against terrorism and narcotics.”

!

It requires a report from the Secretary of State, not less than 90 days

from enactment, that describes (1) the budgetary impact for fiscal

years 2004 through 2007 of State Department and other relevant

agencies of Plan Colombia and Andean Counterdrug Initiative

activities, including the projected cost per year of maintaining and

operating equipment, including aircraft, that the United States has

provided to Colombia; (2) the progress, to date, that the United

States has made in turning over management and implementation of

Plan Colombia and the Andean Counterdrug Initiative programs

from U.S. personnel to the Colombian government; and (3) the exit

strategy that would transfer such programs and activities to the

Colombian government.

!

It continues the so-called “Leahy Amendment” that prohibits

funding for any units of security forces if the Secretary of State has

credible evidence that such unit has committed gross violations of

human rights.

!

It makes U.S. assistance to the Bolivian police or military contingent

on a report from the Secretary of State that (1) the Bolivian

government is vigorously investigating and prosecuting members of

the military and police who have been credibly alleged to have

committed gross violations of human rights and is punishing those

found to have committed such violations; and (2) the Bolivian

CRS-35

military and police are cooperating with such investigations and

prosecutions.

!

It prohibits assistance to Venezuela if the Secretary of State certifies

that the government of Venezuela is assisting, harboring, or

providing sanctuary to Colombian terrorist organizations. It exempts

$5 million in Economic Support Funds for democracy and rule of

law programs.

Conference Report.

The House and Senate Foreign Operations

Appropriations Bills were included in the FY2004 Consolidated Appropriations Bill

(H.R. 2673/H.Rept. 108-401). The measure passed the House on December 8, 2003,

and the Senate on January 22, 2004 (P.L. 108-199). The conference report provides

$731 million for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative, the same as the President’s

request. It also provides a total of $4.294 billion in Foreign Military Financing, of

which the Administration proposed spending $133.5 million in the Andean nations.

The conference report included a number of provisions relating to the Andean

Region.

!

It maintains language authorizing support for a unified

campaign against narcotics trafficking and activities by

organizations designated as terrorist organizations. Report

language notes that counternarcotics, alternative development,

and judicial reform should remain the principal focus of U.S.

policy in Colombia.

!

This authority shall cease if the Secretary of State has credible

evidence that the Colombian Armed Forces are not vigorously

attempting to restore government authority and respect for

human rights in areas under the effective control of

paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.

!

It maintains the current cap on the number of U.S. military and

U.S. civilian contractors at 400 each, in support of Plan

Colombia.

!

It maintains language requiring that if any helicopter procured

with ACI funds is used to aid or abet the operations of any

illegal self-defense group or illegal security cooperative, the

helicopter shall be immediately returned to the United States.

!

It requires that the Secretary of State, in consultation with the

Administrator of USAID, provide to the Committees on

Appropriations a report within 45 days of enactment and prior

to the initial obligation of funds on the proposed uses of all

ACI funds on a country-by-country basis for each proposed

program, project, or activity.

!

It requires that not less than $257 million of ACI funds be

made available for alternative development and institution

CRS-36

building, of which $229.2 million shall be allocated to

USAID.

!

It requires that not less than $25 million be made available for

justice and rule of law programs in Colombia.

!

It requires that not less than $13 million, in addition to the $25

million referred to above, be made available for organizations

and programs to protect human rights. Accompanying report

language states that these funds are to be allocated as follows:

$2.5 million for protecting human rights defenders in

Colombia; $2.5 million for the U.N. Office of the High

Commissioner for Human Rights in Colombia; $6.5 million

for the Colombian Attorney General’s Human Rights Unit;

and $1.5 million for the human rights unit of the Colombian

Procuraduria.

!

It requires that not more than 20% of funds used for the

procurement of chemicals for aerial coca and poppy

fumigation be made available unless the Secretary of State, in

consultation with the Administrator of the Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) certifies that 1) the herbicide

mixture is in accordance with EPA label requirements for

comparable use in the United States and any additional

controls recommended by the EPA; and 2) the herbicide

mixture does not pose unreasonable risks or adverse effects to

humans or the environment. Further, the Secretary of State

must certify that complaints of harm to health or licit crops

caused by fumigation are evaluated and fair compensation is

being paid for meritorious claims. These funds may not be

made available unless programs are being implemented by

USAID, the Colombian government, or other organizations,

and in consultation with local communities, to provide

alternative sources of income in areas where security permits

for small-acreage growers whose illicit crops are targeted for

fumigation.

!

It requires that not less than $2.5 million be made available for

training, equipment, and other assistance for the Colombian

National Park Service. It also provides that funds may be used

for aerial fumigation in Colombia’s national parks or reserves

if the Secretary of State determines that it is in accordance

with Colombian laws and that there are no effective

alternatives to reduce drug cultivation in these areas.

!

It prohibits any U.S. military personnel or U.S. civilian

contractors from participating in any combat operations in

Colombia.

It allows the obligation of 75% of assistance to the Colombian

Armed Forces without a determination and certification from

!

CRS-37

the Secretary of State regarding respect for human rights and

severing ties with paramilitary groups. The remaining 25%

can be released in two installments of 12.5% each. The first

installment can be made provided that the Secretary of State

certifies that 1) the Commander General of the Colombian

Armed Forces is suspending members who have been credibly

alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or

to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; 2) the

Colombian government is vigorously investigating and

prosecuting members of the military who have been credibly

alleged to have committed gross violations of human rights or

to have aided or abetted paramilitary organizations; 3) the

Colombian Armed Forces have made substantial progress in

cooperating with civilian prosecutors and judicial authorities

in such cases; 4) the Colombian Armed Forces have made

substantial progress in severing links to paramilitary

organizations; and 5) the Colombian Armed Forces are

dismantling paramilitary leadership and financial networks by

arresting commanders and financial backers. The last

installment can be made after July 31, 2004, if the Secretary

of State certifies that the Colombian Armed Forces are

continuing to meet the above conditions and are conducting

vigorous operations to restore government authority and

respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of

paramilitary and guerrilla organizations. It also requires that

not later than 60 days after enactment, and every 90 days

thereafter, the Secretary of State shall consult with

internationally recognized human rights organizations

regarding progress in meeting these conditions.

!

It denies visas to anyone who the Secretary of State

determines willfully provided any support to the FARC, ELN,

or AUC, or has participated in the commission of gross

violations of human rights in Colombia.

!

None of the funds can be used to support a Peruvian air

interdiction program until the Secretary of State and the

Director of Central Intelligence certify to Congress 30 days

prior to resuming the program that enhanced safeguards and

procedures have been developed.

!

It requires a report by the Secretary of State that the Bolivian

military and police are respecting human rights and

cooperating with investigations and prosecutions of alleged

violations of human rights before ACI funding for Bolivia can

be spent.

!

It provides that $17 million in FMF funds may be transferred

to and merged with ACI funds, and made available for aircraft

and related assistance for the Colombian National Police.

CRS-38

FY2004-FY2005 Foreign Relations Authorization

House Action. Reflecting continuing concern with the persistent and complex

conflict in Colombia, the spill-over of guerrilla and drug trafficking activities into

neighboring countries, and the ongoing involvement of the United States (including

the kidnaping and killing of American citizens), the House International Relations

Committee reported out H.R. 1950, (H.Rept. 108-105, Part 1) on May 16, 2003, with

three reporting requirements similar to provisions in the Foreign Relations

Authorization for FY2003 (H.R. 1646/P.L. 107-228), and with the provision of

additional authority related to the interdiction of illicit arms trafficking.

Section 703 of the bill as reported by the House International Relations

Committee would require the Secretary of State, after consulting with internationally

recognized human rights organizations, to make a very detailed report to Congress,

not later than 30 days after enactment and every 180 days thereafter, on the specific

measures that the Colombian authorities are taking to apprehend and prosecute

leaders of paramilitary organizations and other terrorist organizations. The

Committee report expressed concern about the illegal activities not only of two leftist

guerrilla groups, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the

National Liberation Army (ELN), but also of the rightist paramilitary groups,

specifically the United Self Defense Forces of Colombia (AUC), that are reported to

be responsible for at least half of all non-combatant killings, torture, and

disappearances. Noting that the State Department’s March 2003 human rights report

found some continuing collusion with the AUC by members of the Colombian

security forces, the Committee report stated that Colombia’s government has not

committed at every level to confront the paramilitaries and to protect civilians from

paramilitary abuses.

Section 709 would require the Secretary of State to submit a report on the

impact of the U.S. assistance plan known as Plan Colombia on Ecuador and

Colombia’s neighboring countries to appropriate congressional committees not later

than 30 days after enactment. This report is to set forth a comprehensive strategy for

United States activities in Colombia, with specific reference to the impact of U.S.

assistance on Ecuador and other adjacent countries, and it is to provide the reasons

for the failure to submit a report on this subject as required by the Foreign Relations

Authorization Act for FY2003. Stating that a State Department report of March 4,

2003, was inadequate, the Committee report expressed the expectation that a new

report “will address in detail not only the counter-drug repercussions of Plan

Colombia and its successor programs on Ecuador and other adjacent countries, but

also the humanitarian and economic development implications of increased

eradication efforts for these countries.”

Section 1801 would provide specific authority for U.S. counter-drug assistance

which is being used to support the interdiction of aerial trafficking of illicit narcotics

to be used to support the interdiction of illicit arms in connection with illicit drug

trafficking. The Committee report notes that “this provision ensures that any and all

illegal arms brought into Colombia by aerial means that are in any way trafficked in

connection with the illicit drug trade, are also clearly eligible for U.S. assistance in

interdicting.”

CRS-39

Section 1802 would require the Secretary of State, acting through the

Department of State’s Narcotics Affairs Section (NAS) in Bogotá, Colombia, to

ensure, not later than 180 days after enactment, “that all pilots participating in the

United States opium eradication program in Colombia are Colombians and are fully

trained, qualified and experienced pilots, with preference provided to individuals who

are members of the Colombian National Police.” The Committee report states that

local Colombian police anti-drug pilots are more familiar with the terrain and can be

more effective in locating crops, thereby enhancing efforts to eradicate the small but

potent opium crop that makes up nearly two-thirds of U.S. heroin use, according to

recent United States estimates, while promoting the Colombianization of the

programs and reducing the involvement of U.S. private contractors.

On July 16, 2003, the House passed H.R. 1950 by a vote of 382-42.

Senate Action. On April 24, 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

reported out S. 925 (S.Rept. 108-39), the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of

2004, with one provision related to Colombia and the Andean region. Responding

to a request from the Executive Branch, Section 801 of the bill would repeal the

requirement in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriation Act for FY2000 (P.L.

106-246) that the State Department report semi-annually on the extradition of

narcotics traffickers from Andean countries. In floor action on S. 925 on July 10,

2003, the Senate approved two amendments related to Colombia and Andean region

assistance, both by voice vote.

Amendment 1162, proposed by Chairman Luger, added Section 815, which

would modify the reporting requirements on U.S. personnel involved in the antinarcotics campaign in Colombia by changing the frequency of the reports from

bimonthly to quarterly, and by clarifying that the reports were to be provided to

appropriate committees of Congress.

Amendment 1194, proposed by Majority Leader Frist, added Section 2522,

which would commend the leadership and people of Colombia for the progress made

against illicit drug traffickers and terrorists, and which supported the efforts of

President Uribe and the government and the people of Colombia to preserve and

strengthen democracy, human rights, and economic opportunity in Colombia.

FY2004 Foreign Assistance Authorization

Senate Action. On May 29, 2003, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

reported out S. 1161, the Foreign Assistance Authorization Act of 2004 (S.Rept. 10856), with several provisions on assistance to Colombia and the Andean region.

Section 122 would authorize $700 million (rather than the $731 million

requested) for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative. It provides that assistance for

Colombia for FY2004 and previous years may be used to support a unified campaign

against narcotics trafficking and terrorist activities; and to take actions to protect

human health and welfare in emergency circumstances, including undertaking rescue

operations. It further provides that U.S. personnel providing such assistance shall be

subject to the personnel caps in the Emergency Supplemental Act for 2000, shall not

participate in any combat operation in connection with such assistance; and shall be

CRS-40

subject to the condition that Colombia is fulfilling its commitment to the United

States with respect to its human rights practices, including specific conditions set

forth in the Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2003.

Section 502 provides that information on the extent of involvement of U.S.

businesses in counter-narcotics activities under State or Defense Department

contracts, required by the previous Foreign Relations Authorization, may be reported

in the annual report detailing the counter-narcotics performance of drug producing

and drug transit countries.

FY2004 National Defense Authorization

House Action. On April 4, 2003, Representative Duncan Hunter introduced

H.R. 1588, authorizing appropriations for FY2004 for the Department of Defense.

The Committee on Armed Services reported the bill on May 16, 2003, with

provisions relating to Colombia (H.Rept. 108-106). The House considered H.R.

1588 on May 20, and 21, with final passage on May 22. With regard to Colombia,

Section 1208 of the bill would increase the cap on the number of U.S. military

personnel in Colombia to 500, from 400 in existing law. It would provide an

exemption from the limitation for any members of the armed forces in Colombia to

rescue or retrieve U.S. military or civilian personnel. This limitation could not be

exceeded for a period longer than 30 days. The provision also exempts from the cap

(1) military personnel assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Colombia as attaches, as part

of the security assistance office, with the Marine Corps security contingent, (2)

personnel participating in natural disaster relief operations, and (3) those involved in

non-operational transit through Colombia. The Secretary of Defense is provided with

authority to waive these limitations if he deems it in the national security interests of

the United States, and with notification to congressional defense committees within

15 days.

Section 1047 of the bill would provide authorization for drug interdiction and

counterdrug activities to provide assistance to Colombia to support a unified

campaign against drug trafficking and activities by organizations designated as

terrorist organizations.

Senate Action. On May 13, 2003, Senator John Warner introduced S. 1050,

the National Defense Authorization Act of FY2004. On June 4, 2003, the Senate

took up H.R. 1588, striking all after the enacting clause and inserting the text of S.

1050. The measure passed the Senate by voice vote the same day and conference

committee consideration is pending. With regard to Colombia and the Andean

region, Section 1207 of the bill extends the authority of Section 1033 of the National

Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998 (P.L. 105-84) which authorizes

DOD counternarcotics programs. It also would renew authority to support

counterdrug activities in Peru which had expired at the end of FY2002. The section

also authorizes counternarcotics support through the end of FY2006 for seven

additional countries, including Bolivia and Ecuador, among others, with $40 million

for each authorized in any fiscal year. The bill directs the Secretary of Defense to

provide a comprehensive report on how counterdrug funds are spent in each of these

nine countries within 60 days following the end of each fiscal year for which the

program is authorized.

CRS-41

Section 1208 of the bill would extend for two additional years the expanded

authority to use DOD funds to support a unified campaign against narcotics

cultivation and trafficking, and against terrorist organizations in Colombia.

Conference Report. The conference report (H.Rept. 108-354) was agreed

to by the House on November 7 and by the Senate on November 12, 2003, and signed

by President Bush on November 24, 2003 (P.L. 108-136). Section 1021 provides

authority for the Defense Department to provide support for counterdrug activities

by extending authority in Section 1033 of the National Defense Authorization Act

for FY1998 (P.L. 105-84) for counterdrug support to Colombia and Peru. Section

1022 authorizes the Department of Defense joint task forces to provide for

counterterrorism activities to law enforcement agencies, as it does for counterdrug

activities. Section 1023 extends for an additional two years expanded authority to

use Defense Department counterdrug funds to support a unified campaign against

narcotics cultivation and trafficking and against associated terrorist organizations in

Colombia.

FY2004 Intelligence Authorization

House Action. On June 11, 2003, Representative Porter Goss introduced

H.R. 2417, the Intelligence Authorization Bill for FY2004. It was reported (H.Rept.

108-163) from the Committee on Intelligence on June 17, 2003, and approved by the

House on June 27, 2003, by a vote of 410-9. In regard to Colombia, Section 501

authorizes funds for counterdrug and counterterrorism activities, with provisions

similar to the Senate bill regarding a unified campaign, a prohibition on participation

of U.S. military and contract employees, and caps on U.S. military and contract

personnel. (See below.) The report accompanying the bill notes the Committee’s

concern with regard to the level of resources and personnel allocated to narcotics

trafficking, transnational organized crime, and terrorist activity in Colombia, as well

as Afghanistan, and North Korea. It states the expectation that the FY2005 budget

request will include “a reinvigorated strategy to combat narcotics trafficking and

other transnational organized crime — with appropriate funding and personnel levels

for the Director of Central Intelligence’s Crime and Narcotics Center (CEC).”

Senate Action. On May 8, 2003, Senator Pat Roberts introduced S. 1025, to

authorize appropriations for FY2004 for intelligence and intelligence-related

activities, including provisions relating to Colombia. The Committee on Intelligence

reported the bill the same day (S.Rept. 108-44) while the Committee on Armed

Services reported the bill (S.Rept. 108-80) on June 26, 2003. Section 313 of the bill

authorizes the use of funds for a unified campaign against narcotics trafficking and

activities of designated terrorist organizations such as the FARC, ELN, and AUC.

This authority shall cease “if the Secretary of Defense has credible evidence that the

Colombian military is not conducting vigorous operations to restore government

authority and respect for human rights in areas under the effective control of

paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.” Section 313 also maintains caps of 400

each on U.S. military and contractor personnel stationed in Colombia, and prohibits

the participation of U.S. military personnel or civilian contractors in any combat

operations except for the purposes of self defense or search and rescue operations of

U.S. Armed Forces personnel, U.S. civilian employees, or civilian contractors

CRS-42

employed by the United States. On July 31, 2003, the Senate took up H.R. 2417,

inserting the text of S. 1025, and passing it the same day.

Conference Report. The conference report (H.Rept. 108-381) passed the

House on November 20, 2003, and the Senate the following day. It was signed into

law on December 13, 2003 (P.L. 108-177). Section 502 of the agreement authorizes

the use of intelligence funds for a unified campaign against drug trafficking and

terrorism in Colombia. It also maintains the prohibition on U.S. military or civilian

contractors from participating in combat operations in Colombia.

Temporary Protected Status Legislation

Several bills were introduced to designate Colombian and Peruvian citizens

under section 244 of the Immigration and Nationality Act as eligible for temporary

protected status (TPS). H.R. 2843, introduced on July 24, 2003, would grant TPS to

both Colombians and Peruvians. H.R. 2853, introduced the same day, would grant

TPS to just Colombians. Both bills have been referred to the House Judiciary

Committee. In the Senate, S. 986 would designate Colombians as eligible for TPS.

The bill has been referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee.37

37

For more information, see CRS Report RS20844, Temporary Protected Status: Current

Immigration Policy and Issues, by (name redacted) and (name redacted).

CRS-43

Appendix A. Map Showing Andean Regional

Initiative Countries

CRS-44

Appendix B. FY2002 Andean Regional Initiative

FY2002 Request and FY2002 Allocations by Purpose and by Functional Accounts

($ millions)

Country

Total ARI

FY2002

Request

Colombia

399.00

Bolivia

Total

ARI

FY2002

Actual

ACI FY2002 Actual

By Purpose

ARI FY2002 Actual

By Account

Economic/

Social/

Governance

Counternarcotics and

Security

International

Narcotics Control

(Andean

Counterdrug

Initiative)

Development

Aid

Child

Survival

and

Diseases

Economic

Support

Fund

Foreign

Military

Financing

373.90

130.40

243.50

373.90

0

0

0

0

143.48

130.70

39.60

48.00

87.60

12.90

19.70

10.00

0.5*

Brazil

26.18

20.00

0

6.00

6.00

4.80

9.20

0

0

Ecuador

76.48

46.86

10.00

15.00

25.00

6.86

0

15.00

0

Panama

20.50

13.70

0

5.00

5.00

4.50

0

4.20

0

Peru

206.15

195.70

67.50

75.00

142.50

15.00

23.70

14.50

0

Venezuela

10.50

5.5

0

5.00

5.00

0

0

0.50

0

Totals

882.29

786.40

247.50

397.50

645.00

44.06

52.60

43.70

0.50

Source: Office of the Secretary of State. International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2003 Budget Request Summary and Highlights. These data include

funding from accounts that comprise the Andean Regional Initiative: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE.), Andean Counterdrug

Initiative, development aid, child survival and health aid, and foreign military financing. The ARI has not included (and consequently these figures do not

include) International Military Education and Training funds, food aid, peace corps funds, or Department of Defense counternarcotics funds. Prepared by (nam

e redacted) and (name redacted), Updated July 17, 2003. Totals may not add due to rounding.

The ARI for FY2002 also did not include Foreign Military Finance Funding (FMF). The small amount for Bolivia is included here, even though it was not

specifically for counternarcotics purposes, in order to facilitate comparisons with the FY2003 request, which includes FMF for Andean Regional Initiative

countries. Amounts for Colombia do not include funds from the FY2002 Supplemental: $4 million for ACI; $25 million in counter-kidnaping training; and

$6 million to protect the Cano-Limon oil pipeline. Similarly, amounts for Ecuador do not include $3 million in FMF funds.

CRS-45

Appendix C. FY2003 Andean Regional Initiative

FY2003 Request and FY2003 Allocations by Purpose and by Functional Accounts

($ millions)

ACI FY2003 Allocations

By Purpose

Country

Total

ARI

FY2003

Request

Total

ARI

FY2003

Allocations

Economic/

Social/

Governance

Counternarcotics

and

Security

ARI FY2003 Allocations

By Account

International

Narcotics

Control

(Andean

Counterdrug

Initiative)

Development

Aid

Child

Survival

and

Diseases

Economic

Support

Fund

Foreign

Military

Financing

Colombia

537.0

597.3

149.2

318.0

467.2

0

0

0

130.1

Bolivia

132.6

133.4

41.7

49.0

90.7

12.2

18.5

10.0

2.0

Brazil

29.5

22.2

0

6.0

6.0

6.4

9.8

0

0

Ecuador

65.1

54.5

15.9

15.0

30.9

7.1

0

15.5

1.0

Panama

20.5

13.4

0

4.5

4.5

4.9

0

3.0

1.0

Peru

186.6

176.2

68.6

59.5

128.1

16.3

21.7

9.0

1.0

8.5

2.6

0

2.1

2.1

0

0

.5

0

979.8

999.6

275.4

454.1

729.5

46.9

50.0

38.0

135.1

Venezuela

Totals

Source: Office of the Secretary of State. International Affairs Function 150 Fiscal Year 2004 Budget Request Summary and Highlights. February 2003.

Estimates for FY2003 were provided to CRS by the Department of State. These data include funding from accounts that comprise the Andean Regional

Initiative: International Narcotics Control and Law Enforcement (INCLE), Andean Counterdrug Initiative, development aid, child survival and health aid, and

foreign military financing. The ARI has not included (and consequently these figures do not include) International Military Education and Training funds, food

aid, peace corps funds, or Department of Defense counternarcotics funds. Totals may not add due to rounding.

Note: Amounts for Colombia include the FY2003 Emergency Wartime Supplemental. Not included here, because it is not part of the ARI, is $34 million from

DOD’s counternarcotics program. Prepared by (name redacted), Analyst in Latin American Affairs, July 17, 2003.

CRS-46

Appendix D. FY2004 Andean Regional Initiative

FY2004 Request by Purpose and Functional Accounts

($ millions)

ARI FY2004 Request by

Purpose

Country

Total ARI

FY2004

Request

ARI FY2004 Request by Account

International Narcotics Control

(ACI)

Economic/

Social/

Governance

Counternarcotics and

Security

TOTAL

ACI

Alternative

Development/

Institution

Building

Interdiction

Development

Aid

Child

Survival

and

Health

Programs

Fund

Economic

Support

Fund

Foreign

Military

Financing

Colombia

573.0

150.0

423.0

463.0

150.0

313.0

0

0

0

110.0

Bolivia

128.8

75.8

53.0

91.0

42.0

49.0

11.4

14.4

8.0

4.0

Brazil

32.2

20.2

12

12.0

0

12

8.2

12.0

0

0

Ecuador

71.4

36.4

30.0

35.0

15.0

20.0

7.1

0.3

14.0

15.0

Panama

20.8

9.3

11.5

9.0

0

9

5.8

0

3.5

2.5

Peru

159.0

91.0

68.0

116.0

50.0

66.0

15.3

16.7

9.0

2.0

5.5

.5

5.0

5.0

0

5

0

0

0.5

0

990.7

383.2

602.5

731.0

257.0

474.0

47.8

43.4

35.0

133.5

Venezuela

Totals

Source: Office of the Secretary of State, Resources, Plans and Policy. International Affairs Function 150 Summary and Highlights, Fiscal Year 2004 Budget

Request. Prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in Intern ational Security Affairs, and (name redacted), Analyst in Latin American Affairs, updated July 17,

2003.

Note: The Budget documents submitted by the Administration make reference to the Andean Counterdrug Initiative only. It does not reference the Andean

Regional Initiative, which has since its inception, included funding for development assistance, children survival and health, and economic support fund

programs. For purposes of this report, both are included for comparative purposes with previous years’ funding levels.

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