Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress

Congressional research reportJun 4, 2003

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Order Code RL31946

Report for Congress

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Iraq War: Defense Program

Implications for Congress

June 4, 2003

Coordinated by Ronald O’Rourke

Specialist in National Defense

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Contributors

Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division

Richard A. Best, Jr.

(name redacted)

Ronald O’Rourke

Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for Congress

Summary

The recent war against Iraq may have implications for various defense programs

of interest to Congress. This report surveys some of those potential implications, and

will be updated periodically as new information becomes available. Three cautionary

notes associated with post-conflict “lessons-learned” reports apply to this report:

Information about the Iraq war is incomplete and imperfect, so early lessons are

subject to change. Each war is unique in some ways, so observers should avoid

“overlearning” the lessons of the Iraq war. And potential U.S. adversaries can derive

lessons from the Iraq war and apply them in future conflicts against U.S. forces,

possibly devaluing U.S.-perceived lessons. It can also be noted that some persons

or organizations offering purported lessons of the Iraq war may have a financial,

institutional, or ideological stake in the issue.

Many observers have concluded that the Iraq war validated the Administration’s

vision for defense transformation, or major parts of it. Other observers disagree. The

issue is potentially significant because implementing the Administration’s vision

could affect the composition of U.S. defense spending, and because the

Administration may invoke the theme of transformation to help justify or seek rapid

congressional consideration of legislative proposals, including proposals that could

affect Congress’ role in conducting oversight of defense programs. The Iraq war may

influence debate on whether active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently large to

carry out current U.S. military strategy, and on whether greater emphasis should be

placed on forces that are less dependent on access to in-theater bases.

One of the most significant defense-program debates going into the Iraq war –

and potentially one of those most significantly influenced by the war – concerns the

future size and composition of the active-duty Army. Both supporters and opponents

of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Army divisions may find support in the Iraq

war for their positions, as may both supporters and opponents of the current Army

plan to shift toward a mix of fewer heavy armored units and a larger number of

lighter and more mobile units.

The Iraq war validated the effectiveness of combat-aircraft armed with

precision-guided weapons, and may influence discussions about current plans for

investing in specific aircraft and munitions programs. The Iraq war may reinforce

support generated by the war in Afghanistan for increased investment in U.S. special

operations forces. It may also highlight questions concerning reserve combat

divisions and the potential consequences of extended callups of large numbers of

reserve forces.

The war appears to have demonstrated the value of network-centric operations

and timely battlefield intelligence, and the potential value of psychological

operations. It appears to have confirmed the importance of preparing for urban

combat. The war offered a limited real-world test of the Patriot missile defense

system. The war may lead to renewed discussions about strategies for reducing

friendly fire incidents. It may reinforce support for investing in aerial refueling

capabilities, and increase interest in potential new airlift and sealift technologies.

Contents

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Scope of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Deriving “Lessons” of the War: Some Cautionary Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

Organization of Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3

Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Defense Transformation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4

Size of Military Needed For National Military Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

Overseas Base Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15

Army Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

Combat Aircraft and Precision-Guided Munitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

Special Operations Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40

Reserve Forces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42

Network-Centric Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46

Urban Combat . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49

Ballistic Missile Defense . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51

Friendly Fire . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54

Intelligence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58

Psychological Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61

Chemical-Biological Warfare . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63

Airlift and Aerial Refueling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 64

Sealift . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71

Iraq War: Defense Program Implications for

Congress

Introduction1

The recent war against Iraq, known formally as Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF),

was the largest U.S. military operation since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and may

have implications for various defense programs of interest to Congress. This report,

which is similar to one that CRS prepared following the 1991 Persian Gulf war,2

surveys some of those potential implications. It will be updated periodically as new

information becomes available.

Scope of Report

This report focuses on how the Iraq war may affect defense programs that

Congress may address in acting on defense authorization and appropriation bills for

FY2004 and subsequent fiscal years. It does not cover broader defense policy issues

such as U.S. national security strategy or Congress’ role in declaring war. Nor does

it cover the post-war occupation and reconstruction efforts in Iraq or the potential

impact of the war on U.S. foreign relations and the U.S. role in the world. Issues like

those are covered in other CRS products.

Deriving “Lessons” of the War: Some Cautionary Notes

Although the Department of Defense (DoD) and other organizations customarily

produce “lessons learned” reports following the conclusion of a major military

operation like the Iraq war, this report for the most part avoids using the term

“lessons” because it can imply the making of recommendations – something that

CRS reports do not do. Even so, certain cautionary notes associated with “lessonslearned” reports apply to this report. These include the following:

! Information is imperfect; early lessons are subject to change. Public

information about the Iraq war is currently incomplete, and will likely remain

so for some time. Although certain aspects of the war, such as the operations

of U.S. Army and Marine Corps ground forces moving from Kuwait to

Baghdad, received extensive press coverage, many details of these operations

are not known. Other aspects of the war, such as coalition air operations, were

reported in less detail. And some aspects of the war, such as the activities of

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

CRS Report 91-421 F, Persian Gulf War: Defense-Policy Implications for Congress,

coordinated by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 1991. (May 15, 2001) 82 p.

CRS-2

special operations forces, have received very little press coverage. Knowledge

about the war at this point is thus fragmentary and unbalanced. Historically,

moreover, early information that is publicly available about a war often proves

to be inaccurate. Attempts to identify lessons should be tempered by an

appreciation for gaps and imperfections in the available information. As

information becomes more complete and accurate with time, early lessons

may need to be modified or dropped.

! Each war is unique; avoid “overlearning” the lessons of this war.

Particularly for U.S. military forces, which fight conflicts in different parts of

the world against various adversaries, each war is characterized by a unique

combination of variables such as geographic setting, pre-conflict warning and

preparation time, U.S. and enemy war aims, the size and composition of

enemy military forces, the quality of enemy military training and leadership,

the amount and kind of military assistance that the United States or the enemy

receives during the war from other governments or groups, the enemy

government’s degree of popular support among its own population, and the

presence or absence of factional divisions within the enemy country’s

population due to ethnic differences or other factors. Given how at least some

of these factors usually change for the United States from one war to the next,

it has long been a staple of U.S. lessons-learned reports to note that lessons

from one conflict may not necessarily apply to the next, might need to be

applied with caution, or might contradict lessons of previous conflicts. Some

of the lessons of the Iraq war, for example, may differ from lessons of the

U.S.-led war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002 or the U.S. military operation in

Kosovo in 1999. In short, the lessons of the Iraq war should not be

“overlearned” because the Iraq war in some ways might not serve as an

accurate template for future conflicts.

! Non-U.S. observers derive lessons as well, possibly devaluing U.S.-

perceived lessons. The United States is not the only country that derives

lessons from U.S. military operations; observers in other countries do so as

well. Non-U.S. observers keenly observe the U.S. way of war and draw

conclusions about its strengths and weaknesses. These conclusions, if correct,

can be applied by potential U.S. adversaries to improve their ability to contest

U.S. forces in a future conflict. Serbia, for example, observed the 1991

Persian Gulf war and drew lessons from it on how to counter the effects of

U.S. air power. These lessons were applied with some success by Serbian

forces in Kosovo in 1999. In short, lessons that U.S. observers reach about a

given U.S. military operation can be devalued by lessons that potential

adversaries draw from that same operation. This is another reason to avoid

“overlearning” the lessons of a given U.S. military operation.

Numerous persons or organizations may offer what they contend are the lessons

of the Iraq war. In evaluating purported lessons offered by various sources, one

factor to consider is whether those sources have a potential financial, institutional,

or ideological stake in the issue. Persons or organizations identifying the lessons of

a war can be influenced, perhaps strongly, by such a stake. Indeed, some persons or

organizations may deliberately identify and publicize purported lessons with the aim

of influencing policy decisions on defense programs in a way that promotes their own

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interests. Although lessons offered by persons or organizations with a stake in the

issue in many cases may be reasonable or correct, policymakers may wish to take

such interests into account in evaluating lessons put forward by such sources.

Organization of Report

The remainder of this report consists of a series of discussions on various

defense program issues that might have been affected in one way or another by the

Iraq war. The discussions are designed to be fairly self-contained, so that readers

may browse topics using the Table of Contents and read those of interest. A footnote

at the start of each discussion identifies the CRS analyst who prepared that section.

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Issues for Congress

Defense Transformation3

Iraq War Viewed As A Test. In the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, many

observers anticipated that the conflict would serve as a test of the administration’s

vision for defense transformation – its concept for overhauling the U.S. military to

exploit new technologies and counter 21st-Century security threats.4 Following the

war, many of these observers concluded that the war validated this vision, or at least

major parts of it, and also strengthened Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s

authority to implement this vision over the objections of persons or organizations

opposed to parts of it. Some observers speculated that the war may encourage the

administration to increase the scope of its planned defense transformation or

implement it more quickly.5

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

Defense transformation generally refers to large-scale, discontinuous, and possibly

disruptive changes in military weapons, organization, and concepts of operations (i.e.,

approaches to warfighting), that are prompted by significant changes in technology or the

emergence of new and different international security challenges. For more on defense

transformation, see CRS Reports RS20787, Army Transformation and Modernization:

Overview and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted); RS20859,

Air Force

Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress, by (name redacted); RS20851,

Naval Transformation: Background and Information for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke,

RL31922, Military Transformation: Issues for Congress and Status of Effort, by Lloyd D.

DeSerisey, and RL31425, Military Transformation: Intelligence, Surveillance and

Reconnaissance, by Judy G. Chizek.

For examples of pre-war articles anticipating that the war would test the administration’s

vision for defense transformation, see Cooper, Richard T., and John Hendren. Strategy

Boiled Down To Light Vs. Heavy. Los Angeles Times, March 19, 2003; Gordon, Michael

R. A Sequel, Not A Rerun. New York Times on the Web, March 18, 2003 (Dispatches: A

Web-Exclusive Column); Towell, Pat. The War Agenda: Military Operations.

Congressional Quarterly Weekly, March 15, 2001: 601; Ricks, Thomas E. War Plan For

Iraq Largely In Place. Washington Post, March 2, 2003: 1; Barry, John, and Evan Thomas.

Boots, Bytes And Bombs. Newsweek, February 17, 2003; Sinnreich, Richard Hart. War

Could Test Transformation The Hard Way. Lawton (Oklahoma) Constitution, February 16,

2003; Jaffe, Greg. Getting U.S. Forces Together Poses Challenge For War Plan. Wall

Street Journal, February 11, 2003: 1; Thompson, Mark, and Michael Duffy. Pentagon

Warlord. Time, January 27, 2003; Jaffe, Greg. War Plan Aims To Balance Roles Of

Ground Forces, New Weapons. Wall Street Journal, November 27, 2002: 1.

See, for example, Jonson, Nick. Cebrowski: Emerging Global Threats Require New

Methods Of Operation. Aerospace Daily, May 14 2003; Scarborough, Rowan. ‘Decisive

Force’ Now Measured By Speed. Washington Times, May 7, 2003: 1; Hanson, Victor

Davis. Don Rumsfeld, Radical For Our Time. National Review, May 5, 2003; Moniz, Dave,

and John Diamond. Rumsfeld Is Perched At ‘Pinnacle Of Power.’ USA Today, May 1,

2003: 10; Stern, Seth. Pentagon Iconoclasts. Christian Science Monitor, April 29, 2003:1;

Burlas, Joe. ‘Iraqi Freedom’ Proves Transformation Concepts. Army News Service, April

28, 2003; Schlesinger, Robert. War May Provide Ammunition For Rumsfeld To Pursue

Vision. Boston Globe, April 25, 2003: 18; Whittle, Richard. Military Mulls Lessons Of

(continued...)

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Potential Significance for Congress. These conclusions and speculations,

if correct – and not all observers agree with them6 – are potentially of great

significance to Congress, for at least two reasons:

! Implementing the Administration’s vision for defense transformation could

substantially affect the composition of U.S. defense spending, shifting defense

funding toward defense programs that are judged to be transformational and

away from defense programs that are judged to be non-transformational or

“legacy.” Such shifts could significantly affect revenues and employment

levels at companies associated with the affected programs.

! The Administration may be encouraged to invoke the theme of transformation

to help justify or seek rapid congressional consideration of legislative

proposals affecting DoD that may or may not be transformational, depending

on one’s definition of transformation, including proposals which could, if

implemented, affect Congress’ role in conducting oversight of U.S. defense

activities. A potential case in point is the “Defense Transformation for the 21st

Century Act,” a 205-page legislative proposal that the administration

submitted to Congress on April 10, 2003 that would, among other things,

permit DoD to establish its own policies for hiring, firing, and compensating

its civil service employees; change the terms in office for certain senior

generals and admirals; give DoD increased authority to transfer funds between

(...continued)

War. Dallas Morning News, April 22, 2003; Ricks, Thomas E. Rumsfeld Stands Tall After

Iraq Victory. Washington Post, April 20, 2003: 1; Purdy, Matthew. After The War, New

Stature For Rumsfeld. New York Times, April 20, 2003; Knickerbocker, Brad. Iraq War As

A Blueprint For Next One. Christian Science Monitor, April 16, 2003: 1; Bowman, Tom.

U.S. Demonstrates ‘New Style Of War’ In Iraq. Baltimore Sun, April 13, 2003; Cooper,

Richard T., and Peter Pae. Battle For Military’s Future Unresolved. Los Angeles Times,

April 12, 2003; Squeo, Anne Marie, and Greg Jaffe. War’s Early Lessons May Curb

Enthusiasm For Older Weapons. Wall Street Journal, April 11, 2003; Jaffe, Greg.

Rumsfeld’s Vindication Promises A Change In Tactics, Deployment. Wall Street Journal,

April 10, 2003; Knickerbocker, Brad. War Boosts Rumsfeld’s Vision Of An Agile Military.

Christian Science Monitor, April 11, 2003; Cushman, John H. Jr., and Thom Shanker. War

In Iraq Provides Model Of New Way Of Doing Battle. New York Times, April 10, 2003;

Bender, Bryan. Maturing Approach Called Guide. Boston Globe, April 9, 2003; Jenkins,

Holman W., Jr. Two Wars Of CEO Rumsfeld. Wall Street Journal, April 9, 2003; Bender,

Bryan, and Robert Schlesinger. Arms And The Man: The Rumsfeld Vision. Boston Globe,

April 6, 2003. See also Trimble, Stephen. Cebrowski: Iraq War Offers Clues For

Transformation Agenda. Aerospace Daily, April 23, 2003.

For examples of articles that take issue in varying degrees with the conclusion that the Iraq

war validated the administration’s transformation vision, see Stern, Seth. Military

‘Transformation’ May Not Mean Smaller Forces. Christian Science Monitor, May 7, 2003;

Helprin, Mark. Analyze This: Civilian Officials Reached A Point Of Sufficiency Only

Because They Were Pushed To It. National Review, May 5, 2003; O’Hanlon, Michael. A

Reality Check For The Rumsfeld Doctrine. London Financial Times, April 29, 2003: 13;

Arkin, William M. It Ain’t Broke After All. Los Angeles Times, April 27, 2003.

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DoD budget accounts; and eliminate many DoD reporting requirements that

were instituted to assist Congress in conducting oversight of DoD activities.7

The Administration’s Transformation Vision. The administration

identified defense transformation as a major goal for DoD soon after taking office

and has since worked to define its transformation vision. In general, that vision calls

for shifting U.S. military planning away from a reliance on massed forces, sheer

firepower, military services operating in isolation from one another, and attritionstyle warfare,8 and toward a greater reliance on speed and agility, stealth, precision

application of firepower by widely distributed forces, information technology, joint

(i.e., integrated multi-service) operations, and effects-based warfare.9 Some

transformation advocates characterize these changes as shifting from an Industrial

Age approach to war to an Information Age approach. Transforming the military

along these lines, the administration and its supporters argue, will permit the United

States to apply military power more rapidly and flexibly in distant parts of the world,

outpace enemy decisionmaking on the battlefield, more effectively counter so-called

asymmetric military threats,10 and generally achieve U.S. military combat goals with

fewer forces, more quickly, and at lower cost. The Administration’s transformation

vision also includes proposals for changing DoD’s business practices, particularly

with an eye toward streamlining those practices so as to accelerate the fielding of new

weapons and generate savings that can be used to invest in them.

See, for example, Donnelly, John M. Hill Rebuffing Rumsfeld Plan To Kill Reports To

Congress. Defense Week Daily Update, May 15, 2003; Liang, John. House Democrats

Object To DOD Transformation Legislation. InsideDefense.com, May 14, 2003; Matthews,

William, and Gopal Ratnam. Transformation Act Draws U.S. Lawmakers’ Fire.

DefenseNews, May 5, 2003: 1; and Korb, Lawrence. Pentagon Independence.

DefenseNews, June 2, 2003: 29.

Attrition-style warfare refers to a traditional warfighting strategy that focuses on seeking

out the enemy’s military forces, wherever they might be, and then using firepower to destroy

them piece by piece, through a process of gradual attrition, until the enemy is no longer

capable of fighting effectively.

Effects-based warfare, also called effects-based operations, refers to a warfighting strategy

that has been proposed as an alternative to traditional attrition-style warfare. Rather than

focusing on seeking out and destroying enemy forces wherever they might be, effects-based

operations focuses on attacking selected key elements of the enemy’s ability to fight in a

coordinated manner. Under an effects-based strategy, U.S. forces might attack the enemy’s

military leadership, its military command-and-control systems, and the most politically and

militarily significant elements of the enemy’s fielded military forces while bypassing less

significant enemy military forces. The goal of effects-based warfare is to create specific

effects on the enemy that lead to a rapid collapse of the enemy’s willingness and ability to

fight, without having to go through a time-consuming and potentially costly effort to destroy

the bulk of the enemy’s military forces through a gradual process of attrition.

Asymmetric threats refer to military capabilities that adversaries may field as part of a

strategy to avoid directly attacking perceived U.S. strengths and instead attack perceived

U.S. weaknesses. Potential asymmetric strategies include terrorism, use of nuclear,

chemical, or biological weapons, and development of so-called anti-access/area-denial

forces that are intended to prevent U.S. forces from establishing an initial foothold in a

contested overseas area of military operations.

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Transformational vs. Legacy Programs. Within the discussion on

defense transformation, there has been significant debate over which programs

qualify as transformational and which do not. Advocates of various defense

programs have argued that their programs should be viewed as transformational, or

at least not as legacy – a label that in some eyes has become synonymous with

obsolescence and suitability for reduction or termination.

Defense program areas that have frequently been identified as closely associated

with the administration’s transformation vision include the following:

! precision-guided air-delivered weapons,

! lighter and more mobile Army ground forces,

! special operations forces,

! unmanned vehicles,

! smaller and faster Navy surface ships,

! space systems and missile defense,

! forces for countering terrorists and weapons of mass destruction, and

! C4ISR systems that link U.S. and coalition military units into highly

integrated networks possessing superior battlespace awareness.11

Defense program areas that have been identified by various observers, correctly

or not, as non-transformational or legacy include the following:

! unguided weapons,

! heavy armored forces for the Army,

! manned tactical aircraft,

! large, slower-moving Navy surface ships, and

! weapons and associated C4ISR systems that operate in an isolated, stand-

alone manner rather than as part of a network.

The Pre-War Debate. Prior to the Iraq war, the Administration had identified

transformational programs as a high defense investment priority. In submitting its

proposed FY2004 defense budget to Congress in February 2003, the Administration

stated that the request was the first to fully reflect its transformation vision and

included more than $24 billion in acquisition funding for transformational programs.

Some transformation advocates outside the administration argue that the

administration, though rhetorically supportive of transformation, has continued to

place too much emphasis on legacy programs and not enough on transformational

programs. They argue, for example, that the administration’s defense budget plans

devote too much funding to manned tactical aircraft programs and not enough

funding to programs for upgrading or replacing the Air Force’s long-range bombers

C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance. C4ISR systems include things such as ground-based,

airborne, and spaced based sensors for locating, identifying and tracking friendly and enemy

forces, and computers, datalinks, and networking software for rapidly processing and

sharing information among networked friendly forces. Battlespace awareness refers to

having a real-time understanding of the location, identity, and movement of friendly and

enemy forces within a military area of operations.

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(which can deliver large numbers of precision-guided weapons) or for acquiring

unmanned vehicles.

In the weeks leading up to the Iraq war, some observers speculated that the

conflict would test important elements of the Administration’s transformation vision,

including its increased reliance on precision-guided air-delivered weapons, special

operations forces, unmanned vehicles, and joint operations; the use of advanced

C4ISR systems for networked operations and improved battlespace awareness;

reduced reliance on massed ground forces; and a war plan reflecting an effects-based

approach more than traditional attrition-style warfare. Pre-war speculation that the

conflict would test the Administration’s transformation theories was strengthened by

reports that Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld had played a strong role in shaping the

war plan to make it more in keeping with the Administration’s transformation vision,

particularly in terms of reducing the planned number of conventional ground forces

to be used in the invasion.

Debate Following the Iraq War. Those who support the idea that the Iraq

war validated the Administration’s transformation vision, or at least important

elements of it, could argue one or more of the following:

! The U.S.-led war effort, which produced a quick victory with low casualties,

featured a significant and successful use of precision-guided air-delivered

weapons, special operations forces, unmanned vehicles, joint operations, and

advanced C4ISR systems. It also employed a strategy that avoided attritionstyle warfare where possible and focused more on effects-based operations

directed against the key leadership and command-and-control targets and the

most politically and militarily significant elements of the enemy’s fielded

military forces.

! The number of conventional ground forces making up the invasion force was

not only fairly small compared to the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but even smaller

than the administration had planned, due to Turkey’s decision not to permit

the Army’s 4th Infantry Division to use Turkish territory to invade Iraq from

the north and the administration’s decision to begin the war before this

division was redeployed to Kuwait.

! The speed and precision of the U.S.-led war effort significantly reduced Iraq’s

ability to mount a coordinated response, leading to scattered and largely

ineffective Iraqi defensive efforts and to many instances of Iraqi military units

in the field that were hopelessly uninformed about the location and

movements of U.S. forces.

! Lighter and more air-mobile Army forces, which the Army is currently

developing as part of the Administration’s transformation plan, would have

been useful, following Turkey’s decision, for quickly establishing a more

significant U.S. ground presence in northern Iraq.

Those taking a more skeptical view on whether the war validated the

Administration’s transformation vision could argue one or more of the following:

! The U.S. military force employed in the war was largely a product of

investment decisions made prior to the Bush administration. Although the

force incorporated some elements of the administration’s transformation plan,

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it represented only a partial or embryonic version of the administration’s

vision for a transformed force. A more fully transformed force would have

featured, for example, more (and more capable) unmanned vehicles, a more

completely networked C4ISR environment, and the use of lighter, more

mobile Army forces that are now in development. The war thus did not

provide a pure test of a force fully transformed along the lines of the

administration’s vision.

! Iraq’s military was significantly inept in mounting a defense of the country.12

In light of Iraqi military ineptness, it is not clear that the war amounted to a

serious test of the Administration’s transformation plan. A more traditional

U.S.-led war effort, or an effort reflecting a transformation plan significantly

different from the Administration’s, might also have succeeded.

! The number of conventional ground forces making up the invasion force was

greater, according to some press reports, than some transformation advocates

had proposed during the early stages of planning for the Iraq war. And the

larger force that was used came close to being insufficient: If Iraqi forces had

mounted a more effective effort to cut the extended and thinly defended

supply lines linking U.S. ground forces to supply areas further south, the

invasion might have experienced a significant setback. In this sense, the

relatively small ground invasion force may have introduced greater risk into

the war plan than anticipated.

! Although heavy armored ground forces are not closely associated with the

Administration’s transformation plan and have been characterized as legacy

forces, the war underscored the value of heavy armored ground forces. Heavy

armored units were successful both in breaking through Iraqi defenses in the

south and in urban combat operations in Baghdad and other cities. They were

largely invulnerable to Iraqi rocket-propelled grenades and other light arms

and, in drawing fire from such weapons, proved valuable in uncovering the

locations of hidden Iraqi fighters, who could then be killed. More lightly

armored ground forces like those being developed by the Army as part of the

Among other things, Iraq’s air force did not take to the air; important bridges in most cases

were not destroyed; armored units were left out in the open, where they would be vulnerable

to U.S. air attack (repeating a mistake made from the 1991 Persian Gulf war); ineffective

human-wave tactics were used to attack U.S. armored vehicles; and few apparent

preparations were made to mount an organized defense of Baghdad. In addition, Iraq did

not make use of options that might have complicated U.S. and coalition operations, such as

attacking the buildup of U.S. and British forces in Kuwait, igniting large numbers of oil

wells, blowing dams to flood likely invasion routes, and employing any available chemical

weapons.

An alternative but similar argument is that Iraq’s response to the invasion reflected not Iraqi

military ineptness, but rather a decision by Iraq’s leaders to forego making a serious attempt

to resist the invasion in favor of a strategy of allowing the invasion effort to succeed, going

into hiding, and then reemerging after the withdrawal of U.S. and other foreign forces to win

back control of the country through the efforts of a reorganized Baath party. This scenario

is consistent with the sudden and apparently planned disappearance of much of Iraq’s top

leadership as U.S. forces entered Baghdad. For articles discussing this possibility, see Sale,

Richard. CIA Reported To Believe Saddam Is Alive. UPI.com, June 2, 2003; Saddam

Plotting Return To Power, Ex-Generals Say. New York Times on the Web, May 19, 2003.

(Reuters wire service story)

CRS-10

Administration’s transformation plan would have been more vulnerable to fire

from the kinds of weapons used by Iraqi defenders.

! Even if Iraqi military operations had been better planned and executed, the

war could not provide a major test of certain elements of the Administration’s

transformation plan. For example, although Iraq laid mines in the Persian

Gulf and may have attempted to fire antiship cruise missiles at coalition naval

forces, Iraq’s military capabilities and geographic options for countering

enemy naval forces were very limited. The war therefore could not pose a

significant test of the Administration’s programs for transforming U.S. naval

forces so as to make them effective against significant enemy maritime antiaccess/area-denial forces.

A potential intermediate view would combine arguments from both sides of the

debate. This view, while noting the success of the war effort and its significant use

of force elements associated with the Administration’s plan, would also acknowledge

that the U.S. force used in the war represented only a partial fulfillment of the

administration’s transformation plan, that Iraqi military ineptness was a significant

factor, that the war may offer mixed evidence concerning the Administration’s plan

for transforming Army forces, and that the war did not significantly test other

elements of the Administration’s transformation plans.

It should also be noted that observers who take a skeptical view on whether the

war validated the Administration’s transformation vision are not necessarily opposed

to that vision. They may support the vision but conclude that the war did not happen

to offer a clear validation of it.

An additional potential implication concerns asymmetric military threats. By

demonstrating to the world the formidable capabilities of conventional U.S. military

forces, the Iraq war may encourage other countries to place increased emphasis on

developing asymmetric means of countering the United States, including terrorism,

nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons, cyberwarfare against U.S. military and

civilian computer systems, and anti-access/area-denial weapons (such as theaterrange ballistic missiles) that are intended to prevent U.S. forces from gaining a

foothold in an overseas operating area. In this sense, the success of the U.S.-led war

effort, it might be argued, may strengthen the need for U.S. defense transformation

to focus on developing capabilities for countering such asymmetric threats.13

Some of the program areas mentioned above, including Army ground forces,

special operations forces, and unmanned vehicles, are discussed in more detail in

subsequent sections of this report.

Size of Military Needed For National Military Strategy14

Concern Regarding Size of U.S. Forces. Prior to the Iraq war, some

observers had expressed concern that active-duty U.S. military forces are

See, for example, Tiboni, Frank. War Game Stuns U.S. Strategists. DefenseNews, May

12, 2003: 1.

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-11

insufficiently sized to execute the administration’s national military strategy, at least

not without placing an undue strain on military personnel and equipment or taking

undue risks in time of war. The Administration and its supporters argued in response

that U.S. forces were of sufficient size to carry out the strategy.

Administration’s Military Strategy. The administration’s military strategy

is sometimes called the 1-4-2-1 strategy because it calls for maintaining U.S. military

forces sufficient for:

! [1] “protect[ing] the U.S. domestic population, its territory, and its critical

defense-related infrastructure against attacks emanating from outside U.S.

borders,”

! [4] “maintaining regionally tailored forces forward stationed and deployed in

[the four regions of] Europe, Northeast Asia, the East Asian littoral, and the

Middle East/Southwest Asia to assure allies and friends, counter coercion, and

deter aggression against the United States, its forces, allies, and friends,”

! [2] “swiftly defeating attacks against U.S. allies and friends in any two

theaters of operation in overlapping timeframes,” and

! [1] “decisively defeating an adversary in one of the two theaters in which U.S.

forces are conducting major combat operations by imposing America’s will

and removing any future threat it could pose. This capability will include the

ability to occupy territory or set the conditions for a regime change if so

directed.”15

Pre-War Debate. Prior to the Iraq war, those who were concerned about

whether U.S. forces were sufficiently sized to carry out this strategy pointed to the

high operational tempo that certain parts of the military have maintained in recent

years, the large number of reserve forces that have been activated since the terrorist

attacks of September 11, 2001 (and the extended length of certain reserve-unit tours

of duty since that time), the interest among certain Army officers for increasing the

Army’s active-duty end strength so as to better support ongoing commitments in

various locations, gaps in forward deployments of Navy ships to certain overseas

regions, and the relationship of the total number of active air wings, divisions, and

ships to the potential requirements of fighting two regional wars in overlapping time

frames.

Some observers expressed concern that going to war in Iraq would stretch

certain active-duty U.S. forces too thinly. They argued that a war with Iraq could

reduce forces available for pursuing the global war on terrorism or leave the United

States with insufficient forces to deter or respond to potential aggression by North

Korea. Forces that were cited as at risk of being in short supply in the event of a war

with Iraq included special operations forces, certain kinds of aircraft (cargo planes,

tankers, jamming aircraft, surveillance aircraft, and battle-management aircraft), and

U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2001.

(September 30, 2001) p. 17-21. The quoted passages are taken from pages 18, 20, and 21.

The strategy also calls for the United States “to maintain and prepare its forces for smallerscale contingencies in peacetime, preferably in concert with allies and friends.” (page 21)

CRS-12

specialized infantry vehicles, combat-support troops, and support gear for the Army.16

These concerns continued as the Iraq war began.17

Force Commitments During the War. Fighting the Iraq war while also

performing other duties – including war-on-terrorism operations in Afghanistan and

elsewhere, regional-deterrence operations, and homeland-defense operations –

resulted in the following commitments of active-duty U.S. forces:

! Army: A large fraction of the Army’s 10 active-duty divisions and additional

independent combat units were deployed or stationed outside the United

States. Three divisions (the 3rd Infantry Division, the 101st Airborne Division,

and the 4th Infantry Division), parts of two other divisions (the 82nd Airborne

Division and the 10th Mountain Division) and one or two independent combat

units (the 173rd Airborne Brigade and possibly the 2nd Cavalry Regiment) were

deployed to Iraq, part of a division (the 82nd Airborne Division) was deployed

to Afghanistan, two divisions (the 1st Armored Division and the 1st Infantry

Division) were stationed in Germany, and most of another division (the 2nd

Infantry Division) was stationed in Korea.

! Air Force: A high percentage of the Air Force’s cargo aircraft, tankers, and

certain other specialized aircraft, and a high percentage of the military’s radarjamming aircraft (which are operated by the Navy and Marine Corps), were

deployed to Iraq.

! Marine Corps: About 67% of the Marine Corps’ operating forces were

forward-deployed in Iraq and elsewhere, and almost 80% were either forwarddeployed, forward-based, or forward stationed. Two of the Marine Corps’

three Maritime Prepositioning Ship (MPS) squadrons were committed to the

Iraq war. On April 2, 2003, General Michael Hagee, the Commandant of the

Marine Corps reportedly stated: “So, what we have done is we have provided,

in my opinion, sufficient combat power to do what needs to be done in Iraq....

We have sufficient forces positioned to swiftly defeat the effort if North Korea

decides to do something. And what are we doing in the other areas – we are

taking risks.”18

! Navy: The Navy put to sea 67%-68% of its ships (54% or 55% in deployed

status and another 13% in non-deployed operations),19 including 7 or 8 of its

See, for example, Tyson, Ann Scott. If More Duty Calls, Can US Military Deliver?

Christian Science Monitor, September 9, 2002; Richter, Paul. Two-War Strategy Faces

Test. Los Angeles Times, February 13, 2003.

See, for example, Infield, Tom. War Leaves Little In Reserve For Military. Philadelphia

Inquirer, April 3, 2002.

As quoted in Brown, Malina. Hagee: Marine Corps ‘Taking Risks’ In Areas Other Than

Iraq, N. Korea. Inside the Navy, April 7, 2003.

On March 24, 2003, 167 of the Navy’s 305 ships were at sea. The figures for April 1,

2003 were 164 of 303 ships. Non-deployed status can include training operations and other

short-term operations. Normally, about 40%-45% of the Navy is at sea, including 25%-30%

in deployed status and the remainder in non-deployed operations.

CRS-13

12 aircraft carriers,20 7 of its 11 carrier air wings,21 25 to 29 of its 38

amphibious ships22 and, within the amphibious-ship total, 9 or 10 of the

Navy’s 12 “large-deck” amphibious assault ships.23 Admiral William Fallon,

the Vice Chief of Naval Operations, testified on March 18, 2003, on the eve

of the war, that “today’s surge [in deployments] has put a significant strain on

every Navy resource.”24

! Special Operations Forces (SOF): A very high portion of the country’s

10,000 or so combat SOF personnel25 were committed to either Iraq,

Afghanistan, or other overseas locations.

In addition to these active-duty forces, 62% of the Military Sealift Command’s

prepositioning and surge sealift ships were involved in supporting the Iraq war.26

Post-War Debate. Supporters of the view that active-duty U.S. military

forces are sufficiently sized to execute the 1-4-2-1 strategy could argue the following:

! Even while U.S. forces were preparing for and fighting the Iraq war, the

military was able to augment its forces in Korea and the Western Pacific for

purposes of deterring possible North Korean aggression.

! Had a major conflict on the Korean Peninsula occurred while the Iraq war was

in progress, substantial additional combat forces were available for use there,

including Air Force bombers and tactical aircraft, Navy carriers and other

ships, Marine forces, and Army forces. Available Marine forces included

units based in Okinawa and Hawaii and the Marine Corps’ third MPS

squadron, which is based in the Western Pacific. Available Army units

included the 25th Infantry Division in Hawaii, the 1st Cavalry Division in

Texas, the remaining part of the 2nd Infantry Division in Washington, and the

remaining parts of the 10th Mountain Division in New York, plus one or more

independent combat units based in other U.S. locations.

! The quick and relatively low-cost victory gained by the relatively small U.S.led force in the Iraq war, together with further technological improvements

planned for U.S. military forces planned in the future, suggests that future

regional conflicts on average might require fewer U.S. forces than currently

Five of these carriers were used to fight the Iraq war. A sixth was on its way to the Persian

Gulf to replace one of the carriers operating in the Gulf, a seventh was deployed to the

Western Pacific, in part to deter potential aggression by North Korea, and an eighth was for

a time at sea apparently for training purposes.

The Navy has 10 active-duty carrier air wings and 1 reserve carrier air wing.

Twenty-eight on March 24, 2003; 29 on April 1, 2003; 25 on April 7, 2003.

Ten ships on March 24 and April 1, 2003, 9 on April 7, 2003.

As quoted in Infield, Tom. War Leaves Little In Reserve For Military. Philadelphia

Inquirer, April 3, 2002.

U.S. SOF forces total about 47,000 personnel. About 10,000 of these personnel are

combat forces; the rest are civil-affairs and support forces.

Information provided to CRS by Military Sealift Command via e-mail and telephone , May

23, 2003.

CRS-14

planned. If so, the current size of U.S. forces might be more than sufficient

for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames.

! Post-war demands for peacekeeping and constabulary forces in Iraq, while

substantial, are not permanent and can be met in part by forces from allied and

friendly countries. Some countries have already offered to provide such

forces.27

Those skeptical of the view that active-duty U.S. military forces are sufficiently

sized to execute the 1-4-2-1 strategy could argue the following:

! Fighting the Iraq war while performing other duties left the country with a

reduced capability for responding to an additional major emergency on the

Korean Peninsula or elsewhere, particularly with regard to specialized Air

Force aircraft, Navy carriers and air wings, Navy amphibious ships and

Marine Forces, and special operations forces.

! While sufficient ground forces may have been available for fighting an

additional conflict in Korea, transporting those forces to Korea in a timely

manner might have been very difficult, given the large commitment of U.S.

airlift and sealift assets to the Iraq war.

! Iraqi military ineptness contributed to the quick and relatively low-cost victory

of the U.S.-led war effort. Future adversaries may not be as inept, and may

learn and apply their own lessons from the Iraq war, suggesting that future

regional conflicts on average might require U.S. forces at least as large as

those used in the Iraq war. If so, the size of U.S. forces needed in the future

to fight two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames might be larger than

suggested by the Iraq war.

! In February 2002, the Air Force was forced to begin making exceptions to the

rotational cycle for its 10 Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs) so as to

meet overseas demands for Air Force personnel in certain career fields. As a

result, some Air Force personnel have had to deploy longer or more frequently

than the AEF standard.

! The Iraq war has created a post-war demand for maintaining tens of thousands

of Army soldiers in Iraq for peacekeeping and constabulary purposes,28 adding

to existing demands for Army peacekeeping and constabulary forces in

Afghanistan, the Balkans, and other locations. Maintaining significant

numbers of peacekeeping and constabulary forces in Iraq and elsewhere might

require the Army to use large numbers of activated reserve forces for extended

periods of time – a signal that the active-duty force is not sufficiently sized.

The Iraq war, coming at a time of elevated tensions on the Korean Peninsula,

may highlight the difference between conflicts that occur in overlapping time frames

vs. those that occur simultaneously. U.S. strategy is to have forces sufficient for

winning two major regional conflicts that occur in overlapping time frames, but not

Bowman, Tom. Few Allies Offer Help On Policing In Iraq. Baltimore Sun, May 31, 2003;

Squitieri, Tom. Relief For U.S. Troops Lacking. USA Today, May 30, 2003: 1.

Moniz, Dave. Ex-Army Boss: Pentagon Won’t Admit Reality In Iraq. USA Today, June

3, 2003: 1; Gordon, Michael R. How Much Is Enough? New York Times on the Web. May

30, 2003.

CRS-15

necessarily for winning two such conflicts that occur simultaneously. The

distinction, though important, is often overlooked in popular descriptions of U.S.

strategy.

The requirement for winning two conflicts that occur in overlapping time frames

refers in part to an assumption that the second conflict will start some number of

weeks after the first, and that certain U.S. forces that are needed primarily or most

urgently in the early stages of a regional conflict – such as certain airlift and sealift

forces, some kinds of aircraft, cruise-missile-armed Navy ships, and perhaps Marine

amphibious forces – can therefore be rotated from the first conflict to the second.

Such forces are sized closer to the requirements for fighting one conflict rather than

two. If this assumption proves incorrect – if the second conflict begins before such

forces can be rotated from the first conflict to the second – the U.S. ability to

prosecute the second conflict successfully or at acceptable cost could be reduced.

The combination of the Iraq war and the tense situation on the Korean Peninsula

provides policymakers with a potential case study for reviewing the planning

assumption of overlapping time frames and the potential risks of planning U.S. forces

on that basis.

Overseas Base Access29

Uncertain Access as a Planning Issue. The Iraq war, like the war in

Afghanistan in 2001-2002, appears to have underscored how, in the post-Cold War

era, U.S. access to foreign bases and territory in time of war can be uncertain and,

when provided, can come with restrictions from host nations on how the bases and

territory can be used. This is potentially significant, because some military analysts

have argued that U.S. defense programs must take uncertain access to foreign bases

into account in planning U.S. military forces.

War in Afghanistan. In the war in Afghanistan, few air bases in countries

close to Afghanistan were made available to support U.S. military operations, and

bases in Pakistan that were made available had to be used in a low-profile manner,

with a limited U.S. presence and a preference for conducting operations at night

rather than during the day. As a result of these limitations, sea-based forces operating

in the Northern Arabian Sea – carrier-based Navy and Marine Corps aircraft, Marine

forces on Navy amphibious ships, and special operations forces deploying from a

Navy carrier – played a significant role in U.S. military operations in Afghanistan,

particularly in the earlier stages of the conflict.

Iraq War. In the case of the Iraq war, protracted negotiations with Turkey

ended with a decision by the Turkish government to deny U.S. ground forces and

aircraft the use of bases and territory in Turkey. Turkey’s decision forced significant

alterations to the U.S. war plan: The plan to have the Army’s 4th Infantry Division

invade northern Iraq from Turkey, and thereby confront Iraqi leaders with significant

ground invasions from both the north and south, had to be abandoned. The 4th

Infantry Division was instead redeployed to Kuwait, and the United States conducted

the war with a much smaller U.S. ground presence in northern Iraq that consisted

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-16

primarily of a few hundred U.S. special operations forces personnel and 2,000

personnel from the Army’s 173rd Airborne Brigade who parachuted into the area.

Fighting the war this way reportedly complicated the U.S. politically sensitive goal

of preventing Turkish forces from entering northern Iraq and may have broadened

escape options for Iraqi leaders fleeing from U.S. forces that were advancing into

Baghdad from the south.

Turkey’s decision not to allow its air bases to be used by U.S. combat and

support aircraft similarly complicated U.S. air operations during the war. Air Force

combat aircraft could not fly into northern Iraq directly from Turkish bases, forcing

them to fly into that area from more distant bases, and sorties of Navy aircraft flying

into Iraq from two carriers in the Eastern Mediterranean were reportedly reduced

because Air Force tankers needed to refuel the Navy planes had to fly from more

distant bases in Eastern Europe and consequently could provide them with less onstation in-flight refueling capacity.

U.S. war plans were also complicated by, among other things, Saudi Arabia’s

reported unwillingness to allow its air bases and its territory near Iraq to be used by

most types of U.S. strike aircraft30 and invading U.S. ground forces, its decision to

not permit its ports on the Persian Gulf to be used by U.S. military sealift ships

(which reportedly contributed to a bottleneck at Kuwaiti port facilities for unloading

equipment and supplies from those ships),31 and Jordan’s reported unwillingness to

allow its bases and territory to be used, at least overtly, by U.S. aircraft and regular

ground forces.

In the weeks leading up to the war, there was uncertainty about whether Saudi

Arabia would permit the United States to use the large U.S.-built air operations

command center at Prince Sultan Air Base south of Riyadh. Although the Saudi

government decided to permit the facility to be used, U.S. military planners, as a

hedge against the possibility that the Saudi government would decide otherwise,

quickly built, at substantial cost, a substitute facility at Al Udeid Air Base near Doha

in Qatar.

During the war, the failure of several Navy Tomahawk cruise missiles using

certain flight paths over Turkey and Saudi Arabia prompted a decision by both

countries to close down those flight paths for use by Tomahawk missiles for the

remainder of the conflict, possibly complicating U.S. planning for subsequent

Tomahawk cruise missile attacks.

Potential Program Implications. Analysts who stress uncertainties about

access to foreign bases argue that U.S. defense programs should be restructured to

Saudi Arabia reportedly did allow its air bases to be used by F-16CGs armed with weapons

for attacking Iraqi radar systems. Gertz, Bill, and Roman Scarborough. Inside the Ring.

Washington Times, April 25, 2003: 5. (Item entitled “Saudi versatility II”)

Josar, David. Transportation Groups Tackle Oversized Load. European Stars and Stripes,

April 8, 2003; Wilkinson, Jeff. U.S. Supply Loads Are Taxing Kuwait’s Ports, Airports.

Philadelphia Inquirer, March 19, 2003.

CRS-17

place greater emphasis on forces that are less dependent on such bases. Examples of

such forces that are usually cited include the following:

! manned and unmanned aircraft with long operating ranges, fuel-efficient

engines, and large payloads (i.e., aircraft that can operate from distant bases,

including bases in the United States, loiter over distant battlefields for long

periods of time, and attack many targets before having to return home, while

requiring a minimum amount of in-flight refueling),

! aircraft that can operate from short or austere airfields (which might be the

only kind of air bases available in certain locations),

! sea-based forces, such as Navy and Marine Corps forces, that can conduct intheater operations from nearby international waters; and

! long-range weapons such as cruise missiles and, potentially, directed-energy

weapons such as lasers, that can destroy targets hundreds of miles away.

Advocates of both long-range aircraft and naval forces have long cited their relative

independence from in-theater land bases as an important characteristic in their

favor.32

Some observers believe the experience with base access during the Iraq war may

lead to increased interest in a new operational concept (i.e., a new approach to

warfighting) referred to as sea basing, or more formally as enhanced networked sea

basing.33 Although Navy and Marine Corps forces have long been referred to as seabased forces, Navy and Marine Corps officials are now using the term sea basing

more specifically, to refer to a proposed new approach for launching, directing and

supporting expeditionary military operations directly from ships at sea.34 Navy and

Marine Corps officials began to discuss the sea basing concept at about the time of

the war in Afghanistan. Although the sea basing concept has been proposed

primarily by Navy and Marine Corps officials, it can be expanded into a joint concept

under which Army or Air Force units might also be staged from bases at sea. DoD

officials have expressed some interest in the concept.35 Restructuring U.S. forces in

Some advocates of defense transformation argue that in-theater land bases, even if made

available to U.S. forces, might become vulnerable in the future to attack by enemy theaterrange ballistic missiles. For this somewhat different reason, they argue that DoD plans

should place less emphasis on forces requiring access to in-theater land bases, and more

emphasis on forces that are less dependent on access to such bases.

See, for example, Hodge, Nathan. Iraq War Seen As Test of Sea Basing. Defense Week,

April 21, 2003: 6; Brown, Malina. Navy, Marine Officials Argue Iraq War Validates Need

For Sea Basing. Inside the Navy, April 14, 2003: 1.

Under the sea basing concept, U.S. forces based at sea, rather than beginning an

expeditionary operation by first establishing or gaining control of an intermediate land base

somewhere in the theater of operations, would instead launch, direct and support the

operation directly from the ships at sea. Functions normally performed from the

intermediate land base – including command and control, indirect fire support, and logistics

support – would instead be performed from the ships at sea, while the expeditionary force

proceeds directly from the ships to the inland objective.

MacRae, Catherine. Aldridge Wants Top Defense Scientists To Study Future Of

(continued...)

CRS-18

accordance with the sea basing concept could lead to numerous changes in DoD ship,

aircraft, and weapon acquisition programs.

Other observers argue that the issue of overseas base access, while a concern,

has been exaggerated. They could argue that although the United States encountered

challenges with base access in Iraq and Afghanistan, the United States in both cases

was able to secure sufficient base access to support its operations, in part by

capturing air bases inside both countries. They can also note that, following the 1991

Persian Gulf war, many observers argued that Iraq had erred by allowing the U.S.-led

coalition to build up forces in the Persian Gulf for 6 months without challenge, and

that U.S. adversaries in the future would not repeat this mistake. In the Iraq war, they

could argue, this expectation proved inaccurate, as Iraq once again allowed U.S. and

British forces several months to build up forces in the Persian Gulf. Observers who

believe the base-access issue has been exaggerated can also note that, other things

held equal, long-range systems can be more expensive than short-range systems.

They could argue that given the cost of long-range systems and the likelihood that the

United States will be able to gain at least some access to in-region bases, DoD should

maintain its current mix of long- and short-range capabilities.

Army Forces36

A Pre-War Controversy. One of the most significant defense-program

debates going into the Iraq war – and potentially one of those most significantly

influenced by the war – concerns the future size and composition of the active-duty

Army. Issues involved in this debate include, among other things:

! the number of active-duty Army divisions to be maintained in the future;

! programs for upgrading the Army’s M1 Abrams tanks and other heavily

armored vehicles; and

! the Army’s plan to shift to a mix of combat forces that includes fewer heavily

armored combat units and a greater number of lighter and more mobile

combat units.

The Army’s Transformation Plan. The Army currently includes 10 activeduty divisions, as well as some additional independent active-duty combat brigades.

Several of the divisions and independent brigades are heavily armored units.

The Army’s transformation plan, which was initiated in 1999 by Army Chief of

Staff Eric K. Shinseki, would leave the number of active-duty Army divisions

unchanged at 10 but shift the composition of the Army toward a mix featuring fewer

heavily armored units built around armored vehicles like the M1 Abrams tank and

(...continued)

Seabasing. Inside the Pentagon, November 14, 2002: 1; Castelli, Christopher J. DOD Panel

Mulls Seabasing Ideas, Including Mobile Offshore Bases. Inside the Navy, November 18,

2002: 1; Ma, Jason. Seabasing Concept Pursued As A Way To Support Entire Joint Force.

Inside the Navy, November 25, 2002.

This section prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-19

the M2 Bradley fighting vehicle, and a greater number of more-mobile Army combat

units built around more lightly armored combat vehicles.

The principal goal of the transformation plan is to significantly improve the

Army’s ability to rapidly deploy significant ground combat forces to conflicts in

distant areas. The plan was prompted by the 1999 U.S. military operation in Kosovo,

which exposed inadequacies in the Army’s ability to rapidly deploy heavy forces, and

by the Army’s initial reaction to Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990. In the

latter instance, the Army was able to quickly deploy some lightly armed units, such

as the 82nd Airborne Division, to northeast Saudi Arabia to defend against a potential

Iraqi follow-on attack into that country,37 but some observers at the time said that

those forces would serve as little more than “speed bumps” in slowing down any

such attack.

The first step in the Army’s transformation plan is to create 6 new mobile

combat brigades over the next few years. These brigades are to be built around the

lightly armored Stryker wheeled combat vehicle and consequently are called Stryker

Brigade Combat Teams (SBCTs) or simply Stryker Brigades. The 6 Stryker Brigades

would constitute the core of the Army’s “Interim” transformation force.

The second step in the Army’s transformation plan would be to create a group

of more technologically advanced mobile combat units that would be the eventual

successors to both the legacy force38 and the Stryker Brigades. These more high-tech

combat units would be built around the Future Combat System (FCS), a collection

of advanced combat vehicles and supporting systems that is now in development.

The first FCS-equipped unit is to enter service in FY2008. Army units built around

the FCS would constitute the Army’s longer-term “Objective” transformation force.

To help finance programs for the Interim and Objective forces, funding has been

reduced for many programs related to the Army’s current “Legacy” force, including

programs for upgrading some of the Army’s M1 tanks and other armored vehicles.

Reported Tensions with OSD. Although the intent of the Army’s

transformation plan – shifting toward forces with greater mobility – appears broadly

consistent with the Administration’s vision for defense transformation, the Office of

the Secretary of Defense (OSD) reportedly is dissatisfied with Army transformation

efforts, believing them to be insufficiently aggressive. OSD is widely rumored in the

Immediately following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, U.S. officials were concerned that Iraqi

forces might continue their advance into northeastern Saudi Arabia so as to seize important

Saudi oil fields and port facilities located there. If they had done so, it would have given

Iraq control over a major source of oil and significantly complicated for U.S. military

planners the task of mounting a counter-offensive to expel Iraqi forces from territory they

had seized.

The Army uses “legacy force” as a neutral term for referring to Army units built around

weapons and equipment procured in previous years. Although, as mentioned earlier in the

report, the term “legacy” has become synonymous in some eyes with obsolescence and

suitability for reduction or termination, the Army’s use of the term does not carry that

meaning.

CRS-20

defense trade press to be interested in reducing the total number of Army active-duty

divisions from 10 to 8. OSD also expressed interest last year in reducing the number

of Stryker Brigades from 6 to 4, in part to make more funding available for programs

for the Objective force.

There have been numerous press reports of tension between OSD and the

Army’s senior leadership over the future size and composition of the active-duty

Army. Many observers believe that Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld’s

announcement in early 2002 of his preferred choice for General Shinseki’s successor,

which was made more than a year before the end of Shinseki’s term as Army Chief

of Staff, reflected this tension and was intended to prematurely turn Shinseki into a

lame duck. Some observers believe that OSD’s views on Army transformation

efforts are conditioned by a general OSD preference for air power over ground

power. Others believe OSD’s perceived tepid support for the Army’s transformation

plan is due in part to the fact that it was initiated in 1999, during the Clinton

Administration.39

Pre-War Debate Over the Plan. Independent of reported tensions between

OSD and the Army’s leadership, the Army’s transformation plan has generated

significant debate among military analysts.

Merits of Maintaining 10 Divisions. Supporters of the Army’s intention

to maintain 10 active-duty divisions have argued that this is the correct number for

carrying out the Army’s portion of the U.S. national military strategy. Ten activeduty Army divisions, together with 3 active-duty Marine Corps divisions, will be

sufficient, they have argued, for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping time

frames while carrying out additional responsibilities in other areas. If additional U.S.

ground forces are needed, they have argued, they can be mobilized from the Army

and Marine Corps reserves.

Some opponents of the 10-division figure have argued that it is insufficient to

carry out the Army’s portion of the national military strategy. The high operational

tempo of active-duty Army forces in recent years, and the need to mobilize large

numbers of Army reserve personnel for extended periods of active duty since

September 11, 2001, they have argued, is evidence that a 10-division force is

insufficient to carry out the Army’s various ongoing duties around the world,

particularly after 9/11. Other opponents of the 10-division figure (including,

reportedly, officials within OSD) argue that a 10-division force is larger than what

the Army will need in the future to carry out its portion of the national military

strategy. They argue that advances in U.S. warfighting technology, and changes in

U.S. military doctrine, might permit the Army to be reduced to as few as 6 activeduty divisions – 2 divisions for each of 2 overlapping regional conflicts, and 2 more

divisions for carrying out smaller-scale operations elsewhere.

For recent examples of articles reporting tension between OSD and the Army, see

Bowman, Tom. Rumsfeld Conducting War On Army. Baltimore Sun, May 7, 2003;

Caldwell, Robert J. Rumsfeld Vs. The Army. San Diego Union-Tribune, May 4, 2003.

CRS-21

Merits of Planned Shift to Lighter Forces. Supporters of the Army’s plan

to shift to a greater reliance on lighter forces have argued that it represents a good

strategy for making the Army more mobile and responsive. They have argued that

Stryker vehicles can be transported to distant locations aboard Air Force airlift

aircraft much more easily than the Army’s current heavily armored vehicles, that

Stryker-equipped units will derive their survivability on the battlefield from superior

situational awareness, stand-off capabilities, and agility rather than from armor, that

Stryker vehicles would be more useful than heavily armored vehicles for

maneuvering through countryside featuring poor roads and bridges, and that they

would be highly effective for combat operations in congested urban areas.

Opponents of the Army’s plan for shifting to lighter forces have questioned the

survivability in combat of more lightly armored vehicles like the Stryker. The

Stryker Brigades, they argue, could prove to be a good way for rapidly deploying

Army personnel into combat situations where they will be defeated by opposing

forces. Opponents of the Army’s transformation plan have also expressed doubts

about the technical feasibility of the FCS, which is to be significantly more mobile

than the Army’s current heavily armored vehicles while at the same time offering a

degree of protection against enemy fire similar to that of heavily armored vehicles.

Even using new technology, opponents have argued, it will not prove possible for the

FCS to offer both things at the same time.40

Army Operations in the Iraq War. Active-duty Army combat units, along

with Marine Corps and British combat units, played a central role in the Iraq war.

Major Army units involved in the war included the 3rd Infantry Division

(Mechanized), the 101st Airborne Division, a brigade from the 82nd Airborne

Division, and (in northern Iraq) the 173rd Airborne Brigade. The Army’s main

fighting forces for most of the war thus totaled less than 3 full divisions. U.S. war

plans originally called for an additional Army unit, the 4th Infantry Division

(Mechanized), to invade Iraq from Turkey. Following Turkey’s decision not to allow

its territory to be used by U.S. forces for staging an invasion of Iraq, this division was

redeployed to Kuwait and participated in a few combat operations toward the end of

For more on the Army’s transformation plan, see CRS Report RS20787, Army

Modernization and Transformation: Overview and Issues for Congress, by (name red

acted). Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 6 p.

CRS-22

conflict.41 Thousands of additional Army special operations forces were also

involved in the war (see the section on special operations forces.)

The Iraq war demonstrated that U.S. ground forces are highly capable on the

battlefield in conflicts against opposing ground forces. The U.S. and British ground

campaign benefitted from well-trained soldiers and Marines, good equipment,

effective air support from Air Force and Navy, and superior situational awareness.

U.S. and British ground forces appeared to have achieved some tactical surprise at

the start of the war, in spite of the lengthy pre-war buildup, by starting their attack

before the 4th Infantry Division deployed to Kuwait and before the start of extensive

U.S. air attacks. Once the invasion was underway, U.S. and British ground forces

achieved further tactical surprise through their high speed of advance, which

involved bypassing some Iraqi towns and military units, and their use of unexpected

routes. The flexible battle plan and rapid maneuvers used by U.S. ground forces kept

Iraqi forces off-balance. Some ground engagements involved fierce fighting, but

most weapons used by Iraqi forces were no match for the Army’s M1 tanks and M2

Bradley fighting vehicles.

Potential Program Implications.

Number of Active-Duty Army Divisions. Following the Iraq war, those

who support reducing the Army to less than 10 active-duty Army divisions could

argue that the relatively small number of Army divisions used for most of the war –

the equivalent of less than 3 full divisions – and the dominance achieved by those

units in combat, demonstrate that the Army can safely be reduced to less than 10

active-duty divisions while still retaining a capacity, in conjunction with Marine

Corps divisions, for fighting two regional conflicts in overlapping time frames and

performing additional duties elsewhere. The Iraq war, they could argue, is consistent

with the planned path of U.S. defense transformation, which envisages the United

States fighting future conflicts with less reliance on massive ground forces like those

assembled for the 1991 Persian Gulf war.

On March 21, 2003 the 3rd Infantry Division (Mechanized) (3ID) and the Marine Corp’s

1 Expeditionary Force (I MEF) entered Iraq from Kuwait and began their drive north to

Baghdad while British forces concentrated on southern Iraq, including the city of Basrah.

On March 28, the 101st Airborne Division joined the attack. On April 4, U.S. ground forces

were more than 300 miles into Iraq, and 3ID captured Saddam International Airport on the

outskirts of Baghdad. That same day, the Iraqi Republican Guard Nida Division was

declared combat ineffective and the Republican Guard Baghdad Division surrendered 2,500

soldiers to I MEF. On April 7, 3ID conducted a raid into the center of Baghdad with about

70 Abrams Tanks and 60 Bradley fighting vehicles. On April 9, U.S. Central Command

announced that Saddam Hussein’s regime no longer controlled Baghdad. By April 15, the

4th Infantry Division (Mechanized) was engaged in combat operations north of Baghdad and

U.S. special operations forces, Marines, and U.S. Army airborne forces occupied various

cities in northern Iraq, including Kirkuk and Tikrit. On April 15, 25 days after the ground

attack began, U.S. Central Command declared major combat to be over. At that point,

another two Army armored divisions and an Army armored cavalry regiment were still

deploying into the theater.

CRS-23

Those who support the idea of maintaining at least 10 active-duty Army

divisions could argue, following the war, that the original U.S. war plan called for

using an additional division (the 4th Infantry Division) throughout the war, that Army

supply lines were stretched to the breaking point and thinly defended as a result of

the rapid advance to Baghdad, that the number of U.S. ground forces needed for the

invasion was reduced by the contribution of an additional division by a coalition

partner (Britain), which is something the United States cannot count on happening

in future conflicts, that about 148,000 Army National Guard and Army Reserve

members were activated to help fulfill Army commitments during the war, and that

the commitment of Army forces for the Iraq war exacerbated an ongoing situation of

high worldwide operational tempo for both active and reserve Army units.42

Programs for Upgrading Armored Vehicles. Supporters of reinstituting

funding for upgrading the Army’s M1 tanks and other heavily armored vehicles

would argue that the Iraq war dramatically demonstrated the continuing value of

heavy armor in modern warfare, not only for defeating enemy forces in open terrain,

as many expected, but for conducting combat operations in urban areas, which many

observers did not anticipate. Given the importance of operations by heavily armored

units in the Iraq war, they could argue, the United States should ensure that all of its

armored forces are fully upgraded, particularly for fighting two regional conflicts in

overlapping time frames against capable enemy forces. They could also argue that

upgrading all the Army’s armored vehicles will provide more time to develop the

FCS, and thus reduce technical risk in the FCS development program.

Opponents of reinstituting funding for armor upgrades could argue that the war

demonstrated that U.S. armored units are already vastly superior to enemy forces and

that expending funds on further upgrades would therefore be unnecessary and

wasteful. They can note that the armored vehicles that were used successfully by the

Army and Marine Corps for most of the war are not the most upgraded versions in

the U.S. inventory, and that the Army already has a substantial number of more

highly upgraded versions that can be used, if needed, to fight more capable enemy

forces in the future.43 In light of this, they might argue, the Army can successfully

rely on its current plan to maintain a force that includes a mix of highly upgraded and

somewhat less upgraded (but still very capable) armored vehicles.

Plan to Shift to Lighter Forces. Supporters of the Army’s plan to shift to

a mix of forces including fewer heavily armored combat units and a greater number

of lighter and more mobile combat units could argue that the battlefield dominance

achieved by the relatively small number of Army and Marine Corps armored units

For an article discussing this issue in the context of the Army’s post-war constabulary

responsibilities in Iraq, see Gordon, Michael R. How Much Is Enough? New York Times

on the Web. May 30, 2003.

The main Army and Marine Corps units involved in the Iraq war, such as the 3rd Infantry

Division and 1st Marine Expeditionary Force, were not equipped with the most upgraded

armored vehicles in the U.S. inventory. The Army’s most upgraded armored vehicles

belong to the 4th Infantry Division, which was redeployed from the Eastern Mediterranean

to Kuwait while the war was underway and did not participate in combat operations until

the final days of the conflict.

CRS-24

in the Iraq war demonstrated that the United States currently has more than enough

heavily armored combat units to fight future conflicts. They might also argue that

lighter and more mobile units like the planned Stryker Brigades would have been

valuable during the Iraq war in helping the United States establish a more formidable

ground presence in northern Iraq following Turkey’s decision not to allow its

territory to be used as a staging area for U.S. forces. From their perspective, in the

days following the end of major fighting in the war, Stryker vehicles would have

been useful in Iraqi cities for helping to reestablish civil order. The effectiveness of

the M1 tank in combat operations in Baghdad, they could argue, resulted in part from

Baghdad’s broad avenues and sizeable public plazas and other open areas, which

gave the M1s room to maneuver and long lines of sight. Future urban combat

situations, they are likely to maintain, may take place in cities and towns with

narrower roads and shorter lines of sight, which could make M1s less effective and

potentially more vulnerable to enemy attack.

Opponents of the Army’s plan to shift the mix of its forces could argue that the

Iraq war, by demonstrating the continued value of heavy armor in modern combat,

suggests that the United States should think twice about reducing the number of

Army armored units, particularly given the requirement for being able to fight two

regional conflicts in overlapping time frames. They could also argue that Stryker

vehicles would have been vulnerable to some of the weapons that Iraqi forces used

ineffectively against M1 tanks and M2 Bradley fighting vehicles, and that the war

thus demonstrated the inadvisability of shifting the Army toward more lightly

armored combat units. In particular, they might argue that the Army should be

cautious in its planning for the FCS to use situational awareness as compensation for

less armor protection. They may also argue that, although heavily armored units are

more difficult to transport, the United States was able to deploy sufficient numbers

of them to start the war in a reasonable amount of time, and that given the potential

vulnerability to enemy fire of lightly armored vehicles, the need to improve the

Army’s rapid-response capability should be met not by lightening Army forces, but

by investing in improved airlift and sealift capabilities, such as wing-in-ground

aircraft44 and very high-speed sealift ships (see sections on air mobility and sealift).

Combat Aircraft and Precision-Guided Munitions45

Program Issues Going Into the War. The Iraq war occurred as Congress

was considering a number of significant issues relating to programs for combat

aircraft and precision-guided munitions, including the following:

! the degree to which air power can substitute for ground forces in future

conflicts;

! the balance of funding for manned aircraft vs. unmanned air vehicles (UAVs);

! the balance of funding for shorter-ranged tactical aircraft vs. long-ranged

bombers;

Wing-in-ground aircraft are aircraft that fly very close to the surface so as to reduce drag,

increase lift, and thereby transport heavy loads more efficiently.

This section prepared by (name redacted), Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-25

! funding for specific tactical aircraft programs, including the F/A-22 fighter,

the F/A-18E/F strike fighter, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, the V-22 tilt-rotor

aircraft; and the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program;

! funding for specialized combat-support aircraft;

! funding for specific UAV programs, including the Global Hawk and Predator

UAVs; and

! funding for various precision-guided munition programs.

Combat Aircraft Operations in the Iraq War. The Iraq war was the latest

in a series of U.S. military operations dating back to the 1980s where the United

States has thoroughly dominated the air war.46 U.S. and British combat aircraft

played a central role in the Iraq war, as expected, destroying thousands of Iraqi

targets of various kinds. Unlike the 1991 Persian Gulf war, when some Iraqi aircraft

flew against U.S. and coalition aircraft, Iraq in this conflict, with one reported

exception,47 apparently did not put any manned aircraft into the air.48

An Air Force statistical summary of the war states that a total of about 1,801

U.S., British, Australian and Canadian aircraft (excluding U.S. Army helicopters)

were involved in the conflict. These aircraft flew a total of 41,404 sorties (excluding

sorties by special operations and Army helicopters, and “coalition sovereignty

flights”).49 At the height of the war, roughly 1,500 to 2,000 sorties, including roughly

In addition to the Iraq war, the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, and the operation in

Kosovo in 1999, this series includes operations in Bosnia in 1995, the 1991 Persian Gulf

war, the operation in Panama in 1989, strikes against targets in Libya in 1986, and the

operation in Grenada in 1983.

According to one report, “At least two Iraqi ultralight aircraft flew over a patch of desert

Friday [March 28, 2003] where thousands of U.S. soldiers and several command and control

facilities are located.... Both of the small, prop-driven aircraft spotted here evaded a tight

air defense system and flew over an assembly area packed with helicopters, tanks, Bradley

fighting vehicles and other military equipment. They flew off before the anti-aircraft crews

could get permission to shoot them down.... The aircraft were probably being flown by

pilots drawn from one of the paramilitary forces loyal to the Hussein regime, or by Iraqi

special forces, [one officer] said....Although none could be certain, officers here believe this

is the first time an enemy aircraft has flown over American ground forces since the Korean

War. (Naylor, Sean D. Iraqi Ultralights Spotted Over U.S. Troops. ArmyTimes.com, March

29, 2003.)

Various theories have been advanced as to why the Iraqi Air Force did not fly during the

war, including the following: (1) Few Iraqi aircraft were in condition to fly, and rapid U.S.

attacks at the start of the war prevented these aircraft from taking to the air before being

destroyed or pinned down. (2) Iraqi officials decided that attempting to put their aircraft

into the air to contest U.S. and British aircraft would be pointless or was not necessary to

the success of their military strategy, which relied on contesting U.S. and British forces in

cities, in which case it was better to preserve the aircraft for potential post-war use following

the hoped-for defeat of U.S. and British forces. (3) Iraqi officials feared that Iraqi pilots, if

allowed to fly, might in some cases fly their aircraft to Iran (as some did in the 1991 Persian

Gulf war) or turn against their own leaders and attack Iraqi leadership targets.

U.S. Department of Defense. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers.

(Assessment and Analysis Division, USCENTAF, T. Michael Moseley, Lt Gen, USAF

(continued...)

CRS-26

750 to 1,000 strike sorties, were reportedly flown each day. Coalition forces dropped

or fired a total of 29,199 bombs and missiles. Of these, about 19,948, or about 68%,

were precision guided – about the same as the 69%-share in the war in Afghanistan,

and many times higher than the 9%-share in the 1991 Persian Gulf war, but less than

the 90%-share that some observers had predicted prior to the Iraq war. The total of

19,948 precision-guided weapons includes 802 Tomahawk cruise missiles fired by

U.S. Navy surface combatants and submarines.50

Preliminary DoD estimates are that aircraft-delivered precision-guided weapons

found their targets as much as 98% of the time, and that the percentage of Tomahawk

missiles that found their targets might be almost as high.51 Past experience, however,

suggests that as combat records are reviewed in more detail, these percentages may

well be revised downward. The success rate for the Tomahawk missile in the 1991

Persian Gulf war, for example, was reduced significantly after the results of

Tomahawk attacks in that war were reviewed in detail.

As expected, U.S., British, and Australian combat aircraft in the Iraq war

attacked various kinds of targets in Iraq, including leadership targets, command-andcontrol facilities, air-defense systems, and fielded military forces. Perhaps more

surprising to some, fixed-wing aircraft armed with precision-guided weapons proved

useful in providing close air support to U.S. and British ground forces engaged in

urban combat operations.52 Perhaps more than the public realized at the time, U.S.

air power decimated key Iraqi Republican Guard divisions defending the southern

approaches to Baghdad, facilitating the rapid advance to the city by U.S. ground

forces.53 U.S. and British air operations benefitted from networking technology that

permitted information about Iraqi targets to be passed quickly from surveillance

aircraft to strike aircraft.

DoD reports that 7 aircraft – 1 A-10 Warthog attack plane, 4 AH-64 Apache

helicopters, and 2 AH-1W Cobra helicopters – were shot down by Iraqi ground fire.

Another 13 aircraft were lost due to other causes, including 2 fighters (1 U.S. and 1

(...continued)

Commander, April 30, 2003, Unclassified) 16 p.

Operation Iraqi Freedom - By The Numbers, op cit.

See, for example, Capaccio, Tony. Raytheon Tomahawks Miss Few Iraqi Targets, Navy

Says. Bloomberg.com, April 12, 2003; Weisman, Jonathan. Pentagon Says Some Missiles

Strayed. Washington Post, March 30, 2003: 23.

See, for example, Lowe, Christian.

DefenseNews, April 21, 2003: 19.

Urban Combat Role Grows For Airstrikes.

Some air power supporters are concerned that the relatively low amount of wartime

reporting on air operations in the Iraq war compared to the extensive wartime reporting on

ground operations could disadvantage air power programs in post-war deliberations on U.S.

defense programs. (Scott, William B. Out Of Sight. Aviation Week & Space Technology,

April 21, 2003: 24; Cooper, Christopher, and David Cloud. Branches Of U.S. Military Fight

Over Media Attention In Iraq. Wall Street Journal, March 26, 2003.)

CRS-27

British) lost in friendly-fire incidents and several aircraft lost due to accidents.54 The

small number of aircraft lost due to enemy fire was consistent with U.S. experience

in other recent military operations.55

U.S. and British strike operations were supported by a variety of specialized

combat-support aircraft, including Air Force E-3 Airborne Warning and Control

System (AWACS) aircraft, Navy E-2C Airborne Early Warning aircraft (the Navy’s

analogue to the E-3), Air Force E-8 Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance

System (JSTARS) ground-surveillance aircraft, and Navy and Marine Corps EA-6B

radar-jamming aircraft.

The United States used more than 10 kinds of UAVs in the Iraq war,56 compared

with 3 kinds in the war in Afghanistan and a single kind in the 1991 Persian Gulf

war. UAVs proved especially valuable in providing persistent (i.e., round-the-clock)

overhead surveillance of Iraqi forces, something that cannot be done with satellites

and might be too risky to attempt with manned surveillance aircraft. UAVs were

used to draw attention from Iraqi air defense systems, permitting those systems to be

located and attacked. Unmanned combat air vehicles (UCAVs), which are UAVs

armed with weapons, were used to attack targets on the ground.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers, op cit. An Air Force F-15E fighter was

also lost, but whether due to Iraqi ground fire or some other cause is still unknown. It was

also reported that a UH-60 Black Hawk helicopter was possibly lost to enemy fire.

McIntyre, Jamie. U.S. Crew Missing After F-15 Goes Down. CNN.Com, April 17, 2003;

U.S. Army Helicopter Shot Down; 7 Killed, New York Times, April 3, 2003; Sack, Kevin.

Accidents Chief Foe For Allied Aircraft, Los Angeles Times, April 3, 2003.

Despite flying tens of thousands of combat sorties in military operations dating back to the

1980s, U.S. aircraft losses per conflict generally have either been zero or in single digits.

An exception is the 1991 Persian Gulf war, in which 33 coalition aircraft were lost to enemy

fire. No U.S. military aircraft has been shot down by an enemy aircraft since 1991. All

aircraft losses in subsequent conflicts have been to surface-based air defenses. For more

information on losses of U.S. aircraft in recent military operations, see CRS Report

RS21124, Military Suppression of Enemy Air Defenses (SEAD): Assessing Future Needs,

by (name redacted). Washingt

on, 2003. (Updated periodically) 6 p.

Among the types of UAVs used in the Iraq war were the Army’s Hunter, Pointer, and

Shadow, the Air Force’s Global Hawk, Predator, Desert Hawk, and Force Protection

Surveillance System, and the Marine Corps’ Dragon Eye, Pioneer, and Silver Fox. For an

article listing all of these but Desert Hawk and Silver Fox, see Selinger, Marc. U.S. Using

More Than 10 Types of UAVs In Iraq War, Official Says. Aerospace Daily, March 27,

2003. The article said that in addition to the UAV systems it named, “several other small

systems are supporting specialized requirements.” For an article mentioning Desert Hawk,

see Kirsner, Scott. Eye In The Sky. Boston Globe, March 24, 2003: B9. For articles

mentioning Silver Fox, which was originally used to spot whales before starting Navy

exercises, see Brown, Malina. Cohen Expects To Draw Lessons From Iraq on Unmanned

Drones. Inside the Navy, April 21, 2003; Sagara, Eric. New, Tucson-Made Drone Scans

Mideast. Tucson Citizen, April 16, 2003; Morris, Jefferson. Four New Silver Fox UAVs

Deployed For Iraq. Aerospace Daily, April 14, 2003; Brown, Malina. Marines Receive

New Silver Fox UAV For Surveillance Missions In Iraq. Inside the Navy, April 14, 2003.

CRS-28

Potential Program Implications. The Iraq war has potential implications

for several issues relating to the Air Force as a whole, combat and combat-support

aircraft programs, and precision-guided weapon programs.

Size and Structure of the Air Force. The recent war in Iraq has raised

questions regarding whether the U.S. Air Force is appropriately sized and organized

for meeting operational demands. Prior to the terrorist attacks of September 11,

2001, the Air Force deployed approximately 7,000 personnel globally to meet

worldwide commitments. By December 2002, that figure had increased to about

24,000.57 Continued U.S. military operations in Afghanistan, stabilization efforts in

Iraq, anti-terrorism activities in the Horn of Africa and in South East Asia, deterrence

operations in North East Asia, and unforseen disaster relief and humanitarian

assistance scenarios suggest that this deployment level may not subside soon.

In 1999, the Air Force reorganized itself into a service composed of 10

Aerospace Expeditionary Forces (AEFs). The purpose of the reorganization was to

create an organizational structure and rotational deployment schedule that would

permit the Air Force to effectively meet worldwide contingency demands without

placing undue strains on equipment and personnel. Each AEF includes

approximately 175 aircraft and 20,000 people from both the active and reserve

components.58 The 10 AEFs rotate on a 15-month training and deployment cycle,

during which they may be deployed for up to 90 days. The Air Force wants to be

able to deploy an AEF in 48 hours, and up to 5 AEFs within 15 days. Each AEF is

tailored to the regional commander’s needs.

Prior to the Iraq war, signs emerged that the Air Force was being tasked to do

more than its reorganized force structure would easily allow. In February 2002, it

was reported that Air Force leaders had begun making exceptions to the AEF

deployment schedule to meet overseas demands for personnel in certain career fields,

and that as a result some Air Force personnel would have to deploy longer or more

frequently than the AEF standard.59 In September 2002, it was reported that the Air

Force plans to modify the AEF structure by embedding personnel and materiel from

two on-call air wings in the 10 AEFs while expeditionary combat-support assets from

throughout the Air Force are “leveled.”60 In January 2003, the Air Force again made

exceptions to the AEF rotational scheme by deploying indefinitely several aircraft

squadrons of various types (bombers, fighters, helicopters, UAVs) to augment AEFs

Rolfsen, Bruce. Deployment Outlook. Air Force Times, April 28, 2003: 14.

The 10 AEFs, together with two newly created rapid-reaction Aerospace Expeditionary

Wings, form the heart of what Air Force officials now refer to as the Expeditionary Air

Force (EAF). The EAF also includes airlift and aerial refueling aircraft, and so-called highdemand/low-density (HD/LD) forces such as U-2 surveillance aircraft and E-8 Joint

Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance (JSTARS) aircraft.

Dougherty, Tim. Air Force Remains Committed to AEF Rotation Cycles. Air Force Print

News, February 5, 2002.

Elliot, Scott. Major AEF Changes Coming in June.” Air Force Print News, September 23,

2002.

CRS-29

7 and 8, which were deploying to the Persian Gulf.61 Normally, Air Force personnel

are not allowed to serve temporary duty of more than 180 days in one location. In

April 2003, however, Secretary of the Air Force James Roche issued a blanket waiver

authorizing all Air Force personnel supporting contingency operations to exceed

the180 day limit.

What do these recent events suggest for the size and organization of the Air

Force? Should Air Force end strength be increased to more easily satisfy demands

for personnel in certain career fields? If so, what changes, if any, need to be made

to Air Force recruitment, training, and retention programs? Are there alternatives to

increasing Air Force end strength? Could more cooperation with other services help

alleviate this shortfall? Air Force military policemen (MPs), for example, have

reportedly been in high demand. Could increased numbers of Army personnel be

used to help guard Air Force air bases?62

When conceived, the AEF concept was lauded as the key organizational

component to the Air Force’s transformation strategy. Do the recent exceptions to

the AEF rotational schedule suggest that the AEF concept is broken? If so, how

should the AEF concept be modified?

Aircraft Carriers and Sea-Based Aircraft. Five Navy aircraft carriers and

a total of 408 Navy aircraft (almost all of them operating from the carriers) were

involved in the Iraq war. Another 372 Marine Corps aircraft (many operating from

Navy amphibious ships) were also involved. The combined naval (i.e., Navy and

Marine Corps) total of 780 aircraft represented about 43% of the 1,801 aircraft

(excluding Army helicopters) used in the war. Naval aircraft flew 13,893, or about

34%, of the 41,404 sorties (excluding sorties by special operations and Army

helicopters, and “coalition sovereignty flights”) in the war.63 The contribution of

naval aircraft to U.S. air operations in the war in Afghanistan was even more

pronounced. Supporters of aircraft carriers and sea-based aircraft could argue that

the Iraq war, like the war in Afghanistan, demonstrated the value of aircraft carriers

and carrier-based aircraft for conducting U.S. military operations where access to intheater land bases is limited.

Balance of Air and Ground Forces. Some observers argued that a primary

lesson of the U.S. military operation in Kosovo in 1999 was that air power alone

could now be used to defeat U.S. adversaries. They argued that while air power in

previous U.S. military operations had supported ground operations, the U.S.

Chapman, Suzanne. USAF to Exceed AEF Rotations. Air Force Magazine. February

2003: 15.

Some Army MPs are already used for this purpose. See Hafemeister, Rod, and Jim Tice.

Army Guard To Secure Air Force Bases. Army Times, December 30, 2002: 10.

In the 1991 Persian Gulf war, only a small percentage of carrier-based combat aircraft

were equipped to drop precision-guided munitions, and a lack of proper electronic links

forced the air tasking order (ATO) to be sent each day from the land-based air operations

center to the aircraft carrier in physical rather than electronic form. In the Iraq war, in

contrast, all Navy and Marine Corps carrier-based strike fighters were equipped to use

precision-guided weapons, and the ATO could be transmitted to the carriers electronically.

CRS-30

operation in Kosovo had demonstrated that air power by itself could achieve U.S. war

aims.64 Air power advocates argued that the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, which

employed few ground forces relative to air forces, reinforced this argument.

Debate following the Iraq war over the relative value of air power vs. “boots on

the ground” has been muted to date. The prominent use and success of U.S. heavy

ground forces appears to have suppressed arguments from air power advocates that

air power “can do it all.” Even so, analysts may debate the relative contributions of

air operations and operations by U.S. armor and artillery in destroying Iraq’s army.

This debate could influence views on how much air power can or should replace

armor and artillery in future conflicts, and thus views on how much funding to invest

in each area.

Reports suggest that U.S. and British air strikes severely weakened Iraq’s

Republican Guard Divisions – Iraq’s toughest ground forces – making them easy prey

for advancing Army and Marine Corps divisions. Some observers estimate that the

Republican Guard divisions lost half their tanks, armored personnel carriers and

artillery before their first encounter with U.S. ground forces on April 1, 2003.65

Other observers estimate that by April 4, U.S. air power had reduced Republican

Guard Divisions to between 18 and 44 percent of their full strength.66

Other observers, however, caution that the effectiveness of air operations in

destroying Iraqi ground forces is still being assessed. They note that many of the

early assessments of the effectiveness of air operations against Iraqi ground units in

the 1991 Persian Gulf war were later downgraded. Some analysts, for example, now

estimate that coalition aircraft were responsible for only 17 percent of the Iraqi tanks

that were destroyed in the 1991 war.67 These observers also point out that even

though Iraqi ground forces in the Iraq war were destroyed by U.S. and British air

strikes, U.S. Army and Marine Corps forces still encountered stiff resistance from

some Iraqi units.

Armor, artillery, ammunition, and fuel are among the most challenging military

materiel to transport long distances. Some observers argue that if U.S. ground forces

begin relying more on combat aircraft than on armor and artillery, U.S. forces in the

future could be more rapidly deployable and remain just as lethal. Advocates of

shifting to a greater reliance on aircraft note that the Marine Corps fields fewer large

artillery pieces than does the Army, and relies more on Marine Corps combat aircraft

(AV-8B attack planes and F/A-18 strike fighters) for fire support. Those skeptical

of substituting aircraft for Army armor and artillery note that unlike aircraft, the

Other analysts demurred, arguing that the enemy leaders capitulated only when ongoing

air operations were joined by a threat to introduce ground forces, or when it became clear

to the enemy leaders that Russia would not support their effort.

Scarborough, Rowan. Rulers of the Air. Washington Times, April 27, 2003: 1.

Graham, Bradley, and Vernon Loeb. An Air War of Might, Coordination and Risks.

Washington Post, April 27, 2003: 1.

Wheeler, Winslow. Iraq War: Drop the Myths, Learn the Lessons. Defense Week, April

28, 2003.

CRS-31

availability and effectiveness of artillery is not degraded by adverse weather. Recent

combat in the mountains of Afghanistan, they could argue, suggest that ground forces

might have been more effective and might have suffered fewer casualties if they were

supported by artillery rather than solely combat aircraft.

Close Air Support (CAS) vs. Other Missions. The military strategy

pursued in the Iraq war may add fuel to a long-running discussion on the relative

balance, within U.S. air power operations, between close air support (CAS) missions

vs. attacking more strategic targets in attempts to topple enemy governments and

power centers. Was the Iraqi regime toppled by the strategic bombing that destroyed

key regime targets in Baghdad, or because of CAS missions that contributed to the

rapid destruction of Iraqi military forces in the field? Views on this debate could

influence decisions on the kinds of aircraft and associated systems DoD should

acquire in coming years.

Long-Range Bombers.68 Long-range B-1, B-52, and B-2 bombers played

a significant role in the Iraq war, as they did in the war in Afghanistan in 2001-2002.

In both conflicts, relatively small numbers of bombers dropped large numbers of

precision-guided bombs and traditional unguided bombs, destroying many enemy

ground targets,69 and were able to loiter over the battlefield for extended periods of

time, which made them readily available for attacking so-called time-sensitive targets

– targets that emerge suddenly and remain susceptible to attack for only short periods

of time. For example, the B-1 bomber that carried out the April 7, 2003 bombing

attack on a building in Baghdad where Saddam Hussein and his close associates were

thought to be located had been loitering above Iraq waiting for just such an emerging

target, and dropped its bombs just 12 minutes after being given the coordinates.

The performance of long-range bombers in the Iraq war and the war in

Afghanistan may influence a long-simmering the debate on the balance of funding

for bomber programs vs. tactical aircraft. Specific questions relating to this debate

include the following:

For more on long-range bomber programs, see CRS Report RL31544, Long-Range

Bombers: Background and Issues for Congress, by Pierre Bernasconi and (name redac

ted). Washington, 2002. (August 22, 2002) 44 p.

In the Iraq war, for example, Air Force B-1s, reportedly flew only about 2% of total

aircraft sorties, but dropped 50% of all the Joint Direct Attack Munitions (JDAMs) dropped

by aircraft in the war. (Fulghum, David, and Robert Wall. Baghdad Confidential. Aviation

Week & Space Technology, April 28, 2003.) The B-1 bomber was a major contributor to the

U.S.-led war effort in Afghanistan; some observers have called it the “workhorse” of that

conflict. B-1s flew only 5% of all aircraft sorties in the conflict, but accounted for 40% of

the ordnance that was dropped from all aircraft. Observers have also lauded the B-52's

performance in the war in Afghanistan. Operating from Diego Garcia, B-52s were able to

loiter for extended periods over Afghanistan, and dropped many precision-guided weapons

on targets that had been designated by ground forces, destroying Taliban positions and

providing air cover for outnumbered Northern Alliance troops. The fall of Taliban/al Qaeda

forces at the northern Afghan city of Mazar-e Sharif has been attributed by some observers

in large part to the B-52s’ support of pro-U.S. Northern Alliance fighters.

CRS-32

! What is the best mix of long-range bombers and shorter range tactical combat

aircraft?

! Should bombers be emphasized more in the overall structure of the Air Force?

! Is DoD shortchanging bomber modernization to finance its tactical combat

aircraft programs?

! Should planned early retirements of B-1s be slowed, or even reversed?70

! Should the Air Force implement a proposal it is now considering to replace

the engines on its B-52s?

Prior to the Iraq war, bomber supporters argued that programs for modernizing

the bomber force are underfunded relative to tactical aircraft programs in DoD

budgets,71 that DoD’s current plan to retire certain B-1 bombers early is unwise,72 and

that the current DoD plan for developing a next-generation bomber to replace the

aging bombers in the current fleet is not sufficiently aggressive.73 Supporters of

current DoD plans argued that the force-structure and modernization needs of the

bomber force are properly reflected in DoD planning and budgeting.

Bomber supporters could argue that the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan

demonstrated that the value of bombers in combat operations has been significantly

enhanced by the advent of precision-guided weapons. They could also argue that the

two conflicts underscored the value of bombers for reducing the need for in-theater

bases and for maintaining aircraft with precision-guided weapons over the battlefield

for long periods of time. In light of the enhanced role of bombers, they could argue,

DoD should place greater emphasis on bomber programs in its plans and budgets.

Supporters of DoD’s current plans for modernization of the bomber force could

argue the Iraq war and the war in Afghanistan show that the United States has

enough, or more than enough, long-range bombers for fighting regional conflicts,

particularly given how precision-guided weapons have multiplied the number of

targets that each bomber can attack during a single sortie. They could also argue that

the good reviews given to bomber operations in both of these wars shows that these

aircraft are receiving sufficient amounts of modernization funding and that there is

no urgent need to develop and procure a next-generation bomber. Rather than

devoting funding to maintaining a larger bomber force or developing a new bomber

design now, they could argue, the successful use of bombers in Iraq and Afghanistan

shows that funding should instead be used to maintain the readiness of the currently

Many bomber supporters argue that in light of the B-1's contributions in the Iraq war and

the war in Afghanistan, B-1 retirements should be truncated so as to maintain a force of

about 70 B-1s.

For decades, DoD funding levels for tactical combat aircraft have been much greater than

funding levels for bombers. In FY04, for example, DoD is requesting $363.2 million in

bomber funding and $100.3 billion in funding – 276 times as much money – for tactical

aviation programs. (U.S. Department of Defense. Comptroller. Program Acquisition Costs

by Weapon System. Washington, 2003. [Department of Defense Budget for Fiscal Years

2004/2005, February 2003])

In 2001, the Air Force began retiring B-1 bombers, reducing the fleet from 92 aircraft to

60 aircraft.

Current DoD plans don’t call for a new bomber to be fielded until 2037.

CRS-33

planned bomber force and increase its effectiveness by funding additional

improvements to precision-guided weapons and associated targeting systems.

Tactical Fighter Aircraft in General.74 Prior to the Iraq war, proponents

of DoD’s three main tactical aircraft modernization programs – the F/A-22 Raptor,

the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, and F-35 Joint Strike Fighter – have argued that

proceeding with all three programs as currently planned represents the best way to

guarantee continued U.S. air dominance in future conflicts. They have argued that

the successful operations of current U.S. aircraft in recent military operations does

not imply that they would achieve similar success in future conflicts. Air-defense

technology, they have argued, is developing and proliferating rapidly, making

tomorrow’s adversaries potentially more capable than yesterday’s. Stealthy, agile

tactical aircraft with advanced avionics, they have argued, will be required in the

future for successful operations against adversaries armed with highly-capable airdefense systems such as the Russian-built long-range SA-10 and SA-12 surface-to-air

missile systems. The F/A-22, F/A-18E/F, and JSF, they have also argued, will field

flexible technologies that will permit these aircraft to take on new capabilities, if

needed, for responding to changes in the international security environment. For

example, they have argued, if cruise-missile defense becomes a much more

prominent mission for tactical aircraft, these new aircraft will be well suited to

incorporate this mission.

Critics of DoD’s tactical aircraft modernization program have argued that DoD

simply cannot afford to proceed with all three tactical aircraft programs as now

planned, at least not without requiring significant cutbacks in other critical DoD

programs. They have argued that the tremendous success in recent U.S. military

operations of current U.S. aircraft such as the F-15 and F-16 fighter demonstrate that

the margin of U.S. superiority in air operations is so significant that it is likely to last

for some number of years.75 They have also argued that with the growing importance

to U.S. air operations of precision-guided weapons, associated surveillance and

targeting systems, and technologies for networked air operations, investing in new

tactical aircraft designs is now less critical for insuring future success in U.S. air

operations than investing in these other air-related technologies. In optimizing

investments in future air power capability, they have argued, DoD should move away

from its traditional “platform-centric”focus on developing new aircraft designs, and

toward a “system-of-systems” approach that more fully recognizes the importance of

these supporting technologies in contributing to total U.S. air power capability.

F/A-22 Program.76 As the most capable, most expensive, and most air-to-air

oriented aircraft in DoD’s tactical aircraft modernization plan, the F/A-22 has often

been at the center of the debate over the merits of DoD’s tactical aircraft

For more on tactical fighter aircraft programs in general, see CRS Issue Brief IB92115,

Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress, by (name redacted).

Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 15 p.

See, for example, Montgomery, Dave. Critics: Iraq War Shows New Jets Aren’t Needed.

Miami Herald, May 5, 2003.

For more on the F/A-22 program, see CRS Report RL31675, F/A-22 Raptor, by

(name redacted). Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 18 p.

CRS-34

modernization plan. Following the Iraq war, critics of the F/A-22 program could

argue that the degree of U.S. air dominance in the Iraq war and other recent conflicts

demonstrates that the F/A-22 program has become the “Seawolf of the sky” – i.e., a

program, like the Navy’s Seawolf submarine program, that was initiated in the 1980s

with the goal of producing an expensive, high-capability platform for addressing a

projected Soviet military threat that never materialized.77 Successful U.S. air

operations in the Iraq war and previous conflicts, they could argue, demonstrate that

today’s tactical combat aircraft are more than sufficiently effective, and that upgrades

to these aircraft can therefore maintain DoD’s air power dominance until lessexpensive manned aircraft such as the JSF or unmanned combat aerial vehicles

(UCAVs) are fielded. As a result, they could argue, the F/A-22 program can either

be terminated or procurement of the aircraft can be reduced from the currently

planned total of about 276 to a smaller “silver bullet” force of no more than 100

aircraft.

Supporters of procuring 276 or more F/A-22s could argue that the air-to-air

capabilities of Iraq, like those of Afghanistan and enemy Serbian forces operating in

Kosovo, were known to be virtually nonexistent, and that none of these wars

consequently do anything to invalidate the projected future threat for which the F/A22 will be needed – an enemy equipped with modern, highly capable fighters and

surface-to-air missile systems. In addition, F/A-22 supporters could argue, the F-22

was recently redesignated the F/A-22 to reflect the fact that it is no longer a pure airsuperiority fighter, but a rather strike fighter that can also perform valuable air-toground strike missions like those conducted in Iraq, Afghanistan, and Kosovo.78

F/A-18E/F and F-35 (JSF) Programs.79 Some observers, including

Admiral Vernon Clark, the Chief of Naval Operations, argue that the Iraq war, like

the war in Afghanistan, has underscored the need for the Navy to replace its shorterranged F/A-18C/D strike fighters with longer-ranged F/A-18E/F strike fighters and

F-35 Joint Strike Fighters. In both Afghanistan and Iraq, Clark and others have

argued, Navy F/A-18C/Ds performing long-range, long-duration missions (including

missions in which aircraft orbit over target areas while waiting for targets of

The Seawolf-class submarine is a large, powerful attack submarine designed by the Navy

in the 1980s to counter advanced Soviet submarines that were projected to enter service in

the 1990s and beyond. A total procurement of 29 or more Seawolf submarines was

originally planned. In the 1990s, following the end of the Cold War, DoD halted the

Seawolf program after procuring 3 boats and shifted to developing and procuring the

Virginia-class attack submarine, a smaller and less expensive design. For more on the

Seawolf and Virginia-class programs, see CRS Report RL30045, Navy Attack Submarine

Programs: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2000.

(June 1, 2000) 37 p.

For more on debate on the F/A-22 program following the Iraq war, see Kaufman, Gail.

Iraq War Arms Both Sides Of F/A-22 Debate. DefenseNews, April 28, 2003: 13.

For more on the F/A-18E/F and F-35 JSF programs, CRS Reports RL30624, Military

Aircraft, the F/A-18E/F Super Hornet Program: Background and Issues for Congress, by

(name redacted). (Updated periodically) 15 p., and RL30563,

Joint Strike Fighter

(JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues, by (name redacted). (Updated

periodically) 25 p.

CRS-35

opportunity to emerge) required multiple in-flight refuelings per sortie. F/A-18E/Fs

or F-35s, he and others argue, can perform such missions with fewer in-flight

refuelings or none at all, reducing the Navy’s need for aerial refueling, which was in

short supply in the Iraq war. During the Iraq war, the number of strike sorties flown

from carriers was reduced in some instances due to insufficient in-flight refueling

assets. Replacing F/A-18C/Ds with F/A-18E/Fs and F-35s, they now argue, will

reduce the chances of such problems occurring in future operations.

V-22 Tilt-Rotor Aircraft.80 Current DoD plans call for procuring a total of

458 V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, mostly for use by Marine Corps forces as replacement for

aged Marine Corps transport helicopters. Supporters of the V-22, which has

experienced considerable controversy over the years due in part to fatal crashes

during testing, argue that the V-22 offers numerous operational advantages over

helicopters, including a higher cruising speed for transporting Marine personnel and

equipment from ship to operating area.

Supporters of the V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft could argue that in both the Iraq war

and the war in Afghanistan, Marine forces conducted ground combat operations 350

or more miles from shore, and perhaps 450 or more miles away from their Navy

amphibious ships at sea. These are much longer operating distances than Marine

forces have traditionally experienced. V-22 supporters could argue that the Marines’

deep-inland operations in Iraq and Afghanistan could be repeated in future conflicts,

which would underscore the value of replacing the Marine Corp’s aged helicopters

with faster-flying V-22s. V-22 supporters could also argue that difficulties

experienced in the Iraq war with maintaining the readiness of the aged heavy-lift

helicopters underscores the need to proceed with V-22 procurement.

Other observers could argue that although the V-22 can be of value in replacing

aged heavy-lift helicopters and in supporting deep-inland Marine Corps operations,

the Iraq war, like the war in Afghanistan, does nothing to alter the need for the strict

testing program for the V-22 DoD established in the wake of fatal V-22 crashes.

They could argue that although there may be a need, even an urgent need, for the V22, this V-22 program’s past development difficulties resulted in part from efforts to

rush its development. If the V-22 is to serve as an effective replacement for today’s

helicopters, they could argue, the V-22 testing program must continue to proceed as

planned.

Helicopters. The Iraq war is the third consecutive major U.S. military

operation, following the operation in Kosovo in 1999 and the war in Afghanistan in

2001-2002, where helicopter performance was mixed. In Kosovo, the Army was

criticized for not being able to quickly deploy and use Task Force Hawk, a group of

24 AH-64 Apache attack helicopters. Critics emphasized that the task force had

grown into a 5,000-soldier force that required 500 C-17 sorties to deploy, and that the

Army had kept its helicopter operations separate from the daily air tasking order

(ATO) – the document issued each day by the air operations center that coordinated

the operations of most U.S. aircraft. Keeping Army helicopters out of the ATO,

For more on the V-22 program, see CRS Report RL31384, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor

Aircraft, by (name redacted). Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 20 p.

CRS-36

critics argued, made Army helicopter operations in Kosovo less integrated with the

operations of other U.S. forces and thereby reduced helicopter effectiveness.81

In Afghanistan, critics noted a similar lack of coordination between Army

helicopter operations and the operations of other U.S. forces, especially during a

combat operation in March 2002 called Operation Anaconda.82 In addition, the high

elevation of the Afghanistan theater of operations made some helicopter operations

difficult, and U.S. special operations forces experienced a shortfall in MH-47 heavylift helicopters, leading some observers to argue more strenuously in favor of the V22 Osprey as one potential solution to both of these problems.

In the Iraq war, helicopters encountered problems with survivability and

maintainability. With regard to survivability, an attack on a Republican Guard

division by 34 AH-64 helicopters from the Army’s 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment

has been described as a near disaster: Every helicopter was hit by ground fire, one

helicopter was lost, and 27 of the 33 that returned to base were too damaged to fly

again without repair.83 Some observers suggest that, reminiscent of problems with

Army helicopter operations in Kosovo and Afghanistan, an Army failure to

coordinate the Apache attack with supporting Air Force and Navy aircraft operations

may have played a significant role in the poor outcome of this attack.84 By using

different tactics and by more closely integrating their efforts with fixed-wing attack

aircraft and Army artillery, AH-64s from the 101st Air Assault Division conducted

a raid on the city of Karbala four days later with much less damage.85

One traditional role for Army attack helicopters is conducting close air support

– i.e., attacking enemy forces that are directly in contact with, or near contact with,

friendly forces. Early in the Iraq war, attack helicopter pilots complained that they

were being sidelined – that U.S. war planners were relying more on fixed-wing

aircraft (many armed with precision-guided weapons) than on helicopters for

performing close air support missions.86 This perceived preference for fixed-wing

aircraft, if accurate, may have been due in part to concerns regarding helicopter

survivability following results of the attack by the 11th Attack Helicopter Regiment.

Lambeth, Benjamin. Task Force Hawk. Air Force Magazine, February 2002.

Grant, Rebecca. The Clash About CAS. Air Force Magazine, January 2003.

Scarborough, Rowan. Apache Operation a Lesson In Defeat. Washington Times, April

22, 2003. p.1

See, for example, Scarborough, Rowan.

Washington Times, April 22, 2003.: 1.

Apache Operation A Lesson In Defeat.

Atkinson, Rick. A Flotilla of Army Helicopters Joint Attack on Karbala. Washington

Post, March 29, 2003: 23. See also Baumgardner, Neil. Apache Longbow Battalion

Destroyed Two Republican Guard Battalions During OIF. Defense Daily, May 12, 2003:

4; Burger, Kim. US Army Reviews The Way It Operates The Apache. Jane’s Defence

Weekly, May 21, 2003; Sheridan, Mary Beth. Copter Unit Retools Tactics After Fight.

Washington Post, March 26, 2003: 22.

Frank, Thomas. Back-Seat Role for Apaches. Long Island Newsday, April 15, 2003.

CRS-37

With regard to helicopter maintainability, keeping helicopters flying in the harsh

desert conditions of Iraq appears to have been a challenge. Early reports indicate that

many different helicopters, but perhaps especially Marine Corps heavy-lift CH-53Es,

were frequently grounded due to sand-induced engine problems. While some

maintenance difficulties may always be expected for forces operating in the field in

time of war, some observers argue that little improvement in helicopter

maintainability has been made since the 1991 Persian Gulf war, and that the desert

conditions in which these helicopters must operate are well known.87

In light of the mixed results with helicopter operations in Iraq and other recent

operations, there is speculation that DoD may consider the option of placing less

emphasis on helicopters in its plans and budgets. The helicopter program that might

most be affected by this is the Army’s RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program. The

Comanche is a stealthy, armed reconnaissance helicopter that the Army has been

developing for about 20 years, during which time it has been a frequent topic of

debate. In late 2002, DoD restructured the program, reducing the Army’s planned

procurement of the helicopter by about half, from about 1,200 to about 600, and

including in the program a new effort to develop companion UAVs for each

helicopter. These companion UAVs could be used to improve situational awareness

for the crews flying the Comanches, or to attack targets on the ground that might

threaten Comanches.88

Supporters of reducing the planned procurement of Comanche programs further,

or of terminating the program entirely, could argue that the Iraq war demonstrated

that attack helicopters can be significantly vulnerable to ground fire in modern

combat operations, and that missions previously performed by helicopters can now

be performed by higher-flying fixed-wing aircraft armed with precision-guided

munitions.

Supporters of the Comanche program could argue that the problems with

helicopter survivability in the Iraq war reflected incorrect tactics (including lack of

coordination with Air Force and Navy fixed-wing aircraft) rather than inherent

problems with helicopters, and that adjusting tactics produced better results. They

could also argue that the Comanche helicopter, with its stealth features and support

from companion UAVs, will be much more survivable on the modern battlefield than

today’s attack helicopters. Helicopters, they could argue, will retain their

effectiveness relative to fixed-wing aircraft in responding with agility to enemy

maneuvers on the battlefield – something that Iraqi forces did little of in the Iraq war,

but which enemy forces on future conflicts could do significantly.89

Wall, Robert. Woes Encumber Helo Ops. Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 14,

2003. p.75.

For more on the RAH-66 Comanche helicopter program, see CRS Report RS20522, Army

Aviation: The RAH-66 Comanche Helicopter Issue, by (name redacted). Washington,

2003. (Updated periodically) 6 p.

For more on how the Iraq war may affect views on the Comanche helicopter programs and

helicopters in general, see Wall, Robert, and David A. Fulghum. Coming Under Fire.

Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 12, 2003: 63.

CRS-38

Some observers argue that difficulties with helicopter maintenance in the Iraq

war were due in part to the advanced age of the helicopters in question. The Marine

Corps’ heavy-lift helicopters (i.e., its CH-53s and CH-46s) are generally quite old,

in part because acquisition of the V-22 Osprey tilt-rotor aircraft, which is to replace

these helicopters, has been slowed. Following the Iraq war, one potential issue

concerns what contingency plans DoD has in place for modernizing or replacing

existing heavy-lift helicopters if the V-22 program is delayed further or cancelled.

Combat-Support Aircraft.90 The Iraq war highlighted the effectiveness

of specialized combat-support aircraft such as the U-2 surveillance plane and the E-8

Joint Surveillance, Targeting and Reconnaissance System (JSTARS) aircraft. The

JSTARS’ ground-surveillance radar proved particularly useful, in one instance

detecting and tracking Iraqi armored vehicles that were attempting to use a sandstorm

to evade detection by U.S. forces. Specialized combat-support aircraft like the U-2,

the E-8, and the Navy/Marine Corps EA-6B radar-jamming aircraft, however, are

examples of so-called high-demand, low-density (HD/LD) assets – assets that are in

great demand, but which exist in limited numbers. In the wake of the Iraq war,

supporters of combat-support aircraft programs could argue that funding for

modernization and procurement of such aircraft should be increased.

Unmanned Air Vehicles.91 The value of UAVs was highlighted by the war

in Afghanistan, and following that war, unmanned vehicles became a more prominent

element in DoD’s defense transformation plans. Some observers expect that the

successful use of more than 10 kinds of UAVs in the Iraq war will reinforce support

generated by the war in Afghanistan for expanding and accelerating DoD’s UAV

programs.92 UAV programs that might be affected include the Global Hawk and

Predator long-range UAV programs, several programs for developing and procuring

smaller and shorter-ranged UAVs for all the services, and the joint Air Force-Navy

program to develop a high-capability unmanned combat air vehicle (UCAV).

Air-Delivered Precision-Guided Munitions. During the war in

Afghanistan, some observers expressed concern for inventory levels of certain

For more on combat-support aircraft programs, see CRS Reports RL30639, Electronic

Warfare: EA-6B Aircraft Modernization and Related Issues for Congress, by (name redac

ted). Washington, 2001. (Update

d December 3, 2001) 53 p., and RL30841, Airborne

Electronic Warfare: Issues for the 107th Congress, by (name redacted). Washington,

2001. (February 9, 2001) 26 p.

For more on UAV programs, see CRS Report RL31872, Unmanned Aerial Vehicles:

Background and Issues for Congress, by Elizabeth Bone and (name redacted).

Washington, 2003. (April 25, 2003) 48 p.

For examples of articles describing the successful use of UAVs in the Iraq war, including

some concluding that the Iraq war will reinforce support for UAV programs, see , Cantlupe,

Joe. Military Sees Growing Role For Unmanned Planes. San Diego Union-Tribune, April

20, 2003; Brzezinski, Matthew. The Unmanned Army. New York Times Magazine, April

20, 2003; Schmitt, Eric. In The Skies Over Iraq, Silent Observers Become Futuristic

Weapons. New York Times, April 18, 2003; Fulghum, David A. Opening Night In Baghdad.

Aviation Week & Space Technology, April 24, 2003: 24; Schmickle, Sharon. Eye In The

Sky Helps Troops On The Ground. Minneapolis Star Tribune, March 28, 2003.

CRS-39

precision-guided munitions, particularly the relatively new GPS-guided Joint Direct

Attack Munition (JDAM).93 Following the highly successful use of JDAMs and

other precision-guided munitions in the war in Afghanistan, production rates for

these weapons were increased. As a result, U.S. military planners expressed less

concern about the size of the inventory at the start of the Iraq war, and after it was

completed.94 DoD plans to procure large numbers of JDAMs and other precisionguided weapons in coming years, and the success of these weapons in the Iraq war

may reinforce support for funding these plans.

The JDAM currently exists in 2,000-pound and 1,000-pound versions. A 500pound version, now in development, was not available at the time of the Iraq war;

some pilots reportedly believe it would have been useful, particularly for attacking

certain targets while limiting damage to nearby non-targeted structures. The Iraq war

may thus reinforce support for proceeding with development and procurement of the

500-pound version of the weapon.

An even smaller GPS-guided weapon, the 250-pound Small Diameter Bomb

(SDB), is now being developed. Large numbers of SDBs could be carried by strike

aircraft, permitting aircraft to attack even more aim points in a single sortie than is

now possible. Following the Iraq war, supporters of this weapon could argue that it

might prove particularly useful for supporting ground forces in urban combat

operations – a mission for fixed-wing aircraft that was elevated in prominence by the

Iraq war, and one where concern for avoiding damage to civilians and civilian

infrastructure can be paramount.

Prior to the start of the Iraq war, it was well known that the Iraqi regime had

built an elaborate network of bunkers, command centers, living quarters and tunnels

deep under Baghdad. The effectiveness of U.S. attempts to destroy such targets with

“bunker-busting” weapons is not yet known. Post-war analysis of these attacks,

when complete, may influence views on whether to proceed with development of

improved bunker-busting weapons.

Tomahawk Cruise Missile. A total of 802 Tomahawk land- attack missiles

(TLAMs) were used in the Iraq war,95 or more than 40% of the reported pre-war

inventory of 1,890 to 2,000 TLAMs,96 which itself may have been much smaller than

GPS stands for the Global Positioning System, a constellation of satellites that allow

people and weapons equipped with the proper GPS receivers to almost instantly know their

precise geographic location.

See, for example, Butler, Amy. Air Force Chief Says Munition Stockpiles Are Sound.

Inside the Air Force, April 11, 2003.

Operation IRAQI FREEDOM – By The Numbers, op cit.

Pae, Peter. Raytheon’s Task: More Missiles, On The Double. Los Angeles Times, April

3, 2003; Squeo, Anne Marie. Navy’s Tomahawk Arsenal Dwindles. Wall Street Journal,

April 3, 2003; Infield, Tom. Tomahawks Used Heavily In War’s First 12 Days.

Philadelphia Inquirer, April 2, 2003.

CRS-40

called for in DoD plans.97 The most capable version of the Tomahawk in the

inventory is called the Block III. Most of the Tomahawks used in the Iraq war were

likely Block IIIs. Procurement of new Block IIIs ended in FY1999. Procurement of

the next version of the Tomahawk, called the Block IV or the Tactical Tomahawk

(TacTom for short), began in FY2002. Thirty-two Block IVs were procured in

FY2002, and another 167 were procured in FY2003. The missiles take roughly 18

months to build, so the first Block IVs may enter the inventory in 2004.

The FY2004-FY2009 Future Years Defense Plan (FYDP), submitted to

Congress in February 2003, prior to the start of the Iraq war, calls for procuring 267

Block IVs in FY2004, 218 in FY2005, 422 in FY2006, 406 in FY2007, 471 in

FY2008, and 410 in FY2009. Given the large number of Tomahawks used in the

Iraq war, and the currently low remaining inventory of Tomahawks, some observers

have proposed increasing the planned number of Block IVs to be procured in FY2004

and subsequent years, so as to replenish the Tomahawk inventory sooner. To support

this plan, they have proposed increasing the capacity of the Tomahawk production

line from 38 missiles per month (456 missiles per year) to 50 missiles per month (600

per year) or 75 missiles per month (900 missiles per year).98

Special Operations Forces99

SOF Profile Elevated By Afghanistan Operations. The successful use

of significant numbers of SOF personnel in the war in Afghanistan elevated the

profile of special operations forces in U.S. defense planning. Following the war in

Afghanistan, enhancing the capabilities U.S. SOF came to be viewed as a key

element of the administration’s plans for transforming the U.S. military to meet 21stCentury threats. The Administration’s proposed FY2004 defense budget, which was

submitted to Congress in February 2003 (i.e., before the Iraq war) proposes

increasing the number of U.S. SOF personnel (currently about 47,000) by 1,890, and

increasing the non-personnel portion of the SOF budget by 48% over the FY2003

figure. Much of the proposed funding increase will support efforts to modernize the

For a discussion of reported desired and estimated Tomahawk inventory levels, see CRS

Report RS20162, Cruise Missile Inventories and NATO Attacks on Yugoslavia: Background

Information, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 1999. (April 20, 1999) 6 p.

See, for example, Brown, Malina. Raytheon Prepared To Accelerate Tactical Tomahawk

Production. Inside the Navy, April 7, 2003; Pae, Peter. Raytheon’s Task: More Missiles,

On The Double. Los Angeles Times, April 3, 2003; Squeo, Anne Marie. Navy’s Tomahawk

Arsenal Dwindles. Wall Street Journal, April 3, 2003; Raytheon In Talks For Possible

Production Increase. Defense Daily, April 3, 2003; Selinger, Marc. Navy Chief Looking

At Ways To Remedy Tomahawk Shortage. Aerospace Daily, April 2, 2003; Keeter, Hunter.

Clark Calls For Accelerating TLAM Production. Defense Daily, April 2, 2003; Brown,

Malina. Navy Officials Warn Congress Of Urgent Tomahawk Shortfalls. Inside the Navy,

March 31, 2003; Keeter, Hunter. Mullen Argues Against Remanufacturing Tomahawks,

Prefers Block IV. Defense Daily, March 31, 2003;.

This section prepared by Ronald O’Rourke, Specialist in National Defense.

CRS-41

fleet of specialized helicopters and C-130 fixed-wing aircraft that support U.S. SOF

operations.100

SOF in the Iraq War. As many observers had expected, U.S. special

operations forces (SOF), along with British, Australian, and Polish SOF units, played

a significant role in the Iraq war, conducting operations in southern, western, and

northern Iraq, and in and around Baghdad. The total number of U.S. SOF personnel

involved – more than 9,000 or 10,000 personnel from the Army, Navy, and Air

Force, according to press reports – was considerably larger than the 6,000 or so

reportedly used in Afghanistan in 2001-2002, and much larger than the number used

in the 1991 Persian Gulf war.101 Although relatively few details about SOF

operations in the Iraq war have been reported, observers have generally concluded

that SOF operations in the Iraq war, like those in Afghanistan, were highly effective

and made a disproportionately large contribution to the success of the U.S.-led war

effort.102

Potential Program Implications. Some observers believe the successful

use of significant numbers of SOF in the Iraq war will reinforce the support generated

by the war in Afghanistan for increasing the size and budget of U.S. special

100

For more on U.S. special operations forces, see CRS Report RS21048, U.S. Special

Operations Forces (SOF): Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke.

Washington, 2003. (Updated periodically) 6 p.

101

A few U.S. and coalition SOF units, along with some CIA officers, were reportedly

inserted into Iraq in late 2002. Large numbers of additional U.S. and coalition SOF

personnel reportedly were inserted starting a day or two prior to the onset of overt

hostilities. Among other things, U.S. and coalition SOF units reportedly seized airfields and

oil facilities, engaged Iraqi forces in various parts of the country, designated Iraqi targets for

air attack, conducted psychological warfare operations, rescued a U.S. soldier who had been

captured by Iraqi forces, and searched for Iraqi leaders. They reportedly worked with

Kurdish forces and regular U.S. Army units in northern Iraq, and with regular U.S. Army

units in the assault on Baghdad.

102

See, for example, Cuningham, Henry. Special Forces Soldiers Prove They’re Special.

Fayetteville (NC) Observer, May 24, 2003; Muradian, Vago. Allied Special Forces Took

Western Iraq. DefenseNews, May 19, 2003: 1; Robinson, Linda. The Men In The Shadows.

U.S. News & World Report, May 19, 2003; Jehl, Douglas. In Iraq’s Remote Corners, A Few

Americans Seemed ‘10 Feet Tall.’ New York Times, April 18, 2003; Thomas, Evan, and

Martha Brant. The Secret War. Newsweek, April 21, 2003; Robinson, Linda. The Silent

Warriors. U.S. News & World Report, April 14, 2003; Dine, Philip. Covert Ops. St. Louis

Post-Dispatch, April 13, 2003: B1; Landay, Jonathan S. Stealthy Spotters Call In The Air

Strikes. Philadelphia Inquirer, April 9, 2003; Scarborough, Rowan. Special Ops Steal

Show As Successes Mount In Iraq. Washington Times, April 7, 2003; Kelly, Jack. Covert

Troops Fight Shadow War Off-Camera. USA Today, April 7, 2003: 2; Dao, James. Swift

Commando Run In The Night. New York Times, April 7, 2003; Shanker, Thom, and Eric

Schmitt. Covert Units Conduct An Invisible Campaign. New York Times, April 6, 2003;

Dao, James. Hoping To Confuse Iraqis, American Commandos Prepare To Enter Baghdad.

New York Times, April 4, 2003; Graham, Bradley. U.S. Gains Ground In West Of Iraq.

Washington Post, March 28, 2003: 25; Bender, Bryan. 10,000 Special Forces Are Waging

Unseen War. Boston Globe, March 27, 2003: 28; Capaccio, Tony. U.S., Coalition

Commandos Have Wider Role In Conflict. Bloomberg.com, March 26, 2003.

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operations forces.103 Advocates of such increases argue that they are not only

justified by operational experience in Afghanistan and Iraq, but necessary if U.S.

SOF forces are not to be stretched too thin in carrying out their recently expanded

responsibilities for conducting key parts of the U.S. military’s global war on

terrorism.

Some observers, however, caution that the elite nature of special operations

forces could make it difficult to rapidly expand the size of U.S. special operations

forces without eroding their very high selection and training standards. Another

potential concern is that enthusiasm for special operations forces could lead to underinvestment in regular U.S. forces or support for using SOF units to carry out military

operations for which they might not be well suited.

Reserve Forces104

Post-9/11 Reserve Activations. From September 11, 2001, through April

25, 2003, the United States has involuntarily activated more than 286,000 reservists

for federal service to support the ongoing global war on terrorism and more recently

the Iraq war. In addition, at least 47,500 more reservists have been activated in other

statuses – for example, to serve as members of the National Guard under state

control, or as volunteers for active duty. Some reservists who were called up after

September 11, 2001 were released from active duty and returned to civilian life prior

to the start of the Iraq war. At the time of the Iraq war, roughly 220,000 reservists

were on active duty.105

The callup of reservists since September 11, 2001 represents the second-largest

reserve callup since the end of World War II in 1945. Only the Korean War

mobilization of 858,000 reservists in 1950-1953 was larger.106

The post-9/11 reserve mobilization appears to have experienced many fewer

administrative and bureaucratic problems than the somewhat smaller 1990-1991

callup for the 1991 Persian Gulf war, which involved a total of about 265,000 total

reservists. Lessons learned from the 1990-1991 callup, as well from smaller

activations in the 1990s for contingencies in places such as Bosnia, Haiti, and

Kosovo, are likely responsible for these improvements.

103

See, for example, Sherman, Jason, Frank Tiboni, and Gail Kaufman. Rising Profile

Profits U.S. Special Forces. DefenseNews, April 21, 2003: 30; Roosevelt, Ann. Special

Operations Command Seeks Additional Funds. Defense Week, April 78, 2003: 1.

104

This section prepared by (name redacted) , Specialist in National Defense, and (name re

dacted), Analyst in National Defense.

105

DoD states that on March 26, 2003 – 6 days after the start of the Iraq war – a total of

216,811 Reserve and National Guard personnel, including both units and individual

augmentees, were on active duty. By April 16, 2003, toward the end of major combat

operations in the Iraq war, the total number had grown to 223,203 personnel.

106

The U.S. population at the time of the Korean War, moreover, was only about half as

large as it is today, making the impact of the Korean War mobilization on the general

population that much greater.

CRS-43

Potential Program Implications. Although the post-9/11 reserve

mobilization has experienced fewer problems than previous callups, it has also

highlighted, and possibly even exacerbated, two issues regarding reserve force

structure and accessibility which began to emerge during the 1990-1991 callup. One

of these issues concerns the Army National Guard’s combat divisions and separate

brigades; the other concerns reserve recruiting and retention in an era of repeated

callups.

National Guard Combat Divisions And Separate Brigades. The Army

National Guard has 8 combat divisions and 15 “enhanced” separate brigades.107 No

Guard divisions have been called to active duty for an actual or potential foreign

conflict since the 1961 Berlin Crisis, and none of the separate brigades has been

called up for such purposes since the Vietnam War in 1968.

Three Army Guard combat maneuver brigades were mobilized for the 1991

Persian Gulf war. All three were “roundout” units designated to bring parent active

Army divisions to full strength upon mobilization. These three brigades, however,

were not activated until several months after the crisis began with Iraq’s invasion of

Kuwait in August 1990. The two brigades whose parent divisions fought in the war

did not deploy with those divisions; none of the three brigades left the United States;

and the only one to be “validated” as combat-ready was so judged on the date the war

officially ended. The brigades’ experience in the conflict generated much

controversy about the viability of the “roundout” concept and the active Army’s

relationship with the National Guard, in particular engendering great bitterness in

official relations between the Guard and the Army’s senior uniformed leadership.108

None of the Guard divisions and brigades have been activated to serve as whole

divisions and brigades since September 11, 2001. A substantial number of the

combat battalions that make up these divisions and brigades, however, have been

activated since that date, mostly to provide physical security for military installations

(including Air Force bases) in the United States. (A few of the battalions have been

deployed to provide rear-area security in Kuwait and Iraq.)

Given the number of active-duty Army units committed to Iraq and other

locations at the time of the Iraq war, some observers suggested that some Guard

divisions and brigades should be activated to reconstitute a strategic reserve against

possible threats elsewhere, such as the Korean Peninsula. There is no indication,

however, that DoD has contemplated taking such an action. DoD and the

administration have argued that more forces have not been needed. Other observers

107

An Army division normally includes 3 brigades. Most of the Army’s brigades belong to

divisions, but some brigades are separate units that exist independent of the Army’s

divisions. The term “enhanced” denotes brigades that would be “organized and resourced

so that they can be mobilized, trained, and deployed more quickly to the fast-evolving

regional conflicts that we expect in the future.” U.S. Department of Defense. Report on the

Bottom-Up Review [of U.S. defense policy and programs]. Washington, 1993. (Les Aspin,

Secretary of Defense, October 1993) p. 94.

108

See CRS Report 91-763 F, The Army’s Roundout Concept After the Persian Gulf War, by

(name redacted). Washington, 1991. (October 22, 1991)

CRS-44

argue Guard divisions and brigades have not been called up because the senior

uniformed leadership of the Army is anti-National Guard and Secretary of Defense

Rumsfeld is anti-Army in general.

The history of the Army Guard’s combat divisions and separate brigades since

1990 raises the following potential questions for Congress: If these divisions and

brigades are not to be activated under circumstances short of a total national

mobilization – which has not happened since World War II, 60 years ago – of what

use are they in the foreseeable future? If some of the subordinate battalions of the

divisions and brigades are considered useful during less extensive mobilizations, as

their recent activations indicate, then should some or all of the smaller component

units of the divisions and brigades be maintained while the expensive and officerheavy brigade and division headquarters are eliminated? There appears to be a

persistent assumption by senior active Army general officers that Guard combat

brigades and divisions cannot be made combat ready without lengthy postmobilization training. Is this belief supported by solely realistic analysis and

judgment, or is it influenced by organizational and contractual relationships and

loyalties?109

Recruiting and Retention In Era of Repeated Callups. The role of the

reserve components has undergone a dramatic shift since the Cold War effectively

ended with the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. During the Cold War, the reserve

components were primarily a force of last resort and were activated fairly

infrequently – about once every 10 years – in response to a major war or crisis. In

the post-Cold War era, however, they have been activated much more frequently.

Since 1990, there have been 6 involuntary activations of reservists, several of which

are ongoing today.110 For most of these activations, affected reservists have been

required to serve about 6 to 9 months before being released back to their civilian

109

Studies done in the mid-1990s by the Institute for Defense Analyses suggest that National

Guard “heavy” – i.e., armored or mechanized infantry – brigades, with properly structured

pre- and post-mobilization training, can be ready to deploy overseas into combat within 60

days after being called up, and that “light” brigades – i.e., light infantry or airborne brigades

– can be ready in several weeks less. Other studies by the Rand Corporation, however,

assert that such brigades might take between 96 and 154 days to be trained after activation.

The reasons behind this radical difference in the two organizations’ estimated readiness

times remain unclear. See CRS Report 97-719 F, The Army Reserve Components: Strength

and Force Structure Issues, by (name redacted). Washington, 1997. (Updated July 15,

1997) Passim, but especially p. 9-10.

110

Some of these activations have been directly related to war or armed conflict. Examples

include the 1990-1991 callup for the 1991 Persian Gulf war; the mostly low-intensity U.S.

confrontation with Iraq of 1991-2003, which required a reserve callup starting in 1998 to

support both a rapid U.S. deployment of ground troops to Kuwait and the maintenance of

the U.S.-coalition “no-fly zones” over northern and southern Iraq; the global war on

terrorism, which began after September 11, 2001; and the Iraq war. Other activations have

been in support of missions that were primarily peacekeeping and nation-building, such as

the intervention in Haiti (1994-1996) and the ongoing Bosnian peacekeeping mission

(1995-present). The ongoing Kosovo mission (1999-present) has been a combination of

armed conflict and peacekeeping.

CRS-45

lives. Many reserves mobilized after September 11, 2001, however, have been

required to serve on active duty for a year, and some may have to serve for two years.

Callups can pose significant challenges for reservists. Some reservists suffer

mobilization-related financial hardships due to income loss, increased expenses, or

erosion of their professional practices. Others experience family problems due to the

strain of separation from family members. In light of these hardships, there has been

significant concern since at least 1990 that more-frequent and more-lengthy reserve

callups would lead to recruiting and retention problems for the reserve components.

The size and duration of the post-9/11 mobilization has increased those concerns.

To date, the data indicate that reserve recruiting and retention have not suffered

due to increased use of the reserve components. Reserve recruiting in FY 2002 was

very robust, with every reserve component exceeding its recruiting goals, sometimes

by substantial margins. Several scholarly studies have looked at the link between the

mobilization for the 1991 Persian Gulf war and reserve retention.111 These studies

found that the mobilization had no significant impact on reserve retention rates. This

is consistent with studies of active-component personnel, which indicate that,

provided they are well managed and not excessive, deployments do not have a

negative impact on retention – and can even enhance retention by providing

participants with a sense of accomplishment.112

Some of these active-component studies, however, also indicate that beyond a

certain threshold level, deployments can have a negative effect on retention. In light

of this finding, there might be reason to believe that repeated or prolonged

mobilization of reservists might have an adverse affect on reserve retention, and

possibly reserve recruiting as well. Some observers are concerned that, although

reserve recruiting and retention has held up in recent years, the post-9/11

mobilization of reservists might begin have a negative impact on recruiting and

retention, especially if it continues for an extended period of time. If the current

reserve mobilization does at some point begin to erode reserve recruiting and

retention, Congress may examine options for redressing the situation. Potential

questions for Congress under such circumstances could include the following:

Should reserve pay and benefits be increased to maintain the attractiveness of reserve

service? Should active duty and reserve force structure be modified to reduce active

component reliance on the reserves? Could some of the missions currently requiring

reserve component support be scaled back?

111

Kirby, Sheila Nataraj, David W. Grissmer, Stephanie Williamson, and Scott Naftel. Costs

and Benefits of Reserve Participation: New Evidence from the 1992 Reserve Components

Survey, RAND Corporation, 1997; and Kirby, Sheila Nataraj, and Scott Naftel. The Effect

of Mobilization on Retention of Enlisted Reservists After Operation Desert Shield/Storm,

RAND Corporation, 1998.

112

See for example Hosek, James, and Mark Totten. Does Perstempo Hurt Reenlistment?

The Effect of Long or Hostile Perstempo on Reenlistment, RAND Corporation, 1998; Sticha,

Paul, Paul Hogan and Maris Diane. Personnel Tempo: Definition, Measurement, and

Effects on Retention, Readiness and Quality of Life, Army Research Institute, 1999; Francis,

Peter. OPTEMPO and Readiness, Center for Naval Analysis, 1999; and Fricker, Ronald D.

Jr. The Effects of Perstempo on Officer Retention in the U.S. Military, RAND Corporation,

2002.

CRS-46

Network-Centric Warfare113

A Key Element of Defense Transformation. The Iraq war focused

attention on the U.S. military’s increasing ability to gather, share, and analyze

information, and make rapid decisions based on it. Improvements in these areas were

also demonstrated in the war in Afghanistan. These improvements reflect an initial

implementation of the concept of network-centric warfare (NCW), also known as

network-centric operations (NCO). NCW, which is a key element of U.S. plans for

defense transformation, refers to using networking technology – computers, data

links, and networking software – to link U.S. military personnel, ground vehicles,

aircraft, and ships into a series of highly integrated local- and wide-area networks

capable of sharing critical tactical information on a rapid and continuous basis.

Implementing NCW is expected to significantly improve the capability of U.S.

military forces by giving them vastly improved battlespace awareness (i.e., real-time

knowledge of the location and identify of friendly and enemy forces), an ability to

more quickly pass information about enemy targets from surveillance systems to

forces with the right weapons for attacking them (i.e., shortening the “sensor-toshooter” cycle), an ability to quickly make and execute decisions on the battlefield,

and an ability to use widely distributed forces to mass fires on enemy targets. NCW

is also expected to improve pre-conflict planning, including intelligence preparation

of the battlefield. Under NCW, the network elements can become as important to

combat capabilities, if not more important, than the platforms (e.g., tanks, aircraft,

and ships) that they link. Some observers suggest that under NCW, the network itself

becomes a weapon.114

C4ISR Programs for NCW. The concept of network-centric warfare

emerged in the late 1990s, and U.S. military forces are now in the early stages of

developing and acquiring systems for forming various local- and wide-area networks.

Numerous C4ISR115 programs are considered important to achieving NCW.116

113

This section prepared by (name redacted) and Ronald O’Rourke, Specialists in

National Defense.

114

With the advent of network-centric warfare, the traditional (i.e., non-networked) approach

to war – in which individual military platforms operate to a large degree in isolation from

one another – is now referred to as platform-centric warfare. In platform-centric operations,

a force’s total capability frequently is the simple sum, more or less, of the individual

capability of each unit in the force. In network-centric warfare, in contrast, a force’s total

capability can be something much greater – perhaps many times greater – than this simple

sum.

115

C4ISR stands for command and control, communications, computers, intelligence,

surveillance and reconnaissance.

116

Examples of DoD-wide programs for achieving NCW include the Affordable Moving

Surface Target Engagement (AMSTE), Adaptive Joint C4ISR Node (AJCN), and the

Transformational Communications System (TCS). Examples of Army programs for

achieving NCW include the Force XXI Battle Command, Brigade and Below (FBCB2)

system – a digital command and control system for forces in the field; the Tactical Airspace

Integration System (TAIS) – an air traffic control system; the Army Airborne Command and

(continued...)

CRS-47

NCW in the Iraq War. Many observers believe the effectiveness of U.S.

forces in the Iraq war was likely due in significant part to the early stages of NCW

that were implemented in time for the war. A principal case in point concerns U.S.

air operations, which featured rapid transmission of information from sensors to

shooters, particularly for attacking time-sensitive targets. NCW might have figured

even more strongly in the Iraq war had the Army’s 4th Infantry Division – the division

with the highest degree of NCW implementation – played a more significant role in

the war.117

Potential Program Implications. The success of U.S. forces in the Iraq war

may serve to reinforce interest in implementing NCW more fully throughout the

services. This is potentially significant, because investing in NCW might result in

reduced investments in traditional military platforms: C4ISR programs for achieving

NCW require funding that might otherwise go to traditional military platforms, and

the improved force effectiveness generated by NCW may permit military tasks in the

future to be performed by U.S. military forces consisting of fewer numbers of

platforms. Should C4ISR programs for NCW be accelerated or expanded? If so,

which other DoD programs should be reduced to serve as the “bill payers?”

Advocates of NCW could argue that DoD plans and budgets should be adjusted

to place greater emphasis on C4ISR programs and less emphasis on procurement of

traditional combat platforms, because funding invested in C4ISR programs will result

in a greater increase in overall combat capability, dollar per dollar, than funding

invested in traditional military platforms. Supporters of investing in combat

platforms, while acknowledging the importance of NCW and C4ISR programs, could

argue that creating a network requires platforms just as much as it requires systems

to link them, that today’s platforms are aging and growing increasingly expensive to

operate, and that next-generation platforms will be designed to take better advantage

116

(...continued)

Control System (A2C2S) – an airborne command post; the Army Battle Command System

(ABCS) – an overarching command-and-control architecture for Army forces; and the

Objective Force Battle Command System – a planned successor to the ABCS. Examples

of Air Force programs for achieving NCE include the Smart Tanker program, the CAOC-X

(Combined Air Operations Center); and the Advanced Tactical Targeting Technology

(AT3), a joint USAF/DARPA program. Examples of Navy efforts for achieving NCW

include the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC), which provides an improved realtime air-defense picture for Navy ships and aircraft; the Naval Fires Network (NFN), a

system for coordinating information on enemy targets; the IT-21 (Information Technology

for the 21st Century) program for establishing an intranet for transmitting tactical and

administrative data within and between Navy ships; and the ForceNet concept – the Navy’s

overall approach for knitting togther various networks into a grand naval NCW architecture.

(For more on Navy NCW programs, see CRS Report 20557, Navy Network-Centric Warfare

Programs: Key Programs and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington,

2003. [Updated periodically] 6 p.) Taken together, all these examples constitute only a

short, illustrative list of NCW-related C4ISR programs.

117

The 4th Infantry Division was originally scheduled to attack northern Iraq from Turkey but

was redeployed to Kuwait following Turkey’s decision not to grant base-access rights.

Elements of the division did not enter the w

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